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 &&3$&Il lN This week in War in Peace
Until 1950, Korea was little known to the rest of the
world, except as a rugged peninsula in EastAsia..But in
1950, one of the biggestwars in history broke outthere;
the peninsula was brought to the forefront of every-
&mK:$&ffif: one's attention. The Korean War was an enormous
conflict. There were probably over one million deaths
Published weekly by Orbis Publishing Limited in the fighting (calculations are difficult because of the
Orbis House,20-22 Bedfordbury, Lon"don WC2N 4BT lack of accurate figures from the communist side) and
some of the engagements thattook place-the la ndings
Volume 1 lssue 12 at lnchon, the retreat of the US 1st Marines from the
Chosin reservoir, the heroic stand of the Glosters atthe
Editor Consultant Editors
Ashley Brown DrJohn Pimlott lmjin River-stand among the greatfeats of arms of the
Senior Lecturer in the Department of 20th century. This week we look at the beqinnings of
Executive Editors War Studies atthe Royal Military
Sam Elde'r Academy Sandhurst
this conflict, from the sudden invasion oitfre NLrtfr
Adrian Gilbert Korean communists to the enormous risk taken by
Sub-Editors David Floyd
General MacArthur when he ordered amphibious
Sue Leonard Specialist writer on internatronal landings in the dangerous waters of Inchon harbou r.
Simon lnnes politics
Our weapons feature concentrates on the self-
Artwork Editor propelled artillery of the lsraeliArmy, theweaponsthat
Jonathan Beed iditorial Advisory Board
Brigadier-General (Retd) James L.
blasted a way through the Lebanon in 19g2 and are at
Artwork Buyer CollinsJr the heart of the lsreali concept of mobile warfare.
Jean Morley Former Chief of Military History,
US Department of the Army
Picture Editor
Carina Dvorak lan V. Hogg
Authority on smallarms and modern
Piclure Consultant weapons systems
Robert Hunt

Design
Vice-AdmrralSr. Louis Le Bailty KBE CB Next week's issue
Council member of tl'e lnst lute for ll-e
EDC (Patworks) Ltd
Study of Conflict Next week we look at the horrific struggle for the Red
Editorial Secretary River Delta, when massed attacks by the Viet Minh on
Clare Witherden Professor Laurence Martin French positions were met with napalm. The weapons
Vice-Ch ancellor at the U n iversity of
Production Coordinator Newcastfe upon Tyne, and former feature isthe aircraftthat many observers believe isthe
PeterTavlor'Medhu rst Head of the Department of War Studies bestfighter ever built: the F-15 Eagle.
at King's College, University of London

Air Vice-Marshal S.W.B. Menaul CB

CBE DFC AFC
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Acknowledgements
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r1F
lGrea: the beginning
The communists invade the South
The Korean peninsula, which became a battle ground
between the UnitedNationsforces andthe communist
Chinese and North Koreans between 1950 and I 953 .
has a geographical unity that makes it a tragedy that it
was divided at the end of World War II. To the nor1h.
adjoining the Yalu River and Manchuria, are the
mineral resources such as coal, iron, tungsten, cop-
per, graphite and gold, with hydro-electric power for
extraction and smelting. In the south are agricultural
resources - rice and barley. In I 950 , South Korea was
able to export 100,000 tonnes of rice to Japan, and
before parlition, these agricultural products com-
plemented perfectly the coal, timber and electric
power from the north.
-t
The peninsula varies between 145km and 322km Below: The crew of a
(90-200 miles) in width and lrom 845km to 966km halftrack-mou nted 40mm
(525-600 miles) in length. Running the length of the anti-aircraft gun search the
sky for enemy aircraft at the
country is the Taebaek mountain chain which rises to Taegu Air Base in Korea.
2591m (8500 feet). This high ground means that only
20 per cent of the land is arable and 70 per cent of the
people practise intensive cultivation with elaborate
terracing of the mountains. Their origins and reli-
gions are mixed; Confucians, Buddhists. Animists
and Christians make up the population.
The war of 1950-53 dates back io promises of
independence made by the Allied leaders at Cairo and
Potsdam during World War ll. Korea had been occu-
pied by the Japanese since their victor,v in the Rr"rsso-
:!t;]t.,,,..:.,,,,. .,
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;-.:.:::::l::.i:ii,r,:iit I :::
KOREA I95O

Japanese War of I 904. It had been ruled as a colony,

but in 1 942 it was made an integral part of Japan and its The invasion of South Korea
population was conscripted for second-line military 25 June - mid Sept lg50
servlce. '. .:.'
The Allied promises of independence were con- SOVIET ,*'o* i
) i,,,..

fused by a combination of the rapid attack by the

Soviet Union through Manchuria in 19215. and by the
4I ;,' ',*''
!:"-.R
equally fast sur:render of the Japanese fotlowing the J ! .' ;-/.
two atomic bomb attacks on their mainlancl. After I l{'"r

,t';I JAPAN
1

Soviet troops entered norlheni Korea a hunied Allied

agreement on 15 August 1945 established the 38th ,r^n, ft,
degree of latitude as the limit of their advance, and the , ,t ,: ''4
IOR.TH /i
area that would be secured while taking the Japanese no,{Beihtol K
!ei1 f3lvo j
surrender. lj'-
US troops moved into the area south of the 38th
S€UTH
-P"*,tr I .,olillr-""
parallel and both nations took the Japanese surren- 'i
i
YELL_ow
sEl
,,;/,!'
':.;encrtcocrn|
ders. However, following these cerentonies. the I

l-
USSR tookthe 3Sth parallel to be a political boundary J qr'Jo(
"
and it was here that the Iron Curlain t-ell with the onset t"td' '!
of the Cold War. ,' ,..,
Two years passed, with the US atternpting to get ,' ., $lolsan
the problem refened to the newly formed United ,t.--..'PYongYung $ '.
Nations Organisation. The UN undeftook to establish ,Q SEAOFJAPAN
{, I l.s
an independent Korean government after free nation-
wide elections but the Soviet Union refused to cooper-
ate with the arrangements.
On 15 August 1911 the Republic of (South)Korea
was established with Seoul as its capital. The USSR
declared this illegal and then sponsored the Democra-
tic People's Republic ofNorth Korea withPyongyang
as its capital.
The elections that were held in South Korea. under
the auspices of the UN, had produced a right-wing
coalition headed by Syngman Rhec. Though 210
representatives were elected, some 100 seats were
kept vacant for members fiom the Nofih. After the
establishment of the Republic of Korea (ROK), the
US forces withdrew.
To the north, the USSR had streamlined politics
into a classic one-party communist state and in elec-
tions to a Supreme People's Assembly, Kim Il Sung
took office as Premier. Kim had been groomed by thc
Soviet Union over many years and it was said he had
fought for the USSR at Stalingrad in World War II.
The Norrh Korean People's Army (NKPA) had f> NKpAthrusts i)

