Reason & Faith Philosophy in The Middle Ages

Topic Subtopic
Philosophy & Medieval &

Intellectual History Religious Philosophy
Reason and Faith:

Philosophy in the
Middle Ages
Course Guidebook
Professor Thomas Williams

University of South Florida
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Thomas Williams, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies
University of South Florida
Thomas Williams, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies

at the University of South Florida, received his B.A. in Philosophy from
Vanderbilt University in 1988 and his Ph.D. in Philosophy from the
University of Notre Dame in 1994. Before joining the faculty of the
University of South Florida in 2005, he taught at Creighton University and
the University of Iowa, where he received a College of Liberal Arts and
Sciences Teaching Award in 2005. He was the Alvin Plantinga Fellow at
the Center for Philosophy of Religion at Notre Dame from 2005 to 2006.
Professor Williams’s research interests are in medieval philosophy and
theology (with a focus on Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, and Duns Scotus)
and the philosophy of religion. He is the coauthor of Anselm, a volume in
the Great Medieval Thinkers series from Oxford University Press, with
Sandra Visser. He edited The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus and
co-edited Thomas Aquinas: Disputed Questions on the Virtues. His
translations include Augustine’s On Free Choice of the Will and Anselm:
Basic Writings.
Professor Williams has contributed essays to four other volumes in the
Cambridge Companions series—Augustine; Anselm; Abelard; and Medieval
Philosophy—as well as essays for the Cambridge History of Medieval
Philosophy and The Oxford Handbook of Thomas Aquinas. Journals where
his articles have appeared include Modern Theology, Philosophy and
Literature, Apeiron, Faith and Philosophy, Journal of the History of
Philosophy, and Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. He is on the
editorial board of Studies in the History of Ethics.
©2007 The Teaching Company. i

Table of Contents
Reason and Faith: Philosophy in the Middle Ages
Professor Biography .................................................................................... i

Course Scope ............................................................................................... 1
Lecture One Faith Seeking Understanding............................. 4
Lecture Two Augustine’s Platonic Background...................... 9
Lecture Three Augustine on Authority, Reason, and Truth .... 13
Lecture Four Augustine on the Origin of Evil....................... 17
Lecture Five Boethius’s The Consolation of Philosophy...... 21
Lecture Six Boethius on Foreknowledge and Freedom....... 24
Lecture Seven Anselm and the 11th-Century Context.............. 27
Lecture Eight Anselm’s Proof That God Exists ..................... 30
Lecture Nine Anselm on the Divine Attributes ..................... 33
Lecture Ten Anselm on Freedom and the Fall ..................... 37
Lecture Eleven Abelard on Understanding the Trinity ............. 40
Lecture Twelve Abelard on Understanding Redemption........... 44
Lecture Thirteen The Rediscovery of Aristotle ........................... 48
Lecture Fourteen Bonaventure on the Mind’s Journey
into God ........................................................... 53
Lecture Fifteen Aquinas on What Reason Can
and Cannot Do ................................................. 57
Lecture Sixteen Aquinas’s Proof of an Unmoved Mover .......... 61
Lecture Seventeen Aquinas on How to Talk About God ............... 65
Lecture Eighteen Aquinas on Human Nature............................... 69
Lecture Nineteen Aquinas on Natural
and Supernatural Virtues.................................. 72
Lecture Twenty Scotus on God’s Freedom and Ours ................ 76
Lecture Twenty-One Scotus on Saying Exactly What God Is ........... 80
Lecture Twenty-Two What Ockham’s Razor Leaves Behind ............ 84
ii ©2007 The Teaching Company.

Table of Contents
Lecture Twenty-Three Ockham on the Prospects

for Knowing God ............................................. 88
Lecture Twenty-Four The 14th Century and Beyond .......................... 92
Map ............................................................................................................ 96
Timeline ..................................................................................................... 99
Glossary ................................................................................................... 103
Biographical Notes.................................................................................. 109
Bibliography............................................................................................ 114
©2007 The Teaching Company. iii

iv ©2007 The Teaching Company.
Scope:
The great medieval Christian thinkers would all have been bewildered by
the idea, widespread in contemporary culture, that faith and reason are
fundamentally at odds. Though their philosophical outlooks varied widely,
they were in general agreement that philosophical reasoning could and
should be used to defend and elucidate the doctrines of the Christian faith.
This use of philosophy took three main forms. First, medieval thinkers used
philosophical reasoning to prove the existence of God and to establish
conclusions about the divine attributes. Second, they used philosophical
views about the acquisition of knowledge to determine which Christian
doctrines are beyond the scope of rational demonstration. And third, they
used philosophical argumentation to defend Christian beliefs against
objections and to establish the internal consistency of Christian doctrine by
showing the compatibility of Christian beliefs that might appear to
contradict each other. In making all three kinds of arguments, medieval
Christian thinkers felt free to adopt the views of non-Christian philosophers
when those views could be pressed into the service of Christian teaching;
and they were confident that the errors of pagan philosophy could be
exposed by the use of natural reason, without appealing to faith in a
supernatural revelation.
This general agreement about the proper roles of faith and reason provided
a certain continuity in the history of medieval philosophy, but there were
striking discontinuities as well. As new philosophical texts were discovered
and new techniques of argumentation introduced, as philosophical schools
rose to prominence or fell into eclipse, the ways in which medieval
philosophers carried out their project of “faith seeking understanding”
changed dramatically. For Augustine, at the beginning of the medieval
period, philosophy meant Platonism, but for Thomas Aquinas, in the 13th
century, it was Aristotle, not Plato, who was known simply as “the
Philosopher.” Philosophers also had to cope with changing fashions in
theology, not to mention simple church politics. Thus, Peter Abelard was
the target of ecclesiastical harassment for making an argument that Anselm
had made, without controversy, a mere half-century earlier.
Medieval philosophy began with Augustine (354430), who was deeply
influenced by the fundamental Platonic distinction between the intelligible
realm—perfect, unchanging, and accessible only by the mind—and the
©2007 The Teaching Company. 1

sensible realm—imperfect, ever-changing, and apprehensible by the senses.
In some strands of Platonic thought, these two realms are irreconcilably at
odds; the fact that our souls are embodied is a regrettable, if temporary,
impediment to human fulfillment. For Augustine, however, the sensible
realm is created by God and reflects his goodness. The temporal and
embodied character of our experience means that we must rely on authority
in our quest for truth. Nonetheless, by reflecting on the imperfections and
mutability of creatures, the human mind can come to understand something
of the unchanging perfection of the creator. Precisely because we come to
know God as both perfect and creator, Augustine was faced with the
perplexing problem of the origin of evil in a world created by a perfect
God.
Boethius (c. 476c. 526), writing a century later than Augustine, continued
the tradition of pressing pre-Christian philosophy into the service of
Christian thought. In The Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius turns to
Philosophy, personified as a woman, for comfort and reassurance that the
world is justly governed by divine providence. Philosophy argues that there
is one God who governs the universe and has power over all things,
including human affairs. She also undertakes to show how human freedom
and moral responsibility are possible, arguing that because God is eternal—
that is, outside time altogether—he does not foreknow our actions (he
simply knows them, timelessly) and our actions are therefore not necessary
in any sense that threatens freedom or moral responsibility.
For nearly 500 years after the death of Boethius, there was little noteworthy
philosophical activity. In the 11th century, however, there was a revival of
philosophical techniques and their application to theological discussion.
The outstanding Christian philosopher of the 11th century was Anselm
(10331109), who developed an explicit and systematic account of what he
called “the reason of faith”: the intrinsically rational character of Christian
doctrines in virtue of which they form a coherent and rationally defensible
system. Anselm’s most famous contribution to Christian philosophy is his
argument for the existence of God, but his account of the divine nature has
also had an enduring influence.
The leading 12th-century philosopher, Peter Abelard (10791142), is often
thought of as a theological rebel, but in fact, he was firmly in Anselm’s
tradition of elucidating and defending Christian doctrine in accordance with
the standards of philosophical reasoning. His controversial treatments of the
2 ©2007 The Teaching Company.

Trinity and the Atonement show a willingness to challenge received
theological wisdom in the pursuit of philosophical rigor.
The recovery of the full Aristotelian corpus by the end of the 12th century
revolutionized Christian thought in the Latin West. Aristotle’s thinking
offered a conceptual apparatus of obvious power and usefulness for
philosophy and theology, but many of Aristotle’s ideas were at odds with
Christian doctrine. Thirteenth-century thinkers had to figure out how to
accommodate this new material. Thomas Aquinas (c. 12251274), using
the works of Aristotle as his primary philosophical inspiration, developed
arguments for the existence of God, as well as an account of the powers and
limits of human reason in knowing God. He also drew on Aristotle for his
understanding of human nature and ethics. By contrast, Bonaventure (c.
12171274) was willing to borrow Aristotelian doctrines when he found
them helpful, but he argued passionately against excessive enthusiasm in
following Aristotle. Such excesses were attributed to the integral
Aristotelians of the University of Paris, for whom Aristotelian philosophy
was a complete, freestanding account of the natural world.
This engagement with Aristotelian philosophy, in all its different forms,
made the 13th century a particularly lively and inventive period in Christian
philosophy. This energy continued through the work of John Duns Scotus
(1265/661308) and William Ockham (c. 12881347). But Aristotelianism
did not remain dominant for long. Such thinkers as Nicholas of Autrecourt
(c. 12951369) and Nicholas of Cusa (14011464) marked a turn away
from Aristotle and toward a kind of Platonism that would become dominant
during the Renaissance.

Lecture One
Faith Seeking Understanding
Scope: The great medieval Christian thinkers would all have been
bewildered by the idea, widespread in contemporary culture, that
faith and reason are fundamentally at odds. Though their
philosophical outlooks varied widely, they were in general
agreement that philosophical reasoning could and should be used
to defend and elucidate the doctrines of the Christian faith. They
used philosophical reasoning to prove the existence of God and to
establish conclusions about the divine attributes. They also tried to
determine which Christian doctrines are beyond the scope of
rational demonstration by examining philosophical views about
how human beings acquire knowledge. They used philosophical
argumentation to defend Christian beliefs against objections and to
establish the internal consistency of Christian doctrine by showing
the compatibility of Christian beliefs that might appear to
contradict each other. They felt free to adopt the views of non-
Christian philosophers when those views could be pressed into the
service of Christian teaching, and they were confident that the
errors of pagan philosophy could be exposed by the use of natural
reason, without appealing to faith in a supernatural revelation.
Outline
I. The great medieval Christian thinkers would all have been bewildered
by the idea that faith and reason, or theology and philosophy, are
fundamentally at odds. For them, both the techniques and the content
of philosophy are (by and large) compatible with the Christian faith.
A. All of them agreed that philosophical reasoning can and should be
used to defend and elucidate the doctrines of the Christian faith.
1. They used philosophical reasoning, in many cases borrowed
from pagan philosophers, to prove the existence of God and to
establish conclusions about the divine nature.
2. On the basis of philosophical doctrines about the nature and
scope of human knowledge, they distinguished between
Christian doctrines that can be known by reason alone and
those that can be known only by faith.

3. They used philosophical argumentation to defend Christian
beliefs against objections and to establish the internal
consistency of Christian doctrine by showing the compatibility
of Christian beliefs that might appear to contradict each other.
B. All of these great thinkers took a generally accommodating
attitude toward pagan philosophy.
1. They felt free to adopt the views of non-Christian
philosophers when they could be pressed into the service of
Christian teaching, as well as on matters on which Christian
teaching was silent.
2. They were (in general) confident that the errors of pagan
philosophy could be exposed by the use of natural reason,
without the need to appeal to supernatural revelation.
3. They held that Christianity can be shown to be superior to
pagan philosophy by the standards accepted by the pagan
philosophers themselves.
II. In spite of these broad areas of agreement, however, medieval
philosophy is far from monolithic. The contours of the accommodation
between faith and reason changed as particular philosophical systems
and techniques came into widespread use or fell into disfavor.
A. In this course, we will examine the contributions of the most
influential thinkers throughout the period, both for their intrinsic
philosophical importance and as illustrating the development of
Christian engagement with issues of faith and reason.
B. Augustine is representative of early medieval philosophy in
several ways.
1. He is heavily influenced by Platonism, which was the
dominant philosophical outlook well into the 12th century.
2. What Augustine takes from Platonism is not so much a set of
precise doctrines or arguments but a general outlook. Thus, he
is concerned more with elaborating a vision than with
articulating precise reasons in support of a thesis. This more
visionary or holistic approach is typical of early medieval
philosophy.

C. Boethius is, broadly speaking, in the same tradition as
Augustine—though as the primary transmitter of philosophical
logic in the early medieval period, he is more technically minded
than Augustine and provides more careful support for Platonic-
Augustinian theses.
D. Beginning in the 11th century, philosophy becomes more focused
on the development of careful argument. This development
becomes even more pronounced with the reintroduction of the
complete works of Aristotle in the late 12th and early 13th
centuries.
1. The 11th century saw a renewed emphasis on careful argument
in the service of elucidating and defending Christian doctrine.
Anselm defended recognizably Augustinian views, but his
method was very unlike Augustine’s: a more-or-less
continuous series of precise arguments.
2. In the 12th century, Peter Abelard conceived an ambitious
project of reformulating Christian doctrine in a rationally
coherent way.
3. The reintroduction of Aristotle in the late 12th and early 13th
centuries gave Christian philosophers the materials to develop
systematic theories using analytically precise and highly
technical methods. At the same time, it posed new problems
for the relationship between faith and reason, because
Aristotle had put these methods to use in arguing for
conclusions that were seen as incompatible with Christian
teaching.
E. Even in the period of Aristotelian dominance—the 13th and early
14th centuries—a variety of approaches to questions of faith and
reason were possible.
1. Bonaventure cast traditionally Augustinian positions in
Aristotelian language but generally resisted the claims of
Aristotelian philosophy to provide an adequate account of the
natural world, let alone the supernatural world.
2. Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus largely agreed in their
views about what we can know about God using the methods
of Aristotelian philosophy; they also shared a generally
Aristotelian view of knowledge. But they drew quite different
conclusions from that view in their account of religious
language.

3. William Ockham was also heavily influenced by Aristotle, but
he was much more skeptical about the prospects for a purely
philosophical knowledge of God.
F. In the 14th century, as the Aristotelian tradition began to lose its
dominating position, new philosophical stances came to the fore
and, with them, new ways of understanding the relationship
between faith and reason.
III. Within the historical narrative just outlined, certain authors and certain
topics will receive particular attention.
A. Though medieval philosophers wrote on an astonishingly wide
range of topics, we will consider only those that have an obvious
connection with the central topic of faith and reason:
1. How, in general, do human beings come to know anything?
And in light of the answer to that question, how (if at all) can
human beings come to know about God apart from
supernatural revelation?
2. What are the attributes of God, and how do those attributes
bear on other philosophical topics? For example, can divine
foreknowledge be reconciled with human free will?
3. If indeed God is unimaginably different from the objects of
our ordinary experience, how can we use our language—
which is derived from such experience—to talk about God?
4. Can such Christian doctrines as the Trinity, the Incarnation,
and the Atonement be defended against charges of
irrationality and incoherence?
B. This course focuses on the history of philosophy; we will not be
concerned either with matters of revealed theology or with
intellectual history more broadly.
1. Revealed theology (or just theology, for short) takes some
kind of supernatural revelation as its starting point, whereas
philosophy takes its starting point from premises that are
accessible to unaided human reason. Natural theology—the
project of trying to prove the existence and nature of God by
reason alone, without relying on supernatural revelation—is,
thus, a part of philosophy and not of (revealed) theology.

2. The chief concern of the historian of philosophy is what
people thought and what arguments they brought forward in
support of what they thought, whereas the intellectual
historian is more attentive to external contextual influences on
what people thought.
3. Given the relative isolation of medieval philosophy from
broader currents of the time, a history-of-philosophy approach
is especially fitting, though we will examine broader
contextual matters where appropriate.
C. Though many topics receive frequent discussion throughout the
period, we will concentrate on particularly influential or striking
examples.
1. For example, although nearly all medieval Christian
philosophers discussed the claim that God is outside of time,
we will examine the discussion of the topic in Boethius’s
Consolation of Philosophy, which was particularly influential.
2. Anselm and Abelard made similar arguments against a
traditional theory of the Atonement, but only Abelard got into
hot water for them; thus, we will consider Abelard’s
discussion.
Essential Reading:
Stephen P. Marrone, “Medieval Philosophy in Context,” in A. S. McGrade,
ed., The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy.
Paul Vincent Spade, “Medieval Philosophy.”
Supplementary Reading:
David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought.
Thomas Williams, “Some Reflections on Method in the History of
Philosophy.”
Questions to Consider:
1. In what ways does the medieval discussion of the relationship between
faith and reason challenge contemporary assumptions?
2. How does the significance of “reason” change over the course of the
Middle Ages in light of changing philosophical interests and
approaches?

Lecture Two
Augustine’s Platonic Background
Scope: Platonic philosophy draws a fundamental distinction between the

intelligible realm—perfect, unchanging, and accessible only by the
mind—and the sensible realm—imperfect, ever-changing, and
apprehensible by the senses. According to Plato, the objects of the
senses are merely imperfect copies of what is ultimately real, but
because we inhabit bodies, which bombard us with sensation and
entice us with pleasure, we find it difficult to know those ultimate
realities. To remedy this blindness, we need to detach our souls
from our bodies as much as possible. Although Augustine
(354430) finds this Platonist picture compelling and adopts much
of it, he also sees that Christian belief requires him to modify it in
several ways. The doctrine of the Incarnation in particular
challenges Platonism’s negative assessment of the body and the
material world.
Outline
I. Platonism was Augustine’s primary philosophical inspiration.
A. Augustine puts his encounter with Platonism at the center of the
Confessions.
B. Two developments reduce his overt appeals to Platonism as his
career progresses.
1. As Augustine immerses himself in Scripture, scriptural
language and imagery tend to supplant Platonist language and
imagery. Moreover, his reading of Scripture (particularly of
Saint Paul) provides an independent starting point for
philosophical reflection.
2. Augustine’s discovery of anti-Christian writings by one of the
leading Platonists forces him to establish a critical distance
between Platonism and his own thinking.
C. Nevertheless, Augustine can be aptly described as a Platonist to
the end of his days. Even his interpretation of Scripture has a
recognizably Platonist cast.

D. What Augustine took from the Platonists was not so much a set of
doctrines as a particular outlook and approach. The essentials of
Augustine’s Platonic outlook can be best conveyed by means of an
extended analogy.
1. Imagine that you are a high-school senior who has found the
one and only perfect partner, Pat.
2. You leave your hometown to go to college; Pat remains
behind. Yet you remain committed to Pat and seek to maintain
as much of a relationship as you can, in spite of the distance.
3. Eventually, however, yielding to loneliness and to the
importunity of friends, you agree to go out with Chris. Chris,
though no Pat, is enough like Pat to be attractive to you.
4. Gradually, you become involved with Chris and forget about
Pat altogether.
E. The analogy illustrates the fundamental Platonic contrast between
the perfect and the imperfect, the changeless and the changing, the
intelligible and the sensible.
1. Your hometown is the world of what is perfect, unchanging,
and accessible only by the mind (intelligible). It is your true
homeland, the only place in which you can have perfect peace
and rest.
2. Pat represents something in that perfect, unchanging,
intelligible world that will give you that peace and rest.
3. College is the world of what is imperfect, changing, and busy:
the world of what can be apprehended by the senses (sensible,
as opposed to intelligible).
4. Chris represents the imperfect, sensible things that we spend
our lives chasing after, even though they can never truly bring
us that perfect peace and rest.
II. Platonism exploits this fundamental contrast between intelligible and
sensible in at least three important ways that influence Augustine.
A. In metaphysics, the part of philosophy that asks questions about
the fundamental structure of reality, it supports the doctrines of
participation and emanation.
1. Sensible things are said to participate in (or imitate) certain
perfect and unchanging realities that Plato called Forms.

2. These sensible things emanate (literally, “flow forth”) from an
unchanging first principle, the One. The further something is
from the One, the less good it is.
B. In epistemology, the part of philosophy that asks questions about
the nature and acquisition of knowledge, this fundamental contrast
leads to a certain ambivalence about sensible things.
1. On the one hand, because sensible things participate in the
Forms, they can remind us of the Forms.
2. On the other hand, because sensible things are deficient, they
can also blind us to the Forms.
3. The general tendency of Platonism is to emphasize the
epistemic dangers posed by sensible things, rather than their
epistemic usefulness.
C. In ethics, this fundamental contrast supports an emphasis on
asceticism and moral purification. Given that what blinds us to our
true intelligible homeland is sensation and sensation is a function
of the body, it is very important to the Platonist to separate the soul
from the body as much as possible.
III. Although Augustine accepts this general Platonic outlook, his Christian
belief requires him to modify its application in several ways.
A. In metaphysics, he accepts participation but rejects emanation.
God creates all things, including sensible things, freely and by
choice. Given that God creates sensible things, it is no longer open
to Augustine to say that sensible things as such are bad.
B. This metaphysical revision requires a revision in the ethical
application, as well.
1. The body is a divine creation, not an evil, shadowy pseudo-
reality that only gets in the way of our true happiness. Its
dangerousness lies not in its distance from the good but in its
tendency to monopolize our attention and pervert our
imagination.
2. The mere metaphysical “distance” of sensible things from
God is not a fall, because it is in accordance with God’s
perfect will that there be highly limited, changeable, material
beings, including bodies. But moral depravity is truly a fall.
This is the moral revolt against God’s ordering of things, the
deliberate choice to prefer the lower to the higher or to choose
the lower for its own sake rather than for God’s sake.

