TEAMTEAM

CODE:
CODE:14
14

UNITED UNIVERSITY, RAWATPUR, JHALWA,

PRAYAGRAJ

Moot Court, 2023

BEFORE THE HON’BLE CIVIL COURT OF SARDAM,

IN THE STATE OF INDIANA

PETITION NO. ********

M/S. SENGHAL & SENGHAL. ……………APPELLANT

V/s.

SIDD MALHAR. ……………RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

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Table Of Content

S. TITLE PAGE
NO: NO:
1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Page 3

2 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Page 3

3 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION Page 4

4 STATEMENTS OF FACTS Page 5-6

5 Issues For Consideration Page 6


Whether There Is Valid Contract Between M/S Senghal
and senghal Mr. Sidd Malhar?
 Whether the judgement passed in Mohri Bibee v,
Dharmodas Ghose needs reconosideration?
 Whether the Civil Court of sardam was correct in rejecting
the plea of restitutions.
6 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS Page 7 - 9

7 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED Page 11- 15

8 PRAYERS Page 16

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

S.No Abbreviations Full Form

1 & And

2 V/S Versus

3 SCC Supreme Court Cases

4 SC Supreme Court

5 SEC Sections

6 ORS. Others

7 HC High Court

8 AIR All India Reporter

9 ART. Article

10 SOI State Of Indiana

11 DIR Director

12 CONST. Construction

13 U/S Under Section

14 AMT Amount

15 COI Citizens Of Indiana

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES:
1. LAW OF INDIANA
2. THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, 1872
3. THE INDIAN MAJORITY ACT, 1875
CASES:
1. Mohiri Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghosh (1902-03) 30 IA 114: ILR (1903) 30 CAL 539.
2. Dharmeshwar Kalita v. Union of India, AIR 1955 Ass 86.
3. Leslie (R) Ltd v Shiell , (1914) 3 KB 607 (CA), 613.
4. Bhim Mandal Mangaram Corain, AIR 1961 Pat 21
5. Suraj Narain Dubey v. Sukhu Aheer and Anr, ILR (1928) 51 All 164
6. Indra Ramaswami Pandia Thalavar v. Anthappa Chettiar and others (1906) 16 MLJ 422
7. Paramjit Singh vs Lakhwinder Kaur And Another Civil Revision No.4102 of 2018
8. Thurstan v. Nottingham Permanent Benefit Building Society (1902)1 Ch. 1
9. Balangowda Bhimangowda vs Gadigeppa Bhimappa (1929) 31 BOMLR 340, 118 Ind Cas
698
10. Bindeshri Bakhsh Singh v. Chandika Prasad and another (1927) ILR49ALL137
11. Stocks v. Wilson, (1913) 2 KB 235
12. Ajudhia Prasad and Anr. v. Chandan Lal and Anr AIR 1937 All 610, 617(SB)
13. Leslie (R) Ltd v Shiell , (1914) 3 KB 607 (CA), 613.
14. Bhim Mandal vs Magaram Corain And Ors. on 1 August, 1960 AIR 1961 Pat 21
15. Mohd Said v. Bishamber Nath Allahabad High Court 1923

DYANAMIC LINKS:
 www.indiankanoon.org
 www.legalserviceindia.com
 www.scconline.com
 www.manupatrafast.com
LEAGL TEXT BOOKS
 Contract I & Specific Relief Act
 Avtar Singh Law of Contract & Specific Relief Act

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THE STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Sidd Malhar , The respondent appearing before the High Court Of Sardam (Indiana) under
Order 41 Rule 1 of The Civil Procedure Code, 1908 corresponding to the appeal filed by the
Appellant under Section 96 of The Civil Procedure Code, 1908.
STATEMENTS OF FACTS

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Statement of Facts:

The Parties- Sidd Malhar i.e. the Appellant, is a sixteen-year prodigy, citizen of Indiana and
was the recipient of the "Sensational Voice of the Nation " award. He was an astounding
singer, extremely talented not only in Rap. Rock, Hip-Hop and Jazz but also in Classical and
Folk. M's. Senghal & Senghal.ie. the Respondent, is a leading building constructor and
infrastructure provider. Ms. Asha Senghal is the Manager of M's. Senghal & Senghal.

