έ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώ! ௐ 17 ‫ !ס‬ௐ 2 ഇ! ࢱ 93-135!

2021 ѐ/आ‫ཱི؞‬
Taiwan International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 93-135 Summer 2021

共同邊界方向性距離函數於農會信用部
經營效率之探討－長期追蹤資料之分析
ᘲ˜ୂ
ࡺॷᎩ߆‫ྺع‬ຽ఍ࡊࣶ

ᆒࣰ։
̚රགྷᑻࡁտੰქҒགྷᑻࡁտ͕̚ࡁտࣶ

‫ܘ‬ະ̥
έΔξϲ̂ጯЃยྻજგநጯրઘି଱

ӓ঳༈
έ៉̂ጯྺຽགྷᑻጯրି଱

ၡ ࢋ
ώ͛͹ࢋϫ۞Β߁ଣ੅Бέ៉ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़தĂ̶̈́‫ژ‬ᇆᜩ
གྷᒉड़த̝Я৵Ąࡁտ၆෪ࠎέ៉ 2013 ѐҌ 2018 ѐБវ 269 छྺົ
‫ܫ‬ϡొВ 1,614 ඊ̝੠ᖸྤफ़Ąώ͛ଳϡ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴĂੵ҂ณྺ
ົ‫ٸ‬ഠ̈́࠳ዶ۞ϒШຍ୬ய΍Ă֭ৼˢ࢑Ш۞࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠүࠎ‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய
΍ĂГଳϡВТᙝࠧ͞‫ڱ‬ĂซҖ̙Тఢሀ‫ܫ‬ϡొϠயड़த۞ෞҤĂҤ
ზ΍ٙѣྺົ۞ВТᙝࠧड़த̈́Чྺົٙᛳ۞̂̈̚ఢሀ̝ཏ௡ड़
தĂࠎ྿‫ז‬ВТᙝࠧड़த˭Ăέ៉ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷᒉᒻड़‫إ‬ΞԼච۞۩
มĄซ˘ՎӀϡ‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ़ซҖਫ਼ᕩĂ̶‫ژ‬ᒖဩЯ৵ăྺົࣶ̍ᛳ
ّ̈́ CAMEL ෞඈ࠹ᙯ̝ੑચЯ৵Ă၆ВТᙝࠧड़த̈́ཏ௡ᙝࠧड़த
̝ᇆᜩĄࡁտඕ‫ڍ‬ពϯĂ̂ఢሀྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த౵ָĂ̚ఢሀྺ
ົ‫ܫ‬ϡొѨ̝Ă̈ఢሀྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ౵मĂͷˬ࣎ఢሀҋ 2013 ѐҌ 2018
ѐ̝ВТᙝࠧड़த̈́ཏ௡ᙝࠧड़த̂࡭Ӕனుѐј‫ܜ‬ᔌ๕Ą҃̂̈̚
ЧఢሀҾ 2013 Ҍ 2018 ̱ѐπӮ̝πӮཏ௡ᙝࠧड़தĂ̶Ҿѣ 0.19%ă
7.56% ̈́ 13.58% ԫఙԼච۩มĄГ۰Ăࡶડ̶гડҾ̝ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷ

 ώ఼͛ੈү۰ EmailĈpiwu@ntu.edu.twĂTelĈ02-3366-2663Ą
94 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 17 ‫ס‬ăௐ 2 ഇĞ2021/आ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

ᒉड़தĂֶԔࠎ‫ొڌ‬౵੼ăΔొă̚ొѨ̝ă‫ొݑ‬౵ҲĄ౵‫ޢ‬Ăдᇆ
ᜩВТᙝࠧड़த̈́ཏ௡ᙝࠧड़த̝Я৵̚Ăྺົࣶ̍ࠎ઼̈̚ିֈ඀
‫ޘ‬ăྤώዋ֖தᄃх‫ͧٸ‬தດ੼Ăֹྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొड़தດ੼Ă၆གྷᒉड़
தѣϒШᇆᜩĂ҃ᙒӄົࣶҫᓁົࣶᇴͧத෸̂ăࣶ̍ࠎ૞ࡊͽ˯ି
ֈ඀‫ޘ‬ăѐ᛬̬‫ ٺ‬40 Ҍ 49 ໐̈́࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧத෸̂Ă၆གྷᒉड़த‫݋‬ѣ
࢑ШᇆᜩĄ

ᙯᔣෟĈ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠă࠳ዶă͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴăВТᙝࠧăCAMEL ෞ
ඈЯ৵
ВТᙝࠧ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝ଣ੅ů‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ̶़̝‫ژ‬ 95

壹、前言
ྺົĞfarmers’ associationğߏέ៉எˢг͞ૄᆸ۞࠹ᙯྺຽ௡ᖐ̚౵
Ԇፋăົࣶˠᇴ౵к۞ۤဥ‫ڱ‬ˠ 1ĂགྷᒉຽચΒӣ‫ܫ‬ϡĞ‫ܛ‬Ꮙğ
ăܲᐍăଯᇃ
‫ֻ׶‬ዚĞགྷᑻğα̂͹ࢋొ‫ܝ‬Ąྺົдགྷᒉ˯ੵืҋ࢑࠳ᓪγĂᔘᅮፉЇ
߆‫ع‬ᄃྺϔ໛఼፜ୖă‫ם‬ӄ߆΄‫ކ‬ጱĂ۷࢑໰ᜪྺϔĂԼචྺϔϠ߿ᄃ೩
̿ྺछќˢĂТॡᏱநྺϔܲᐍĂྺຽԫਕ۞޽ጱĂྺய‫ݡ‬ΐ̍ᄃଯᇃඈ
ΑਕĂдέ៉ྺຽ൴ण˯ĂԷႊ‫ܧ‬૱ࢦࢋ۞֎ҒĄα̂ొ‫ܫ̝̚ܝ‬ϡొĞcredit
departmnetğߏྺົ͹ࢋᒔӀֽ໚Ăྺົ 90% ࠳ዶֽҋ‫ܫ‬ϡొĞ˷‫؟‬Аăͳ
‫ܛ‬ӀĂ2005ğĂ͹ࢋຽચߏӛќྺϔхഠĂͽ೩ֻົࣶଂྺٙᅮྤ‫ܛ‬Ă֭Ӏ
ϡ࠳ዶଂְྺຽଯᇃăۤົ̳ৈ̈́г͞யຽ̼͛ඈ߿જĂͽ೩઼̰̿ྺຽ
൴णĂߏԧ઼౵ࢦࢋ۞ૄᆸྺຽ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ፟ၹĄֶྺົ‫ڱ‬ௐ 40 ୧ఢ‫ົྺؠ‬ᒔӀ
࠳ዶੵ೩ᇥְຽ̳᎕‫ܛ‬γĂ‫إ‬ᅮ೩ᇥ 62% үࠎଯᇃགྷ෱Ăઇࠎྺপயܳዚ
߿જă۲फ़ྤՄྃӄăᏱநщБϡᘽăϣมგநྺຽԫఙඈྺຽଯᇃĂ۷
࢑੓໰ᜪྺϔయЇĄᐌ඾έ៉གྷᑻ੓ࢳĂྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొјࠎྺົ౵ᔇ᏿۞ొ
‫ܝ‬Ăੵ͚೯ྺົଯᇃăֻዚ̈́ܲᐍඈొ‫ܝ‬ຽચγĂТॡ˵ԼචྺՅགྷᑻĂ
૲જྺՅᓄၷĞఄ‫ߗم‬ăӓॎ઼Ă2006ğĄ
ҭҋέ៉ΐˢ͵ࠧ෶‫ٽ‬௡ᖐĞWorld Trade OrganizationĂᖎჍ WTOğĂ
෶‫ٽ‬ᄃ‫ܛ‬ᏉҋϤ̼ᄃ઼ᅫ̼̝‫ޢ‬Ăΐ˯έ៉ฟ‫ٸ‬າᅙҖͽ઼̈́γᅙҖ۞న
ϲĂ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ፟ၹᚮ‫͟ۋ‬ᔌ፬ধ҃࡭ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొు႙εΝᚮ‫˧ۋ‬Ăྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ
Яఢሀ࠹၆̈ĂҲ۞ஐࣃጱ࡭‫ٸ‬ഠӀमᒺ̈ćΩ˘͞ࢬĂྺϔࢬ၆෶‫ٽ‬ҋ
Ϥ̼Ăྺຽࢬ၆Հᚑध۞ᚮ‫ۋ‬ĂྺຽயࣃЯ҃˭໣ĂЯ҃၆ྺຽ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ̝ᅮ
Ր˵‫זצ‬ᇆᜩĂ჌჌઼̰γ۞኏ᑝᄃ҂រֹ଀ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷᒉՀΐӧᙱĞౘ
ߦ൝ඈˠĂ2019ğĄтѩĂ˜ጱ࡭ 2001 ѐҌ 2002 ѐഇมĂ287 छྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡ
ొ̚ѣ 36 छ৔ய҃ϤથຽᅙҖତგĄ‫̙̚׎‬։‫ٸ‬ഠᄃ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠπӮͧதଂ
1995 ѐ۞ 5.07% ಼̂˯̿‫ ז‬2003 ѐ۞ 17.57%Ăѩּͧ̂ࡗߏέ៉ώ˿થ
ຽᅙҖ۞αࢺĞChen et al., 2007ğ
Ą2002 ѐ߆‫ع‬൴Ҷ˘ాҚ‫ܛ‬ᏉԼซନ߉Ă

1
ॲፂ 2018 ѐέ៉Ч৺ྺົѐಡĂྺົछᇴ྿ 283 छĂົࣶˠᇴ྿ 181 ༱ˠĄ
96 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 17 ‫ס‬ăௐ 2 ഇĞ2021/आ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

2003 ѐĶྺຽ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ‫ڱ‬ķϲ‫఼ڱ‬࿅Ăቁϲྺຽ‫ܛ‬Ꮙវր۞൴ण͞Ш̈́‫ؠڱ‬г
ҜĂ2004 ѐĶҖ߆ੰྺຽ؎ࣶົྺຽ‫ܛ‬ᏉԊĞᖎჍྺຽ‫ܛ‬ᏉԊğķјϲĂϒ
ёቁϲྺຽ‫ܛ‬Ꮙវր፾ϲ‫˘ٺ‬ਠ‫ܛ‬Ꮙវր̝γĂТॡĂࠎᅃጱྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ
̝གྷᒉგநĂ2005 ѐ౹‫ޙ‬ĶБ઼ྺຽ‫ܛ‬ऱķߏέ៉ྺຽ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ൴ण˘ాҚࢦ
ְ̂Іܑ̝னĄ
έ៉Бវྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొВѣώొ 283 छᄃ 817 छ̶ొĂϤ 2007 ѐҌ 2018
ѐ‫ͤغ‬Ăхഠᓁዶᗝ 1 Џ 7,919 ᆆ̮ăᓁхഠј‫ ܜ‬35.6%ć‫ٸ‬ഠᓁዶᗝ 1 Џ
878 ᆆ̮ăᓁ‫ٸ‬ഠј‫ ܜ‬54.7%ć҃࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ 50 ᆆ̮ă࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧத 0.46%
Ğ̚δᅙҖ‫ܛ‬Ꮙຽચᑭߤ఍Ă2019ğĂ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ˭ࢫ˞ 88.9%̈́࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧ
த˭ࢫ˞ 5.96%Ğ̚δᅙҖБ஧ྤੈშĂ2008-2019ğ
ĂଂБវྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొх
ഠ‫ܛ‬ᗝă‫ٸ‬ഠ‫ܛ‬ᗝă࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠᄃ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧத۞ត̼Ξ࠻΍‫ځ‬ព̝ԼචĄ
൒хഠξಞΚѣத‫݋‬Ϥ 1998 ѐ 8.1%˭ࢫҌ 2018 ѐ 3.7%Ă‫ٸ‬ഠξಞΚѣத
Ϥ 1998 ѐ 5.3%˭ࢫҌ 2004 ѐ 2.9%Ğ̚δᅙҖБ஧ྤੈშĂ2008-2019ğ2Ă
࠰Ӕன਽ੜன෪ĄϺӈтϏਕዋ༊ೠ೪ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొड़த۞੼Ҳ̈́੼Ҳड़த
‫ܫ‬ϡొ൴Ϡ‫ٺ‬ң఍Ăྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొࢋᄃ‫ྺܧ΁׎‬ຽ‫ܫ‬ϡొ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ፟ၹ۞ᚮ‫ऻۋ‬
ՀӧᙱĂѩ၆‫ͽٺ‬Ӏमќˢࠎ͹۞ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొĂтң೩̿ᚮ‫ͽ˧ۋ‬ᆧซྺ
ົ‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷᒉᒻड़ࠎ˘ࢦࢋኝᗟĄ
࿅Νଣ੅‫ܛ‬Ꮙ፟ၹٕྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷᒉᒻड़۞࠹ᙯ͛ᚥĂ͹ࢋᑕϡϠய
ᙝࠧĞfrontierğड़தᏊณ̝៍‫ه‬ĂٙᏜϠயᙝࠧ౵ѝܼϤ FarrellĞ1957ğ
೩΍Ăߏ޽ٙѣΞਕ౵ָϠய௡Ъٙԛј۞ϠயᙝࠧĞٕჍࠎԫఙ݈ቡğĄ
̶‫ڱ͞ژ‬Β߁ྤफ़Βඛ̶‫ڱژ‬Ğdata envelopment analysisĂᖎჍ DEAğăᐌ
፟ᙝ̶ࠧ‫ڱژ‬Ğstochastic frontier approachĂᖎჍ SFAğ
ăજၗშඛྤफ़Βඛ
̶‫ڱ‬Ğdynamic network data envelopment analysisĂᖎჍ DNDEAğăमᗝᏊ
ณ‫ڱ‬Ğslack-based measureĂᖎჍ SBMğ
ăˬล߱ DEA ሀ‫ా̈́ݭ‬ᜈྤफ़Βඛ
̶‫ڱژ‬Ğsequential data envelopment analysisĂᖎჍ SDEAğඈĄᔵ൒˵ѣ

2
̚δᅙҖБ஧ྤੈშ̚ĺ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ፟ၹຽચໄ‫ڶ‬ѐಡĻ่ਕ೩ֻྤफ़Ҍ 2008 ѐĂࠎਕԆፋ
Ӕனх‫ٸ‬ഠξಞҫѣதՀ‫ܜ‬ॡม۞ܑனĂ‫ ݋‬1998 ѐҌ 2007 ѐྤफ़ܼፋநҋౘළࠡ
Ğ2008ğĄ
ВТᙝࠧ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝ଣ੅ů‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ̶़̝‫ژ‬ 97

ଳϡੑચͧத̝ CAMEL үࠎགྷᒉᒻड़۞ෞͧ 3Ă൒ѩ჌ෞ఼ͧ૱૟ CAMEL

ٙஉᄏ۞ੑચࣃෛࠎԸˢĂ༊ࢋТॡ҂ᇋԸˢ̈́ய΍ॡ‫̙݋‬ዋϡĂѩγĂ
ѩ჌ෞ่ͧਕᏊณൺഇᒻड़Ă൑‫ڱ‬ዋॡͅߍ‫ܜ‬ഇགྷᒉᒻड़ĞౘළࠡĂ2008ć
ఄ‫ߗم‬ăӓॎ઼Ă2006ćAgarwal, et al., 2014ğĄ
҃ͽ DEA ෞҤ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ፟ၹགྷᒉᒻड़̝ࡁտ࠹၆кĂͧт Chortareas et al.
Ğ2009ğᏊณԓᘷᅙҖड़தĂ଀΍ଠ‫ࢲט‬ᐍઐр၆ᅙҖड़த͞ࢬߏࢦࢋЯ
৵ćFernandes, et al.Ğ2018ğᑕϡ˟ล߱ DEA ଣ੅ 2007-2014 ѐለ̮ડ̝
ለ߷઼̰ᅙҖĂ൴ன߹જྤ‫ܫ׶ܛ‬෷ࢲᐍ၆ᅙҖϠயड़தѣ࢑ࢬᇆᜩĂ҃
ྤώ‫׶‬Ӏማࢲᐍ‫݋‬၆ᅙҖѣϒࢬᇆᜩć‫ࡁ΁׎‬տ‫إ‬ѣ Aghayi ᄃ Maleki
Ğ2016ć2018ğăChortareas ඈˠĞ2009ğă໅ჯऍĞ2016ğă͞ពЍᄃችԈ
ඡĞ2018ğඈĄҌ‫ٺ‬૟ DEA ᑕϡ‫ٺ‬έ៉࠹၆পঅ̝ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷᒉᒻड़̝
ଣ੅Ăтౘߦ൝Ğ2007ć2014ğ̝ࡁտĂྍࡁտТॡ˵̶‫ژ‬ᇆᜩྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡ
ొགྷᒉࢲᐍ̝̰ొ̈́γొЯ৵Ą
࿅Νଳϡ DEA ଣ੅‫ܛ‬Ꮙ፟ၹٕߏྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొᒻड़̝ࡁտĂ̂кᇴ઄న
่ѣĶрķ۞ய΍Ăҭ఺჌઄నϏυЪநĂЯࠎᅙҖ۞࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧதĂૄ
ώ˯Ξਕ˵ҡᐌĶᗼķ۞ய΍ĂЯѩϏৼˢᗼ۞ய΍ΞਕࢫҲᒻड़ෞҤ̝
Ъநّć‫׎‬ѨĂனѣࡁտགྷ૱઄నϠயԫఙߏТኳّĂ҃‫ن‬ர̙Тགྷᒉఢ
ሀ۞хдĂтѩΞਕ੼ҤٕҲҤᒻड़۞ܑனć˫ Sun ඈˠ.Ğ2017ğᄮࠎԸ
ˢ۞ᆧΐѣॡߏࠎ఍நᗼய΍ٕ‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍Ă҃‫ܧ‬ϡ‫ٺ‬ᒻड़۞ԼචĄЯѩĂ
Ъந۞ଐ‫˭ڶ‬ĂੵᑕТॡ҂ᇋрᗼய΍γĂϺᑕ૟̙ТϠயԫఙཏ௡˘‫׀‬
ৼˢ҂ณĄ҃ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొдώኳ˯ߏᛳ‫ܛٺ‬Ꮙ፟ၹĂᒔӀ͹ࢋ໚ҋ‫ٺ‬х‫ٸ‬
ӀमĂຽચ۞ώኳࠎٚፉ଱‫ࢲܫ‬ᐍͽᒔ‫פ‬ӀማĂ͹ࢋຽચࠎӛќ‫͗މ‬хഠ
̈́Ᏹந‫ٸ‬ഠĄЯѩࢋෞҤྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ۞གྷᒉᒻड़ĂтϏ҂ᇋ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ̝‫ܫ‬

3
CAMEL ౵ѝ‫ ٺ‬1979 ѐϤ Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System ੫၆઼࡚ᅙ Җે
Җ۞ෞҤĂ‫ޢ‬ᜈд઼࡚ᓑ֣ᐼ౯ĞU.S. Federal Reserveğ۞‫ޙ‬ᛉ˭ĂјࠎБ஧ّ੫၆ᅙ
Җ፟ၹ೼̈́ଳϡ۞ෞҤ޽ᇾć̣࣎޽ᇾ̶Ҿࠎྤώዋّ֖Ğcapital adequacyğăྤய‫ݡ‬
ኳĞasset qualityğ
ăგநਕ˧Ğmanagementğ ăᒔӀਕ˧Ğearningsğᄃ߹જّĞliquidityğć
1995 ѐ‫݋‬ᆧΐ၆ξಞăপҾߏӀதࢲᐍ̝ୂຏ‫ޘ‬Ğsensitivity to market riskğĂ‫݋‬ᖎჍࠎ
CAMELSĞPrach, 2019ğĄ
98 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 17 ‫ס‬ăௐ 2 ഇĞ2021/आ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

