Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S.

437 (1952)
No. 85
Argued November 27-28, 1951
Decided March 3, 1952
342 U.S. 437
Syllabus
A foreign corporation, owning gold and silver mines in the Philippine Islands,
temporarily carried on in Ohio (during the Japanese occupation of the
Philippines) a continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general
business -- consisting of directors' meetings, business correspondence, banking,
stock transfers, payment of salaries, purchasing of machinery, etc. While
engaged in doing such business in Ohio, its president was served with
summons in an action in personam against the corporation filed in an Ohio
state court by a nonresident of Ohio. The cause of action did not arise in Ohio,
and did not relate to the corporation's activities there. A judgment sustaining a
motion to quash the service was affirmed by the State Supreme Court.
Held:
The Federal Constitution does not compel Ohio to open its courts to such a
case -- even though Ohio permits a complainant to maintain a proceeding in
personam in its courts against a properly served nonresident natural person to
enforce a cause of action which does not arise out of anything done within the
State. Pp. 342 U. S. 440-441. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment also does not prohibit Ohio from granting such relief against a
foreign corporation. Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8,
and Simon v. Southern R. Co., 236 U. S. 115, distinguished. Pp. 342 U. S. 441-
447. As a matter of federal due process, the business done by the corporation in
Ohio was sufficiently substantial and of such a nature as to permit Ohio to
entertain the cause of action against it, though the cause of action arose from
activities entirely distinct from its activities in Ohio. Pp. 342 U.S. 447-449.
It not clearly appearing, under the Ohio practice as to the effect of the syllabus,
whether the Supreme Court of Ohio rested its decision on Ohio law or on the
Fourteenth Amendment, the cause is remanded to that court for further
proceedings in the light of the opinion of this Court. Pp. 342 U. S. 441-449.
Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)
No. 81-2101
Argued February 22, 1983
Reargued October 3, 1983
Decided January 23, 1984
465 U.S. 89
Syllabus
Respondent Halderman, a resident of petitioner Pennhurst State School and
Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally retarded,
brought a class action in Federal District Court against Pennhurst, certain of its
officials, the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, and various state and
county officials (also petitioners). It was alleged that conditions at Pennhurst
violated various federal constitutional and statutory rights of the class members
as well as their rights under the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental
Retardation Act of 1966 (MH/MR Act). Ultimately, the District Court awarded
injunctive relief based in part on the MH/MR Act, which was held to provide a
right to adequate habilitation. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the
MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive environment"
approach for the care of the mentally retarded, and rejecting petitioners'
argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred a federal court from considering
this pendent state law claim. The court reasoned that, since that Amendment
did not bar a federal court from granting prospective injunctive relief against
state officials on the basis of federal claims, citing Ex parte Young, 209 U. S.
123, the same result obtained with respect to a pendent state law claim.