Background of case-The Respondent is an Astounding singer and wanted to develop his

career. So, he wanted a multi-purpose, ultra-modern architectural marvel where he could
have his recording studio, theater - for live musical performances and a rooftop pool for
hosting parties. Ms. Senghal & Senghal the Respondent, was a leading building constructor
and they offered the Appellant to complete the work at Rs. 10, 00,000/. Both the parties knew
that this was an unrealistically low-price contract and the amount will be paid in installments
in order of the completion of different phases of the assigned work. Sidd accepted their offer
and entered into a contract for construction of the multi-purpose building and for providing
all amenities therein. According to the contract, the ground floor was for parking, the first
floor was for the music theatre, the second floor was for the recording studio and the last
floor for the roof top pool. The Appellant completed the construction of ground floor and first
floor and ran out of money and materials for further construction and informed the Sidd that
they could not complete further construction unless further capital was made available. In
order to arrange the same, Sidd had arranged a poolside party to which he had invited top
music directors, producers and other renowned individuals in the music industry whom he
believed would fund for his dream music albums and music tour and He had requested for the
continuance of the construction work and further requested to spend the remaining amount of
Rs.7,00,000/- on the work out of their own funds and assured them that the money would be
paid to them as soon as his album is released.The roof top pool was completed and the party
was a success as Sidd found the client who was ready to provide funds for his new album.
But unfortunately, the album got flopped and he won't be able to repay to the Appellant. Then
Ms Asha Senghal on behalf of Ms. Senghal and Senghal compelled the respondent to render a
music performance in her daughter’s birthday party, in which she had invited all her relatives
and rich dignitaries and in return she agreed to release Sidd from paying the debts of
Rs.7,00,000/-. Sidd agreed on that but again due to his ill health, he won't be able to perform.
So, Finally, on his eighteenth birthday, both the parties, on grounds of humanity, decided to
alter the contract. Sidd acknowledged the debt taken from M/s. Senghal & Senghal for
rendering past services and further both agreed on the same point that Sidd would pay the
debt through easy monthly installments (EMIs) of Rs. 20,000/- per month till the repayment
of the amount of Rs.7,00,000/-. But, later , Sidd realized after the estimation ,that he had
already paid the actual cost incurred by the appellant in pursuance of the material used i.e Rs,
3,00,000. And decided to dispose of the property without any further payment on which the
appellant has the objection , So they sent a notice to repay the amount within 15 days , And
on getting no response from the Respondent , He approached the Civil Court of Sardam
(Indiana) in which the court decided in favor of Sidd and declared the contract as void ab
intio and thus, set Sidd free from all his liabilities towards M/s. Senghal & Senghal by
upholding the judgment passed in Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose. Also rejected the plea
of restitution raised by the Plaintiff and not granted the injunction . Not satisfied with the
decision, the Appellant decided to appeal in the High Court And, Finally the Appellant
appealed before the Hon'ble High Court Sardam , (Indiana).

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The Contract-The Contract was to construct a multi-purpose building including all amenities
therein. According to the contract, the ground floor was for parking, the first floor was for the
music theater, the second floor was for the recording studio and the last floor for the rooftop
pool. Both parties agreed on the payment of Rs. 10, 00,000/ in installments in order of the
completion of different phases of the assigned work.

Dispute between the parties- Respondent tries to dispose of his property as he had already
paid Rupees 3,00,000 the actual cost incurred the Appellant after the estimation in pursuance
of the quality of material used by the Appellant and declare the contract void. Appellant filed
the suit before the Civil Court of Sardam in the State of Indiana on the ground that they had
constructed the building as per the contract and had taken the measure step to recover the
loan from the Respondent of Rs 7,00,000 but now he refused to pay the said amount and
alleged a fraud against him They also prayed for injunction restraining Sidd from selling the
property until the suit was disposed as it was already mentioned that the Civil Cout of Sardan
heard the matter and held that a minor's contract is void ab-initio through the Respondent set
free from all the liabilities towards Appellant by upholding the judgment passed in Mohri
Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose and the plea for restitution by the appellant was rejected and
injunction was not granted. Then Appellant prefered an appeal before the High Court of
Sardam in the State of Indiana . The High Court granted injunction and decided to hear the
case on merits

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ISSUE RAISED

ISSUE ONE:
Whether there is a valid contract between M/s. Senghal and Senghal and MrSidd Malhar?

ISSUE TWO:
Whether the judgment passed in Mohori Bibee V/s Dharmodas Ghose needs
reconsideration?

ISSUE THREE:
Whether the Civil Court of Sardam was correct in rejecting the plea of restitution?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Issue 1 :
Whether there is a valid contract between
M/s. Senghal and Senghal and Mr. Sidd Malhar?