ϡࢲᐍĂ˜ົጱ࡭ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ࠳ዶࡁҿ̝ઐमĂͧтϏበЕ೩ᇥ౯‫ٯ‬ӑ૳Ă
‫੼ົ݋‬Ҥྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ࠳ዶĄ҃ఄ‫ߗم‬ᄃӓॎ઼Ğ2006ğ̈́ Chen ඈˠĞ2007ğ
ඈдෞҤྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷᒉᒻड़ॡĂ˜૟࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠෛࠎ‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍Ą
҃ࢋТॡ҂ᇋຍ୬ய΍ᄃ‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍̝ᒻड़ෞҤΞϡ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ
Ğdirectional distance functionĂᖎჍ DDFğĂѩ˘͞‫ڱ‬Ϥ Chambers ඈˠ
Ğ1996ć1998ğٙ೩΍Ăѩ‫˜ڱ‬઄నᐌ඾Ըˢٕ‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍۞ഴ͌Ăຍ୬
ய΍ົͽ࠹Т۞ּͧј‫ܜ‬Ąֹϡ DDF ͹ࢋᐹᕇߏТॡ̯ధഴ͌‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍
‫׶‬ᆧΐຍ୬ய΍Ąᑕϡд‫ܛ‬Ꮙ፟ၹ˯ĂϤ‫ٺ‬Տ࣎ՙඉಏҜĞdecision making
unitĂᖎჍ DMUğ൑‫ڱ‬ᔖҺ‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍ĂЯѩĂDDF ͞‫ڱ‬၆ DMU ‫ޙ‬ϲሀ
‫ྵݭ‬ЪዋĄ͛ᚥ˯ଳϡ DDF д‫ܛ‬Ꮙ፟ၹ̝࠹ᙯࡁտт Fukuyama ᄃ Weber
Ğ2008ğͽ DDF ᑕϡ DEA ‫׶‬ણᇴቢّ͞‫ڱ‬Ă޽΍࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ၆‫͟ٺ‬ώᅙҖ
གྷᒉᒻड़̙टజ‫ن‬ෛćBarros ඈˠĞ2012ğᑕϡ Russell ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ੫
၆ 2000 Ҍ 2007 ͟ώᅙҖซҖԫఙड़தෞҤĂඕ‫ڍ‬ពϯ̙։෷ഠ၆ᅙҖ۞
ᒻड़ѣࢦ̂࢑ፉĄPal ᄃ MitraĞ 2018ğϺᑕϡ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ၆ 2008 Ҍ 2013
ѐБ஧ 64 छ̈ᗝ‫ܫ‬෷፟ၹĞmicrofinance institutionğซҖགྷᒉᒻड़ଣ੅Ă
ඕ‫ڍ‬ϺӔனѣ൑ৼˢࢲᐍ҂ณ۞ड़தඕ‫࠹ڍ‬༊̙ТĄ
҃үࠎ‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍۞࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠĂBarros ඈˠĞ2012ğ‫ؠ‬ཌྷࠎ᎕ͣώ‫ܛ‬
෹࿅ 6 ٕ࣎͡ͽ˯Ă‫ͣٳ‬Ӏिๅચ 3 ٕ࣎͡ͽ˯ҭ͌‫ ٺ‬6 ࣎͡Ă̈́ࢦፋๅ
ચă৔யăΞႷྤயٕѨ৺෷ഠඈĄ҃ԧ઼ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ၆‫ٺ‬ϒ૱‫ٸ‬ഠᖼЕ
࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠܼॲፂĶྺົႢົ‫ܫ‬ϡొྤயෞҤຫε໤౯೩Ё́࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ๊ќ
ഠ૲૳఍நᏱ‫ڱ‬ķĂ‫ܫ‬ϡొٙఢቑ̝࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠΞ̶ࠎώ‫ܛ‬᎕ͣ྿ˬ࣎͡ͽ
˯ăӀि̏‫ؼ‬႖̱࣎͡ͽ˯ă̚‫ܜ‬ഇ෷ഠϏ޷ഇᝊᔘ࿈̱࣎͡ͽ˯ٕ̏Ш
͹ăଂๅચˠ෦੠ٕ఍̶ፉܲ‫ݡ‬۰ĞҖ߆ੰྺຽ؎ࣶົྺຽ‫ܛ‬ᏉԊĂ2014ğ
Ą
Ҍ‫ܫٺ‬ϡొԸˢăய΍ี۞Ᏼ‫פ‬ᄃన‫ؠ‬Ă҂ณᅙҖࠎ೩ֻ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ‫ڇ‬ચ۞̬̚
፟ၹĂӈᅙҖӛќྤ‫ܛ‬Ğхഠğ֭‫̚ا‬෷‫ٸ‬ගྤ‫ܛ‬ᅮՐ۰Ğ‫ٸ‬ഠğĂϤ̚ม
̝Ӏमֽᒔ‫פ‬Ӏማćд࿅඀̚ĂᅙҖԷႊྤ‫֎۞̬̚ܛ‬ҒĂ҃‫ܧ‬Ϡயхഠă
‫ٸ‬ഠ૳͗ćSealey ᄃ LindleyĞ1977ğăBerger ᄃ HumphreyĞ1998ğӮᄮࠎ
̬̚‫࠹ڱ‬၆ߏዋЪෞҤ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ፟ၹड़த۞͞‫ڱ‬Ą
Elyasiani ᄃ RezvanianĞ2002ğͧྵ઼࡚γྤᅙҖ‫઼̰׶‬ᅙҖ۞Ϡயԫ
ВТᙝࠧ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝ଣ੅ů‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ̶़̝‫ژ‬ 99

ఙĂͽͅᑕ఺‫ᙷ׌‬ᅙҖளኳّ̝ϠயԫఙćHuang ඈˠĞ2011ğ‫݋‬ଣ੅ለ
߷થຽᅙҖགྷᒉड़தĂඕ‫ڍ‬൴ன̙Тវր۞ᅙҖ‫׍‬ѣ̙Т۞ԫఙͪ໤Ą࠹
ᙯࡁտ۞ВТඕኢߏ̙ТᅙҖఢሀมቁ၁хдԫఙमளĂϤѩΞ̙ۢТᅙ
ҖఢሀҾ̝ԫఙम෼ົͅᑕ΍̙Т۞གྷᒉड़தĄྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ˵ѣᙷҬଐ
ԛĂЯ̙Тఢሀྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొٙ‫׍‬౯۞Ϡய୧І̙ТĂֶѩΞ྿ј̝౵ָड़
த˵̙ТĄDDF ᔵΞТॡৼˢຍ୬ய΍ᄃ‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍Ă൒൑‫ڱ‬҂ณྺົ‫ܫ‬
ϡొ̝ளኳّĄ
ࠎ˞ҹ‫ࢗ˯ڇ‬યᗟĂВТᙝࠧĞmetafrontierğໄ‫ه‬Я҃யϠĂВТᙝ
ࠧ੓໚‫ ٺ‬HayamiĞ1969ğᑕϡВТϠய‫ב‬ᇴĞmetaproduction functionğү
ࠎҲ‫ޘ‬ฟ൴ᄃ̏ฟ൴ડાྺຽϠய˧̝ͧྵĂ֭ଣ੅̙Т઼छมྺຽϠய
˧۞̂̈Ą҃ Battese ᄃ RaoĞ2002ğ̈́ Battese et al.Ğ2004ğ‫݋‬ଂϠயड़த
۞ ៍ ᕇ Ă ଳ В Т ᙝ ࠧ ۞ ໄ ‫ ه‬Ă Ꮚ ณ ̙ Т ཏ ௡ ม ԫ ఙ ड़ த Ğ technology
efficiencyĂᖎჍ TEğ
Ğᆒࣰ։ඈˠĂ2009ğĄBattese ᄃ RaoĞ2002ğ૟ВТ
ϠயĞmetaproductionğෛࠎ౵ѣड़தϠயᕇٙԛј۞ΒඛѡቢĂ઄నٙѣ
Ϡய۰ٕ DMU ֭‫ܧ‬ጾѣ࠹Т۞ϠயԫఙĂົЯЧᙷ‫̶ݭ‬ཏٙౄј۞Ϡயఢ
ሀ̂̈ඈमளă҃хд̙Т۞ϠயԫఙĂЯѩĂдෞҤϠயԫఙड़தॡĂ
̙ᑕྍԯٙѣϠய۰ٕ DMU ෛࠎጾѣ࠹Тԫఙͪ໤Ă҃ᑕ࣎ҾෞҤϠய۰
ٙᛳ̝Ϡயఢሀ̂̈ཏ௡Ą
дளኳཏ௡˭҂ณຍ୬ய΍̈́‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍Ă‫݋‬ᅮ૟͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴᄃ
ВТᙝࠧ͞‫ڱ‬ඕЪĂѩ჌ඕЪĂд࿅ΝӮᑕϡ‫ٺ‬ଣ੅ᒖဩᛉᗟٕЧ̍ຽϠ
யᅳાĞᆒࣰ։ඈˠĂ2009 ; Hsiao, et al., 2012; Lin, et al., 2013; Li, et al.,
2018; Wan,g et al., 2019ğĂҌϫ݈ࠎͤĂϏѣ͛ᚥ૟͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴඕЪВ
Тᙝࠧ͞‫ڱ‬ᑕϡд‫ܛ‬Ꮙຽٕྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̶‫˯ژ‬Ąੵѩ̝γĂᖣϤ
ͧྵВТᙝࠧԫఙड़த̈́Чఢሀԫఙड़தࣃ଀म෼ĂΞͽܑϯ΍Чఢሀԫ
ఙᄃВТᙝࠧԫఙमள۞ԫఙ৿˾தĞtechnology gap ratioĂᖎჍ TGRğ
ĞBattese, et al., 2004ğٕߏВТԫఙͧதĞmeta-technology ratioĂᖎჍ MTRğ
ĞO’Donnell, et al., 2007ğ
Ąซ҃Ă˵ΞͽҤზ̙Тཏ௡۞ MTR ٕ TGR ࣃĂ
ᖣѩͽซҖྭ̙Тཏ௡۞ԫఙͪ໤ͧྵĄ
ѣᝦ‫ٺ‬ѩĂώ͛ࢵ‫ޘ‬ඕЪ DDF ᄃВТᙝ̶ࠧ‫ژ‬Ă҂ณྺົ‫ٸ‬ഠ̈́࠳ዶ
100 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 17 ‫ס‬ăௐ 2 ഇĞ2021/आ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

۞ຍ୬ய΍ĂТॡৼˢ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠࠎ‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍Ă૟ଳϡՀ෭‫ܫົྺܕ‬ϡᒉ
ྻ̰உ۞ྻ‫מ‬෸ረ̝͞ёĂ૟ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొထ̶ࠎ̂̈̚ˬ჌ఢሀҾĂଣ੅
ྺົགྷᒉᒻड़ߏӎ‫צ‬ఢሀҾ҃ѣमளĂ֭រᙋ‫ี׌‬ຍ୬ய΍ă˘ี‫ܧ‬ຍ୬
ய΍̝ВТᙝࠧड़தăཏ௡ᙝࠧड़த̈́ВТԫఙͧĂώ͛ଳϡ 2013 ѐҌ
2018 ѐέ៉ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొĂՏѐ 269 छ̱ѐВ 1,614 ඊ̝‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ़Ğpanel
datağĂෞҤ̙ТఢሀҾ‫ܫ‬ϡొ̶ٙᛳఢሀཏ௡ड़தĂд྿‫ז‬ፋវ౵ָВТ
ᙝࠧड़தଐ‫˭ڶ‬Ăέ៉Чཏ௡ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷᒉᒻड़̝Լච۩มć౵‫ޢ‬ଣ੅
ᇆᜩྺົፋវ‫ܫ‬ϡొ࠹ᙯགྷᒉड़த̝Я৵Ą

貳、評估信用部經營效率概念架構

˘ăέ៉ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొᒉྻໄ‫ڶ‬
ྺົдགྷᒉ˯ੵืҋ࢑࠳ᓪγĂᔘᅮፉЇ߆‫ع‬ᄃྺϔ໛఼፜ୖă‫ם‬ӄ
߆΄‫ކ‬ጱĂ۷࢑໰ᜪྺϔĂԼචྺϔϠ߿ᄃ೩̿ྺछќˢĂᏱநྺϔܲᐍĂ
ྺຽԫਕ۞޽ጱĂྺய‫۞ݡ‬ΐ̍ᄃଯᇃඈΑਕĄ҃‫ܫ̚׎‬ϡొ̝‫ؠڱ‬гҜ
Ξ੠४Ҍ 1974 ѐĂ1975 ѐ࿴οĶྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొຽચგநᏱ‫ڱ‬ķĂ‫ܫؠځ‬ϡొ
‫ڱ‬໚ࠎྺົ‫̈́ڱ‬ᅙҖ‫ڱ‬Ăҋѩྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొϒёᒔ଀‫ޠڱ‬гҜĄྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ
̝నϲĂ‫׎‬ϫ۞ߏдќ‫ࣶົצ‬хഠĂͽ೩ֻົࣶᄃ‫׎‬В͗छᛳٙᅮ̝ྺຽ
ྤ‫ܛ‬Ă྿ј·ྈྺຽϠயྤ‫ܛ‬Ăܳซྺຽ൴ण̝‫؟‬ўĄᐌ඾έ៉གྷᑻ੓ࢳĂ
ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొјࠎྺົ౵ᔇ᏿۞ొ‫ܝ‬Ă͚೯ྺົଯᇃăֻዚ̈́ܲᐍඈొ‫ܝ‬ຽ
ચĂТॡ˵ԼචྺՅགྷᑻĂ૲જྺՅᓄၷĄ
ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొᔵᛳ‫ٺ‬ԧ઼‫ܛ‬Ꮙវր̝˘ᒖĂҭૄ‫ྺٺ‬ຽ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ۞পঅّᄃ
ྺົк̮ۤົయЇĂᄃ˘ਠથຽᅙҖຽдώኳ˯̪̙࠹ТĄͧтྺົᒉຽ
ቑಛ‫ࢨצ‬дТ˘ડા̰ͽ௡ᖐ˘࣎ྺົࠎࣧ‫݋‬Ą˵ЯѩĂధкઐᅈฏᗉĂ
൑ᅙҖనᕇĂҭ̪ѣઐฏྺົ೩ֻૄᆸ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ‫ڇ‬ચćѩγĂֶĶྺຽ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ‫ڱ‬ķௐ
31 ୧ఢቑྺຽ‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷᒉຽચѣٙࢨ‫ט‬Ăຽચีϫ̙̈́થຽᅙҖкᇹّĞέ
Δ‫ܛ‬Ꮙࡁ੊ੰĂ2009ğć˫ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ‫̳ົۤ׍‬ৈّኳĂӈྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొтѣ
࠳ዶĂљੵ೩ᇥЧྍְຽ̳᎕γĂዶ೩ᇥྺຽଯᇃă੊ቚ̼̈́͛ă჊Ӏְ
ВТᙝࠧ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝ଣ੅ů‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ̶़̝‫ ژ‬101

ຽ෱Ă̙଀͌‫ٺ‬Ѻ̶̝̱Ȉ˟ĞҖ߆ੰྺຽ؎ࣶົĂ2016ğĄѩᄃᅙҖຽ̝
࠳ዶΞҋҖྻϡ̙Тćྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొዶྈྤ‫ܛ‬ᔵᖼх‫ٺ‬Б઼ྺຽ‫ܛ‬ऱĂѩన
ࢍΞ೩ֻ‫ܫ‬ϡొΝ̼ዶྈྤ‫ܛ‬გ྽Ăҭ˵ࢨ‫ܫົྺ˞ט‬ϡొዶྈྤ‫ྻ̝ܛ‬
ϡĞέΔ‫ܛ‬Ꮙࡁ੊ੰĂ2009ğĄ
߆‫ࠎع‬ར၁໰ᜪྺϔĂଯ΍߆ඉّྺຽ૞९෷ഠĂྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొࠎ߆ඉ
ّ૞९ྺ෷۞ٚᏱ፟ၹĂтѩΞֹྺϔ଀ͽᐹ೎Ӏத‫଀פ‬གྷᒉྺຽٙᅮྤ
‫ܛ‬Ąྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ˵ЯᏱந૞९ྺ෷҃‫ྃ଀פ‬෭िĂࠎགྷᒉ̙‫ྺ̝ٽ‬Ⴂົ೩
ֻ˘ีӀૄćѩγĂྺົᓁ຅ְѣˠְЇϡᝋĂΐ˯ઐฏгડՐ̖̈́ˠࣶ
ૈ੊̙֖Ăૄᆸྺົ‫࣎˘ــ‬ឍቾ˘࣎ӫĂ༊ˠְளજॡĂ՟ѣ݈ٕ͘Т
ְΞͽ࠹̢ጯ௫ٕ็ٚĂͷЯຽચᓄѓĂ˵൑‫ڱ‬ણΐ૞ຽᓾ௫Ăౄјྺົ
ˠࣶ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ৵ዳણम̙ᆅć˫ѝഇྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొјϲॡĂ߆‫ࢋع‬Ր۞ְຽྤ‫ܛ‬
ᇾ໤ໂҲĂ่Ꮵѣࢨ̝࠳ዶၙၙ௢᎕ְຽྤ‫̳̈́ܛ‬᎕Ă௢᎕ి‫ޘ‬ቤၙĂ˵
̙ည‫ܛ΁׎‬Ꮙ፟ၹΞͽଂྤώξಞ˯ᚯନྤ‫ܛ‬ĂٙͽĂ̈̚‫ܫົྺݭ‬ϡొ
ஐࣃઐҲĂซ҃˵ᇆᜩ‫׎‬གྷᒉఢሀĄ
Ϥ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొѣҾ‫ٺ‬ᅙҖĂх‫ٸ‬ഠᙷҾ˵ѣमளĂੵ˘ਠх‫ٸ‬ഠγĂ
ͧྵপঅ۞ߏ‫ܫ‬ϡొѣ૞९‫ٸ‬ഠĞproject loansğă௚˘ྺ෷Ğunified loansğ
‫ྺ׶‬ຽ൴णૄ‫ܛ‬෷ഠĞagricultural development fundğඈć࠹၆۞Ă‫ٸ‬ഠ‫݋‬
ѣྺຽ൴णૄ‫ܛ‬෷ഠ̝ᔉг‫ٸ‬ഠĞfarm-field loansğ
ăྺ፟‫ٸ‬ഠĞagricultural
machine loansğăྺ‫ٸޙ‬ഠĞagricultural development loansğᄃྺш‫ٸ‬ഠ
Ğfarm-house loansğĞ̚රϔ઼ྺົĂ2019ğĄ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ፟ၹ͹ࢋຽચͽхഠă
‫ٸ‬ഠࠎ͹Ăӛќхഠˠ۞ྤ‫ܛ‬Ă෷‫ٸ‬ගྤ‫ܛ‬ᅮՐ۰Ăᔇ‫פ‬ӀमĂࠎ͹ࢋᒉ
ຽќˢֽ໚ć҃࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠĂ˫Ⴭࠎ๊ќഠีĂߏϫ݈Ꮚณ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ፟ၹᒻड़ٕ
Ϡய˧‫ܧ‬૱ࢦࢋ޽ᇾ̝˘ĄٙͽĂଂхഠă‫ٸ‬ഠ̈́ஐࣃĞnet valueğΞ៍၅
ᒉຽఢሀĂЯ‫ٸ‬ഠຽચҫྤயඕၹ̂ొ̶Ă҃࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ‫៍݋‬၅෷‫ݡٸ‬ኳĂ
Ϻӈ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠԾᙯྤய‫ݡ‬ኳĄΞϤБវྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొхഠ‫ܛ‬ᗝᄃ‫ٸ‬ഠ‫ܛ‬ᗝĂ
ֽ˞ྋྺົགྷᒉఢሀ̈́ᒻड़ć˫ଂ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠᄃ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧதĂᑭෛྺົ‫ܫ‬
ϡొྤய‫ݡ‬ኳćซ҃Ϥፋវ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ፟ၹ̚Ă៍၅Бវྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ̝хഠξಞ
Κѣதă‫ٸ‬ഠξಞΚѣதᄃඁ݈ஐӀĂགྷᒉᒻड़۞ត̼Ą
102 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 17 ‫ס‬ăௐ 2 ഇĞ2021/आ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

