Don’t Vote, Develop a Real People’s Movement

Revolutionary People’s Front, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist

La Paz, Bolivia, 2012

Translated by Comrade Lucas

luchaliberation@protonmail.com
Contents

Introduction 1

1. The Pact of the Ruling Classes 4

2. The Results of Negotiation 12
3. Semi-Feudalism in Bolivia 18
3.1 Perks, Quotas, and Caudillaje:
Expressions of Semi-Feudalism 23
4. Semi-Colonialism in Bolivia 26
4.1 The State: The Lever of a Faction of
the Big Bourgeoisie 28
5. The Union Aristocracy 32
6. The Role of Revisionism 36
7. The Necessity to Organize a Proletarian Party 40
8. Don’t Vote, Develop a Real People’s Movement 43
Introduction

1
 Collusion and conflict, unity and struggle. That is the
dynamic of the ruling class, of the factions of the big
bourgeoisie and the landowners. Relative unity, constant
struggle, political calculation, the degree to which one yields
to the other in terms of the distribution of State benefits –
that is what the Bolivian people have seen during the 2008
political process.
The intensification of the struggle between the
bureaucrat-bourgeoisie (represented by the government) and
the comprador-bourgeoisie and the landowners (represented
by the opposition, the media luna)1 to impose their
government projects and the restructuring of the State
resulted in a pact, sealed by the draft Political Constitution
which will be voted on on January 25 th, 2009. The
predictions of civil war and a split in Bolivia on behalf of
the pessimists of one faction or another ultimately
amounted to nothing.
The explanation for this absence of “fatalities” is that
the ruling classes do not just commit suicide; on the
contrary, when the old State (which they refer to as
“democratic”) is threatened, they forge pacts and resolve
their contradictions. This is why the accentuation of their
differences is a preliminary step to collusion or agreement.
It was within this context that the 2008 street
demonstrations took place. The political negotiation
between each faction of the ruling class resulted in a pact in

1 Media luna (half moon) refers to a group of majority-Mestizo and

white-minority provinces in northeastern Bolivia – Santa Cruz,
Beni, Tarija, and Pando – whose prefects and local administrators
staunchly oppose the government of the MAS and Evo Morales,
instead supporting more conservative parties like the National
Council for Democracy (CONALDE).

2
accordance with this deployment of forces on the battlefield.
As always, the people supplied the dead and wounded.

3
1. The Pact of the Ruling Classes

4
 As we have pointed out before, the government of
Evo Morales is reformist, and seeks to restructure the
Bolivian State, which is in the midst of deep crisis. To this
end, it applies the program of the bureaucrat-bourgeoisie,
first applied in 1952 by the Revolutionary Nationalist
Movement (MNR). This signifies that the struggles between
the government and the opposition (the struggle between
representatives of the factions of the big bourgeoisie) are
contradictions between a bureaucrat-bourgeois program on
the one hand, and the comprador-bourgeois program on the
other. These are contradictions between the ruling classes
and not a contradiction between “the people and the
rightists,” as the opportunists and revisionists in the
government proclaim.
The program of the bureaucrat-bourgeoisie of 1952
advocated for the formation of the “national bourgeoisie”
capable of leading the country out of its backwardness and
misery. In addition, it carried out liberal-democratic
reforms, nationalization of the mines, and agrarian reform
under pressure from the miners and peasant masses. The
agrarian program of that time ostensibly proposed to put an
end to the latifundia, but in eastern Bolivia, the reform
initiated the tendency of land concentration in the hands of
a few “new” landowners. They advocated for a “class
alliance” to wage the “national revolution.” According to
certain movimientismo (MNR) theorists, the working class
is an insignificant factor in waging socialist revolution.
The bureaucrat-bourgeoisie first arose in the 1930s,
but it was not until 1950 that it assumed leadership of the
old State and began to implement its program. In the
subsequent years (1950-1985), the struggle of the factions of
the big bourgeoisie continued in order to divide the benefits