No, the contract between Ms. Senghal and Senghal and Mr. Sidd Malhar is not valid, but void
ab initio , As at the time , when contract was made, the respondent was minor and relying on
the judgement of Mohiri Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghosh1 , any agreement made with minor is
void ab intio .

Age of majority:
The age of majority is generally eighteen, except when guardian of a minor’s person or
property has been appointed by the court, in which case,it is 21 .
Section 3 of The Indian Majority Act, 1875, provides the definition of the the major person.
And this section defines the inherent competence to be a party to a contract, and not
competence for being an agent or representative; etc.2

Issue 2 :
Whether the judgment passed in Mohori Bibee v.
Dharmodas Ghose needs reconsideration?
1

The counsel on behalf of the Defendant most humbly and respectfully submits before this
honourable Court that the judgement passed in Mohori bibee v/s Dharmodas Ghose does not
need reconsideration as per the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Any contract
with a minor or an infant is Null & void-ab-intio .

Mohori Bibee v/s Dharmodas Ghose suit relates to the nature of contracts of a minor,
fraudulent false interference by him, enforcement of the principle of Estoppel, sections 64, 65
of the Contract Act, ete.

Name Of The Judges: Lord McNaughton, Lord Davey, Lord Lindley, Sir Ford North, Sir
Andrew Scoble, Sir Andrew Wilson.

The respondent was Dharmodas Ghose, who was a minor, received a loan from Brahmodutt,
a lender in Calcutta, by saying that he was an adult and had written a mortgage deed
(Mortgage Deed) in his favour to get a loan. At the time when the mortgage was being
considered for advance money. At the time of standing, Kedarnath, the agent of Brahmodutt,
had received information that the respondent was a minor; So, he cannot execute the deed.
But still he executed a mortgage deed firom Dharamdos Ghose.
The minor then filed a suit against Brahmodutt by his mother and guardian in which he
appeal to the court to cancel the mortgage deed, as he was minor at the time of the mortgage

1
Mohiri Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghosh (1902-03) 30 IA 114: ILR (1903) 30 CAL 539.
2
Dharmeshwar Kalita v. Union of India, AIR 1955 Ass 86.

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deed being executed. Justice Jenkins (Jenkins J.) who was a judge of the trial court,
Accepting the appeal of the respondent, he cancelled the mortgage deed.

The appeal against the order was also quashed by the High Court; Therefore, the appellant
appealed to the Privy Council. Brahmodutt had died at the time of making this appeal. So, he
was replaced by his successor, Mohori Bibee.

Issue Raised:

1.Whether the deed was void under section 2, 10, 11, of Indian Contract Act, 1872 or
not?
2. Whether the defendant was liable to return the amount of loan which he had received by
him under such deed or mortgage or not?
3. Whether the mortgage commenced by the defendant was voidable or not?

The following arguments were presented by Mohori Bibee:

While cancelling the mortgage deed, the court should have forced the minor to pay the money
(Rs. 10,500) under the deed Return it. Iin favor of this argument, he referred to the Specific
Relief Act, 1963 under which the Court has the power to pass such an order

Under Sections 64 and 65 of the Indian Contract Act 1872, the return of the money received
under the deed cancelled may be compelled.
According to the principle of 'Estoppel', the minor, who called himself a minor, cannot now
be allowed to argue that he was a minor while contracting.
The Contract made by the minor is null and voidable

Verdict:
The court dismissed the appeal,

The principle of restriction cannot apply in this case because both the parties were aware that
the contract was being done with a minor.
Under the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the minor may be compelled to return the benefits
availed under zero contract. But in this case, the court does not think it appropriate, because
when Dharmodas Ghose was given a mortgage loan, the appellant knew that he was a minor.

Conclusion:
Based on the above principles, the Privy Council rejected the appeal of the appellant.

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Issue 3:
Whether Civil Court of Sardam was
correct in rejecting the plea of restitution by the Appellant?

Yes, The Civil court of Sardam was correct in rejecting the plea of Restitution, The relevant
authority to this is Leslie v. Shiell3, where the Lord Sumner said that the principle , which at
common law relieved an infant from liability for a tort directly connected with a voidable
contract , namely , that it was impossible to enforce in a roundabout way an unenforceable
contract, equally forbids the court of law to allow , under the name of an implied contract or
in the form of an action quasi ex contract , a proceeding to enforce a part of a contract , which
the statute declares to be wholly void.

