Art.

151
Magbaleta vs. Gonong
No. L-44903. April 22, 1977. *
BARREDO, J.:
Article 222 of the Civil Code and Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court on the pre-
requisite of allegation in the complaint that the suit, being between members of the same
family, earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made before the same was filed DO
NOT APPLY whenever a stranger to the family is a party thereto, whether as a necessary or
indispensable one.
FACTS
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the case filed against them on the basis of alleged
violation Article 222 of the Civil Code and Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, there
being no allegation in respondent’s complaint that his suit, being between members of the
same family, earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made before the same was
filed.
private respondent is the brother of petitioner Rufino Magbaleta, the husband of the other
petitioner Romana B. Magbaleta, and the suit is to have a parcel of land, covered by a Free
Patent Title in the name of Rufino, declared to be the property of private respondent, who
claims in said complaint that the third petitioner Susana G. Baldovi is trying to take
possession of said land from his representative, contending she had bought the same from the
spouses Rufino and Romana.
However, the judge dismissed the motion to dismiss stating that the above provisions do not
apply since one of the defendants, Susana G. Baldovi, the alleged buyer of the land in
dispute, is a stranger.
ISSUE
Whether or not Article 222 of the Civil Code and Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
do not apply to the case since one of the defendants is a stranger.
RULING
YES.
Said provisions, do not weigh enough to make it imperative that such efforts to compromise
should be a jurisdictional pre-requisite for the maintenance of an action whenever a stranger
to the family is a party thereto, whether as a necessary or indispensable one.
It is neither practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of a stranger to the family who just happened to
have innocently acquired some kind of interest in any right or property disputed among its members should be
made to depend on the way the latter would settle their differences among themselves.

Art. 152-162
Oliva-De Mesa vs. Acero, Jr.
G.R. No. 185064. January 16, 2012.*
REYES, J.:
Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to
invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriff’s duty to
presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family home.
FACTS
a parcel of land which was formerly covered by TCT No. T-76.725 (M) was issued under the
name of Araceli. The petitioners jointly purchased the subject property while they were still
merely cohabiting before their marriage. A house was later constructed on the subject
property, which the petitioners thereafter occupied as their family home after they got married
sometime in January 1987.
Araceli obtained a loan from Claudio which was secured by a mortgage over the subject
property. As payment, Araceli issued a check drawn against CBC. When presented for
payment, it was dishonored for being closed. The petitioners failed to heed Claudio’s
subsequent demand for payment.
Claudio filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22 against the petitioners, which an
Information was subsequently filed in the RTC. The RTC acquitted the petitioners but
demanded the payment of the loan.
a writ of execution was issued and Sheriff Samonte levied upon the subject property which
was sold on auction. Claudio was the highest bidder and the corresponding certificate of sale
was issued to him.
Claudio leased the subject property to the petitioners and a certain Juanito However, the
petitioners and Juanito defaulted in the payment of the rent.
Meanwhile, a Final Deed of Sale over the subject property was issued to Claudio and the
Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. T-76.725 (M) and issued TCT No. T-221755 (M) in his
favor.
Unable to collect the rentals due, Sps. Acero filed a complaint for ejectment against the
petitioners and Juanito.
ISSUE
whether the lower courts erred in refusing to cancel Claudio’s Torrens title TCT No. T-
221755 (M) over the subject property.
RULING
NO.
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from
execution, could be summarized as follows:
 First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or
before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or
 extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be
exempt from execution;
 Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from
execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein;
 Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a
family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter,
are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to
the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. There was
no showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family
home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by operation of law and
was thus prospectively exempt from execution.
HOWEVER, the petitioners should have asserted the subject property being a family home
and its being exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time
thereafter.
No other time can the status of a residential house as a family home can be set up and proved
and its exemption from execution be claimed but before the sale thereof at public auction.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family
Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed
not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction.
It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a
family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff.
Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed exemption of the subject
property before the sale thereof at public auction, the petitioners now are barred from raising
the same. Failure to do so estop them from later claiming the said exemption.
The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. However, this right
can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the property as a family
home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter. In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners
allowed a considerable time to lapse before claiming that the subject property is a family home and its
exemption from execution and forced sale under the Family Code. The petitioners allowed the subject property
to be levied upon and the public sale to proceed. One (1) year lapsed from the time the subject property was sold
until a Final Deed of Sale was issued to Claudio and, later, Araceli’s Torrens title was cancelled and a new one
issued under Claudio’s name, still, the petitioner remained silent. In fact, it was only after the respondents filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer, or approximately four (4) years from the time of the auction sale, that the
petitioners claimed that the subject property is a family home, thus, exempt from execution. Article 153 of the
Family Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and prove the same within the
prescribed period and it is not the sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family
home.