5
of the State among themselves. In the 1980s, during the
Popular Democratic Unity (UDP) government, a great State
crisis occurred, followed by the total bankruptcy of the
bureaucrat-bourgeois program. In 1985, the comprador
faction regained leadership of the State. Once again, the
MNR, its most pro-imperialist wing, lead this process,
applying the program of old liberalism, now called
“neoliberalism.” Factional conflict intensified once again, but
this time, the comprador-bourgeoisie came out on top.
The current situation reflects the new struggle over
leadership of the State. In view of the crisis of the State and
of the comprador program, the Movement for Socialism
(MAS) joined the battle for the government in 2004,
although its accumulation of forces began as far back as the
1990s. Emerging from the popular sectors, the MAS
undertook the defense of the old State in the name of
“defending democracy,” whereupon it adopted the old
program of the bureaucrat-bourgeoisie, though clothed in
indigenous garb to lend itself more credence in the eyes of
the Bolivian people. In the same way as the bourgeois
liberal reforms, the MAS incorporates the inclusion of
indigenous people in the political decisions of the country
because, according to the MAS, “the indigenous peoples
have traditionally been excluded from the destinies of the
Fatherland,” and from State administration.
At this point, the pact forged between the
government and the opposition should come as a surprise.
The vision of Evo Morales’ government is nothing more
than the vision of the ruling classes, committed to an
exploitative State of hunger and crime.
In 2005, while the people were struggling and
demanding the expulsion of the transnational corporations

6
(as part of the October 2003 agenda), Evo Morales declared:
“Out of ignorance, I asked the transnational companies to
leave. Now, I understand the necessity of conducting
business with them.” The government’s “anti-imperialist”
stance revolves around this axis, and is complemented by
the maxim: “We want partners, not bosses” [Queremos
socios y no patrones] when it comes to conducting
negotiations with transnational corporations. The
“maturity” of Morales’ statements and lines of thought go
hand-in-hand with the necessity to administer the
government in the form of an alliance with the comprador-
bourgeoisie and landowner sectors.
Álvaro García Linera, Vice President and contrite
former militant of the armed struggle, clearly expressed to
the magazine Nueva Sociedad no. 209 in May 2007 that the
government seeks an “agreed-upon redistribution of power.”
Regarding the reforms in the erstwhile Constituent
Assembly, he said: “Our objective is to come to an
agreement,” referring, of course, to the conflict with the
opposition (the comprador-bourgeoisie and the landowners).
“What the elites must understand is that they now must
share decisions with the Indians,” he said. Regarding his
vision of the so-called “process of change,” he says: “It is an
expansion of the [types of people who compose the] elites,
an expansion of rights, and a redistribution of wealth.”
The necessity of forming a pact with the opposition
was also clearly stated by Evo Morales in a different speech
after the August 2008 recall referendum. While his
ccorreligionarios implored him to take a hard stance against
the opposition, Evo said: “We are convinced that this
[referendum] is critical to unite Bolivians, and the
participation of the people, through their vote, serves to

7
unite the different sectors of the countryside and of the city,
of the east and west; and this unity will be achieved by
assembling [juntado] the new Political Constitution of the
Bolivian State [i.e., the government’s proposal] with the
statues on autonomy [the media luna proposals.] This is the
best way to unite the Bolivian people.”
Only revisionist and opportunist foolishness can blind
one to this dynamic of collusion and conflict, mainly
because these revisionists and opportunists have jobs in the
government itself.
The ruling classes feel that this pact is necessary for
several different reasons:

1. Intense polarization may endanger the interests of

the ruling class as a whole.
2. The factions of the big bourgeoisie have no interest
in crushing each other. In the final analysis, their
contradictions are non-antagonistic.
3. The sharpening of these contradictions weakens the
State and unlocks the struggle of the masses.
4. The rise of mass struggle, convoked by both factions,
threatened to buck [salir] the corporate control to
which they are subjected under the direction of their
leaders. There existed a danger of overtaking those
leaders.

For this reason, the government and the opposition

initiated clandestine negotiations. In public, they egged on
one another’s bases with demonstrations of force.
The pact showed that, as has traditionally been the
case, the old partisan forces (the MNR, PODEMOS [Social-
Democratic Power], National Unity, and the MAS) have the