3
Leslie (R) Ltd v Shiell , (1914) 3 KB 607 (CA), 613

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

Issue 1:
Whether there is valid contract between M/s.
Senghal and Senghal and Mr. Sidd Malhar?

1.The counsel for the respondent respectfully submits to the honorable high court that the
contract between Ms Senghal and Senghal and Mr. Sidd Malhar is not valid as the contract
was void ab initio (void from beginning) He was of 16 years of age when he entered into the
contract, as it is stated that Agreements entered into with Minors are void ab-initio'. Section
10 requires that the parties to a contract must be competent and section 11 declares, that the
minor is not competent. But neither section makes it clear whether, if a minor enters into an
agreement, it would be voidable at his option or altogether void The Privy Council in their
well-known pronouncement in Mohori Bibee v. Dhurmodas Ghose observed the question
whether the contract is void or voidable preposes the existence of a contract within the
meaning of the act , and cannot arise in the case of an infant. Section 10 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872 provides, what all agreements are Contract: - All agreements are
Contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties, competent to contract, for a lawful
consideration and with a lawful object and not hereby expressly declared to be void.

Nothing herein contained shall affect any law enforce in (India) and not hereby expressly
repealed by which any contract is required to be made in writing or in the presence of
witnesses or any law relating to the registration of the documents. Also, Section 1l of the
Indian Contract Act defines the term "competent," which includes three elements-The person
must be of legal age, which is 18 years old, the person should be of sound mind and not
disqualified from contracting by any law to which he is subject. And the age of majority is
given in The Indian majority act,1875 declares in section 3 that every person domiciled in
India shall be deemed to have attained his majority when he shall have completed the age of
18 years, and not before. The age of majority being 18 years, a person less than that age even
by a day would be a minor for the purposes of contracting. And this section defines the
inherent competence to be a party to a contract, and not competence for being an agent or
representative; etc. As in the case of Bhim Mandal Magaram Corain4 held that a
minor is not competent to contract and an agreement with a minor has been held to be void.
In respect of contracts thus it has been presumed that a minor is not capable of making an
informed choice and taking a decision and thus the consent of a minor has no effect of
binding him to any contract.

4
.Bhim Mandal Mangaram Corain, AIR 1961 Pat 21

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2.Further on respondent’s 18th birthday both the parties on the ground of humanity decided
to alter the contract which is void too as they tried to ratify the void contract based on the past
consideration not being paid b the respondent. A fresh Contract should be made on attaining a
majority and a new contract will also require a fresh consideration. The consideration which
passed in the earlier contract can not be implied into the contract into which the minor enters
on attaining majority.
3.It is also given that the ratification of a minor's contract does not exist. If a person is a
minor at the time of contracting the contract is invalid and void. After becoming a major, the
minor is no longer able to remedy the contract (the contract, if corrected. will no longer be
valid). Furthermore, if the parties to the contract express interest, they may engage in a new
contract with the restriction that the consideration in the new contract be as the prior
consideration cannot be utilized again. And in this case the alteration was made on past
services that both agreed on that the Sidd would pay the debt through EM of Rs 20,000/- per
month till the repayment of the amount of Rs 7.00,000/- so there was no new consideration
was made which leads to contract be void. As in the case of Suraj Narain Dubey v. Sukhu
Aheer and Anr5 Allahabad High Cout held the old consideration by the minor is not valid
consideration for a fresh contract The judgment was The three-Judge Bench of Allahabad
High Cout upheld the decision of Small Causes Court they stated the previous contract fails
Section 1l of the Indian Contract Act Competency of Contract" as the respondent was a
minor so the Contract was void. The previous contract being void, the consideration not
good consideration for the contract and the contract was held void. The same view was taken
by the Madras High Court in Indran Ramaswami Pandia Thalavar v. Anthappa Chettiar
and others6(Vol. XVI MLJ 422). It is held that a promissory note executed by a person on
attaining majority in settlement of an earlier one executed by him while minor, in
consideration of his having received from the oblige a certain sum of money when he was a
minor, is bad for want of consideration.
Also, it is given in the case of Satya Pal Anand v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.7 it was
stated that any novation, rescission and alteration of contract, can be made only through
bilaterally and with the amicable consent of both the parties. But in this present case the
consent for contract is given by a minor so there is no point of alteration because as there is
no contract so there is a no point of alteration so the alteration of the contract is not possible.
Also, there is no point of the application of the principle of necessaries as the house was
made was luxury not for basic need as in the case of Nash v Inman8 Here, an Oxford student
who was still a minor (under 21 years of age - Age of Majority at the time) purchased 11
fancy waistcoats from a Seville Roy tailor. Despite the fact that these waistcoats were
generally deemed to be necessaries, the court found that they were not necessary under the
circumstances. The father of the infant was clearly able to demonstrate that his son was
adequately supplied with clothes.
In, Lakhwinder Singh v. Paramjit Kaur7, it has been observed that one needs to be more
vigilant and must make all reasonable and diligent enquiries in order to ascertain the age of
the other party to the agreement. Hence after considering all the facts the contract between

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appellant and respondent is void ab intio.2, here the Appellant fails to take due diligence in
asserting the age of the other party.