Eulogio vs. Bell, Sr.

G.R. No. 186322. July 8, 2015.*
SERENO, CJ.:
To summarize, the exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment is
limited to P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values
are adjusted by law. If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not match the present value
of the peso because of currency fluctuations, the amount of exemption shall be based on the
value that is most favorable to the constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess of
those limits can be applied to the payment of any of the obligations specified in Articles 155
and 160.
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting
it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the property at
the time of its constitution has been determined to fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the
improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in its value exceeding the statutory
limit. Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of a forced sale, and any amount above
the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160.
FACTS
The respondents Bell siblings are the unmarried children of respondent Spouses Bell. The
Bell siblings lodged a Complaint for annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title
and damages against petitioners Eulogios.
The Complaint sought the annulment of the contract of sale executed by Spouses Bell over
their 329square-meter residential house and lot, as well as the cancellation of the title
obtained by petitioners by virtue of the Deed.
The RTC granted respondents’ prayers, but declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the
amount of P1 million. Spouses Bell later brought the case to this Court to question their
liability to petitioners in the amount of P1 million plus interest. The Court, however,
dismissed their Petition for failure to show any reversible error committed by the CA.4
Thereafter, entry of judgment was made.
the RTC issued a Writ of Execution, as a result of which respondents’ property covered by the
newly reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title was levied on execution. Upon motion by
respondents, the trial court ordered the lifting of the writ of execution on the ground that the
property was a family home.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the lifting of the writ of execution. Invoking
Article 160 of the Family Code, they posited that the current market value of the property
exceeded the statutory limit of P300,000 considering that it was located in a commercial area,
and that Spouses Bell had even sold it to them for P1 million.
The RTC set the case for hearing to determine the present value of the family home of
respondents. It also appointed a Board of Appraisers to conduct a study on the prevailing
market value of their house and lot.
ISSUE
 1. whether a hearing to determine the value of respondents’ family home for purposes of
execution under Article 160 of the Family Code is barred under the principle of res
judicata;
2. whether respondents’ family home may be sold on execution under Article 160 of the
Family Code.
RULING
1. NO.
She testified that during the prior years the assessed values were lower. This shows that the
limit of the value of P300,000.00 under Article 157, Title 5 of the Family Code has not been
exceeded. The testimonies of the plaintiffs who are children of Sps. Paterno Bell, Sr. and
Rogelia Calingasan Bell show that they had lived in that house together with their said
parents. The Court therefore concludes that the said house is a family home under Chapter 2,
Title 5 of the Family Code. Its alienation by the said Spouses without the written consent of
the majority of the children/plaintiffs is null and void for being contrary to law and public
policy as enunciated in Art. 158 of the Family Code.
The foregoing points plainly show that the issue of whether the property in dispute exceeded
the statutory limit of P300,000 has already been determined with finality by the trial court. Its
finding necessarily meant that the property is exempt from execution. Assuming for the sake
of argument that causes of action in the main proceedings and in the execution proceedings
are different, the parties are still barred from litigating the issue of whether respondents’
family home may be sold on execution sale under the principle of conclusiveness of
judgment.
2. NO
The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to be exempt, however, are
determined by the exemption statute. The exemption is limited to the particular kind of
property or the specific articles prescribed by the statute; the exemption cannot exceed the
statutory limit.
ARTICLE 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:

(1) For nonpayment of taxes;

(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.

ARTICLE 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a
judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth
more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the
judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it
finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the
time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and
results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the
family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and
procedure shall apply.
 At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. The
proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under
the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor.