8
power to define a situation, and that the Constituent
Assembly never possessed original or foundational power, as
was claimed by those who believed in the re-foundation of
the country. The assemblymen were left playing the part of
useful idiots and decorative figureheads of the Evo Morales’
government’s “process of change.”
Just so that there is no doubt as to the government’s
conception of these events, it is necessary to look at some
illuminating statements from one of the main players of the
political negotiations, Álvaro García Linera. In a public
forum held last November in La Paz called “Power and
Change in Bolivia, 2003-2007,” he said:
“The new Constitution pact would have been
impossible if not for a moment of war in our history… The
assembly of the senators has led to a strange mix of them
saying ‘I cede this, but not that,’ and of them calling upon
the CAO [the Agricultural Chamber of Eastern Bolivia, a
group of Bolivian landowners], [Fidel] Surco [top leader of
CONALCAM],2 and the COB [Bolivian Workers’ Center] to
help draft those inclusive pacts… The standard of
agreement was very lively, in some way inaugurating what
will surely lead to future political pacts, both congressional
and extra-congressional, channeled through a congressional
event… At the same time, this new modality of substantial
social negotiation would have been impossible without a
brief moment of tension, which I referred to as a bifurcation
point, which I believe has now taken place – that moment of
showing off forces. Not necessarily the brutal deployment of
force, but the war-like showing-off of forces, along with
small clashes, all in view of how much will be conceded and

2 CONALCAM – Syndicalist Confederation of Intercultural

Communities

9
how much will be retained; and all, in its own way, leading
to new armistices and capitulations. I believe that this
democratic construction, or this enrichment of the
democratic pact which has taken place over the last few
months, would have been impossible without this previous
war-like dramatization of the correlation of forces… In
Bolivia, this moment of a plain, brutal show of force, has
caused almost 20 deaths… [The opposition] never were big
believers in persistence, and I believe that the moment that
they understood we weren’t just going to leave [our
demands on the table] like that, that we were ready for
anything… that was what led to the two gigantic moments
of mobilization organized around Santa Cruz… and its state
of siege.”3

The necessity, in the minds of the “government

strategists,” to form a pact with media luna is very clear.
Management and political calculation in the midst of
confrontation between the government and the opposition,
the corporatist usage of the union sectors and the masses,
the secret negotiations held with businessmen, landowners,
and opposition political leaders, and the organization of
protests (which the government and its allies called
“spontaneous marches on behalf of the social movements”)
were all according to their plan, with the ultimate goal of
coming to the table to negotiate.
We Maoists have maintained that the sharpening of
political factional struggle is the first step towards coming
to the negotiations table. The nature of this confrontation is

3 This passage has been somewhat reduced for brevity, as the original
quotation was several pages long. The relevant excerpts have been
left over. - TRANS.

10
oriented in such a way that it averts danger for the State.
García Linera confessed as much when he said: “I believe
that this “I believe that this democratic construction, or this
enrichment of the democratic pact which has taken place
over the last few months, would have been impossible
without this previous war-like dramatization of the
correlation of forces…” This is an expression of the behavior
of the ruling classes and their need to negotiate for
coexistence in holding power. García exposed the fact that
the government felt the need for this agreement ages ago.
That is why the “war-like staging” led “to force… mainly on
behalf… of the opposition.”
Faced with this modus operandi of the MAS, these
pompous arguments put forward by revisionism are nothing
more than vile complicity, and a swindling of the Bolivian
people in their struggles to undermine a government
program, with the justification that the program’s intention
is to put an end to capitalism, that it is dismantling
neoliberalism, and that it has initiated the march toward
socialism. The labor of the revisionists, in fact, serves only
to sustain the old State in the midst of unsalvageable crisis,
and for the old State to continue exploiting the people.
Certainly, the government’s negotiation tact has
allowed it to retake the political initiative that it was losing.
It has weakened the opposition and has strengthened the
bureaucratic faction through the force of control of the
State.
This does not mean that the people will gain
anything. The result embodied by the new constitutional
project is but a taste of how special interests have been
traded between one faction and the other. A constitutional
reform will not alter the situation of the exploited classes.

11
2. The Results of the Negotiation

12
 Bolivia spent more than a year paying off the
expenses of a Constituent Assembly that failed to yield any
concrete results. It never possessed the foundational power
that it claimed it did, and failed to impose itself even in the
face of reactionary sabotage in the city of Sucre. The
unfortunate culmination of this sabotage resulted in three
dead – a lawyer, a carpenter, and a university student, shot
by police in a military barracks.
A year following these events in October 2008, the
government and the Congressional opposition approved
changes to more than 100 articles of the Constitution
drafted by constituents near the end of 2007, out of 400
total articles.
The MAS proposal approved by the Constituent
Assembly in Oruro in December 2007 was itself a slew of
contradictions, in which liberal spirit prevailed, and in
which the greatest benefit for the indigenous sectors was
cultural recognition, their right to autonomy through a
vague application, and “social control” that, to this day, has
failed to be effective in any way. The proposal also limited
the size of the latifundio from 10,000 to 5,000 hectares.
The reactionary forces had not made any major
observations regarding the economic question. National
Unity (UN), the party of businessman Samuel Doria
Medina, stated that it expressed no disagreements, and that
its members had participated in the session to approve the
Oruro text. Tuto Quiroga’s party, PODEMOS, pointed out
that the government’s constitution attacked private
property, but this argument was simply part of the
opposition’s propaganda campaign. Evo Morales’ reforms
never even dreamed of ending private property. Its leaders
make this clear on a daily basis through the press.