Issue 2:
Whether the judgment passed in Mohori Bibee v.
Dharmodas Ghose needs reconsideration?

The counsel humbly submits to the honorable court that the case of Mohori Bibee vs.
Dharmodas Ghosh10 needs no reconsideration because according to the Indian contract act
any
contract with minor is void ab initio and also Indian courts do not prescribe the minor's
contract. The main reason for these policies to protect minors from their own rash decision
and preventing minor's from other parties from taking advantage of minor's mental capacity.

The decision is good precedent in Indian contract law, and was re-affined by the Supreme
Cout in its 2014 decision in Mathai Mathai v Joseph Mary.
The case of Mohori Bibee v's Dharmodas Ghose related to minor's contract where a minor
who enters in a contract with the major person.

Plaintiff (Dharmodas Ghose) who was a minor at the time of contract received a loan from
Respondent (BrahmoDuttt) by saying that he was an adult and entered into a contract for a
mortgage deed in his favor for loan and the management of his business was in the control
of the attorney of Brahmo Dutta (Kedarnath) Kedarnath receives the information of
Dharmodas minority from the letter sent by the mother of Dharmodas. But still he executed a
mortgage deed from Dharmodas Ghose.

On the 10th day of September 1895, a legal action brought by Dharmodas and his mother by
saying that the mortgage executed by Minor or infant was void and disproportionate or
improper.

Justice Jenkins, who was the judge of the trial court, cancelled the mortgage deed.

When Brahmo Dutta was not satisfied with the verdict of Trial Court he filed an
appeal in the Calcutta High court.
But when the petition or claim was in process, Brahmo Dutta had died and further
appeal or petition was litigated by his executor's.

The appeal against the order was also rejected by the High Court, The plaintiff argued or
confronted that in such case no relaxation or any sought of aid should be provided to them
because according to him, defendant had dishonestly misinterpreted the fact about his age and
because if mortgage is canceled at the request by defendant i.e. Dharmodas Ghose. It was
also contended that one who geeks equity must do equity .But, the appeal against the order
was also quashed by the Privy council and held that there cannot be any sought of contract
25
Suraj Narain Dubey v. Sukhu Aheer and Anr, ILR (1928) 51 All 164
6
Indra Ramaswami Pandia Thalavar v. Anthappa Chettiar and others (1906) 16 MLJ 422
7
Paramjit Singh vs Lakhwinder Kaur And Another Civil Revision No.4102 of 2018

8
Thurstan v. Nottingham Permanent Benefit Building Society (1902)1 Ch. 1

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between a minor and a major person, referred to the decision of the court of appeal in
Thurstan v. Nottingham Permanent Benefit Building Society8.,Para13 “ The short answer
is that a court of Equity cannot say that it is equitable to compel a person to pay any money in
respect of a transaction which as against that person the legislature has declared to be void.”

Verdict:

A minor is one who has not attained the age of 18, and for every contract, the majority is
a condition precedent. By looking at the Indian law, minor's agreement is a void one,
meaning thereby that it has no value in the eve of the law, and it is null and void as it
cannot be enforced by either party to the contract.

Effects of minors agreement:

And even after he attains majority, the same agreement could not be ratified by him. Here,
the difference is that minor’s contract is void’null, but is not illegal as there is no statutory
provision upon this. In case of Gadigeppa Bhimappa Meti v. Balangowda Bhimangowda9,
the court is of opinion that where an infant represents fraudulently or otherwise that he is of
age of majority and thereby induces another to enter into contract with him then in an action
founded on the contract the infant is no estopped from setting up the infancy. No liability
arising out of either tort/contract: A minor is incapable of giving consent, and the nature of
minor's agreement is a nullity and cannot be enforced. Also in the case of Bindesbari Bux
Singh v Chandika10, it was held that all transactions entered into by a minor are void, and
therefore a minor, on attaining majority, cannot take upon himself a liability which from the
point of view of law, never really existed, e.g. he cannot execute a fresh bond ratifying an old
bond executed during his minority.

