CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Definition

Statutory Construction – the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of
the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered
doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
(Caltex vs. Palomar)

Construction vs. Interpretation

Construction is the drawing of conclusions with respect to subjects that are beyond the direct expression
of the text, while interpretation is the process of discovering the true meaning of the language used.

Interpretation is limited to exploring the written text. Construction on the other hand is the drawing of
conclusions, respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expressions of the text.

Laws vs. Statutes

All Statutes are Laws, not all Laws are Statutes.

Law - refers to the system of rules and regulations in a country governing its citizens.

Statutes- refers to the written form of a law passed by a legislative body.

Laws not created by statute (not a statute because it was not made by Congress, but still a law):

 Constitution
 Presidential Decrees (the one who made these were not the legislative, but the President during
the Martial Law)
 Executive Orders (it was enacted by the President during their administration)
 Supreme Court Rulings and Jurisprudence (Art 8 of the Civil Code)
 Ordinances

Situs of Construction and Interpretation

 The situs of construction and interpretation of written laws belong to the judicial department.
 It is the duty of the Courts of Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
 Supreme Court is the one and only Constitutional Court and all other lower courts are statutory
courts, and such lower courts have the power to construe and interpret written laws.

Subjects of Construction and Interpretation

Most common subjects of construction and interpretation are the constitution and statutes which include
ordinances. But we may also add resolutions, executive orders, and department circulars.

The first and fundamental duty of the Courts is to apply the law.

Requisites for the Construction and Interpretation of a Law

1. There must be an actual case or controversy.

2. There is ambiguity in the law involved in the controversy. (Ambiguity exists if reasonable persons
can find different meanings in a statute, document, etc.)

Priority of the Court:

1) Application
2) Interpretation (you go to the text alone, if it is not found, the Court will go to other provisions of
the text within the law)
3) Construction (When interpretation does not suffice, the Court will seek the help of extrinsic aids
such as minutes of Congress, initial bill)

Since the Court is obligated to decide at all times, if after construction, the law remains ambiguous, it is
the judge who will decide. If you are not satisfied, that is where the long process of judicial process comes
in.

Kinds of Construction and Interpretation

Hermeneutics – the science or art of construction and interpretation.

Legal hermeneutics – is the systematic body of rules which are recognized as applicable to the
construction and interpretation of legal writings.

Dr. Lieber in his work on Hermeneutics gives the following classification of the diff kinds of interpretation:

1. Close interpretation – adopted if just reasons connected with the character and formation of the text
induce as to take the words in the narrowest meaning. This is generally known as “literal” interpretation.

2. Extensive interpretation – also called as liberal interpretation, it adopts a more comprehensive

signification of the words.

3. Extravagant interpretation – substitutes a meaning evidently beyond the true one. It is therefore not
genuine interpretation.

4. Free or unrestricted interpretation – proceeds simply on the general principles of interpretation in

good faith, not bound by any specific or superior principle.

5. Limited or restricted interpretation - influenced by other principles than the strictly hermeneutic
ones.

6. Predestined interpretation – takes place when the interpreter, laboring under a strong bias of mind,
makes the text subservient to his preconceived views and desires.

Some Principles of Construction and Interpretation

 Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, vacillation, or equivocations, there is room only for application.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 102858, July 28, 1997

FACTS: Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original certification of his land title under the PD 1529.
However, during the pendency of the case, he died and was substituted by his children, represented by
their aunt Josefa Abistado. Land Registration Court dismissed the petition for non-compliance with
publication requirement of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. It was only
published in the Official Gazette.

Petitioner contends that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be "published both
in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation." Private respondents argue that
publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient enough.

RTC Occidental Mindoro: The trial court dismissed the petition noting that applicants failed to comply
with the provisions of Section 23(1) of PD 1529, requiring the applicants to publish the notice of Initial
Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

CA: Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in
the name of Teodoro Abistado.

The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a need for the Court to interpret/construe the publication requirement of
notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation under Section 23 of PD 1529.

RULING: No. The Court ruled that the law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the
Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial
hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute.
While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import
ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, the Supreme Court hold that in the present
case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning.

BARCELLANO BAÑAS v. BAÑAS

G.R. No. 165287, September 14, 2011

FACTS: Dolores Bañas, heir of Bartolome Bañas who own a lot in Albay which was adjoined with the
owned lot of Medina. The latter offered his lot to the Bañas for 60k but then Medina sold the property to
petitioner Armando Barcellano for the same amount, and a deed of sale executed.

Dolores filed for legal redemption on the basis that they were not given written notice required to be given
to adjoining owner under Article 1623 of the Civil Code. Art 1623 specifically provides that “The right of
legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing
by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be.

Barcellano maintains that the written notice was no longer necessary because there was already actual
notice.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a need for the Court to interpret/construe the written notice under Article
1623 of the Civil Code for legal redemption.

RULING: No. The law is clear in this case, there must first be a written notice to the family of Bañas. Time
and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application.

 When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless
of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or erroneous.

PASCUAL v. PASCUAL BAUTISTA ET AL.

G.R. No. 84240, March 25, 1992

FACTS: Olivia and Hermes Pascual are the natural children of late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full
blood brother of decedent Don Pascual who died intestate and was survived by his surviving spouse and
the children of his brothers.

Private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within the prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil
Code which provides that “An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother…”

Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a need for the Court to interpret/construe Article 992 of the Civil Code to
exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

RULING: No. The interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane, but it is also
an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear, it is not susceptible of
interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or
onerous.

 The first and fundamental duty of the Courts is to apply the law.

PEOPLE v. MAPA
G.R. No. L-22301, August 30, 1967

FACTS: Mario Mapa was apprehended in Manila for violating section 878 in connection with Section 2692
of the Revised Administrative Code as he was caught in possession of 1 homemade revolver without
permit.

The lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms”.

Respondent claimed that he was a secret agent of Batangas governor and was on a mission, therefore
should be exempted from illegal possession of firearms.

ISSUE: Whether or not a “secret agent” is exempt from illegal possession of firearms.

RULING: No. The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not
exempt. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law.