C. Augustine continues to accept the Platonists’ epistemological
application of the contrast, but he seems much more interested in
the reminding aspect than in the blinding aspect. He concentrates
on ways in which we can use sensible things as a springboard for
coming to know intelligible reality.
Essential Reading:
Augustine, Confessions, Book VII.
J. M. Rist, Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized.
Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography.
James J. O’Donnell, Augustine: A New Biography.
1. To what uses does Augustine adapt the fundamental Platonist contrast
between the intelligible and the sensible?
2. In what ways does his Christian belief require Augustine to modify or
even reject his Platonic inheritance?

Lecture Three
Augustine on Authority, Reason, and Truth
Scope: Augustine argues that every human being’s search for truth must
begin with the acceptance of authority, not merely in religion, but
in all areas of human life. Historical claims in particular must be
accepted or rejected on the basis of authoritative testimony.
Christianity involves such historical claims, and Augustine seeks
to show that it is reasonable to accept the testimony on which
Christianity rests. Yet although Augustine emphasizes the
importance of believing, he affirms that human reason, properly
exercised, is capable of coming to some knowledge of God. By
reflecting on the imperfections and mutability of creatures, the
human mind can come to understand something of the unchanging
perfection of the creator.
Outline
I. Augustine was a crucial figure in the development of the notion that a
religion is a body of teaching about historical and metaphysical
realities.
A. For many people in Augustine’s day and before, religion was
primarily a matter of what people did, not what they believed.
Similar attitudes are in evidence today among those who are not
concerned with doctrine but participate in worship because it
“works for them” in some way.
B. Augustine criticizes philosophers before him who were willing to
participate in religious rituals that were at odds with their
philosophical beliefs. Augustine’s view—that ritual and teaching
must be consistent—marks an important turning point and remains
influential to the present day.
II. If we are to evaluate religion in terms of truth, we must ask how human
beings attain truth. When this question is posed with reference to
religious matters, it is often referred to as the problem of faith and
reason.

A. Faith and reason seem to be opposed in several ways.
1. They involve different methods of arriving at beliefs. Faith
relies on testimony; reason relies on evidence and
examination.
2. They involve different contents. Faith involves belief in such
things as the Trinity and the Incarnation, which seem
incompatible with basic principles of reason.
3. They seem to involve different ways of holding beliefs. Faith
involves commitment; reason involves detachment.
B. This standard way of contrasting faith and reason, though not
entirely inapplicable to Augustine, misrepresents Augustine’s
approach in three crucial ways.
1. It treats both faith and reason entirely as ways of acquiring
beliefs—as cognitive processes. But for Augustine, both faith
and reason involve not only our cognitive side but also our
affective side.
2. It ignores the purpose of seeking the truth. Until we know
what knowledge is for, we can’t evaluate whether faith or
reason or both might serve that aim.
3. It assumes that there is such a thing as a purely rational
approach to the truth, so that faith involves a repudiation of
the purely rational life that would otherwise be possible. But
Augustine denies that any such purely rational approach to
truth is possible.
III. Augustine’s account of how we attain truth is called the theory of
illumination. Though the theory is not much more than an extended
analogy between sight and intellectual “vision,” it does help make
sense of Augustine’s emphasis on the importance of the affective side
in our attainment of truth.
A. The theory of illumination presents knowledge as an analogue to
vision.
1. In order for physical vision to take place, we need the power
of vision itself, the presence of a visible object, light, and the
proper direction of our eyes.
2. Analogously, for intellectual vision to take place, we need the
power of intellectual vision (the mind itself), the presence of
the intelligible object, some kind of intelligible “light,” and
the proper direction of our wills.

B. The proper direction of our wills is the only requirement for
intellectual vision that is not always met. Consequently, failure of
intellectual vision will always be traceable in some way to a failure
of will: that is, to sin in some form.
IV. The purpose of seeking truth is transformation rather than information.
A. For someone so committed to the life of the mind, Augustine
places a strikingly low value on the possession of knowledge.
1. He argues in the Confessions that knowledge is valuable only
insofar as it leads one to love and honor God.
2. He applies this analysis even to biblical interpretation:
Knowledge of Scripture is not a destination in itself but
merely a vehicle by which we might be carried toward our
destination.
B. In principle, reliance on authority (that is, on testimony taken to be
reliable and definitive) can be as valuable for transformation as
reliance on reason. In fact, Augustine is convinced that the
humility necessary for acceding to authority is in itself a
precondition for transformation.
V. A successful search for truth will always involve reliance on authority
at some point. Because this is true in everyday life, it should not
surprise or dismay us that it is true with respect to Christianity, as well.
Faith is simply reliance on divine authority.
Essential Reading:
Augustine, Confessions and On Free Choice of the Will.
J. M. Rist, “Faith and Reason,” in Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann,
eds., The Cambridge Companion to Augustine.
Ronald H. Nash, The Light of the Mind: St. Augustine’s Theory of
Knowledge.
Thomas Williams, “Biblical Interpretation,” in Eleonore Stump and
Norman Kretzmann, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Augustine.

1. What is the role of the will in knowledge, according to Augustine?
What are his philosophical reasons for giving the will so great a role?
2. Under what circumstances, and for what purposes, is the pursuit and
attainment of knowledge valuable, according to Augustine?

Lecture Four
Augustine on the Origin of Evil
Scope: According to Augustine, given that God is good, everything he

creates is good, and given that God is the creator, nothing exists
that he does not create. The origin of evil is, therefore, a
particularly perplexing problem for Augustine. Part of his solution
is to argue that evil, in itself, is not anything. It is a mere privation:
a lack of measure, form, or order. The other part of his solution is
to blame moral evil—the privation of goodness in the will—on
human free choice. Moral evil enters the picture when we misuse
our free choice to turn away from the perfect goodness of God to
the fragmentary and defective goodness of creatures. Yet even
though free choice comes with the potential for misuse, God was
right to give it to us, because we cannot live rightly without it.
Outline
I. Augustine begins his dialogue On Free Choice of the Will by asking,
“Isn’t God the cause of evil?” The question seems surprising because it
expects an affirmative answer.
A. If God is ultimately responsible for the whole of creation and there
is evil in creation, it seems that God must be responsible for evil.
But if God is responsible for evil, he acts unjustly in punishing
sinners.
B. The question of the origin of evil was the first philosophical
question to get a grip on Augustine, and he remained deeply
interested in the question throughout his career.
C. His inability (at first) to answer the question drove him to the
Manichees, who taught that evil was independent of, and co-
eternal with, good. Augustine credits the Platonists with providing
the answer he was seeking.

II. Augustine comes to his account of good and evil by reflecting on God
and his relation to creation.
A. God is incorruptible and immutable.
1. God is a being so great that one cannot even conceive of a
being that would be greater. Given that the incorruptible is
greater than the corruptible and the immutable greater than the
mutable, God must be incorruptible and immutable.
2. Augustine learns from the Platonists that if God is to be
incorruptible and immutable, he must be entirely outside of
space and time, just as truth is. In fact, God is identical with
truth.
B. Things other than God have being because they are from God and
are in some ways like God. But they also lack being because they
are not wholly what God is. They are corruptible and extended in
space and time.
C. By reflecting on the logic of corruptibility, Augustine comes to see
that evil is a privation (that is, a mere lack or absence).
1. There are two ways in which something can be incorruptible:
either by being supremely good or by not being good at all.
2. Corruption by definition involves damage, and if something is
not at all good, it cannot be damaged. Thus, everything that
can be corrupted has to be, in some sense, good. If something
is completely corrupted—that is, deprived of all goodness—it
will then be incorruptible, but only in the sense that it will not
exist at all.
3. Thus, everything that exists is good insofar as it exists. Evil is
not a substance (a positive reality in its own right) but merely
a privation. In other words, evil is nothing more than a lack of
goodness where goodness ought to be.
III. Goodness consists in “measure, form, and order”; evil is a privation of
measure, form, or order.
A. By measure Augustine means the greatness or excellence of a
nature. The more measure a thing has, the more it resembles God.
1. It is in this sense that angels are better than human beings and
that worms and vipers are low-level goods.

2. One could speak of the privation of this form of good as
ontological evil, though Augustine does not use such
language. Ontological evil is not evil in any worrisome sense,
because the things that suffer from such “evil” are still good
insofar as they exist.
B. Augustine uses form to refer to the extent to which a given thing
lives up to the standards of its nature.
1. It is in this sense that a virtuous human being is better than a
vicious human being. (Every human being has the same
measure.)
2. The most noteworthy privation of form is moral evil. The
origin of moral evil is a particularly perplexing question and
will be treated independently below.
C. Augustine uses order to refer to the harmonious arrangement of
things.
1. The privation of order would be called “natural evil,” but
Augustine argues that there is no privation of order.
2. The appearance of disorder in the universe results from our
limited perspective. If we could grasp the arrangement of the
whole cosmos, we would see that it is perfectly ordered by
divine providence.
IV. Augustine devotes sustained attention to the origin of moral evil, which
is a deprivation of form.
A. Augustine argues that the human will’s initial turning from good to
evil must be uncoerced and, therefore, a matter for which human
beings are themselves responsible.
1. If God created human nature in such a way that the fall was
inevitable, God would be blameworthy for our evil will.
2. Thus, it is the human will itself that is responsible for its own
turning from good to evil.
3. There remains, however, a degree of mystery. Because evil is
“a nothing,” the human turn to evil is, in one sense,
inexplicable.
B. Note that immoral acts subsequent to the original sin could, in
principle, be explained in the same way or differently. Augustine
comes more and more to emphasize the ways in which an inherited
defect in human nature interferes with, or perhaps completely
eliminates, our freedom.

1. Pursuing the details of this development would take us very
far afield and require consideration of theological and
scriptural matters.
2. Nevertheless, to the end of his career, Augustine remains
concerned to uphold the justice of God.
Essential Reading:
Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will and Confessions, Book VII.
Eleonore Stump, “Augustine on Free Will,” in Eleonore Stump and Norman
Kretzmann, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Augustine.
1. What is the significance of Augustine’s view that evil is a privation,
and how does Augustine arrive at that view?
2. How does Augustine’s understanding of goodness as “measure, form,
and order” complicate his account of the origin of evil?

Lecture Five
Boethius’s The Consolation of Philosophy
Scope: Deposed from high government office and imprisoned on charges

of treason, Boethius (c. 476–c. 526) composed The Consolation of
Philosophy, in which Philosophy, personified as a woman, appears
to offer him comfort and reassure him that human affairs are
governed by an all-encompassing providence. Many readers have
wondered why Boethius, a Christian, would turn to philosophy
rather than to theology or Scripture for consolation during his
troubles. But because his grief stems from his inability to see that
everything in the universe comes together to form a single,
rationally coherent system, the therapy that he needs must come
from reason, as manifested in Philosophy. Philosophy argues that
there is one God who governs the universe and has power over all
things, including human affairs.
Outline
I. Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy, written when Boethius was
exiled and in prison, was one of the most influential books ever written
in Latin. It takes the form of a dialogue between the prisoner Boethius
and Philosophy, personified as a woman.
A. Both its imagery and its arguments became part of the common
stock of medieval ideas.
B. Its interpretation poses a problem, however, because it does not
seem explicitly Christian. Why would a Christian author turn to
philosophy, not to faith, in the greatest crisis of his life?
1. Some interpretations suggest that Boethius was never more
than superficially Christian and that his real loyalty was to
pagan philosophy.
2. Others emphasize the Christian imagery and language of the
Consolation and present it as a thoroughly Christian work.
3. Intermediate between these two views is a third: Boethius set
out to write a philosophical rather than a theological work in
order to emphasize what Christians had in common with the
best pagan thought, as representatives of “civilization” against
the “barbarians” who had falsely accused and imprisoned him.

C. The prisoner’s main complaint is that divine providence leaves
human affairs ungoverned, so that the wicked have power and the
good suffer at their hands. The Consolation, therefore, examines
the nature of providence, its relation to human affairs, and the
nature of good and evil, moving outward from one man’s feelings
about a specific historical situation to a timeless, global, “God’s-
eye” view of the whole sweep of the universe.
II. Boethius first complains about the loss of good fortune.
A. Philosophy replies that it is of the nature of fortune to be fickle.
B. Moreover, the goods of fortune are not true goods.
III. What, then, are true goods? Philosophy begins to answer this question
by examining false goods.
A. Everyone seeks happiness: a good so complete that it leaves
nothing more to be desired.
B. Misguided people seek to attain happiness through wealth, public
office, kingship, celebrity, and pleasure. Yet these false goods do
not even provide the partial happiness for the sake of which people
pursue them.
C. People seek these goods as if they were separate things, when in
fact, they are all one. True happiness is an all-encompassing good.
D. Such happiness cannot be found in transient things.
IV. God is the perfect good and the source of happiness.
A. There has to be a perfect good that is the source of all goods.
B. That good has to be in God, because we already believe that
nothing better than God can be imagined. We must further admit
that God is the source of his own goodness and is, indeed, identical
with that goodness.
C. Further, given that divinity and happiness are the same thing, it
follows that human beings become happy by attaining divinity.
V. Recall that all the imperfect goods can be recognized as imperfect
because they are partial; the perfect good must be a unity. Thus, the
one and the good (or unity and goodness) are the same.
A. We can see this by looking at the natural tendency of things to
maintain their unity and integrity and noting that when a thing
loses its unity altogether, it ceases to exist.

B. Thus, all things desire or aim at unity, which means that all things
desire or aim at the good.
C. This good, the one God, governs the universe, as we can see from
the way in which all the disparate natures that inhabit the universe
form a single coherent system.
Essential Reading:
Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy.
John Marenbon, Boethius.
1. How does the discussion of happiness in The Consolation of
Philosophy serve as part of Philosophy’s answer to the challenge posed
by the prisoner Boethius?
2. In what specific ways do human beings misconceive, and therefore,
miss happiness?

Lecture Six
Boethius on Foreknowledge and Freedom
Scope: The Consolation of Philosophy is best known for its influential

discussion of the problem of divine foreknowledge and human
freedom. Boethius worries that if God’s foreknowledge is both
comprehensive and infallible, our actions are necessary. We
cannot do anything other than what we, in fact, do because we
cannot act in such a way that God turns out to have been mistaken.
Yet it is hard to see how we could ever deserve blame or
punishment for doing wrong, or praise or reward for doing right, if
we never have the power to do anything other than what we do.
Philosophy undertakes to show how human freedom and moral
responsibility are possible within God’s providential governance
of the universe. She explains that God is eternal—that is, outside
time altogether—so that he does not foreknow our actions; he
simply knows them, timelessly. She then uses the doctrine of
divine eternity to show how our actions are not necessary in any
sense that threatens freedom or moral responsibility.
Outline
I. Philosophy’s arguments to this point have solved one problem only to
introduce another: If God is really as powerful and good as she says,
why are there evils?
A. Philosophy sets a high bar for herself: She plans to argue that “the
powerful men are in fact always the good, while the wicked are
always the abject and weak; that vices never go unpunished, nor
virtues unrewarded; that the good always achieve success, and the
wicked suffer misfortune.”
1. Success in human action depends on two things: will and
power. Everyone, whether virtuous or wicked, wants to attain
happiness, but the wicked don’t attain it. Therefore, we must
conclude that they lack the power to attain it.
2. Boethius objects: Don’t evil men clearly have power, given
that they are able to do evil? Philosophy replies: No, because
evil is nothing, the power to do evil isn’t really power at all.

3.Because goodness is the reward everyone seeks, the virtuous
person has his reward simply in virtue of being good.
4. Just as virtue itself is the reward of the good, wickedness itself
is the punishment of the wicked. Wickedness demeans the
wicked person and transforms him into an animal.
B. Boethius is willing to accept these arguments, but he still expresses
the wish that these wild animals were not allowed to go on
rampages and destroy the good.
1. Philosophy replies that they are not allowed to do so. Their
schemes often come to bad ends, and in any event, death soon
overtakes them.
2. Philosophy also notes that the wicked are actually worse off
when their schemes succeed: It’s bad to desire evil but even
worse to achieve it.
C. Yet Boethius notes that even the wise would prefer wealth,
respect, status, and power at home to poverty and disgrace in exile.
1. Philosophy invokes divine providence in answer to reassure
Boethius. Boethius, however, insists on more than
reassurance; he wants an explanation.
2. Philosophy notes that such an explanation will have to include
a discussion of several complicated issues: fate, chance, divine
foreknowledge, predestination, and free will. The discussion
of foreknowledge and free will is the chief philosophical
legacy of the Consolation of Philosophy.
II. In Book V of the Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius offers a solution
of enduring value to the problem of foreknowledge and freedom. In the
course of laying out his solution, he also offers the classic discussion of
the doctrine of divine eternity.
A. The problem of foreknowledge and freedom is an argument
purporting to show that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with
human free choice.
1. What God foreknows must be the case.
2. What must be the case is not subject to human free choice.
3. God foreknows all our future actions.
4. Therefore, our future actions are not subject to human free
choice.

B. Philosophy says that the solution depends on a correct
understanding of two things: the nature of God’s foreknowledge
and the nature of necessity (the “must” referred to in II.A.1 and
II.A.2).
C. God’s knowledge of the future is not properly called
foreknowledge at all, because God is eternal.
1. Eternity is “the complete and perfect possession of illimitable
life all at once.”
2. God’s life is not successive, as ours is. He has no past or
future but only an all-encompassing, eternal present.
3. Consequently, his foreknowledge is analogous to our own
vision of something present, as when we watch a chariot race.
D. The necessity involved in God’s knowledge of the future is not
incompatible with free choice.
1. It’s true that if we see the charioteer doing something, he
“must” be doing it, yet we do not suppose that this “must” in
any way interferes with the charioteer’s free choice.
2. This is the same kind of necessity—Boethius calls it
“conditional necessity”—that attaches to what God
“foreknows.”
3. Thus, what God foreknows is conditionally necessary. But
something that is conditionally necessary can still be subject
to human free choice. Therefore, the original argument for the
incompatibility of foreknowledge and freedom fails.
Essential Reading:
Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy.
John Marenbon, Boethius.
1. What is the problem of foreknowledge and freedom, and what is
Philosophy’s solution to the problem?
2. What role does the doctrine of divine eternity play in the Consolation?

Lecture Seven
Anselm and the 11th-Century Context
Scope: For nearly 500 years after the death of Boethius, there was little
noteworthy philosophical activity. The 11th century saw a revival
of the techniques of philosophical argument known as dialectic
and of their application to theological discussion. Though leading
11th-century figures differed in emphasis and temperament, there
came to be considerable agreement that it was appropriate to use
dialectic both to elucidate Christian doctrine and to defend it. But
it remained for Anselm (1033–1109) to develop an explicit and
systematic view of the place of dialectic in theology. Anselm
speaks of “the reason of faith,” the intrinsically rational character
of Christian doctrines in virtue of which they form a coherent and
rationally defensible system. The doctrines of the Christian faith
are intrinsically rational because they concern the nature and
activity of God, who is himself supreme reason and exemplifies
supreme wisdom in everything he does. And because human
beings are rational by nature, we can grasp the reason of faith.
Outline
I. There was little noteworthy philosophical activity from Boethius to
Anselm.
A. The political instability caused by the fall of Rome and the various
“barbarian invasions” was hardly conducive to intellectual life
generally.
B. The education of the period was primarily literary and historical,
rather than philosophical.
C. The only noteworthy philosopher of the period was John Scottus
Eriugena, who wrote during the relative calm of the Carolingian
era (9th century). He had no subsequent influence to speak of,
except as a translator, but the story of his death is worth knowing.
II. For no reason that we can discern, the 11th century saw a revival of
dialectic. According to a standard picture of the period, the disputes
over the relationship between dialectic and Christian theology
produced three main camps.

A. Rationalists, typified by Berengar of Tours, maintained the
absolute supremacy of reason and disdained reliance on authority
of any kind.
B. Obscurantists, typified by Saint Peter Damian, privileged faith and
authority; they were highly skeptical of dialectic or even overtly
hostile to its use.
C. Moderates, typified by Lanfranc of Bec, held that dialectic,
properly used and within certain limits, was compatible with
Christian faith.
III. The reality, however, was far more complicated than this standard
picture suggests.
A. Berengar was not a thoroughgoing rationalist; he accepted
Christian doctrines on the basis of authority. He used dialectic to
formulate those doctrines in intelligible ways and to argue against
mistaken construals of doctrine.
B. Damian was hostile to what he regarded as improper uses of
dialectic, but he did not oppose the use of dialectic in principle.
C. Thus, in Anselm’s immediate intellectual context, there is a
general consensus that it is appropriate to use dialectic for at least
two purposes:
1. Dialectic can be used to elucidate Christian doctrine, that is, to
explain what it means and guard against misinterpretation.
2. Dialectic can be used to defend Christian doctrine, that is, to
argue against challenges to the truth or intelligibility of
Christian doctrine.
D. It remains for Anselm to work out a clear and explicit doctrine of
the powers and limits of human reason.
IV. Anselm offers a clear and well-worked-out view on the relationship
between faith and reason.
A. Anselm has a very high view of the powers of reason and of the
need for philosophical examination of authoritative texts.
1. He thinks many items of Christian belief can be definitively
established by reason alone.
2. He thinks reason can even establish the truth of the doctrines
of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement.