(˘) Бវྺົх‫ٸ‬ഠј‫̈́ܜ‬࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧதుѐ˭ࢫ

Бវྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొВѣώొ 283 छᄃ 817 छ̶ొĂၟҌ 2018 ѐ‫ͤغ‬Ăх

ഠᓁዶᗝ 1 Џ 7,919 ᆆ̮Ă‫ٸ‬ഠᓁዶᗝ 1 Џ 878 ᆆ̮Ă࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ 50 ᆆ̮Ă
࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧத 0.46%Ą҃ 2007 ѐхഠᓁዶᗝ 1 Џ 3,214 ᆆ̮ĂҌ 2018 ѐࠎ
1 Џ 7,919 ᆆ̮Ă12 ѐֽᓁхഠј‫ ܜ‬35.6%ć˫ଂ 2007 ѐ‫ٸ‬ഠᓁዶᗝ 7,030
ᆆ̮ĂҌ 2018 ѐࠎ 1 Џ 878 ᆆ̮Ă12 ѐֽᓁ‫ٸ‬ഠј‫ ܜ‬54.7%ĄѩγĂ࿈ഇ
‫ٸ‬ഠᓁዶᗝϤ 2007 ѐ۞ 451 ᆆ̮Ă˭ࢫҌ 2018 ѐ 50 ᆆ̮Ă12 ѐֽ˭ࢫ
88.9%ć҃ϤБវྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧத଀ۢĂଂ 2007 ѐ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧத
6.42%Ă˭ࢫҌ 2018 ѐ̝ 0.46%Ă12 ѐֽ˭ࢫ 5.96%ĄϤ 2007 ѐҌ 2018
ѐБវྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొхഠ‫ܛ‬ᗝă‫ٸ‬ഠ‫ܛ‬ᗝă࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠᄃ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧத଀ۢĂ
གྷᒉᒻड़ഈј‫ܜ‬ăྤய‫ݡ‬ኳഈԼච͞ШᔙซĄ

(˟) ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొх‫ٸ‬ഠξಞҫѣதుѐ˭ࢫ

൒дхഠ͞ࢬĂЯ‫ܛ΁׎זצ‬Ꮙ፟ၹ̝፬ধᚮ‫ۋ‬Ăፋវྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొх
ഠ̙ᕝ߹εĂхഠξಞΚѣதϤ 1998 ѐ 8.1%˭ࢫҌ 2018 ѐ 3.7%Ăξҫத
ഴ͌ 54%Ă‫ځ‬ពӔன਽ੜᔌ๕Ăтဦ 1 ٙϯĄ҃‫ٸ‬ഠξಞΚѣத‫݋‬Ϥ 1998
ѐ 5.3%˭ࢫҌ 2004 ѐ 2.9%ĂϺӔன਽ੜᔌ๕Ąҭ‫ܕ‬ѐֽĂ߆‫ع‬ଯ΍߆ඉ
ّ૞९ྺຽ෷ഠĂྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొᄃྺຽ‫ܛ‬ऱЪүٚତ̂‫ݭ‬ᓑ෷९Ăྤੈր௚
ుՎፋЪјྤੈВϡր௚ඈЯ৵Ăࡗர 10 ѐ‫ٸ‬ഠҫѣத̂࡭ჯ޺д 3.3%ν
ΠĂӔன޺πன෪Ąྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ 12 ѐֽ۞х‫ٸ‬ഠ̙ᕝј‫ܜ‬Ă‫̚׎‬хഠј‫ܜ‬
35.6%Ă‫ٸ‬ഠј‫ ܜ‬54.7%Ăҭᄃፋវ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ፟ၹͧྵĂྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొхഠξಞΚ
ѣத̪Ӕன਽ੜன෪Ă‫ٸ‬ഠξಞΚѣதӔனА਽ੜ‫޺ޢ‬πன෪Ăтဦ 2 ٙϯĄ

(ˬ) ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొડા̶οଐԛ

έ៉ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొВѣ 283 छĂΔă̚ă‫ݑ‬ă‫ܫົྺ۞ڌ‬ϡొछᇴЧ̙

࠹ТĂΔొΒ߁έΔᎩξăॿ๩ᎩᄃາѻᎩĂВ 56 छć̚ొࠎࡺॷᎩăέ
̚Ꭹăၓ̼Ꭹăำ‫ڒ‬Ꭹᄃ‫ݑ‬ԸᎩĂВ 98 छć‫ొݑ‬Β߁လཌྷᎩăέ‫ݑ‬Ꭹă੼
ฯᎩᄃ‫ڌލ‬ᎩĂВ 98 छć‫ొڌ‬Β߁‫آ‬ᜋᎩă‫܅‬ቷᎩᄃέ‫ڌ‬ᎩĂВ 27 छć
ВТᙝࠧ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝ଣ੅ů‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ̶़̝‫ ژ‬103

%
9.0
8.1 7.9
8.0 7.3
7.0 6.5
6.1 5.9
5.8 5.6
6.0 5.4
5.0 4.6 4.4
4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1
4.0 3.9 3.8
4.0 3.7 3.7

3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
年

ֽ໚ĈፋநҋౘළࠡĞ2008*ğ̈́̚δᅙҖБ஧ྤੈშĞ2008-2019ğĄ

ဦ 1Ĉྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొхഠξಞҫѣத
%
6.0
5.3

5.0 4.7
4.3

4.0 3.8
3.5
3.3 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
3.1 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.2
2.9 3.0
3.0

2.0

1.0

0.0
年

ֽ໚ĈፋநҋౘළࠡĞ2008*ğ̈́̚δᅙҖБ஧ྤੈშĞ2008-2019ğĄ

ဦ 2Ĉྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ‫ٸ‬ഠξಞҫѣத

Ꭹ৺̈́ᗓफĈ̚රϔ઼ྺົă‫ڌލ‬ᎩྺົăመസᎩྺົ̈́ాѯᎩྺົĂВ 4
छĂЯૄᆸྺົֶฏᗉҾనϲĂٙͽБέ‫ܫ‬ϡొछᇴ̶ο‫إ‬ჍπӮĂҭ̪
ͽ̚‫ొݑ‬छᇴઐкĞ̚රϔ઼ྺົĂ2019ğĄ
104 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 17 ‫ס‬ăௐ 2 ഇĞ2021/आ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

(α) ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొఢሀҾ̶̝ཏ

Бវྺົ̶ο‫ٺ‬Б઼ЧฏᗉĂࠎ˞ྋЧฏᗉҾఢሀ̂̈Ăώ͛˜ણ੩
ྺຽ‫ܛ‬ᏉԊ።‫ܛྺب‬ረᒉྻ‫מ‬෸ረ̶̝௡͞ёĂͽ‫ܫ‬ϡొѐᓁќˢ̝
50%ăхഠᓁᗝ̝ 25% ̈́ஐࣃ̝ 25% ˬีΐᝋࢍ̶Ă૟Ч‫ܫ‬ϡొထ̶ј̂
̙̈̚ТఢሀĂͽͧྵ̙Т‫ܫ‬ϡొఢሀม۞পኳᄃमள 4ĄࢵА၆ 283 छྺ
ົ‫ܫ‬ϡొซҖ̶௡ĄљੵέΔξ 3 छăາΔξ 1 छăॿ๩ξ 1 छă‫ڌލ‬Ꭹ 5
छĂЯྤफ़̙Б̈́Ꭹ৺‫׶‬γफ 4 छྺົγĂ‫׎‬ዶ۞ 269 छֶ݈ࢗˬี޽ᇾ
ΐᝋ‫ޢ‬Ϥ̂Ҍ̈ଵԔ̶јˬ௡Ă̶Ҿࠎ̂ఢሀ‫ܫ‬ϡొ 91 छă̚ఢሀ‫ܫ‬ϡొ
92 छĂͽ̈́̈ఢሀ‫ܫ‬ϡొ 86 छĂซ҃ࢍზ࣎Ҿ‫ܫ‬ϡొ 2013 ѐҌ 2018 ѐ̝
݈ࢗˬีπӮΐᝋᓁᗝĂͽາΔξгડྺົ౵੼Ăέ‫ڌ‬гડྺົ౵ҲĂາ
Δξгડྺົߏέ‫ڌ‬гડྺົ 12.3 ࢺĂтဦ 3 ٙϯĂϤѩΞ̙ۢТгડ̝
ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొఢሀ̂̈मள࠹༊ᚙঅĞ̚රϔ઼ྺົĂ2014-2019ğĄ

百萬元
100,000 92,776
90,000
80,000
70,000
60,000 52,779
45,161
50,000
40,876 41,256 42,472
40,000
28,672 29,580
30,000
20,131
17,256
20,000 12,933 13,561 13,462
10,000 7,527 8,465

ֽ໚Ĉࢍზҋ̚රϔ઼ྺົĞ2019ğĄ

ဦ 3Ĉ2018 ѐЧᎩξྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొఢሀҾ

4
Җ߆ੰྺຽ؎ࣶົᓝᏱ̝ྺ‫ܛ‬ረᒉྻ‫מ‬෸ረĂҌ 2020 ѐ̏ᓝᏱҌ 14 ‫ب‬ረĂώֹ͛ϡ‫׎‬
̚ 2013 ѐҌ 2018 ѐВ 6 ѐ۞ྤफ़Ăѩ˘ረีߏܑೳྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొᒉྻᐹК۞˘࣎ረีĂ
˘ਠ၆‫଀ٺ‬ረ۰Ξਕᖎ̼ࠎߏᒉྻड़த࠹၆ᐹኳ۞ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొĄረี̶௡тϒ͛ٙࢗĄ
ВТᙝࠧ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝ଣ੅ů‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ̶़̝‫ ژ‬105

ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ̶ࠎ̂̈̚ఢሀҾ‫ޢ‬Ăܑ 1 Ӕன 2013 ѐҌ 2018 ѐЧఢሀ

Ҿྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ̝хഠă‫ٸ‬ഠ̈́࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ̝πӮᓁᗝ̈́ 6 ѐπӮᇴĂϤܑ 1
Ξۢ 6 ѐхഠᓁᗝĂ̂ఢሀྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొߏ̚ఢሀ 2.4 ࢺĂ̚ఢሀྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ
ߏ̈ఢሀ 2.4 ࢺĂពϯྺົఢሀ̂̈дхഠᓁᗝ͞ࢬम෼‫̂ޝ‬Ą̱ѐπӮ‫ٸ‬
ഠᓁᗝ͞ࢬĂ̂ఢሀྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొߏ̚ఢሀ 3.1 ࢺĂ̚ఢሀྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొߏ̈ఢ
ሀ 2.7 ࢺкĂពϯྺົఢሀ̂̈д‫ٸ‬ഠᓁᗝ͞ࢬम෼Հ̂Ąд࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ͞ࢬ
Ξ൴னĂ̚ఢሀ‫ܫ‬ϡొ 6 ѐπӮ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ౵੼Ă̂ఢሀ‫ܫ‬ϡొѨ̝Ă̈ఢ
ሀ‫ܫ‬ϡొ౵͌Ă࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠᄃ‫ܫ‬ϡొఢሀ̂̈‫݋‬൑˘‫ؠ‬ᙯܼĄ

ܑ 1Ĉ2013 ѐҌ 2018 ѐЧఢሀҾྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ̝хഠă

‫ٸ‬ഠ̈́࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ̝πӮ *
ಏҜĈ˼̮

ఢ ሀ Ҿ
̂ఢሀྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ ̚ఢሀྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ ̈ఢሀྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ
ѐ‫ޘ‬
࿈ഇ ࿈ഇ ࿈ഇ
хഠ ‫ٸ‬ഠ хഠ ‫ٸ‬ഠ хഠ ‫ٸ‬ഠ
‫ٸ‬ഠ ‫ٸ‬ഠ ‫ٸ‬ഠ
2013 11,095,862 6,554,525 35,046 4,335,997 1,988,296 47,068 1,641,411 646,229 13,403
2014 11,458,867 7,031,410 21,004 4,583,091 2,108,830 36,193 1,804,330 756,704 8,786
2015 11,605,242 7,381,040 15,825 4,709,891 2,274,005 30,685 1,932,306 821,470 7,170
2016 11,736,935 7,439,780 16,683 4,855,953 2,361,452 27,160 2,043,048 887,376 6,019
2017 11,857,903 7,577,005 17,176 4,929,083 2,544,046 25,016 2,111,275 934,050 7,467
2018 11,813,689 7,912,450 22,900 5,033,168 2,698,250 21,960 2,180,361 1,013,630 6,904
6ѐ
11,594,750 7,316,035 21,439 4,741,197 2,329,147 31,347 1,952,122 843,243 8,292
πӮ
ֽ໚Ĉፋநҋ̚රϔ઼ྺົĞ2014-2019ğĄ
ොĈ * ٙѣྤफ़Ӯͽ 2018 ѐࠎૄഇĄ

Чྺົٙᛳ۞ఢሀҾд݈ࢗˬ࣎޽ᇾᝋࢦ̝ࢍზ˭ĂЧѐΞਕᕩᛳ‫ٺ‬
̙ТఢሀҾĂ҃ͽ౵‫˘ܕ‬ѐ 2018 ѐࠎּĂ݈ȈЩ̝̂ఢሀྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొĂֶ
Ԕࠎ‫ڕ‬፜ડăາఄડă̚‫׶‬гડăፘ‫ڒ‬ડă֧̂ડă੼ฯгડăᛀ߷ડă
ϖ૵ડăѱͤડ̈́ˬࢦડඈྺົĞ̚රϔ઼ྺົĂ2019ğĂ݈ 10 Щ̂ఢሀ
ྺົ̚ĂҜ‫ٺ‬າΔξгડҫѣ 7 छĂ҃‫ڕ‬፜ડྺົాᜈ 5 ѐ࠰ᖩᓑௐ˘Щă
ௐ˟Щࠎາఄડྺົ̈́ௐˬЩࠎ̚‫׶‬гડྺົĄ‫ޢ‬ȈЩ̈ఢሀྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡ
106 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 17 ‫ס‬ăௐ 2 ഇĞ2021/आ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

ొĂ̶Ҿࠎऩ࠺ฏă˛۵ડă֘‫ݱ‬гડăָ΋ฏăνᗉડă‫ܜ‬ᑺฏăሗэ
ᗉăϮ⛬ડă༱ᝇгડ̈́π໨ડඈྺົĞ̚රϔ઼ྺົĂ2019ğĂ‫̚׎‬າΔ
ξ 2 छăາѻᎩ 1 छăέ‫ݑ‬ξ 2 छĂ҃‫ڌލ‬Ꭹ‫݋‬ҫ˞ 5 छĄϤѩΞ֍Ă̈
ఢሀྺົдᎩξҾ۞̶೸඀‫̂ྵͧޘ‬Ą

˟ăෞҤྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొड़த۞͞‫ڱ‬
ͽ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴĞDDFğੵΞ҂ณྺົ‫ٸ‬ഠ̈́࠳ዶ۞ຍ୬ய΍γĂ
֭଀ͽৼˢ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ̝‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍Ă҃ଳϡВТᙝࠧ‫ڱ‬Ă‫݋‬ΞҤზٙѣྺ
ົ۞ВТᙝࠧड़தĂ̈́Чྺົ̶ٙᛳ۞̂̈̚ఢሀཏ௡ᙝࠧड़தĄ҃ DDF
дĶ‫׌‬჌Ըˢăಏ˘ய΍ķߛၹ˭ĂͽඈயณѡቢĞisoquant curveğҤზ
΍ϠயᙝࠧĞٕჍࠎԫఙ݈ቡğĂ‫ͽߏ݋‬౵̂Ӏማٕ౵̈јώ̶‫ژ‬ड़தĄ˫
д DEA ሀ‫̚ݭ‬҂ณ‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍Ăຍ޽ࢋഴٕ͌٦ୢ‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍ื‫܅‬෱јώ
ٕᜁࠗрய΍ĞFäre, et al., 1989; Sahoo, et al., 2016ğĂ҃ ChangĞ1999ğ૟
ࢲᐍྤயă࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠٕ౯‫ٯ‬ӑ૳ˬ۰ෛࠎࢲᐍ޽ᇾĂЯкᇴྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ้
ШᏴፄ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠซҖࢲᐍგநĂ҃ᅙҖٕྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొࠎࢫҲ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠĂื
‫ੰڱז‬Ϧኛ‫ٕٮڱ‬ᖼዚӑ૳Ăᅮ఍ཉјώĂ߇࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ̝‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍ΞЪ
நෛࠎऴΞ٦Ğweakly separatableğĄ

(˘) DEA ඕЪ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ

ShephardĞ1970ğࢵ‫ͽޘ‬෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴĞdistance functionğ૟ DEA ͽ͞Ш

ّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴĂТॡৼˢ‫ٸ‬ഠ̈́࠳ዶ۞ຍ୬ய΍̈́࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ̝‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍Ă
҃ Shephard ᄃ FäreĞ1974ğซ҃೩΍ΞඕЪрᗼய΍̝ᓑЪϠயĞjoint
productionğໄ‫ه‬ĄFäre ඈˠĞ2005ğГ࣒ϒ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴĂѩ˘࣒ϒ̝
͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ‫݋‬ᇃ‫ھ‬ᑕϡ‫ז‬Ꮚณਕ໚ड़தٕෞҤЧயຽᅳાϠயᒻड़Ą
Ᏼፄ Färe ඈˠĞ2005ğన‫ؠ‬ෞҤྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ̝གྷᒉड़தĂ΃ܑྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ
̝Ϡயԫఙ‫ٸ‬ഠ̈́࠳ዶ̝ԫఙะЪĞtechnology setĂTğΞ‫ؠ‬ཌྷт (1)ёĈ

T =  ( y, b, x) : x 可以生產 ( y, b)  (1)
ВТᙝࠧ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝ଣ੅ů‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ̶़̝‫ ژ‬107

઄నѣ N छྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొԸˢ x Ğ౻જăྤ‫ܛ‬ăྤώğĂ x ΞϠய M ࣎ຍ୬

ய΍ y Ă b ‫ܧ۞ࠎ݋‬ຍ୬ய΍ઘய‫ݡ‬ĂЧё‫ؠ‬ཌྷт˭Ĉ

x = ( x1 ,..., xN )  R+N ; xn 代表 n =1...... N ౻જĂྤ‫ܛ‬Ăྤώ۞Ըˢ

y = ( y1 ,, yM )  R+M ; ym 代表 m =1...... M ‫ٸ‬ഠĂ࠳ዶ۞ຍ୬ய΍

b = (b1 ,..., bJ )  R+J ; bj 代表 j =1...... J ۞࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍

Ϥ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొϠயԫఙஉᄏ˞࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ̝‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍ĂЯѩĂග‫ؠ‬Ըˢ
ଐ‫˭ڶ‬Ă΃ܑ‫ٸ‬ഠ̈́࠳ዶຍ୬ய΍̝ะЪĞoutput set; P ( x ) ğт(2)ёĈ

P( x)   ( y, b) : ( y, b, x)  T  (2)

ֶፂ Chung et al.Ğ1997ğ̝న‫ؠ‬Ă҂ณ‫ٸ‬ഠ̈́࠳ዶຍ୬ய΍̈́࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬
ഠ‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍̝͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴĂт(3)ёٙϯĈ

D0 ( x, y, b; g )  max  : ( y    g y , b    gb )  P( x) (3)