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received good training from its Soviet advisers and by
1950 was estimated to have some I 35 ,000 troops. It
had eight infantry divisions at full strength and a
further two at half strength with a motorcycle recon-
naissance regiment and an armoured brigade. The
NKPA possessed some 150 Soviet-made T34 tanks
and each division had a towed artiliery regiment
( l22mm howitzers) and a self-propelled gun battalion
(76mm guns). The air force had 180 Russian fighter-
bombers of World War II vintage. In addition to the
regular units, which were given added strength from a
hard core of some 25.000 veterans of the Chinese
communistcampaign in Manchuria, the NKPA could
call on 100.000 trained reservists.
By contrast, the ROK Army was poorly equipped.
Its eight divisions held 100,000 men, but they had
neither medium nor heavy tanks, combat aircraft or
reserves and only a small amount of artillery.
Withdrawal and invasion
In December 1948 Soviet forces left Norlh Kurea.
but this served only to signal a campaign to undermine
the South Korean govemment; cross-border raids,
sabotage and virulent propaganda were all employed.
Then, on 25 June 1950, the NKPA invaded South
Korea. The precise reasoning behind the invasion is
unclear, although almost ceftainly one factor in com-
munist calculations was the lack of interest that the
USA had shown in smaller-scale aggression across
the border.
Seven infantry divisions of the NKPA, with the
tank brigade and supporling troops, crossed the bor-
der. Commanded by Marshal Choe Yong Gun, they
advanced in two columns towards Seoul. An addi-
tional column moved along the eastern coast while
one small unit thrust into an enclave on the western
coast that was south of the 38th parallel. The NKPA
attack came as a complete surprise to the South; there
had been no forewarning and many soldiers were on
weekend leave.
The four South Korean divisions in the path of the
main NKPA attack were scattered and the NKPA
quickly advanced across the Han River and pressed
southwards. The North Korean and Soviet scheme
was to complete the invasion quickly and then present
the world with a fait accompli - their excuse for the
invasion of 25 June was that the ROK forces had
attacked first.
On the day of the invasion, the Security Council of
the UN went into emergency session and ordered the
NKPA to cease its operations. Two days later the US
President, Hary Truman, ordered General Douglas
MacArthur to reporl on the ROK's capability to resist
the invasion and to lend suppofi to the ROK Army
with air and sea forces. MacArthur had at his disposal
the US Seventh Fleet and the Far East Air Force as
well as ground forces in Japan composed of four
understrength divisions with no support arms. Equip-
ment was at two thirds its normal strength.
However, within five days of the invasion, Amer-
ican units began to move to Korea by sea and air. On 4
July an understrength battalion, with an artillery
I
battery in support, commanded by Lieutenant-Col-
onel.Charles B. Smith, tookoverpositions nearOsan.
The day after their arrival they were attacked by an
i;: NKPA division with 30 tanks. Sur:rounded. and de-
I
hr serted by adjoining ROK forces, they fought for seven
hours before breaking out, abandoning their vehicles
and war material.
,
KOREA I95O
General William F. Dean, commanding the US Bottom left: A unit of M26
24th Division, committed his forces as soon as they Pershing heavytanks,
became available. Between 16 and 20 Julyhe heldoff armed with 90mm guns,
prepareto engage enemy
the NKPA advance at Taejon and then, as the North
targets from a hilltop
Koreans assaulted the positions along three axes, he position. Above: Members
took command of the rearguard as the survivors of a South Korean
withdrew. Dean was captured, but his delaying action Community Protective
had allowed the US lst Cavalry Division to arrive Corps; armed onlywith
from Japan, and as the 24th was withdrawn, the 1st sharpened bamboo canes
they pose for a photog raph
Cavalry and 25th Divisions bolstered the ROK de- priorto going on guard
fences and slowed down the NKPA advance. duty. Formed in 1948the
On 7 July 1950 MacArthur was designated the Corps was raised to protect
commander-in-chief of the UN Command. The the local population from
appointment, made by President Truman, was in communist harassment.
response to a UN request for an overall commander
forthe forces in Korea. But by the end of July 1950,
the ROK and US forces had been pushed back to the
small perimeter of Pusan in the southeast comer of
Korea. The US forces, now the Eighth Army com-
manded by Major-General Walton Walker, held a
line along the Naktong River, about l45km (90 miles)
nofih from the sea (the Straits olTsushima), and
thence about 97km (60 miles) towards the Sea of
Japan. Within this perimeter was Pusan. the only
deep-water harbour available.
The ROK now fielded five re-equipped divisions
and covered the north, while the US defended the west
where the main weight of the NKPA attacks were
directed. The US Seventh Fleet not only covered
the sea flanks. but harassed NKPA movements
with naval gunflre and carrier-bome air attacks while
the Far East Air Force, with an Australian group,
attacked NKPA lines of communication and logistic
centres.
Despite the increasing strength of the Uniited Na-
tions Command forces as they continued their milit-
arybuild-up in Korea, it seemed unlikelythatthe units
that had already suffered defeats in the north, at the
hands of the NKPA. could continue to withstand
the relentless assaults of the communist forces. But
the concentration of NKPA units around the Pusan
perimeter had opened the way for MacArthur to
Iaunch an offensive in the communist rear. Pusan had
to hold out in order that the darine landinss at Inchon
couldtakeplace. - WillLmFdwler
23t
I
 TheUS Arm
Postwar planning and new responsibilities
By the end of World War-II the United States had
proven itself to be the most powerful state in the
world, to be in fact the first supetpower. No other
nation could approach it in wealth; and the Amer-
icans, besides possessing the only atomic weapons in
the world, had the largest air force and navy. The
United States Army was not as large in terms of
numbers as the Red Army or the Chinese Army, but
with over 8 million men and 89 divisions it was still a
formidable force. Furthermore there was no doubt
that it was the best equipped in the world; no other
force could match it in mobility and firepower.
This was the more remarkable because in Septem-
ber 1939 the US Army mustered only 210,000 men.
Even in December 1941, when America actually
joined the war, it still possessed just 34 divisions
which, short of every sort of equipment and lacking
trained manpower, really existed in name only. The
speed with which the United States had mobilised and
trained its army was impressive, but this was ex-
ceeded by the haste with which the whole process was
reversed.
Although the United States government had no
intention of returning to its pre-war policy of isola-
tionism, the American public expected their fighting
iu
ffi
?
.l
3r .',;
M{ &,,:;
ffi: ;t
F:,,l rf R'
l'..1:- y;
men to be returned to their families without delay. By
the end of 1 945, less than four months after the end of
the war, the army's manpower had been halved. The
army tried to establish a points system to determine
soldiers' release dates, based on length and type of
senrice. However. when it tried to slow down the
retum oirnen to civilian life, there was apublic outcry
in the United States and 'demonstrations' among
troops stationed in China, the Philippines, Hawaii.
Britain, France, Germany and even California. The
arrny was obliged to release immediately everyone
who had served for more than two years. By July I 946
army strength had fallen to 1,891,01 l, which in-
cluded air force personnel. When manpower linally
stabilised a year later the army numbered only
684,000 ground troops and 306,000 in the Army Air
Force.
About half these troops were serving abroad and
occupation duties were the army's first priority.
American garrisons were maintained in Germany,
Austria, Trieste, Japan and Korea. Germany was
Dismantling the American
divided into four zones of occupation between the war machine: rows and
Americans, British, French and Russians. The com- rows of engineless P-40s,
plete destruction of the Nazi government leftthe parl of a salvage pile of
Allied atmies responsible fbr the disarmament. de- more than 40,000 planes.
il: ld{e
 THE US ARMY

miiitarisation and denazification of Germany.

It soon became clearthat the formerAllies diltered
widely in their policy towards Germany. As the four
powers were unable to agree how torebuild Germany,
and in parlicular what sott of government should be
established, the country drifted into a partition which
was recognised by the establishment of two German
states in 1949. The American garison in Germany
was a rather mixed force. Its only field formation was
the lst Infantry Division, and it included the US
Constabulary, a mobile force with an intemal security
role.
In Austria the problems were rather similar to
Germany and were not solved until the Austrian State
Treaty (May 1955) led to the withdrawal of all
occupation forces. In Trieste the Aliied garrison was
concemed to protect ltaly's claim to the city against
Yugoslavia. In the Far East occupation duties were
made rather easier by the fact that the garisons were
almost entirely American. In Japan there were four
divisions under General Douglas MacArthur, with a The authorities were naturally aware of these prob- Above: 'D'company of the
lems but their efforts to remedy them were hampered Sth Regiment of US
small British Commonwealth force. but the Russians
Marines mountan M26
were not permitted to contribute. Korea was divided by lack ofpublic support and by in-fighting between
tankto spearhead a patrol
into Russian and American spheres and, as in Ger- the services. The atmy had a long-standing ambition in search ofguerrillas
many, this eventually led to the establishment of two to establish a system of universal military training, operating in the east of
states. Soviet and American forces then withdrew in with a comparatively small regular army and a large Korea.
t949. pool of trained manpower to be mobilised in wartime,
Clearly it was impossible that an anny should but such ideas found little suppott in Congress or
suffer such drastic reductions in manpower and that so among the public. The army was the least popular of
much of what remained should be employed on the armed services and public opinion seemed to
occupation duties without military efficiency declin- consider ground troops obsolete in the atomic age.
ing. By the end of 1941 the US Army was only a Congress would not even extend the wartime Selec-
shadow of its former strength; and a shortage of tive Service Act beyond March 1 947, and although a
properly-trained maintenance troops led to a rapid new Selective Service Act was passed in June 1948 it
deterioration in the amy's equipment. only increased the army's strength by 100,000.

I
Ill
l.

I
,,::is'liirl,;;13i.