Held: The Eleventh Amendment prohibited the District Court from ordering
state officials to conform their conduct to state law. Pp. 465 U. S. 97-124.
(a) The principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the
federal judicial power established in Art. III of the Constitution. The Eleventh
Amendment bars a suit against state officials when the State is the real,
substantial party in interest, regardless of whether the suit seeks damages or
injunctive relief. The Court in Ex parte Young, supra, recognized an important
exception to this general rule: a suit challenging the federal constitutionality of
a state official's action is not one against the State. Pp. 465 U. S. 97-103.
(b) In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, this Court recognized that the need to
promote the supremacy of federal law that is the basis of Young must be
accommodated to the constitutional immunity of the States. Thus, the Court
declined to extend the Young doctrine to
Page 465 U. S. 90
encompass retroactive relief, for to do so would effectively eliminate the States'
constitutional immunity. Edelman's distinction between prospective and
retroactive relief fulfilled Young's underlying purpose of vindicating the
supreme authority of federal law while at the same time preserving to an
important degree the States' constitutional immunity. But this need to reconcile
competing interests is wholly absent when a plaintiff alleges that a state official
has violated state law. In such a case, the entire basis for the doctrine
of Young and Edelman disappears. A federal court's grant of relief against state
officials on the basis of state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not
vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. When a federal court instructs
state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law, this conflicts
directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh
Amendment. Pp. 465 U. S. 103-106.
(c) The dissenters' view is that an allegation that official conduct is contrary to
a state statute would suffice to override the State's protection from injunctive
relief under the Eleventh Amendment because such conduct is ultra vires the
official's authority. This view rests on fiction, is wrong on the law, and would
emasculate the Eleventh Amendment. At least insofar as injunctive relief is
sought, an error of law by state officers acting in their official capacity will not
suffice to override the sovereign immunity of the State where the relief
effectively is against it. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U. S. 682. Under the dissenters' view, the ultra vires doctrine, a narrow and
questionable exception, would swallow the general rule that a suit is against the
State if the relief will run against it. Pp. 465 U. S. 106-117.
(d) The principle that a claim that state officials violated state law in carrying
out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by
the Eleventh Amendment applies as well to state law claims brought into
federal court under pendent jurisdiction. Pp. 465 U. S. 117-121.
(e) While it may be that applying the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state
law claims results in federal claims' being brought in state court or in
bifurcation of claims, such considerations of policy cannot override the
constitutional limitation on the authority of the federal judiciary to adjudicate
suits against a State. Pp. 465 U. S. 121-123.
(f) The judgment below cannot be sustained on the basis of the state law
obligation of petitioner county officials, since any relief granted against these
officials on the basis of the MH/MR Act would be partial and incomplete, at
best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law would not appear to serve
the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the
exercise of pendent jurisdiction. Pp. 465 U. S. 123-124.

Saudi Arabian Airlines v. CA - Case Digest

Facts:
Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA) hired Milagros Morada as a Flight
Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. While on a lay-over in
Jakarta, Morada went to a disco with fellow crew members Thamer & Allah,
both Saudi nationals. Because it was almost morning when they returned to
their hotels, they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. In
which Allah left on some pretext. Thamer attempted to rape Morada but she
was rescued by hotel personnel when they heard her cries for help. Indonesian
police came and arrested Thamer and Allah, the latter as an accomplice.

Morada refused to cooperate when SAUDIA’s Legal Officer and its base
manager tried to negotiate the immediate release of the detained crew members
with Jakarta police.
Through the intercession of Saudi Arabian government, Thamer and Allah
were deported and, eventually, again put in service by SAUDIA. But Morada
was transferred to Manila.

One year and a half year later, Morada was again ordered to see SAUDIA’s
Chief Legal Officer. Instead, she was brought to a Saudi court where she was
asked to sign a blank document, which turned out to be a notice to her to
appear in court. Monada returned to Manila.

The next time she was escorted by SAUDIA’s legal officer to court, the judge
rendered a decision against her sentencing her to five months imprisonment
and to 286 lashes. Apparently, she was tried by the court which found her
guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in
violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in
contravention of Islamic tradition.

After denial by SAUDIA, Morada sought help from Philippine Embassy during
the appeal. Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her. SAUDIA fired her
without notice.

Morada filed a complaint for damages against SAUDIA, with the RTC of
QC. SAUDIA filed Omnibus Motion to Dismiss which raised the ground that
the court has no jurisdiction, among others which was denied

ISSUE: Whether RTC of QC has jurisdiction to hear and try the case

HELD: YES. The RTC of QC has jurisdiction and Philippine law should
govern.Its jurisdiction has basis on Sec. 1 of RA 7691 and Rules of Court on
venue. Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also
weigh heavily in favor of the RTC QC assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the
private interest of the litigant. Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the
court a quo found it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to
take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing Morada to seek remedial action
elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains
substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to
her.

By filing a complaint, Morada has voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of

the court. By filing several motions and praying for reliefs (such as dismissal),
SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial court’s jurisdiction.
Gemperle vs. Schenker

G.R. No. L-18164; January 23, 1967

Facts:

This case was the result of William Gemperle’s retaliatory act when
respondent spouses Paul and Helen Schenker filed a case against him for the
enforcement of Schenker's allegedly initial subscription to the shares of stock
of the Philippines-Swiss Trading Co., Inc. and the exercise of his alleged pre-
emptive rights to the then unissued original capital stock of said corporation
and the increase thereof, as well as for an accounting and damages. Petitioner
alleged that the said complaint tainted his name as a businessman. He then filed
a complaint for damages and prays for the retraction of statements made by
Helen Schenker.
Summons was personally served to Helen Schenker but not to Paul
Schenker. Helen then filed an answer with a counterclaim, but Paul Schenker
filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the court never acquired jurisdiction over
his person since admittedly, he is a Swiss citizen, residing in Zurich,
Switzerland, and has not been actually served with summons in the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Paul
Schenker.