Färe et al.Ğ2001ğ޽΍ඈּͧഴ͌‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ᄃᆧΐຍ୬ய΍ĂΞ྿‫ז‬౵ָ̝
ϠயᙝࠧćЯѩĂд‫ٸ‬ഠ̈́࠳ዶᆧΐᄃ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠഴ಼͌‫࠹ޘ‬Т˭Ă  ࠎТ
ॡ྿ј‫ٸ‬ഠ̈́࠳ዶຍ୬ய΍ y ᆧΐĂ̈́࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍ b ഴ͌౵̂Ξ
ਕณĄ
҃ဦ 4 ̚ g  ( g y ,  gb ) ΃ܑ͞ШّШณĂܑϯྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ‫ٸ‬ഠٕ࠳ዶ
ຍ୬ய΍ᄃ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍۞˘ϒ˘࢑ᙯܼĂ༊ྺົࢋТॡᆧΐ   g y
‫ٸ‬ഠٕ࠳ዶĂ֭Тॡഴ͌   gb ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠĂͽ྿‫ז‬౵ዋய΍Ϡயड़த݈ቡĂ
ߏ੠Ր‫ٸ‬ഠ̈́࠳ዶϒຍ୬ய΍۞ໂ̼̂ᄃ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍۞ໂ̼̈Ą

҃༊ D0 ( x, y, b; g )=0 Ăܑϯྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొٕ DMU Ҝ‫ٺ‬ड़த݈ቡ˯Ăܑϯྺົ

‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷᒉ‫׍‬ѣड़தĄ̝ͅĂࡶ༊ D0 ( x, y, b; g )>0 ॡĂܑϯྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొٕ DMU
Ҝ‫ٺ‬ड़த݈ቡ̰઎Ăܑϯྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొхдགྷᒉ൑ड़தĄ˫дऴΞ٦̝઄న
˭Ăຍӈࢋഴ͌࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍Ăυืᜁٕࠗഴ͌˘ֱ‫ٸ‬ഠ̈́࠳ዶຍ
108 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 17 ‫ס‬ăௐ 2 ഇĞ2021/आ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

୬ய΍Ăтѩֹ଀ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొд൑გ‫ט‬ԫఙĞunregulated technololgyğ˭̝
ड़தͪ໤ΞϤ˭ЧёՐ଀Ĉ

D 0 ( x, y, b; g )  max  k
K
s.t. z
k 1
k
y k  (1   k ) ymk , m  1,......, M (4-1)

z b
k 1
k k
j  (1   )b kj , j  1,......, J (4-2)

z
k 1
k
xnk xnk , n  1,......, N (4-3)

z
k 1
k 1 zk  0, k = 1,......K

意欲產出量y

B  ( y  0.7 g y , b  0.7 gb )
B

( g y ,  gb )

A=(y,b)
P ( x)

非意欲產出量b

ֽ໚Ĉ࣒ϒҋ Chung ඈˠ(1997)Ą

ဦ 4ĈΒஉຍ୬ய΍ᄃ‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ
ВТᙝࠧ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝ଣ੅ů‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ̶़̝‫ ژ‬109

(˟) ВТᙝࠧԫఙड़தăཏ௡ᙝࠧԫఙड़தᄃВТԫఙͧ

ੵТॡৼˢຍ୬̈́‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍γĂ˫҂ณளኳّϠயఢሀ၆ड़த۞Ξ
ਕᇆᜩĂBattese ᄃ RaoĞ2002ğ೩΍̝ВТϠயᙝࠧ‫ב‬ᇴĞmeta-frontier
production functionğ̶‫ߛژ‬ၹĂ˜઄నٙѣ DMU Ξ‫࠹଀פ‬Тԫఙͪ໤̝݈
೩ĂΞซҖٙѣ DMU ‫ٺ‬ВТᙝࠧϠயड़த̝ͧྵ̶‫ژ‬Ąт‫ڍ‬உᄏٙѣྺົ
meta
‫ܫ‬ϡొ۞ԸˢĂӈய΍ВТᙝࠧԫఙ௡Ъ(meta-technology set)ࠎ T Ĉ

T meta =  ( y , b, x) : x 可以生產 ( y , b) (5)

Ϥ‫ٺ‬Ϡயԫఙஉᄏ˞࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍ĂЯѩĂ΃ܑ‫ٸ‬ഠٕ࠳ዶ̝ய΍
meta
ะЪĞoutput setć P ( x) ğࠎ‫ؠ׽‬Ըˢଐ‫˭ڶ‬Ăซ˘Վ‫ؠ‬ཌྷ΍ВТᙝࠧ۞
‫ٸ‬ഠٕ࠳ዶ̝ٙѣΞਕய΍۞ะЪࠎĈ

Pmeta ( x)   ( y, b) : ( y, b, x) T  (6)
 meta
ֶѩ҃଀͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴࠎ D 0 т(7)ёĈ
 meta
D0 ( x, y, b; g )  max  : ( y    g y , b    gb )  P meta ( x) (7)
 meta
Ϥௐ(7)ё଀‫ ז‬D 0 ( x , y , b ; g ) ͽВТᙝࠧઇࠎͧྵૄ໤̝͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ
 meta
ࣃĂд D 0 ( x , y , b ; g ) ܑ̚ன౵ָ۞ϠயಏҜٙԛј۞ΒඛѡቢӈࠎВТϠ
 meta
யᙝࠧĄ D 0 ࣃ෸̂΃ܑВТᙝࠧԫఙ̝൑ड़தࣃ෸̂ĂӈВТᙝࠧԫఙ
 meta
ड़த෸ҲĂܑϯ DMU ᗓВТᙝࠧ෸ᅈĂ̝ͅĂ༊ D 0  0 ॡĂ΃ܑВТᙝ
ࠧԫఙ౵ѣड़தĂӈ DMU ᗓВТᙝࠧ෸‫ܕ‬Ąт˯Ч჌న‫ؠ‬ĂΞͽ଀‫ז‬ВТ
ᙝࠧԫఙड़தĂ TE meta Ăт(8)ёĈ
 meta
TE meta  1  D 0 ( x, y, b; g ) (8)

઄నௐ k ࣎ཏ௡ጾѣͽ˭Ըˢய΍௡ЪĂཏ௡ᙝࠧԫఙ௡Ъ
k
(group-technology set)ࠎ T k ă၆ᑕ۞ய΍ะЪࠎ P ( x) Ă‫݋‬ཏ௡͞Шّ෼ᗓ
 k
‫ב‬ᇴࠎ D 0 т(9)ёĈ
110 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 17 ‫ס‬ăௐ 2 ഇĞ2021/आ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

 k
D0 ( x, y, b; g )  max  : ( y    g y , b    gb )  P k ( x) , k  1, 2,...K (9)
 k
Ϥ(9)ё଀‫ ז‬D 0 ( x , y , b ; g ) ߏͽЧཏ௡ᙝࠧઇࠎͧྵૄ໤ॡٙ଀‫͞ז‬Шّ෼
 k
ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴࣃĂ҃ D 0 ( x , y , b ; g ) ܑ̚ன౵ָ۞ϠயಏҜٙԛј۞Βඛѡቢӈ‫ؠ‬ཌྷ
ࠎཏ௡ϠயᙝࠧĄֶѩĂΞ଀‫ז‬ཏ௡ k ԫఙड़தͽ TE k ܑϯт(10)ёĈ
 k
TE k  1  D 0 ( x , y , b; g ) (10)

གྷϤ(8)̈́(10)˟ёٙᏊณ଀‫۞ז‬ԫఙड़தࣃӮ̬‫ ٺ‬0 ᄃ 1 ̝มĂ༊ྍ

ࣃ෸ତ‫ ܕ‬1 ॡĂܑϯϠயड़த෸ָć̝ͅĂ‫݋‬ड़த෸ҲĄ‫׎‬ѨĂТ˘Ϡய
ಏҜ۞ཏ௡ड़த TE k υ‫ٕٺ̂ؠ‬ඈ‫ٺ‬ВТᙝࠧ TE meta ࣃĂ҃˟۰̝มͧ
தĂӈࠎВТԫఙͧĂт(11)ёĈ
 meta
TE meta (1  D 0 ( x, y, b; g ))
MTR    k (11)
TE k (1  D 0 ( x, y, b; g ))

Ϻӈ༊˘࣎ DMU ۞ TE meta  0.6ĂTE k  0.8 ॡĂ‫ ׎‬MTR ࣃࠎ 0.6 / 0.8  0.75Ą
ܑϯͽ࠹Тࢋ৵Ըˢ௡Ъ x Ăдఢሀ k ۞Ϡயԫఙ˭ĂТ˘࣎ϠயಏҜΪ
ਕ྿‫ז‬ВТᙝࠧϠயԫఙ 75%۞ड़தĄ༊ MTR ࣃ෸੼ॡĂܑϯఢሀ k ٙଳ
ϡ̝ԫఙͪ໤෸ତ‫ܕ‬౵ָВТᙝࠧԫఙͪ໤ć̝ͅĂ‫݋‬෸ᅈᗓĄֶѩĂΞ
ซ˘Վ૟ TE meta ă TE k ᄃ MTR ˬ۰ᙯܼࢦາፋநт(12)ёĈ

TE meta  TE k  MTR (12)

ВТᙝ̶ࠧ‫ߛژ‬ၹтဦ 5Ă༊ѣிкϠயಏҜĂтֶ‫׎‬ԫఙͪ໤̝ளТ
ડ̶ࠎˬ࣎ཏ௡Ăˬ࣎ཏ௡ఢሀ‫׍‬౯౵ָϠயड़த̝ DMU ̶Ҿၹј̈ఢሀ
ᙝࠧ G3ă̚ఢሀᙝࠧ G2 ᄃ̂ఢሀᙝࠧ G1Ą࣐ࡶซ˘Վ઄న G1ăG2 ᄃ
G3 ˬ࣎ఢሀٙѣ۞ DMU ࠰ͽሕд౵ָ۞Ϡயͪ໤ซҖϠயĂѩॡ‫׍‬౯౵
ָϠயड़த̝ DMU ӈၹј˘࣎ВТᙝࠧ MĄ઄న˘࣎̚ఢሀ G2 ѣ˘࣎
DMU ̝Ϡய௡Ъࠎ b 0 Ăѩॡ૟ b 0 ۞੼‫̚ͽੵޘ‬ఢሀᙝࠧ G2 ˯౵ָϠய௡
Ъ b1 ੼‫ޘ‬ĂϺӈྍ DMU ٙᛳཏ௡̝ཏ௡ड़த TE k ć˫઄ࡶྍ DMU ͽሕд
౵ָϠயԫఙͪ໤ซҖϠயĂ‫݋‬дВТᙝࠧ˯౵ָ b 2 ۞੼‫ ͽੵޘ‬b 0 ۞੼
‫ޘ‬Ăӈྍ DMU ̝ВТԫఙͧத MTRĄ
ВТᙝࠧ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝ଣ੅ů‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ̶़̝‫ ژ‬111

2
b2
Y

b1
1
Y

Y0 b0

ဦ 5ĈВТᙝࠧᄃཏ௡ᙝ̝ࠧᙯܼ

參、樣本來源與實證結果分析

˘ăᇹώֽ໚̈́តᇴୃࢗ௚ࢍ
ώ̶͛ٙ‫ܫົྺ۞ژ‬ϡొ̶ᛳЧฏăᗉăડ̝ૄᆸྺົĂ҃ࠎ˞ͧྵ
̙Т‫ܫ‬ϡొఢሀม۞পኳᄃमளĂ૟ 269 छྺົЧѐ‫̶ޘ‬ᛳ‫̈̂̚ٺ‬ఢሀ
ҾĂҭ‫ ̚׎‬2013 ѐЯາΔξπ໨ડăॿ๩ξ៍ࢰડă‫ڌލ‬Ꭹሗэᗉăາ๩
ฏă੼ፘฏăָ΋ฏă༱ᝇгડ 5 छăᎩ৺‫׶‬γफ̝ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొྤफ़̙БĂ
߇౵‫ྤ঻่ܲޢ‬फ़ᆅБ۞ྺົĂЯ৿႒ྤफ़۞ྺົ̶ᛳ̙ТఢሀҾĂ߇౵
‫ ۞঻ܲޢ‬269 छ‫ܫ‬ϡొߏд̂̈̚ఢሀҾѣԆፋ 2013-2018 ѐྤफ़̝‫ܫ‬ϡ
ొĂ̶ҾߏέΔξ 6 छăາΔξ 23 छă‫آ‬ᜋᎩ 10 छăॿ๩Ꭹ 11 छăາѻ
Ꭹ 11 छăࡺॷᎩ 17 छăέ̚Ꭹ 22 छăၓ̼Ꭹ 26 छă‫ݑ‬ԸᎩ 13 छăำ‫ڒ‬
Ꭹ 20 छăလཌྷᎩ 17 छăέ‫ݑ‬Ꭹ 32 छă੼ฯᎩ 26 छă‫ڌލ‬Ꭹ 18 छă‫܅‬ቷ
Ꭹ 9 छᄃέ‫ڌ‬Ꭹ 8 छĂЧछྺົϤ 2013 Ҍ 2018 ѐ̱ѐВ 1,614 ඊྤफ़Ą
112 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 17 ‫ס‬ăௐ 2 ഇĞ2021/आ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

҃ఢሀ̶ཏ‫ߏ݋‬Чѐֶΐᝋ‫ޢ‬ᇴࣃϤ̂Ҍ̈ଵԔ̶јˬ௡Ă̂̈̚ఢ
ሀҾπӮ̶Ҿࠎ 91 छă92 छ̈́ 86 छĂֶ֭ѩࢍზ 2013-2018 ѐЧఢሀҾ
‫ܫ‬ϡొ̱ѐԸˢᄃய΍តᇴ̝πӮᓁᗝ̈́ᇾ໤मĞ̚රϔ઼ྺົĂ
2014-2019ğĄຍ୬ய΍̝‫ٸ‬ഠ̈́࠳ዶă‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍̝࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ̈́౻જĞϡ
ˠ෱ϡğăྤ‫ܛ‬Ğхഠğ̈́ྤώĞ‫ྤؠ׽‬யğˬีԸˢĂЧតᇴ‫ؠ‬ཌྷ̈́௡ј
тܑ 2 ٙϯĄܑ҃ 3 ܑ̈́ 4 ࠎ࠹ᙯԸˢய΍ 2013-2018 ̱ѐٕЧѐ‫̝ޘ‬π
Ӯࣃᄃᇾ໤मĄ

ܑ 2ĈԸˢᄃய΍តᇴᏴፄ
ԸˢƟய΍ តᇴ‫ؠ‬ཌྷ តᇴ௑ཱི ಏҜ ௡јࡊϫ
ຍ୬ய΍ ‫ٸ‬ഠ y1 ˼̮Ɵѐ ˘ਠፉܲ‫ٸ‬ഠ+൑ፉܲ‫ٸ‬ഠ+෭ன
+౅͚+௚˘ྺ෷+૞९‫ٸ‬ഠ
+ྺຽ൴णૄ‫ܛ‬෷ഠ+̰ొᏉྤ
࠳ዶĞ࠳ᓪğ y2 ˼̮Ɵѐ ќˢ–͚΍
‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍ ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ b ˼̮Ɵѐ ๊ќഠี
ࢋ৵Ըˢ ౻જĞϡˠ෱ϡğ x1 ˼̮Ɵѐ ϡˠ෱ϡ
ྤ‫ܛ‬Ğᓁхഠğ x2 ˼̮Ɵѐ ͚ைхഠ+ܲ;͚ை+߿ഇхഠ
+߿ഇᐼᄊхഠ+‫ؠ‬ഇхഠ
+ࣶ̍ᐼᄊхഠ+̳ऱхഠ
ྤώĞ‫ྤؠ׽‬யğ x3 ˼̮Ɵѐ ‫ྤؠ׽‬யᓁᗝ–௢᎕Զᖞ

˟ăྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొВТᙝࠧड़தăཏ௡ᙝࠧड़த̈́ВТԫఙ̝ͧ
̶‫ژ‬

(˘) ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొЧఢሀҾड़தᄃВТԫఙ̶̝ͧ‫ژ‬

ॲፂ݈ࢗ (1) - (12) ёВТᙝࠧඕЪ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴሀ‫ݭ‬Ăͽ GAMS ඀ё

ՐྋĂࢵА၆ 269 छྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొĂ̶ཏࠎ̂ఢሀ‫ܫ‬ϡొĞG1ğ
ă̚ఢሀ‫ܫ‬ϡ
ొĞG2ğĂ̈́̈ఢሀ‫ܫ‬ϡొĞG3ğඈˬ࣎ఢሀҾĄϤܑ 5 ඕ‫ڍ‬ΞۢĂ̂ఢ
ሀ G1 ۞ TE meta πӮࣃĂҋ 2013 ѐҌ 2018 ѐ̶Ҿࠎ 0.8086ă0.8292ă0.8574ă
0.8658ă0.8538 ᄃ 0.9029Ăͽ 2018 ѐࠎּĂ‫ ׎‬TE meta πӮࣃࠎ 0.9029Ăܑ
ϯࡶଳϡ౵ָགྷᒉԫఙĂ‫̪݋‬ѣ (1-0.9029)100%=9.71% ड़தԼච۩มĂ
ВТᙝࠧ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝ଣ੅ů‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ̶़̝‫ ژ‬113

࠹Т͞ёΞࢍზ 2013-2018Ă҃ЧѐҌ౵ָड़த̶Ҿѣ 19.14%ă17.08%ă

14.26%ă13.42%ă14.627% ۞೩̿۩มĂពϯВТᙝࠧड़த̂࡭Ӕனుѐ
ј‫ܜ‬ᔌ๕Ą҃Ҍ౵ָགྷᒉड़தĂ̚ఢሀ G2 ۞ TE meta ड़தϤ 2013-2018 ̶Ҿ
ѣ 28.29%ă29.72%ă26.96%ă26.16%ă24.97% ᄃ 20.40% ۞೩̿۩มć̈
ఢሀ G3 ۞ TE meta ҋ 2013 ѐҌ 2018 ѐĂ‫̶݋‬Ҿѣ 31.45%ă32.52%ă32.36%ă
30.41%ă32.72% ᄃ 27.62% ड़த೩̝̿۩มĄ

ܑ 3Ĉέ៉ЧఢሀҾྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొЧតᇴ 2013 ѐҌ 2018 ѐ̝πӮᇴᄃᇾ໤म*

ಏҜĈາέ။˼̮
ఢሀ Ըˢᄃய΍ តᇴЩჍ πӮᇴ ᇾ໤म
̂ఢሀ Ըˢ ౻જ 79,072 42,948
‫ܫ‬ϡొ ྤ‫ܛ‬ 11,594,750 6,811,578
Ğ91 छğ ྤώ 594,245 580,831
ຍ୬ய΍ ‫ٸ‬ഠ 7,316,035 5,475,402
࠳ዶ 40,302 39,350
‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍ ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ 21,439 41,938
̚ఢሀ Ըˢ ౻જ 37,690 8,881
‫ܫ‬ϡొ ྤ‫ܛ‬ 4,746,710 897,924
Ğ92 छğ ྤώ 254,976 187,716
ຍ୬ய΍ ‫ٸ‬ഠ 2,332,505 944,032
࠳ዶ 11,231 8,174
‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍ ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ 31,232 60,115
̈ఢሀ Ըˢ ౻જ 16,018 7,947
‫ܫ‬ϡొ ྤ‫ܛ‬ 1,962,566 805,913
Ğ86 छğ ྤώ 140,325 120,698
ຍ୬ய΍ ‫ٸ‬ഠ 849,440 527,605
࠳ዶ 3,386 3,314
‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍ ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ 8,328 15,726
ොĈ * ٙѣྤफ़Ӯͽ 2018 ѐࠎૄഇĄ

‫׎‬ѨĂГ៍၅ЧྺົఢሀҾ MTR ̝੼ҲĂ‫݋‬Ξ˞ྋপ‫ؠ‬ఢሀٙౄј̝

TE ᄃ TE meta ̝मளĂ༊ MTR ࣃ෸੼Ăܑϯఢሀ G ෸ତ‫ ܕ‬TE meta Ă΃ܑ‫צ‬
k

‫ז‬གྷᒉᒖဩ͚޺۞ԫఙͪ໤ດ੼ć̝ͅĂ‫݋‬ԫఙͪ໤෸ҲĄТᇹॲፂܑ 5
ΞۢĂ̂ఢሀ G1 ̝ MTR ̂࡭Ӕனుѐј‫ܜ‬Ăͷ።ѐ̂ఢሀ G1 ۞ MTR π
Ӯࣃᔌ‫ ܕ‬1Ăᔌ‫ܕ‬౵ָ TE meta Ąдड़தࣃ۞ྋ᝝˯Ăͽ 2018 ѐࠎּĂG1 ‫׎‬
114 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 17 ‫ס‬ăௐ 2 ഇĞ2021/आ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