RESINS, INC. v. AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-17888 October 29, 1968

FACTS: Resins, Inc, seeks a refund from Central Bank on the claim that it was exempt from the margin
fee under Republic Act No. 2609 for the importation of UREA and FORMALDEHYDE as separate units
used for the production of synthetic glue, of which it was a manufacturer.

Respondent contends that 'urea formaldehyde' is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and
different from 'urea' and 'formaldehyde', as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic
resins known as 'urea formaldehyde'.

Petitioner argues, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction 'and'
between the terms 'urea' and 'formaldehyde', and that the members of Congress intended to exempt
'urea' and 'formaldehyde' separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue
called 'urea fomaldehyde' not the latter as a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements
made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members
thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not “urea formaldehyde” in Section 2(18) of RA 2609 can be interpreted to mean urea
and formaldehyde as separate units, as opposed to it being one finished product.

RULING: No. The Court ruled that it is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term 'urea
formaldehyde' instead of 'urea and formaldehyde' — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of
the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the
printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on
which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining
one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation,
not by judicial decree.

Furthermore, it has been the constant and uniform holding that exemption from taxation is not favored
and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively
put, the law frowns on exemption from taxation, hence, an exempting provision should be construed
“strictissimi juris" (according to the strictest interpretation of the law). Certainly, whatever may be said of
the statutory language found in Republic Act 2609, it would be going too far to assert that there was such
a clear and manifest inention of legislative will as to compel such a refund.

 The duty of the Court is to apply the law disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for
the accused.

PEOPLE v. AMIGO
G.R. Nos. 116719, January 18, 1996

FACTS: Benito Sy got into an accidental head-on collision with the Tamaraw of Virgilio Abogado. In the
midst of their verbal confrontation, Patricio Amigo intervened, asking Benito to just leave as it was only a
minor incident. Benito rebuked Amigo. The latter then stabbed the former with a five-inch knife. Benito
died. Amigo was convicted with the penalty of reclusion perpertua.

The accused-appellant argues that error was committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out the
penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution was already in effect when the offense was committed.

He claims that it is too cruel and harsh a penalty and pleads for sympathy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty imposed can be modified or reduced by virtue of Section 19 (1) of
Article III of the Constitution which prohibits the imposition of death penalty.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of
courts is to apply the law, disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for an accused. Dura Lex Sed Lex.
The remedy is elsewhere — clemency from the executive or an amendment of the law by the legislative,
but surely, at this point, this Court can but apply the law.

PEOPLE v. DELMO ET AL.

G.R. Nos. 130078-82, 04 October 2020

FACTS: In the afternoon of September 9, 1995, the bodies of Angelito’s estranged wife, her 2 daughters,
and son, were found lying in pools of blood inside their house. The youngest daughter was the only
survivor of what local media bannered as the "Payumo Massacre.”

Police called in Danilo Lapiz, Francisco "Kit" Lapiz, Edmund Delmo, and Maximo Delmo for questioning.
Danilo confessed that the two Delmos and his brother Francisco are the culprits. Cases were filed on the
3. Danilo was later included for refusal to turn state witness. Danilo then formally retracted confession
before the MTC judge, claiming that he had been tortured into making a confession.

Lone survivor Helen, after emerging from a 10-day coma, pointed to Ramos, Cruzata, and Ibañez as the
assailants. However, 4 months later, she recanted this and instead pointed to the accused-appellants.

On arraignment, appellants pleaded "not guilty" to the charges. Trial then ensued.

RTC Biñan: The trial court found the prosecution’s evidence more than ample to establish with moral
certainty the guilt of all the appellants and convicted them of the charges.

Respondents appealed. Consolidating all their individual appeal briefs, the main issues in these cases
concern: (a) the credibility of the lone eyewitness, Helen Grace Payumo; (b) the admissibility of the
extrajudicial confession of appellant Danilo Lapiz; (c) the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to
sustain the conviction of appellants; and (4) the propriety of the penalties imposed on them by the trial
court.

The public outcry that ensued saw various law enforcement agencies rush to solve the murders.

RTC-Binan found Maximo Delmo, Francisco “Kit” Lapiz and Edmon Delmo guilty as principals in the
crimes of murder on four (4) counts and frustrated murder on one (1) count, they are hereby sentenced to
suffer death penalty for murder and a penalty of reclusion perpetua for frustrated murder, with the
accessory penalties set by law, to pay jointly and severally actual damages in to the legal heirs of the
dead victims and Helen Grace Payumo.

Likewise, it found Danilo Lapiz guilty as accomplice in the same crimes and is hereby sentenced to suffer
a penalty of reclusion perpetua for the frustrated murder, with the accessory penalties set by law.

RTC found the prosecution’s evidence more than ample to establish with moral certainty the guilt of all the
appellants and convicted them of the charges.

Hence, appellants individually submitted their separate appeal briefs to SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a need for interpretation/construction on the penalties specified under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING: No. The duty of the Court is to apply the law disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for
the accused. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
murder is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, for each count of murder the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed
against appellants Maximo Delmo, Edmund Delmo, and Francisco Lapiz, pursuant to Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code.

In the present cases, Helen Grace’s positive identification of appellants Maximo Delmo, Edmund Delmo,
and Francisco Lapiz in open court remained unshaken. She was steadfast under tedious, even confusing,
cross-examination.

Helen Grace’s testimony, however, is silent with respect to appellant Danilo Lapiz. Neither did she identify
him in open court as one of the perpetrators. Given this circumstance, and in view of the inadmissibility of
his extrajudicial confession.

The consolidated decision of RTC-Laguna, finding appellants MAXIMO DELMO, EDMUND DELMO, AND
FRANCISCO “KIT” LAPIZ GUILTY as principals for murder is AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION. Appellant
DANILO R. LAPIZ is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.