11
'i,-,ila:ialraryB* l{&694
..:t. :
 THEUS ARMY

In fact the army's scheme did not actually coffes-

p_o1d1o therealities of the late 1940s anyway. As the
Cold War developed it became obvious thatihe army
would need large forces in peacetime in order to meet
its commitments. A trained reservo which could be
mobilised for a total war would have been useful for
the Americans in World Wars I or II, but such a
structure was less useful when it was becoming -l
obvious that the Americans' first priority was to
II
: t-l
prevent a world war from happening. The era of rilr
deterrence and containment demanded large, well- *
trained and well-equipped forces available in peace-
time. Early in 1948 General George Marshall, the
wartime chief of staff whom Truman had made
Secretary of State, warned the National Security
Council that 'we are playing with fire while we have -i ...:.. ..:: -:a....::...:.,:... . --
nothing to put it out'.
ThiS was partly because the armed forces were Above: US Marines in mental combat teams (brigade-sized units) and the
arguing so much among themselves. The National Tientsin, China, on board a European Constabulary. Five divisions served over-
Security Act of 1947 waspassed to establish a nation- street-car, clearing the way
seas, four in Japan and one in Germany. The remain-
al organisation for defence planning, but in many forthe movement of
Japanese civilians, who, ing five were in the General Reserve in the United
ways it only made the situation worse. The airforce at States and consisted of one armoured, two infantry
without the protection of
last achieved full independence from the army, so the troops, ran the risk of and two airbome infantry divisions.
there were now three services Iighting for their share lynchings by the Chinese. This was not an impressive order of battle and only
ofthe defence budget. The air force was arguing for a Below: A Sherman tank of one division, the lst Infantry in Germany, was at
70-group striking force, while the navy was seeking the 1 sth Tank Company.
anything like full strength. The rest hadbeen 'skelero-
funds to build a class of 80,000-ton aircraft carriers. Shermans were easyto
produce in large numbers, nised' as part of the economy measures. Thus each
The army's requirements were easily lost to sight division's three infantry regiments had only two
but were decidedly inferior
during the very public argument between the other to Soviet machines likethe battalions rather than thiee, ind each battalion was
two services. It was not until 1949 that an amendment T34. short of a rifle company. The divisional artillery was
to the National Security Act gave the Secretary of at two-thirds of its required strength and most infantry
State real power to coordinate defence planning'and divisions lacked theirorganic armoured battalion.
brought the services together in one Department of The US Army's tactical doctrine was basically
Defense (which soon became known as the Pentagon, unchanged since 1945. It looked back to the experi-
afterthe building it occupied). ence of the last war rather than tried to foretell the
In 1950 the National Security Council claimed that requirements of a future conflict. It is
the Soviet Union's nuclear therefore not surprising that the army
programme would match was still equipped with the weapons of
America's by 1954. Once a World War II. The Ml rifle and the
nuclear stalemate was reached the
in ground !
Browning Automatic Rifle were the
Soviet Union's superiority standard weapons of the infantry
forces would become increasingly significant squad. Most of the United
The Council argued that the United States should States tank park still con-
build up its conventional forces in order to counter the sisted of Sherman tanks.
Soviet strength. Such a policy could have been the Three new tanks, light,
foundation for a far-reaching reorganisation of the medium and heavy,
army to prepare it for the challenges of the 1950s. were under design
However, although the president supporled the but as a stop-gap it
programme it was not implemented because of the
had been decided
costs involved. to modify some
A survey of the US Army in June 1950 would 2000 M26 Per-
have shown it to be a force reduced bv shing heavy
financial pressures to a strength of59 I ,000
tanks. The
that was organised into three combat
arns - infantry, arrnour and artillery -
and 14 services. These services
were the Adjutant General's
Corps, Army Medical Ser-
vice, Chaplain's Corps,
Chemical Corps, Corps
of Engineers, Finance
Corps. Inspector Gener-
al's Corps, Judge Advo-
cate General's Corps, Mili-
tary Police Corps, Ordnance
Corps, Quartemaster' s Corps,
Signal Corps, Transportation
Corps and Women's Army Corps.
The field army consisted of 10 divisions, 9 regi-

l3+
*
:j new tank, known as the M46 Patton, appeared rn
1948. The pressures of the Korean War ensured that.
in order to save time. the Americans continued to
modify the M46 producing the M47, M48 and
eventually the M60 - rather than design a completely
new vehicle.
When the Norlh Korean Army irossed the 38th
parallel on 25 June 1950, therefore. the American
formations sent to help the South Koreans were World
il War Il units in organisation, tactics and equipment.
However they lacked the combat experience of the
divisions of 1945 and soon experienced difficulties.
The basic Sherman tank was no match for the Rus-
sian-built T34 used by the North Koreans. At first the
American infantry were still equipped with the 7-5mm
rocket launcher which could not penetrate the T34.
even if the over-age rockets worked. With few or no
anti-tank mines and little anti-tank ammunition fbr
the l05mm gun, the Americans were ridiculously
ill-equipped for the army of the world's richest
economy. Furlhermore the skeletonised fbrnrations
proved to be tactically inept. A regimental comman-
der with just two battalions under command could
create a reserve only by comproniising the effective-
ness of his forward troops. Units outside Korea had to
be cannibalised to bring the Korean divisions up to
strength.
But the Korean War did awaken Congress to the
deficiencies of the defence budget, which was in-
creased ovemight from $15 billion to $60 billion. A
programme of universal military training was estab-
lished and the army rose to a strength of 2.834,000
men with 20 divisions in its order of battle. Eight
National Guard divisions were embodied for service.
lnall, eight army divisions were used inKoreaand the
US Army's strength in Germany rose to five divi-
sions. ln Korea the policy was to post men to the
country on a nine-month tour. There were arguments
in favour of this policy of troop rotation, but it did not
make for stability and continuity in combat units. The
huge expansion ofthe army placed a great strain on its
w.: $r
junior leadership. The West Point class of 1950 Above: UN infantry trudge
graduated directly to combat duty in Korea and a high through Norlh Korean hill
proportion became casualties. country. The biting winters
and often diff icu lt terrain
After President Dwight D. Eisenhower came to posed many problems for
power, def'ence expenditure was r)nce again cut, to foreign soldiers. Below:
achieve the 'maximum deterrent at a bearable cost'. American Military Police
In practice this meant greater reliance on nuclear move in fast to disperse a
weapons, not only strategically but on the battlefield crowd of protesters in
as well. As tactical nuclear weapons became tech- Trieste, ltaly.
nically feasible they were welcomed as a way of
saving expensive manpower. It was thought that
smaller. more mobile amroured formations would be
required on the nuclear battlefield, which gave rise to
the 'pentomic' division built around five self-
contained battlegroups. Such a formation was only
really suited to a European battlefield, but the United
States was determined to avoid minor wars else-
where. It was not until the late 1950s that otficers like
Generals Matthew Ridgway and Maxwell Taylor
forced the government to accept that a world role
required tbrces fbr every eventuality. whatever the
cost, and it was only after 1960 that the US Army
began to prepare realistically for limited war roles.
Michael Orr
235
 . -..:.t : .:

E' eaf..-,-Y linsawea\e{enemy ;landingasearlyas2gJune lg50,onlyfourdaysafier

3],9,r.41i.Qfj,O,lr:$qiie.victorious,Com- the Nonh Ko..u, people's army lNffA) had
$rb. V-entagtxo thelimit by advanc- crossed the 38th parattelano stu,t"i it xo."un w*.
S4BqrYlett,v ykilometreofground OnreturningtoTbkyofromKoreahebega,pLunnlng, -ai "
4q,bd.vaneei.nereases the length of the on 4 July, for an amphibious landing oia division

.ryg,:q.'11giathu9 ryke1it evermore lnchon. Th-e, code' ,u; ;;

d ;;
op;;;t,",
i:iegle.1{l.h,the q.my as it advances. The Bluehearts. His inrention was thatrhe tst US'Cavatry
$lldyange Southwardl towards Pusan Division, part of the ganison in Japan and hastily
as the logistic units uroughttowa.rtr.ngln]trrorr;;;;fi;;;;;#il]
,
'.i..l,q,f:fu".li,a^situation
,.*j:.1::t_,t11"1]if troopsprouidedwith
supplies. ..Tlie enthusiasm and dash rhus oisplayeJ uy
MacArthurwas nor, at this stage, topay diviaenos ani
3_+ai!9u,a1d
aEi::r'.TU9'F ..qblem.foi,the
North Koreans was the scarci- his first arrempt to seize the initiative was thwar-ted on
'fo@ '5nd railways in
a,-s Korean peninsula. two grounds. ln the firstplac., ura *oJ i*portantly,
the
i:T,-t1j.':l-*fo:4icatior
routes,there were ran nofih to ttre Nrpa advanced soiast towards the sourhem tip
sotith d9w1 the peninsula and, because of the rugged of the peninsula that the few American
_", -' ,' formationi
l;,: ', "f::TiiXr",:139;,tty^:,llpassedthroughorcloseto available in Japan (and this included 1st Cavatry)
l' , the.cityof Seoul,thecapital. simply had to be used to,"ut. u stand in the south
during his first visit to Korea after the around the harbourof Pusan. Secondly, MacArlhur
:,-rl: .;,.: :: "tlt*dy'
:j1'li.. ri.lt.,!}d SgJised the-significance of the iroblem for the choice, as low tides preclucled any orher day in Juty)
'i..".,':'... r;'i r,'North Koreans. If the enemy lines of communication and this set his stafi' un in.,po*ri6t" task. fo plan'a
,'r,,'r:.,,..'ri' i'i couldbe
..;,i'L1.L,':.,; could fle cut; th€1r
th€ir fighting ta^pability quickly
fightlng capability would quickly
'woulil landing
landing and assemble the necessary men, weapons.
::r:::' :.: : :: : 'di,minish
i:::.rt,,.,",.. 'di'minish and rhethe impetug
impetus of their advance
advance'would aircrafl
aircrafiancl
and ships drvs was
shins in I gR days irrcr.^r
rreq just +;ocihr^
not f.easible.
;.1i .r,1.:,falter' This would talie the pressure off the !\ qnrl OperarionBiuehearts*ur.unf"tt.aon l0Juiybut
':.: : .r:'i 'South Korean forces to the south who were fighting fromthen ^ on MacAr-thu..ua. ..p.uted demands for
,,.,, , .,.',r .,de3p.9rately to bnng the Northern forces to a halt.
- the men and war material he needed in order to mount
'':': :' ' 'WhereMacArthur'sgreatnesscametotheforewas theoperationatalaterdate. TheJointChiefsof Staff
-of
.'.'-t,.,:l-gt in his recognjtion the gains to be had if the
in thb United States conceded tire neea to begin a
': ' 'r,North's communications could be cut. but rather in major mobilisation of ...our.., and promisej, on
.1 '' his determination, against all oclds, to mount an :Jirly,toputaregimentof MarinesatMacArthur,s
' ' 'operation to do the curting.
'''" disposd. Soon afier, on zo luli,, iii.v agreed to send
He made up his mind to iaunch an amphibious twomoreregimentsiomakerliuvr;i".division.