MTR πӮࣃࠎ 0.9998Ă‫׎‬ٙଳϡ۞πӮԫఙͪ໤ਕૉ྿‫ז‬౵ָ TE meta ۞

0.9998100%=99.98%Ă΃ܑ̂ఢሀ 2018 ѐԫఙͪ໤ೀͼ྿‫ז‬౵ָ TE meta Ă
ͅ៍Ă̈̚ఢሀ G2 ᄃ G3 ̝ MTR πӮࣃ̶Ҿࠎ 92.09% ᄃ 90.31%Ăܑϯ
‫׎‬πӮԫఙͪ໤Ϊਕ྿‫ז‬౵ָड़த۞ 92.09% ᄃ 90.31%Ą
ซ҃ĂҤზЧఢሀཏ௡̝ TE k Ăҋ 2013 ѐҌ 2016 ѐĂ̚ఢሀྺົ G2
̝ TE k πӮࣃҲ‫̈ٺ‬ఢሀྺົ G3ĂG2 ̝ TE k ָ̙۞ࣧЯ͹ࢋߏགྷᒉԫఙ
Ҳརٙ࡭Ą҃ 2017 ѐҌ 2018 ѐĂ̚ఢሀྺົ G2 ̝ TE k πӮࣃ̏੼‫̈ٺ‬ఢ
ሀྺົ G3Ăፋវ҃֏Ă̂ఢሀ G1 ᄃ̚ఢሀ G2 ̝ TE k πӮࣃ̂࡭Ӕனు
ѐј‫ܜ‬ᔌ๕Ă҃̈ఢሀ G3 ̝ TE k πӮࣃࡗࠎ 0.8ĄტЪ˯ࢗĂ̙ኢߏ TE meta
ᄃ MTR πӮࣃĂఢሀҾ̂̈ึԔ࠰ᄃྺົགྷᒉᒻड़ԫఙͪ໤੼Ҳ˘࡭ĂϺ
ӈ࠰ࠎ̂ఢሀ G1 ੼‫̚ٺ‬ఢሀ G2ăซ҃˫੼‫̈ٺ‬ఢሀ G3Ăͷҋ 2013 ѐҌ
2018 ѐགྷᒉԫఙड़தӔனј‫ܜ‬ᔌ๕Ă̙҃ТఢሀҾมхдགྷᒉԫఙमளĂ
ఢሀҾ෸̝̂ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొĂ˵೼࿆хдྵ੼གྷᒉԫఙͪ໤Ăֳѣྵָགྷᒉ
ᒻड़Ăೱ֏̝Ăྺົགྷᒉᒻड़ᄃ‫ܫ‬ϡొఢሀӔϒ࠹ᙯĄܑ 5 ౵‫݋ޢ‬Е΍Ч
ఢሀҾ 2013-2018 ̱ѐπӮ̝ TE meta ă TE k ̈́ MTRĂ҃ЧఢሀҾ۞πӮ
TE k Ă̂̈̚ఢሀҾ̶Ҿѣ 0.19%ă7.56% ̈́ 13.58% ԫఙԼච۩มĄ

(˟) ౵ָ̈́‫ޞܨ‬Լච̝ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొπӮཏ௡ड़த

ଂܑ 6 Ξ࠻΍Ă269 छྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ 2013 ѐҌ 2018 ѐπӮВѣ 30 छ྿

౵ָགྷᒉड़தĂӈ TE k =1ă TE meta =1ăMTR=1Ăд̂ఢሀྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొѣ 19
छĞ‫ڕ‬፜ડăາఄડăᛀ߷ડăѱͤડྺົăˬࢦડăϖ૵ડă᜶ႇડă
ࣶ̋ฏăᘲ‫ڌ‬ᗉặ۵ડăন͟ડăսͪฏă̂ฮડă‫˾ڒ‬ડă‫܅‬ጪฏă
͢ߝડă̂ևડăᒨ໨ฏᄃщ‫ؠ‬ડඈྺົğĂ̚ఢሀྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొѣ 3 छĞˬ
ߐгડă‫ޢ‬ᐷᗉᄃፖ̋гડඈྺົğᄃ̈ఢሀྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొѣ 8 छĞ‫ڌ‬പᗉă
൫ྮฏăቢҘฏăंៃฏăјΑᗉăѰ˯ฏăল஧ฏᄃ‫ڊ‬ᆴгડඈྺົğĄ
̂ఢሀྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొҜ‫ا‬າΔξѣ 9 छĂᛳ‫ۡٺ‬ᔑξѣ 14 छĂԆБड़த̂ఢ
ሀྺົҬᄃགྷᑻ൴ण୧Іྵָ۞ΔొгડٕۡᔑξѣٙᙯᓑĄ҃ԆБड़த
̝̈ఢሀྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ̂кҜ‫ڌލٺ‬Ꭹᄃέ‫ڌ‬Ꭹ̝‫ొݑ‬гડĄ˫ԆБड़த̝
̚ఢሀྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొᄃপ‫ؠ‬гાᙯాّྵҲĄ
ВТᙝࠧ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝ଣ੅ů‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ̶़̝‫ ژ‬115

ܑ 4ĈЧఢሀҾྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ 2013-2018 Чѐ‫ޘ‬Ըˢᄃய΍πӮᇴ̈́ᇾ໤म *

ఢ ѐ‫ޘ‬
តᇴЩჍ
ሀ 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Ըˢតᇴ
౻જ 76,770 78,232 80,164 82,189 78,453 78,625
(46,543) (44,172) (42,058) (42,736) (42,081) (40,095)
ྤ‫ܛ‬ 11,095,862 11,458,867 11,605,242 11,736,935 11,857,903 11,813,689
̂ఢሀ‫ܫ‬ϡొ

(6,820,600) (6,911,622) (6,958,700) (6,940,108) (6,991,111) (6,247,328)

ྤώ 495,488 583,351 598,146 611,847 631,708 644,928
(524,845) (578,641) (590,782) (593,138) (599,655) (597,924)
ຍ୬ய΍
‫ٸ‬ഠ 6,554,525 7,031,410 7,381,040 7,439,780 7,577,005 7,912,450
(5,688,674) (5,711,974) (5,573,074) (5,361,264) (5,229,733) (5,287,696)
࠳ዶ 37,916 42,652 45,149 36,753 38,211 41,133
(40,659) (44,417) (43,262) (35,130) (35,226) (37,408)
‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍
࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ 35,046 21,004 15,825 16,683 17,176 22,900
(78,576) (50,778) (26,238) (26,222) (27,973) (41,842)
Ըˢតᇴ
౻જ 36,659 37,206 38,765 38,573 37,217 37,719
(9,501) (9,124) (9,174) (8,569) (8,309) (8,607)
ྤ‫ܛ‬ 4,369,075 4,583,091 4,709,891 4,855,953 4,929,083 5,033,168
̚ఢሀ‫ܫ‬ϡొ

(855,423) (900,365) (892,812) (907,531) (910,280) (921,134)

ྤώ 220,797 247,519 259,649 261,614 267,224 273,053
(184,003) (177,504) (192,904) (190,101) (188,624) (193,161)
ຍ୬ய΍
‫ٸ‬ഠ 2,008,450 2,108,830 2,274,005 2,361,452 2,544,046 2,698,250
(897,720) (999,604) (1,010,786) (981,174) (896,327) (878,579)
࠳ዶ 10,269 11,799 12,079 10,390 10,918 11,931
(10,948) (7,806) (7,744) (7,465) (7,609) (7,473)
‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍
࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ 45,111 36,591 30,924 27,458 25,254 22,054
(85,560) (71,506) (64,774) (53,699) (47,445) (37,709)
Ըˢតᇴ
౻જ 14,844 15,218 16,134 16,682 16,360 16,870
(8,212) (7,756) (7,963) (8,238) (7,737) (7,775)
ྤ‫ܛ‬ 1,704,078 1,804,330 1,932,306 2,043,048 2,111,275 2,180,361
̈ఢሀ‫ܫ‬ϡొ

(766,104) (789,565) (788,726) (814,594) (830,464) (846,022)

ྤώ 95,529 134,094 146,483 147,025 155,514 163,302
(112,183) (102,388) (116,750) (117,579) (131,529) (143,759)
ຍ୬ய΍
‫ٸ‬ഠ 683,409 756,704 821,470 887,376 934,050 1,013,630
(448,793) (484,826) (510,756) (551,173) (565,400) (604,682)
࠳ዶ 3,176 3,657 3,984 2,819 3,245 3,437
(3,129) (3,737) (3,607) (3,070) (3,035) (3,307)
‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍
࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ 13,619 8,786 7,170 6,019 7,467 6,904
(24,224) (18,528) (16,351) (12,042) (12,701) (10,509)
ොĈ * ܑ̚ᇴфࠎТ˘ఢሀҾЧྺົ̝πӮࣃć߁ཱི̰ࠎᇾ໤मĄܑ̚ಏҜࠎ˼̮າέ။ͷ
ͽ 2018 ѐࠎૄഇĄ
116 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 17 ‫ס‬ăௐ 2 ഇĞ2021/आ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

ܑ 5ĈЧఢሀҾ‫ܫ‬ϡొ 2013 ѐҌ 2018 ѐВТᙝࠧड़தăཏ௡ᙝࠧड़தᄃ

ВТԫఙͧத
ѐ‫ޘ‬ ‫ܫ‬ϡొఢሀҾ TE meta TE k MTR
2013 ̂ఢሀ G1 0.8086 0.8169 0.9900
̚ఢሀ G2 0.7171 0.7839 0.9114
̈ఢሀ G3 0.6855 0.7978 0.8506
2014 ̂ఢሀ G1 0.8292 0.8408 0.9863
̚ఢሀ G2 0.7028 0.7484 0.9361
̈ఢሀ G3 0.6748 0.7858 0.8513
2015 ̂ఢሀ G1 0.8574 0.8656 0.9907
̚ఢሀ G2 0.7304 0.7827 0.9279
̈ఢሀ G3 0.6764 0.8014 0.8352
2016 ̂ఢሀ G1 0.8658 0.8727 0.9915
̚ఢሀ G2 0.7384 0.7793 0.9428
̈ఢሀ G3 0.6959 0.8027 0.8607
2017 ̂ఢሀ G1 0.8538 0.8544 0.9993
̚ఢሀ G2 0.7503 0.8320 0.8999
̈ఢሀ G3 0.6728 0.8114 0.8218
2018 ̂ఢሀ G1 0.9029 0.9031 0.9998
̚ఢሀ G2 0.7960 0.8633 0.9209
̈ఢሀ G3 0.7238 0.7986 0.9031
2013-2018 ̂ఢሀ G1 0.8679 0.8695 0.9981
πӮ ̚ఢሀ G2 0.7488 0.8078 0.9244
̈ఢሀ G3 0.6983 0.8000 0.8642

Ωܑ 7 ‫݋‬Ӕன 2013 ѐҌ 2018 ѐπӮ TE k ܑனྵम̝ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొĂ̂

ఢሀ TE k ܑன‫ޞܨ‬Լซ۞ˬछྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ̶Ҿࠎ౪ᆴฏăϔฯฏᄃ‫ݑ‬Ըξ
ඈྺົĂ‫׎‬ड़தࣃࠎ 0.55ă0.56ă0.61Ăពϯ఺ˬ࣎ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొࡶࢋ྿ј౵
ָགྷᒉड़தĂ̪ѣ੼྿ 45%ă44% ᄃ 39% ۞Լච۩มĄ̚ఢሀ TE k ‫ޞܨ‬Լ
ซ۞̶Ҿࠎ‫ޢ‬ጨડăͪ‫ڒ‬ฏᄃૃᐝฏඈྺົĂ‫׎‬ड़தࣃࠎ 0.45ă0.48ă0.50Ă
ѩˬ࣎ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ̪ѣ੼྿ 55%ă52% ᄃ 50% ۞Լච۩มͽ྿౵ָགྷᒉड़
தĄ̈ఢሀ TE k ܑன‫ޞܨ‬Լซ‫̶݋‬Ҿࠎέ‫ݑ‬ξ‫̼ݑ‬ડ̰̈́̂ડྺົᄃ੼ฯ
ξ̰‫ܝ‬ડྺົĂड़தࣃ̶Ҿࠎ 0.33ă0.47ă0.54Ăࢋ྿౵ָགྷᒉड़தЧѣ
67%ă53% ᄃ 46% Լච۩มĄϤѩពϯ̂̈̚ఢሀཏ௡Ӯѣགྷᒉड़த‫ޞܨ‬
Լซ̝ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొĄ൒̙ኢ֤˘჌ఢሀҾĂ2013 Ҍ 2018 ѐགྷᒉड़த‫ޞܨ‬Լ
ซ۞ 9 छྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొк̶οд‫ొݑ‬Ăܑϯྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷᒉᒻड़̝։⯅ѣડ
ાّ̝मளĄ
ВТᙝࠧ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝ଣ੅ů‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ̶़̝‫ ژ‬117

ܑ 6Ĉ2013 ѐҌ 2018 ѐЧఢሀҾπӮ྿౵ָགྷᒉड़த̝ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ

̂ఢሀྺົ G1 ̚ఢሀྺົ G2 ̈ఢሀྺົ G3
າΔξ‫ڕ‬፜ડ ‫آ‬ᜋᎩˬߐгડ ‫ڌލ‬Ꭹ‫ڌ‬പᗉ
າΔξາఄડ ࡺॷᎩ‫ޢ‬ᐷᗉ လཌྷᎩ൫ྮฏ
າΔξᛀ߷ડ າѻᎩፖ̋гડ ၓ̼ᎩቢҘฏ
າΔξѱͤડ ၓ̼Ꭹंៃฏ
າΔξˬࢦડ έ‫ڌ‬ᎩјΑᗉ
έ‫ݑ‬ξϖ૵ડ έ‫ڌ‬ᎩѰ˯ฏ
າΔξ᜶ႇડ ‫ڌލ‬Ꭹল஧ฏ
‫آ‬ᜋᎩࣶ̋ฏ ‫ڌލ‬Ꭹ‫ڊ‬ᆴгડ
‫آ‬ᜋᎩᘲ‫ڌ‬ᗉ
າΔξ̣۵ડ
έ̚ξন͟ડ
ၓ̼Ꭹսͪฏ
έ̚ξ̂ฮડ
າΔξ‫˾ڒ‬ડ
ၓ̼Ꭹ‫܅‬ጪฏ
າΔξ͢ߝડ
έ̚ξ̂ևડ
‫آ‬ᜋᎩᒨ໨ฏ
έ‫ݑ‬ξщ‫ؠ‬ડ
19 छ 3छ 8छ

ܑ 7Ĉ2013 ѐҌ 2018 ѐπӮཏ௡ड़தᒻड़‫ޞܨ‬Լච̝ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ

̂ఢሀྺົ G1 ̚ఢሀྺົ G2 ̈ఢሀྺົ G3
ำ‫ڒ‬Ꭹ౪ᆴฏ έ‫ݑ‬ξ‫ޢ‬ጨડ έ‫ݑ‬ξ‫̼ݑ‬ડ
လཌྷᎩϔฯฏ ำ‫ڒ‬Ꭹͪ‫ڒ‬ฏ ੼ฯξ̰‫ܝ‬ડ
‫ݑ‬ԸᎩ‫ݑ‬Ըξ ၓ̼Ꭹૃᐝฏ έ‫ݑ‬ξ̰̂ડ

(ˬ) ᑭෛડાّྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ̝གྷᒉड़த

тซ˘Վ૟ 269 ֶгநડҜ̶ࠎΔă̚ă‫ݑ‬ă‫ڌ‬α̂ཏྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొĂ

ࢍზ΍ЧડાҾ̝πӮགྷᒉड़தĂॲፂܑ 8 ඕ‫ڍ‬ពϯ 269 छྺົ‫ ٺ‬2013 ѐ
118 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 17 ‫ס‬ăௐ 2 ഇĞ2021/आ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

Ҍ 2018 ѐЧડાҾ̝ TE k ă TE meta ̈́ MTRĂ‫ ̚׎‬TE meta ၆Δొă̚ొă‫ݑ‬

ొ̈́‫ܫົྺొڌ‬ϡొ̝πӮࣃ̶Ҿࠎ 0.8635ă0.7713ă0.6908ă0.8907Ăѩ
ܑϯЧડાҌ౵ָགྷᒉԫఙĂ‫̶݋‬Ҿѣ 13.65%ă22.87%ă30.92% ᄃ 10.93%
ड़த೩̿۞۩มĄ‫׎‬ѨĂ៍၅ડાҾྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ MTR ̝੼ҲĂ༊ MTR ࣃ
෸੼ĂܑϯྍડાҾఢሀٙଳϡԫఙͪ໤྿‫ז‬౵ָВТᙝࠧԫఙͪ໤෸
੼ć̝ͅĂ‫݋‬ԫఙͪ໤෸ҲĄТᇹϤܑ 8 ඕ‫ڍ‬Ξۢ 2013-2018 ѐྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡ
ొ۞ MTR πӮࣃĂΔొă̚ొă‫̶ొڌ̈́ొݑ‬Ҿࠎ 0.9800ă0.9375ă0.9038
ᄃ 0.9824Ă ܑϯ Чડ ા πӮ ԫఙ ͪ ໤̶ Ҿ྿ ‫ ז‬౵ָ ԫఙ ͪ ໤۞ 98%ă
93.75%ă90.38% ᄃ 98.24%Ąซ҃ĂГ៍၅ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొડાҾཏ௡ԫఙड़த
̝੼ҲĂ‫ ొڌ‬TE k ࠎ 0.8806 ᛳαડ̚౵੼۰Ă҃Δă̚ă‫̶ݑ‬Ҿࠎ 0.8215ă
0.7598 ̈́ 0.9070Ą
ტЪ˯ࢗĂ̙ኢߏ TE k ă TE meta ٕ MTR дα࣎ડા̝πӮࣃĂЧડા
ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొπӮགྷᒉᒻड़ԫఙͪ໤̝੼ҲĂֶԔࠎ‫ొڌ‬౵੼ăΔొă̚ొ
Ѩ̝ă‫ొݑ‬౵ҲĂܑϯ̙ТડાҾ̝ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొቁ၁хдགྷᒉԫఙ̝मளĄ
ѩඕኢᙹᖬ˘ਠˠ۞៍‫ه‬Ă็௚ᄮࠎΔొགྷᑻྵᓄၷă‫ܛ‬ᏉξಞϹ‫ٽ‬ሤඛĂ
໰૱நᑕߏΔొྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొड़த౵ָĂଣտ‫ࣧ׎‬Яώ͛ΔొгડΒ߁έΔ
Ꭹξăॿ๩Ꭹ̈́າѻᎩĂྺົఢሀ̂̈̈́གྷᒉड़தम෼࠹၆̂Ăΐ˯ྺົ
छᇴྵ‫ࠎొڌ‬кĂ҃Δొгડྺົ‫إ‬Β߁ొ̶ઐฏྺົĂтϮ⛬ડă‫ڒ؀‬
ડăΔंฏăऩ࠺ฏ̈́ೇᎸડඈड़த࠹၆Ҳ۞ྺົĂЯ҃ٛҲΔొгડፋ
វ۞πӮܑனćѩγĂΔొгડ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ፟ၹ‫ڒ‬ϲĂྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొӀम̈ĂᒔӀ
۩มഴ͌Ăͷྺຽ߿જ࠹၆̙߿ඛĂྺຽ࠹ᙯ෷ഠྵ͌ćͅ៍‫ొڌ‬гડĂ
‫ܛ‬Ꮙ፟ၹྵ͌Ăтѩ҃ͅΎពྺົ۞ࢦࢋّĂֹ଀ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ̝གྷᒉड़த
ྵָćГΐ˯‫ొڌ‬ጾѣ͇൒ਆങᒖဩĂ࡭˧‫ٺ‬೩̿ྺຽԫఙĂߏԧ઼։ኳ
ቌѼ۞̂ώᒉĂ‫آ‬ᜋ‫ڌ܅‬гડྺຽ߿જ࠹၆൴྿ĂТॡֹ଀‫ొڌ‬гડྺົ
ፋវܑன่̙ྵπӮă˵࠹၆ָĄЧડાྺົགྷᒉड़தඕ‫݋ڍ‬Ӕனтܑ 8
̈́ဦ 6Ą
ВТᙝࠧ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝ଣ੅ů‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ̶़̝‫ ژ‬119

