United States v.

Causby

United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256

(1946), was a landmark United States
Supreme Court decision related to
ownership of airspace above private
property. The United States government
claimed a public right to fly over Thomas
Lee Causby's farm located near an airport
in Greensboro, North Carolina. Causby
argued that the government's low-altitude
flights entitled him to just compensation
under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.[2]
 United States v. Causby

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued May 1, 1946

Decided May 27, 1946

Full case name United States v.

Causby[1]

Citations 328 U.S. 256 (https://

supreme.justia.com/u
s/328/256/case.htm
l) (more)
66 S. Ct. 1062; 90 L.
Ed. 1206
Case history

Prior 104 Ct. Cls. 342, 60 F.

Supp. 751, reversed
and remanded.
 Holding

'a landowner's domain includes the lower

altitude airspace, but that property does not
extend "ad coelum" (indefinitely upward).
Court membership

Chief Justice
vacant
Associate Justices
Hugo Black · Stanley F. Reed
Felix Frankfurter · William O. Douglas
Frank Murphy · Robert H. Jackson
Wiley B. Rutledge · Harold H. Burton
Case opinions

Majority Douglas, joined by

Reed, Frankfurter,
Murphy, Rutledge
Dissent Black, Burton
Jackson took no part in the consideration or
 decision of the case

The Court held that a taking had occurred,

but nullified the common law doctrine that
ownership of property extended
indefinitely upward. The court also
affirmed that navigable airspace was
public domain and held that flights which
are so low and frequent as to be a direct
and immediate interference with the
enjoyment and use of real property
constitute a taking. Much of the holding
has been superseded by more recent
cases and changes in the regulations
relied upon.[3]
Background

Thomas Lee Causby was a land owner

less than a half mile from the end of the
runway of Lindley Field, an airstrip in
Greensboro, North Carolina.[4] During
World War II, the United States military
flew planes into the airstrip and as low as
83 feet (25 m) above Causby's Farm[4]
thereby interfering with the productive use
of the Causby farm. Vibrations and sounds
caused by the aircraft prevented use of
property as a chicken farm, killing more
than 150 chickens.
The Court of Claims ruled that a land
owner's domain includes the airspace
above it, and ruled that Causby was
entitled to just compensation for the
government having 'Taken' his property by
conducting overflights through the
airspace above his property.

The United States appealed this ruling

against them, and the Supreme Court
agreed to review the case, regarding the
contradiction between the common laws
of property ownership (without any height
limit) against the assertion of a federal
claim that flights are made within the
navigable airspace without any physical
invasion of the property of the landowners,
there has been no taking of property.

Holding

The Court recognized that a claim of

property ownership indefinitely upward
"has no place in the modern world."[5]: 260
effectively nullifying the common law ad
coelum doctrine.

The Court affirmed the right to of transit

through navigable airspace:[5]: 260–261 266

"The air above the minimum

safe altitude of flight prescribed
 by the Civil Aeronautics
Authority is a public highway
and part of the public domain,
as declared by Congress in the
Air Commerce Act of 1926, as
amended by the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938."

However, the Court held that the flights

occurred outside of navigable
airspace:[5]: 264

"the flights in question were not

within the navigable airspace
which Congress placed within
 the public domain. If any
airspace needed for landing or
taking off were included, flights
which were so close to the land
as to render it uninhabitable
would be immune. But the
United States concedes, as we
have said, that, in that event,
there would be a taking."

Ultimately the Court agreed with the Court

of Claims and held that a taking had
occurred because flight occurred outside
of navigable airspace :[5]: 267
 "there was a diminution in value
of the property, and that the
frequent, low-level flights were
the direct and immediate cause.
We agree with the Court of
Claims that a servitude has been
imposed upon the land."

This meant that the government

conducting such low-level flights
constituted a "taking" of Causby's property,
and under the Constitution's takings
clause, he was owed compensation.