3. He thinks the content of authoritative texts cannot even be
definitively determined without the use of reason.
B. Anselm thinks of faith primarily as a volitional rather than an
epistemic state; faith is what purifies the heart and will so that
reason does not get misdirected.
C. To someone who already has faith, the primary use of reason is to
penetrate more deeply into what is already believed.
D. Anselm’s claim that “I believe in order to understand” is not
inconsistent with his belief that reason can establish many truths of
the Christian faith. He holds that faith is needed to discover the
arguments, whereas any sufficiently well-disposed and intelligent
person can follow those arguments.
Essential Reading:
Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams, “The Reason of Faith,” in Anselm.
Thomas Williams, “Saint Anselm.”
Toivo Holopainen, Dialectic and Theology in the Eleventh Century.
1. In what ways did political and institutional factors contribute to
keeping philosophical activity in abeyance between Boethius and the
11th century?
2. What does Anselm mean by “the reason of faith”? How does he
understand the relationship between faith and reason?

Lecture Eight
Anselm’s Proof That God Exists
Scope: At the request of his monks, Anselm composed the Monologion, a

template for philosophical reflection on the nature of God, starting
from premises that were widely accessible. Anselm was
dissatisfied with the complex argumentation of the Monologion; he
wanted a single argument that established a whole range of
conclusions about God at once. That single argument, which
Anselm presents in the Proslogion, has come to be known as the
ontological argument. By exploring the conception of God as “that
than which a greater cannot be thought,” Anselm argues, we can
prove not only that God exists but that he is wise, just, good, all-
powerful, all-knowing, and so forth. Almost immediately,
Anselm’s argument was criticized by a monk named Gaunilo, who
complained that if Anselm’s argument proved the existence of a
greatest conceivable being, it also proved the existence of the
greatest conceivable island, which is nonsense.
Outline
I. Anselm’s argument for the existence of God, which has come to be
known as the ontological argument, has proved to be his most enduring
contribution to philosophy.
A. Anselm offered several independent proofs of the existence of God
in his first major work, the Monologion. The Monologion, written
at the request of his monks, was intended to be a template for
philosophical reflection on the nature of God, starting from
premises that were accessible even to those who do not accept the
authority of Scripture or the fathers of the church.
B. Anselm was dissatisfied with the Monologion because it involved
a complex chain of argumentation; he wanted a single argument
that established a whole range of conclusions about God at once.
C. Anselm became so preoccupied with his search for that “single
argument” that he came to regard it as a temptation from the devil,
but he found it impossible to give up on the idea. When the
argument finally came to him, he presented it in a new work, the
Proslogion.

II. The ontological argument is an attempt to show that merely by
examining the concept of God, we can see that God does and, indeed,
must exist.
A. God is a being than which a greater cannot be thought.
B. Because we can conceive of such a being, this being exists in our
minds, in the way that a painting exists in the mind of a painter
who has yet to paint it.
C. To exist in reality is greater than to exist only in the mind. Thus, if
we think of God as existing only in the mind, we can think of
something greater than God. But God is that than which nothing
greater can be thought.
D. It follows, then, that God exists in reality as well. In fact, it is
incoherent to suppose that that than which nothing greater can be
thought exists only in the mind.
III. Variations on this argument can be used to establish not just the
existence of God but also God’s perfect goodness, omnipotence,
justice, and so forth. It can thus serve as the “single argument” for
which Anselm had been searching.
IV. The reception of Anselm’s argument was influenced by his first critic,
a monk named Gaunilo, who complained that if Anselm’s argument
proved the existence of a greatest conceivable being, it also proved the
existence of an island than which no greater island can be thought.
A. Gaunilo ingeniously constructs an argument that he believes is
exactly parallel to Anselm’s but with an absurd conclusion.
B. He also argues that God is so beyond human comprehension that
we cannot say that that than which nothing greater can be thought
exists in our minds.
C. Anselm replies that Gaunilo has misunderstood the original
argument. The argument for a greatest conceivable island is not
actually parallel to the argument for a greatest conceivable being.
D. Moreover, Anselm argues, it is possible to conceive of God to the
degree necessary for his argument to work.
V. The ontological argument itself has been largely rejected by
philosophers (although there is no consensus about where, exactly, its
failure lies). But Anselm’s conception of God as “that than which
nothing greater can be thought” remains influential even today.

Essential Reading:
Anselm, Monologion, Proslogion, and the exchange with Gaunilo, in
Anselm: Basic Writings.
Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams, “The Argument of the Proslogion,” in
Anselm.
Brian Davies, “The Ontological Argument,” in Brian Davies and Brian
Leftow, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Anselm.
1. What is the purpose of the ontological argument?
2. Why, according to Anselm, is Gaunilo’s “lost island” argument not
parallel to his own ontological argument?

Lecture Nine
Anselm on the Divine Attributes
Scope: The ontological argument establishes so many different divine

attributes that it is difficult to see how one and the same being can
possess all of them at once. For example, God is supposed to be
both merciful and impassible; but to be impassible is to be
incapable of emotion, whereas mercy seems to require the emotion
of compassion. Anselm devotes considerable attention to
dissolving such apparent contradictions in his account of the
divine attributes. The picture of God that emerges is at odds with
well-entrenched popular conceptions of God and even seems to
contradict Scripture, but Anselm argues powerfully that his own
conception of God is both rationally grounded and theologically
superior.
Outline
I. Once Anselm has established the existence of God in the Proslogion,
two main tasks remain.
A. First, he must figure out what (if anything) we can know about
God on the basis of the ontological argument, besides the fact that
he exists. This is important because the whole point of the
ontological argument was to provide a single argument from which
we could derive a great deal of information about the divine
nature.
B. Second, he must demonstrate that those attributes are consistent
with each other. If one of God’s attributes contradicts another, then
God is logically impossible, and the whole argument falls apart.
And at first glance, it does seem that some of God’s supposed
attributes contradict other ones.
II. The first task proves to be altogether straightforward.
A. Given that God is that than which nothing greater can be thought,
we know that God is whatever it is greater to be than not to be.

B. On this basis, Anselm is able to argue that God exists through
himself, that everything else depends on him for existence and
well-being, that God is unlimited in power and knowledge, that
God is just, and so on.
C. The various attributes of God, Anselm argues, are not, in fact,
many distinct attributes; they are all identical with God and with
each other.
1. If God’s various attributes were distinct from God himself,
God would be dependent on something other than himself to
be what he is—in violation of the principle that God is utterly
independent of everything other than himself.
2. Nevertheless, we have to use a variety of distinct concepts in
trying to think of the one simple divine nature.
III. The second task is considerably more difficult. Anselm has to resolve
several apparent contradictions among the divine attributes that are
generated in the course of completing the first task.
A. It appears that God’s mercy contradicts his impassibility.
1. Mercy implies compassion, but if God is impassible
(incapable of feeling emotion), he does not experience
compassion.
2. Anselm distinguishes between the affect of compassion, which
God does not experience, and the effect of compassion, which
we do experience. God acts mercifully without experiencing
any emotion.
3. Given his Platonic-Augustinian intuitions about value,
Anselm did not feel the need to argue that impassibility is
better than passibility. Nevertheless, it is possible to defend
the doctrine of divine impassibility against contemporary
objections that an impassible God would be cold and
impersonal.
B. It appears that God’s omnipotence contradicts his justice.
1. If God is omnipotent, he can do everything, but if God is
perfectly just, he cannot lie.
2. Anselm argues that omnipotence should not be construed as
the ability to do everything but as the possession of all power.
The “power” to lie is not really a power at all but a kind of
weakness. Therefore, omnipotence does not require the ability
to lie; it actually excludes such an ability.

3. Anselm’s account of omnipotence has the resources to answer
the Paradox of the Stone: “Can God create a stone so heavy
that he cannot lift it?”
C. It appears that God’s mercy contradicts his justice.
1. If God is just, he will punish the wicked; if God is merciful,
he will spare the wicked.
2. Anselm first appeals to God’s goodness. If God is to be
unsurpassably good, he must be good both to the wicked and
to the good.
3. He then argues that God’s justice to himself requires God to
show mercy to sinners.
4. The philosopher can trace the conceptual relations among
goodness, justice, and mercy and show that God not only can
but must have all three; still, no human reasoning can hope to
show why God displays his justice and mercy in precisely the
ways in which he does.
IV. Anselm’s arguments concerning the divine attributes illustrate three
general points about his philosophical method and his continuing
relevance to philosophy.
A. His arguments show the techniques of dialectic at work. Anselm
frequently solves a problem by distinguishing between two
different senses of an expression or noting two different ways in
which a statement might be true.
B. Anselm is unswerving in his commitment to exploring the reason
of faith. Although he does not think that reason can uncover
everything, he is convinced that reason can go a long way toward
making the Christian faith intelligible.
C. Although most philosophers think that the ontological argument
fails as a proof for the existence of God, many contemporary
philosophers of religion think that Anselm’s conception of God as
“that than which nothing greater can be thought” is the most
promising basis on which to think about God and his attributes.
Essential Reading:
Anselm, Proslogion, in Anselm: Basic Writings.

Jasper Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm.
Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams, “The Divine Attributes,” in Anselm.
1. How does Anselm use the ontological argument to generate a list of
divine attributes? How does this use of the argument relate to the
argument’s original purpose?
2. How does Anselm’s discussion of the divine attributes extend and
clarify his understanding of God’s “greatness”?

Lecture Ten
Anselm on Freedom and the Fall
Scope: Saint Paul asked the Corinthians, “What do you have that you have
not received?” He expected the answer “nothing.” But Anselm
notes that if literally everything we have—every desire, every
choice, every action—is received from God, it is God who
deserves all the praise for the good we do and all the blame for the
evil we do. Anselm explains how we can reconcile human freedom
and moral responsibility with the claim that everything we have is
received from God. Rational creatures receive two fundamental
inclinations from God: an inclination to choose what they think
will make them happy and an inclination to do what they believe
they ought to do. When they choose to act on one of these
inclinations in preference to the other, that choice is not received
from God, and thus, they can be held responsible for it.
Outline
I. Anselm introduces the problem of freedom and the fall by quoting
from Saint Paul (1 Corinthians 4:7): “What do you have that you have
not received?”
A. Paul’s question clearly expects the answer “nothing.” But if, in
fact, we have nothing but what we have received from God, it
becomes difficult to see how we deserve credit for anything good
or blame for anything bad.
B. Anselm explicitly applies Paul’s question to the angels, not to
human beings.
1. By discussing the fall of the angels, Anselm excludes a
number of complications that arise in the case of human
beings but are extraneous to Anselm’s main interest. (This is
typical of the way in which medieval thinkers use angels in
their philosophical discussions.)
2. Nonetheless, what Anselm says about angels will apply to
human beings, because the human will is structurally the same
as the angelic will, and the question about our moral
responsibility is also the same.

C. The essence of the problem is that the angels that did not fall had
the gift of “perseverance.” If creatures have nothing that they have
not received, the good angel had perseverance because he received
it from God. Accordingly, the bad angel lacked it because he
didn’t receive it from God; thus, the fall of the devil was God’s
fault.
II. Anselm’s initial solution to the problem is that God gave all the angels
the will to persevere, but the evil angels abandoned that will. In order
to understand this solution, however, we must explore Anselm’s
account of freedom and his theory of motivation.
A. Anselm defines freedom as “the power to preserve rectitude of will
for its own sake.”
1. Freedom is not the power to sin or not to sin. God is free, but
he cannot sin.
2. Because “rectitude of will preserved for its own sake” is
Anselm’s definition of justice, Anselm’s definition of freedom
is explicitly moral: Freedom is the capacity for justice.
B. Anselm argues that rational natures (angels and human beings) are
motivated by two sorts of considerations. He calls them “justice”
and “advantage”; in contemporary language, we could call them
“morality” and “happiness.”
C. The angels who abandoned the will to persevere did so because
they willed something else in preference to justice.
1. Anselm acknowledges that he cannot identify what this
“something extra” was.
2. When the evil angels abandoned their will for justice, God
punished them by taking away all their happiness.
3. God gave the good angels that “something extra” as a reward
for their choice to preserve justice. As a result, the good
angels can no longer sin.
III. Anselm elaborates the necessary conditions for free choice by
imagining an angel that is created one step at a time.
A. An angel with only the will for happiness would necessarily will
happiness. Such an angel would be neither praiseworthy nor
blameworthy, because his will would be “the work and gift of
God.”

B. Similarly, an angel with only the will for justice would necessarily
will what is just.
C. An angel with both wills, however, can initiate an action that is not
received entirely from God.
D. These considerations show that it was impossible for God to make
a free creature who would be guaranteed not to fall.
E. Anselm’s view clearly implies that there is something the angels
did not receive from God: the content of their free choice either to
persevere or to reject perseverance. Anselm recognizes this
implication but is cagey about stating it openly.
Essential Reading:
Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil, in Anselm: Basic Writings.
Jasper Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm.
Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams, “Anselm’s Account of Freedom,” in
Brian Davies and Brian Leftow, eds., The Cambridge Companion to
Anselm.
1. Why does Anselm use a discussion about angels to answer a question
about human beings?
2. What are the two fundamental motivations that Anselm recognizes, and
how do the two of them together provide the necessary condition for
free choice?

Lecture Eleven
Abelard on Understanding the Trinity
Scope: Peter Abelard (1079–1142) was famously a wreck in his personal

life and constantly at odds with ecclesiastical authority (his works
were condemned at two church councils), but he was the
outstanding philosopher and theologian of the 12th century.
Although he acknowledged that God surpasses the power of
human understanding, he was not willing to make the
incomprehensibility of God an excuse for obscurity or careless
thinking. Christian doctrine, he argued, must be elucidated and
defended in accordance with the standards of philosophical
reasoning. Abelard took this approach most persistently (and most
controversially) to the doctrine of the Trinity. Through the use of
philosophical techniques, we can show that the doctrine of the
Trinity makes sense and can be defended against any objections.
Outline
I. Abelard’s life explains a lot about the difficulties he encountered in his
academic career.
A. His combativeness and intellectual arrogance made enemies of his
teachers.
B. His infamous romance with Heloise demonstrated his
impetuousness. Its brutal conclusion was the occasion for his
entering monastic life and focusing on his theological work.
II. One of Abelard’s primary interests was a wide-ranging effort to
reformulate Christian doctrine in a rationally coherent way. The
doctrine of the Trinity was at the center of this project.
A. Abelard wrote three treatises on Christian theology, each focused
on the Trinity.
1. The first treatise, written around 1120, was condemned by
the Council of Soissons in 1121, and Abelard was forced to
burn it.

2.Undeterred, Abelard elaborated his arguments in a second
treatise, which was twice as long and added a great deal of
praise for pagan philosophers. This second treatise was left
unfinished when Abelard abandoned it to produce a third.
3. Thanks to a vigorous propaganda war and clever ecclesiastical
maneuvering by Bernard of Clairvaux, the third treatise was
condemned at the Council of Sens in 1141. This
condemnation put an end to Abelard’s teaching career.
B. Three general features of Abelard’s engagement with Trinitarian
doctrine reveal his approach to questions of faith and reason.
1. Abelard placed his specific reflections on the Trinity in the
context of a general account of the scope and limits of human
knowledge.
2. He argued that pre-Christian philosophers recognized the
Trinitarian nature of God. Consequently, we can see that the
doctrine of the Trinity can be grasped (to some extent) by
reason alone.
3. He insisted on the use of philosophical techniques to elucidate
and defend the doctrine of the Trinity. The fact that God is
ultimately beyond human comprehension does not excuse
sloppy thinking or entitle us to take refuge in vague claims
about “mystery.”
III. Abelard situates his reflections on the Trinity in the context of a
general account of the scope and limits of human knowledge. Although
it is difficult to make out exactly how Abelard envisions the
relationship between faith and reason, it is clear that he denies the
possibility of any genuine conflict between the two.
A. He says that “except by divine illumination, no one can learn the
least thing.” If all learning, of whatever kind, is a product of divine
illumination, we can expect that what is learned by means of
authority will cohere with what is learned by means of reason.
B. Reason itself also reveals that “God far exceeds what can come
under human discussion or the powers of human intelligence.”
Thus, reason recognizes its own limits and the consequent need to
accede to authority.
C. Because God exceeds the powers of human reason, it is both
proper and necessary to use “similitudes” (analogies) in talking
about God.

IV. As evidence that the doctrine of the Trinity can be grasped by reason,
Abelard cites what he regards as adumbrations of the doctrine in pre-
Christian philosophers.
A. Pagan philosophers had knowledge of the Trinity both by reason
and by grace.
1. Abelard’s need to defend his citation of pagan writers says a
lot about the intellectual climate of the time.
2. Abelard brings forward pagan witness that the Word was
generated (was begotten), that the Word (the Son) and the
Father are co-eternal, and that the Holy Spirit as a third person
proceeded from God and the Word.
B. Abelard probably goes further than is necessary (or wise) when he
defends the claim that Gentile philosophers before Christ were
saved, even though he does so in part by appealing to Paul.
V. Because there is no conflict between reason and authority and because
the adumbrations of Trinitarian doctrine in pre-Christian philosophers
demonstrate that the Trinity is amenable to rational investigation,
Abelard insists on developing a rational account of the Trinity that
dissolves its apparent paradoxes.
A. The ultimate incomprehensibility of God is not a license for
obscurity. By using “similitudes,” arguments, and careful
philosophical distinctions, we can at least approximate the truth
about God.
B. The fundamental issue in making sense of the doctrine of the
Trinity, Abelard holds, requires getting clear on the various kinds
of sameness and difference.
1. The doctrine of the Trinity requires (for example) that the
Father and the Son be the same God but different persons. If
the three persons are not the same God, Abelard will fall into
the heresy of tritheism; if the three persons are not distinct
from each other, he will fall into the heresy of modalism.
2. Believing that the traditional accounts of sameness and
difference (deriving from Boethius) are not sufficient, Abelard
develops a more fine-grained account by appealing to
everyday things that can serve as analogues to the way in
which the three persons are both the same and different.

3. This account allows him to speak coherently of the relations
of sameness and difference that must hold within the Godhead
according to the doctrine of the Trinity.
Essential Reading:
Peter King, “Peter Abelard.”
Jeffery Brower, “Trinity,” in Jeffrey Brower and Kevin Guilfoy, eds., The
Cambridge Companion to Abelard.
1. On what grounds did Abelard’s teaching on the Trinity run afoul of the
orthodoxy of his day?
2. Does Abelard treat the doctrine of the Trinity any differently from the
way he would treat any other problem in metaphysics?

Lecture Twelve
Abelard on Understanding Redemption
Scope: Abelard’s theory of the Atonement shows the complexities of his

engagement with both authority and reason. He developed his
theory in commenting on Paul’s Letter to the Romans, accepting
the authority of the scriptural text but showing how its meaning
can be made clear only through philosophical analysis. He risked
ecclesiastical censure by rejecting a widely held theory of the
Atonement on the grounds that it makes no philosophical sense.
He also tried to show how an understanding of the divine nature
enables us to adjudicate among rival theories of the Atonement.
According to Abelard, the death of Christ delivers us from the
punishment for the sin of our first parents, thereby inspiring our
gratitude and enabling us to serve God out of love rather than out
of fear.
Outline
I. The Christian doctrine of the Atonement states that the suffering, death,
and resurrection of Christ effect a reconciliation between God and
human beings. Various theories of the way in which the Atonement
works have been proposed, and Abelard got in trouble for revising or
rejecting the dominant theories of his own day.
A. Theories of the Atonement can be classified as objective or
subjective.
1. Objective theories describe the Passion itself as accomplishing
something. For example, a penal substitution theory holds that
Christ undergoes on our behalf the punishment owed to us for
sin; a ransom theory holds that Christ’s death pays a ransom
owed to the devil in order to free us from his control.
2. Subjective theories locate the efficacy of the Passion in us.
For example, an exemplarist theory holds that the Passion is
simply a manifestation of divine love that awakens an
answering love in the believer.
B. It is commonly said that Abelard both rejects objective theories
and accepts a subjective, exemplarist theory. Neither claim is true,
though neither claim is entirely without foundation.