13
 But things began to change in October of 2008, when
the text approved by the Constituent Assembly was
submitted to Congress for revision. There, opposition
politicians were kept updated on negotiations between the
government and representatives of the media luna.
Throughout the negotiations, PODEMOS and media luna
Congressman Pablo Klinski publicly announced that they
were 99% of the way towards reaching a “happy agreement,”
and that the obervsations of the Santa Cruz civic
organizations were more of form and not of substance.
Klinski asked the MAS to be more flexible in these
secondary observations in order to reach a better
agreement.
In the end, the October 2008 negotiations modified
more than 100 articles of the original text. Among the most
important issues subject to the negotiations were
[provincial] autonomies, social control, and landownership.
Autonomy was demanded by the ruling classes of eastern
Bolivia and Chaco, with the Santa Cruz Civic Committee as
the main proponent. The agreed-upon proposal includes, in
part, the jurisdictions of “autonomic statutes” drafted by the
“civic” committees, who, particularly in Santa Cruz, went so
far as to propose a small State structure within the Bolivian
State, which would grant them the power to control natural
resources in their regions, land entitlement, intervention in
education, health and justice policies, and even the creation
of a paramilitary-police organ for the protection of future
departmental authorities. Legislative faculties for the
autonomous departments was a concession granted by the
MAS government to the “cívicos,” who were able to obtain
26 exclusive jurisdictions to administer part of the State in
their respective regions, aside from the purview shared with

14
the State itself, which was to be defined at some point in
the future. Despite this, a minority in the opposition still
claims that the Constitution does not recognize
departmental autonomy.
“Social control” was the most trimmed-up [recortado]
issue when it came to the negotiations of the big
bourgeoisie. Initially, the “social control” proposal, drafted
by the rank-and-files [grassroots] of the MAS, was presented
as a suprapower, handed over to society to control the
different tiers of the State and avoid the “old evils” like
corruption, the granting of perks [prebendalismo], political
quotas, etc. But, within the framework of the old State,
“social control” can only function as an official apparatus of
appropriation. This is the case of the vigilance committees,
school boards, and basic territorial organizations (OTBs),
created by the comprador-bourgeoisie during the so-called
“neoliberal period.” That is why this proposal from the MAS
rank-and-file, though possibly drafted with good intentions,
is inapplicable to a bureaucrat-landowner State, where the
“old evils” are rooted in its very structure. Also, the idea
was dismissed by the MAS government representatives
themselves. García Linera stated at the aforementioned
“Power and Change” forum:
“Allow me to comment on how this elimination of the
measure for social control in the State structure, which was
originally present in Oruro, came about. One of the
elements of the negotiations that took place at the national
leadership level, as well as at the intermediate leadership
level [of MAS], who participated in the entire process of
reforming the Constitution… was the idea of the State as an
externality subject to control by the social movement,
versus the idea of the State as something belonging to

15
oneself, of which one is a part. Fellow members said, ‘If we
are the State, we are therefore the government, the prefects,
the councilmen, the senators, the deputies, the presidents of
YPFB [Bolivian Fiscal Oil Deposits], the Chancellor… Why
should we have something to control ourselves, as if we are
opposed to the movement?’ That was a very lively area of
debate.”
For García Linera, the discussion surrounding “social
control” has to do with the class nature of the old State. Its
logic introduces nefarious propaganda: that indigenous and
union leaders occupy positions in the administration of the
old State (in the capacity of deputies, directors, and
ministers), implying that the indigenous and trade union
sectors have taken hold of the reins of the State. MAS
political operatives, through this simplistic logic, try to
make us believe that the masses, or their leaders, are
administering the old State, and that therefore, self-control
[in the context of the State representatives instituting
measures to combat the “old evils” – TRANS.] would be
useless.
A secondary aspect that confirms these statements is
that the central decisions to alter the Constitution in
Congress were subject to consultation by the President of
the Republic himself, thereby rejecting versions of those
alterations that try to implicate Evo Morales’ responsibility
in the negotiations.
The issue of landownership was the biggest
concession in favor of the landowners. According to Carlos
Romero, the Minister of Agriculture, the government
negotiated with the CAO, who agreed to put the issue of
the latifundio limit (5,000 or 10,0000 hectares) for
properties acquired after January 25th, 2009, to a

