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The role of ESG-based compensation in sustaining the supply chain

Article · January 2017

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Katarzyna Klimkiewicz
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Klimkiewicz, K. The role of ESG-based compensation in sustaining the supply chain.
Journal of Reverse Logistics, (1/2017 (3)), 12–17.

Katarzyna Klimkiewicz, AGH University of Science and Technology,

kklimkie@zarz.agh.edu.pl

The role of ESG-based compensation in sustaining the supply chain

Abstract: The growing importance of supply chain management on a global scale raises
questions about it sustainability and measuring of social impact. This need stems both from a
desire to determine the benefits and risks for the organization resulting from the sustainable
development paradigm. Organizations strive also for tools, that help them to access their social
and environmental impact. Decisions made in this field depend, however, on the people, the
scope of their duties, their norms, values and beliefs. This article focuses on the role the
remuneration system has for sustaining supply chains. The analysis shows that discrepancies
between incentive schemes used by chain members hinder the partnership oriented on
sustaining supply chain networks. Recommendations for the practice are discussed.

Key words: Sustainable supply chain, incentive schemes, ESG-criteria, social and
environmental impact, performance measurement systems

1. Introduction
The role of sustainability in global supply chains increases. On one hand there is a number of
institutional pressures that underline the need of responsible management and sustainable
development i.e. EU directives addressing the issue of cost externalization when using natural
resources in manufacturing and production (European Commission 2011; Michniewska 2015;
Patorska and Karbowska 2016). On the other hand companies start to recognize the intrinsic
value and importance of sustainable thinking and handling. Corporations stop to treat
sustainability only as an unpleasant requirement that is hindering their business or as a tool that

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helps to blur reputational damage. Manufacturers take seriously environmental pressure from
consumers and attempt to minimize their emissions, produce more environmental friendly
products, and/or establish recycling network systems (Cruz and Matsypura 2009; Jastrzębska
2016). The idea of sustainable supply chain (SC) aims at recognizing the value created by all
chain members and its importance for common good and next generations (Commission of the
European Communities 2001; Rudnicka 2011). In this sense sustaining of supply chain and
assuring value created within supply chain network (economic, social, environmental) may
prompt new organizational strategies and help to achieve competitive advantage. The
sustainability approach becomes, therefore, a part of organization’s strategic plan, and impacts
the corporate’s goals and processes. In this sense criteria linked to environmental, social and
corporate government (ESG) issues become more and more important for the measurement of
corporate performance.
In this article we aim at analyzing the role of compensation system for assuring and
promoting the environmental policies across the supply chain. We concentrate especially at the
incentives schemes that are directly linked to sustainability, corporate social and environmental
performance.

2. Sustainable supply chain and Corporate Performance

The question of sustainable (or “green”) supply and distribution channels grew at first from
economic reasons, as waste are often connected to economic loss. Therefore the Supply Chain
Management focus strongly at operational efficiency as well as minimization of waste
(Michniewska 2011). The concept of sustainable supply chain may be characterized by other
terms that occur in the literature, as green/environmental logistics, purchasing, or supply and
demand sustainability in corporate social responsibility (CSR) networks. The sustainability
within the supply chain should be treated across the whole network of manufacturers, suppliers,
retailers and customers whereas each of the group has its own goals, policies and structures.
While manufacturers and suppliers strive to maximize the profit and minimize the risk, the
retailers are involved in transactions both – with manufacturers, as well as customers.
Customers might be sensitive towards ESG issues, therefore the question of how the product
and its part were manufactured becomes an important topic for the retailer (Magretta 1998).
The literature review on the metrics used in the Supply Chain Performance
Measurement Systems (SCPMS) shows that there are used both – quantitative and qualitative
indicators. Chan et al. (2003) indicate three categories of quantitative indicators are:

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 • costs (e.g. costs, revenues, inventory investments),
• customer (e.g. product lateness, fill rate, response time)
• productivity (Chan et al. 2003).
The qualitative indicators refer to customer (e.g. customer satisfaction, loyalty), but also to
flexibility, information flow, risk management and supplier performance (Chan et al. 2003;
Leończuk 2016). The increasing range of literature on the sustainability in supply chains
(Cuthbertson 2010; Hervani et al. 2005) indicates the need for incorporating the ESG criteria
into SCPMS. The most common approach for framing the key measures is Balance Score Card.
The example proposed by Epstein and Wisner (2001) shows how social and environmental
criteria may be incorporated into organizational management (Table 1).
Table 1 Chosen BSC Measures for Social and Environmental Concerns

Environmental Social Environmental Social

FINANCIAL INTERNAL PROCESSES
- % Proactive vs. reactive - Philanthropic - % Production and office - No. of Employee
expenditures contributions to the materials recycled accidents, absence
(promoting vs. assuring local community - No. of certified - Warranty claims
environmental issues) - Employees benefit and suppliers - Ethical sourcing
- Capital investment in compensation costs - Internal audit scores - Supplier violations
the environmental - Training budgets - Energy consumption, - Improvement of
concerns - Reduction in hiring use Occupational Safe and
- Recycling revenues costs - Hazardous material Healthy
- Fines and penalties output
Environmental Social Environmental Social
CUSTOMER LEARNING AND GROWTH
- No. of “green products” - Customer perceptions, - No. of violations - % of Employees trained
- Product safety satisfaction reported by employees - Workforce diversity,
- No. of claims, recalls, - No. of Cause-related - No. of employees with equity
returns events incentives linked to - No. of volunteer hours
- Eco-efficiency (e.g. - Community support, environmental goals - Ethics violations,
energy costs) meetings - No. of functions with - Stakeholder perceptions
- Social report requests environmental - Community education
- Advertising complains responsibilities programs
Source: Based on (Epstein and Wisner 2001)

The main objective of Supply Chain Management is to provide the right product, in the exact
amount and state, at given time and cost to exact place (Azfar et al. 2014). This shows that
Supply Chain Management aims at delivering the product/service in a way that is most
appropriate for customer (time, place) and under conditions that are accepted by the customer
(quality, amount, costs). The common questions, that organization asks, concern the origin of
components (to make or buy), the choice of suppliers, the coordination of product design related
issues, the coordination of demand planning and forecasting among all suppliers, the choice of
production and IT infrastructure, transport strategies that are needed to support supply chain

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operations (Simchi-Levi et al. 1999). The corporate performance relies thus strongly on the SC
in terms of whether the organization fulfills the contract or not. Organizations use to treat the
mutual contract purely in economic sense. Customer, however, perceive this obligation rather
as fulfilling the given promise that might be of diverse character: economic (e.g. price for
quality), social (e.g. brand, values, prestige), environmental (e.g. safety, health, clean) or even
moral (e.g. fair, justice, legal). These two perspectives show that the way we define the
relationship and obligations between partners determine the goals and the way the achievement
of the given goals may be measured. The successful SC is based on mutually beneficial
relationship between organization, its suppliers (and suppliers of the suppliers, etc.), customers
and clients. The sustainability approach goes, therefore, across the whole value chain - from
the Supplier Relationship Management to the Customer Relationship Management and as such
should be measured (Figure 1).

Figure 1 Reciprocal Value Flow in a Supply Chain

Source: Based on (GEMI 2004, p. 10)

Value creation may be improved by the communication and collaboration between partners.
Sharing know-how about the environmental and social regulations and emerging technologies
may strengthen the whole value chain and the performance of each partner. In example common
collaboration on chosen aspect of value chain to develop more efficient, low-cost, or reduce
waste solution (GEMI 2004). By collaboration and communication we understand, however,
not imposing organization’s best practices on suppliers. That is because of different

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stakeholders expectations, social norms and values. Otherwise it may result in compromising
supply chain partnerships (Gallear et al. 2012).