C. As in the case of Trinitarian doctrine, Abelard seeks an account of
the Atonement that is philosophically defensible and coherent. His
arguments against the theories he rejects are purely philosophical
ones.
II. Abelard discusses the Atonement in his commentary on Paul’s Letter to
the Romans.
A. The commentary has two overarching themes:
1. Abelard insists that Paul always wishes to exalt divine grace at
the expense of human merit. Accordingly, he denies
Pelagianism, the view that it is possible to act well without
divine grace.
2. We are meant to serve God out of love rather than out of fear.
B. A purely exemplarist theory does not fit the themes of the Romans
commentary at all well. Though Abelard will emphasize the
subjective transformation brought about by the Passion (in
accordance with the second theme), he also has to acknowledge an
objective aspect, because otherwise, our response to the Passion
would bring about our own redemption (in violation of the first
theme).
III. Before he explains what the objective element is, Abelard explains
what it is not. He rejects the ransom theory (thereby incurring the wrath
of Bernard of Clairvaux).
A. The elect are, by definition, not under the jurisdiction of the devil.
B. The only right the devil could have over human beings would be
one given by God.
1. The devil had wrongly seduced us, thereby gaining no right
over us.
2. It would be more fitting for us to have some right over the
devil than vice versa.
3. The devil lied in promising immortality.
C. Human beings sinned only against God, and it is therefore up to
God to forgive.
IV. The objective element in the Atonement, Abelard argues, is our release
from what we might call the “objective dominion of sin”: that is, our
being liable to the punishment for sin. Thus, Abelard teaches a theory
of penal substitution.

V. There is also a “subjective dominion of sin,” which is disordered
desire—concupiscence. The Passion also delivers us from disordered
desire.
VI. The question is whether the Passion delivers us from disordered desire
naturally or supernaturally. If it is does so naturally, Abelard will be
open to Bernard’s charge of Pelagianism.
A. Abelard emphatically affirms that no one acts well apart from
grace. But the text “Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated”
(Romans 9:13) poses a problem for this view.
1. It appears that God acts unjustly. Abelard argues, however,
that God can treat human beings however he pleases without
doing them any injustice.
2. Yet even if God is not blameworthy for giving grace to some
but not others, it certainly appears that human beings are not
at fault if they act badly because they have not received grace.
3. In response, Abelard first argues that God is not blameworthy,
because he offers grace to saints and sinners alike. Sinners are
blameworthy for rejecting grace.
4. The problem with this response, as Abelard sees it, is that (if
we are to avoid Pelagianism) we must say that it takes grace to
accept grace.
5. Abelard’s unstated assumption in his solution to this problem
is that the grace we need in order to accept grace is just God’s
creating our nature appropriately.
B. In light of these arguments, one cannot entirely acquit Abelard of
Pelagianism in his attempt to offer a philosophically palatable
account of the Atonement. It depends on how we define
Pelagianism.
1. If we define it as the view that one can act rightly apart from
grace, then Abelard is no Pelagian.
2. But if we define it as the view that human beings in their
present state can will rightly through an unaided exercise of
their power of free choice, then Abelard is an unapologetic
Pelagian. Any other view, Abelard thinks, would be
inconsistent with what we know about the nature of God.

Essential Reading:
Thomas Williams, “Sin, Grace, and Redemption,” in Jeffrey Brower and
Kevin Guilfoy, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Abelard.
Gustav Aulen, Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main
Types of the Idea of the Atonement.
Philip Quinn, “Abelard on Atonement: Nothing Unintelligible, Arbitrary,
Illogical, or Immoral About It,” in Eleonore Stump, ed., Reasoned Faith.
1. How does Abelard’s overall interpretation of the Letter to the Romans
constrain his account of the Atonement?
2. What are the subjective and objective elements in the Atonement as
Abelard understands it? How do those elements work together?

Lecture Thirteen
The Rediscovery of Aristotle
Scope: The recovery of the full Aristotelian corpus by the middle of the
13th century revolutionized Christian thought in the Latin West.
Aristotle’s thinking offered a conceptual apparatus of obvious
power and usefulness for philosophy and theology, but many of
Aristotle’s ideas were at odds with Christian doctrine. Thirteenth-
century thinkers had to figure out how to accommodate this new
material as prohibitions against lecturing on Aristotle’s works
proved ineffective. Albert the Great (1206–1280) did more than
anyone else in making the study of Aristotle respectable by using
Aristotelian principles to systematize theology, though Albert’s
most enduring influence was as the teacher of Thomas Aquinas (c.
1225–1274). By contrast, Bonaventure (c. 1217–1274) was willing
to borrow Aristotelian doctrines when he found them helpful, but
the character of his thinking is not noticeably Aristotelian, and he
argues passionately against excessive enthusiasm in following
Aristotle. Such excesses were attributed to the integral
Aristotelians of the University of Paris, for whom Aristotelian
philosophy was a complete, freestanding account of the natural
world.
Outline
I. Beginning late in Abelard’s lifetime, the full corpus of Aristotle’s
works began to become available in Latin.
A. Until this time, scholars had had access only to some of Aristotle’s
logical works and a handful of other texts.
1. The Categories (containing Aristotle’s theory of terms) and
De interpretatione (containing Aristotle’s theory of
statements), as translated by Boethius, were the only
Aristotelian texts in wide circulation in the early Middle Ages.
2. Early medieval scholars also had access to Porphyry’s Isagoge
(an introduction to the Categories) and commentaries and
original logical works by Boethius.

B. The first new translations were of the remainder of Aristotle’s
logical works (dubbed the new logic).
1. The Prior Analytics (containing Aristotle’s theory of the
syllogism) did not make a great impact because its contents
were known at second hand.
2. The Posterior Analytics (containing Aristotle’s theory of
scientific knowledge) was too difficult to make a great impact
immediately.
3. The Sophistical Refutations (a handbook of fallacies)
generated considerable interest, leading to a number of
developments in logic.
C. These were followed by Aristotle’s scientific, metaphysical,
ethical, and political writings, along with extensive commentary by
Muslim thinkers.
1. The earliest translations were often unreliable because of the
number of intermediaries between the Greek original and the
Latin translation.
2. Robert Grosseteste made the first complete translation of
Aristotle’s Ethics some time around 1250.
3. By the middle of the 13th century, William of Moerbecke had
revised or replaced earlier translations, working directly from
the Greek. His translations were used by Thomas Aquinas.
II. The recovery of the full Aristotelian corpus coincided with the rise of
the universities, establishing a determinate institutional context in
which the new accommodations between Aristotelian reason and
Christian faith would have to be worked out.
A. The universities grew out of the famous cathedral schools that had
an international draw.
B. The premier European university in the 13th century was the
University of Paris, which was officially founded in 1215, though
the statutes of the university were in existence for some years
before that.
C. Universities were divided into faculties. The arts faculty provided
the basic training for students, who would then proceed to the
“higher” faculties, such as medicine, law, or theology.

1. Students would begin their arts training at around 14 or 15 and
study for about six years. Because the arts faculty provided a
preparatory education, arts masters would typically teach in
arts only two years, then “move up” to a higher faculty.
2. After a stint as a master of arts, a student who went into the
theology faculty would have a further eight years (or more) of
training before becoming a master or doctor of theology.
D. The newly translated works of Aristotle made their first
appearance at the University of Paris in the arts faculty.
1. Beginning in 1210, there were repeated prohibitions of
“reading” Aristotle’s works (that is, lecturing on them
publicly), which were regarded as theologically dangerous.
2. The very fact that the prohibitions had to be repeated is
evidence that they were not altogether successful. Certainly by
the 1250s, people were unabashedly lecturing on whatever
Aristotle was available.
III. Aristotle’s work seemed attractive because it was wide-ranging,
systematic, and rigorously argued; it seemed dangerous because
Aristotle explicitly taught views that contradicted Christian doctrine.
A. Many features of Aristotle’s work made it deeply attractive to
thinkers of this period.
1. The wide range of Aristotle’s thought (logic, science,
metaphysics, ethics, politics) appealed to the medieval longing
for encyclopedic knowledge.
2. Its systematic character—a small stock of principles, concepts,
and distinctions employed across disparate contexts—and
hierarchical organization of different fields of inquiry
appealed to the medieval passion for unity and order.
3. Its primarily argumentative (rather than mystical) character fit
with the increasing emphasis on rigorous argumentation.
4. The systematic, hierarchical, and argumentative character of
Aristotle’s thought is encapsulated in his understanding of
“science.” A science is a body of knowledge expressed as
arguments that proceed from first principles to conclusions.
The conclusions of a “higher” science serve as first principles
for “subordinate” sciences.

B. Yet some of Aristotle’s teaching was clearly at odds with Christian
doctrine.
1. He taught that the world had always existed—indeed, that the
notion of a beginning of time was incoherent.
2. He claimed that God had no concern for the world.
3. It was hard to find any clear acknowledgment of personal
immortality in Aristotle, and in places, he seems to deny it
outright.
4. His ethical theory seemed to emphasize self-love and self-
fulfillment.
5. In general, Aristotle’s philosophy was naturalistic; it left little
room for appeals to such supernatural activities as grace (in
ethics) or divine illumination (in the theory of knowledge).
IV. We can see three kinds of reaction to the “new” Aristotelian
philosophy.
A. The integral Aristotelians of the arts faculty treated Aristotelian
philosophy as a complete, freestanding account of the natural
world.
1. Those who were inclined to think this way typically
interpreted Aristotle under the influence of the Arabic
commentator Averroes; thus, they are also known as Latin
Averroists.
2. A key figure was Siger of Brabant, who is said to have held a
two-truths theory, according to which a statement could be
true in philosophy but false in theology.
B. Conservative reaction in the theology faculty, exemplified by
Bonaventure, largely rejected Aristotelian thought. Bonaventure
was willing to borrow Aristotelian doctrine or techniques when he
found them useful, but his thinking was not noticeably
Aristotelian, and he argued passionately against what he took to be
excessive enthusiasm in following Aristotle.
C. Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas staked out a moderate
position.
1. Albert the Great did more than anyone else to make the study
of Aristotle respectable by using Aristotelian principles to
systematize theology.

2. Albert’s most enduring influence, however, was as a teacher
of Thomas Aquinas, who not only wrote extensive
commentaries on Aristotle but did theology in a thoroughly
Aristotelian way.
Essential Reading:
C. H. Lohr, “The Medieval Interpretation of Aristotle,” in Norman
Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, eds., The Cambridge History
of Later Medieval Philosophy.
Bernard G. Dod, “Aristoteles latinus,” in Norman Kretzmann, Anthony
Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, eds., The Cambridge History of Later Medieval
Philosophy.
1. Why did the reintroduction of the full Aristotelian corpus have such
wide-ranging effects on medieval philosophical thought?
2. What role did the nature of the 13th-century university play in the
disputes over Aristotle?

Lecture Fourteen
Bonaventure on the Mind’s Journey into God
Scope: Bonaventure identifies six ways of approaching the knowledge of

God. The first two involve discerning the traces that God has left
in his creative activity within the sub-rational world: first, as a
basis for reaching conclusions about God and, second, as evidence
of God’s presence in sensible things. The next two involve
discerning the image of God borne by the human intellect: first, in
our natural powers and, second, in our powers as reformed by
grace. The two highest ways involve discerning God in himself:
first, in reason’s grasp of the unity of nature in God and, second, in
faith’s grasp of the trinity of persons in God.
Bonaventure’s account of the mind’s journey to God reveals an
independent and critical approach to the newly ascendant
Aristotelian philosophy. In his account of creation, Bonaventure
rejects the Aristotelian doctrine that the material world has always
existed, but in his account of theoretical knowledge, he tries to
synthesize the Aristotelian account of knowledge through
sensation with the Augustinian account of knowledge through
illumination. Bonaventure’s approach is not to carve off distinctive
spheres of competence for faith and reason or theology and
philosophy but to use philosophy as one available technique within
theology, which encompasses all knowledge about God.
Outline
I. In his most influential work, The Mind’s Journey into God (Itinerarium
mentis in Deum; also translated as The Journey of the Mind to God),
Bonaventure identifies six ways of approaching the knowledge of God.
A. Bonaventure takes the image of the six-winged seraph as standing
for six “progressive illuminations” by which human beings can
come to know God.

B. Each pair of wings corresponds to a different level in the hierarchy
of being.
1. The first pair represents the traces of God’s activity that can
be discerned in the sub-rational world. Here, we contemplate
God “outside us” or “below us.”
2. The second pair represents the image of God borne by the
human intellect. Here, we contemplate God “within us.”
3. The third pair represents God himself. Here, we contemplate
God “above us.”
II. The first steps in attaining knowledge of God begin with knowledge of
the sensible world.
A. Bonaventure first considers the “vestiges” (literally, footprints) of
God in the visible world as a basis for reaching conclusions about
God as their source.
1. Part of Bonaventure’s goal is to insist that the visible universe
is not self-explaining. Creatures require explanation in terms
of the power, wisdom, and goodness of their creator.
2. The ancient philosophers were correct in drawing the
conclusion that God ordered the world, but they failed to draw
the conclusion that God originated the world—though that
conclusion ought to have been evident to them, as well.
B. Bonaventure then considers the vestiges of God as providing
evidence for God’s presence in sensible things.
1. Through sensation, human beings are a microcosm.
Everything existing in the sensible world enters the human
being through the “portals” of the senses.
2. What enters the human soul is not, of course, the thing itself
but its likeness. In this way, sensation detaches the sensible
thing from its particular place and time, thus preparing it to be
understood universally by the intellect.
3. The generation of the sensible likeness mirrors the eternal
generation of the Word in the Trinity.

III. The next steps in attaining knowledge of God arise from considering
the image of God borne by the human intellect.
A. Bonaventure first considers the image of God imprinted on our
natural powers.
1. In this step, he offers an account of theoretical knowledge that
seeks to integrate Augustine with Aristotle.
2. He first describes the activity of intellect in Aristotelian terms.
It consists of knowing first terms, then propositions, and then
inferences.
3. Yet he appeals to Augustine to argue that the intellect can
have no certainty unless it is taught and illumined by truth
itself.
4. Like Augustine, Bonaventure sees in the soul’s memory,
understanding, and love an image of the Trinity.
5. He even finds Augustinian images of the Trinity in
Aristotelian divisions of the sciences (for example, the
division of natural philosophy into metaphysics, mathematics,
and physics).
B. He then considers the image of God as reformed by grace.
1. Our natural powers must be restored by the theological virtues
of faith, hope, and charity.
2. The study of Scripture is indispensable for the work of this
step.
3. Note that Bonaventure’s description gives Scripture a certain
preeminence over the philosophical reasoning described by
the previous step.
IV. In the two final steps, Bonaventure turns from created things to God
himself.
A. He first considers the essential attributes of God by investigating
the notion of being. This consideration relies especially on the Old
Testament, which proclaims the unity of the divine essence and
names God as “I am Who am” (Exodus 3:14).
1. In a way reminiscent of Anselm, Bonaventure argues that
being itself is so certain that it cannot be thought not to be.
2. The most pure being must exist from itself and be eternal and
supremely one.

B. Finally, Bonaventure considers the proper attributes of the three
persons in God by investigating the notion of goodness. This
consideration relies especially on the New Testament, which
proclaims the plurality of divine persons and says, “No one is good
but God alone” (Luke 18:19).
1. Goodness is, by its very nature, self-communicating. The
divine goodness must therefore be “supremely self-diffusive.”
2. The self-communication of divine goodness is realized in the
multiplicity of persons in the Godhead.
V. Bonaventure’s approach cannot be easily characterized as either
philosophical or theological because he does not recognize a clear
division of labor between the two.
A. Philosophical reasoning transforms an object of faith into
something intelligible.
B. Theology is free to draw on both revelation and reason for its
premises.
C. Rather than seeing philosophy and theology as involving two
different subject matters or as having two different spheres of
competence, Bonaventure prefers to see theology as encompassing
all knowledge about God. Philosophy is one available technique
within theology.
Essential Reading:
Bonaventure, The Journey of the Mind to God.
Timothy B. Noone and R. E. Houser, “Saint Bonaventure.”
Timothy B. Noone, “The Franciscans and Epistemology: Reflections on the
Roles of Bonaventure and Scotus,” in R. E. Houser, ed., Medieval Masters:
Essays in Memory of E. A. Synan.
1. Why is it difficult to talk about Bonaventure’s approach to faith and
reason in the same terms we use for talking about other authors?
2. How does Bonaventure’s use of both sensible and intelligible creation
as stepping stones to knowledge of God illustrate his blending of
philosophical and theological arguments?

Lecture Fifteen
Aquinas on What Reason Can and Cannot Do
Scope: Thomas Aquinas, following Aristotle, held that all human

knowledge ultimately derives from sense experience.
Consequently, by the exercise of their natural intellectual powers,
human beings can know only those facts about God that are
somehow evident from reflection upon sense experience, for
example, that God exists, that there is only one God, and so forth.
Other things that Christians believe about God, such as his being a
Trinity, are not evident from sensible things; such facts must be
revealed if human beings are to have any awareness of them at all.
Yet (Aquinas believes) God also reveals truths that can be known
apart from revelation, because otherwise, too few people would
know them.
Outline
I. Aquinas follows Aristotle in affirming that all natural human
knowledge originates in sensation. One consequence of this view is a
clear distinction between truths about God that we can know by the
exercise of natural reason, unaided by supernatural revelation, and
truths about God that we must take on faith.
A. In this present life, the human intellect can grasp only what can be
inferred from the objects of the senses. Because sensible objects
are effects that fall short of the power of their cause, we can know
some things about God, but we cannot achieve knowledge of his
essence.
1. Aquinas calls these naturally knowable truths “preambles to
faith.”
2. Among the preambles to faith are that God exists, that there is
only one God, that he is omnipotent and immutable, and so
forth. We can (in principle) come to know these on the basis
of reasoning about sensible things.
B. There are also truths about God that exceed the ability of human
reason because they cannot be discerned by examining sensible
things.
1. Aquinas calls such truths “mysteries of faith.”

2. Among the mysteries of faith are the Trinity and the
Incarnation.
II. Although the mysteries of faith exceed the powers of natural reason, it
is reasonable to believe in them.
A. Aquinas argues that it is reasonable to think that not everything is
accessible to human reason. Even in mundane affairs, we find that
we have a tenuous grasp even on what we apprehend by means of
the senses.
B. Given that there are such truths, it is important for several reasons
that God reveal them to us.
1. God has higher things in mind for us than what our reason can
figure out. But if we did not know about this higher good, we
would not strive wholeheartedly for it.
2. God’s revealing these truths to us allows us to have a truer
knowledge of God, and it strengthens our view that God
exceeds our reason.
3. We are, thus, freed from presumption, which is the mother of
error.
4. Such knowledge of the noblest realities brings the greatest
perfection and joy to the soul.
C. God confirms the truth of this teaching by “works that surpass the
ability of all nature.”
III. It is also reasonable for God to reveal the preambles to faith, even
though in principle we can discover them on our own.
A. If God did not reveal them, few people would know them, because
most people are too stupid, busy, or lazy to do the intellectual
work necessary to discover them.
B. Even those who would come to know God would take a long time
to do it, because these truths are profound, presuppose much other
knowledge, and cannot fittingly be pursued by the young.
C. Many people who would not be able to see the force of the
arguments would hold their conclusions in doubt.

IV. Although faith surpasses reason, it cannot conflict with reason.
A. Aquinas offers several arguments for the claim that faith and
reason cannot conflict.
1. All truths are given to us by God—either by nature or by
grace—and God cannot contradict God.
2. All truths are contained within the divine wisdom, and perfect
wisdom cannot include contradictions.
3. All truths are taught to us by God, and God would be a bad
teacher if he taught us contradictory things.
4. Only the false can be opposed to the true.
B. Aquinas admits that sometimes there appears to be a conflict
between the two.
1. The situation he envisions is one in which someone produces
an argument against a doctrine of the faith.
2. In such a case, we know that there’s something wrong with
the argument. We just have to find the mistake.
3. Aquinas’s approach offers a program for incorporating
Aristotle’s philosophy within Christian theology while
resisting Aristotle’s errors. It therefore steers a middle course
between conservative resistance to Aristotle and the two-
truths theory of the integral Aristotelians.
C. We can understand what is distinctive in Aquinas’s view by
comparing it to Augustine’s.
1. In one sense, the Augustinian view is more pessimistic about
reason than Aquinas’s, because it claims that there can be no
genuine understanding of God apart from faith. Reason can be
properly directed only if the will is right, but the will is not
right unless it is submitted to God in faith.
2. In another sense, though, Augustinianism is more optimistic
about reason than Thomism. Once you believe, you can try to
use reason about practically all of the faith. There is no need
to distinguish between mysteries and preambles.
3. According to Augustine, faith is necessary because of the
perversity of the will. According to Aquinas, faith is necessary
because of the weakness of our intellect.

Essential Reading:
Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, Book One: God, chapters 1–9.
Ralph McInerny and John O’Callaghan, “Saint Thomas Aquinas.”
Norman Kretzmann, “Theology from the Bottom Up” (chapter 1), in The
Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas’s Natural Theology in Summa Contra
Gentiles I.
1. What philosophical considerations make it necessary for Aquinas to
distinguish between preambles to faith and mysteries of faith?
2. How does Aquinas’s understanding of the relationship between faith
and reason make him a “centrist” figure in the 13th-century debate?

