VI.

Structure and Powers of Government

A. The Legislative Department
i. Composition, Qualifications and Term of Office
1. Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486 - There is one independent and one dependent
issue in Powell. First, what power the Constitution confers on the House. In other words,
is there a textually dependent commitment? Second, how to interpret the text on which such
commitment depends. A textually dependent commitment is necessary for judicial review
(i.e., the Supreme Court is the ultimate interpreter of the constitution). Once this is
established, the Supreme Court must interpret the textual meaning. In Powell, it is clear
and conceded that Powell met the requirements specifically mentioned in Article I
regarding qualifications of representatives.
2. Pobre v Defensor-Santiago, 597 SCRA 1 (2009)- No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress
or in any committee thereof
3. Aquino III v Comelec, 617 SCRA 623 (2010) - If an additional legislative
district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250k
in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a
province.
4. Alababa v Comelec, 611 SCRA 147 (2010) - The passage of apportionment acts
is not so exclusively within the political power of the legislature as to preclude a court
from inquiring into their constitutionality when the question is properly brought before
it. Hence, the population indicators for the creation of a legislative district of Malolos
City can be subject to judicial review.
5. Naval v Comelec, 729 SCRA 299 (2014) - The three-term limit rule provided
by the Constitution is inflexible.Here, Naval was elected by the same inhabitants in the
same territorial jurisdiction. While RA 9716 created a new second district for Camarines
Sur, it merely renamed the third district which elected Naval into the position. Hence,
her election for the year 2013 is not valid.

6. Bagabuyo v Comelec, 573 SCRA 290 (2008)

7. Reyes v Comelec, 699 SCRA 522 (2013) and 708 SCRA 197 (2013
8. Banat v Comelec, GR 179271 (2009)
9. Ang Ladlad v Comelec, GR 190582 (2010) - Having complied with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, to deny Ang Ladlad, which represents the
LGBT sector, accreditation as a party list organization on the ground of sexual immorality
is violative of the non-establishment clause, the equal protection clause, the freedom of
expression and association, and is incongruous with our international obligation to
protect and promote human rights.
10. Walden Bello v Comelec GR 191998 (2010)
11. Atong Paglaum v Comelec, GR 203766 - Sectoral parties or organizations may
either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector.
12. Coalition of Asso. of Senior Citizens in the Phil. V. Comelec,
201 SCRA 786 (2013) - If the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented
by the parties thereto, it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had
been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the COMELEC En Banc. There can be no
disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from
carrying out their agreement.
13. Lico v Comelec, GR 205505, Sep 29, 2015 - In the case of party-
list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of
office as member of the House of Representatives.
14. Abang Lingkod v Comelec, 708 SCRA 133 (2013)- Sectoral parties or
organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing
 their track record. It is sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral
organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which they represent.

15. Akbayan v HRET, 612 SCRA 375 (2010)

16. Aquino v Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 (1995) - In the absence of clear and
positive proof of successful abandonment of domicile, it shall be deemed continued.
17. Daryl Grace J. Abayon v. The Honorable House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, et al., G.R. Nos. 189466 and 189506, 612 SCRA
375, 11 February 2010 - Since party-list nominees are "elected members" of the
House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications.

ii. Organization and Discipline

18. Santiago v Guingona, G.R. 134577, (1998)- “Majority” simply refers to the
number more than half the total. Constitution is silent on the manner of selecting
officers other than the Senate President and House Speaker – Art VI, Sec 16 (1).
19. Avelino v Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 (1949)- Majority of “all Members” means
absolute majority. “A majority” of each House means simple majority, requiring a less
number – Art VI, Sec 16 (2).
20. Alejandrino v Quezon, 46 Phil 83 (1924) – Only the Governor-
General has the power to remove senators and representatives. However, the Senate and the
House of Representatives is granted the power to punish its members for disorderly
behaviour, and with concurrence of 2/3 expel an elective member. To punish does not
include to suspend.
21. De Venecia v SB, G.R. No. 130240 (2002)
22. Pobre v Defensor-Santiago, 597 SCRA 1 (2009)- No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress
or in any committee thereof.