Ruling:

Yes, although as a rule, when the defendant is a non-resident and in

an accion in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be
acquired only through voluntary appearance or personal service of summons.
But this case is an exception to the said rule. The Supreme ratiocinated:

“We hold that the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over said defendant,
through service of the summons addressed to him upon Mrs. Schenker, it
appearing from said answer that she is the representative and attorney-in-fact of
her husband aforementioned civil case No. Q-2796, which apparently was filed
at her behest, in her aforementioned representative capacity. In other words,
Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually sued on behalf of her
husband, so that she was, also, empowered to represent him in suits filed
against him, particularly in a case, like the of the one at bar, which is
consequence of the action brought by her on his behalf.”

Briefly, in an accion in personam where the defendant is a non-resident,

substituted service of summons does not apply. However, by way of exception,
substituted service of summons may be effected, if the following requisites are
present:

1. The summons is served to the spouse of the defendant

2. The spouse must be residing in the Philippines

3. The spouse is appointed as attorney-in-fact of the spouse defendant in a

previous case involving the non-resident spouse.
IDONAH PERKINS vs. ROXAS ET AL.
GRN 47517, June 27, 1941
FACTS:
July 5, 1938, respondent Eugene Perkins filed a complaint in the CFI- Manila
against the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for the recovery of a sum
consisting of dividends which have been declared and made payable on shares
of stock registered in his name, payment of which was being withheld by the
company, and for the recognition of his right to the control and disposal of said
shares to the exclusion of all others. The company alleged, by way of defense
that the withholding of plaintiff’s right to the disposal and control of the shares
was due to certain demands made with respect to said shares by the petitioner
Idonah Perkins, and by one Engelhard.
Eugene Perkins included in his modified complaint as parties defendants
petitioner, Idonah Perkins, and Engelhard. Eugene Perkins prayed that
petitioner Idonah Perkins and H. Engelhard be adjudged without interest in the
shares of stock in question and excluded from any claim they assert thereon.
Summons by publication were served upon the nonresident defendants Idonah
Perkins and Engelhard. Engelhard filed his answer. Petitioner filed her answer
with a crosscomplaint in which she sets up a judgment allegedly obtained by
her against respondent Eugene Perkins, from the SC of the State of New York,
wherein it is declared that she is the sole legal owner and entitled to the
possession and control of the shares of stock in question with all the cash
dividends declared thereon by the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company.
Idonah Perkins filed a demurrer thereto on the ground that “the court has no
jurisdiction of the subject of the action,” because the alleged judgment of the
SC of the State of New York is res judicata. Petitioner’s demurrer was
overruled, thus this petition.
ISSUE:
WON in view of the alleged judgment entered in favor of the petitioner by the
SC of New York and which is claimed by her to be res judicata on all questions
raised by the respondent, Eugene Perkins, the local court has jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action.
RULING:
By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the cause of
action and of the relief sought, and this is conferred by the sovereign authority
which organizes the court, and is to be sought for in general nature of its
powers, or in authority specially conferred. In the present case, the amended
complaint filed by the respondent, Eugene Perkins alleged calls for the
adjudication of title to certain shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated
Mining Company and the granting of affirmative reliefs, which fall within the
general jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila. Similarly CFI- Manila is empowered to
adjudicate the several demands contained in petitioner’s crosscomplaint.
Idonah Perkins in her crosscomplaint brought suit against Eugene Perkins and
the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company upon the alleged judgment of the
SC of the State of New York and asked the court below to render judgment
enforcing that New York judgment, and to issue execution thereon. This is a
form of action recognized by section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now
section 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court) and which falls within the general
jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila, to adjudicate, settle and determine.
The petitioner expresses the fear that the respondent judge may render
judgment “annulling the final, subsisting, valid judgment rendered and entered
in this petitioner’s favor by the courts of the State of New York, which decision
is res judicata on all the questions constituting the subject matter of civil case”
and argues on the assumption that the respondent judge is without jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the cause. Whether or not the respondent judge in the
course of the proceedings will give validity and efficacy to the New York
judgment set up by the petitioner in her cross-complaint is a question that goes
to the merits of the controversy and relates to the rights of the parties as
between each other, and not to the jurisdiction or power of the court. The test
of jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power to enter upon the
inquiry, not whether its conclusion in the course of it is right or wrong. If its
decision is erroneous, its judgment can be reversed on appeal; but its
determination of the question, which the petitioner here anticipates and seeks to
prevent, is the exercise by that court and the rightful exercise of its jurisdiction.
Petition denied.
ADONG VS. CHEONG SENG GEE 43 PHIL. 43
November 24, 2016
Facts:
A Chinese national, Cheong Boo, died intestate in the Philippines. His
(deceased) property in the Philippines is being claimed by; a) Respondent,
Seng Gee, who alleged to be his son from his first marriage with Tan Bit in
China, and b) Petitioner, Mora Adong, deceased lawfully married wife in
Basilan with 2 daugthers. CFI states that deceased Seng Gee failed to prove the
validity of the marriage of his parents through his uncle’s letter, however, he is
entitled to the estate of his father because he has been admitted to the
Philippines as a natural child of the deceased, Cheong Boo. On the other hand,
the 2 daughters of Cheong and Petitioner Mora Adong are entitled also to the
shares of the estate.
Issue:
W/N the marriage between Cheong boo and tan bit in China is valid here in the
Philippines.
Held/Ratio Decidendi:
NO! There is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in the
province of an Bit. Section IV of the Marriage Law (Gen. Order #65) provides
that “All marriage contracted without these islands, which would be valid by
laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in these
islands”. To established a valid marriage, it must be proven before the court of
the islands the existence of the law as a question of fact; and must be supported
by convincing evidence in which Respondent Cheong Seng Gee failed to
provide.
My Personal note:
This is in relation with Art. 3 of the Civil Code: “Ignorance of the law excuse
no one from compliance therewith” (Ignorancia Legis Neminem Excusat)
Ignorance of fact is not Ignorance of the Law.
Art 3. applies only to domestic laws
Doctrine ofProcessual Presumption = Foreign law must be proven in order to
be recognize here in the Philippines.
Raytheon international vs rouzie gr 162894