Lecture Sixteen
Aquinas’s Proof of an Unmoved Mover
Scope: Before arguing that God exists, Aquinas deals with two objections
to the project of proving God’s existence: first, that it is
unnecessary to prove God’s existence because it is self-evident
that God exists and, second, that it is impossible to prove God’s
existence because the existence of God is exclusively a matter for
faith and revelation. In response, Aquinas argues that the existence
of God is not self-evident in the way a mathematical or logical
truth is, but it can be proved by reasoning backwards from
effects—the objects of our sense experience—to God as their
ultimate cause. There are five ways to prove that God exists. The
first and “most evident” of these is an argument from motion.
Everything that is in motion must be put in motion by some other
thing. Because an infinite series of movers is impossible, there
must be a first mover that is not itself in motion. This first
unmoved mover, Aquinas says, is God.
Outline
I. Before Aquinas offers his five proofs for the existence of God, he deals
with the objection that the existence of God cannot be proved: either
because it is self-evident or because it just has to be taken on faith.
A. Aquinas’s approach to this objection illustrates his use of the
Scholastic method, which framed philosophical inquiry as a debate
between opposing points of view.
1. The Scholastic method begins with a quaestio: a question that
can be given a yes-or-no answer.
2. Then, one marshals the best arguments from authorities (the
“big names in the field”) for the view that one rejects.
3. Then, one sets forth one’s own view and gives arguments for
it.
4. Finally, one considers the opposing arguments and explains
why they fail. Perhaps one finds a mistaken premise or logical
fallacy in the original argument, or perhaps one shows that the
authority is wrong if interpreted in one way but right if
interpreted in another way.

B. Aquinas interprets Anselm as holding that the existence of God is
self-evident. In reply, he denies that the existence of God is self-
evident in a way that would make a proof of God’s existence
otiose.
1. A proposition is self-evident when one can tell, just by
thinking about the concepts involved, that it is true.
2. According to Anselm, once we understand the concept of
God, we can see that God exists.
3. Aquinas argues that we cannot, in this life, have the kind of
understanding of God that would enable us just to “see” that
God exists.
C. The objection that the existence of God must simply be taken on
faith takes off from Aquinas’s response to Anselm. If we cannot
have any direct insight into the nature of God, how are we
supposed to prove that God exists?
1. Aquinas replies by distinguishing between two different kinds
of arguments. In an argument propter quid, we argue from the
nature of a thing to its features; in an argument quia, we argue
backwards from effects to cause.
2. Because we have no direct insight into the nature of God, we
cannot have any propter quid arguments about God. But we
can have quia arguments about God by reasoning backwards
from God’s effects—sensible things—to their cause.
II. Each of the “five ways” begins from some fact that can be observed by
the senses and argues on that basis for the existence of God.
A. The first way argues on the basis of motion that there must be a
first unmoved mover.
B. The second way argues on the basis of causality that there must be
a first uncaused cause.
C. The third way argues on the basis of contingency (the fact that
things are capable of existing and of not existing) that there must
be a necessary being.
D. The fourth way argues on the basis of the degrees of perfection
that there must be a maximally perfect being.
E. The fifth way argues on the basis of apparently purposive
behavior that there must be an intelligent being that directs all
things to attain their ends.

III. A detailed look at the first way to prove that God exists, which
Aquinas calls “the clearest way,” offers a glimpse into Aquinas’s
argumentative method and his use of Aristotelian principles.
A. It is “evident to the senses” that some things are in motion.
1. In Aristotelian jargon, three kinds of changes count as
“motion”: change in quality, change in size, and change in
place.
2. Each of these changes involves going from potentiality
(potentially being a certain way) to actuality (actually being a
certain way).
B. Whenever something goes from potentiality to actuality, there
must be something that causes it go from potentiality to actuality.
1. Something that causes motion is in actuality, whereas
something that undergoes motion is in potentiality. For
example, something that is actually hot is needed to heat what
is only potentially hot.
2. Because nothing can be both in actuality and in potentiality in
the same respect at the same time, nothing can move itself.
3. Thus, everything that is moved is moved by some other thing.
C. Because there cannot be an infinite regress of movers and things
moved, we must come to a first unmoved mover.
1. In an infinite series of movers, there is no first mover.
2. If there is no first mover, there is no motion.
3. Therefore, there is no infinite series of movers.
Essential Reading:
Brian Davies, “Getting to God” (chapter 2), in The Thought of Thomas
Aquinas.
Norman Kretzmann, “The God of the Self-Movers” (chapter 2), in The
Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas’s Natural Theology in Summa Contra
Gentiles I.

1. Why can Aquinas not take it for granted that it makes sense to argue
for the existence of God?
2. How does Aquinas employ Aristotelian principles in making his
argument from motion?

Lecture Seventeen
Aquinas on How to Talk About God
Scope: Aquinas’s Aristotelian strategy of arguing from effects to cause

allows us to establish a wide range of conclusions about God, but
it also threatens to undermine the meaningfulness of our language
about God. Our language reflects our concepts, and our concepts
are all ultimately derived from our experience of the objects of the
senses. But the objects of the senses fall far short of God. How,
then, can the words that we use for ordinary objects be meaningful
when applied to God? Aquinas’s answer is that created things
resemble or imitate their creator. We can, therefore, use the
language that derives from experience of creatures to speak
meaningfully about God, although our words cannot have exactly
the same meaning in theological language that they have in
ordinary language.
Outline
I. Given the fact that God far exceeds our understanding, how can we say
anything true about God? In medieval terminology, how can we have
“names” for God?
A. Some of Aquinas’s sources concerning this issue particularly
emphasized the via remotionis or via negativa: that is, the
approach to speaking of God that insists that we can say only what
God is not.
1. According to these authors, God is so much beyond the
sensible things that we must use in order to understand him
that the best we can do is to say of him what he is not.
2. Some would even go so far as to say that even the affirmative
names are really disguised negatives.
3. Maimonides had held that affirmative names for God actually
express (a) what God is not and (b) God’s relation to
creatures.
B. Aquinas allows a role to the via remotionis, but he insists that it
can and must be supplemented by the via affirmationis: the
practice of using affirmative names to speak of God.

1. If no positive predications are possible, there is no reason to
call God one thing in preference to another.
2. Although God transcends sensible things, such things do
provide enough clues to his nature that we can derive positive
conclusions about God and express them in affirmative names.
II. Aquinas develops a general theory about how names work, then applies
it to the case of names for God.
A. The general theory of names, derived from Aristotle, holds that we
can name something insofar as we can understand it.
1. Words are signs of ideas, and ideas are resemblances
(“similitudes”) of things.
2. Thus, words do serve as signs of things but indirectly: They
signify things by means of our intellect’s conception of the
things.
B. We can, therefore, name God insofar as we can understand God.
1. Given that we cannot understand God as he is in himself, we
also cannot name God as he is in himself. (In that sense, the
proponents of the via remotionis were right.)
2. But because we can understand God as he is known from
creatures, we can name him on the basis of our knowledge of
creatures.
III. Because God possesses all the perfections of creatures, though in a
more excellent way, we can apply the names for those perfections to
God—in the technical jargon of the day, we can predicate those names
of God.
A. If a name implies a perfection without limitation, we can apply it
literally to God.
1. For example, good does not imply any limitation; thus, we can
apply it literally to God, as we apply it literally to creatures.
2. We can also predicate it “in the mode of supereminence,” in
which case, it applies only to God. For example, we can
predicate highest good of God alone.
B. If a name implies some limitation or defect, we can apply it
metaphorically to God. For example, we can predicate rock
metaphorically of God.

IV. Aquinas’s main interest is in names that can be predicated literally of
both God and creatures.
A. Even these names are inadequate in a way. As all our names do,
they get their meaning through our intellect’s conception, and our
intellect’s conception falls short of the reality of God.
1. Our names for God suggest multiplicity within God, even
though God has no parts of any kind.
2. We have to use a plurality of names, all of which are signs of
the same thing—the divine essence—which we conceive in a
variety of ways.
B. For these reasons, such names are predicated analogically of God.
1. Analogical predication is contrasted with equivocal
predication (in which the same word is used with entirely
different meanings) and with univocal predication (in which
the same word is used with exactly the same meaning).
2. In analogical predication, the same word is used with different
but related meanings.
3. For example, the expression my niece is predicated
analogically of my niece and a photograph of my niece.
4. On Aquinas’s theory, God is the original of which all
creatures are images. Our knowledge of God is somewhat like
our knowledge of someone we know only from a photograph.
Essential Reading:
Brian Davies, “Talking About God” (chapter 4), in The Thought of Thomas
Aquinas.
Ralph McInerny, “Analogy of Names Is a Logical Doctrine.”
1. What philosophical and theological considerations push Aquinas to
find the middle ground of analogy between purely univocal
predication, on the one hand, and purely equivocal predication, on the
other?

2. How is the doctrine of analogy related both to Aquinas’s metaphysics
of God (his account of what God is) and his epistemology of God (his
theory of how we know God)?

Lecture Eighteen
Aquinas on Human Nature
Scope: Aquinas adopts a generally Aristotelian picture of human nature.

For Aquinas, the human soul is the form of the body; that is, it
organizes or structures matter in such a way as to make it a living
human organism. Aristotle’s view that the soul is the form of the
body might be taken to imply that when a human organism ceases
to live, the soul simply ceases to exist, but Aquinas argues that we
can prove philosophically that the soul survives the death of the
body. The Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body adds
that the soul will not exist permanently in its separated state but
will be reunited with matter. Unlike the survival of the soul,
however, the resurrection of the body cannot be proved
philosophically. Belief in resurrection is a matter of faith.
Outline
I. Aquinas’s understanding of the human soul derives from Aristotle’s
account of change in the Physics and Metaphysics and his account of
soul in De anima (On the Soul).
A. Rejecting the arguments of Parmenides, Aristotle held that what
comes to be arises both from what is and from what is not.
1. In every change, there must be three “principles.” There is
privation (what is not), form (what comes to be), and the
subject (the thing that exists both before and after the change).
2. When the subject of the change is a substance, what comes to
be is an accidental form.
3. When a new substance comes into being, such a substance
can’t be the subject that exists before the change and endures
throughout the change; instead, the subject of the change is
matter, and what comes to be is a substantial form.
4. A soul is a substantial form: It is what makes a given parcel of
matter to be the living thing that it is.

B. Aquinas’s starting definition of soul, derived from Aristotle, is
“the first principle of life in those things in our world which live.”
1. This definition means, in effect, that the presence of some sort
of soul is what makes the difference between something that is
alive and something that is not.
2. On this understanding of soul, every living thing has a soul,
even plants.
3. Aquinas argues that a soul—what makes a given physical
thing alive—cannot itself be a physical thing.
C. The human soul, unlike other souls, is a substance: a thing in its
own right.
1. Only substances carry on activities of their own, and the
human soul carries on an activity of its own, namely,
intellectual understanding.
2. Because it is a substance in its own right, independent of the
body that it ensouls, it must be produced directly by God and
cannot be destroyed except by God.
II. The human intellect, which is the defining power of human beings, is
both an active power and a passive power.
A. The intellect is passive in the sense that it moves from potentiality
to actuality. The intellect starts off as a blank slate with nothing
written on it, but gradually, we acquire understanding and the
mind fills with thoughts.
B. If the passive intellect is the blank slate on which thoughts are
written, the function of the active or agent intellect is to write those
thoughts. To explain the function of the agent intellect, Aquinas
offers a quick lesson in ancient Greek philosophy.
1. Plato thought that the forms of material objects existed on
their own, apart from matter, and were, therefore, intelligible.
Thus, there is a Form of Horse, and all knowledge of horses is
really knowledge of the Form of Horse.
2. Aristotle maintained that there were no such things as
immaterial ideas. He was prepared to go along with Plato to
this extent: What makes a given horse a horse is a form. But
he denies that this form exists apart from matter.
3. On Aristotle’s account, to understand horses is to think about
the universal horse, not about any particular horse. (Particular
horses are sensible, not intelligible.)

4. The agent intellect must, therefore, create the intelligible
object by abstracting universal horse-ness from the
particularizing conditions in which we always encounter it.
III. Aquinas struggles to make his understanding of human nature
consistent with Christian belief in the resurrection of the body.
A. The immortality of the soul is a preamble to faith. That is, we can
know on purely philosophical grounds that the soul does not cease
to exist just because the body ceases to exist.
1. As we have seen, the soul is a substance, because it has an
activity of its own, independent of the body.
2. Things acquire actuality to the extent that they acquire form,
and they are corrupted to the extent that they are separated
from form. But the soul is itself a form. Thus, the soul cannot
be corrupted, because it cannot be separated from itself.
B. The resurrection of the body, however, is a mystery of faith. It
cannot be proved by natural reason.
1. The soul maintains an “aptitude” to inform a body.
2. Souls separated from their bodies are identifiable individuals.
This claim seems inconsistent with other things Aquinas says,
but he needs it in order to make sense of the practice of
prayers to saints.
Essential Reading:
Brian Davies, “Being Human” (chapter 11), in The Thought of Thomas
Aquinas.
Robert C. Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature.
Eleonore Stump, “The Nature of Human Beings” (Part II), in Aquinas.
1. What does Aquinas mean by calling the soul both a substantial form
and a substance in its own right?
2. What difficulties related to the problem of faith and reason are posed
by Aquinas’s Aristotelian account of human nature?

Lecture Nineteen
Aquinas on Natural and Supernatural Virtues
Scope: Aquinas’s account of the virtues shows how he resisted both the
extreme naturalism of the integral Aristotelians and the
conservative hostility to Aristotle. Even as he adopted much of
Aristotle’s philosophy, he did not agree with the integral
Aristotelians that philosophy by itself offers a comprehensive,
autonomous account of everything there is. Aquinas insisted that
in addition to the natural order, which philosophy investigates,
there is a supernatural order, which is beyond the competence of
philosophy. The supernatural order does not supersede the natural
but brings it to a higher fulfillment.
Within ethics, this understanding of the relationship between
natural and supernatural allowed Aquinas to affirm that there is
indeed such a thing as natural happiness and that it does not lose
its importance simply because, as Christians affirm, there is also a
supernatural happiness, of which Aristotle was unaware. For
Aquinas, natural happiness is what sets the standards of natural
law, and natural virtues—preeminently temperance, fortitude,
justice, and practical wisdom—dispose us to attain such happiness.
But in addition, there must be supernatural virtues that dispose us
to attain supernatural happiness. Natural virtues are attained by a
natural process of moral development; supernatural virtues are
acquired by divine gift.
Outline
I. Aquinas develops his account of natural law by appeal to an analogy
between the functioning of theoretical reason (the sort of thinking that
aims simply at knowing the truth) and the functioning of practical
reason (the sort of thinking that aims at making or doing something).
A. Theoretical reason starts from first principles and proceeds by way
of theoretical argument or syllogism until it reaches a conclusion.
1. First principles are known without proof.
2. They play a role in speculative reasoning, although an
individual reasoner may not explicitly formulate them.

B. Practical reason also starts from first principles. It proceeds by way
of practical argument or syllogism until it issues in a particular
action.
1. The first principles of practical reason are called natural law.
2. The principles of natural law play a role in practical
reasoning, although an individual reasoner may not explicitly
formulate them.
C. The very first principle of natural law is that “good is to be done
and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.” The most general precepts
of the natural law are more substantive principles that point out
specific goods that are to be pursued. The human good involves
three broad types of good.
1. As it is for every creature, it is good for us to maintain
ourselves in existence.
2. As it is for every animal, it is good for us to reproduce
ourselves and to care for our offspring.
3. For us alone among all animals, it is also a good to exercise
the powers of rational thought and (consequently) to live in
society and to know God.
D. These three goods are arranged hierarchically (so that the unique
human good is the best of these three goods) and inclusively (so
that our unique good subsumes the other two without superseding
them).
II. In order to attain the human good through rational choice, we need
virtues.
A. We need virtues to moderate or rectify the “sensitive appetite”
(that is, our capacity for sub-rational desires).
1. Our sensitive appetite is aimed only at the part of our good
that we share with the lower animals. Because the sensitive
appetite can come into conflict with reason, we need virtues
that bring the sensitive appetite into conformity with reason.
2. The virtue of temperance ensures that we desire what reason
recognizes as good and reject what reason recognizes as evil.
3. The virtue of fortitude ensures that we overcome obstacles to
our attainment of what reason recognizes as good.

B. We also need a virtue to moderate or rectify the “intellectual
appetite” or will (that is, our capacity for rational desire).
1. The will needs no virtue in order to be aimed at our individual
good; that is the natural orientation of the will.
2. But because the human good involves life in society, the will
does need a virtue that disposes it properly toward the
common good. This is the virtue of justice.
C. Finally, we need a virtue in reason itself that enables us to discern
readily, in particular circumstances, how to attain our good. This is
the virtue of practical wisdom or prudence.
III. The human good is twofold: In addition to the natural happiness of
which Aristotle spoke, there is a supernatural happiness. Aquinas’s
account of the twofold human good reveals his distinctive way of
accommodating Aristotelian philosophy within Christian theology.
A. The natural human good is the life of practical reason: a life in
which our natural powers are developed to their ultimate
perfection. The life of theoretical reason is, in an important sense,
superhuman. But as a Christian, Aquinas believes that God intends
human beings for a life that surpasses their nature.
B. Aquinas’s account of natural and supernatural happiness shows a
distinctive approach to the relationship between Aristotle and
Christian faith.
1. Against those masters in the faculty of arts who asserted the
autonomy and integrity of the natural order (as understood by
Aristotle), Aquinas insists on a supernatural fulfillment for
human beings.
2. Unlike conservatives in the faculty of theology, however,
Aquinas insists that the supernatural builds on, rather than
obliterates, the natural. This approach allows Aquinas to
affirm that there is such a thing as natural happiness and that it
does not lose its importance for moral theory simply because
there is also such a thing as supernatural happiness.
C. Just as there are natural virtues that dispose us to attaining our
natural good, there are also supernatural virtues that dispose us to
attaining our supernatural good.
1. Whereas natural virtues are acquired, supernatural virtues are
infused (literally, “poured in”) by God.

2. There are infused counterparts to each of the cardinal virtues:
infused temperance, fortitude, justice, and practical wisdom.
The infused cardinal virtues perfect our natural capacities so
that we will deal with the concerns of our natural life in a way
that is informed by our supernatural destiny.
3. There are also infused virtues that perfect our natural
capacities so that we can deal directly with concerns that
transcend our natural life altogether. These are the three
“theological” virtues of faith, hope, and charity.
Essential Reading:
Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Virtues.
Eleonore Stump, “The Nature of Human Excellence” (Part III), in Aquinas.
1. How do the virtues function in Aquinas’s ethics? What is their role,
and how are they related to the various powers that belong to human
nature?
2. How does Aquinas’s twofold understanding of happiness reflect his
general approach to the relationship between faith and reason?

Lecture Twenty
Scotus on God’s Freedom and Ours
Scope: John Duns Scotus (1265/66–1308) was a Franciscan, and it was

characteristic of the Franciscans to regard the will as a power
higher than, and to some extent, independent from, the intellect.
Scotus followed this emphasis in his account of both divine and
human freedom. The human will does not simply ratify the
intellect’s judgment about how it would be best to act; it can reject
the intellect’s judgment and choose otherwise. Without this sort of
freedom, the will would be merely a passive instrument of the
human intellect, and human acts would not be free. God’s freedom
is like ours, but the scope of his will is much greater. God cannot
change necessary truths—he cannot make 2 plus 2 equal 5, for
example—and he cannot act unjustly. Scotus understands these
restrictions to be quite minimal, so that in a sense, God’s activity,
both in creating and in establishing the moral law, is arbitrary.
Outline
I. Just four years after the death of Thomas Aquinas, Stephen Tempier,
bishop of Paris, published a list of 219 philosophical and theological
theses. Anyone teaching or listening to these theses would be
excommunicated. This event is known as the Condemnation of 1277.
A. The Condemnation did not identify the people suspected of
teaching heresy.
1. Tempier simply wrote of “some scholars of arts at Paris,”
suggesting that the rivalry between the faculties of theology
and arts had something to do with the Condemnation.
2. Scholars have sought—with mixed results—to identify the
authors or disseminators of the condemned theses. It is widely
thought that Thomas Aquinas was a target of part of the
Condemnation.
3. At any rate, it seems clear that the Condemnation was, in
some way, a reaction to the reintroduction of Greek
philosophy and its overenthusiastic reception by some in the
faculty of arts and even in the faculty of theology.

B. The Condemnation can be seen as an attempt to reassert the
prerogatives of revealed theology.
1. Many of the condemned theses assert the dignity and
autonomy of philosophy and of the natural world.
2. The Condemnation gives particular emphasis to the notion of
divine omnipotence. The notion of God’s “absolute power”—
his ability to act beyond the limits of nature as discerned by
reason—is central to the project of reining in the pretensions
of natural human reason.
3. Though it is not clear how much the Condemnation really
changed what was being taught at Paris, a renewed emphasis
on divine omnipotence is certainly noticeable after 1277. We
see this clearly in John Duns Scotus’s account of divine
freedom.
II. Scotus (1265/66–1308) holds that God’s “absolute power” extends to
everything that does not involve a contradiction. This view has
implications both for God’s act of creation and for his establishment of
the moral law.
A. God’s act of creation is, to a certain extent, arbitrary.
1. Scotus claims that God must act justly in whatever he does,
but he also claims that God’s justice does not affect how he
treats creatures. God is under no obligation to anything
outside himself.
2. God must also act rationally in whatever he does. This means
that God will take the appropriate means to whatever end he
wishes to attain—God cannot thwart himself—but he is
absolutely free with respect to his choice of ends.
B. God’s act of moral legislation is also, to a certain extent, arbitrary.
1. The natural law in the strict sense includes only those moral
truths that are self-evident and true by definition. God cannot
change these.
2. Most moral truths, however, do not belong to the natural law
in this strict sense. These other moral truths are all completely
subject to the divine will.
3. Scotus’s account of the Ten Commandments illustrates this
distinction.