3. The role of incentive schemes in supporting the sustainability across the value
chain
The remuneration system aims at ensuring that the value of people and their contribution to the
achievement of organizational, departmental and team goals is recognized and rewarded
(Armstrong 2010). It consists of the rewarding policies and practices within a company that
help to fulfill organization’s goals and support its strategy. While we recognize the direct link
between the remuneration system and the way organization strives for achieving the strategic
goals we need to explore its role in shaping relations with stakeholders. According to Ed
Freeman each strategic decision is moral in nature. Organizational strategy should therefore
reflect the understanding for stakeholder’s values (Freeman et al. 1991). Relying on this
assumption we propose that remuneration policy and incentives schemes should also be linked
to the stakeholder expectations towards organization, should reflect the understanding for their
values and respect the mutual obligations that organization has towards society, its
shareholders, employees and other stakeholders (customers, suppliers). This approach refers to
so called responsible rewarding (Klimkiewicz and Beck-Krala 2015). The remuneration system
is directly connected to corporate performance. Therefore there is a need for evaluating the
whole performance system according to its social and environmental impact that organization
exerts towards its stakeholders. This is especially important within the supply chain, where we
can observe the value flow across all stakeholders and recognize organization’s impact.
In order to effectively match a demand with supply, manufacturers and retailers
collaborate with each other, which often results in new forms of relationship. In example Wal-
Mart aims at reducing order cycle time and base stocking decisions by transferring it to its
suppliers. Doing so Wal-Mart reduces its lost sales and stocking costs, while suppliers are able
to minimize stockouts and improve brand loyalty (Simatupang et al. 2000). Partnerships in the
supply chain may provide mutual benefits, this however, seems to be rarely recognized due to
the differences among different chain members. The burdens result to some extent from the
individual goals, that chain members are striving for. Not all chain members tend to do what is
in everyone’s best interest and companies are “chasing different goals” (Narayanan and Raman
2004). Agents act opportunistically, striving for maximization of own performance metrics at
expense of other chain members (Feldmann and Müller 2003). In example we may take a
manufacturer A, whose employee is responsible for managing demands of customers and he is

5
gratified for providing the sufficient supply to requested demands. Manufacturer B, who is A’s
customer may use the A’s stocking system to get the information about the availability. When
material is in on stock, B marks as its demand is satisfied. The A’s employee gets bonus. Based
on the information provided by A, B offers goods to its client. The client accepts the offer and
gives deadline, so B returns to A to buy the material and basing on previous information that
material was on stock. But, meantime, A sold available material to another customer. The A’s
employee was gratified because of excellent matching of demand and supply, but the
manufacturer B has to pay fees for not delivering on time to its client. This example shows how
incentive misalignment leads to inefficiencies as chain member works against the overall goal
of the system.
The cooperation between partners is regulated by the performance scheme that specifies
payment conditions including what performance metric should be applied to each individual
manager or employee. Thus, even small changes in incentive schemes can transform the whole
supply chain (Narayanan and Raman 2004). In order to handle the problems with allocation
(e.g. goods, resources, information), incentive schemes are often based on so called Groves
Scheme, that aims at motivating individual managers to report truthfully the division’s profit to
the headquarter. This helps then to take optimal local decision to maximize the division’s profit.
The division managers strive, therefore, to maximize the profit align on their assessment basis
(Feldmann and Müller 2003). This however works only in case of providing the true
information. While opportunistic agent starts to falsify the communication to get advantage
from bonus scheme, this impacts the trust and the functioning of the whole supply chain
network. The supply chain works good when companies’ incentives are aligned - that is “if the
risks, costs, and rewards of doing business are distributed fairly across the network. (…) Indeed,
misaligned incentives are often the cause of excess inventory, stock-outs, incorrect forecasts,
inadequate sales efforts, and even poor customer service” (Narayanan and Raman 2004, p. 96).
It the end, the cooperation and success of the whole supply chain network depends on the single
agent behavior and his or her tendency to obey the rules and acting align with the common
interest.
The decision-making process of individuals is strongly influenced by the way the person
use to think and use to solve problems. The manager, who is convinced that the right decision
should benefit entirely his or her own interest, will act differently from somebody, who is
convinced that his or her work should provide benefits for the organization, the whole chain or
even the broad range of stakeholders. The same refers to the question concerning the way
decision makers think and discuss the relation between their organization and society or how