it
t&. .
*::
ir#
*-
#*

r
*'-,r
*-l 7

Above:Whiletanks
engaged targets at long
range, troops such as
these. f iring a bazooka,
were relied upon to
el iminate close-quarter
targets. Below: Holding on
tothe Pusan perimeter, M4
Shermans prepare to
bombard enemy positions.
I '::ri t3i!:i.l;:
... .a-::tJ:..:...: -.
,r#tE 'as
Pusan
The Nor-th Korean People's Army (NKPA) that
pushed the US forces eversouthward.fgpm the 38th
parallel in June 1950 had surprised its opponents
with its combat ability and tactrcs which took the
N KPA troops to within 48km (30 miles) of the porl of
Pusan, rn the far southeast of the peninsula, by the
last week of July 1950
On 1 August, Lieutenant-General Walton Walker,
the gifted commander of the Eighth US Army in
Korea (EUSAK), ordered all forces to withdraw
across the Naktong River to around Pusan. And so
early in August the UN Command forces had been
forced into an area some 130km (80 miles) from
north to south and 80km (50 miles) from east to
west. Ttis was the Dusan perirneter
It was clear to General Douglas MacAnhur that
Pusan was the key to Korea and should be held at all
costs, not necessa r ly as the oase f or reneweo off en-
sives against the NKPA but because the concentra-
tion of N KPA troops in the area would leave the way
open for an amphibrous landing further north. From
24 July 1950 onwards, therefore, reinforcements
began to land at Pusan.
Wlth the arrival of reinforcemenis, Walker drew
up plans for a massed counter-offensrve aimed at
driv ngthe NKPAnorthwards. Butthefirstattemptto
push out, which had begun on 7 August, was rather
unsuccessf ul, and Walker was soon under pressure
from renewed NKPA offensives. To,the west, the
4th Division of the NKPA crossed the Naktong and
took the key terrrtory of the Naktong Bu1ge. Walker
qu ckly moved the Marines into this sector and by 1 8
August had driven the NKPA back across the Nak-
tonq. But at the same time in the north, five NKPA
divisions, with armour, were attempting to break
through in the Taegu area. Once again, by moving
various regiments into the battle area Walker pre-
vented a breakth rough, but only after large-scale tan k
battles, and the pressure in this area remained un-
altered. Then, 19km (12 mlles)west of Pohang-dong,
the N KPA 5th Division pushed southwards and man-
aged to trap the Republic of Korea (ROK) 3rd Division
and cause their immedlate evacuatlon by sea to
Kuryongpo-n - which was not"completed until 17
August. Walker had to regroup the BOK 3rd and
Capitol Divlsions to force the NKPA back north west
of Ponang-dong
Afterthis fallure to smash the perimeterdefences,
the N KPA forward command decided on a strategy
of coordinated offensrves against Walker's forces
:.,
<ffidr
The Pu\ perimeter i
Kumchon Pohang-dong.J -11
.: Yongchon
h\4 pfl.uryongpo-ri
,k*' ..;
t ('i
Kyongju ;
J
and by the begrnning of September was deployrng
some 98,000 ground troops along the front (UN
forces at this time were approximately 180,000) On
the night of 31 August 1950, the NKPA forces laun-
ched a mass offensive against the defenders in the
Masan sector At the same time in the Naktong
Bulge sector two NKPA divisions with armoured
support crossed the river and reached Yongsan late
on 1 September.
By 2 September, both rn the Masan and Bulge
sectors, the perimeter had been breached and by 6
September, Waegwan had been abandoned by the
US forces defending t On thls same day Yongchon
and Pohang-dong had once again been taken by the
N KPA. The situatlon had become almost as bad as it
had been in July. However Waiker, with his skilful
and rapid deployment of troops, forced the NKPA
onto the defensive in all the areas where they had
broken through and thus prevented them from ex-
ploiting their advantages - although as a precaution
he did order EUSAK HO to move to Pusan.
It was now, when it had become clear that Walker
had woo the perimeter battles, that the news of
MacArlhur's plans for lnchon seeped through.
MacArthur was obviously intent on breaking the
Naktong deadlock; and by holding, through his bril-
liant defensive manoeuvres, the Pusan perimeter,
Walker had helped to create the srtuation whereby,
afterthe lnchon landings, the N KPAwould be caught
between the Elghth Army and the newly formed X
Corps. Alexander McNair-Wilson
9;j a
,,*-
..'::€,e,===,
I
 KCREA 1950

The decision to send the 1st Marine Division to the

.Far East may have been taken by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff but the problem of actually finding the men still
remained. Successive cutbacks of QS fbrces since
World War II meant that reservists would have to be
called up. President Hary Truman was persuaded to
sign the necessary papers to mobilise the Marine
Corps Reserve on l9 July; 5000 men were called up
on 20 July and, by 4 August, a further 29,000 men
received their orders to rejoin the colours.
With a major effbrt underway in the United States
to provide the forces fbr the landing at lnchon.
preparations and planning for the operation, now
codenamed Chromite, began with a flurry of activity
at MacArthur's HQ in Japan. The problems to be
overcome seemed at first-sight insurmountable and
an officeron the planning staffsaid later 'we drew up a
Iist of every conceivable natural and geographic
handicap and lnchon had 'em all'. The harbour was
approached by a long narrow seaway called Flying
Fish Channel which followed a twisting course and
thus effectively prevented large ships from getting
close to the port itself. The channel would thus create
major difficulties for an invasion fleet and in pafiicu-
lar the destroyers and cruisers whose task it would be
to provide naval gunlire support for the landing.
Pinpoint navigational accuracy would be vital as the
channel was dotted with rocks. reefs and islands -
many of which were not charted.
The variations in tide were of critical imporlance.
Inchon possesses one of the largest tidal ranges in the
world with the difference between high and low tide
rising periodically up to as much as 1 I m (36 f'eet). The
landing and supporting ships would only be able to
reach lnchon along Flying Fish Channel on the high
tides of 15 September, I 1 October and 3 November. any case, the shipping channel was so namow that Below:The momentof
When the tide fell away, even on those days, any they would not be able to manoeuvre for fear of truth - US Marines, ladders
shipping in the harbour would be stranded on the mud running aground on the adjacent mudbanks. atthe ready, prepareto go
over the top as thei r
flats. With such tidal variations the cunent in the Another factor to be taken into account was the
landing craft reaches the
harbour and channel was extremely swift and mud small island of Wolmi-do which stood just otf Inchon sea wall. The whole
banks were constantly shifted by the force of the harbour and which was linked to the mainland by a operation was so swiftly
water. ln this respect, there was no up-to-date in- causeway. The hills on the island dominated the executed that casualties
formation available for MacArthur' s statf to work on. approaches to the harbour and were keptto a minimum.
The swift ebb and flow of the the harbour iself. which lay Timed almostto
per{ection, beach heads
tide also meant that supponing on the low coastal plain. The
were quickly established
naval ships would be forced to island was known to (above) and men and
dr,'p anchor to maintain their be heavily for- war material were rapidly
'tation whilst carrying out tifisd and it would disgorged onto the lnchon
bombardments in supporl of clearly have to be landing zone.
the landings. This would neutralised betbre
make them sitting targets 'er9:''ltrai! .iia;'gris the main land-
for enemy gunflre from ings took
shore-based artillerv. In place. It was

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Blue Beach Two
'The 3rd Battalion, I st Marines, was assigned to land
over"Blue Beach Two, the rrght flank beach, at
lnchon. 'Beach'was a misnomer: there was a 12-
foot sea-wallwhere we were to land i had Weapons
Company- 30 calibre water-cooled machine guns,
81mm modars, 3.5-inch rocket launchers, back-
packed flamethrowers, and demolrtions. We were
to get over the wall by scaling ladders left in place by
the two assaLlt r'e compat es.
'{ was embarked, along with parl of my company
and the battalion command group, in LST 802, a
well-rusted veteran of World War ll.
'We were Wave 5. Our amphibian tractors
plunged off the bow ramp at 1 630 hours. There was
that dubious moment when you see nothing but
water and you wonder rf your tractor is going to sink
orswim. Then we got clearand I led mywave away.
We had been told that a wave guide would p ck us up
and lead us to the line of departure. No wave guide
-
appeared. Two LCVPs landing craft - did come
alongsrde. The f irst was filled with photographers.
The second was loaded with Korean interpreters.
Two of these were dumped into my LW under the
mistaken notion that I was the battalion commander.
Neither spoke English.
'in the smoke and haze I could see almost nothrng
and was feeling faintly desperate when we came up
on a large grey shape. lt looked like a destroyer that
had been chopped off abaft the bridge so I supposed
it was the Blue Beach control vessel. USS Wantuck
\
Yonqrono-do
'}:- ,-;, , t
l 3rd Battalion
t._- mud banks 5th Marines
{
Flying Fish Channel ..,t" .t
The Inchon 7 -9 fathoms ,.'
Landing r''-
15 Sept 1950
E
r{
KOREA I95O
(APD-l 25). I asked the bridge f or instructions. A Navy
officer wrth a bull-horn pointed out the direction of
Blue Beach Two and we were on ourwayatthough I
could see nothing but mustard-coloured hqie and
black smoke. I broke out my map and askedmy LW
driver if he had a compass. He looked at his instru-
ment panel and said, "Search me; six weeks ago I
was driving a truck in San Francisco". I got out my
lensatic compass and, with no confidence in its
accuracy within a steel hull, made a best guess as to
the azimuth of our approach lane.
'The sea-wall became visible at about 200 yards.
H-hourwas I 730. lt was now about 1750 and neither
the assault platoons nor the first wave armoured
-
amphibian tractors LVT(A)s - were fully ashore.
Smallarms f ire was moderately heavyand there was
the occasronal plop of a morlarshell in the water. I led
Wave 5 in a circle to prevent f urthercongestion at the
sea-wall. Three or four of the LW(A)s crawled up
through a drainage ditch that came down through the
sea-wall. I fol lowed with my wave. We disembarked
from our tractors and found ourselves sandwiched
between the assault and supporl platoons of the lead
rifle companies,
'lt was getting ncreasingly dark, complicating the
business of sortlnq out rndividuals and units. The
companies moved out for their objectives against
light, scattered resistance. By 2030 the battalion had
reached its 0-1 Iine. We dug in for the night and
waited f or the expected cou nterattack. Fortunately it
nevercame.' Brigadier-General Edwin H.
Simmons. USMC (Ret.)
I
KOREA I95O