FACTS

Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized & existing
under the laws of Connecticut, &Stockton Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen,
entered into a contract

BMSI hired Rouzie as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in

several government projects in thePhilippines for an agreed remuneration of
10% of the gross receipts.

Rouzie secured a service contract w/ the Rep. of Phil. on behalf of BMSI for
the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt.Pinatubo eruption & mudflows.

Rouzie filed before the NLRC a suit against BMSI and Rust International
(Rust) for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination, & breach of
employment contract.

The Labor Arbiter order

ed BMSI & Rust to pay Rouzie’s money claims.

Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed & dismissed Rouzie’s complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Rouzie filed an action for damages before the RTC of La Union (where he was
a resident) against Raytheon International. He reiterated that he was not paid
the commissions due him from the Pinatubo dredging project w/c hesecured on
behalf of BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI, RUST and Raytheon
had combined & functioned as 1 company.

RAYTHEON SOUGHT THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT ON THE

GROUNDS OF FAILURE TO STATE ACAUSE OF ACTION & FORUM
NON CONVENIENS & PRAYED FOR DAMAGES BY WAY OF
COMPULSORY
COUNTERCLAIM. THE RTC DENIED RAYTHEON’S MOTION. THE CA
AFFIRMED.

Raytheon’s contention: The written contract between Rouzie & BMSI included
a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the
laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign
elements in the dispute, namely that the parties & witnesses involved are
American corporations & citizens & the evidence to be presented is located
outside the Philippines, that renders our local courts inconvenient forums. The
foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the immediate application of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.