ܑ 8ĈЧડાྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ 2013 ѐҌ 2018 ѐπӮВТᙝࠧड़தăཏ௡ड़த

̈́ВТԫఙͧத
ડા̶ο छᇴ TE meta TE k MTR
Δొ 51 0.8635 0.8806 0.9800
̚ొ 98 0.7713 0.8215 0.9375
‫ొݑ‬ 93 0.6908 0.7598 0.9038
‫ొڌ‬ 27 0.8907 0.9070 0.9824

1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Δొ ̚ొ ‫ొݑ‬ ‫ొڌ‬
ВТᙝࠧड़த ཏ௡ड़த ВТԫఙͧத

ဦ 6ĈЧડાҾ 2013 ѐҌ 2018 ѐπӮ̝ВТᙝࠧड़தă

ཏ௡ᙝࠧड़தᄃВТԫఙͧத

肆、影響農會信用部共同邊界及群組邊界經營效率因
素分析
˘ăྤफ़ֽ໚ᄃតᇴᏴፄ
ࠎଣ੅ 2013 ѐҌ 2018 ѐᇆᜩ 269 छྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ̝ВТᙝࠧड़த
Ğ TE meta ğᄃཏ௡ᙝࠧड़தĞ TE k ğ̝Я৵Ă‫݋‬Ᏼ‫ؠ‬ྋᛖតᇴᇆᜩྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡ
ొड़த۞ᒖဩЯ৵ăྺົࣶ̍ᛳّ̈́ੑચЯ৵ćᒖဩЯ৵Β߁ఢሀҾ෍ᑢ
តᇴĂ̶Ҿࠎ̚ఢሀ۞ G2 ̈́̈ఢሀ۞ G3ćΩྺົ͹ࢋ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ‫ڇ‬ચ၆෪ࠎົ
120 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 17 ‫ס‬ăௐ 2 ഇĞ2021/आ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

ࣶĂ˫ྺົົࣶડ̶ࠎϒົࣶᄃᙒӄົࣶ‫ᙷ׌‬âਠ҃֏ĂฏՅઐᅈгડ
ྺົĂϒົࣶΚᓁົࣶͧத࠹၆‫ٺ‬ᙒӄົࣶٙΚͧத੼Ăܑϯྍડ‫ܫ‬ϡొ
ଂְྺຽ߿જ૜ะ඀‫੼ޘ‬Ăѩ၆ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొፋវϠய˧ᒻड़ѣٙᇆᜩĂͅ
̝ĂᙒӄົࣶҫᓁົࣶˠᇴͧதĞAssociateğ΃ܑౌξ̼඀‫੼̝ޘ‬ҲĂͧ
தດ੼΃ܑౌξ̼඀‫ޘ‬ດ੼Ă̝ͅĂฏՅ̼඀‫੼ྵޘ‬ĞChen el al., 2007ğĄ
˫έ៉ྺົֶฏᗉҾ̶న࣎ҾྺົĂొ̶ྺົົдฏՅˠ˾ჸརྵк
гડనϲ̶ొ‫ڇ‬ચྺϔĂ൒гᕇనϲ‫ٺ‬ઐฏгડĂᒉຽቑಛ݀ࢨ‫ٺ‬хഠຽ
ચĂͷϤ‫ٺ‬ઐฏгડຽચณ̙̂ĂᒉຽᒔӀ̂ౌ̙ᇳˠְјώĂ߇ྺົ‫ܫ‬
ϡొ̶ొᇴĞBranchğϺΞਕᇆᜩགྷᒉड़தć˫߆ඉّ૞९ྺ෷ٕჍྺຽ
൴णૄ‫ٸܛ‬ഠߏ߆‫ࠎع‬໰ᜪྺϔĂٙଯ΍̝߆ඉّྺຽ૞९෷ഠĂྺϔ଀
ͽགྷϤᐹ೎Ӏத‫଀פ‬གྷᒉྺຽٙᅮ̝ྤ‫ܛ‬Ăྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ˵ЯᏱந૞९ྺ෷
҃‫ྃع߆଀פ‬෭िĂࠎགྷᒉ̙‫ົྺ̝ٽ‬೩ֻ˘ีӀૄĂЯѩ߆ඉّ૞९ྺ
෷ҫᓁ‫ٸ‬ഠͧதĞGovloanğ੼ҲϺΞਕᇆᜩགྷᒉड़தĄ
˫ྺົࣶ̍۞ᛳّপᇈтିֈ඀‫ޘ‬Ğeducationğᄃѐ᛬ĞageğඈĂϺ
Ξਕߏᇆᜩྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝Я৵Ąώֶ͛̚රϔ઼ྺົ૟ྺົࣶ̍
ିֈ඀‫ޘ‬Ă૟ࣶ̍ିֈј‫ޘ‬ҫበ‫̝ࣶͧ̍ט‬த̶ࠎĈჇ̀̈́̂ጯĞU12rğă
̂૞ĞU3rğă੼̚ᖚĞU4rğᄃ઼̈̈́‫΁׎‬ĞU56rğඈαᙷćҌ‫ٺ‬ѐ᛬‫ֶ݋‬
̚රϔ઼ྺົ૟ྺົࣶ̍ѐ᛬̂̈Ă૟̙Тѐ᛬ҫበ‫ࣶͧ̍ט‬த̶ࠎ 39 ໐
ă40 ໐Ҍ 49 ໐Ğ40and49ğᄃ 50 ໐Ҍ 60 ໐ͽ˯ĞOver50ğ
ͽ˭ĞUnder39ğ
ˬᙷĄ
Ҍ‫ٺ‬ᇆᜩᇆᜩВТᙝࠧड़தĞ TE meta ğᄃཏ௡ᙝࠧड़தĞ TE k ğ۞ੑચ
Я৵Ă‫݋‬ΞͽϤБ઼ྺຽ‫ܛ‬ऱ̝ྺႢົᒻड़ෞᝥٙଳϡ̝ CAMEL ̚Ᏼፄ
ዋ༊۞Я৵Ăώ͛ᏴፄЪॾஐࣃᄃࢲᐍّྤயᓁᗝͧதĞcapital adequacyğ
ࠎྤώዋ֖தĞBISğតᇴĈ

合格淨值
BIS = (13)
風險性資產總額

BIS ດ੼΃ܑྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొࢲᐍٚፉਕ˧ດָćΩᏴፄ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧதĞNPLğ
΃ܑྤய‫ݡ‬ኳĞasset qualityğĂNPL ࢍზࠎ࿰ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠΚ‫ٸ‬ഠᓁᗝͧதĈ
ВТᙝࠧ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝ଣ੅ů‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ̶़̝‫ ژ‬121

逾期放款
NPL = (14)
放款總額

Ωх‫ͧٸ‬தĞC1ğ΃ܑგநਕ˧Ğmanagementğăࢍზт (15) ёĈ

 放款總額   淨值  固定資產淨額  
C1 =  (15)
存款總額   公庫存款/2  

ஐࣃಡ࿌தĞC2ğ΃ܑᒔӀਕ˧ĞearningsğăࠎώഇຫৈᄃஐࣃͧĂࢍზ
т(16)Ĉ

本期損益
C2 = (16)
淨值

༊ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొࠎᑕ;Ξਕ൴Ϡ۞ྤ‫ܛ‬ᅮՐĂٙ޺ѣᐌॡΞតன̝ྤயٕᓜ
ॡّΞࣄˢ̝࢑ๅĂCAMEL ෞඈ҂८޽ᇾ̝̚߹જّĞliquidityğ
Ăߏ૱ϡ
۞ੑચ޽ᇾࠎ߹જͧதĂྍͧதດ੼΃ܑᐺๅਕ˧ດૻĂщБّດ੼Ăੑ
ચ‫ڶې‬෸ָĂ߹જͧதĞC3ğࢍზт (17) ёĈ

流動資產
C3 = (17)
 流動負債 +  存款  放款 

݈ࢗٙѣΞਕᇆᜩ TE meta ᄃ TE k ̝ᇹώᒖဩăࣶ̍ᛳّ̈́ੑચЯ৵ٙ΃ܑ۞

࠹ᙯតᇴ̝πӮᇴ̈́ᇾ໤मЕ‫ ܑٺ‬9Ą

˟ăᇆᜩड़த၁ᙋሀ‫ݭ‬న‫ؠ‬ᄃҤࢍ
ώ͛Ӏϡ‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ़Ğpanel datağ۞পّĂΒ߁ 269 छྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొĂ
2013 ѐ Ҍ 2018 ѐ έ ៉ ૄ ᆸ ྺ ົ ‫ ܫ‬ϡ ొ ྤ फ़ Ă ఺ ߏ Т ॡ Β ߁ ॡ ม Ԕ Е
Ğtime-seriesğ̈́ፖᕝࢬĞcross-sectionğ̝ྤफ़ĂЯѩଳϡ‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸਫ਼ᕩሀ
ё̝‫ؠ׽‬ड़‫ڍ‬Ğfixed effect modelĂᖎჍ FEğሀ‫ݭ‬ᄃᐌ፟ड़‫ڍ‬Ğrandom effect
modelĂᖎჍ REğሀ‫ݭ‬ซҖҤࢍĄт TEtiH ΃ܑྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝జྋ
ᛖតᇴĂ̶ҾҤࢍᇆᜩВТᙝࠧड़தĞH=metağ̈́ཏ௡ᙝࠧड़தĞH=kğ
122 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 17 ‫ס‬ăௐ 2 ഇĞ2021/आ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

۞࠹ᙯЯ৵т (18) ё 5Ĉ

TEtiH   0i  1G 2ti   2G3ti  3 Associateti   4 Branchti  5Govloanti

  6 U12rti   7 U3rti +8 U56rti +9 40&49ti +10 Over50ti +11BISti (18)
+12 NDFti +13C1ti +14 C2ti +15 C3ti + ti H = meta, k

‫ ̚׎‬i  1,...,269ĂВѣ 269 ࣎ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ̝ DMUă t ΃ܑ̙ТѐЊĂٙѣ 

ࠎ‫ޞ‬ҤࢍܼᇴĂ  ࠎ‫ڇ‬ଂ૱ၗ̶੨̝ᐌ፟ᄱमีĂд FE ሀ‫ ̈́ݭ‬RE ሀ‫̝ݭ‬
ᏴፄâਠӀϡ Hausman  ᑭ‫ࠎؠ‬ᏴፄֶፂĂࡶ١඗˟ሀ‫ݭ‬ड़‫ڍ‬൑ள̝෍
2

൑઄నĂ‫݋‬ᑕଳϡ FE ሀ‫ݭ‬Ą

ܑ 9ĈҤࢍᇆᜩྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷ̈́ड़த࠹ᙯតᇴ̝πӮᇴᄃᇾ໤म *
តᇴ௑ཱི តᇴ‫ؠ‬ཌྷ πӮᇴ ᇾ໤म
G2 ෍ᑢតᇴĂ1 ࠎ̚ఢሀྺົă0 ࠎ‫΁׎‬ 0.34 0.473
G3 ෍ᑢតᇴĂ1 ࠎ̈ఢሀྺົă0 ࠎ‫΁׎‬ 0.32 0.474
Aassociate ᙒӄົࣶҫᓁົࣶˠᇴͧத(%) 34.2% 24.543
Branch ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ̶ొᇴ(छ) 3.0 2.563
Govloan ߆ඉّ૞९ྺ෷ҫᓁ‫ٸ‬ഠͧத(%) 16.9% 19.201
U12r ିֈ඀‫ޘ‬ĞჇ̀̈́̂ጯğ(%) 26.8% 13.023
U3r ିֈ඀‫ޘ‬Ğ̂૞ğ(%) 32.5% 11.264
U4r ିֈ඀‫ޘ‬Ğ੼̚ᖚğ(%) 39.6% 13.281
U56r ିֈ඀‫ޘ‬Ğ઼̈̚ğ(%) 1.0% 2.211
Under39 ѐ᛬Ğ39 ໐ͽ˭ğ(%) 21.6% 11.391
40&49 ѐ᛬Ğ40 ໐Ҍ 49 ໐ğ(%) 34.7% 10.882
Over50 ѐ᛬Ğ50 ໐ͽ˯ğ(%) 43.6% 11.802
BIS ྤώዋ֖த(%) 12.7% 4.001
NPL ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧதĞ%ğ 1.08% 2.503
C1 х‫ͧٸ‬தĞ%ğ 48.3% 17.393
C2 ஐࣃಡ࿌தĞ%ğ 5.2% 29.853
C3 ߹જͧதĞ%ğ 112.3% 16.563

5
ࠎᔖҺྋᛖតᇴมхдВቢّયᗟĂٙѣྋᛖតᇴАགྷ‫࠹׌׌‬ᙯّᑭ‫ؠ‬Ăੵ U4r ̈́
Under39 γĂ‫׎‬ዶӮҲ‫ ٺ‬0.5Ăซ˘ՎГ૟ٙѣ‫΁׎‬ྋᛖតᇴͽ variance inflation factor
ĞVIFğԆјкࢦតᇴ࠹ᙯᑭ‫ؠ‬Ăͽቁܲٙѣྋᛖតᇴ՟ѣкࢦ࠹ᙯĄᑭ‫ؠ‬ඕ‫ڍ‬൴னٙ
ѣྋᛖតᇴ VIF πӮࣃࠎ 1.70Ă҃ VIF ౵੼ࠎ̂ఢሀ෍ᑢតᇴ G2 ۞ 2.70ć౵̈ࠎஐࣃ
ಡ࿌த C2 ۞ 1.01Ăѩܑϯٙѣ۞ྋᛖតᇴӮҲ‫ٺ‬ҿᕝкࢦВቢّ૱ϡ̝ VIF=10 ̝‫ܝ‬
ᕣࣃĂЯѩٙϡ̝ྋᛖតᇴϺ̙хдкࢦВቢّયᗟĄ
ВТᙝࠧ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝ଣ੅ů‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ̶़̝‫ ژ‬123

ˬăᇆᜩВТᙝࠧड़தЯ৵̝၁ᙋඕ‫ڍ‬ᄃ̶‫ژ‬

(˘) ВТᙝࠧड़தࣃՙ‫ؠ‬Я৵

ॲፂܑ 10 ̝ Hausman ᑭ‫ؠ‬ඕ‫ڍ‬Ă  =109.82ĂЯࠎ pŴ0.05Ă߇Ᏼፄ

2

FE ሀ‫ݭ‬Ă҃ВТᙝࠧड़த FE ሀ‫̝ݭ‬Ҥࢍඕ‫ڍ‬Ăព඾ᇆᜩБវྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ
TE meta ۞၁ᙋྋᛖតᇴΒ߁ᙒӄົࣶҫᓁົࣶˠᇴͧதĞAssociateğă૞ࡊ
ĞU3rğᄃ઼̈̚ĞU56rğିֈ඀‫ޘ‬ăĞ40&49ğѐ᛬ᆸăஐࣃҫࢲᐍّྤ
யͧதĞBISğă࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧதĞNPLğăх‫ͧٸ‬தĞC1ğĄ‫̚׎‬ĂAssociate
̝Ҥࢍඕ‫–ࠎڍ‬0.2839ĂܑϯᙒӄົࣶҫᓁົࣶˠᇴͧதՏᆧΐ 1%Ăົֹྺ
ົ‫ܫ‬ϡొड़தഴ͌ 0.2839Ą҃ Associate ၆ྺົВТᙝࠧड़தӔ࢑Шᇆᜩ6Ă
ѩᄃ˘ਠᄮ‫ؠ‬ᙒӄົࣶΚᓁົࣶᇴͧத෸੼ăྺົड़த෸੼۞ଐԛ࠹ͅĂ
˘ਠᄮࠎᙒӄົࣶˠᇴͧதΞүࠎ‫ܫ‬ϡొౌξ̼඀‫ܑ΃̝ޘ‬Ăͧதດ੼ܑ
ϯౌξ̼඀‫ޘ‬ດ੼ĂϤ‫˘ٺ‬ਠથຽᅙҖ૟ྺгෛࠎઘፉܲĂྵ͌ٚүྺг
෷ഠĂЯѩĂᙒӄົࣶͧத෸੼ăྵ‫ٽ‬೩̿ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ࠳ዶᒔӀĂົֹྺ
ົ‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷᒉᒻड़೩੼Ą൒ѩ჌ଐԛ࠹༊඀‫่ߏޘ‬҂ᇋᙒӄົࣶώ֗၆ड़
த۞੒ᚥĂ༊ᄃ‫΁׎‬Я৵Ъ‫៍׀‬၅Ă‫݋‬ඕ‫ڍ‬ϏυтѩĄ
Ҍ‫ࣶ̍ົྺٺ‬ᛳّ̚۞ିֈ඀‫ࢬ͞ޘ‬Ăିֈ඀‫ޘ‬Ğ૞ࡊ U3rğҤࢍܼᇴ
ࠎ–0.0901Ăܑϯ૞ࡊጯ።࠹ྵ‫̚੼ٺ‬ᖚड़தഴ͌ 0.0901Ăିֈ඀‫ޘ‬Ğ઼̚
̈ U56rğҤࢍඕ‫ ࠎڍ‬0.2907Ăܑϯ઼̈̚ጯ።ͧத࠹ྵ‫̚੼ٺ‬ᖚड़த੼
0.2907ć҃Ğ40&49ğ̝ѐ᛬Ҥࢍܼᇴࠎ–0.0576Ăܑϯѐ᛬д 40 Ҍ 49 ໐ྵ
29 ໐ͽ˭ड़தഴ͌ 0.0576Ăܑϯѐ᛬ດѐᅅĂड़தດָĄ˫ିֈ඀‫ޘ‬Ğ઼
̈̚ğࣶ̍ͧ෸੼Ă࠹၆‫ٺ‬૞ࡊ̈́ͽ˯̝ିֈ඀‫ޘ‬۰ड़தྵ੼ĂӔன੼ጯ
።၆ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొड़த҃ͅҲ̝পঅன෪Ă௟տ‫ࣧ׎‬ЯĂ‫ି઼̈̚׍‬ֈ඀‫ޘ‬
ᛳѝഇซˢྺົ‫ڇ‬ચ̝ࣶ̍ĂЇ౻ЇީĂሢଉྺົЧొ‫ܝ‬ຽચ̈́ᜪ‫މ‬ཏĂ
̍үགྷរᖳಱĂጽ‫ܜ‬ଯणྺົЧีྺপய‫ݡ‬Ăᄃྺົड़தӔϒШᇆᜩĄ

6
тಏ፾ͽ 2018 ѐ̝ಏ˘តᇴᙒӄົࣶҫᓁົࣶˠᇴͧதĞAssociateğ
Ăଳϡ౵̈π͞‫ڱ‬
Ğpooled OLSğҤࢍ‫׎‬၆ྺົВТᙝࠧड़த̝ᇆᜩĂඕ‫ڍ‬Ӕனϒͷ t ࣃ=7.67 ព඾࠹ᙯĂ
ҭᐌ඾ഇมٛ‫ܜ‬Ҍ 6 ѐ̈́ৼˢ‫΁׎‬តᇴ‫ޢ‬Ăt ࣃ=–6.99Ă‫ݒ‬Ӕன࢑ព඾࠹ᙯĂܑϯၚ૱
О෪̚ᙒӄົࣶͧத෸੼ăྺົड़த෸੼۞ଐԛĂ࠹༊඀‫่ߏޘ‬҂ᇋᙒӄົࣶώ֗၆ड़
த۞੒ᚥĂ൒ᄃ‫΁׎‬Я৵Ъ‫៍׀‬၅Ă‫݋‬ඕ‫ڍ‬ϏυтѩĄ
124 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 17 ‫ס‬ăௐ 2 ഇĞ2021/आ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