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they do perceive environmental causes in their decisions and its role in the supply chain
strategy. On one hand, research shows that while a company has a bad environmental
performance, managers may feel embarrassed and start to include environmental issues in their
decisions (Onkila 2015). Individual’s negative emotions play a role of a driver of a change:
may encourage individual managers to accept higher norms in doing business what may also
impact the organization’s environmental policy. On the other hand, according to the reports on
executive compensation, despite the increasing number of companies linking CEOs
compensation to sustainability performance, more and more boards of directors oversees the
sustainability efforts (CERES and Sustainalitics 2014). Coombs and Gilley (2005) confirm the
negative relationship between executive salaries and firms’ environmental reputation. Authors
suggest that stakeholder management may result in reducing rewards CEOs may get for
increasing level of financial performance (Coombs and Gilley 2005).

4. Collaboration, disclosure, aligning and measuring for sustainable supply chain

network
In order to discuss the role of incentive schemes for supporting sustainability we propose a
seven-step process, by which companies may assess own incentive schemes and its role within
the broader chain network:
1. Analyze - recognizing of supply chain network context, identifying the ESG factors, at
the macro level, that are important for aligning the role of sustainability within the
supply chain network;
2. Collaboration and Communication – inviting the value chain members to common
discussion, collaboration on common understanding of what the “success of the value
chain network” means, with reference to the sustainability and social/environmental
performance; follow-up with the ESG macro factors;
3. Alignment – identifying alignments and misalignments of chain member’s values,
goals, strategies, sustainability approaches, incentive schemes with reference to the
agreed goals and values within value chain network;
4. Closing contracts – proposing a basic contract for information flow across the network
and the role of each chain member for the network assurance. The contract should refer
to the mutual obligations and rights that partners committed to, in order to strengthen
the value of the whole chain network and respond to broader stakeholder expectations;

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 5. Sharing – sharing best practices among the chain members - customers and suppliers -
in order to commit employees to sustainability goals, avoid falsification within
information flow, proposing programs or procedures to prevent or minimize potentially
adverse impacts of products and services; procedures to assist product and service
designers to create products or services with reduced adverse life cycle impact, building
sustainability culture across the whole network.
6. Measure – proposing basic metrics that indicate the level of development of supply
chain network with reference to the ESG macro factors, metrics showing how chain
members tide the sustainability across the compensation system and incentive schemes
(e.g. how sustainability performance is incorporated into executive compensation
packages), metrics linked to executive commitment to sustainability performance (e.g.
the percentage of boards, who oversee the sustainability effort).
7. Execute – indicating the governance within the network as well as the way the chain
members reports the performance and identifying the areas, where the collaboration
requires improvement.
Collaboration within supply chain network might be difficult because of a large number of
chain members and costs that each organization will have to bear due to fulfill all the network
requirements. A detailed cost-benefit analysis should indicate the possible boundaries and
limitations that may hinder the common venture. Crucial for this cost-benefit analyze is: that
beside economic benefits or losses, also should be considered the further ESG criteria and its
influence on the whole supply chain network success.
Managing as complex venture as supply chain network requires general framework for
performance measurement system (PMS). According to Neely (1995) each PMS is embedded
in the broad environment, therefore, the metrics should reflect its characteristics and the
relationship between the PMS and its surrounding (e.g. what kind of measures will be accepted,
how to set the scales of the metrics to keep their legitimacy). The second category of metrics in
PMS should be linked to the corporate performance and be coupled into a set of performance
measures. The last category of measures reflects the individual behavior and refers to individual
performance indicators (Neely et al. 1995). Chain members may decide to use existing
frameworks and build their PMS around the indicators and metrics provided by organizations
like Global Reporting Initiative or Account Ability AA1000. Nevertheless, the challenge here
is to align the metrics across the supply chain network specific ESG factors, company specific
strategies and targets, as well as individual attitudes and behaviors. In Table 2 we propose a set

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of chosen factors that may be incorporated in the PMS in order to align and manage the venture
across the whole chain network.
Table 2 Proposition of factors and targets important for sustaining incentive schemes