ARTICLE 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution,
the amount of three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural
areas, or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law.

In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of this Code, the value most
favorable for the constitution of a family home shall be the basis of evaluation.

For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include chartered cities and municipalities
whose annual income at least equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed to
be rural areas.

To summarize, the exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment is
limited to P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values
are adjusted by law. If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not match the present value
of the peso because of currency fluctuations, the amount of exemption shall be based on the
value that is most favorable to the constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess of
those limits can be applied to the payment of any of the obligations specified in Articles 155
and 160.
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting
it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the property at
the time of its constitution has been determined to fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the
improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in its value exceeding the statutory
limit. Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of a forced sale, and any amount above
the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160.
it has been judicially determined with finality that the property in dispute is a family home,
and that its value at the time of its constitution was within the statutory limit. Moreover,
respondents have timely claimed the exemption of the property from execution.48 On the
other hand, there is no question that the money judgment awarded to petitioners falls under
the ambit of Article 160.

Arroyo vs. Vazquez de Arroyo

No. 17014. August 11, 1921
Street, J.:
It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the
spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other.
FACTS
The parties were married and have lived as husband and wife, when the wife went away from
their common home with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband. After
efforts had been made by the husband without avail to induce her to resume marital relations,
this action was initiated by him to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with
him as a dutiful wife.
The wife admitted the fact of marriage, and that she had left her husband's home without his
consent; but she averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled
to leave by cruel treatment on the part of her husband.
The lower court ruled in favor of the wife and authorized her to live apart from her husband,
also granting her alimony.
ISSUE
Whether or not the husband was more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-
treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home
and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him.
RULING
NO.
The tales of cruelty on the part of the husband towards the wife, which are the basis of the
cross-action, are in our opinion no more than highly colored versions of personal wrangles in
which the spouses have allowed themselves from time to time to become involved and would
have little significance apart from the morbid condition exhibited by the wife. The judgment
must therefore be recorded that the abandonment by her of the marital home was without
sufficient justification in fact.
where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to live apart from her husband,
she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance and
he may be required to pay the expenses, including attorney's fees, necessarily incurred in
enforcing such obligation.
In the light of the considerations stated, it is obvious that the cross-complaint is not well
founded and none of the relief sought therein can be granted.
where judicial divorces have never been procurable on any ground, the Supreme Court fully
recognizes the right of the wife to have provision for separate maintenance, where it is
impossible for her to continue safely to cohabit with her husband; but the same court has
more than once rejected the petition of the wife for separate maintenance where it appeared
that the husband's alleged cruelty or ill-treatment was provoked by the wife's own improper
conduct.
Here, it is obvious that the cross-complaint is not well founded and none of the relief sought
therein can be granted.
Upon examination of the authorities we are convinced that it is not within the province of the
courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render
conjugal rights to, the other.
Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of
such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order,
enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely
personal right of consortium.
We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the
unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is
sought in the petitory part of the complaint;

Lilius vs. Manila Railroad Company

No. 39587. March 24, 1934
VlLLA-REAL, J.:
In order that a husband may recover damages for deprivation of his wife's assistance during
her illness from an accident, it is necessary for him to prove the existence of such assistance
and his wife's willingness to continue rendering the same had she not been prevented from so
doing by her illness.
FACTS
Aleko E. Lilius et al. filed a complaint against defendant to pay be ordered to pay by way of
indemnity for material and moral damages suffered by them through the fault and negligence
of the said defendant entity's employees. The CFI rendered judgment ordering the defendant
company to pay the plaintiffs.
The plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius has, for many years, been a well-known and reputed journalist,
author and photographer. At the time of the collision in question, he was a staff correspondent
in the Far East of the magazines The American Weekly of New York and The Sphere of
London. Some of his works have been translated into various languages. He utilized the
linguistic ability of his wife Sonja Maria Lilius, who translated his articles and books into
English, German, and Swedish. Furthermore, she acted as his secretary.
The plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius suffered from a fractured nose, a contusion above the left eye
and a lacerated wound on the right leg, in addition to multiple contusions and scratches on
various parts of the body. As a result of the accident, the said plaintiff was highly nervous and
very easily irritated, and for several months he had great difficulty in concentrating his
attention on any matter and could not write articles nor short stories for the newspapers and
magazines to which he was a contributor, thus losing for some time his only means of
livelihood.
ISSUE
Whether or not the claim of the husband for the loss of what is called Anglo-Saxon common
law "consortium" of his wife, that is, "her services, society and conjugal companionship", as
a result of personal injuries which she had received from the accident should be granted.
RULING
NO.
The plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of P2,500 for the loss of what is
called Anglo-Saxon common law "consortium" of his wife, that is, "her services, society and
conjugal companionship", as a result of personal injuries which she had received from the
accident now under consideration.
"The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and
obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband
must live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when
he changes his domicile or residence, except when he removes to a foreign country. * * *"