On remand, the Court of Claims was

tasked with defining the value of the
"property interests" that had been taken
from Causby by flyovers. Because the
lowest plane flew at 83 feet (25 m), the
tallest object on Causby's land was 65 feet
(20 m) tall, and flights 300 feet (91 m)
above the tallest terrain were considered
within the public easement declared by
Congress, the Court needed to determine
the value owed the farmer for public use of
his airspace between 83 and 365 feet (25
and 111 m). The Court of Claims did not
need to compensate the farmer for use
below 83 feet (25 m), because the planes
did not fly below that height.[5]
Compensation was owed based on the
occupancy of the property, and not
damage to chickens.

Dissent

Justice Black, joined by Justice Burton,

dissented with the decision.[6] Black wrote
that the majority opinion created:

... "an opening wedge for an

unwarranted judicial interference with
the power of Congress to develop
solutions for new and vital national
problems."

The minority opinion was predicated on

interference with private property being
resolved at the State Court level through
tort law, rather than in a federal court with
constitutional jurisdiction. However, the
U.S. government filed its appeal based
upon an assertion of ownership to low
altitude airspace, which the court roundly
rejected, and as a case filed by the federal
government it automatically became a
federal court issue.[6]

The dissenting opinion would have forced

the issue of compensation into State
court. The principle on which the dissent
was based was later rejected in a 1962
ruling[7] that established that all federal
"takings" claims need to be litigated in a
federal court with jurisdiction over U.S.
Constitutional issues.

Changes to reliance and

precedent

In determining that the flights had

occurred outside of "navigable airspace",
the Court relied on the definition of
navigable airspace to reach a decision. At
the time, this was defined as "airspace
above the minimum safe altitudes of flight
prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics
Authority." However, shortly after this
decision, Congress redefined navigable
airspace to include "airspace needed to
ensure safety in the takeoff and landing of
aircraft."[8]

Currently, some aircraft, such as

helicopters, balloons, and ultralights have
no minimum safe altitudes.[9]

The question of whether takings can occur

within navigable airspace has been
addressed in later cases, most notably in
Griggs v. County of Allegheny and Branning
v. United States. The former case held that
aircraft noise from operations within
navigable airspace did amount to a
taking.[3]
See also

Air rights
Cuius est solum, eius est usque ad
coelum et ad inferos

Energy law
List of notable United States Supreme
Court cases
List of United States Supreme Court
cases, volume 328
Property law
Takings clause

References
1. 328 U.S. 256 (https://supreme.justia.com/c
ases/federal/us/328/256/) (1946)

2. Huebert, Jacob H. (2011-04-18) Who Owns

the Sky? (http://mises.org/daily/5205/Who-
Owns-the-Sky) , Mises Institute

3. "Branning v. United States, 654 F.2d 88

(Fed. Cir. 1981)" (https://casetext.com/cas
e/branning-v-united-states-2) .

4. Nagy, John A. "Airport Noise Issue Not

New: Chicken Farm Case Set Legal
Precedent in 1946 Court Ruling".
Greensboro News and Record (Greensboro,
North Carolina). October 10, 1998.

5. "Causby v U.S." (https://scholar.google.co

m/scholar_case?case=184178309114493
45480) 1948. 75 F.262 Ct.Cl. – via Google
Scholar.
 6. "High court upholds award against low-
flying planes". The Baltimore Sun.
Associated Press. May 28, 1946. p. 1.

7. U.S. Supreme Court (1962). Griggs v.

Allegheny. 369 US 84.

8. "49 USC § 40102(a)(32)" (https://www.law.c

ornell.edu/uscode/text/49/40102#a_32) .

9. "Minimum safe altitudes" (https://www.law.

cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/91.119) .

External links

Wikisource has original text related to

this article:
United States v. Causby

Text of United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.

256 (1946) is available from: Google
 Scholar (https://scholar.google.com/sch
olar_case?case=172090110202872340
65) Justia (https://supreme.justia.co
m/cases/federal/us/328/256/) Library
of Congress (http://cdn.loc.gov/service/
ll/usrep/usrep328/usrep328256/usrep3
28256.pdf)

Retrieved from
"https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?
title=United_States_v._Causby&oldid=1181433426"

This page was last edited on 23 October 2023, at

00:50 (UTC). •