Problems of command manding general, Oliver P. Smith, was

Command for lnchon had "to
accommodate botn Ar^rerican inter-
service rivalries and lnternational sen-
sibilities. Six countries were contribut-
ing forces, but most of the muscle
was American. A partial solution
canre late in August with the activa-
tion of Joint Task Force Seven under
Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble. Stru-
ble's command was. in fact the US
Seventh Fleet, but designating it a
joint task force brought it under the
immediate control of General Mac-
Arthur as C-in-C, Far East and C-in-C,
UN Command.
The command of the expeditionary
troops was the sticky issue. Mac-
Arthur's own planners had assumed
that command would go to Lieute-
nant-General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr,
US Marine Corps.
US Army doubts of Marine Corps
competence for high command were
endemic, however. Further, the very
name of the 'l st Marine Division com-
a reminder to the army of an un-
pleasantness at Saipan in
f944 when
Lieutenant-General Holland M. ('How-
lin' Mad') Smith, USMC, commanding
V Amphibious Corps, relieved Major-
General Ralph C. Smith, USA, com-
manding 27th lnfantry Div:sion.
How much this might have influ-
enced MacArlhur is not clear and he
decided in favour of an army corps
headquarters. He activated X Corps
on 26 August, giving its command to
Major-General Edward M. Almond.
Almond, aged 57, put off Smith, 56,
at their first meeting by calllng him
'Son' and dismissing the amphibious
assault as'purely mechanical'.
Marine Corps ihagrin at having
Shepherd displaced by Almond was
mollified by having Smith, as Landing
Force Commander, report directly to
Admiral Doyle. the Attack Force Com-
mander, until after the assault phase
was successf ully concluded.
Brigadier-General Edwin H.
Simmons, USMC (Ret.)

also f'eared that Flying Fish Channel and the immedi-
ate approaches to the port might be ntined, which
would add immeasurably to the hazards faced by the
ships associated with the operation. In the event,
some mines had been laid but they caused little
difficulty. A large supply of Russian mines was
stacked on the quay but they still awaited their arming
devices at the time of the landing.
Lastly there were the anxieties concerning the
location and suitability of beaches on wl.rich to make
the landings. In fact, there were no beaches in the
conventional sense of the word. The main assault
would have to go in near the town of lnchon and be
made against rocky sea walls constructed as defences
against an ever encroaching sea. These walls would
have to be scaled by the flrst troops ashore and
breached almost immediately to allow the swift land-
ing of tanks, guns and vehicles. To add to this problem
the so-called beaches led straight from the waterside
into the built-up harbour area oflnchon.
During the preparations for the landing major
eftbrts were made to discover answers to all these
problems causing grave anxiety to the planners. A
need to keep secret the intention to land at Inchon
precluded the possibility of detailed reconnaissance
by air or sea which might have found an answer to
most questions. Instead, more cautious methods had
to be utilised. Some 200 Korean agents were infil-
trated into the area to check on various questions
ranging from strengths and dispositions of the enemy
in the Inchon area to details of the sea walls.
One particularly daring escapade provided much
needed information on the channel leading to the
harbour and the port area itself. On I September a US
naval lieutenant was landed on a small island in the
outer reaches ofthe harbour and, operating from there
using local Korean fishermen sympathetic to the UN
cause, he succeeded in obtaining a great deal ofdata
on enemypositions, tides, mudflats and the seawalls.
His final achievement was to rekindle the ancient
equipment of a lighthouse on Palmi-do island so that it
went into operation on the night the landing fleet
ar:rived and thus helped guide it into Flying Fish
Channel itself.
In order to distract the enemy's attention from the
inevitable activities in the Inchon area many other
raids, bombardments and air and sea reconnaissances
were carried out at other locations both on the west
and east coasts ofthe peninsula. The effort appeared
to have paid off as nothing was done to increase the
garrisons of Seoul or Inchon and it seems highly
probable that the Nofth Koreans were unaware that
Inchon had been chosen until a fewdays before the
operation commenced.
The" detailed planning for Operation Chromite be-
gan on 12 August when the decision was linally taken
to land at Inchon on 15 Septembtr. The task of
planning the operation fell to the Joint Strategic Plans
and Operations Group (JSPOG) of MacArlhur's Far
Eastem Command HQ. A nucleus of officers within
JSPOG was nominated to form the staff of X Corps
which was activated to be the formation to carry out
the landing. The Corps was to be commanded by
Major-General Edward Almond, MacArthur's chief
of staff, and would comprise I st US Marine Division
and 7th US Infantry Division liom the occupation
forces in Japan.
During the final stages ofplanning forthe operation
there were many anxious moments. The offlcers of
JSPOG were continually coming up against seeming-
ly insurmountable stumbling blocks. It was not just
that the conditions for the landing were so hazardous;
there were also problems with regard to gathering
together the necessary men, weapons , vehicles , land-
ing ships and craft. The imperative demands of.the
Pusan perimeter as conditions there worsened caused
many headaches and, even in the last days prior to the
ianding, elements of 7th Infantry Division were.held

210

. ill't -

*---
The push to Seoul afterthe
successful lnchon
initiative. Three US
Marines take cover (top)as
they begin to clear Seoul of
com munist forces. Above :
While a US Marine
searches a captured North
Korean, a soldier of the
South Korean Army
(armedwith a US M1A1
carbine) stands guard.
on call to reinfbrce the troops defending Pusan.
Despite superhuman efforts to gather together the
Marines, the 7th Regiment arrived inJapan only on 17
September (two days after the landing went in) and
initially a regiment of South Korean Marines pro-
vided the divisional reserve for the landing.
The provision of Tank Landing Ships (LSTs) was
another nightmare. It was calculated that 47 were
needed but the US Navy could lay hands on only 17.
In the end, the remaining 30 were provided from
Japan where they had been used as inter-island
ferries. These ships came complete with Japanese
crews, one being commanded by an admiral and two
by captains formerly of the lmperial Japanese Navy.
MacArthur remained doggedly determined despite
the doubts voiced by his staff. Not only was he
assailed from below. but the Joiirt Chiefs of Staff in
Washington also continued to have grave reserva-
tions as to the feasibility of the operation. On 23
August a major conference assembled in Tokyo.
MacArlhur and his senior staff were present but so
were the Chief of the Army Staff, General Lawton
Coilins, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Forest P. Sherman, representing the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. They had flown in specially to find outthe exact
details of the enterprise. The conference began with a
general outline ofthe plans for the landing given by
staff officers: MacArthur, meanwhile, sat quietly
smoking his old com-cob pipe. At the conclusion of
the briefing Collins and Sherman asked various de-
tailed questions and proffered one or two suggestions.
MacArthur then rose to his feet and, speaking for
45 minutes, he outlined his reasons for going fbr the
assault on Inchon. The capture of Seoul would strike a
major blow at the Norlh Korean offensive to the
south, but more important, it would be apsychologic-
al victory of greatmagnitude. He defended the choice
of Inchon despite the seeming difficulties such a
choice invited, by comparing it to the unexpected
KOREA I95O
assault on the Heights of Abraham at Quebec in 1759
by General Wolfe u'hen the impossible nature of the
heights caused the French to ignore them as a likely
route of attack by the British. MacArthur claimed that
the NKPA would view lnchon in the same light.
Coming to the end of his statement he dropped his
voice to barely a u'hisper and concluded: 'We shall
land at Inchon and I shall destroy them'. The room
was wrapped in silence as he finished speaking and it
was clear he had won evervone over. All had been
car:ried along by his confidence and enthusiasm and,
not a little, by his fervent oratory
.
The broad plan envisaged that a battalion landing
team (BLT3) of the 5th Marines would land at Green
Beach on Wolmi-do on the morning trde of 15
September. The remainder of the 5th Marines would
Iand on the evening tide at Red Beach to the norlh-
west of the town itself and, at the same time, the I st
Marinet would land at Biue Beach to the south of the
town.
The first ships en route for Inchon left Japan on 5
September and once the whole fleet was at sea,
Admiral ArthurStruble. the naval commander. num-
bered 260 vessels in his fleet. At one moment, after
the fleet had sailed, it looked as though the whole
operation might be in jeopardy as an unexpected
typhoon swept across the Yellow Sea. The armada
rode out the stom. however, and continued un-
detered nofthwards.
From l0 September air attacks were carried out
against Wolmi-do and Inchon with increasing feroc-
rty and for two days before the landing the .navy
pounded the island of Wolmi-do and the area of Red
and Blue Beaches on the mainland with naval gunflre
supplemented with rockets, napalm and bombs from
carrier-based aircraft. Destroyers sailed close-in to
their targets and brqught a murderous fire to bear on
the enemy's gun emplacements and trenches. At the
same time cruisers, relying on airbome observers.
)lr
r