Therefore, under the law and the doctrine of this court, one of the husband's rights is to count
on his wife's assistance. This assistance comprises the management of the home and the
performance of household duties, including the care and education of the children and
attention to the husband upon whom primarily devolves the duty of supporting the family of
which he is the head.
In the case under consideration, apart from the services of his wife Sonja Maria Lilius as
translator and secretary, the value of which has not been proven, the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius
has not presented any evidence showing the existence of domestic services and their nature,
rendered by her prior to the accident, in order that it may serve as a basis in estimating their
value.
inasmuch as a wife's domestic assistance and conjugal companionship are purely personal
and voluntary acts which neither of the spouses may be compelled to render , it is necessary
for the party claiming indemnity for the loss of such services to prove that the person obliged
to render them had done so before he was injured and that he would be willing to continue
rendering them had he not been prevented from so doing.

Arts. 163-171
Miller vs. Miller
G.R. No. 200344. August 28, 2019.
LEONEN, J.:
The legitimacy and filiation of children cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for
correction of entries in the certificate of live birth.
FACTS
John Miller and Beatriz Marcaida were legally married and bore four children.
After John’s death, Joan Miller through her mother Lennie , filed before the Regional Trial
Court a Petition for Partition and Accounting of John’s estate with a prayer for preliminary
attachment, receivership, support, and damages. Alleging that she is John’s illegitimate child
with Lennie, Joan presented her Certificate of Live Birth which showed John to be her
registered father.
Glenn (son of Sps. Miller) filed a separate Petition praying that Joan’s Certificate of Live
Birth be canceled. With it, he also prayed that the Local Civil Registrar be directed to replace
Joan’s surname, Miller, with Espenida, and that Joan use Espenida instead of Miller in all
official documents.
Joan admitted that John did not sign her birth certificate, he “openly and continuously
recognized [her] as [his] child during his lifetime. Moreover, in his holographic will, he gave
Joan a 1/8 share of his estate.
ISSUE
whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial Court’s Judgment
allowing private respondent Joan Miller y Espenida to continue using the surname Miller.
RULING
YES.
Glenn’s initiatory pleading before the Regional Trial Court of Masbate City is a Petition for
Correction of Entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Joan Miller y Espenida. This type of
petition is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
What petitioners seek is not a mere clerical change. It is not a simple matter of correcting a
single letter in private respondent’s surname due to a misspelling. Rather, private
respondent’s filiation will be gravely affected, as changing her surname from Miller to
Espenida will also change her status. This will affect not only her identity, but her
successional rights as well. Certainly, this change is substantial.
“legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, and not through collateral attack[.]”Moreover, impugning the legitimacy of a
child is governed by Article 171 of the Family Code, not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Ordoña v. Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City,