16
referendum. Article 399 of the proposed “new” Constitution,
however, states that the delimitation of the latifundio will
not be retroactive, in other words, that respect for the
currently existing haciendas and latifundios will be
guaranteed. In synthesis, the constitutional project protects
the interests of the disputing factions (the comprador- and
bureaucrat-bourgeoisie), as well as the landowners.
Propaganda about the destruction of the latifundio
was a central characteristic of the government’s response to
the democratic and historical demand for land on behalf of
the Bolivian people, the peasantry in particular. This
demands was not resolved by the agrarian reform of 1953,
which only allowed semi-feudalism to evolve, thereby
consolidating landownership in eastern Bolivia and
generating minifundia throughout the western area of the
country.
The penetration of capitalism in the countryside by
the formation of agro-industry has not eliminated servitude
in agrarian production, nor has it eliminated gamonalismo
as a political practice. Together with the latifundista, they
are the highest expression of the survival of semi-feudalism,
upon rests the development of bureaucrat-capitalism.
This government measure only signifies that the
landlord path has been once again consolidated. In order to
convince its peasant base otherwise, the MAS spreads the
discourse that unproductive lands will be expropriated from
the landowners. This propaganda has garnered the applause
of CONALCAM and all the other leaders appropriated by
the government.

17
3. Semi-Feudalism in Bolivia

18
 The acute expressions of the contradictions between
the factions of the ruling class have exposed the survival of
semi-feudalism.
Although the structure of the power of the
landowners and the comprador-bourgeoisie in our country,
more deeply-rooted in the Santa Cruz region than anywhere
else, has indeed developed through concessions from the
State like subsidies, tax exemptions, perks, corruption, etc.,
its principal impetus is the accumulation of surplus value –
a product of the exploitation of the labor force of the vast
majority of workers and peasants in those areas.
The colonization of the Amazon and the Bolivian
Chaco, in terms of agricultural exploitation, dates back to
the Bohan Plan of the 1940s, and was consolidated through
property entitlement via the Agrarian Reform Law of 1953,
thereby reproducing the old social relations which prevailed
in the hands of the hacendados in the western areas of the
country – La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, and Potosí. The
latifundio, servitude, and gamonalismo are the living
expressions of semi-feudalism that dominate not only the
so-called media luna, but also in the western areas of the
country – although to varying degrees and in a renovated,
disguised form.
The large properties, which, in some cases, can be as
large as half a million hectares, have flexed their muscles in
this conflict. The conflicts between the government and the
opposition have exposed the existence of large properties in
Santa Cruz, Beni, and Pando, whose size in area exceed the
size of the Santa Cruz urbana. The landowning families own
upwards of 10,000, 50,000, 100,000, and even 500,000
hectares, among them forests, lakes, lagoons, access roads,
etc. These large properties are areas on which “agro-

19
industrial” production, cattleranching, lumber extraction,
and the use of land for financial speculation, are
concentrated.
In addition to this, the existence of so-called “captive
communities,” have made headlines. On “captive
communities,” people living on the owners’ properties are
subject to servitude and hard labor just to have food in
their bellies and a roof over their heads. Services such as
health, education, and others are managed entirely by the
owners. These relations of abject servitude exist not only in
the Bolivian Chaco (a region that includes the departments
of Santa Cruz, Tarija, and Chuquisaca), where the
unproductive and “old type” of landowners live, but also in
areas as north as Beni and Pando, in which “empatronada” 4
communities exist.
In addition to this, the peasants suffer under
relations of servitude during the harvest period (of chestnut,
sugarcane, among others). In many cases, they do not work
for a salary, but based on the exchange of products. In
others, the landowners utilize theinfamous habilito system
(advance payment in cash and/or in-kind) to force the
worker into deep debt and chain the zafrero5 to the worst
exploitative conditions. These forms currently intersect with
labor retention in various forms – all without payment.
According to some academics, in the indigenous
communities of the Chiquitanía, indigenous children are
kidnapped to “accompany” the children of the employer on
the hacienda or ranch.