ISSUES(a) W/N the RTC had jurisdiction.(b) W/N the complaint should be
dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens.

RULING

(a) YES.

On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is

filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the
rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign
forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the
case is filed.

Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the
Constitution and the law & by the material allegations in the complaint,
irrespective of w/n the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims
or reliefs sought therein. The case file was an action for damages arising from
an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the
amount of damages prayed are w/in the jurisdiction of the RTC.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over
Rouzi upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the
person of Raytheon was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.

That THE SUBJECT CONTRACT INCLUDED A STIPULATION THAT

THE SAME SHALL BE GOVERNED BYTHE LAWS OF THE STATE OF
CONNECTICUT DOES NOT SUGGEST THAT THE PHILIPPINE
COURTS,
OR ANY OTHER FOREIGN TRIBUNAL FOR THAT MATTER, ARE PRE
CLUDED FROM HEARING THE CIVIL ACTION.

JURISDICTION & CHOICE OF LAW ARE 2 DISTINCT CONCEPTS.

Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this
state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both
parties. The choice of law stipulation will be come relevant only when the
substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the
merits proceeds before the trial court.
(b) NO.

UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS, A COURT, IN

CONFLICTS-OF-LAWS CASES, MAY
REFUSE IMPOSITIONS ON ITS JURISDICTION WHERE IT IS NOT THE
MOST “CONVENIENT” OR
AVAILABLE FORUM AND THE PARTIES ARE NOT
PRECLUDED FROM SEEKING REMEDIES ELSEWHERE.
Raytheon’s averments of the foreign elements are not sufficient to oust the
RTC of its jurisdiction over the case and the parties involved.

Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum

non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly
considered as a matter of defense. While it is w/c the discretion of the trial
court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only
after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances
require the court’s desistance.
Augusto Santos III vs Northwest Orient Airlines

Facts:
Augusto Benedicto Santos III is a minor represented by his dad. In October
1986, he bought a round trip ticket from Northwest Orient Airlines
(NOA) in San Francisco. His flight would be from San Francisco to Manila via
Tokyo and back to San Francisco. His scheduled flight was in
December. A day before his departure he checked with NOA and NOA said he
made no reservation and that he bought no ticket. The next year,
due to the incident, he sued NOA for damages. He sued NOA in Manila. NOA
argued that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the matter
pursuant to Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, which provides that
complaints against international carriers can only be instituted in:
1. the court of the domicile of the carrier (NOA’s domicile is in the USA);
2. the court of its principal place of business (which is San Francisco, USA);
3. the court where it has a place of business through which the contract had
been made (ticket was purchased in San Francisco so that’s where
the contract was made);
4. the court of the place of destination (Santos bought a round trip ticket which
final destination is San Francisco).
The lower court ruled in favor of NOA. Santos III averred that Philippine
courts have jurisdiction over the case and he questioned the
constitutionality of Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention.

ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter to
conduct judicial review.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that they cannot rule over the matter for
the SC is bound by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention which
was ratified by the Senate. Until & unless there would be amendment to the
Warsaw Convention, the only remedy for Santos III is to sue in any of
the place indicated in the Convention such as in San Francisco, USA.
The SC cannot rule upon the constitutionality of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention. In the first place, it is a treaty which was a joint act by the
legislative and the executive. The presumption is that it was first carefully
studied and determined to be constitutional before it was adopted and
given the force of law in this country. In this case, Santos was not able to offer
any compelling argument to overcome the presumption.
El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Vicente Palanca G.R. No. L-11390, March 26,
1918
G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918

* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is

the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property
under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or
it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special
provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and
made effective.
* The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by
which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in
rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.
* DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always
assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may
be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that
proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of

real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio
returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning
again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding
but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by
publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons
to the defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not
shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after
publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and
judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and
afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder.
On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about
seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente
Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the
applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment,
and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this
application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon
were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant
or over the subject of the action.

ISSUE:

* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and
the subject matter of the action
* Whether or not due process of law was observed

RULING:

On Jurisdiction

The word “jurisdiction” is used in several different, though related, senses

since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a
particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may
refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is
the subject to the litigation.