G.R. No. 21537, November 9, 2021
INTING, J.:
The rule is that the mother is barred from impugning or declaring against the legitimacy of
her child, and only the father, or in exceptional instances, his heirs, can contest in an
appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife based on any of the grounds
enumerated under Article 166 of the Family Code.
FACTS
Petitioner was married to a certain Ariel. Petitioner went to Qatar for work until she
discovered that Ariel had an illicit relationship. This prompted her to return to the Philippines
and separate from him. Despite their eventual separation, petitioner has not yet filed a petition
for annulment of her marriage to Ariel.
Thereafter, applied for another work in UAE where she met Allan, her former colleague in
Qatar. She and Allan engaged in an intimate relationship which resulted in petitioner's
pregnancy with Allan as the purported father. Thus, petitioner went back to the Philippines
and gave birth to a son. In the Certificate of Live Birth, the child was given the name "Alrich
Paul Ordoña Fulgueras” with "Allan Demen Fulgueras" as the purported father.
petitioner filed before the RTC the Rule 108 petition seeking the following corrections: (1)
change of last name of Alrich Paul in Item No. 1 from "Fulgueras" to "Ordoña," petitioner's
maiden name; and (2) deletion of entries in the paternal information as provided in Item Nos.
13 to 17. She alleged that it was not Allan who signed the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity attached to the Certificate of Live Birth (Affidavit
of Acknowledgment) considering that Allan was not in the Philippines when she gave birth to
Alrich Paul.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner may seek the cancellation or correction of entries of Adrich’s
last name and filiation through Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
RULING
NO.
e legitimacy and filiation of children cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for
correction of entries in the certificate of live birth, the action filed in that case.
Article 164 of the Family Code provides that "children conceived or born during the marriage
of the parties are legitimate." Here, petitioner admitted to being in a valid and subsisting
marriage with Ariel when she conceived and gave birth to Alrich Paul. Thus, Alrich Paul is
presumed to be a legitimate child of petitioner and Ariel. However, looking at the Rule 108
petition in this case, petitioner, mother of Alrich Paul, in effect declared against her child's
legitimacy when she alleged that Alrich Paul was the child of Allan. Following the
pronouncement in Miller, petitioner's collateral attack of Alrich Paul's filiation cannot be
allowed in a Rule 108 proceeding. Thus, on this ground alone, the RTC should have
dismissed the Rule 108 petition
the direct action to impugn the legitimacy of a child must be brought by the proper parties
and within the period limited by law. petitioner is barred from impugning Alrich Paul's
presumed legitimacy considering the prohibition under Article 167 of the Family Code.
Article 167 provides that "[t]he child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress."
the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code is not conclusive.
It may be disputed based on the grounds and manner provided under Articles 166,
170, and 171 of the same law.
the rule is that the mother is barred from impugning or declaring against the legitimacy of her
child, and only the father, or in exceptional instances, his heirs, can contest in an appropriate
action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife based on any of the grounds enumerated
under Article 166 of the Family Code.
In the case, Ariel, the presumed father of Alrich Paul was not impleaded as a party. Being the
presumed father of Alrich Paul, Ariel has an interest that would be affected if the trial court
were to grant the reliefs sought by petitioner. His hereditary rights would be adversely
affected if the Court were to declare that Alrich Paul is not his legitimate child but Allan's
illegitimate child.
petitioner failed to establish the presence of exceptions to this rule. There is likewise no
indication in the records that Ariel, although not impleaded, was made aware of the petition
and the status of the proceedings.
RULES:
1. First, the mother who was in a valid and subsisting marriage at the time of conception
or giving birth to her child is prohibited under Article 167 of the Family Code from
impugning the legitimacy of her child. The proscription remains even if the mother is
an estranged wife.
2. Second, the child who was conceived or born during a valid and existing marriage has
no right to impugn his own legitimacy under the Family Code. He cannot choose his
own filiation.
3. Third, it is only the father, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, who may
impugn the child's legitimacy on grounds provided under Article 166 of the Family
Code within the periods provided under Article 170 in relation to Article 171 of the
Family Code. Upon the expiration of the periods, the status conferred by the
presumption becomes fixed and can no longer be questioned.
One of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of a child is that found in Article 166(1) (b)
of the Family Code, i.e., "that it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child because of x x x" "x x x the fact that the husband and wife
were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible."
However, there is no remedy under the law available to petitioner to dispute the presumption
of legitimacy accorded to Alrich Paul—not in a Rule 108 petition which must be dismissed
primarily for being a collateral attack and not in any other action by reason of her being the
mother of Alrich Paul.
It must be emphasized that the scenario under Article 166(1)(b) is a factual matter personally
known not only to the husband, but also the wife. And yet, Article 167 of the Family Code
prohibits the mother from impugning or declaring against the legitimacy of her child. Further,
the right to impugn belongs only to the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs.
Certainly, there is, in the words of Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, "[an] apparent
disparity between the mother's and the father's legal standing in assailing the legitimacy
and/or filiation of a child." [77] This runs counter to the provisions of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) to which the
Philippines is a state party.
Here, petitioner's declaration against the legitimacy of Alrich Paul is in conformity with the
provisions of the CEDAW but is regrettably prohibited under our national law. However, with
the current state of the laws, an illegitimate child's true filiation may never be recognized by
law because the husband, who is already living separately from the wife, may have no
interest in filing the appropriate action even if he knows that his wife gave birth to a child
with another man. Nevertheless, while there is a lacuna in the law, this is an opportune
moment to signal to the Legislature the incongruity between our domestic law and our
international obligation to eliminate the discrimination against women particularly in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations. Ultimately, the Legislature should be given
the opportunity to perform its primordial role of lawmaking.