AQUINO v. AQUINO
G.R. Nos. 208912, December 7, 2021

If the Court has knowledge of any act which it may deemed proper to repress & is not punishable by the
law, and in cases of excessive penalties, it shall:

 Render a proper decision based on the existing law. (Art 5 RPC)

 Report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the
court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation. (Art 5 RPC)

CHAPTER 2 - STATUTES

BIRTH OF A LAW

Legislative Procedures

The power to make laws is lodged in the legislative department of the government.
A statute starts with a bill.

Bill – is the draft of a proposed law from the time of its introduction in a legislative body through all the
various stages in both houses.

Act - is the appropriate term for it after it has been acted on and passed by the legislature.

It then becomes a statute, the written will of the legislature expressed according to the form necessary to
constitute it as the law of the state.

How Does a Bill Becomes A Law – Steps

1. A proposal may come from the President, government agencies, private individuals, interest
groups (lobbying) and legislators themselves.
 2. A member of congress may introduce the proposed bill to the secretary of either house
which will then be calendared for 1st reading.
3. In the First Reading, only the title and number of the bill is read. Thereafter, it is referred to the
appropriate committee for study.
4. The appropriate committee will conduct public hearings. After the public hearing, the
committee will make a committee report, deciding w/n the proposed bill is feasible or not.
Should there be an unfavorable report, the proposed bill is deemed dead.
5. Upon favorable action by the committee, it is then referred to the Committee on Rules to be
calendared for Second Reading.
6. In the second reading, the bill is read in its entirety. Immediately after the second reading, the
bill is set for open debates where members of the congress may propose amendments and
insertions to the proposed bill.
7. After the period of amendments and insertions, the bill will be subject for voting: (1) If
favorable, it is calendared for Third Reading; (2) If unfavorable, it is transmitted to archives.
8. After the approval of the bill in its 2 nd reading and at least 3 calendar days before its final
passage, the bill is printed in its final form and copies thereof distributed to each of the
members.
9. The bill is then calendared for the third and final reading. At this stage, no amendment shall
be allowed. Only the title of the bill is read, and The House will then vote on the bill. (Votes for a
bill to pass on 3rd reading, depends on the policy, either 50%+1 or 51% of the majority in a
quorum)
10. The bill will then be transmitted to the other house where it will undergo the same process.
11. If both houses have different versions passed, it will then be submitted to the Bicameral
Conference Committee. The BCC will be tasked to come up with a compromised bill which will
then be subject to the approval of both houses before the bill is enrolled.
12. The enrolled bill will then be authenticated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the Senate President and attested by the secretaries of both houses.
13. The enrolled bill will then be transmitted to the President for his approval or veto. The
President may veto specific line items or the enrolled bill as a whole. If for any reason the bill is
vetoed, it is then returned to the originating house with his objections.
14. Congress may accept or override the veto. To override the veto of the President, Congress,
during a joint session will need to garner two-thirds vote of all its members
voting separately.

Compromised Bill - if both houses have different versions of the bill, the BCC is tasked to come up with
a compromised bill in order to settle the differences in the bill from both houses.

Enrolled Bill - refers to the bill passed by Congress, authenticated by Senate President & House
Speaker, and approved by President.

Principle of Enrolled Bill - under this principle, it is presumed that once a bill passes a legislative body
and is signed into law, the courts assume that all rules of procedure in the enactment process were
properly followed.

How to invalidate an enrolled bill - you can argue that the quorum in 3rd reading was not followed or
that during the 3rd reading, number of votes were not followed.

Can you invalidate the enrolled bill on this ground? No. Under the principle of enrolled bill, there is a
presumption that it went through the regular process. The Court has to rely on good faith of the 2
branches.

Constitutional option: None.

Administrative option: Yes. You can file a case against the legislator, etc.,

Enrolled Bill v. Journal, which should rise above the 2?

In Morales v. Subido, the Court held that if there is discrepancy between the enrolled bill and
journals, enrolled bill should prevail because we cannot go behind it to discover what really happened.
The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the Court act upon the faith and
credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments.
Otherwise, it would cast an unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did
happen in the labyrinth of law-making with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative
process.

When it comes to extrinsic aids, it is the journals that prevail.

When does the law-making process end in Congress? After the Senate President & House Speaker
authenticates the bill and sends it to the President.
What happens if the Congress finds out that the wrong bill was approved by the Pres., can the Congress
withdraw their signatures? Normally, no. The only ground that they can withdraw their signatures is if
there is a substantial difference between the bill passed by Congress and the one submitted to the
President.

Constitutional Test in Passage of a Bill

3 constitutional requirements in the enactment of statute:

1) Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof.
2) No bill passed by either House shall become law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to each member
three days before its passage.
3) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President.
The executive approval and veto power of the President is the third important constitutional
requirement in the mechanical passage of a bill.

Executive Approval

 When the President signs it.

 When the President does not sign it and 30 days lapsed. (30 calendar days)
 When the President vetoes, and Congress overrides the veto power by 2/3 votes of all members,
voting separately.

Constitutional Requirements (Technical Requirements):

No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be passed.

Ex Post Facto Law - makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when
done, criminal, and punishes such action.

a) If it makes criminal an act

b) When a law aggravates a crime
c) If it changes the punishment
d) When it alters the weight of evidence
e) Limits the rights under bill of rights

Bill of Attainder - punishes a party for a perceived crime without first going through trial/due process.

REMMAN ENTERPRISE INC. v. PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF ESTATE

G.R. No.197676, 04 February 2014

FACTS: Remman Enterprises, Inc. & Chamber of Real Estate and Builder’s Association filed a petition to
declare as unconstitutional sections 28(a), 29 and 32 of Republic Act No. 9646, entitled “An Act
Regulating the Practice of Real Estate Service in the Philippines, Creating for the Purpose a Professional
Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes.”

Petitioners claim that the new law is unconstitutional as it violates the one-title-one subject rule of Article
VI, Section 26 (1) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which mandates that "Every bill passed by Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.”

Petitioners filed a case before the RTC-Manila, seeking to declare as void and unconstitutional
sections 28(a), 29, and 32 of R.A. No. 9646.

RTC denied the petition. It held that the assailed provisions are relevant to the title of the law as they are
intended to regulate the practice of real estate service in the country.