III. Scotus defends a theory of human freedom that parallels his theory of
divine freedom in many ways, though the scope of human freedom is,
of course, more limited.
A. In Scotus’s theory of human freedom, as in his theory of divine
freedom, it is the will, rather than the intellect, that has the final
say.
1. This fits with the Franciscan emphasis on the will.
2. It also fits with Tempier’s condemnation of several theses that
tended to make the will a mere executive power for the
intellect. Such theses seemed to make sin a matter of
ignorance or faulty reasoning rather than a matter of deliberate
choice.
B. The central element of Scotus’s theory of human freedom is his
denial that the will is “intellectual appetite” (a capacity for rational
desire).
1. Scotus argues that if the will were merely intellectual appetite,
as Aquinas had held, we would not be free. The will would
have to choose whatever the intellect judges to be good.
2. Furthermore, intellectual appetite is aimed at happiness. But in
order to choose morally, we must choose what is right, not
what we think will make us happy.
3. Thus, although the inclination to pursue our own good is
certainly part of our psychology, it cannot be the whole of our
ability to choose.
Essential Reading:
John Duns Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality.
Hans Thijssen, “Condemnation of 1277.”
Thomas Williams, “The Libertarian Foundations of Scotus’s Moral
Philosophy” and “A Most Methodical Lover? On Scotus’s Arbitrary
Creator.”

1. How does the emphasis on divine omnipotence in the Condemnation of
1277 provide a background for Scotus’s view of God’s will in its
relation to both creation and the moral law?
2. In what ways does Scotus’s account of the will reflect a more
Augustinian than Aristotelian understanding of human nature?

Lecture Twenty-One
Scotus on Saying Exactly What God Is
Scope: Like Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus accepts Aristotle’s view
that natural knowledge of God must be obtained by reasoning from
effects to cause. He denies, however, that this view implies any
slippage of meaning in the words we use in talking about God.
Unless theological language has the same meaning as ordinary
language, we will not be able to know anything about God at all,
and it will be impossible for theology to be an argumentative
discipline. In defending this view, Scotus must find a way to
preserve a radical discontinuity between God and creatures
without sacrificing the continuity of language that he claims is
necessary.
Outline
I. The differences between Aquinas and Scotus are illustrative of the
difference between Dominicans and Franciscans more generally.
A. Though it is often said that the Franciscans were hostile to
Aristotle and the Dominicans embraced Aristotle, the reality was
more complicated.
1. Granted, it was two Dominicans—Albert the Great and
Thomas Aquinas—who did the most to make Aristotle
respectable in 13th-century Christian philosophy, and a
Franciscan—Bonaventure—who resisted the new
Aristotelianism most emphatically.
2. But even Bonaventure used Aristotelian terminology when it
suited him, and Scotus (also a Franciscan) is unabashedly
Aristotelian.
B. A better way to explain the difference is to say that the Franciscans
were much more in the spirit of Augustine than the Dominicans
were.
1. Like Augustine, the Franciscans tended to emphasize the role
of the will and of love more than the role of the intellect and
knowledge.
2. In particular, they tended to have a more radical view of the
freedom of the will than the Dominicans did.

3. It is important to note, however, that these are merely general
tendencies or characteristic temperaments of the two orders.
They suggest only a broad uniformity of outlook, which was
compatible with quite marked divergences in teaching.
Franciscans and Dominicans argued among themselves as
much as they argued against each other.
II. Scotus goes much further than Aquinas in rejecting the via negativa.
A. More emphatically than Aquinas, Scotus argues that any negation
presupposes an affirmation.
B. In a characteristically Franciscan way, Scotus also argues,
“Negations are not the object of our greatest love.” This argument
points to Scotus’s claim that theology is primarily a practical rather
than a theoretical discipline.
III. Scotus argues that it is possible by natural means (that is, without
supernatural help) for the human intellect in this present life to acquire
a concept in which God, and God alone, is grasped.
A. Scotus agrees with Aquinas that all our knowledge begins from
creatures.
1. Consequently, by our natural powers, we can know God only
by an argument quia, not by an argument propter quid.
2. We cannot know the essence of God in this life.
B. Scotus disagrees with Aquinas, however, in holding that we can
apply certain predicates univocally—with exactly the same
meaning—to God and creatures. His three best arguments for
univocal predication are the following:
1. One can doubt whether God is a finite being or an infinite
being while being quite certain that he is a being.
Consequently, the concept of being that is affirmed of God is
univocal in the two concepts of finite being and infinite being.
2. If all our concepts come from our experience with creatures,
the concepts we apply to God will also come from creatures.
They won’t just be like the concepts that come from creatures,
as in analogous predication; they will be the very same
concepts that come from creatures.
3. The test (derived from Anselm) by which we determine what
to predicate of God depends on univocity.

C. Scotus’s doctrine of univocal predication is no mere technical
point but a matter of deep importance throughout his theological
and philosophical work. Scotus argues compellingly that univocity
is necessary for three reasons.
1. Without univocity, it will turn out that we do not quite know
what we are saying when we say of God that he is good, just,
powerful, and so on.
a. We will be using our ordinary language to speak about
God, but that language will have a different meaning—
and we will not be able to specify just what that meaning
is.
b. Thus, univocity is necessary to secure the intelligibility of
theological language.
2. An argument in which the key words change meaning is a bad
argument.
a. Without univocity, the key words in many theological
arguments will change meaning: They will mean one
thing as applied to creatures but something else as applied
to God.
b. Thus, univocity is necessary to secure the status of
theology as an argumentative discipline.
3. According to the Aristotelian view of knowledge, we know
God—as we know anything else—on the basis of creatures.
The points made in III.C.1 and III.C.2 above show that
without univocity, such knowledge will be impossible because
the language we use in speaking of creatures will be
inapplicable to God, and there will be no legitimate way to
argue from what we know about creatures to any facts about
God.
D. Not only can we acquire concepts that apply univocally to God,
but we can acquire a “proper” concept of God (that is, that applies
only to God).
1. In one sense, we cannot possess a proper concept of God in
this life because we cannot know God’s essence as a particular
thing. We know God in the way that we know someone we
have heard about but have never met.
2. But by taking any of those predicates to the highest degree
(for example, highest good, first cause), we can construct a
concept that applies only to God.

3. Despite appearances, the concept of infinite being is a non-
complex concept that applies to God alone. To know God as
infinite being is to have the most adequate knowledge of God
of which we are capable in this life: it is the simplest concept,
and it is the most fruitful concept.
Essential Reading:
John Duns Scotus, “Man’s Natural Knowledge of God” (II), in
Philosophical Writings: A Selection.
Thomas Williams, “John Duns Scotus.”
James F. Ross and Todd Bates, “Natural Theology,” in Thomas Williams,
ed., The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus.
1. In what ways does Scotus’s account of our knowledge of God reflect
his Franciscan leanings?
2. How does Scotus begin from roughly the same theory of knowledge as
Thomas Aquinas but end up with a radically different account of
religious language?

Lecture Twenty-Two
What Ockham’s Razor Leaves Behind
Scope: William Ockham (c. 1288–1347) is best known for what has come
to be called Ockham’s razor, the methodological principle that one
should refrain from positing entities unless there is compelling
reason to do so. Ockham employed this principle to reduce
drastically the basic categories in the Aristotelian inventory of the
world. Where Scotus had recognized 10 irreducible categories of
beings, Ockham acknowledged only 3: substance, quality, and
relation. And the entities in the category of relation are needed
only for theological reasons pertaining to the Trinity, the
Incarnation, and the Eucharist. If it were not for revelation,
Ockham argued, we would see no reason at all for this third
category. Ockham’s nominalism, his denial that there are universal
entities, is not a consequence of the razor. Ockham does not argue
merely that we have no good reason to posit universal entities but
that theories of universal entities are outright incoherent.
Outline
I. William Ockham (c. 1288–1347) is best known for the principle of
ontological parsimony, or Ockham’s razor: the principle that one
should not needlessly multiply entities.
A. Ockham was not the first to appeal to this principle, but he made
unusually extensive use of it.
B. Strictly speaking, the razor does not allow one to deny entities; it
simply cautions against positing them unless there are compelling
theoretical reasons to do so.
C. The relevance of Ockham’s razor to issues of faith and reason may
not seem immediately evident, and the connection is not often
discussed. But in fact, Ockham’s extensive use of the razor
represents a destabilizing force in the medieval synthesis of faith
and reason.
1. We will examine in some detail Ockham’s use of the razor
within his metaphysics. This use is an exercise of reason: The
razor is a principle of reason, and Ockham applies it through
arguments and logical analysis.

2. Yet Ockham will note that this exercise of reason leaves him
with a metaphysical theory that is too sparse to support the
requirements of Christian faith.
3. He will, therefore, add back into his metaphysical theory
certain features whose only purpose is to allow a coherent
statement of Christian doctrine. Thus, for Ockham, the
elucidation of Christian doctrine is not simply a matter of the
best philosophy pressed into the service of Christian
revelation; it requires admitting principles or entities that the
best philosophy, left to itself, would reject.
II. Ockham uses the razor to eliminate entities in all but 3 of the 10
traditional Aristotelian categories.
A. Aristotle had recognized 10 irreducibly different categories.
1. There was always debate about whether the categories were a
classification of words or a classification of entities.
2. Scotus had held that the categories were a classification of
entities. There are 10 irreducible categories of being.
B. Ockham argues that as far as reason alone is concerned, only 2
categories are needed: substance and quality.
1. Substances are beings capable of independent existence.
2. Qualities are the characteristics or features of substances.
3. Ockham argues against the need to posit entities in other
categories by analyzing statements that appear to refer to such
entities. For example, the truth of “Socrates is similar to
Plato” does not require us to believe that, in addition to
Socrates, Plato, and their qualities, there is a special
“relational entity” of similarity that belongs to Socrates.
C. Nevertheless, Ockham believes that for theological reasons, we
have to admit entities in a third category: relation.
1. For example, the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be stated
without recourse to relations.
2. Although Ockham is motivated by the desire to maintain
Christian orthodoxy, the ideal of accommodating both faith
and reason seems to be destabilized by his retention, for
exclusively theological purposes, of ideas that do not
otherwise pass rational muster.

III. Ockham is also notorious for his nominalism: his denial that there are
any universal entities.
A. The usual reason for positing universals is that they help with
epistemology; that is, they are useful for grounding knowledge
(and the language that expresses such knowledge).
1. We need universals to provide objects for the intellect. I have
sensation of a particular dog, but I have intellectual
knowledge of the universal dog.
2. We need universals to provide a subject matter for the
sciences. Science deals with what is universal; if there were
no universal entities, then science would deal only with
concepts.
3. We need universals to ground predication. If I say, “This rose
is red,” I predicate the general concept red of this rose. The
universal entity redness is what gives objectivity to this
predication.
B. The difficulty with positing universals is that they behave in
metaphysically odd ways.
1. They are one and yet many: The universal red is one entity,
yet it exists in every red thing.
2. They are both in things and separate from them: The universal
man exists apart from any given man, yet it must exist in
every man (because otherwise, we could not predicate man of
every man).
C. On the basis of such metaphysical difficulties, Ockham argues that
the very idea of universal entities is incoherent.
D. He then undercuts the motivation for positing universal entities by
arguing that they are not needed for epistemological purposes.
1. The objects of the intellect are individuals.
2. The universality of science is not a matter of its dealing with
universal entities. Rather, science deals with statements that
have universal terms in them; those universal terms stand for
individuals, not universal entities.

3. The qualities of things are all we need to ground our
predication. A rose and its quality of redness are sufficient to
give an objective basis for my statement “This rose is red.”
The concept is general, not because it is a concept of a
universal entity, but simply because it can be applied to many
distinct things.
E. Ockham’s nominalism was widely influential. Some historians of
medieval thought, especially those sympathetic to Thomas
Aquinas, have regarded it as the beginning of all the philosophical
and theological ills of modernity.
1. Some have argued that nominalism leads to skepticism. The
nominalist denies that there are real, objective natures that we
can come to know.
2. Opponents of nominalism also argue that it means no one way
of conceptualizing the world is superior to any other. This
leads to a loss of confidence that the world is intelligible.
3. Yet Ockham was convinced that the world is intelligible, and
he was not inclined to skepticism—except for his skepticism
about the prospects of natural theology.
Essential Reading:
Paul Vincent Spade, “William of Ockham.”
David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought, chapters 27–28.
Paul Vincent Spade, “Ockham’s Nominalist Metaphysics: Some Main
Themes,” in Paul Vincent Spade, ed., The Cambridge Companion to
Ockham.
1. How does Ockham represent a radical departure from the prevailing
metaphysical and epistemological theories of medieval
Aristotelianism?
2. What is the relation between Ockham’s razor and his nominalism?

Lecture Twenty-Three
Ockham on the Prospects for Knowing God
Scope: In light of the serious deficiencies he found in the arguments of his

predecessors, Ockham held a noticeably dimmer view of the
prospects for natural knowledge of God. He held that it is
impossible to prove, by natural reason alone, that there is a first
cause. Natural reason cannot rule out the possibility of an infinite
regress, in which each effect is fully explained by its cause, which
in turn, is fully explained by its cause, and so on. Moreover, it
cannot be proved that there is a being than which no greater can be
conceived. Such claims must rest on supernatural revelation and
are the objects of faith, not of philosophical proof. It is even
possible that the best philosophical theory will be at odds with the
demands of Christian doctrine; in such a case, Ockham thinks
there will be no neutral grounds by which the conflict between
faith and reason can be resolved.
Outline
I. Although Ockham is noticeably (and notoriously) less sanguine than
his predecessors about the possibility of attaining knowledge of God by
the exercise of natural reason alone, apart from revelation, the contrast
between Ockham and Aquinas or Scotus should not be exaggerated.
A. All three are situated within the mainstream of Christian thought
on these matters, which has rejected both fideism (exclusive
reliance on faith) and rationalism (exclusive reliance on reason).
B. All three accept that it is legitimate to use the achievements of
pagan philosophy in Christian thought.
C. All three affirm that the powers of human reason are not only
limited in themselves but also damaged by the fall, so that reason
requires both supplementation and repair by the deliverances of
faith.

II. Nevertheless, Ockham differs from both Aquinas and Scotus in
important ways.
A. Ockham rejects the claim that theology counts as an Aristotelian
science, that is, as an organized body of knowledge that proceeds
from self-evident principles to conclusions that are seen to follow
deductively from those principles.
1. Both Aquinas and Scotus had regarded theology as a science,
even though the principles of theology are not self-evident to
us. They are self-evident to God and to the blessed; thus, they
can serve as the basis for a science.
2. Ockham replies that it makes no sense to say that I have
scientific knowledge of a conclusion that follows from
something that is self-evident only to someone else.
B. Ockham rejects the claim that Christian theology builds on and
perfects Classical philosophy in a way that meets the intellectual
standards and aims of the Classical philosophers themselves.
1. Both Aquinas and Scotus argued that many of the truths
affirmed by Christian doctrine can be shown to be true by the
methods of Classical philosophy and that Christian doctrines
that cannot be shown to be true in this way can at least be
shown not to contradict reason.
2. Ockham rejects both claims. He is skeptical both about natural
theology (the enterprise of proving truths about God by
philosophical reasoning) and about the prospects of showing
that the mysteries of the faith are consonant with reason.
III. Ockham is deeply skeptical about natural theology.
A. At most, he thinks, we can prove that there is a being such that no
other being is more perfect than it.
1. Such a being could be finite for all we can know.
2. Nor can we prove that there is only one such being.
B. In rejecting the arguments given by his predecessors, Ockham
shows little interest in rehabilitating their arguments. His interest
in natural theology seems purely destructive.
IV. Ockham is also deeply skeptical about the prospects of showing that
the mysteries of faith are consonant with reason. We can see this
skepticism at work in his treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity.

A. The impasse comes about because Ockham rejects the category of
relations on philosophical grounds (as discussed in Lecture
Twenty-Two), yet it appears that the doctrine of the Trinity
requires relations.
1. Ockham defends what he takes to be Aristotle’s theory that
there are no “relative entities” (see Lecture Twenty-Two).
2. Yet he also concedes that the doctrine of the Trinity seems to
suggest that the three divine persons are constituted by the
relations they bear to one another.
B. Ockham rejects the approach of Aquinas and Scotus to such
apparent conflicts.
1. Both Aquinas and Scotus insist that if a philosophical theory
is incompatible with a doctrine of the faith, there is a mistake
in the arguments for that theory. The mistake can be exposed
by purely rational means.
2. Ockham, in contrast, insists that the Aristotelian theory that
there are no relative entities is, on purely rational grounds, the
only defensible theory. There is no mistake in it for reason to
expose.
3. It is only by faith that we know the theory is false. Thus, we
have to hold a restricted version of the Aristotelian view—
basically, we hold the Aristotelian view but carve out an
exception as needed for theological purposes. There would be
no neutral grounds on which to defend this exception against
objections from a non-Christian philosopher.
V. Ockham has been described as an “irenic separatist” on the question of
faith and reason.
A. He does not reject natural reason altogether or rely purely on faith.
B. Yet he does reject the view of Christian theology as the
culmination of Classical philosophy—a view common to
Augustine, Anselm, Abelard, Aquinas, and Scotus.
Essential Reading:
Alfred J. Freddoso, “Ockham on Faith and Reason,” in Paul Vincent Spade,
ed., The Cambridge Companion to Ockham.
David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought, chapters 27–28.

1. In what ways does Ockham represent a continuation of the main line of
medieval thinking on issues of faith and reason and in what ways does
he represent a departure?
2. How does Ockham differ from Aquinas and Scotus in his account of
apparent conflicts between faith and reason?

Lecture Twenty-Four
The 14th Century and Beyond
Scope: Aristotelianism did not remain dominant for long. By 1350, it was
losing ground rapidly, and by 1400, a new Renaissance version of
Platonism was widespread and thriving. Nicholas of Autrecourt
(c. 1295–1369) challenged some of the main tenets of medieval
Aristotelianism, including the principle that we can infer causes
from effects without experiencing both. Consequently, he denied
that it was possible to infer anything at all about God on the basis
of creatures. Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464) adopted a mystical
brand of Platonism that emphasized the infinite distance between
God and creatures. Given that God is beyond all comparison,
human reason, which proceeds by means of comparison, is utterly
incapable of grasping God. We must, therefore, go beyond reason
and use what Cusa called “intelligence,” a power of knowing that
does not involve a process of argument but a direct vision of
reality.
Outline
I. The best account of later medieval philosophy does not see it simply as
a decline from a glorious summit but as involving a loss of confidence
in one project and a shift of focus to other projects.
II. Both philosophical and theological developments led to the waning of
Aristotelianism in the 14th century.
A. The Condemnation of 1277 and its aftermath led to a more
cautious approach to Aristotelianism. One of the targets of the
Condemnation had been Aristotelian “natures” as a limit on divine
omnipotence.
B. The Aristotelian tradition itself ran into intractable problems in
accounting for human knowledge.
1. For Aristotle, the individual substance is the most basic thing
and the primary object of knowledge, yet only what is
universal is fully intelligible.

2. If all our knowledge comes from the senses, how can we
know the essences of things? Medieval Aristotelians had
developed an elaborate psychological machinery to explain
how we come to know essences, when in fact, it appears that
we cannot know essences at all.
III. Nicholas of Autrecourt (c. 1295–1369) is representative of 14th-century
anti-Aristotelianism.
A. Nicholas derides Aristotle as “like the God of our age” and insists
that none of Aristotle’s views rests on secure argument.
B. There are only two sources of certainty.
1. The law of non-contradiction, combined with experience, is
the only source of natural certainty.
2. Faith is the source of supernatural certainty.
C. Causal arguments are not sources of certainty.
1. Nicholas argued that we cannot logically infer the existence of
a cause from an effect or vice versa. We can experience causal
connections, but we cannot infer them in the absence of
experience.
2. Consequently, we cannot infer the existence of God on the
basis of a causal proof.
IV. Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464) is representative of Renaissance
Platonism.
A. All rational inquiry involves a movement from what is unknown to
what is known.
1. We advance in knowledge by using what is already familiar as
a pattern by which to investigate what is unfamiliar.
2. The greater the distance between the familiar thing we know
and the unfamiliar thing we are inquiring into, the harder it is
to draw our conclusions.
3. Given that the distance between God and creatures is infinite,
the truth of God is always beyond our reach. We can approach
it, but we never attain it.
B. We must, therefore, get beyond the process of rational inquiry
(which is characteristic of Aristotelian thought) and rely instead on
direct intuition of the truth, which Nicholas calls “intelligence.”
1. God is a “coincidence of opposites.” God includes all
conceivable perfections, even incompatible ones.