Art. 152-162
Lucas vs. Lucas
G.R. No. 190710. June 6, 2011.*
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS
Petitioner filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission
of Parties to DNA Testing)
Petitioner narrated that his mother, Elsie, migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with a
certain Belen who worked in a prominent nightspot in Manila. Elsie would oftentimes
accompany Belen to work. On one occasion, Elsie got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S.
Lucas, at Belen’s workplace, and an intimate relationship developed between the two. Elsie
eventually got pregnant she gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioner’s
father was not stated in petitioner’s certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on told
petitioner that his father is respondent. Respondent allegedly extended financial support to
Elsie and petitioner for a period of about two years. When the relationship of Elsie and
respondent ended, Elsie refused to accept respondent’s offer of support and decided to raise
petitioner on her own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several attempts to
introduce petitioner to respondent, but all attempts were in vain.
Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of
the petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial court and obtained a
copy of the petition.
the RTC, acting on respondent’s motion for reconsideration, issued an Order6 dismissing the
case. The court opined that petitioner must first establish these four procedural aspects before
he can present evidence of paternity and filiation, which may include incriminating acts or
scientific evidence like blood group test and DNA test results.
ISSUE/ RULING
whether it was necessary, in the first place, to serve summons on respondent for the court to
acquire jurisdiction over the case.
NO.
an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi
in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person’s interest in a
property to a corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed against the “thing” itself or
the res, which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of
marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal
process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the
institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made
effective.
The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the simple filing
of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over
the case. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is
notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who
might be minded to make an objection of any sort to the right sought to be established.24
Through publication, all interested parties are deemed notified of the petition.
If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of
vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.
The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court, which requires the complaint to contain a plain, concise, and direct statement
of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim.

Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.
YES.
The Court ruled that during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner
must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order
remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether
there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of
evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative,
the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.

Salas vs. Matusalem

G.R. No. 180284. September 11, 2013.*
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The action for support having been filed in the trial court when petitioner was still alive, it is
not barred under Article 175 (2) of the Family Code. We have also held that the death of the
putative father is not a bar to the action commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to be
his illegitimate child. The rule on substitution of parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, thus applies.
FACTS
Respondent claimed that petitioner is the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas. Petitioner
rented an apartment where respondent stayed and shouldered all expenses in the delivery of
their child, including the cost of caesarian operation and hospital confinement. However,
when respondent refused the offer of petitioner’s family to take the child from her, petitioner
abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives
and friends.
Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support
Murillo corroborated respondent’s testimony as to the payment by petitioner of apartment
rental, his weekly visits to respondent and financial support to her, his presence during and
after delivery of respondent’s baby, respondent’s attempted suicide through sleeping pills
overdose and hospitalization for which she paid the bill, her complaint before the police
authorities and meeting with petitioner’s wife at the headquarters.
ISSUE
whether or not respondent’s evidence sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the
illegitimate child of petitioner.
RULING
NO.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Christian Paulo Salas in which the
name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it was
only respondent who filled up the entries and signed the said document though she claims it
was petitioner who supplied the information she wrote therein.
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in
the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate,
the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent
evidence of paternity.
As to the Baptismal Certificate of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the
father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents,
they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so
specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with
respect to the child’s paternity.
The rest of respondent’s documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters,
hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment
unit. Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are
inconclusive evidence to prove paternity.
As to the handwritten notes of petitioner and respondent showing their exchange of
affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian
Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement
of admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were
authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the Family Code
which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a
private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are not
competent proof of paternity and the totality of respondent’s evidence failed to establish
Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner.
a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation.
The action for support having been filed in the trial court when petitioner was still alive, it is
not barred under Article 175 (2) of the Family Code. We have also held that the death of the
putative father is not a bar to the action commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to be
his illegitimate child. The rule on substitution of parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, thus applies.