Petitioners appealed to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional provisions should be strictly construed to mean only what it states.

RULING: No. the Supreme Court laid down the rule that Constitutional provisions relating to the
subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede
the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should
receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough
reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and
every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not
be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The Court has previously ruled that the one-subject requirement under the Constitution is satisfied if all
the parts of the statute are related and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long
as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.

It is also well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the
title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and
the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to
include the general object which the statute seeks to effect.

Parts of a Statute

 Title – the heading on the preliminary part, furnishing the name by which the act is individually
known. It is usually prefixed to the statute in the brief summary of its contents.
 Preamble – part of statute explaining the reasons for its enactment and the objects sought to be
accomplished. Usually, it starts with “whereas”.
 Enacting clause – part of statute which declares its enactment and serves to identify it as an act
of legislation proceeding from the proper legislative authority. “Be enacted” is the usual formula
used to start this clause.
 Body – the main and operative part of the statute containing its substantive and even procedural
provisions. Provisos and exceptions may also be found.
 Repealing Clause - announces the prior statutes or specific provisions which have been
abrogated by reason of the enactment of the new law.
 Saving Clause – restriction in a repealing act, which is intended to save rights, pending
proceedings, penalties, etc. from the annihilation which would result from an unrestricted repeal.
 Separability Clause – provides that in the event that one or more provisions or unconstitutional,
the remaining provisions shall still be in force.
 Effectivity Clause – announces the effective date of the law.

Kinds of Statutes

1. General Law – affects the community at large. That which affects all people of the state or all of a
particular class.

2. Special Law – designed for a particular purpose, or limited in range or confined to a prescribed field of
action on operation.

3. Local Law – relates or operates over a particular locality instead of over the whole territory of the state.

4. Public Law – a general classification of law, consisting generally of constitutional, administrative,

criminal, and international law, concerned with the organization of the state, the relations between the
state and the people who compose it, the responsibilities of public officers of the state, to each other, and
to private persons, and the relations of state to one another. Public law may be general, local or special
law.

5. Private Law – defines, regulates, enforces and administers relationships among individuals,
associations and corporations.

6. Remedial Statute – providing means or method whereby causes of action may be effectuated, wrongs
redressed, and relief obtained.

7. Curative Statute – a form of retrospective legislation which reaches back into the past to operate upon
past events, acts or transactions in order to correct errors and irregularities and to render valid and
effective many attempted acts which would otherwise be ineffective for the purpose intended.

8. Penal Statute – defines criminal offenses specify corresponding fines and punishments.

9. Prospective Law – applicable only to cases which shall arise after its enactment.

10. Retrospective Law – looks backward or contemplates the past; one which is made to affect acts or
facts occurring, or rights occurring, before it came into force.

11. Affirmative Statute – directs the doing of an act or declares what shall be done in contrast to a
negative statute which is one that prohibits the things from being done or declares what shall not be done.

12. Mandatory Statutes – generic term describing statutes which require and not merely permit a course
of action.

Concept of Vague Statutes

Statues or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards those men “of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
Statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects:

1) It violates due process for failure to accord persons fair notice of conduct to avoid; and
2) It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretions.

The Supreme Court held that the “vagueness” doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld--- not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of
the statute are clearly delineated.

How Statutes are Repealed

1) Express repeal – is the abrogation or annulling of a previously existing law by the enactment of a
subsequent statute which declares that the former law shall be revoked and abrogated.
2) Implied repeal – when a later statute contains provisions so contrary to & irreconcilable with
those of the earlier law that only one of the two statutes can stand in force.

The repeal of a penal law deprives the court of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of
the old penal law prior to its repeal.

Only a law can repeal a law.

The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest, otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to
be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act.

2 categories of repeal by implication:

1) Repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency - Where provision in the two acts on the same subject
matter are in an irreconcilable conflict.
2) Repeal by intended substitute - If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is
clearly intended as a substitute – to be a complete and perfect system in itself. (RPC, Civil Code)

Ordinance

Test of Valid Ordinance

1) Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

2) Must not be unfair or oppressive;
3) Must not be partial or discriminatory;
4) Must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5) Must be general and consistent with public policy; and
6) Must not be unreasonable.

Reason why an ordinance should not contravene a statute

Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national
law-making body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal.

How to pass an ordinance

1) Drafting the proposal.

2) First reading where the ordinance is introduced to the legislative body (City Councilors,
Municipal Councilors)
3) The draft is sent to the appropriate committee for further scrutiny.
4) At the second reading, the ordinance undergoes thorough examination, discussion, and
amendment. The responsible committee presents its findings and recommendations.
5) The third reading is the final legislative scrutiny of the ordinance. A final vote takes place.
6) Mayor’s approval; (only 10 days to do that); Municipal Mayor (only 10 days) SL Governor (15
days)
7) For MM, sent to Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review (30 days)
8) Veto: 2/3 of all the members can override President’s veto.

Application of Foreign Jurisprudence

Philippine laws must necessarily be construed in accordance with the intention of its own law
makers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other
local legislation related thereof.

Doctrine of Processual Presumption

- Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that
foreign law is the same as ours.
 DEL SOCORRO v. VAN WILSEM
G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014

FACTS: Del Socorro filed a petition seeking to reverse and set aside RTC-Cebu Orders which dismissed
the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, for violation of
RA No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

Norma Del Socorro filed a case against Ernst Johan Van Wilsem for his alleged unjust refusal to support
his minor child with petitioner which makes him liable under RA No. 9262, also known as the Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

Norma Del Socorro and Ernst Johan Van Wilsem got married in Holand, had a child together, and soon
afterwards, got divorced in Holland. Petitioner, together with their son, went back home to the Philippines,
with the respondent promising to support his child but to which he allegedly never did. Not long thereafter,
Van Wilsem came to the Philippines and remarried.

The respondent, on the other hand, contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by
petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support, on the basis that he is an
alien, specifically a citizen of Netherlands, and therefore is not bound by Philippine national law.

RTC-Cebu dismissed the instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in
the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien. Thereafter,
petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration. The lower court denied.

Hence, this petition.