4 Equivalent to “empatronaged”.
5 In Bolivia, a peasant who harvests sugarcane.

20
 In addition to the widespread minifundio and
sharecropping in western Bolivia, these conditions give us a
clear idea of the persistence of semi-feudalism.
Another important element of semi-feudalism,
gamonalismo, was also on the upswing throughout this
dispute in the government. José Carlos Mariátegui pointed
out that: “The term gamonalismo designates more than just
a social and economic category: that of the latifundistas or
large landowners. It signifies a whole phenomenon.
gamonalismo is represented not only by the gamonales but
by a long hierarchy of officials, intermediaries, agents,
parasites, etc. The literate Indian who enters the service of
gamonalismo turns into an exploiter of his own race. The
central factor of the phenomenon is the hegemony of the
semi-feudal landed estate in the policy and mechanism of
the government. Therefore, it is this factor that should be
acted upon if the evil is to be attacked at its roots and not
merely observed in its temporary or subsidiary
manifestations.” (Our emphases)
In other words, gamonalismo is political management
in the function of landowner power. Gamonalismo is
organized in Bolivia is several different ways, and is also
known as caciquismo. The conflicts between the government
and the opposition has clearly exposed, as is the case in the
Pando prefecture, the existence of an entire political
organization at the service of the landowners – an entire
branch of senior and junior officials, engineers, technicians,
journalists, and even service personnel, who carry out their
activities in accordance with the policies set forth by the big
landowners. This situation is replicated with more or less
similarity in other departmental governments, particularly
those in which the latifundio maintains a strong presence.

21
 However, this process is also replicated at the central
government level by the MAS. Corruption and perks have
been far from the exception in the Evo Morales
administration. Every citizen that has ever experienced the
unfortune of filling out paperwork for a State agency
understands that corruption persists, as does the handing-
out of jobs upon the recommendation of a union leader
linked to the government. There is also the sale of such
endorsements in order to obtain government positions,
which has involved even senior MAS leaders, including
many deputies and a senator. This fact, based on which
Morales has criticized his colleagues for being “caught” in
action by the press, has been forgotten. The most recent
case occurred in Cochabamba prefecture, in which Rafael
Puente of the MAS was forced to resign as a prefect after
three months in office. He denounced the plunder of public
administration under the auspices of Evo Morales himself.
The management of State institutions, which Puente refers
to as the existence of a “patrimonial State,” exposes the
survival of semi-feudal forms even in the political
superstructure.
In another aspect of gamonalismo, the landowners
(linked closely to the comprador-bourgeoisie), through re-
adapting groups of armed thugs [pistoleros] that are
widespread in their territories, promote the so-called “civic
organizations.” These armed thugs repress the peasantry
and suppress popular struggles (sometimes led by the
government.)
Although the actions of these groups maintain a
fascist character due to their brutality and particular
contempt for the peasantry and indigenous people, the fact
is that they are renewed expressions of the gamonal at the

22
service of the big landowners, organized and finance by
them. They are also part of the entire departmental power
structure. The civic leaders and prefectural authorities
themselves know that these “youth groups” are necessary to
crush the emergence of popular struggle, along with the
actions promoted by the MAS government.

3.1. Perks, Quotas, and Caudillaje: Expressions of

Semi-Feudalism

An expression of semi-feudalism found in the political

superstructure is the management of the State as an
institution for the reaping of political spoils [botín] or
agrarian parcels. These “political quotas,” widely practiced
by previous governments, continues today in the current
government. The government’s leaders usually send certain
individuals to obtain jobs in the administration of the State,
accompanied by a letter of recommendation. This struggle
for administrative positions unleashed a veritable crisis in
the MAS in 2007, which generated confusion between its
“militants” and “invitees.” These forms, known as padrinaje
[patronage] or compadrazgo [lit. “co-parenthood,” but used in
this context to essentially mean “sponsorship” – TRANS.]
have been denounced by the State administration.
However, it has been justified by certain MAS
leaders, who have demanded their power quotas by saying
that the State must be “decolonized” through a change of
current officials for other indigenous ones. The murderous
Armed Forces have also had their share of power granted by
the government to buy the loyalty of the high command. To
this end, Morals has even declared that the Bolivian Armed
Forces are now “revolutionary armed forces.” Several former