Aguilar vs. Siasat

G.R. No. 200169. January 28, 2015.*
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and
relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said
document constitutes an “admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.”

FACTS
Aguilar spouses died, intestate and without debts. Included in their estate are two parcels of
land. petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed a civil case for mandatory injunction with damages
against respondent Edna G. Siasat.
the Complaint alleged that petitioner is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar
spouses; that he (petitioner) discovered that the subject titles were missing, and thus he
suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could have stolen the same; that he executed
affidavits of loss of the subject titles and filed the same with the Registries of Deeds
ISSUE
Whether or not the SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and
relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code
RULING
YES.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record
of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
In a case the Court ruled that, “A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were
born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify
Danilo de Jesus as being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more
firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than
the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.”
Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it must be concluded that
petitioner — who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar28 and before their respective deaths29 — has sufficiently proved
that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses.
Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and
relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said
document constitutes an “admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.”
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all the records
covering the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed,
which necessitated the introduction of other documentary evidence — particularly Alfredo
Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”) — to prove filiation.
As to petitioner’s argument that respondent has no personality to impugn his legitimacy and
cannot collaterally attack his legitimacy, and that the action to impugn his legitimacy has
already prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, the Court has held
before that —
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove
that a person is not a man’s child by his wife. However, the present case is not one
impugning petitioner’s legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that
petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all.

Heirs of Paula C. Fabillar vs. Paller

G.R. No. 231459. January 21, 2019.*
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
As a general rule, a declaration of heirship can only be made in a special proceeding
inasmuch as what is sought is the establishment of a status or right by way of exception, the
need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be
dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence
regarding the issue of heirship,” and “the trial court had consequently rendered judgment
upon the issues it defined during the pretrial,”
FACTS
The instant case stemmed from an Amended Complaint5 for Recovery of Ownership,
Possession, and Damages filed by respondents against the Custodio, involving a 3.1003-
hectare parcel of agricultural coconut land.
Respondents claimed that the subject land was a portion of a bigger parcel of land originally
owned by their grandfather, Marcelino. After the latter’s death, his children, Ambrosio, Isidra,
and Ignacia, along several others, orally partitioned his properties and took possession of
their respective shares.
The Custodios claimed to be legitimate and compulsory heirs of Marcelino who can validly
and legally possess the subject land which has not been partitioned, and thus, commonly
owned by his heirs.
ISSUE
Whether or not the filiation of Ambrosio to Marcelino can only be successfully proved by
virtue of a declaration of heirship by a competent court in a special proceeding, absent which,
respondents cannot claim any right over the subject land.
RULING
NO.
A special proceeding for declaration of heirship is not necessary in the present case,
considering that the parties voluntarily submitted the issue of heirship before the trial court.
Notably, the issue of whether or not Ambrosio is one of the children of Marcelino was
squarely raised by both parties in their respective pretrial briefs.
As a general rule, a declaration of heirship can only be made in a special proceeding
inasmuch as what is sought is the establishment of a status or right by way of exception, the
need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be
dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence
regarding the issue of heirship,” and “the trial court had consequently rendered judgment
upon the issues it defined during the pretrial,” as in this case

