Module 3 Supplement

1.2 Art as Representation

Although as we will see in a moment Collingwood holds that there is more to it than this, representation is, in the first
instance, the relation that a portrait bears to its sitter. It is plainly a matter of skill, of technique, since one can envisage a
successful outcome before undertaking it. So art cannot be representation (or ‘mimesis’, in any straightforward sense).
But the theory that it is is so venerable and influential that it demands separate attention. (Not, however, because of
Plato and Aristotle; Collingwood holds that despite popular opinion, they did not hold it!).

Collingwood advances a very liberal notion of representation, such that a great deal more artefacts than one would
initially think could rightly qualify as representative. For the standard for fidelity is not resemblance, but that the feeling
evoked by the artefact resembles that evoked by the original. Representation comes in three, overlapping degrees. The
first is that of the ordinary photograph, or paintings and the like which attempt that sort of literalness. The second is that
whereby the painter – he mentions van Gogh – ‘leaves out some things that he sees, modifies others, and introduces
some which he not does see in his sitter at all’ (53–4). At the extreme, he may paint mere patterns, for example, of a
dance, leaving out the dancers. The third is ‘emotional representation’, which represents the inner aspect of emotion,
but which is nevertheless distinct from expression. Some types of music, on this view, represent the mind undergoing its
experiences, such the feeling of ‘lying in deep grass on a summer’s day watching clouds drift across the sky’ (56).
Collingwood does not say what the exact difference is between representation and expression, but I assume that it
depends first of all on whether or not the artist has a clear conception of what he is trying to represent; if he does, then
his activity is craft, not art proper. As we will see below, this is not implausible because the artist, at least according to
Collingwood, does not literally know the expressive content of his artwork in advance of expressing it. It would be in
keeping with Collingwood’s approach to add that the expressed content is individual, whereas represented contents are
always general; perceptually quite different works can represent exactly the same thing.

What does it mean?

Collingwood challenges the idea that art is purely about mimicking or imitating reality, known as representation or
'mimesis.' While many think of art as replicating what we see, Collingwood suggests a broader view. He argues that
representation in art can take different forms. The first is straightforward, like a photograph accurately depicting a scene.
The second involves artists like van Gogh who modify or omit details, and the third, termed 'emotional representation,'
captures the inner aspects of emotions without necessarily expressing them outright. Collingwood distinguishes
representation from expression, suggesting that representation is more about conveying general ideas, while expression
involves the artist's individual feelings.