The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and
extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction
with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.

How Jurisdiction is Acquired

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party

in court and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive
power of legal process exerted over the person.

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result
either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought
into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal
proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court
over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the
property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never
be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired
by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is
seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress,
and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we
term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register
the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court,
without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the
instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem
over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all
the world.

In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said

to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is
not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is
substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application,
used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein
the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon
which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true
action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as
defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to
the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their
sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant,
whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general
way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive
only between the parties.

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom

publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and
is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that where
the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore
be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem.
CAYETANO LIM and MARCIANO LIM, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, respondent-appellee.

Williams, Ferrier and SyCip for appellants.

Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The real question raised on this appeal is whether the Insular Collector of
Customs may lawfully deny entry into the Philippine Islands to two children
aged 8 and 14 years, respectively, under and by authority of the Chinese
Immigration, Laws, it appearing that the children arrived at the Port of Manila
accompanied by and in the custody of their mother, a Filipino woman; that they
were born in China, out of lawful wedlock; and that their father was a Chinese
person.
It is contended, on behalf of the Insular Collector of Customs, that these
children being Chinese persons are denied the right of entrance into the
Philippine Islands under the express terms of the Chinese immigration laws. On
the other hand, it is urged on behalf of the children that they are entitled to
enter, regardless of the provisions of the Chinese immigration laws, since the
admitted facts, as it is said, disclose that they are citizens of the Philippine
Islands; and for the further reason, that their mother, who is entitled to their
custody and charged with their maintenance and education, is clearly entitled to
take up her residence in the Philippine Islands and should not be required, to
that end, to abandon her minor children.
Without discussing or deciding any of the contentions of the parties as to the
rights of citizenship of these children, actual or inchoate, we are of opinion that
by analogous reasoning to that upon which the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the wives and minor children of Chinese merchants domiciled
in the United States may enter that country without certificates, these children
must be held to be entitled to enter the Philippine Islands with their mother, for
the purpose of taking up their residence here with her, it appearing that she is
natural guardian, entitled to their custody and charged with their maintenance
and education. (U. S. vs. Gue Lim, 176 U. S. 459.)
In the case just cited the court said:
While the literal construction of the section would require a certificate, as
therein stated, from every Chinese person, other than a laborer, who should
come into the country, yet such a construction leads to what we think an absurd
result, for it requires a certificate for a wife of a merchant, among others, in
regard to whom its would be impossible to give the particulars which the
statute requires shall be stated in such certificate.
"Nothing is better settled," says the present Chief Justice, in Lau Ow
Bew vs. United States (144 U. S., 59) "than that statutes should receive a
sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if
possible, so as to avoid and unjust or an absurd conclusion.
The purposes of the sixth section, requiring the certificate, was not to prevent
the persons named in the second article of the treaty from coming into the
country, but to prevent Chinese laborers from entering under the guise of being
one of the classes permitted by the treaty. It is the coming of Chinese laborers
that the act is aimed against.
It was said in the opinion in the Lau Ow Bew case, in speaking of the
provisions that the sole evidence permissible should be the certificate: "This
rule of evidence was evidently prescribed by the amendment as a means of
effectually preventing the violation or evasion of the prohibition against the
coming of Chinese laborers. It was designed as a safeguard to prevent the
unlawful entry of such laborers, under the pretense that they belong to the
merchant class or to some other of the admitted classes."
It was also held in that case that although the literal wording of the statute of
1884, section six, would require a certificate in the case of a merchant already
domiciled in the United States and who had left the country for temporary
purposes, animo revertendi, yet its true and proper construction did not include