ܑ 10ĈᇆᜩВТᙝࠧड़தЯ৵̝ FE ᄃ RE Ҥࢍඕ‫ڍ‬
FE ሀ‫ݭ‬ RE ሀ‫ݭ‬
តᇴ΃ཱི
Ҥࢍܼᇴ tࣃ Ҥࢍܼᇴ tࣃ
Constant 0.5604 (12.56) 0.3816 (10.74)
G2 -0.0223 (-0.92) 0.0393*** (3.22)
G3 -0.0009 (-0.05) 0.0168* (1.74)
Associate -0.2839*** (-6.99) 0.0023 (0.12)
Branch -0.0005 (-0.26) -0.0009 (-0.63)
Govloan 0.0211 (0.91) -0.0053 (-0.27)
U12r -0.0492 (-1.47) -0.0325 (-1.17)
U3r -0.0901** (-2.36) -0.0351 (-1.16)
U56r 0.2907*** (2.76) 0.2305** (2.33)
40&49 -0.0576* (-1.89) 0.0527* (-1.85)
Over50 0.0034 (0.12) -0.0290 (-1.12)
BIS 0.2444** (2.22) -0.3468*** (4.13)
NPL -0.0055*** (-4.80) -0.0055*** (-5.37)
C1 0.7626*** (29.13) 0.7612*** (34.55)
C2 0.0054 (1.13) 0.0066 (1.37)
C3 -0.0280 (-1.49) 0.0060 (0.35)
Fࣃ 84.73
2
አፋ R 0.4886 0.4627
Hausman  2 109.82
ᄲ‫ځ‬Ĉ߁‫ ࠎ̰ؾ‬t ᑭ‫ࣃؠ‬Ą
ොĈ *** ܑϯྍܼᇴд 1% ព඾ͪ໤˭ள‫ٺ‬࿬ć** ܑϯྍܼᇴд 5% ព඾ͪ໤˭ள‫ٺ‬࿬ć* ܑϯ
ྍܼᇴд 10% ព඾ͪ໤˭ள‫ٺ‬࿬Ą

҃ੑચЯ৵̚۞ BIS Ҥࢍܼᇴࠎ 0.2444Ăܑϯྤώዋ֖தՏᆧΐ 1%Ă

ົֹྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొड़தᆧΐ 0.2444ĂBIS ດ੼΃ܑྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొࢲᐍٚፉਕ˧
ດָĂགྷᒉវኳດઉБĂѝഇྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొјϲॡĂ൑‫˘ڱ‬т‫ܛ΁׎‬Ꮙ፟ၹ
Ξͽଂྤώξಞ˯ᚯନྤ‫ܛ‬ĂٙͽĂྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొஐࣃઐҲĂซ҃˵ᇆᜩ‫׎‬
གྷᒉఢሀĂ҃Ϥ၁ᙋඕ‫ڍ‬ពϯྤώዋ֖தĞBISğດ੼Ăྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొड़தດ
੼ĄNPL Ҥࢍܼᇴ–0.0055Ăܑϯ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧதՏᆧΐ 1%Ăົֹྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡ
ొड़தഴ͌ 0.0055Ăពϯ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧதĞNPLğດҲĂֹྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొड़த
ດ੼Ąх‫ͧٸ‬தĞC1ğܼᇴ 0.7626Ăܑϯ C1 Տᆧΐ 1%Ăົֹྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ
ड़தᆧΐ 0.7626Ąдх‫ͧٸ‬தĞC1ğ͞ࢬĂЯх‫ܫߏͧٸ‬ϡొӛќᇃ̂х
ഠ‫ޢ‬Ăᖼࠎ‫ٸ‬ഠຽચ۞ਕ˧Ăܑϯх‫ͧٸ‬தֹϡதດ੼ăྤ‫ֹ۞ܛ‬ϡதດ
ВТᙝࠧ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝ଣ੅ů‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ̶़̝‫ ژ‬125

ָĂֹ҃ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొຽᒻგநड़ਕດָĂϤ၁ᙋඕ‫ڍ‬ពϯх‫ͧٸ‬தĞC1ğ
ດ੼Ăֹྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొड़தດ੼Ą൒ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ̶ొᇴă߆ඉّ૞९ྺ෷ҫ
ᓁ‫ٸ‬ഠͧதăஐࣃಡ࿌தᄃ߹જͧத၆ВТᙝࠧड़தࣃ൑ព඾ᇆᜩĄ

(˟) ཏ௡ᙝࠧड़த̝ᇆᜩЯ৵̶‫ژ‬

ซ˘Վ៍၅̂̈̚ఢሀٙ၆ᑕ TE k ̝ՙ‫ؠ‬Я৵ĂЯྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొఢሀ̂
̈मள‫̂ޝ‬ĂТᇹ۞ྋᛖតᇴ̝ᇆᜩ඀‫ޘ‬ᄃ͞ШдЧఢሀม̙Ⴝ࠹ТĂТ
ᇹ۞ྋᛖតᇴՙ‫ؠ‬Я৵Ă၆ᑕ TE k ૲ֽ۞ᇆᜩ˵ѣ̙ٙТĄܑ 11 ̝ Hausman
ᑭ‫ؠ‬ඕ‫ڍ‬Ă  =86.63Ă߇Ᏼፄ FE ሀ‫ݭ‬Ă҃၆ཏ௡ᙝࠧड़தѣព඾ᇆᜩ̝ត
2

ᇴΒ߁ఢሀҾ̚ఢሀ̈́̈ఢሀҾ෍ᑢតᇴĞG2ăG3ğăᙒӄົࣶҫᓁົࣶ
ˠᇴͧதĞAssociateğăିֈ඀‫ޘ‬ĞჇ̀̈́̂ጯ U12ră̂૞ U3rğăྤώዋ
֖தĞBISğă࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧதĞNPLğăх‫ͧٸ‬தĞC1ğĄ‫̚׎‬ĂఢሀҾ෍ᑢ
តᇴĞG2ăG3ğ၆ВТᙝࠧड़தᇆᜩ̙ព඾Ăҭ၆ཏ௡ड़தᇆᜩӔ࢑Шໂ
ព඾̝࠹ᙯĄ
၁ᙋඕ‫ڍ‬ពϯཏ௡ᙝࠧड़தቁ၁хдఢሀҾ̂̈۞मளć˫ᙒӄົࣶ
ͧதĞAssociateğҤࢍܼᇴࠎ–0.2397ĂܑϯᙒӄົࣶҫᓁົࣶˠᇴͧதՏ
ᆧΐ 1%Ăົֹྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొड़தഴ͌ 0.2397Ăдᙒӄົࣶҫᓁົࣶˠᇴͧத
ĞAssociateğᇆᜩЯ৵˯ĂӔன࢑ШᇆᜩĂϤ၁ᙋඕ‫ڍ‬ពϯᙒӄົࣶҫᓁ
ົࣶˠᇴͧதດ੼Ăֹྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొड़தດҲĄିֈ඀‫̚ޘ‬Ⴧ̀̈́̂ጯ U12r
̈́૞ࡊ U3r Ҥࢍܼᇴ̶Ҿࠎ–0.1246 ̈́–0.1193ĂܑϯჇ̀ă̂ጯ̈́૞ࡊ۞
ጯ።ྵ੼̚ᖚ࠹၆ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ۞ཏ௡ड़தഴ͌ 0.1246 ̈́ 0.1193Ăពϯ੼ጯ
።၆ྺົཏ௡ड़த҃ͅྵҲ۞ଐԛĂିֈ඀‫ࣶ̍۞੼ྵޘ‬ĂϤ‫ٺ‬າซྺົĂ
၆ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ૞ຽۢਕѣ‫ޞ‬ΐૻĂ၆ྺົ۞‫މ‬ཏ̈́Ϡၗ̙ሢଉĂ̙Ӏଯण
ྺົຽચٙ࡭Ą
҃ѣᙯੑચЯ৵࠹ᙯតᇴ۞ᇆᜩĂྤώዋ֖தĞBISğܼᇴࠎ 0.3982Ă
ܑϯྤώዋ֖தՏᆧΐ 1%Ăົֹྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొड़தᆧΐ 0.3982Ą࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧ
தĞNPLğܼᇴ–0.0067Ăܑϯ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧதՏᆧΐ 1%Ăົֹྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొड़
தഴ͌ 0.0067%Ąх‫ͧٸ‬தĞC1ğܼᇴ 0.7205Ăܑϯх‫ͧٸ‬தՏᆧΐ 1%Ă
ົֹྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొड़தᆧΐ 0.7205Ąдྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ̶̝ొᇴĞBranchğăѐ᛬
126 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 17 ‫ס‬ăௐ 2 ഇĞ2021/आ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

Ğ40&49ăOver50ğă߆ඉّ૞९ྺ෷ҫᓁ‫ٸ‬ഠͧதĞGovloanğăஐࣃಡ࿌
தĞC2ğᄃ߹જͧதĞC3ğ၆ཏ௡ड़தࣃᇆᜩ̙֭ព඾Ą҃дྤώዋ֖த
ĞBISğă࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧதĞNPLğăх‫ͧٸ‬தĞC1ğ၆ཏ௡ड़தᇆᜩ͞Шᄃព
඾ّĂ̂࡭˯ᄃВТᙝࠧड़த࠹ТĄ

ܑ 11Ĉᇆᜩཏ௡ᙝࠧड़த̝ FE ᄃ RE ሀ‫ݭ‬Ҥࢍඕ‫ڍ‬
FE ሀ‫ݭ‬ RE ሀ‫ݭ‬
តᇴ΃ཱི
Ҥࢍܼᇴ tࣃ Ҥࢍܼᇴ tࣃ
Constant 0.7100 (14.58) 0.5606 (14.72)
G2 -0.0919*** (-3.47) -0.0556*** (-4.33)
G3 -0.0600*** (-3.24) -0.0386*** (-3.78)
Associate -0.2397*** (-5.40) 0.0096 (0.48)
Branch -0.0004 (-0.16) -0.0017 (-1.03)
Govloan 0.0211 (-1.38) -0.0409** (-1.96)
U12r -0.0352*** (-3.39) -0.0424 (-1.43)
U3r -0.1193*** (-2.86) -0.0429 (-1.33)
U56r 0.2907 (1.52) 0.1830* (1.72)
40&49 -0.0474 (-1.42) 0.0527 (-1.52)
Over50 -0.0348 (-1.14) -0.0683** (-2.45)
BIS 0.3982*** (3.31) 0.3813*** (4.27)
NPL -0.0067*** (-5.38) -0.0066*** (-5.99)
C1 0.7205*** (25.20) 0.6930*** (29.40)
C2 0.0044 (0.84) 0.0053 (1.00)
C3 -0.035 (-1.70) -0.0063 (-0.34)
Fࣃ 65.63
2
አፋ R 0.425 0.405
Hausman  2 86.63
ᄲ‫ځ‬Ĉ߁‫ ࠎ̰ؾ‬t ᑭ‫ࣃؠ‬Ą
ොĈ *** ܑϯྍܼᇴд 1% ព඾ͪ໤˭ள‫ٺ‬࿬ć** ܑϯྍܼᇴд 5% ព඾ͪ໤˭ள‫ٺ‬࿬ć* ܑϯ
ྍܼᇴд 10% ព඾ͪ໤˭ள‫ٺ‬࿬Ą

˯ࢗ၁ᙋඕ‫ڍ‬ពϯĂିֈ඀‫ޘ‬Ğ઼̈̚ U56rğ
ăྤώዋ֖தᄃх‫ͧٸ‬த
ດ੼Ăྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ̝ВТᙝࠧड़தĞ TE meta ğ෸੼Ăᙒӄົࣶҫᓁົࣶˠᇴ
ͧதăିֈ඀‫ޘ‬Ğ̂૞ U3rğăѐ᛬Ğ40&49ğᄃ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧதĂ၆ВТᙝ
ࠧड़தĞ TE meta ğӔ࢑ШᇆᜩĄ˫ྤώዋ֖தᄃх‫ͧٸ‬தດ੼Ă၆ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡ
ВТᙝࠧ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝ଣ੅ů‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ̶़̝‫ ژ‬127

ొఢሀཏ௡ᙝࠧड़தĞ TE k ğѣϒШᇆᜩĂ࠹ͅгĂ̚ఢሀ̈́̈ఢሀ‫ܫ‬ϡ
ొăᙒӄົࣶҫᓁົࣶˠᇴͧதăିֈ඀‫ޘ‬ĞჇ̀̈́̂ጯ U12ră૞ࡊ U3rğ
ᄃ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧதĂᄃཏ௡ᙝࠧड़தĞ TE k ğӔன࢑ШᇆᜩĄΩγĂྺົ‫ܫ‬
ϡొ̶̝ొᇴĞBranchğă߆ඉّ૞९ྺ෷ҫᓁ‫ٸ‬ഠͧதĞGovloanğăஐࣃ
ಡ࿌தĞC2ğᄃ߹જͧதĞC3ğ၆ВТᙝࠧड़தࣃ̈́ཏ௡ᙝࠧड़த൑ព඾
ᇆᜩĄ

伍、結論
ώ͛ࢵѨඕЪ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠ̝‫ܧ‬ຍ୬ய΍̈́‫ٸ‬ഠᄃ࠳ዶ̝ຍ୬ய΍Ăԛј
͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴĂ̶‫ژ‬έ៉ 269 छྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ 2013 ѐҌ 2018 ѐĂ̂̈̚
Чఢሀཏ௡ड़தăВТᙝࠧड़தᄃВТԫఙͧதĂֶ֭ѩ̶‫ܫژ‬ϡొఢሀ
ҌВТᙝࠧड़தٕᄃཏ௡ᙝࠧड़த̝Լච۩มĄ၁ᙋඕ‫ڍ‬ពϯ̙ТఢሀҾ
̝มхдགྷᒉԫఙ̝मளĂఢሀҾ෸̝̂ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొĂ˵೼࿆хдྵ੼۞
གྷᒉԫఙͪ໤Ăѣྵ੼۞ཏ௡ᙝࠧड़தĄፋវ҃֏Ă269 छྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొд
2013-2018 ѐπӮВѣ 30 छ྿౵ָགྷᒉड़தĂᛳ‫̂ٺ‬ఢሀྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొѣ 19
छă̚ఢሀ‫݋‬ѣ 3 छă҃̈ఢሀྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ‫݋‬ѣ 8 छćԆБड़தд̂ఢሀ
̈́̈ఢሀྺົᄃΔొă‫۞ొݑ̈́ొڌ‬гાᙯాّ੼Ă҃ԆБड़த̝̚ఢሀ
ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొᄃপ‫ؠ‬гાᙯాّྵҲĄ˫ 2013-2018 ̱ѐπӮ̝ఢሀҾ̝ཏ
௡ᙝࠧड़தĂ̂̈̚ఢሀҾ̶Ҿѣ 0.19%ă7.56%̈́ 13.58%ԫఙԼච۩มĄ
˫ВТᙝࠧड़தдડાҾड़தͪ໤̝੼ҲĂֶԔࠎ‫ొڌ‬౵੼ăΔొă
̚ొѨ̝ă‫̝ొݑ‬ड़தπӮ࠹၆౵ҲĂܑϯ̙Тྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొдડાҾ̝ม
хдВТᙝࠧड़த̝मளĂ΃ܑྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷᒉᒻड़̝։⯅Ăхдડાّ
मளĄΞਕࣧЯߏέΔᎩξăॿ๩Ꭹ̈́າѻᎩĂྺົछᇴᔵྵ‫ొڌ‬кĂ൒
Я˵ѣ̙͌ड़தྵҲ۞ઐฏྺົĂЯ҃ٛҲΔొВТᙝࠧड़தĂ҃‫ొڌ‬г
ડྺົፋវܑனྵπӮĄГ۰ĂΔొгડ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ፟ၹ‫ڒ‬ϲĂᒔӀ۩ม࠹၆͌Ă
ͷ࠹၆̙ߏྺຽࢦࢋ߿જડાĂྺຽ࠹ᙯ෷ഠྵ͌Ăͅ៍‫ొڌ‬гડĂ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ
፟ၹྵ͌Ăྺົࢦࢋّ҃ͅ࠹၆੼Ă‫آ‬ᜋ‫ڌ܅‬гડྺຽ߿જ࠹၆߿ඛĂֹ
‫ొڌ‬гડྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़தྵָĄ
128 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 17 ‫ס‬ăௐ 2 ഇĞ2021/आ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

҃ᇆᜩྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొВТᙝࠧड़த̈́ཏ௡ᙝࠧड़த̝Я৵Ăጾѣ࠹၆੼
ּͧ̂ጯ̈́Ⴧ̀ጯ።ࣶ̝̍ྺົĂВТᙝࠧड़த֭ϏѣЇңᐹ๕Ă͹ࢋߏ
ВТᙝࠧड़தߏะඕٙѣЧё̂̈̚ఢሀ̝ྺົ҃јĂЯѩĂᄃ˘ਠ࿰ഇ
੼ጯ።ᑕྍ၆‫ٺ‬ड़தѣ࠹၆੼۞੒ᚥٕߏϒࢬᇆᜩ̙ТĂΞਕ۞ࣧЯߏЪ
‫̙̈̂̚׀‬ТఢሀҾ۞ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొĂ੼ጯ።۞ᇆᜩ‫̈̚ࠎ݋‬ఢሀࣶ̍࠹၆
Ҳ۞ጯ።ٙංᛖĄ൒҃Ăӈ‫ܮ‬ะඕ̂̈̚ఢሀྺົ҃ј۞ВТᙝࠧड़தĂ
࡭ֹ࠹၆Ҳጯ።̝ࣶ̍дВТᙝࠧ˯˵Ξͽ੒ᚥͧྵ੼۞ड़தĂϺ̙൑Ξ
ਕĂ˵ಶߏ఺ֱࣶ̍ߏѝഇซˢྺົ۰ĂЯѩ‫ޙ‬ϲྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొ‫ܜ‬ഇᘦ‫ؠ‬౻
ྤᙯܼĂЯѩొ̶ྺົड़த̝੒ᚥ࠹၆кĄ࠹၆۞Ăጯ።၆ཏ௡ᙝࠧड़த
۞ᇆᜩ‫݋‬ᄃ˘ਠ࿰ഇ࠹௑Ă˵ಶߏጯ።෸੼ཏ௡ᙝࠧड़த෸੼Ăཏ௡ᙝࠧ
ड़தٙͅᑕ۞ϒߏ̙̂̈̚Т۞ఢሀҾĂ҃̂̈̚ఢሀҾ࠹༊Ξਕᄃࣶ̍
ጯ።۞੼Ҳѣ࠹༊۞˘࡭ّٙ࡭Ą‫۞΁׎‬ᇆᜩЯ৵‫إ‬Β߁ᙒӄົࣶҫᓁົ
ͧதăྤώዋ֖தăх‫ͧٸ‬தᄃࢫҲ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧதćдྤώዋ֖த͞ࢬĂ
ྺົஐࣃ‫׍‬ѣჯ޺‫͕ܫ͗މ‬ăӛќຫεă֨ͤࢲᐍّྤயٙጱ࡭۞‫׹‬ᖼ̙
ី̈́୻ზநኪඈк჌ΑਕĂࢫҲ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧத΃ܑྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొࢲᐍٚፉਕ
˧ĂྺົืՀᖰຕᆶ८‫ٸ‬ഠᄃѣड़გநྺົྤயĂֹྤய‫ݡ‬ኳՀָĂѣड़
ࢫҲ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧதĂͽࢫҲ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧதĂ‫ޙ‬ᛉྺົᑕ೩̿ྤώዋ֖தă
ࢫҲࢫҲ࿈ഇ‫ٸ‬ഠͧதͽ೩੼ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొड़தć҃х‫ͧٸ‬த΃ܑຽᒻგந
ड़ਕᄃྤ‫ֹܛ‬ϡதĂດ੼΃ܑྤ‫ֹ۞ܛ‬ϡதດָĂΞ౅࿅ᆧΐ‫ٸ‬ഠٕ߆ඉ
ّ૞९ྺ෷Ă೩੼х‫ͧٸ‬த૟Ξ೩੼ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొड़தĄ҃ඕ‫ڍ‬ϺӔனఢሀ
Ҿ෸̂۞ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొĂཏ௡ᙝࠧड़த෸੼۞ன෪Ăٙͽᆧ೩࠳ዶᖼְຽ̳
᎕‫ܛ‬Ăٕᕖ̂གྷᒉఢሀͽᆧΐྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొஐࣃăᆧΐ‫ܫ‬ϡొќˢĂߏΞᆧ
ΐྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த۞გ྽̝˘Ą
ώ͛ͽྺ‫ܛ‬ረ੫૟Бវྺົ̶ཏֶྺົఢሀ̶̂̈ཏĂѩ჌̶ཏ͞ё
̙Т‫ٺ‬࿅ΝͽгાҾăౌξฏՅٕߏᎩξҾ̶̝ཏĂ‫ޢ‬ᜈΞ҂ณ̙Т̶ཏ
͞ё̈́‫׎‬ඕ‫̝ڍ‬मளĄѩγĂϏֽࡁտΞৼˢፋវགྷᑻ޽ᇾт GDP ј‫ܜ‬தă
ఱ။ֻගѐᆧதăεຽதٕέ៉ΐᝋ۵ᆊ޽ᇴĂ៍၅‫׎‬၆ፋវड़த̝ᇆᜩĄ
ྺົፋវྤੈүຽࢬԫఙ̿৺ᄃր௚ፋЪĂѣӄ‫ٺ‬೩̿‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़தĄ
ྺຽ‫ܛ‬ᏉԊ‫ ٺ‬2013 ѐᅃጱྺຽ‫ܛ‬ऱ‫ޙ‬ཉ‫ܫ‬ϡొྤੈВϡր௚Ăྺຽ‫ܛ‬ऱᄃ
ВТᙝࠧ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝ଣ੅ů‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ̶़̝‫ ژ‬129