Top: Armed with a .3in
Browning machine gun, a
soldier of the South Korean
Army keeps a lookout for
any possible communist
attack. Note the tracer
rounds (an aid to
long-range target
acquisition) that occur in
everyfifth round of the
ammunition link-chain.
Above: General MacArthur
(centre), flanked by Colonel
Lewis B. Pullerand
Major-General Oliver P.
Smith, surveys the
battlefield from his hilltop
position, two days afterthe
success ofthe lnchon
landings.
t help to sustain the beachhead against counter-attack
E
r 1')
wrought havoc on targets further inland.
When the ships carrying BLT3 to Wolmi-do sailed
in on the early morning tide of I 5 Septemberthe island
was scarcely visible behind the pall of smoke which
hung over it and the poft to the east. The landing craft
hit Green Beach at 0633 hours and were met with
minimal resistance. The main height of the island was
scaled, the American flag broken there by 0655 hours
and the whoie island taken by 0800 hours. The tide
had already turned as the Marines consoiidated their
positions on the island. They were then effbctively
marooned with no chance of assistance until late
afternoon when the high water would return bringing
with it the main forces for Red and Blue Beaches.
They needn't have worried: the enemy made no
attempt to counter-attack the island and, at 1430
hours, naval gunllre comt.nenced to soften up the
enemy in preparation for the evening landings.
The troops landing at Red Beach reached the shore
aI 1131 hours and after successtully negotiating the
sea wall, with the help of assault ladders, they made
rapid progress into the town against limited and
sporadic resistance. By midnight the 5th Marines had
seized their objectives at Observatory Hill and
Cemetery Hill. Eight LSTs had run ashore and were
disgorging tanks, guns and vehicles which would all
(should it come in the morning) or, better still , be used
to suppoft further advances at daylight.
To the south of the town the I st Marines ianded at
Blue Beach at exactly 1730 hours butthe landing was
not as srnoothly accomplished as that at Red Beach.
Some landing craft ran aground on mud flats 450m
(500 yards) fiom the shore and part of the reserve
battalion landed in the wrong area. All this was, in
part, because ofthe heavy smoke cloud which hung
across the land completely obscuring it from the
approaching landing craft. Navigation was, in such
conditions, a matter of guesswork. Despite this un-
happy stin the lst Mariies hacl achieved their initial
objectives by midnight.
By dawn next morning. l6 September, the Marine
Divisioqwas ready to press on towards its linal goals,
Kimpo airfield and the capital, Seoul. The landings
had been achieved with remarkably t'ew casualties: 20
killed in action, one diedfiom wounds, onemissingin
action and 174 wounded. However. as was soon to be
discovered, the NKPA may have been caught nap-
ping by the landing but they were cerlainly not going
to allow the taking of Seoul to be a walk-over.
The city was garrisoned by some 20,000 NKPA
troops and they withstood successive batterings by
the enormous firepower of the Americans until they
were virtually annihilated. Marines were on the out-
skirts of Seoul by 20 September and it took them,
notwithstanding their firepower, untll 2l September
befbre they could claim the city as theirs. ln the
intervening period the slaughter and destruction had
been tenible.
MacArthur's gamble at lnchon had paid off.
Against all the odds it was a success. Few would have
imagined at the time, as MacArthur added to his
laurels this 'impossible victory' (as it came to be
known), that it would be his last.
s,

lGyWeapons

ffiffiffi&ffituffi ffiffiffiffi

H
 KEYWEAPONS

Since World War II there has been a growing trend
I l
towards self-propelled artillery, a move reflected
ti within the Israeli Army which has produced its own
Ir designs as well as importing SPGs (self-propelled
I
q guns) from France and America. Although more
il expensive than conventional artillery, SPGs possess a
number of advantages that make them an invaluable
element within the IDF (Israeli Defence Force). In the
open tenain of the Arab-Israeli battlefields the ability
of the SPG to carry on firing during counter-
bombardments is of great value, as is its ability tokeep
up with the advanced armoured formations that have
played such a vital role in securing Israel victory over
its Arab opponents.
The first self-propelled artillery to be imported by
Israel came from France in the 1950s. the Mk 6 1 SPG.
which'consisted of a l05mm Model A howitzer
mounted on an AMX-13 light-tank chassis. At the
same time the Israeli arms industry was trying to
develop its own models, the first of these being the
155mm M5[!P howitzer which came into service in
1963 after years of development. Utilising the trusty
Sherman chassis (with its engine moved to the front
right of the vehicle) it canied a French 155mm Model
50 howitzer. Far more powerful than the lightweight
Mk 61, the M50 can lob a 43kg projectile to a
maximum range of 17,000m (18,600yds) - in com- Previous page: US-built
parison to the 16kg and 15,000m of the M61. The M 109A1 SPGs of the lsraeli
armoured sides of the M50 were subsequently mod- Army pound Syrian
ified to give better protection and the powerplant positions during the lsraeli
invasion of Lebanon in
upgraded with the introduction of the 460 horsepower
1982. Below:Aforward
Cummins diesel engine. viewof the mobile M10941
Israeli interest in developing the Sherman as a gun with its 155mm main
platform was extended with the introduction of the armament.

)11
-45
 #*-."
;&
L-33 SPgun/howitzerin 1973. Armed with a 155mm
M68 gun/howitzer, the L-33 soon saw action, playrng
its paft in the Yom Kippur War in October of 1973 . chassis, although other types - such as the M48 or
While powered by the same Cummins engine as the
M50, the L-33 was generally a more advanced de-
sign, capable offaster and more sustained rates offire.
For crew protection a I .62mm machine gun is
mounted on the right-hand side of the L-33's roof and
can be used against ground targets as well as acting in
an anti-aircraft role.
The private arrns company Soltam Limited have
produced a number of designs for the Israeli Army
including a 160mm mortar mounted on a Sherman
chassis. A simple design, cheap to manufacture, this
motorised heavy morlar has a range of 9600km
(10,500yds) and first saw action during the border
fighting of 1968-70. More advanced is the 155mm
4."
Soltam SP gun/howitzer. Unlike previous models this Above: A battery of L-33s
semi-experimental model uses a modified Centurion preparesforaction in
forward positions in the
Sinai Deserlduringthe
M60 - could be employed. The Soltam M68 gun is Yom KippurWar.
fitted and when the longer 39 calibre barel is used the
gun has a range of 23 ,500m (25 , 1 50yds) .
Despite the Israelis' success in devploping their
own models, they have been tbrced to rely on large
numbers of imported SPGs from the United States.
The most important type is the M 109, the most widely
used howitzer in service in the world. Turet-
mounted, the 155mm howitzer is capable of being
traversed through a full 360 degrees and, powered by
a turbocharged diesel engine. it can attain a top speed
of 56km/h (35mph). In Israel this SPG is designated
the Ml09 AL and has been modified to carrv extra
ammunition.
Left: An L-33 on parade in
lsrael. The disti nctive
Sherman hull and chassis
can be easily discerned in
this photograph.
245
 KEY WEAPONS

Two successful lsraeli SPG

KEY ISRAELI SPGs designswerethe M50
(above left) and the Soltam
Mk61 SP Howitzer 160mm mortar (above
Crew5 right). Both models were sls.: @: : ".
."
' ;!P::s .,&':i;S
Weight 1 6,500k9 (36,3951b) skilful adaptations of the P,'

Performance Maximum road speed 60km/h long-serving M4 Sherman. &

#P & ,
(37mph); range (road) 350km (217miles) Oppositetop: An M109
advancesthrough deep $
Armament One 105mm 61-AU howitzer, HE range
15,000m (16,400yds) sa nd i nfront of a pontoon
bridge being towed
M50 SP Howitzer towards the Suez Canal.
Crew 8 Right:Two M10941son
Weight 31,000k9 (68,3431b) artillery exercises in the
Performance Maximum road speed 42kmlh Negev Desert.
(26mph); range (road) 160km (99 miles)
Armament One 155mm 50-BF howitzer, HE range
20,000m (21,87Oyds)

L-33 SP Gun/Howitzer
CrewS | , t:xt i .s .6!!, ,
Weight 41,500kS {91,5001b) ,s: y
Performance Maximum road speed 36km/h #"
l22mphl; range (road)260km (162 miles)
Armament One 155mm Soltam M68
gun/howitzer, HE range 21,000m (22,966yds); one "r xdtu* il,
7.62mm machine gun