Ambrosio’s baptismal certificate cannot be considered as competent proof of the claimed

filiation with Marcelino.
In the absence of the record of birth and admission of legitimate filiation, Article 17250 of the
Family Code (Code) provides that filiation shall be proved by any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws. Such other proof of one’s filiation may be a baptismal
certificate, xxxx
However, it is jurisprudentially settled that a baptismal certificate has evidentiary value to
prove filiation only if considered alongside other evidence of filiation. while it may be
considered a public document, “it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament on the date specified, but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s
paternity.” As such, a baptismal certificate alone is not sufficient to resolve a disputed
filiation, and the courts must peruse other pieces of evidence instead of relying only on a
canonical record.
In this case, the MCTC, the RTC, and the CA did not appreciate any other material proof
related to the baptismal certificate of Ambrosio that would establish his filiation with
Marcelino, whether as a legitimate or an illegitimate son. Contrary to the ruling of the said
courts, the burden of proof is on respondents to establish their affirmative allegation that
Marcelino is Ambrosio’s father, and not for petitioners to disprove the same, because a
baptismal certificate is neither conclusive proof of filiation/parentage nor of the status of
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person baptized
Arts. 175-176
Aquino vs. Aquino,
G.R. Nos. 208912 & 209018, December 7, 2021

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Art 177-182
BBB vs. AAA
G.R. No. 193225. February 9, 2015.*
REYES, J.:
Alleging psychological violence and economic abuse, AAA anchored her application for the
issuance of a TPO and a PPO on the basis of the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. In the instant
petition, what is essentially being assailed is the PPO issued by the RTC and which was
affirmed by the CA. The rules, however, intend that cases filed under the provisions of R.A.
No. 9262 be not subjects of compromise agreements.
FACTS
Both alleged that they first met in 1991 but started to date seriously only in 1996. [AAA] was
then a medical student and was raising her first child borne from a previous relationship, a
boy named [CCC], with the help of her parents. During the relationship with [BBB], [AAA]
bore two more children namely, [DDD] (born on December 11, 1997) and [EEE] (born on
October 19, 2000).
To legalize their relationship, [BBB] and [AAA] married in civil rights on October 10, 2002
and thereafter, the birth certificates of the children, including [CCC’s], was amended to
change their civil status to legitimated by virtue of the said marriage. However, their
relationship turned sour. [AAA] brought the children with her and left the conjugal home.
On the ground of economic and psychological abuse, [AAA] filed an application for the
issuance of a Temporary Protection Order with a request to make the same permanent after
due hearing.
Finding good ground in [AAA’s] application, the court a quo issued a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO). The TPO was thereafter, made permanent by virtue of a Decision of the RTC
Pending the Court’s deliberation of the instant case, BBB filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Render Judgment Based on a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).16 BBB alleges that on
July 29, 2013, he and AAA had entered into a compromise anent the custody, exercise of
parental authority over, and support of DDD and EEE.
ISSUE
Whether or not the case may be subjected to compromise agreement.
RULING
NO.
The instant petition is not a proper subject of a compromise agreement.
Alleging psychological violence and economic abuse, AAA anchored her application for the
issuance of a TPO and a PPO on the basis of the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. In the instant
petition, what is essentially being assailed is the PPO issued by the RTC and which was
affirmed by the CA. The rules, however, intend that cases filed under the provisions of R.A.
No. 9262 be not subjects of compromise agreements.
AM No. 10-4-16-SC, on the other hand, directs the referral to mediation of all issues under
the Family Code and other laws in relation to support, custody, visitation, property relations
and guardianship of minor children, excepting therefrom those covered by R.A. No. 9262.

The courts a quo committed no error in issuing a PPO against BBB.

the choices of the children as with whom they would prefer to stay would alter the effects of
the PPO. Hence, this Court affirms the herein assailed PPO relative to who shall be granted
custody over the three children, how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and the
amount and manner of providing financial support, which are matters the RTC is now
directed to determine with dispatch.
The Court notes BBB’s manifestation that he and AAA had arrived at an amicable settlement
as regards the issues of custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of DDD and
EEE. While these matters can be lawful subjects of compromise, AAA’s vacillation, as
expressed by her counsel, compels the Court to exercise prudence by directing the RTC to
resolve with finality the aforesaid issues. The parties are, however, not precluded from
entering into a compromise as regards the aforesaid issues, but the Court now requires the
RTC’s direct supervision lest the parties muddle the issues anew and fail to put an end to their
bickering.