iii. Privileges, Inhibitions and Disqualifications

23. Philconsa v Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966)
24. Ligot v Mathay, 56 SCRA 823 (1974)
25. People v Jalosjos, G.R. NO. 132875
26. Adaza v Pacana, 135 SCRA 431 (1985)
27. Puyat v De Guzman 113 SCRA 31 (1982)
28. Liban v Gordon, 593 SCRA 68 (2009) and 639 SCRA 709 (2011)
iv. Powers and Limitations on Powers
29. Makalintal v Comelec, GR 157013, Jul 10, 2003
30. Abakada group Party List v Purisima, GR 166715, Aug 14, 2008 - From
the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any
of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates
the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
31. Bengzon v Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767
32. Arnault v Nazareno, G.R. L-3820
33. PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation v. Senate, G.R. No. 180308,
June 19, 2012
 34. Neri v Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
(549 SCRA 77 AND 564 SCRA 152) - The presumption of executive privilege can
only be overturned by a showing of compelling need for disclosure of the information
covered by the privilege.
35. Balag, v Senate, G.R. No. G.R. No. 234608, July 03, 2018 - The
Court finds that there is a genuine necessity to place a limitation on the period of
imprisonment that may be imposed by the Senate pursuant to its inherent power of contempt
during inquiries in aid of legislation. Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states
that Congress, in conducting inquiries in aid of legislation, must respect the rights of
persons appearing in or affected therein. The Court finds that the period of imprisonment
under the inherent power of contempt by the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation
should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under which the said
power is invoked. In Arnault, it was stated that obedience to its process may be enforced
by the Senate Committee if the subject of investigation before it was within the range of
legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony called relates to that subject.
Accordingly, as long as there is a legitimate legislative inquiry, then the inherent power
of contempt by the Senate may be properly exercised. Conversely, once the said legislative
inquiry concludes, the exercise of the inherent power of contempt ceases and there is no
more genuine necessity to penalize the detained witness.
36. Senate v Ermita, G.R. 169777 (2006) - Executive privilege may only
be invoked by the President. The President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise
such power. While it is discretionary for executive officials to show up during question
hour, it is mandatory for them to show up during inquiries in aid of legislation.
37. Belgica (G.R. 208566, 2013) - The grant of the rule-making power to
administrative agencies must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding
to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to
amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
38. Araullo v Abad (G.R. 209287) - Appropriation has been defined as nothing more
than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid
out of the Treasury.
39. Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty [LAMP] v. The Secretary
of Budget and Management, G.R. No. 164987, Apr. 24, 2012 –
POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
40. Arnault v Balagtas, 97 Phil 358 - The Judicial department has no right or
power or authority to do review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the
prerogative oflegislation, or interfere with their proceedings or their discretion in what
is known as the legislative process, in the same manner that the legislativedepartment may
not invade the judicial realm in the ascertainment of truth and in the application and
interpretation of the law, in what is knownas the judicial process, because that would be
in direct conflict with the fundamental principle of separation of powers established by
theConstitution. The only instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoked are
when there has been a violation of a constitutionalinhibition, or when there has been an
arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion.
41. Imbong v Ochoa, 721 SCRA 146 (2014)
42. Tanada v Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)- The publication of all presidential
issuances of public nature or general applicability is mandated by law. Such publication
is a requirement of due process whereby a person may be bound by law only when he is first
officially and specifically informed of its contents.

The Court ordered the Respondents to PUBLISH in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application. Non-publication shall render such
issuances as having no binding force and effect.
v. Non-legislative Powers and Special Bodies
43. Abbas v SET, 166 SCRA 651 (1988)
44. Bondoc v Pineda, 201 SCRA 732
45. Codilla v De Venecia, G.R. 150605 (2002)
46. Cunanan v Tan 5 SCRA 1 (1962)
47. Velasco v Belmonte, G.R. 211140 (2016) - The decision of the Comelec which
attained finality, and that of the Supreme Court, made the administering of oath of
Velasco, and removal of Reyes’ name in the roll of members of House of Representatives, a
ministerial duty, which may be compelled by Mandamus
48. Ty-Delgado v HRET G.R. 219603 (2016)

B. The Executive Department

i. The President
Republic v Sandiganbayan, GR 152154 (2003)
• Estrada v Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738 (2001)
• Makalintal vs PET 635 SCRA 783 and 651 SCRA 239 - The COMELEC, HRET and SET
are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are,
nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of
judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article
IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals)
of the Constitution.

• Pormento v Estrada, 629 SCRA 530 (2010)

ii. Powers and Limitations

• Laurel v Garcia, GR No. 92013 (1990)
• Marcos v Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760 - EXECUTIVE POWER

Art VII, Sec 1.

The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated
in the Constitution. Executive power is more than the sum of specific powers enumerated. Residual
unstated powers of the President are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing
in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare.

• Saguisag v Ochoa, G.R. 212426 (2016)

• Funa v Ermita, 612 SCRA 308 (2010) - The disqualification laid down in Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is aimed at preventing the concentration of
powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, Vice-President, Members
of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. This practice of holding multiple offices or
positions in the government led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials, who took advantage of
this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment.

• Funa v Agra, 691 SCRA 196 (2013) - The prohibition against dual or multiple
offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or
designations, whether permanent or temporary.

• De Castro v JBC, 615 SCRA 666 (2010) - The ban on making presidential
appointments around the time of presidential elections in Section 15 is confined to appointments
in the Executive Department. It does NOT extend to the Judiciary. The filling of a vacancy in the
SC within the 90-day period prescribed by Section 4 (1), Article VIII was made a true mandate for
the President.

• Velicaria-Garafil v O.P. GR 203372, Jun 16, 2015 - The concurrence of all

the elements of a valid appointment should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is
made, whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban.

• Manalo v Sistosa, GR 107369 (1999)

• Hontiveros-Baraquel v Toll Regulatory Board, GR 181293, Feb 23, 2015
• Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, et
al. v. Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015
• Kulayan v Tan, 675 SCRA 482 (2012)
• Ampatuan v Puno, 651 SCRA 228 (2011)
• Fortun v Macapagal-Arroyo 668 SCRA 504 (2012)
• Lagman v Medialdea, GR 231658, Jul 4, 2017
• Monsanto v Factoran, Jr., 170 SCRA 190 (1989)
• Risos-Vidal v Comelec, 747 SCRA 210 (2015)
• Saguisag v Ochoa, Jr. GR 212426 and 212444, Jan 12, 2016 - The special
nature of an executive agreement is not just a domestic variation in international agreements.
International practice has accepted the use of various forms and designations of international
agreements, ranging from the traditional notion of a treaty – which connotes a formal, solemn
instrument – to engagements concluded in modern, simplified forms that no longer necessitate
ratification.

• Bayan v Executive Secretary, GR 138570, Oct 10, 2000

• Biraogo v Philippine Truth Commission, GR 192935 (2010)