The Court took cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact that the same was directly lodged with
the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,
which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the
Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

ISSUE: Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine
law.

RULING: Yes. In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not
properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support
has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with
Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-
compliance therewith.

CHAPTER 3. BASIC GUIDELINES IN THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS

Legislative Intent - The object of all CI of statute is to ascertain the meaning & intention of the
legislature. It is determined principally from the language of the statute. It is a practice used by judges,
lawyers and other court officials to determine the goals of legislators at the time of a bill's passage.

RAMIREZ vs. CA
G.R. No. 93833, 25 September 1995

FACTS: Socorro Ramirez filed a civil case before RTC-Quezon against Ester Garcia for allegedly
humiliating her at the latter’s office. In support of this, she produced a tape recording of their
confrontation. For this reason, Garcia filed a criminal case before RTC-Pasay against Ramirez. An
information charging petitioner of violation of RA 4200 is issued.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, particularly a violation of RA 4200.

The trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not
constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to the taping
of a communication by a person other than a participant to the communication.

The private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with SC, which referred the case to
the Court of Appeals.

Respondent CA promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order null and void,
holding that quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an
offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent CA denied.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the word “private communication” in sec 1 of the Anti-Wiretapping Act can be
interpreted/construed to mean only recordings of other people’s private conversations where a person’s
not a part of.

RULING: No. Petitioner’s contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of RA 4200
does not include private conversations a person is a part of, narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity.

Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of
a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible
or absurd or would lead to an injustice.

The provision of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.

Verba Legis (Plain Meaning Rule) - If the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, that
meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning which the legislature intended to convey.

REQUEST OF CA JUSTICES FOR COMPUTATION/ADJUSTMENT OF LONGEVITY PAY

8-07-CA 16 June 2015, AM No. 12-9-5-SC, AM No. 13-02-07-SC

FACTS: 3 Court of Appeals Associate Justices filed a motion before the SC for reconsideration to credit
their services rendered outside the Judiciary in the computation of their longevity pay.

Justice Salazar-Fernando requested that her service as Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta.
Rita, Pampanga be considered as part of her judicial service; Justice Gacutan requested that her
services as Commissioner IV of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) be credited as judicial
service; and Justice Veloso assailed the Court’s resolution that denied his request for the crediting of his
services as NLRC Commissioner as judicial service.

A. Services as MTC Judge

The SC found it undisputed that Justice Salazar-Fernando served as MTC Judge from February 15,
1983 to July 31, 1987. This service constitutes continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in
the Judiciary and, hence, should be included in the computation of her longevity pay.

B. Service as COMELEC Commissioner

The Court denied the inclusion of Justice Salazar Fenando’s request to credit her services as
COMELEC Commissioner for her longevity pay, from February 14, 1992 to February 14, 1998, as the
only service recognized for purposes of longevity pay under Section 42 of BP Blg. 129 is service in
the Judiciary, not service in any other branch of government. The COMELEC is an agency
independent of the Judiciary; hence, service in this agency cannot be considered as service
rendered in the Judiciary.

C. Pardo Ruling

Justice Pardo’s one-time service outside of the judiciary was considered part of his service in the
judiciary for purposes of determining his longevity pay. The Court in In Re: Justice Pardo liberally
interpreted the phrase "the Court" in Section 3 of BP 129 to mean the entire judiciary, not just the Court of
Appeals.

D. Services as NLRC Commissioner

The Court denied Justice Gacutan’s request that her past services in the NLRC be recognized for
purposes of her longevity pay. She served as a Commissioner IV of the NLRC for a period of eleven
years and eight months.

Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 is clear and explicit: a judge or justice should have rendered five years of
continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the Judiciary in order to qualify for a monthly
longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay.

The Court pointed out that the NLRC is an agency attached to the DOLE – an adjunct of the Exec Dept.
Under the circumstances, Justice Gacutan’s past service as NLRC Commissioner cannot be credited as
judicial service for longevity pay purposes since she did not render such service while w/ the Judiciary.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a need to interpret/construe the longevity provision under BP Blg. 129 to
include services rendered outside the judiciary.

RULING: The primary rule in addressing any problem relating to the understanding or
interpretation of a law (in this case, the provision granting longevity pay) is to examine the law itself to
see what it plainly says. This is the plain meaning rule of statutory construction.
The first aspect that offers itself in the examination of the law is its title, which gives us a direct
indicator of the exact subject matter of the law. In the present cases, the law under which the disputed
longevity provision can be found is BP Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980). This title
alone already suggests that its provisions specifically relate to members of the judiciary unless an express
contrary intent is made by the legislature. No such exception clause is evident under the terms of BP 129.

As written, the language and terms of this provision are very clear and unequivocal: longevity pay
is granted to a judge or justice (and to none other) who has rendered five years of continuous,
efficient, and meritorious service in the Judiciary. The granted monthly longevity pay is equivalent to
5% of the monthly basic pay.

The plain reading of Section 42 shows that longevity pay is not available even to a judicial officer
who is not a judge or justice. It is likewise not available, for greater reason, to an officer in the
Executive simply because he or she is not serving as a judge or justice. It cannot also be available
t o a judge or justice for past services he or she did not render within the Judiciary as services
rendered outside the Judiciary for purposes of longevity pay is not contemplated by law.

AM No. 12-9-5-SC, AM No. 13-02-07-SC

GLOBE-MACKAY vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 82511, 03 March 1992

FACTS: Imelda Salazar was employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMCR) as
general systems analyst. Also employed by petitioner as manager for technical operations' support was
Delfin Saldivar with whom private respondent was allegedly very close.

GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under
the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of the latter's activities. The report data
indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership with Richard Yambao, owner, and manager of
Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. The report
also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders air-conditioning unit for his own
personal use without authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property.

It likewise appeared that Salazar violated company regulations by involving herself in transactions
conflicting with the company's interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of
partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and
whereabouts of the Fedders air conditioner but failed to inform her employer.

GMCR placed Salazar under preventive suspension for 1 month, giving her 30 days within which to
explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanations three, private respondent filed a complaint
against petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal,
vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and damages.