M109 SP Howitzer
Crew 6
Wei g ht 23,786k9 152,4401blr
Performance Maximum road speed 56km/h
(35mph); range (road)390km (242 miles) Wi'
Armament One 155mm howitzer, HE range
14,700m (16,080yds); one 0.5in AA machine gun
&ww'_
-w
M107 SP Gun
Crew 5 plus 8 in support
Weight 28,1 68ks (62,1 00lb)
Performance Maximum road speed 56kmi h
':#
(35mph); range (road)725km (450 miles)
ArmamentOne 175mm howitzer, HE range
32,800m {34,996yds) e#etr

M1 10 SP Gun
Crew 5 plus 8 in support
Weight 26,534k9 (58,4801b) 3r
Performance Maximum road speed 56km/h
(35mph); range (roadl 7 25km (450 mites)
Armament One 203mm (Bin) howitzer, HE range
16,800m (18,370yds)
w;: .;6

t+6
 *s;;
:.#.
a is
I
s t"

#
,r
#tr
@' s' d

"fF'
,,ir #,

t rr-d}'i.se$'

11a
 -
"",;utd;,i;

t{i

*
,_u
sr**iP*...*.* @
lJ* $,
In the early 1970s the Ml09 was fitted with an range of 32,700m (35,600yds) but sut-fers according- Top : lsrael's heavy arlillery
improved gun to become the M 109A 1 and a number ly from high barrel wear and is able to fire only HE -a 203mm M110 in action,
were purchased by Israel. The new gun gives a better rounds. The M110 is capable of firing a nurhber of firing on Syrian positions
during the Yom Kippur
range so that when using an HE RAP (high-explosive, ammunition types including tactical nuclear and can
War. Above: Thecrew of
rocket-assisted projectile) a maximum range of fire HE RAP to a maximum range of 29,000m an M1 09 take a rest during
24,000m (26,250yds) is possible. M l09s were much (3 I ,700yds). Unlike the M 109. both M 107 and M I 10 a lull inthefighting onthe
in evidence during the invasion of the Lebanon in are unarrnoured (except for the driver's compart- Golan Heights in 1973.
1 982 ment) and this lack of protection caused a whole Empty ammunition cases
At the heavyweight end of Israel's selt-propelled battery of M107s to be destroyed during fighting are strewn around, an
artillery are the US-built M107 and Ml10 SPGs indication of the intensity
in 1913. Nonetheless these types have proved their of the fighting on this front.
which employ a common chassis and are armed with worth when, for instance, during the Yom Kippur
l75mm and 203mm (Sin) guns respectively. The War M107s on the Golan Heights were able to shell
iong-barrelled high-veiocity Ml07 has an e*cellent Damascus.some 32km (20 miles) distant.

2,+8
 t|ii':l
ata;rl.l:: i:i.arri tiai:rrjr .r;tr'j
a:rl ".-"'
,,.,.r;!ri:t:aiia::ua, ui,::ui :a{!
rl..rr'ii*
ailiit}i; Cyprus (1 955-59) 37,39, 51, Huk revolt, Philippines MacArthur, General Douglas 4,
.iili!:i lr:iL: riiirri ririilii :.:iti]} rlilt]it
iitll: l.lll 1:i:l1t1, .iliir"t 1 56,202 (1946-57)220-22 7 4, 231, 236, 238, 240-42,
rillia,ati: rli:lail'tir:ir )ila::'tat: a,:t; li:la:'a il,tliria :,tar:ri.i,:a llSa;r :t:i$: iutr{l Czechoslovakia. communist Hungary, communist takeover 242
ilit.iiit t.::t:li,Lli itr:'] lliitr: tliilil'li li.l]:iiat arriti.:il L.ia:u :l l:$]it.:i!:r:I takeover 1 10-1 1, 1 13,'169, 111.113 Maclean, Donald 179, 1 81 ,

170 Hungary (1 956) 5, 90 182,182 .r

'r'.rri3::l ir.i rranr.riir.; r: r,l:i.u,i, r,.,!:.irli.i :i:lrr.,rll rallrrrrl.ii . :rriij:r:iirl ait:ri, .:;irrlrii:r ,tl Czechoslovakl4(1 968) 79, 90 Malaya 948-60) 38-39,
(1
69-71 ,71 , 1 56, 1 89-97, 201
lfiri: tr:ltiilt' iirli: lluttit;li ir$ t:iiiia':i li?:lt t:lLit. tili:: il
Manchuria (1 947-18) 1 29-34
Mao Tse-tung 7, 12, 1 2,36-37 ,
80-82, 80, 1 29-31, 1 40, 1 56,
I 191
I
Marder MICV 223-28
iii:la .jial::la :lli:ili:i r:l.iiir l{i!:a, :::ltriiri; r:I.::lia: tlr.rli:r;ll D lnchon landings, Korea ( 1 950) Marshall, General George 1 69,
Dayan, l\/loshe 12, 72 236-42 234
.jle::r :;i.':ri. ,lirll.r*al rll{ili; ,.1i.r:1 Dean, General William F. 231 lndia, partition of 198-99 Marshall Plan 169,174
liliililil atlli
,',r,',,,, ..,,,.,,..,.,: iillaii Disarmamentsee Arms control lndia-China war (1 962) 50-51 Martin, Clifford 31,37, 32
r:utt.':ir ':nril.:, t,:i1,,, ,,,r*,,,,r'a'L iLllllial iiti it* Dong Khe 1 58-62 lndochina (1 945-54) 37-39. Mauser pistoi 7.63mm 42
Dutch forces 21 4-1 7 69-7 1,7 4-79, 1 42. 1 49-53, May, Alan Nunn 1 8'1 , 78 7
ti;ilaillr: :ai:llual'ri ,ilalr jiiall rli:|. 'irr:ll:r,t irliria'r. ::iiji:t :;riu:i
Merkava tank 8
1 58-62
lndonesia (1 945-49) 69-71 ,
Mil Mi-24 Hind helicopter 52.
72-73,214-17 83-88
lraqi {orces 93-95 Milan anti-tank missile 227
lndex Volume 1
E
lrgun 30-35.37. 40
lrish Republican Army (lFtA)36
Minuteman ICBM 13. 7 Z
Morale '13. 139-42
I_ 38 Mosquito aircraft 98
Page numbers in bold refer to main articles; numbers in italics reler
Egyptian forces 93, 95-98, 1 40 lsraeli Air Force 98-99 Mountarn warfare 49-52
to illustrations
Eisenhower, President Dwight lsraeli forces 1 3, 1 4-1 5, 29, Mountbatten, Lord Louls 74
D.235 93-95,93-1 02. 101 -02,243, Mukden, siege of (1947-48)
Pages 1 -28 are lssue 1 , 29-48 lssue 2, 49-68 lssue 3, 69-88 lssue 4,
El Salvador5T 244 131 -33
89- 1 08 lssue 5, 1 09-28 lssue 6, 29-48 lssue T, 1 49-68 lssue 8, 1

1 69-88 Issue 9, 1 89-208 Issue 1 0, 209-28 lssue

'1
1 , 229-48 lssue 1 2
Enfield Individual Weapon 6
Exocet missile 10. 70
Exodus 1 947 32

I
tJ
N
A British forces, in Aden 51, 200,
201 ; in Borneo 202,21 1 , 21 3;
Jerusalem, battle for (1948)
1 00-02 Nato (North Atlantic Treaty
A10 Thunderbolt aircrart 85 in Greece 53-54, 53; in E
I Jungle patrols 1 94-95 Organisation) 6, 1 6-1 7,
Abrams M1 tank 43-48 lndochina 74-79, 76i in 174-75
Aden (1 963-67) 59,200, 201 lndonesia 73, 73,215; in F-4 Phantom ll 3, 163-68, Nicaragua 90-97
Afghanistan (1 979) 8,9, 1 3, MalayaT l, 1 56, 1 89, 1 95, 1 83-88, 203-208 Northern lre and 91, 756
38-39, 49,52,88,90, 1 55 792; in Northern lreland 91; Falkland lslands (1 982) 9, 1 0, North Korean forces 231, 235,
AKM assault rifle 8 see a/so Falkland lsiands, 67-68, 90, 1 40 l5a-J/ t+z
Albania. communist takeover
110
Kenya.
Browning automatic rif le 234
Feinstein, Meir 32
Finlandll0-1
.1,113 K Nuclea'ceter.ence 5-7, 1 3, 1 6,
120-2' 'aa
Algerja (1 954-62) 92, 1 42, 1 57 Browning 0.3in machine gun French forces in Algeria 92, Karen revolt, Burma ( 1 947-55) Nuclear ,r :::: - s 2. 6-7, 1 3, 1 6,
Almond, Major General Edward 89.242 1 42, 1 57 ; ln lndochina 69-71, 21 8-1 9 17 .19. 120-22, ' 55
240 Bulgaria, communist takeover 7 4,76-77. 77, 79, 79, 1 42, Kenya (1 952-60) 52. 1 39. 1 56,
American forces, in Korea 111.113 1 49-53,1 49, 1 51 -53, 158-62, 201
49-50, 231, 2 33, 235-42, 758-59, 767; in lvory Coast King David Hotel incident
236-38,240-41; in Laos 52; (1 946) 31 -32, 34-3s
in Vietnam 51 , 70, 140-42, Fuchs, Klaus 1 81 , 787 Korea (1 950-53) 4, 6, 49-s

o
1 .