Environmental issues Social issues Governance issues

Supply chain Country Environmental GINI index of income Government
network specific Policy inequality Effectiveness
factors at macro Country Ecological Unemployment rate Regulatory Quality
level Footprint Corruption Perception Policy on Bribery and
Trend Total Annual CO2 Index Corruption
Emissions Formal Policy on the Tax Transparency
Risk Exposure to Natural Elimination of Disclosure of Directors‘
Climate Catastrophes Discrimination Ratio of Remuneration
Transportation polices average female wage to Environmental and
and infrastructure male wage Social Standards in
Access to energy sources Programs to Increase Credit and Loan
Workforce Diversity Business
Company specific CO Reduction Targets; Employee Turnover Rate; Missions and values
targets Percentage of energy Distribution of employee statement(s);
from renewable sources; compensation Director’s Board
Costs associated with Ratio of company paid Independence;
environmental healthcare expenses Employee participation;
compliance; Trend in the number of Formal, written
Quantity of non-product accidents at work commitments requiring
output returned to process Cost of reduced work an evaluation of life
or market by recycling or efficiency and work quality cycle impacts;
reuse Ratio of charitable
contributions to market
capitalization
Individual attitudes Due to identify the individual performance factors and metrics following steps are to
behaviors proceed:
- Job analysis at crucial posts for sustaining the supply chain network should
be provided due to identify the main responsibilities and drivers, that may
influence the opportunistic agent behavior
- Performance criteria should be analyzed in order to unhide the misalign in
incentive schemes
- Incentives metrics should be proposed that promote the collaboration and
communication across the whole supply chain network
- Individual goals and targets should be agreed with employees due to gain
employees acceptance and align his or her individual interest with the
promotion of sustainability across the network
- Individual ESG criteria may be incorporated within the evaluation system,
but not as a control metrics, but rather as a part of development goals.
Source: Own, based on: (Beck-Krala and Klimkiewicz 2016; Hervani et al. 2005; Hutchins and Sutherland 2008)
With a reference to the dimension of individual attitudes and behaviors, it is important to notice
that exerting institutional pressure by forcing ESG criteria into compensation system may fail
because of opportunistic agent behavior. Therefore, there is a need for building open relation,
based on trust and mutual interest. The culture promoting sustainability should be supported by
employees participation and stakeholder management (Klimkiewicz and Nowak 2016).

5. Conclusions

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Supply Chain Network is a complex system in which separate partners strive for different goals.
The incentive schemes play here an important role, as even small changes in these may
transform the relationships between chain members. Aligning incentive schemes towards
supply chain network is crucial for the successful development of the chain (Narayanan and
Raman 2004), as well as for improving its sustainability. In order to reach the goal,
collaboration and open communication within the network is required. Aligning incentive
schemes and contracts should not refer only to the operational (quality, delivery, time,
flexibility, inventory) and economic performance (e.g. costs, return on assets, efficiency, cash-
to cash cycle), but should be also linked to ESG performance (e.g., reduction of waste, social
impact, transparency).
The answer to the question of how incentive schemes may support the sustainability
performance depends, however, not only on the way the compensation system is designed.
What is equally important is the perception and attitude of the individuals taking decisions in
this area.

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Streszczenie: Wzrost znaczenia łańcuchów dostaw w zarządzaniu na skalę globalną prowadzi

do pytań o potrzebę ich równoważenia i pomiaru wpływu społecznego. Potrzeba ta wynika
zarówno z chęci określenia, jakie korzyści i zagrożenia dla organizacji niesie ze sobą idea
zrównoważonego rozwoju, jak też poznania wpływu, jaki organizacja wywiera na swoje
społeczne i środowiskowe otoczenie. Decyzje w tym zależą jednak od ludzi, zakresu ich
obowiązków, jak też norm, wartości i przekonań, jakimi się kierują. Niniejszy artykuł
koncentruje się na roli systemów wynagradzania dla równoważenia łańcuchów dostaw.
Analiza pokazuje, że niezgodności między bodźcami motywacyjnymi stosowanymi przez
uczestników łańcucha dostaw utrudnia, a często też uniemożliwia realizację założeń
zrównoważonego rozwoju w całym łańcuchu. Przedstawiono rekomendacje dla praktyki
kształtowania systemów wynagradzania w sieciach łańcuchów dostaw.

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