Labor Arbiter: In a decision, ordered petitioner company to reinstate private respondent to her former or
equivalent position and to pay her full backwages and other benefits she would have received were it not
for the illegal dismissal.

Petitioner then filed a petition assailing this decision.

ISSUE: W/N Salazar is illegally dismissed and shall be entitle to reinstatement and full backwages.

RULING: There being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a legal, cause for the
dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but
as well, to full backwages.

The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of backwages
is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary
meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, condition positions etc. from which one had been
removed" and in the latter, to give her back the income lost during the period of unemployment. Both
remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her "whole." Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has
at times been thwarted when reinstatement has not been forthcoming, and the hapless dismissed
employee finds himself on the outside looking in.

In the first place the wording of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full backwages. . . ."
Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-
meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of
intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by, the legislature in a statute
correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have
expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither does the provision
admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or grounds for non-
application of the above-cited provision, this should be by way of exception, such as when the
reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between the employer and the
employee.

BASBACIO vs. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 109445, 07 November 1994

Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of frustrated murder and of two
counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of the latter's wife Florida
and his son Tirso. The motive for the killing was apparently a land dispute between the Boyons and
petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately
detained after their bonds had been cancelled.

Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment, however, as
the appeal of the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his brief.

CA: Rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove
conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. He had been pointed to by a daughter of Federico Boyon as
the companion of Balderrama when the latter barged into their hut and without warning started shooting,
but the appellate court ruled that because petitioner did nothing more, petitioner's presence at the scene
of the crime was insufficient to show conspiracy.

Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which provides for
the payment of compensation to "any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but
subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal." The claim was filed with the Board of
Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground that while petitioner's
presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet,
considering that there was bad blood between him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and the
fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he was "probably guilty."

On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling.

Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act No. 7309,
however, provides for review by certiorari of the decisions of the Secretary of Justice. Nonetheless, in
view of the importance of the question tendered, the Court resolved to treat the petition as a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65.

Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able to recover under sec. 3(a) of the
law the claimant must on appeal be found to be innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted in the
trial court. Through counsel he contends that the language of sec. 3(a) is clear and does not call for
interpretation.

Section 3. Who may File Claims. – The following may file claims for compensation before the
Board:

(a) any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, and imprisoned but subsequently released
by virtue of a judgment of acquittal;

The "mere fact that the claimant was imprisoned for a crime which he was subsequently acquitted of is
already unjust in itself," he contends. To deny his claim because he was not declared innocent would be
to say that his imprisonment for two years while his appeal was pending was justified. Petitioner argues
that there is only one requirement for conviction in criminal cases and that is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to present such proof, the presumption that the accused
is innocent stands and, therefore, there is no reason for requiring that he be declared innocent of
the crime before he can recover compensation for his imprisonment.

ISSUE: W/N section 3(a) should be interpreted to include just any person released by virtue of acquittal to
be eligible to file claims under RA 7309 (AN ACT CREATING A BOARD OF CLAIMS UNDER THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF UNJUST IMPRISONMENT OR DETENTION AND
VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIMES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES).

RULING: No. Sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and]
imprisoned." The fact that his conviction is reversed, and the accused is acquitted is not itself
proof that the previous conviction was "unjust." An accused may be acquitted for a number of
reasons and his conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside.

In this case, there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's conviction by the trial court was
wrongful or that it was the product of malice or gross ignorance or gross negligence. To the contrary, the
court had reason to believe that petitioner and his co-accused were in league, because petitioner is the
father-in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama and it was petitioner who bore the victim a grudge because of a land
dispute. Not only that. Petitioner and his co-accused arrived together in the hut of the victims and forced
their way into it.
Statutes as a whole - A cardinal rule in Statutory Construction is the legislative intent must be
ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not merely of a particular provision. A word
or phrase might easily convey a meaning which is different from the one actually intended.

JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC. vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 82511, 03 March 1992

FACTS: NLRC dismissed the petitioner’s appeal from a decision of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration on the ground of failure to post the required appeal bond. The petitioner
insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas
employment because they are already required under Section 4 of the POEA Rules not only to pay a
license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000.

The Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond requirement but suggest that the rules cited by the
NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of the POEA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners, after having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in
escrow the amount of P200,000 as required by the POEA Rules, still required to post an appeal bond to
perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC.

RULING: Yes. The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to the
cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal
bond is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is
eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.

It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every
part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as
a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.

RADIOLA TOSHIBA PHILIPPINES, INC vs. IAC

G.R. No. 75222, 18 July 1991

FACTS: On March 4, 1980, Petitioner obtained a levy of attachment against the properties of spouses
Carlos and Teresita Gatmaytan for a collection of sum of money before the RTC of Pasig. Three creditors,
herein respondents filed a petition for involuntary insolvency of spouses Gatmaytan.

CFI of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila issued an order directing respondent Sheriff of Angeles
City, or whoever is acting in his behalf, to issue within seven (7) days from notice thereof a final deed of
sale over the two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 18905 and 40430 in
favor of petitioner.

RTC Branch CLII, Pasig, Metro Manila issued a writ of preliminary attachment upon application of the
petitioner, as plaintiff, which put up a bond of P350,000.00. On March 4, 1980, levy on attachment was
done in favor of petitioner on the real properties registered in the names of spouses.

The court ordered the consolidation of ownership of petitioner over said properties; but respondent sheriff
of Angeles City refused to issue a final certificate of sale in favor of petitioner.

Petitioners-creditors interposed their opposition, stating that the insolvency court is devoid of jurisdiction
to grant the motion referring to matter.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with respondent Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC
denied petitioner's aforesaid petition. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of the petitioner is dissolved by the insolvency
proceedings against respondent spouses commenced four months after said attachment.

RULING: Yes. Petitioner correctly argued that the properties in question were never placed under the
jurisdiction of respondent insolvency court so as to be made available for the payment of claim filed
against the Gatmaytans in the insolvency proceedings.