57;see also US Army

1 51,140.229-3'l ,233. 235.
AIVX-13 Light tank 244 235,236-42
Angola (1 961 -76) 7, 19,209 Owen machine g"- --:
Arab forces 32, 32, 33, 33,
93-99,96, 101-02,102
Arab-lsraeli Wars (1 948) 1 0,
C tr
93-1 02; (1 956) 1 0; (1 967, C-47 aircraft 60. 98, 173, 173
Six-DayWao 1 0; (1 973, Yom C-54 aircraft 769, 173,173 Gandhi, Mahatma 1 98-99, 799 I
Kippur War) 1 0, 1 41, 245, C-82aidall173 Glubb Pasha (Lieutenant-
l- D
I
245,248,248 Cao Bang (1 950) 1 50, 1 53, General Sir John Bagot 133 S P Oun/Howilzer 245. 245
Arab Legion 93-95, 96, 1 01 -02, 1 58.62 Glubb) 93,95, 1 01 Lawrence, T. E. 36, 36, 37 P-40 aiqaIt232
102 Castro. Fidel 36, 37, 1 56 Gouzenko, lgor 1 77 Latvia, KGB operations in Paice, l\/lervyn 31,37, 32
Arab Liberation Army 93-95 Centurion tank 1 03-08, 1 23-28, Gracey, Major-General (1945-46) 112 Palestine 29-35,40-42
Armscontrol 17, 19 245 Douglas 7 4-77, 7 5, 7 9, 1 50 Lebanese forces 93-94 ,Palestinian Arabs 30, 32-33. 93
AT-2 Swatter missile 84 Ch'en Ch'eng, General 132 Greece (1 944-49), 49-51 , LebanoQ(1 982) 1O-1 1, 1 4-1 5, Palmach 30, 1 02, see aiso
Ch'en Yi, General 135-36, 1 38 53-62 1 9, 1 39, 1 54,243,248 Haganah
Atom bomb 1,4,181-82
Attlee, Clement 200 Chiang Kai-shek, General Gremlin Task Force 78 Leclerc, General Philippe 76, Papagos, General Alexandros
Avco-Lycoming gas turbine 80-82, 1 29-32, 1 35-38 Grivas, Colonel George 37, 156 79, 1 50 60-61
engine 45, 48, 48 China (1 945-49) 50,80-82, Grum man Hawkey e aircr all 1 1 Lee Enfield rifle 6, 6,202, Papandreou, Georgios 53
1 29-38, 1 52-53, 1 55-56 Gsh-23 cannon 84 21 8-1 I Patton tank 235
Chinese forces (communist) Guerrilla warlare 6, 7-8, 13, Lehi (Stern gang) 30-33 Penal battalions, Soviet Army
51 ,80-82,80-81 , 129-38, 36-39, 54, 55-57, 55, 81 -82, Liao Yao-hsiang, General 1 32 117
1 30-32, 1 38, 1 52-53, 1 55-56: 90-91, 141, 152, 155-56, 755 1inPiao131,132,132 Pershing 1a missile 122
(Nationalist) 80-82, 1 29-38, Guevara, Che 36, 37-38 Lin Po-t'ao. General 135-36 Pershing 2 missile '122
1 29, 134-36, 1 52-53, 1 55-56 Gurney, Sir Henry 192 Lonsdale, Gordon 178, 1 79 Pershing tank 230, 233
Chinook helicopter 64 Phantom aircraft see F-4
B Chish 30 see a/so Haganah
Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan, General
Phantom ll
Philby, H A. R. (Kim) 178
B-1 7 Flying Fortress 98, 99 1 35-38 Poland, communist takeover
BalJour Declaration (1917) 29 Choe Yong Gun, Marshal 231 109-11.113
Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania)110-11
Churchill, SirWinston 709, 1.10,
169
H M Polaris ICBM 13
Poseidon ICBIV 122
Barazani, [/1oshe 32 Clay, General Lucius 171 Haganah defence force 29-33, M1 Carbine 792 Potsdam conlerence (1 945) 71
Begin, Menachem 30 ColdWar4, 169,174 40-42 M16 assault rille 90-97 74, 150, 169, 1 71, 229-31
Bell Huey helicopter 50 Collins, General L awlon 24 1 Harrier aircraft 3, 63-68 M41 tank 92 Puller, Colonel Lewis B. 242
Ben-Gurion, David 32, 33 Communist takeover, eastern Harvard aircrart 99 M48 medium tank 235,245 Puma helicopter 64
Berlin blockade (1 948-49) 1 69, Europe t09-113 Hind helicoptersee [/il [/i-24 M50 SP Howitzer 244.246 Pusan perimeter, Korea231.
171-73 Counter-insurgency 1 56-57, Hind M60 7.62mm machine gun 70 236,237,241
Blake, George 1 79, 7 Z9 1 93-95, 209-13 Hiroshima 2, 120-21 , 121 M60 MBT 235, 245
BMP-1 APC86 Cromwelltank 95, 95 Ho Chi Minh 74, 1 49-50, 1 52, M68 Gun/Howitzer 245
Borneo (1 963) 202,21 1 , 21 3 Cruise missile 3, 1 7 t30 M107SPGun246,248 "
Bren gun 40, 1 95, 21 8-1 I Cuba (1 956-59) 52, 1 56 Hotchkiss machin egun 96, 1 62 M109SP Gun243,244,
Bristol Beaufighter 99 Curtiss S82C Helldiver 50, 60, Hsuchow, Huai-hai campaign 245-46,247, 248,248
British Empire 200-202 62 (1 948-49) 1 3s-38 M1 10 SP Gun 246.248.248

I
 R Sherman tank B, 2 I 4,294-35,
Rhodesia 2 7 7
Ridgway, General Matthew 235
Rioting 4
Rolls-Royce Pegasus engine
64
Bomania. communisl takeover
110-11.113
Roosevelt, Franklin D. 109,110
Rosenberg, Ethel and Julius
80, 181
1 Sorge, Flichard 1 78
S SovietArmy
Saigon,74-77,79
Saraphis, General Stephanos
Scobie, Sir Ronald 53
Sea Harrier 67-68, 68; see a/so
Harrier
SeaWolf missile'10, 70
Sel!propelled guns, Israel j
243-48
Selous Scouts. Rhodesia 2 7 7
Shepherd, Lieutenant-General
Lemuel C.240
Sherman, Admiral Forrest p.
241
234, 236-37, 244-45
240-41
Su-1'1 self-propelled gun 1 1 4 U W
Shrllelagh gun launcher svstem Suezcrisis (1 956) 201 -ZO2
United Nations Commandi Walker, MajorGeneral Walton
44 5UKarno /2
Korea231 ,235,236-37 231.237
Smith, Lreutenant-Colonel HMS Superb 76
Urban warfare 89-92 Warsaw Pact 16, 115
Charles B. 231 Surf ace-to-aildnissiles, Soviet.
US Army 232-35, see also Wei Li-huang, General 131 -32,
Smith, Major-General Olive. p. 143-48
American forces 134
242 Syrian forces 93-95, 98
Westerl;ng, Capt ain'T urk' 21 7
SMLE rifle 6
West German Army 224
Soldiers and civilians 154-57
Woodward, SirJ. F. (Sandy) 12,
Soltam 1 60mm m orlar 245, 246
12
Soulh Korean forces231 ,251 ,
236,240-42
Tl
South Vietnames eforces 141
109-.1 1, 1 1 3,
T34185 tank
caq
1 1 4, 1 1 6-1 7, 231,
V VI
1 14-1 7, 1 1 8-1 9: see a/so T55 tank 79 Van Fleet, General James A. 56
Soviet forces Taylor, General Maxwell 235 Vaphiadis, Markos 54, 56-57 Yalta conference (1 94S) I 09,
Sovret{orces 1 7, 1 9, 38, 86, Thompson sub-machine gun Varkiza Agreement (1 945) 109,110
109-1 1, 1 1 3, 1 14-1 7. 1 1 8-1 9 129 53-54
Yom Kippur War ('1 973) see
Soviet soldier 1 18-19 Thor missile 722 V ckers M1 machineoun29.96
Arab-lsraeli Wars
Spies, atom 1 80-82 Titan|CBM 121-22 Viet Cong 156
York aircraft1 73
Spjral missile B4-85 Tornado aircraft 21 -28 V etMinh 37,74-79, 91, 1 42,
Yugoslavia, communist
Spitf;re aircraft 3, 99 Transjordan forces 93 150-53,158-62, 760-62
takeover 1 1 0
Spyrng and inteliiqence 176-82 Truman, Harry S. 1 69, 1 71, Vietnam 4, 38, 50. 51-52,
-
SS-20 m ssile 16 174,231,238 69-7 1. 72, 89, 90-92. 90-92,
Stalln, Josef 1 09-t 0, 709, 1 i 5, Truman Doctrine 55, 1 69, 17 4 1 40-42. 1 57 . 1A3-88, 1 91 ,
117,'169,171,173 Tu Yu-ming, General 132,
Sten sub-rnachin e gun 40,40, a
41,218-19
I J/-Jd
Type 89 tank ZZ
Vo Nguyen ciap 25,
1 52-53. 1 56
1 50. L
Struble. Admiral Arthur D fype94lank77 Vulcan aircraft 5 Zachariadrs. Nikos 54. 56. 62

&