his case, and the general terms used in the act were limited to those persons to
whom Congress manifestly intended to apply them, which would be those who
were about to come to the United States for the first time, and not to those
Chinese merchants already domiciled in the United States who had gone to
China for temporary purposes only, with the intention of returning. The case of
Wan Shing vs. United States (140 U. S., 24), was referred to, and attention
called to the fact that the appellant therein was not a merchant but a laborer,
who had acquired no commercial domicile in this county, and was clearly
within the exception requiring him to procure and produce the certificate
specified in the act. The rule was approved, and the differences in the two cases
pointed out by the Chief Justice.
To hold that a certificate is required in this case is to decide that the woman
cannot come into this country at all, for it is not possible for her to comply with
the act, because she cannot in any event procure the certificate even by
returning to China. She must come in as the wife of her domiciled husband or
not at all. The act was never meant to accomplish the result of permanently
excluding the wife under the circumstances of this case, and we think that,
properly and reasonably construed, it does not do so. If we hold that she is
entitled to come in as the wife, because the true construction of the treaty and
the act permits it, there is no provision which makes the certificate the only
proof of the fact that she is such wife.
In the case of the minor children, the same result must follow as in that of the
wife. All the reasons which favor the construction of the statute as exempting
the wife from the necessity of procuring a certificate apply with equal force to
the case of minor children of a member or members of the admitted classes.
They come in by reason of their relationship to the father, and whether they
accompany or follow him, a certificate is not necessary in either case. When
the fact is established to the satisfaction of the authorities that the person
claiming to enter, either as wife or minor child, is in fact the wife or minor
child of one of the members of the class mentioned in the treaty as entitled to
enter, them that person in entitled to admission without the certificate.
We are not advised of any provision of Chinese law which differentiates the
status of infant children, born out of lawful wedlock, from that of similar
children under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. We assume,
therefore, that in China as well as in the Philippine Islands such children have
the right to look to their mother for their maintenance and education, and that
she is entitled to their custody and control in fulfilling the obligations towards
them which are imposed upon her, not only by the natural impulses of love and
affection, but also by the express mandate of the law. And it having been held
on the highest authority that the general terms of the Act were limited to those
to whom Congress manifestly intended to apply them as set forth in the
foregoing opinion, and that "nothing is better settled than that statutes should
receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention,
and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion," we are of
opinion that the Chinese Immigration Laws should not be construed so as to
exclude infant children of a Filipino mother, born out of lawful wedlock,
seeking entrance to the Philippine Islands for the purpose of taking up their
residence with her in her native land.
It has been suggested that such a ruling opens the door to fraud and evasion,
but we are not much impressed with the force of this suggestion, knowing as
we do that the immigration authorities have been furnished by the law with
peculiarly effective machinery for its enforcement, well calculated to defeat
any attempt to make an unauthorized or improper use of so manifestly
reasonable an exception from the literal construction and application of its
general provisions.
Some confusion seems to have arisen in the court below as to the precise nature
and effect of the somewhat inartificial pleadings upon which these proceedings
were submitted. The case appears to have been submitted upon an answer to an
order to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not issue upon the
petition filed on behalf of the infant children. In the form in which the answer
is couched, there is much in the contention of the appellee that the trial court
should have treated the answer as in substance and effect a demurrer to the
petition, admitting the truth of the facts alleged therein, but praying judgment
as to whether it sets forth facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and to
justify the issuance of the writ. We are inclined to think, however, that the
understanding of the parties and of the court below was that the answer should
be treated rather as in the nature of a return to a writ of habeas corpus,
accepting as true the allegations of the petition but maintaining the legality of
the detention upon the facts thus submitted. Without considering at this time
whether in habeas corpus proceedings the respondent may, without consent of
court, demur to, instead of answering an order to show cause why the writ
should not issue, and without considering or deciding the course which should
be pursued where a respondent attempts to file a demurrer to a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in lieu of the return prescribed by the statute to the writ
when actually issued; we treat the answer to the order to show cause in the case
at bar as we think the parties and the court below understood it should be
treated, that is to say, as in substance and effect the return which the Insular
Collector desired to make to the writ of habeas corpus issued or assumed to
have been issued in response to the petition on behalf of the children held in
custody by him.
We conclude, therefore, that, it appearing that the respondent Collector of
Customs is detaining the petitioners under an erroneous construction of the
immigration laws, and it appearing from the facts disclosed by the
administrative proceedings that these children are entitled to admission into the
Philippine Islands, the order entered in the court below should be reversed, and
in lieu thereof an order should be entered directing the discharge of these
children from the custody of the Insular Collector of Customs, with the costs in
both instances, de officio. So ordered.