2. Reason, relying on the law of non-contradiction, rejects the
coincidence of opposites. But intelligence sees unity where
reason sees contradiction.
V. Further developments within Aristotelianism offer more illustrations of
the breakup of the medieval conversation on issues of faith and reason.
A. After Ockham, the Aristotelian tradition in the universities seems
to have lost its energy for the systematic exploration of issues of
faith and reason.
1. Some later Aristotelians came to concentrate more and more
on narrow technical questions that could be resolved by purely
logical means.
2. Logic itself was a major preoccupation of the universities in
the 14th and 15th centuries.
3. Questions of faith and reason that lent themselves to logical
analysis, such as the problem of foreknowledge and free will,
were given particularly close attention.
B. Political philosophy began to take center stage in the 14th century
in light of the pressing debates about the nature of authority and
law in both church and state. There is a clearer path to the modern
world from late medieval political philosophy, along with
medieval science, than there is from the medieval discussions of
faith and reason.
C. Those today who are interested in recovering the medieval project
would have to work to restore confidence in the presuppositions
that allowed the project to flourish in the first place, perhaps
thereby inaugurating, not a return to, but a true heir of, that project.
Essential Reading:
Nicholas of Autrecourt, Letters to Bernard of Arezzo, in Arthur Hyman and
James J. Walsh, eds., Philosophy in the Middle Ages.
Nicholas of Cusa, On Learned Ignorance, in Nicholas of Cusa: Selected
Spiritual Writings.
David Luscombe, Medieval Thought, chapters 7–8.

For contemporary work that carries on the tradition of faith seeking
understanding, see the following:
Michael J. Murray, ed., Reason for the Hope Within.
Eleonore Stump, ed., Reasoned Faith.
Peter van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil.
1. How do both Nicholas of Cusa and Nicholas of Autrecourt react
against the Aristotelian theory of knowledge?
2. In what ways did developments in the church and in the universities
contribute to the fragmentation of intellectual life in the late Middle
Ages?

1. Duns, Scotland: John Duns Scotus was born in Duns in 1265 or
1266.
2. Oxford: Oxford was the leading English university in the 13th and
14th centuries.Both John Duns Scotus and William Ockham were
educated there. Robert Grosseteste was chancellor of the university
from 1215 to 1221.
3. London: William Ockham taught philosophy in London from 1321
until he was summoned to Avignon in 1324.
4. Canterbury: Lanfranc of Bec was Archbishop of Canterbury from
1070 to 1089. Anselm was Archbishop from 1093 to 1109.
5. Moerbeke, Flanders: William of Moerbeke was born here around
1215.
6. Brabant, Flanders: Siger of Brabant was born here in 1240.
7. Cologne: Albert the Great taught at Cologne from 1248 to 1254;
Thomas Aquinas was his student there and then began teaching in his
own right. Scotus began teaching at Cologne in 1307 and died there
the next year.
8. Laon: John Scottus Eriugena resided at the court of the Charles the
Bald from 845.
9. Soissons: The Council of Soissons condemned Abelard’s teaching in
1121.
10. Bec, Normandy: Anselm studied in Bec (under Lanfranc) from 1059,
became prior of Bec in 1063, and became abbot of Bec in 1078—a
post he held until becoming Archbishop of Canterbury in 1093.
11. Paris: Abelard tutored and married Héloïse here in the 1110’s and
was castrated by her relatives. The University of Paris, which received
its official charter in 1215, was the leading European university in the
13th and early 14th centuries. Albert the Great taught at Paris from
1245 to 1248; Thomas Aquinas was among his students. Bonaventure
was Franciscan master of theology at Paris (1254–1257) while
Aquinas was Dominican master of theology (1256–1259, 1268–
1272). The Condemnation of 1277 was issued by the Bishop of Paris,
Stephen Tempier. Scotus was Franciscan master of theology from
1305 to 1307.
12. Chartres: A ground of Platonically-inclined theologians and
philosophers flourished at Chartres in the 12th century.
13. Sens: Condemnation by the Council of Sens (1141) ended Abelard’s
teaching career.

14. Munich: Ockham was in Munich under the protection of Ludwig of
Bavaria from 1329 until his death in 1347.
15. Nantes: Abelard was born here in 1079.
16. Brixen: Nicholas of Cusa was Bishop of Brixen from 1450 to 1464.
17. Cluny: The Abbey of Cluny was the center of monastic reform in
the 12th century. Its abbot, Peter the Venerable, welcomed Peter
Abelard and mediated with Bernard of Clairvaux after Abelard’s
condemnation by the Council of Sens in 1141.
18. Aosta: Anselm was born in Aosta in 1033.
19. Pavia: Boethius was exiled to Pavia, where he wrote The Consolation
of Philosophy and was executed around 526.
20. Ravenna: King Theodoric employed Boethius as head of government
c. 520
21. Avignon: The papal court was at Avignon from 1309 to 1377.
Ockham was summoned to Avignon to answer charges of heresy in
1324, and he fled in 1328.
22. Bagnoregio: Bonaventure (Giovanni di Fidanza) was born in
Bagnoregio in 1217.
23. Rome: Boethius was born in Rome around 476.
24. Aquino: Thomas Aquinas was born in Aquino in 1225.
25. Hippo: Augustine was ordained a priest in 391, served as bishop from
395 until his death in 430, and wrote his major works (including the
Confessions and City ofGod), in Hippo.
26. Tagaste: Augustine was born in Tagaste in 354.

Timeline
354 .................................................. Birth of Augustine.

387 .................................................. Augustine baptized by Ambrose of
Milan.
397 .................................................. Augustine writes the Confessions.
411 .................................................. Augustine becomes aware of the
influence of Pelagius.
430 .................................................. Death of Augustine.
c. 476 .............................................. Birth of Boethius.
526 .................................................. Execution of Boethius.
c. 540 .............................................. Benedict writes his Rule.
711 .................................................. Moors control Spain.
768–814 .......................................... Reign of Charlemagne.
800 .................................................. Birth of John Scottus Eriugena.
877 .................................................. Death of John Scottus Eriugena.
910 .................................................. Beginning of Benedictine monastic
reform at Cluny.
1033 ................................................ Birth of Anselm.
1054 ................................................ Schism between Western and Eastern
Churches.
1073–1085 ...................................... Papacy of Gregory VII, a period of
extensive church reform.
1076–1078 ...................................... Anselm writes the Monologion and
Proslogion.
1079 ................................................ Birth of Peter Abelard.
1085–1090 ...................................... Anselm writes On the Fall of the Devil.
1090 ................................................ Birth of Bernard of Clairvaux.

1093 ................................................ Anselm becomes archbishop of
Canterbury.
1095 ................................................ First Crusade begins.
1099 ................................................ Crusaders take Jerusalem.
1109 ................................................ Death of Anselm.
1115 ................................................ Bernard founds monastery at Clairvaux.
1121 ................................................ Abelard’s theology condemned by the
Council of Soissons.
c. 1128 ............................................ Latin translations of Aristotle’s “new
logic” made by James of Venice in
Constantinople.
1141 ................................................ Abelard’s theology condemned by the
Council of Sens.
1142 ................................................ Death of Abelard.
1153 ................................................ Death of Bernard of Clairvaux.
1206 ................................................ Birth of Albert the Great.
1208 ................................................ Beginning of the Order of Friars Minor
(Franciscans).
1215 ................................................ Statutes of the University of Paris
approved by the papal legate.
1216 ................................................ Beginning of the Order of Preachers
(Dominicans).
1217 ................................................ Birth of Bonaventure.
1225 ................................................ Birth of Thomas Aquinas.
1243 ................................................ Bonaventure joins the Franciscans.
1253 ................................................ Death of Robert Grosseteste, translator
of Aristotle’s Ethics.
1256–1259 ...................................... Aquinas is Dominican regent master of
theology at Paris; begins Summa contra
Gentiles.

1259 ................................................ Bonaventure writes The Journey of the
Mind to God.
1265/66 ........................................... Birth of John Duns Scotus.
1266 ................................................ Aquinas begins Summa theologiae.
1269–1272 ...................................... Aquinas is Dominican regent master of
theology at Paris for the second time.
1274 ................................................ Death of Bonaventure; death of Thomas
Aquinas.
1277 ................................................ The bishop of Paris condemns 219
propositions.
1280 ................................................ Death of Albert the Great.
c. 1288 ............................................ Birth of William Ockham.
1295 ................................................ Birth of Nicholas of Autrecourt.
1305–1307 ...................................... John Duns Scotus is Franciscan regent
master of theology at Paris.
1308 ................................................ Death of John Duns Scotus.
1309 ................................................ The papal court moves to Avignon.
1324 ................................................ Ockham is called to Avignon to answer
charges of heresy.
1328 ................................................ Ockham flees Avignon under cover of
darkness.
1337 ................................................ The Hundred Years’ War begins.
1347 ................................................ Death of William Ockham; the Black
Death.
1369 ................................................ Death of Nicholas of Autrecourt.
1377 ................................................ The papal court returns to Rome.
1378 ................................................ Rival claimants to the papacy create the
Great Schism.
1401 ................................................ Birth of Nicholas of Cusa.

1417 ................................................ The Council of Constance ends the
Great Schism.
1453 ................................................ Fall of Constantinople.
1464 ................................................ Death of Nicholas of Cusa.

Glossary
absolute power: God’s ability to act beyond the limits of nature as

discerned by reason (as contrasted with ordained power).
accidental form: In Aristotelianism, a form that can begin or cease to
characterize a thing without affecting the thing’s identity (for example,
color, size).
active (agent) intellect (nous poietikos in Greek; intellectus agens in
Latin): In Aristotelianism, the power that creates intelligible objects out of
the objects of sensation.
actuality (energeia in Greek; actus in Latin): In Aristotelianism, the state
of actually being a certain way (as opposed to potentiality).
analogy: A use of language in which a single term has different but related
meanings.
aseity: From the Latin a se, “from himself”; God’s aseity is his complete
independence from anything other than himself, not merely with respect to
his existence but with respect to every feature or quality that he possesses.
concupiscence (concupiscentia in Latin): Excessive or disordered desire.
dialectic: In medieval educational theory, techniques of philosophical
reasoning that involve distinguishing the meanings of ambiguous terms and
developing rigorous arguments; see also trivium.
Dominican: A member of the Order of Preachers, founded in the early 13th
century to teach, preach, and defend the Christian faith.
emanation: In neo-Platonism, the necessary “flowing forth” of all things
from the One.
epistemology: The part of philosophy that asks questions about the nature
and acquisition of knowledge.
equivocity (aequivocitas in Latin): A use of language in which a single
term has two or more unrelated meanings.
eternity (aeternitas in Latin): According to Boethius, “the complete and
perfect possession of illimitable life all at once”; a mode of existence in
which there is no before and after.

everlasting (sempiternus in Latin): Existing at all times or having endless
temporal duration (as contrasted with eternity).
exemplarism: A theory of the Atonement according to which the
effectiveness of the death of Christ is limited to its serving as an inspiring
example of divine love.
fideism: Exclusive reliance on faith, at least in theological matters (as
opposed to rationalism).
form: (1) In Platonism (idea or eidos in Greek; idea in Latin), the perfect
paradigm of a quality or nature; for example, the Form of the Good or the
Form of Beauty. (2) In Aristotelianism (morphe in Greek; forma in Latin), a
constituent of a thing that gives it actuality (see substantial form and
accidental form).
fortitude (fortitudo in Latin): The virtue in the sensitive appetite by which
we are disposed to overcome obstacles that stand in the way of our attaining
what reason recognizes as good.
Franciscan: A member of the Order of Friars Minor (Order of Lesser
Brothers), founded in the early 13th century to carry out the ideals of Saint
Francis of Assisi.
illumination: The divine enlightening of the human intellect so as to enable
it to grasp intelligible things (variously interpreted by different medieval
thinkers).
immutable: Incapable of undergoing change.
impassible: Incapable of experiencing emotion.
infused virtues (virtutes infusae in Latin): Virtues “poured in” by God (as
contrasted with natural virtues).
integral Aristotelians: Medieval philosophers who treated Aristotelian
philosophy as a complete, freestanding account of the natural world. Also
called Latin Averroists.
intellectual appetite: The capacity for rational desire (as contrasted with
sensitive appetite). Thomas Aquinas identifies the will with intellectual
appetite.
intelligible: Knowable by, or accessible to, the mind or intellect (as
opposed to sensible).

irenic separatism: An expression used to describe Ockham’s approach to
the relation between faith and reason that avoids both fideism and
rationalism.
justice (iustitia in Latin): The virtue in the will by which we are disposed
properly toward the common good.
Latin Averroists: See integral Aristotelians.
Manicheism: A sect that taught that evil is independent of, and co-eternal
with, good.
metaphysics: The part of philosophy that asks questions about the
fundamental structure of reality.
motion (kinesis in Greek; motus in Latin): In Aristotelianism, change in
quality or size or place.
mysteries of faith (mysteria fidei in Latin): In Thomas Aquinas, Christian
doctrines that cannot be proved philosophically and, therefore, must be
taken on faith (as contrasted with preambles to faith).
natural law: In Thomas Aquinas, the self-evident principles on which all
practical reasoning is based; in John Duns Scotus, the necessary and self-
evident moral truths that even God cannot change.
natural theology: The project of trying to prove the existence and nature of
God by reason alone, without relying on supernatural revelation.
natural virtues (virtutes naturales in Latin): Virtues acquired by practice
or teaching (as contrasted with infused virtues).
nominalism: The denial that there are universal entities.
Ockham’s razor (Occam’s razor): Also known as the principle of
ontological parsimony; the methodological principle that one should not
posit more entities or kinds of entities than are necessary to explain
something.
ordained power: God’s ability to act within the limits of the natures he has
created (as contrasted with absolute power).
participation: In Platonism, the way in which particular finite things
resemble or imitate the perfect paradigms (Forms).

passive intellect (nous pathetikos in Greek; intellectus passivus in Latin):
In Aristotelianism, the storehouse of intelligible objects; the initially blank
slate on which the active intellect writes ideas.
Pelagianism: The denial of the need for divine grace for right action. The
heresy gets its name from the British monk Pelagius (c. 354–c. 420), whom
Augustine accused of magnifying human freedom at the expense of divine
grace.
penal substitution theory: The theory of the Atonement according to
which Christ undergoes the punishment for sin on behalf of human beings.
potentiality (dynamis in Greek; potentia in Latin): In Aristotelianism, the
state of being possibly but not actually a certain way (as opposed to
actuality).
practical reason: The kind of thinking that aims at making or doing
something (as opposed to theoretical reason).
practical wisdom/prudence (prudentia in Latin): The virtue of practical
reason that enables someone to ascertain readily, in particular
circumstances, how to attain the human good.
preambles to faith (praeambula fidei in Latin): In Thomas Aquinas,
Christian doctrines that can be proved philosophically, without appeal to
revelation (as contrasted with mysteries of faith).
privation: A lack or absence.
propter quid argument: An argument from the essence of a thing to some
feature that it possesses.
quadrivium: In medieval educational theory, the secondary or advanced
disciplines of music, astronomy, arithmetic, and geometry; in practice, the
quadrivium (a term coined by Boethius, though the underlying idea goes
back to Pythagoras) was in eclipse for much of the period from the 6th
through the 11th centuries, and the trivium was dominant.
quia argument: An argument from effect to cause.
ransom theory: The theory of the Atonement according to which the death
of Christ was a ransom paid to release human beings from captivity.

rationalism: Exclusive or excessive reliance on reason in theological
matters; excessive optimism about the powers of human reason to arrive at
the truth, particularly the truth about God (as opposed to fideism).
self-evident: Knowable without proof, simply by reflection on the concepts
involved.
sensible: Knowable by, or accessible to, the senses (as opposed to
intelligible).
sensitive appetite: In human beings, the capacity for sub-rational desire (as
contrasted with intellectual appetite).
simple: Not composite.
skepticism: Doubts about the power of human reason to come to a truthful
account of the ways things are.
soul (psyche in Greek; anima in Latin): In Aristotelianism, whatever it is
that accounts for the fact that something is alive.
spiration: Literally, “breathing out”: a word used to describe the procession
of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son.
substance: A being capable of independent existence (not independent of
God but independent of other things, as opposed to an accident, which can
exist only in a substance).
substantial form: In Aristotelianism, a form that makes a thing what it is
(for example, the soul makes a human being human).
temperance (temperantia in Latin): The virtue in the sensitive appetite by
which we are disposed to desire what reason recognizes as good and reject
what reason recognizes as evil.
theoretical reason: The kind of thinking that aims simply at knowing (as
opposed to practical reason).
trivium: In medieval educational theory, the elementary or foundational
disciplines of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic (logic). However, in the
period from the 6th through the 11th centuries, dialectic was either omitted
or treated as mere memory work, and the resulting education focused on
grammar and rhetoric and was, thus, largely literary. In the 11th century,
dialectic was revived as a serious intellectual discipline.

univocity (univocitas in Latin): A use of language in which a single term is
used with one consistent meaning.
via affirmationis/via affirmativa: Literally, “the way of affirming”; an
approach to discourse about God that emphasizes what God is. Also called
kataphatic theology.
via remotionis/via negativa: Literally, “the way of negating”; an approach
to discourse about God that emphasizes what God is not. Also called
apophatic theology.
virtue: A disposition in the emotions, will, or intellect that enables its
possessor to act reliably, readily, and with pleasure in accordance with the
demands of morality.
voluntarism: A theory of freedom that gives particular emphasis to the will
(voluntas) and accords it a high degree of independence from the intellect.

Biographical Notes
Note: In keeping with what has become the standard practice in histories of
medieval philosophy, these biographical notes are alphabetized according
to their subjects’ first names.
Albert the Great (1206–1280). Albert was received into the Dominican
Order in 1223 and educated by Dominicans in Padua and Cologne. In the
1240s, he rose through the ranks at the University of Paris, becoming a
leading exponent of the “new” Aristotle and the teacher of Thomas
Aquinas. From 1248 to 1252, he directed the Dominican house of studies in
Cologne. In later years, he served in a variety of ecclesiastical roles,
including three years as bishop of Ratisbon (now Regensburg). Albert was
an encyclopedic thinker, writing on a remarkable range of scientific,
philosophical, and theological topics. His work on natural science proved
especially important to later thinkers, but his greatest influence was through
his student, Thomas Aquinas.
Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109). Anselm was the most important
philosopher-theologian in the 800 years between Augustine and Thomas
Aquinas. Deeply influenced by Augustine, he was nevertheless a highly
original thinker, with a fertile mind for the development of arguments.
Originally attracted to the Abbey of Bec because of the reputation of its
school, which was under the direction of the eminent theologian Lanfranc,
Anselm was soon inspired to become a monk himself. He never lost his
love of the monastic life, though his ever-increasing administrative
responsibilities—first prior, then abbot of Bec and, ultimately, archbishop
of Canterbury under two exceedingly vexatious kings of England—took
him further and further away from the peace of the cloister. In such works
as the Monologion and Proslogion (1076–1078) and Cur Deus Homo
(1094–1098), Anselm seeks to offer “necessary reasons” in support of
Christian doctrine.
Augustine of Hippo (354–430). Both as a transmitter of Christian
Platonism and as a theologian and biblical commentator, Augustine has
been one the most influential figures in Western Christianity. When
Augustine converted to Christianity in 386, he wanted to lead a life of
philosophical retirement. His ordination to the priesthood in Hippo Regius
in 391, then his elevation to bishop of Hippo in 395 made such a life
impossible for him. As a bishop, Augustine was a public figure: a spell-
binding preacher, ecclesiastical controversialist, pastor, polemicist, and

theologian of wide reputation. His extensive writings include the semi-
autobiographical Confessions, The City of God, and his influential work On
the Trinity.
Boethius (Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, c. 476–c. 526). Boethius
was born into the Roman aristocracy and educated in the Classical tradition.
He conceived the ambitious project of translating all of Plato and Aristotle
into Latin, then showing how the two thinkers could be harmonized.
Though he came nowhere near finishing this project, he did translate a good
deal of Aristotle’s logic, as well as writing commentaries on Aristotle and
Porphyry. These works were the primary philosophical textbooks in the
Latin West for the next 600 years. Boethius also wrote several short
theological works, but he is best known for his Consolation of Philosophy,
written while he was in prison. Boethius had been a high-ranking official
under Theodoric, but for reasons that are not altogether clear, he fell out of
favor and was charged with treason and engaging in magic. He was
executed on those charges, probably in 526.
Bonaventure (1217–1274). Born Giovanni di Fidanza in Tuscany, he took
the name Bonaventure (“good fortune”) when he became a Franciscan in
1243/44. From 1254 through 1257, Bonaventure served as Franciscan
master of theology at the University of Paris, engaging in public
disputation, lecturing, and writing on philosophical and theological topics.
In 1257, he was appointed minister general of the Franciscans, a move that
put an end to his university career, though not to his writing. Bonaventure’s
most influential work, The Journey of the Mind to God, was written to
provide a spiritual path to God that any Franciscan could follow, yet it was
no less a philosophical and theological treatise than any of his academic
writing had been. Bonaventure became an influential figure in the church
and was appointed a cardinal in 1273.
John Duns Scotus (1265/66–1308). We know little of Scotus’s early life,
though it seems likely that he began his studies with the Franciscans at an
early age. He studied at Oxford, then went to the University of Paris, where
he lectured on the Sentences of Peter Lombard in 1302–1303 and served as
Franciscan master of theology from 1305 through 1307. For reasons we do
not know, he was transferred to the Franciscan house in Cologne in 1307;
he died in Cologne the following year. Even during his life, the adjective
subtle had come to be associated with Scotus’s thought, which is ingenious,
difficult, and inventively defended; soon after his death, he came to be
known as the “Subtle Doctor.” His surname, Duns, is the origin of our

English word dunce—a slur on the inanities of some of his followers, who
emulated the difficulties of Scotus’s thought without being able to approach
his brilliance.
John Scottus Eriugena (c. 800–c. 877). Although he worked at the court
of Charles the Bald in France in the late Carolingian period, Eriugena was
an Irish monk. (Eriugena, a name he apparently bestowed on himself,
means “Irish-born”; other people called him Scottus, which means
“Scottish,” but in those days, people thought of Ireland as part of Scotland.)
At that time, Irish monks were almost the only people in the West who still
knew Greek, and Eriugena’s greatest influence was as a translator,
particularly of the works of pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. Eriugena’s
own philosophical system, an ambitious neo-Platonic construction with
decidedly pantheistic overtones, has occasionally drawn some interest from
philosophers with an affinity for more exotic versions of Platonism than
Augustine’s, but it has never been part of the mainstream of Christian
thinking. Eriugena was condemned as a heretic at two regional councils in
the 850s for his teaching on predestination, which was regarded as
having Pelagian tendencies and as placing too much confidence in the
power of dialectic to solve theological problems.
Nicholas of Autrecourt (c. 1295–1369). Most of what we know about
Nicholas’s life is limited to his trial in the 1340s. In 1340, Nicholas was
charged with teaching 66 erroneous propositions. The trial dragged on, first
in Paris, then at the papal court in Avignon, until 1346, when Nicholas was
required to make a public recantation. In 1347, his treatise Exigit ordo
(Order Demands) was ceremonially burned, though the work continued to
be circulated, and at least one copy has survived to the present day.
Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464). Nicholas’s original academic interest was
in canon law, in which he received a doctorate from the University of Padua
in 1423. His interest in philosophy and theology came from a sort of
revelation he had on his journey back from Constantinople, to which he had
been sent in 1437 on a fruitless mission to negotiate the reunion of the
Eastern and Western Churches. Nicholas described this revelation as an
experience of “learned ignorance,” an insight that transcends the limits of
reason, and he gave the title On Learned Ignorance (De docta ignorantia)
to his most influential work. Despite suspicions that his views were
ultimately pantheistic, Nicholas was never accused of heresy. He was made
a cardinal in 1449 and a bishop in 1450.