Petitioner's contention is impressed with merit. The provision of Section 32 of the Insolvency Law is very
clear — that attachments dissolved are those levied within one month next preceding the commencement
of the insolvency proceedings and judgments vacated and set aside are judgments entered in any action,
including judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor, where the action was filed within thirty (30)
days immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. In short, there is a cut off
period — one (1) month in attachment cases and thirty (30) days in judgments entered in actions
commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Section 79, on the other hand, relied upon by private
respondents, provides for the right of the plaintiff if the attachment is not dissolved before the
commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if
the claim upon which the attachment suit was commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor.
Therefore, there is no conflict between the two provisions.
But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be stated that in construing a statute, courts
should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. This
rule is expressed in the maxim, ut maqis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought
which gives effect to the whole of the statute — its every word. Hence, where a statute is
susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and
beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and
harmonious with each other.

Spirit and purpose of law – When the interpretation of a statute would lead to absurdity or would
contravene the manifest purpose of legislature in its enactment, it should be construed according to its
spirit & reason.

DE GUIA vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 104712, 06 May 1992

FACTS: On November 18, 1991, Congress passed RA 7166 "An Act providing for Synchronized National
and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations therefor, and for other
purposes."

Petitioner De Guia, an incumbent member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Parañaque
filed with COMELEC a motion for clarification of its Resolution No. 2313 inquiring whether the members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque and other municipalities of Metro Manila enumerated therein,
which are all single-district municipalities would be elected by district in the May 11, 1992, or in the 1995
regular elections.

COMELEC resolved petitioner's Motion for Clarification by interpreting Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, to mean that
the election of elective members of the Sangguniang Bayan, by district, of the thirteen (13) municipalities
in the Metro Manila Area shall apply in the May 11, 1992, elections.

Not satisfied, De Guia filed the instant petition for reversal of the position of the respondent. Petitioner
insisted that the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque should fall under category (d) in which they will still be
elected at large until the 1995 elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque and other municipalities of
Metro Manila enumerated therein, would be elected by district in the May 11, 1992, regular election.

RULING: Yes. As stated in Paragraph (c) Section 3, Cities with 2 or more legislative districts ( Manila,
Cebu, Davao ) shall continue to be elected by district, as well as the 13 Municipalities of Metro Manila
which have already been apportioned into 2 districts.

Paragraph (d) Section 3 of RA 7166 refers only to elective officials of the Sangguniang Panglungsod
which are single district cities and Sangguniang Bayan for Municipalities outside Metro Manila, which
will remain to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992, election. Paragraph (d) should be interpreted
in line with the rest of the statute and to follow the interpretation of the petitioner would make the
act of the statute in singling out the single district provinces as useless or meaningless. The key
to open the door to what the legislature intended in the language of a statute is its purpose or
reason which induced it to enact the statute.

Statutes should be construed in light of the object to be achieved. A Construction should be

rejected that gives the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish its purpose
for which it is enacted.

SALENILLAS vs. CA
G.R. No. 78687, 31 January 1989

FACTS: The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title, in
favor of the spouses, Florencia de Enciso and Miguel Enciso. The patentees, the Enciso spouses, by an
Absolute Deed of Sale, sold the property in favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena Salenillas and
Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of P900.00. Petitioner Elena Salenillas is a daughter of the
Encisos. As a result of the aforementioned sale, TCT was issued in the name of the Salenillas.

The petitioners mortgaged the property with the Rural Bank of Daet, Inc. The mortgage was subsequently
released on November 22, 1973, after the petitioners paid the amount of P1,000.00. Later, the petitioners
again mortgaged the property, this time in favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch, as security for a
loan of P2,500.00.

For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding, pursuant to Act No.
3135, was instituted by the Philippine National Bank against the mortgage and the property was sold at a
public auction. The private respondent, William Guerra, emerged as the highest bidder in the said public
auction and as a result thereof a "Certificate of Sale" was issued to him.

Philippine National Bank filed with the RTC, a motion for a writ of possession. The public respondent,
Judge Raymundo Seva of the trial court, acting on the motion, issued an order for the issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of the private respondent.
When the deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte however, attempted to place the property in the possession
of the private respondent, the petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the possession of the same and
instead offered to repurchase it under Section 119 of the Public Land Act.

Undeterred by their initial setback, the petitioners elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals.
Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of merit. According to them, the transfer of property from
the parent to the child for a nominal sum was not the conveyance contemplated by the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested property under Section 119
of the Public Land Act.

RULING: Yes. The Petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under "Section 119 of the Public
Land Act. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent of homestead provisions, when
proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of 5 years
from the date of re conveyance."

It is clear that only three types of persons are bestowed the right to repurchase that is the applicant, his
widow, and legal heirs. Elena Salenillas is a legal heir of the Enciso being their daughter.

The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. The distinction made by respondent
contravenes the very purpose of the act. Between two statutory interpretations, that which better
serves the purpose of the law shall prevail.

B/GEN. COMMENDADOR ET AL. vs. GEN. DE VILLA

G.R. No. 96948, 02 August 1991

FACTS: The petitioners are officers of the AFP facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the
failed coup d’état that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989. The Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel
issued a uniform subpoena individually addressed to the petitioners. The petitioners acknowledged
receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates
of victims of the rebellion. At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on
various grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days to file their objections in writing through a
Motion for Summary Dismissal.

PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days to submit their respective counter-affidavits
and the affidavits of their witnesses.

The petitioners manifested that they were exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against the
president and members of GCM No.14 by invoking Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408. GCM No. 14 ruled,
however, that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No.39.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners can manifest the right to peremptory challenge.

RULING: Yes. It is a basic canon of statcon that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its
soul. The Court held that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in P.D. No. 39 became
ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045.
As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now
again allows the right to peremptory challenge.

The Court disagrees that the right to peremptory challenge remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To
repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981.
Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer operative.

Doctrine of Necessary Implications - One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is
the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a
part thereof as that which is expressed.

CHUA vs. CSC

G.R. No. 88979, 07 February 1992

Facts: Republic Act 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for
involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 of R.A. 6683 provides who are qualified to avail
the benefits under the law which includes all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees who
have rendered two consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation with the
exception of uniformed personnel of AFP and PC/INP.

Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the Early Retirement Law,
filed an application to the Respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA), which was denied since
petitioner is a co-terminus employee.

She appealed with respondent CSC, but it was also denied because contractual employees are excluded
from the coverage. The date of the petitioner's separation from the service is co-terminus with the NIA
project which is contractual nature.
Issue: W/N petitioner's status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the coverage of R.A. 6683.

Ruling: No. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause should the Court sustain
respondents' submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees
who are similarly situated as those covered by said law. The doctrine of necessary implication must be
applied.

No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always an
omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-
embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps
in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the
gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is
as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to
contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make
effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and
subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.

CITY OF MANILA vs. JUDGE GOMEZ

G.R. No. L-37251, 31 August 1981

Facts: Section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, Republic Act No. 5447, which took, imposed "an
annual additional tax of one per centum on the assessed value of real property in addition to the real
property tax regularly levied thereon under existing laws" but "the total real property tax shall not exceed a
maximum of three per centrum.”

That maximum limit gave the municipal board of Manila the idea of fixing the realty tax at three percent.
So, by means of Ordinance No. 7125, the board imposed an additional one-half percent realty tax.

Esso filed a complaint for the recovery of the said amount. It contended that the additional one-half
percent tax is void because it is not authorized by the city charter nor by any law. It revealed that up to
this time it has been paying the additional one-half percent tax and that from 1975 to 1980 it paid the total
sum of P4,206,240.71 as three percent tax on its real properties.

After hearing, the trial court declared the tax ordinance void and ordered the city treasurer of Manila to
refund to Esso the said tax.

Issue: W/N the additional one-half percent realty tax for the two-year period from the third quarter of 1972
up to the second quarter of 1974 is legal.

Yes. The doctrine of implications in statutory construction sustains the City of Manila's contention that
the additional one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by the provision in section 4 of the Special
Education Fund Law that "the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum.

The doctrine of implications means that "that which is plainly implied in the language of a statute
is as much a part of it as that which is expressed".

While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and a half percent, on the
other hand, the 1968 Special Education Fund Law definitively fixed three percent as
the maximum real property tax of which one percent would accrue to the Special Education Fund.

Cases Omissus - When a statute makes specific provisions in regard to several enumerated cases but
omits to make any provision which is analogous to those enumerated, and it appears that such case was
omitted because it was overlooked, it is called “Cases Omissus”. Such omissions of defects cannot be
supplied by the Courts.

PEOPLE vs. MANANTAN

G.R. No. L-14129, 31 July 1962

Facts: Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

Section 54. Active intervention of public officers and employees. - No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or
assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city,
municipal or rural police force, and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid in any candidate
or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or
to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.

Defendant contends that the provision excludes justice of peace and as such, he is excluded from this
prohibition. The defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of peace, the
defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant. Under the said
rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of peace is within the purview of
section 54. A second motion was filed by the defense counsel who in cited in support the decision of the
Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraig, where a justice of peace is excluded from the prohibition of sec.
54. The

Issue: W/N the Justice of Peace can be interpreted to be included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code.

Ruling: Yes. The word judge in the former provision was qualified by the phrase "of First instance"
the term judge in section 54 is not modified or qualified making it broader and more generic to
comprehend all kinds of judges.

The rule of Casus omissus has no applicability to this case for the maxim only applies and
operates if and when the omission has been clearly established.

The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is
criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing
has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, there has been no such
omission. There has only been a substitution of terms.

Doctrine of Stare Decisis - It refers to the doctrine that when a court has once laid down a principle, it
shall follow that principle and apply it to future cases where facts are substantially the same.

I.J.M. TUASON AND CO, INC, ET AL. vs. MARIANO

G.R. No. L-33140, 23 October 1978

Facts: Respondents were claiming ownership of a parcel of land located in Quezon City. They alleged
that the land to which they claim was acquired by their father by means of Spanish Title, has been
fraudulently and erroneously included in O.C.T. No. 735. Plaintiffs prayed that O.C.T. No. 735 and the
titles derived be declared void due to certain irregularities in the Land Registration proceedings.

J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue,
prescription, laches and prior judgment.

Issue: W/N O.C.T. No. 735 is valid.

Ruling: Yes. The validity of O.C.T. No. 735 was already decided by the Supreme Court in the previous
cases of Benin vs. Tuason, Alcantara vs. Tuason, and Pili vs. Tuason.

The rulings in these cases was also applied in other cases involving the validity of O.C.T. No. 735.

Considering the principle of "Stare Decisis" or "Follow Past Precedents and do not disturb what
has been settled", the court ruled that respondents cannot maintain their action without eroding
the long settled holding of the Courts that O.C.T. No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.

M. AMADO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 210164, 18 August 2015

Facts: Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he was
naturalized as a US citizen.

Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines, Arnado applied for
repatriation under RA 9225 before the Consul in San Francisco. He took the Oath of Allegiance and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

He then filed his 2009 COC for the mayoralty post of Lanao del Norte for the 2010 elections. However, his
co-candidate filed a petition to disqualify on the ground that he continued to use his US passport for entry
to and exit from the Philippines after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation.

While the petition for disqualification was pending, the 2010 elections proceeded, wherein Arnado
garnered the highest votes and was proclaimed winner.

COMELEC 1st Division nullified proclamation and applied rule on succession.

Maquiling, another co-candidate who garnered 2nd highest votes, contested to the application of the rule
on succession.

Issue: W/N the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
disqualification case against private respondent.

Ruling: Yes. The rules on disposition and resolution of cases filed before or after an election
vary. Consequently, the Sunga case cannot apply to the instant case because here, the
disqualification case was filed on seven days after the May 11, 1998, elections. Therefore, the
provisions of paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 2050 must apply, in that, the complaint shall be
dismissed as a disqualification case, but referred to the Law Department of the COMELEC for
preliminary investigation. This is exactly what the COMELEC ruled in its assailed resolution of
June 4, 1998, and rightly so.