311 छྺႢົ‫ܫ‬ϡొԆјፋЪాቢ‫ޢ‬Ăѣӄ‫ٺ‬າ჌ຽચฟ൴ăࢫҲྤੈր௚
ᄃన౯јώᄃѣӀ‫̝΄ڱٺ‬ᏲೈĂ҃ፋЪྺົ‫ੈྤܝొ΁׎‬ր௚Ă‫ ٺ‬2019
ѐ‫̏غ‬ѣ 176 छ‫ܫ‬ϡొ˯ቢĄ‫ޢ‬ᜈĂΞଣ੅ྤੈВϡր௚ፋЪ݈‫ޢ‬ĂྺႢ
ົፋវགྷᒉड़த೩ٕ̿តજଐԛĄ
ྺົགྷᒉ̝ីᅿˠ‫ࠎۏ‬ᓁ຅ְĂᓁ຅ְ̝གྷᒉਕ˧̈́ᅳጱ௚଄‫ــ‬ᇆ
ᜩྺົགྷᒉᒻड़̈́Ϗֽ൴णĂ൒ϫ݈ధкᅳጱࢲॾ֭՟ѣ࠹ᙯ۞ᇴፂֽ΃
ܑĂႬ‫ޢ‬Ăдྤफ़Ξ଀˭Ξ૟ᓁ຅ְˠॾপኳৼˢड़தෞҤሀ‫ݭ‬ćѩγĂ
ྺົՏ‫ب‬αѐԼᏴ˘ѨĂԼᏴ࿅඀ߏӎπึĂགྷᒉဥฤᄃᓁ຅ְăநְ‫ܜ‬
ᄃ૱ચႾְˬλᐝߏӎ‫׶‬ᏘĂϺߏᇆᜩྺົགྷᒉड़தొ̶Я৵ĂϏֽтΞ
҂ᇋ૟఺ֱЯ৵ৼˢड़தෞҤሀё̚Ăड़தෞҤ࿰ഇՀᎷԆචĄ
130 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 17 ‫ס‬ăௐ 2 ഇĞ2021/आ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

參考文獻

˷‫؟‬Аăͳ‫ܛ‬ӀĂ2005ĄĮέ៉‫ܛ‬Ꮙវ‫̝ט‬ႊតįĄέΔĈᓑགྷĄ
̚δᅙҖ‫ܛ‬Ꮙຽચᑭߤ఍Ă2019ĄĮ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ፟ၹຽચໄ‫ڶ‬ѐಡįĄέΔĈ̚δᅙҖ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ
ຽચᑭߤ఍Ą
̚δᅙҖБ஧ྤੈშĂ2008-2019Ą‫ܛ‬Ꮙ፟ၹຽચໄ‫ڶ‬ѐಡĞhttps://www.cbc.gov.
tw/lp.asp?ctNode=977&CtUnit=530&BaseDSD=7&mp=1ğĞ2020/3/25ğ
̚රϔ઼ྺົĂ2014-2019ĄĮЧ৺ྺົѐಡįĄέ̚Ĉ̚රϔ઼ྺົĄ
͞ពЍăችԈඡĄ2018ĄIJ‫ܛ‬Ꮙঔᆣ‫ܛޢ‬ଠ̄ᅙҖགྷᒉᒻड़ෞҤ —ྻϡྤफ़Βඛ̶
‫ژ‬ijĄĮරˠགྷᑻࡁտį16 ‫ ס‬1 ഇĂࢱ 47-69Ą
έΔ‫ܛ‬Ꮙࡁ੊ੰĂ2009ĄĮྺຽ‫ܛ‬Ꮙ࠹ᙯ‫΄ڱ‬ຉበįĄέΔĈέΔ‫ܛ‬Ꮙࡁ੊ੰĄ
Җ ߆ ੰ ྺ ຽ ؎ ࣶ ົ Ă 2016 ĄĮ ྺ ົ ‫ ڱ‬įĞ https://law.coa.gov.tw/GLRSnewsout/Law
Content.aspx?id=FL014814ğĞ2020/4/15ğ
Җ߆ੰྺຽ؎ࣶົྺຽ‫ܛ‬ᏉԊĂ2014Ą
ĮྺົႢົ‫ܫ‬ϡొྤயෞҤຫε໤౯೩Ё́࿈
ഇ ‫ٸ‬ഠ๊ ќഠ ૲૳఍ நᏱ ‫ ڱ‬įĞ https://www.boaf.gov.tw/boafwww/index.jsp?a=
content&CuItem=419753ğĞ2020/3/15ğ
ౘළࠡĂ2008ĄĮέ៉ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝ࡁտ —ྤफ़Βඛ̶‫̝ڱژ‬ᑕϡįჇ̀
ኢ͛Ą̰ंĈ‫ࡊڌލ‬ԫ̂ጯྺЋຽგநրٙĞhttp://dx.doi.org/10.6346/NPUST.
2009.00101ğĞ2020/2/20ğ
Įέ៉ྺົགྷᒉᒻड़̝ෞҤ —кొ‫ྤܝ‬फ़Βඛ‫̝ڱ‬ᑕϡį౾̀ኢ͛Ą
ౘߦ൝Ă2007Ą
έ Δ Ĉ έ ៉ ̂ ጯ ྺ ຽ གྷ ᑻ ጯ ր Ğ http://dx.doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2007.01383 ğ
Ğ2020/4/15ğĄ
ౘߦ൝Ă2014Ą
IJᄂ៉ྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొϠயඕၹᄃјώड़த̝።ѐᔌ๕̶‫ژ‬ij
ĄĮາѻିֈ
̂ጯˠ͛ۤົጯಡį7 ‫ ס‬1 ഇĂࢱ 95-128Ą
ౘߦ൝ăᎊϖேăՂָࠡăᏂ૾ϜĂ2019ĄIJᑕϡ࢑ࣃજၗშඛ DEA ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొ
̝ड़தෞҤijĮგநᄃր௚į26 ‫ ס‬4 ഇĂࢱ 393-425Ą
໅ჯऍĂĄ2016ĄIJԧ઼ᅙҖ઼ᅫ‫ܛ‬Ꮙຽચ̶Җ઼̈́γ̶͚፟ၹ̝གྷᒉᒻड̶़‫— ژ‬
ྤफ़Βඛ̶‫۞ڱژ‬ᑕϡijĮ‫ځ‬າጯಡį42 ‫ ס‬2 ഇĂࢱ 79-102Ą
ఄ‫ߗم‬ăӓॎ઼Ă2006Ą
IJέ៉ડྺົ‫ܫ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़தෞҤĈ‫ܧ‬ຍ୬Я৵ྤफ़Βඛ̶
‫۞ڱژ‬ᑕϡijĮ‫ڌ‬ӓགྷᑻથጯጯಡį52 ഇĂࢱ 1-25Ą
ᆒࣰ։ăӓ঳༈ăเ‫ۘ۾‬Ă2009ĄIJྭ઼ВТᙝࠧϠயԫఙड़தͧྵ — ТՎ҂ณϒ
Шགྷᑻ൴णᄃ࢑Ш CO2 ଵ‫ٸ‬ijĮྺຽᄃགྷᑻį43 ഇĂࢱ 1-37Ą
Aghayi, Nazila, and Bentolhoda Maleki. 2016. “Efficiency Measurement of DMUs
ВТᙝࠧ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝ଣ੅ů‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ̶़̝‫ ژ‬131

with Undesirable Outputs under Uncertainty Based on the Directional Distance

Function: Application on Bank Industry.” Energy, Vol. 112, pp. 376-87.
Aghayi, Nazila, and Bentolhoda Maleki. 2018. “Corrigendum to Efficiency Measurement
of DMUs with Undesirable Outputs under Uncertainty Based on the Directional
Ddistance Function: Application on Bank Industry.” Energy, Vol. 153, pp. 476-78.
Agarwal, Nikita, Banhi Guha, Avijan Dutta, and Gautam Bandyopadhyay. 2014.
“Performance Measurement of Indian Banks Using Data Envelopment Analysis.”
Lecture Notes on Information Theory, Vol. 2, No. 33, pp. 289-94.
Barros, Carlos, Shunsuke Managi, and Roman Matousek. 2012. “The Technical
Efficiency of the Japanese Banks: Non-radial Directional Performance Measurement
with Undesirable Output.” Omega, Vol. 40, pp. 1-8.
Battese, George and D. S. Prasada Rao. 2002. “Technology Gap, Efficiency, and a
Stochastic Metafrontier Function.” International Journal of Business and
Economics, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 87-93.
Battese, George, D. S. Prasada Rao, and Christopher O’Donnell. 2004. “A
Metafrontier Production Function for Estimation of Technical Efficiency and
Technology Gap for Firms Operating under Different Technology.” Journal of
Productivity Analysis, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 91-103.
Berger Allen N., and David B. Humphrey. 1998. “Efficiency of Financial Institutions:
International Survey and Directions for Future Research.” European Journal of
Operational Research, Vol. 98, No, 2, pp. 175-212.
Chambers, Robert G., Yangho Chung, and Rofl Färe. 1996. “Benefit and Distance
Functions.” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 70, No. 2, pp. 407-19.
Chambers, Robert G., Yangho Chung, and Rofl Fare. 1998. “Profit, Directional
Distance Functions, and Nerlovian Efficiency.” Journal of Optimization Theory and
Applications, Vol. 98, No. 2, pp. 351-64.
Chang, Ching-Cheng. 1999. “The Nonparametric Risk-adjusted Efficiency Measurement:
An Application to Taiwan’s Major Rural Financial Intermediaries.” American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 81, pp. 902-13.
Chen, Po-Chi, Ming­Miin Yu, Ching­Cheng Chang, and Shih­Hsun Hsu. 2007.
“Productivity Change in Taiwan’s Farmers’ Credit Unions: A Nonparametric
Risk-adjusted Malmquist Approach.” Agricultural Economics, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp.
221-31.
Chortareas, Georgios E., Claudia Girardone, and Alexia Ventouri. 2009. “Efficiency
132 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 17 ‫ס‬ăௐ 2 ഇĞ2021/आ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

and Productivity of Greek Banks in the EMU Era.” Applied Financial Economics,
Vol. 19, No. 16, pp. 1317-28.
Chung, Yongho, Rolf Färe, and Shawna Grosskopf. 1997. “Productivity and Undesirable
Outputs: A Directional Distance Function Approach.” Journal of Environmental
Management, Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 229-40.
Elyasiani, Elyas, and Rasoul Rezvanian. 2002. “A Comparative Multiproduct Cost
Study of Foreign-owned and Domestic-owned US Banks.” Applied Financial
Economics, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 271-84.
Färe, Rolf, Shawna Grosskopf, C. A. K. Lovell, and Carl Pasurka. 1989. “Multilateral
Productivity Comparisons When Some Outputs Are Undesirable: A Nonparametric
Approach.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 71, No. 1, pp. 90-98.
Färe, Rolf, Shawna Grosskopf, and Carl A. Pasurka, Jr. 2001. “Accounting for Air
Pollution Emissions in Measures of State Manufacturing Productivity Growth.”
Journal of Regional Science, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 381-409.
Färe, Rolf, Shawna Crosskopf, Dong-Woon Noh, and William Webber. 2005.
“Characteristics of a Polluting Technology Theory and Practices.” Journal of
Economitrics, Vol. 126, Issue 2, pp. 469-92.
Farrell, M. J. 1957. “The Measurement of Productive Efficiency.” Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society, Series A, Vol. 120, No. 3, pp. 253-351.
Fernandes, Filipa Da Silva., Charalampos Stasinakis, and Valeriya Bardarova. 2018.
“Two-stage DEA-truncated Regression: Application in Banking Efficiency and
Financial Development.” Expert Systems with Applications, Vol. 96, pp. 284-301.
Fukuyama, Hirofumi, and William L. Weber. 2008. “Japanese Banking Inefficiency
and Shadow Pricing.” Mathematical and Computer Modelling, Vol. 48, Nos. 11-12,
pp. 1854-67.
Hayami, Yujiro. 1969. “Sources of Agricultural Productivity Gap among Selected
Countries.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 564-75.
Huang, T., Chiang, L., and Chen, K. 2011. “An Empirical Study of Bank Efficiencies
and Technology Gaps in European Banking.” The Manchester School, Vol. 79, 4, pp.
839-60.
Hsiao, Bo, Ching-Chin Chern, Ming-Miin Yu, and Ching-Ren Chiu. 2012. “Measuring
the Relative Efficiency of IC Design Firms Using the Directional Distance Function
and a Meta-frontier Approach.” Decision Support Systems, Vol. 53, No. 4, pp.
881-91.
ВТᙝࠧ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝ଣ੅ů‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ̶़̝‫ ژ‬133

Li, Y., Chiu, Y. H., and Lu, L. C. 2018. “Regional Energy, CO2, and Economic and
Air Quality Index Performances in China: A Meta-frontier Approach.” Energies, Vol.
11, pp. 1-20.
Lin, Eugene Yu-Ying, Ping-Yu Chen, and Chi-Chung Chen. 2013. “Measuring the
Environmental Efficiency of Countries: A Directional Distance Function
Metafrontier Approach.” Journal of Environmental Management, Vol. 119, No. 15,
pp. 134-42.
O’Donnell, Christopher J., D. S. Prasada Rao, and George E. Battese. 2007.
“Metafrontier Frameworks for the Study of Firm-level Efficiency and Technology
Ratios.” Empirical Economics, Vol. 34, pp. 231-55.
Pal, Debdatta, and Subrata K. Mitra. 2018. “The Efficiency of Microfinance Institutions
with Problem Loans: A Directional Distance Function Approach.” Computational
and Mathematical Organization Theory, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 285-307.
Prachi, M. 2019. The Investors Book: CAMELS Rating System. (https://theinvestors
book.com/camels-rating-system.html) (2020/1/20)
Sahoo, Biresh K., Mohammad Khoveyni, Robabeh Eslami, and Pradipta Chaudhury.
2016. “Returns to Scale and Most Productive Scale Size in DEA with Negative
Data.” European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 255, Issue.2, pp. 545-58.
Sealey, C. W., Jr., and James T. Lindley. 1977. “Inputs, Outputs and a Theory of
Production and Cost at Depository Financial Institution.” Journal of Finance, Vol.
32, No. 4, pp. 1251-66.
Shephard, Ronald W. 1970. Theory of Cost and Production Functions. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Shephard, Ronald W., and Rolf Färe. 1974. “The Law of Diminishing Returns.”
Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, pp. 69-90.
Sun, Jiasen, Chun Wang, Xiang Ji, and Jie Wu. 2017. “Performance Evaluation of
Heterogeneous Bank Supply Chain Systems from the Perspective of Measurement
and Decomposition.” Computers & Industrial Engineering, Vol. 113, pp. 891-903.
Wang, Pei, Xiangzheng Deng, Niig Zhang, and Xueyan Zhang. 2019. “Energy
Efficiency and Technology Gap of Enterprises in Guangdong Province: A
Meta-frontier Directional Distance Function Analysis.” Journal of Cleaner
Production, Vol. 212, No. 1, pp. 1446-53.
134 Įέ៉઼ᅫࡁտ‫؞‬Ώįௐ 17 ‫ס‬ăௐ 2 ഇĞ2021/आ‫ཱི؞‬ğ

Efficiency Measurement for Credit

Department of Farmers’ Associations by
Metafrontier Framework with Directional
Distance Function: Analysis of Panel Data

Nai-Min Lo
Officer, Agriculture Department, Miaoli County Government, Miaoli, TAIWAN

Je-Liang Liou
Research Fellow, Center for Green Economy, Chung-Hua Institution for
Economic Research, Taipei, TAIWAN

Ching-Ren Chiu
Associate Professor, Department of Recreation and Sports Management,
University of Taipei, Taipei, TAIWAN

Pei-Ing Wu
Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics,
National Taiwan University, Taipei, TAIWAN

Abstract
The main objectives of this study are to explore the operation efficiency
of the credit department for farmers’ associations and analyze the factors that
affect operation efficiency in Taiwan. The analyzed data were based on a
total of 1,614 panel data from the credit department of 269 farmers’
associations from 2013 to 2018 in Taiwan. This study uses a directional
distance function with both two positive desirable outputs of the farmer’
associations’ loans and surplus and one undesirable output of


Corresponding author. Email: piwu@ntu.edu.tw.
ВТᙝࠧ͞Шّ෼ᗓ‫ב‬ᇴ‫ܫົྺٺ‬ϡొགྷᒉड़த̝ଣ੅ů‫ܜ‬ഇ੠ᖸྤफ̶़̝‫ ژ‬135

non-performing loans. Metafrontier efficiencies are used to evaluate the

large, the medium and the small scale group of farmers’ association to
differentiate the performance of each credit department of farmers’
associations. It is further to analyze the factors that potentially impact
metafrontier efficiency and group efficiency. The results show that the
credit department of large scale has the best operation efficiency, the
medium-group and the small-group has been ranked the second and the last.
Furthermore, there has a trend of improvement for the metafrontier
efficiency and group efficiency from 2013 to 2018. The average group
efficiency over 6 years has 0.19%, 7.56% and 13.58% to improve the
metafrontier. Additionally, the east regional credit departments have the
highest operation efficiency, followed by the north and central, and then the
south. Finally, the staffs with education level of elementary and junior to
high school have positive impact on the operation efficiency. Factors for
farmers’ associations with higher ratio of capital adequacy and higher
deposit loan ratio have similar positive impact both on metafrontier
efficiency and group efficiency. On the contrary, the ratio of associated
members, education level of above college, age between 40 and 49 and
non-performing loans ratio has negative impact on both metafrontier
efficiency and group efficiency.

Keywords: Non-performing loans, Surplus, Directional distance function,

Metafrontier approach, CAMEL rating factors