Peter Abelard (1079–1142). Born in Brittany into the minor nobility but
determined from an early age to devote himself to learning, Abelard studied
under many of the most eminent teachers of his day. He frequently
quarreled with his teachers and was eager to defeat them in public debate.
As a result, he acquired a reputation as an intellectual powerhouse,
attracting students of his own. After his ill-fated affair with Heloise, which
resulted in his castration, Abelard sought the peace of monastic life and
devoted himself to teaching and writing theology. His Trinitarian
speculations were condemned at two councils (Soissons, 1121; Sens, 1141).
Though these condemnations, along with Bernard of Clairvaux’s energetic
propaganda campaign against him, discouraged people from citing Abelard
explicitly, it is clear that he had extensive influence on 12th-century thought.
Siger of Brabant (1240–c. 1284). Siger was a leader of the integral
Aristotelians at the University of Paris and one of the prime targets of the
Condemnation of 1277. In the face of charges of heresy, Siger fled from
Paris to Italy, where he died under mysterious circumstances. Dante placed
Siger in heaven in the Paradiso, where Thomas Aquinas—in life a bitter
opponent of the integral Aristotelians—introduces Siger to the poet.
Stephen Tempier (d. 1279). A Paris-trained theologian, Stephen (Étienne)
Tempier became bishop of Paris in 1268. His chief legacy was the
Condemnation of 1277, a list of 219 condemned theses taught by “some
scholars of arts.” The Condemnation circulated widely, and bachelors of
theology were required to swear that they would not teach any of the
prohibited theses.
Thomas Aquinas (Thomas of Aquino) (c. 1225–1274). After joining the
Dominicans over the protests of his family, Thomas Aquinas was sent to
study at Paris under Albert the Great. He followed Albert to Cologne but
then returned to Paris in 1251 to complete his studies. From 1256 to 1259
and again from 1268 to 1272, he occupied one of the Dominican chairs of
theology at the University of Paris. Aquinas was a tireless opponent of the
integral Aristotelians in the arts faculty, but he was also an ardent defender
of the propriety of using Aristotle in formulating Christian theology. His
writings include extensive commentary on Aristotle, as well as his two
great syntheses of theology, Summa theologiae and Summa contra Gentiles.
Aquinas was regarded by some as rather too friendly to Aristotle to be quite
safe, and some of his views were officially proscribed by the Condemnation
of 1277. The condemnation of Aquinas was soon retracted, however, and
Aquinas was canonized in 1323.

William (of) Ockham (c. 1288–1347). Ockham (also spelled Occam) was
educated by the Franciscans in London and Oxford. Around 1323, someone
went to the papal court, then located in Avignon, and charged Ockham with
teaching heresy. Ockham was summoned to Avignon to answer the charges.
Ockham remained in Avignon for four years, being questioned occasionally
by the investigators but otherwise left free to continue his writing. A
dispute between Michael Cesana, the minister general of the Franciscans,
and Pope John XXII led Ockham to accuse the pope of effectively
abdicating his office by stubbornly teaching heresy. The fallout from this
bold declaration led Cesana, Ockham, and two other Franciscans to flee
Avignon under the cover of night. They eventually came under the
protection of Ludwig of Bavaria, the Holy Roman Emperor, in Munich.
Ockham was excommunicated in 1328 for leaving Avignon without
permission. He remained under imperial protection for the rest of his life
and wrote exclusively on political matters.

Bibliography
All quotations from the works discussed in this course were translated from
Latin by the instructor. Some of these translations, including all the
quotations from Anselm, as well as those from Augustine’s On Free Choice
of the Will, have appeared in print; the books in which they appear are listed
in the bibliography. (In a few cases, the translation used in this course
differs slightly from the published version in order to bring out a nuance
that is particularly relevant to the material being discussed.) The other
translations were made specifically for this course.
The bibliography also lists the work of other translators. These translations
were not used in the course itself, but they represent, in the instructor’s
judgment, the best published English translations of the Latin works.
Those especially in interested in issues arising in the translation of medieval
philosophers from the Latin West may wish to consult Thomas Williams,
“Transmission and Translation,” The Cambridge Companion to Medieval
Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 328–346), also
available at http://shell.cas.usf.edu/~twilliam/trans.pdf.
Essential Reading:
Anselm. Anselm: Basic Writings. Translated by Thomas Williams.
Indianapolis: Hackett, 2007. This volume contains all the major works of
Anselm in a careful translation with notes and a glossary.
Augustine. Confessions. Translated by Rex Warner. New York: Signet
Classics, 1963. Much more than an autobiography, the Confessions is a
wide-ranging meditation on God, creation, sin, and the human condition. Of
the many translations of the Confessions, Warner’s offers the best
combination of fidelity to the Latin text and a vivid, accessible style.
———. On Free Choice of the Will. Translated by Thomas Williams.
Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993. This work represents Augustine’s earliest
attempts to come to grips with the origin of evil. It introduces many of the
themes that become prominent in Augustine’s mature works, and for that
reason, it serves as the best short introduction to Augustine’s thought in his
own words.
———. On True Religion. In Augustine: Earlier Writings, edited by John
H. S. Burleigh. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1979. On
True Religion is one of the key texts in which Augustine lays out his view
of the relationship between faith and reason.

Boethius. The Consolation of Philosophy. Translated by V. E. Watts, New
York: Penguin, 1969, or translated by P. G. Walsh, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999. “To acquire a taste for” The Consolation of
Philosophy, C. S. Lewis wrote, “is almost to become naturalised in the
Middle Ages.”
Bonaventure. The Journey of the Mind to God. Translated by Philotheus
Boehner. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993. This remarkable work unites
philosophy, theology, and Franciscan spirituality in a dense but rewarding
meditation on the possibility for knowledge of God.
Brower, Jeffrey, and Kevin Guilfoy, eds. The Cambridge Companion to
Abelard. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Abelard is most
often studied today for his contributions to the more technical areas of
philosophy. As a result, some of the essays in this volume are dense and
difficult in spots. Nonetheless, the collection as a whole is an excellent
guide to Abelard’s thought.
Cross, Richard. John Duns Scotus. New York: Oxford University Press,
1999. This book is an excellent short introduction to Scotus’s philosophy
and theology.
Davies, Brian. The Thought of Thomas Aquinas. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993. Davies writes with exceptional clarity even about
the most difficult material in Aquinas’s thought.
Hyman, Arthur, and James J. Walsh, eds. Philosophy in the Middle Ages.
2nd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983. This exemplary collection of
philosophical texts represents the Christian, Islamic, and Jewish traditions
from the 4th through the 14th centuries.
John Duns Scotus. Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality. Translated by
Allan B. Wolter. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press,
1998. This volume contains translations of Scotus’s most important
writings on the nature of the will and its freedom, the natural law and its
relation to the divine will, and other aspects of morality.
———. Philosophical Writings: A Selection. Translated by Allan B.
Wolter. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987. Scotus’s central writings on
metaphysics, natural theology, the theory of knowledge, and human nature
are collected in this indispensable volume.
King, Peter. “Peter Abelard.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abelard. King offers the best short overview

of Abelard’s thought, with more attention to Abelard’s views on faith and
reason than that topic is usually given.
Lohr, C. H. “The Medieval Interpretation of Aristotle.” In The Cambridge
History of Later Medieval Philosophy, edited by Norman Kretzmann,
Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, pp. 80–98. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1992. Lohr discusses the varying fortunes of Aristotle in
science, philosophy, and theology from Boethius through the Renaissance.
He gives particular attention to the crucial debates of the 13th century.
McGrade, A. S., ed. The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. This collection of essays
offers an excellent overview of the development of medieval philosophy in
the Christian, Jewish, and Islamic traditions. The volume is organized
topically, rather than according to individual authors, giving a sense of the
sweep of medieval thinking on such issues as language and logic,
metaphysics, ethics, human nature, and politics.
McInerny, Ralph, and John O’Callaghan. “Saint Thomas Aquinas.”
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/aquinas.
Two leading Thomists present the essentials of Aquinas’s thought in a form
accessible to non-specialists.
Nicholas of Cusa. Nicholas of Cusa: Selected Spiritual Writings. Edited by
H. Lawrence Bond. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1997. This collection
contains On Learned Ignorance and other works of Nicholas of Cusa, as
well as an extensive introduction.
Noone, Timothy B., and R. E. Houser. “Saint Bonaventure.” Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/bonaventure. The
authors survey Bonaventure’s main philosophical and theological
contributions and offer a good sense of the distinctive flavor of
Bonaventure’s thought.
Pasnau, Robert C. Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pasnau offers a detailed account of
Aquinas’s views on the relationship between mind and body, the
mechanisms of cognition, personal identity and immortality, and the will.
Rist, J. M. Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2003. Rist explores Augustine’s thought against the
background of the Platonism that Augustine adopted and developed. Many
readers find this the best single book on Augustine’s thought, and it is fully
accessible to a non-specialist.

Spade, Paul Vincent, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. The leading scholars of William
of Ockham analyze his contributions to logic, metaphysics, the theory of
knowledge, ethics, and politics. This is an indispensable guide to Ockham’s
thought.
———. “Medieval Philosophy.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-philosophy. This article serves as
a short orientation tour for medieval philosophy, with many links to more
detailed discussions of particular authors and topics.
———. “William of Ockham.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ockham. Spade provides an excellent
overview of the central areas of Ockham’s philosophical and political
writings.
Stump, Eleonore, and Norman Kretzmann, eds. The Cambridge Companion
to Augustine. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. The 18 essays
in this volume cover the whole range of Augustine’s philosophical work, as
well as much of his theology.
Thijssen, Hans. “Condemnation of 1277.” Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/condemnation. Thijssen surveys the
history of the Condemnation of 1277 and explains the unanswered
questions about who exactly was being condemned and what significance
the Condemnation had.
Thomas Aquinas. Disputed Questions on the Virtues. Translated by E. M.
Atkins, edited by Thomas Williams. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2005. These “disputed questions” are records of academic debates on
the virtues held while Aquinas was teaching at the University of Paris. The
introduction explains the role of virtue in Aquinas’s ethics as a whole and
places the disputed questions in their intellectual context.
———. Summa contra Gentiles, Book One: God. Translated by Anton C.
Pegis. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997. This volume is
the most accessible source for Aquinas’s account of faith and reason, his
arguments for the existence of God, and his account of the divine nature.
Visser, Sandra, and Thomas Williams. Anselm. New York: Oxford
University Press, forthcoming (2008). Visser and Williams divide their
discussion of Anselm’s work into two main areas: the divine nature and the
economy of redemption. This book seeks to offer a comprehensive and
systematic account of the whole of Anselm’s philosophy and theology.

Williams, Thomas. “John Duns Scotus.” Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/duns-scotus. This article aims
at giving a non-technical explanation of the thought of this most technically
sophisticated thinker. The presentation of Scotus’s celebrated argument for
the existence of God is worth especially close attention.
———. “Saint Anselm.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/anselm. This article offers an overview of
Anselm’s life and works, his proofs of the existence of God, his account of
the divine nature, and his views on sin and freedom.
Aulen, Gustav. Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main
Types of the Idea of the Atonement. Translated by A. G. Herbert. New
York: Wipf & Stock, 2003. Aulen’s classic study of the history of the
Christian doctrine of redemption helps situate Abelard’s contributions in
their intellectual context.
Brown, Peter. Augustine of Hippo: A Biography. Revised edition with a
new epilogue. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. Brown’s
1967 biography of Augustine quickly became the standard work on
Augustine’s life. This revised edition takes account of developments in
scholarship since the publication of the original work.
Davies, Brian, and Brian Leftow, eds. The Cambridge Companion to
Anselm. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. This useful
collection considers every major aspect of Anselm’s thought, as well as his
intellectual background and his influence on later thinkers.
Dod, Bernard G. “Aristoteles latinus.” In The Cambridge History of Later
Medieval Philosophy, edited by Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and
Jan Pinborg, pp. 45–79. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Dod discusses the translations and translators that made possible the
complete reintroduction of Aristotle into the Latin West in the 12th and 13th
centuries.
Holopainen, Toivo. Dialectic and Theology in the Eleventh Century. New
York: E.J. Brill, 1996. Holopainen argues persuasively for a reexamination
of the four leading figures in the 11th-century revival of dialectic: Peter
Damian, Lanfranc of Bec, Berengar of Tours, and Anselm of Canterbury.
Hopkins, Jasper. A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1972. Hopkins offers a useful roadmap
through Anselm’s writings, as well as philosophical commentary.

Knowles, David. The Evolution of Medieval Thought. New York: Vintage
Books, 1962. This classic work is a highly readable survey of medieval
thought from its roots in Classical Greek philosophy through the 14th
century. It is, unfortunately, out of print and hard to find, but it is worth the
search.
Kretzmann, Norman. The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas’s Natural
Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles I. New York: Oxford University Press,
2002. Kretzmann carefully expounds Aquinas’s account of our knowledge
of God, his arguments for the existence of God, and his account of the
divine attributes. A mix of historical scholarship and philosophical defense,
this book is challenging but rewarding reading.
Luscombe, David. Medieval Thought. New York: Oxford University Press,
2004. Luscombe’s work is especially useful for its discussion of the 14th
and 15th centuries.
Marenbon, John. Boethius. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Marenbon discusses the full range of Boethius’s work and its intellectual
context, devoting about a third of the book to The Consolation of
Philosophy.
———. The Philosophy of Peter Abelard. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1997. Marenbon’s treatment of Abelard’s philosophy is
particularly noteworthy for its careful and extensive assessment of
Abelard’s ethical theory.
McInerny, Ralph. “Analogy of Names Is a Logical Doctrine.” In Being and
Predication: Thomistic Interpretations, pp. 279–286. Washington, DC:
Catholic University of America Press, 1986. In this essay, the leading
exponent of Aquinas’s doctrine of analogy gives his most succinct and
accessible explanation of the doctrine.
Murray, Michael J., ed. Reason for the Hope Within. Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 1998. The rising generation of Christian philosophers considers
the fundamental topics of faith seeking understanding.
Nash, Ronald H. The Light of the Mind: St. Augustine’s Theory of
Knowledge. Ann Arbor, MI: Academic Renewal Press, 2003. Nash’s
treatment of Augustine’s theory of knowledge offers the most careful
investigation available of the theory of illumination, along with a discussion
of other topics, such as skepticism.
Noone, Timothy B. “The Franciscan and Epistemology: Reflections on the
Roles of Bonaventure and Scotus.” In Medieval Masters: Essays in Memory

of E. A. Synan, edited by R. E. Houser, pp. 63–90. Minneapolis: Center for
Thomistic Studies, 1999. A leading exponent of medieval Franciscan
philosophy considers the theory of knowledge in Bonaventure and John
Duns Scotus against the broader historical context of developments in
epistemology.
O’Donnell, James J. Augustine: A New Biography. New York:
HarperCollins, 2005. This highly controversial (and hostile) reappraisal of
Augustine’s life and work is written with extraordinary verve.
Quinn, Philip. “Abelard on Atonement: Nothing Unintelligible, Arbitrary,
Illogical, or Immoral About It.” In Reasoned Faith, edited by Eleonore
Stump, pp. 281–300. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993. Quinn
seeks to rescue Abelard from the misunderstandings of both his critics and
his admirers in this excellent and admirably clear essay.
Stump, Eleonore. Aquinas. New York: Routledge, 2005. Stump places
Aquinas in dialogue with contemporary philosophy on such issues as
metaphysics, the nature of God, human nature and cognition, ethics,
incarnational theology, and the problem of evil. Many regard this as the
best book available on Aquinas’s thought as a whole.
———, ed. Reasoned Faith. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993.
This collection of essays by both theists and non-theists explores faith and
reason, the nature of revelation, the nature of God, and the problem of evil.
Van Inwagen, Peter. The Problem of Evil. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006. A leading philosopher of religion examines the greatest difficulty for
belief in God.
Williams, Thomas, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. This collection provides the most
comprehensive account of Scotus’s philosophical writings, although (owing
to the highly technical nature of Scotus’s philosophy) some of the essays in
this volume make for difficult reading in spots.
———. “The Libertarian Foundations of Scotus’s Moral Philosophy.” The
Thomist 62 (1998): 193–215. This article examines the importance of
Scotus’s account of freedom, as contrasted with that of Thomas Aquinas, in
the larger context of his ethical theory.
———. “A Most Methodical Lover? On Scotus’s Arbitrary Creator.”
Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (2000): 169–202. This article
makes the case for a controversial reading of Scotus as teaching that God’s
creative act is, in an important sense, arbitrary.

———. “Some Reflections on Method in the History of Philosophy.”
http://shell.cas.usf.edu/~twilliam/method.pdf. This brief essay considers a
range of possible approaches to the history of philosophy, including an
account of the approach exemplified by this course.
———. “Transmission and Translation.” In The Cambridge Companion to
Medieval Philosophy, edited by A. S. McGrade, pp. 328–346. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2003. This paper considers the channels of
transmission by which medieval philosophical texts have come down to us,
with special attention to three case studies: the works of Anselm, John Duns
Scotus, and the 14th-century Dominican Robert Holcot. It also discusses the
difficulties, both interpretive and linguistic, involved in translating Latin
texts into English. A preprint is available online at
http://shell.cas.usf.edu/~twilliam/trans.pdf.
Internet Resources:
Christian Classics Ethereal Library. The library links to a variety of
classics of Christian thought, including extensive translations of Augustine.
http://ccel.org.
EpistemeLinks. EpistemeLinks offers more than 2,000 e-texts, including
works of Aristotle and all the major medieval philosophers.
www.epistemelinks.com/Main/MainText.aspx.
The Franciscan Archive. The archive offers both Latin editions and
extensive translations of Bonaventure, John Duns Scotus, and other
important Franciscan writers. The translations can be somewhat old-
fashioned and stodgy, but they include a great deal of material not available
elsewhere. www.franciscan-archive.org.
Internet Medieval Sourcebook. This site contains vast resources for the
student of medieval history. www.fordham.edu/halsall/sbook.html.
Summa Theologica. Aquinas’s greatest work is presented in the standard
translation by the fathers of the English Dominican Province.
www.newadvent.org/summa.

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Reason and Faith:

Professor Thomas Williams

THE GREAT COURSES

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Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above,

Thomas Williams, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies

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Professor Biography .................................................................................... i

ii ©2007 The Teaching Company.

Lecture Twenty-Three Ockham on the Prospects

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Scope: Platonic philosophy draws a fundamental distinction between the

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Scope: According to Augustine, given that God is good, everything he

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Scope: Deposed from high government office and imprisoned on charges

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Scope: The Consolation of Philosophy is best known for its influential

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Scope: At the request of his monks, Anselm composed the Monologion, a

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Scope: The ontological argument establishes so many different divine

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Scope: Peter Abelard (1079–1142) was famously a wreck in his personal

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