In the case of 3Ram Ashish Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A person was appointed as a
teacher from agreement but it was found that he was a minor at the time of his appointment
as a teacher. The Cout held that the agreement was void ab initio due to the minority of the
person on the basis of the judgment passed in Mohori Bibee v/s Dharmodas Ghose. Hence
after considering all the facts we can say that there is no need of reconsideration of the
Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose.

ISSUE THIRD:
Whether the Civil Court of Sardam was correct in rejecting the plea of restitution by the
Appellant?

The counsel for the respondent respectfully submits that the civil court of Sardam was correct
in rejecting the plea of restitution as this is a minor’s contract which is void ab initio (void
from beginning) this this set respondent free from all his liabilities the civil court has given
its decision on the basis of Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose where it is said that minor
contract is void and he is not liable for any debt.

Doctrine of Restitution is applied if an infant obtains property or goods by misrepresenting

his age, he can be compelled to restore it , but only so long as the same is traceable in his
39
Balangowda Bhimangowda vs Gadigeppa Bhimappa (1929) 31 BOMLR 340, 118 Ind Cas 698
10
Bindeshri Bakhsh Singh v. Chandika Prasad and another (1927)ILR49ALL137
11
Stocks v. Wilson, (1913) 2 KB 235

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possession. But, In Stocks v. Wilson11 10, it has been observed that, where the infant has sold
or converted them, he cannot be made to repay the value of the goods, because that would
amount to enforcing a void contract .

According to Ajudhia Prasad and Anr. v. Chandan Lal and Anr12," on 11 May. 1937 the
court said that the clear ule laid down is that neither Section 64 nor Section 65 deals with a
case where a party is incompetent to enter into a contract at all, and that in such a case,
therefore there would be no question of ordering him to restore the advantage which he has
received or to make compensation for what he has received. So according to this the
respondent is not liable to pay any debt.
And also, there is no need of paying any debt as the respondent has already paid 3,00,000/-
for the construction work which is already enough because the plaintiff fails to provide
satisfactory work to the Respondent and also uses cheap quality products in construction
which was agreed by the Respondent at the time of minority so the consent of respondent can
be considered as not a valid consent . Hence after considering all the facts, we can say that
the plea of restitution was correctly rejected.
In Leslie v. Shield13, the court while rejecting the contention of the money- lenders relied
upon the Doctrine of Restitution that the infant should be compellable in equity to restore the
money. The Lord Sumner said, “I think the whole current of decisions down to 1913…. Went
to show that, when an infant obtained an advantage by falsely stating himself to be of full
age, equity required him to restore his ill-gotten gains, or to release the party deceived from
obligations entered into while he was an infant, even by means if fraud…… Restitution
stopped where repayment began.
……………. The money was paid over in order to be used as the defendant’s own and he
was so used it and , I suppose, spent it : There is no question of tracing it , no possibility of
restoring the very thing got by the fraud, nothing but compulsion through a personal
judgment to repay an equivalent sum out of his present and future resources…I think would
be nothing but an enforcing a void contract.
Another relevant authority, Bhim Mandal v Mangaram Corain14, where it was held that the
court will not compel any restitution by a minor even when he is a plaintiff , where the other
party was aware of the infancy so that he was not deceived. Or where the other party has
been unscrupulous in his dealings with the minor (Mohd Said v. Bishamber Nath15) or,
where the minor had misrepresented his age , the other party was so zealous to enter into the
transaction that the false representation exerted no influence on him where the other party
lays no material a before the court for coming to the conclusion that justice requires return of
the money paid to the minor.

12
Ajudhia Prasad and Anr. v. Chandan Lal and Anr AIR 1937 All 610, 617(SB)
13
Leslie (R) Ltd v Shiell , (1914) 3 KB 607 (CA), 613.
14
Bhim Mandal vs Magaram Corain And Ors. on 1 August, 1960 AIR 1961 Pat 21

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15
Mohd Said v. Bishamber Nath Allahabad High Court 1923

PRAYER

Wherefore, in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
most humbly and respectfully prayed before this Hon'ble Court to adjudge and declare that:
 The contract between M/s Senghal and Senghal and Mr.Sdd Malhar was null and
void-ab-inito.
 The judgment passed in Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas need not be reconsider.

And any other order which this hon'ble court may be pleased to grant in the interest of justice,
equity and good conscience All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted

Date:..... Defendant place…..

Through council

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