23
commanders of the Armed Forces and the police are now
directors and vice ministers in the State administration, in
National Customs, in the Ministry of Defense, and in Pando
prefecture.
Another failure of the government’s form of political
management has been the caudillismo [caudillo – military
leader, often dictatorial – TRANS.] of Evo Morales, who is
usually the individual who has the final say on who or who
does not serve in the State administration. The particular
policy applied by Evo Morales consists of lowering the
profile of a leader (even by humiliation) who begins to
emerge with a certain degree of strength within the MAS.
Or, to entirely eliminate an official when he steps out of line
as dictated by the caudillo. In several cases, these targeted
officials first learned of their removal through the press.
Former MAS militants deputy Guillermo Beckar and
senator Guideo Guardia each separately denounced cases of
corruption within the government, and were subsequently
subject to this process and kicked out of the MAS.
For the government, that which is not useful is
discarded. A particularly illustrative case is that of Army
General General César López, former President of National
Customs. Although some sectors of the people questioned
his appointment, as López was involved in the October 2003
massacre, the government of Evo Morales defended the
military officer by stating that he was a “great patriot.” But
when López denounced the powerful minister Juan Ramón
Quintana for supporting smuggling [contrabando] and
corruption in the Pando department, López became the
victim of a government propaganda campaign, who
identified him as the perpetrator of the October 2003
massacre and the mastermind behind the “disarmament of

24
the Armed Forces” (the delivery of missiles to the US), facts
that were widely-known before the MAS took office. Here,
the Manichean management of the government stands out
clearly. They do not even explain to their rank-and-file why
the “now-genocidal” López was, until recently, considered a
“patriotic military man” and the moral reserve of the State.
The caudillo spirit in the governing party shows its clear
contempt for its own rank-and-file.

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4. Semi-Colonialism in Bolivia

26
 Considering all of these elements, we can see that the
survival of semi-feudalism, linked to semi-colonialism by
way of imperialist domination, develops bureaucrat-
capitalism.
Only opportunism and revisionism, in tandem with
government officials, propagate the fallacy that our country
is no longer subject to imperialism. Many diverse theories
have been elaborated in pursuit of this task, from those that
proclaim that our country has broken free of imperialist
domination, to the one that recognizes only the Yankee
government as imperialistic, obfuscating the imperialist
roles of the European powers, Russia, and China. Sizable
Yankee and European investments in the hydrocarbon and
mining industries show the enormous dependence of our
country’s national economy. Added to this is our country’s
subordination to the “international market.” The Bolivian
government has repeatedly spread anti-imperialist discourse,
and has repeatedly attacked one or another Yankee
government official or institution, who it inevitably accuses
of collaborating with the opposition.
In the past, the bureaucrat-bourgeoisie has used this
characteristic anti-Yankee discourse in order to encourage
investment from other imperialist powers. At the regional
level, this is exemplified by the [Hugo] Chávez government,
who, despite its business ties to the Yankees, seeks to
establish ties with Europe or Russia to diversify its options.
Bolivia is no exception. It has courted investments from
India and has a strong interest in encouraging investments
from Gazprom [Russia], the largest hydrocarbon exploration
company in the world, and which is a true political
expression of the hegemonic desires of the Russian
governments and its bourgeoisie.

27
 The posturing of Evo Morales in his discourse is not
anti-imperialist. At best, it is anti-Yankee or anti-Bush. As
Mariátegui said, one cannot be an anti-imperialist without
being an anti-capitalist; and this government has not taken
a single step in that direction.

4.1. The State: The Lever of a Faction of the Big

Bourgeoisie

One characteristic of the Bolivian State is that it

serves as a lever with which the ruling classes use to enrich
themselves and crush the popular sectors when they wage
direct struggles against the power it represents. Usage of the
State in this manner has always been criticized by
progressive academia or liberals. In fact, the big bourgeoisie
and the landowners have used, and continue to use, the
State as a lever with which to wrest countless business
benefits, such as subsidies, credit (which is never repaid),
rigged bidding, etc. Big business has been reserved for the
big business partners, and the bulk of the pie goes into the
pockets of the imperialist master.
This is State monopoly capitalism, which assumes
only superficial differences under the bureaucrat-bourgeoisie
(represented by the MAS.) Once again, García Linera
colorfully illustrates this type of management of the State,
this time in favor of the bureaucratic faction of the big
bourgeoisie: “The main mechanism of political pressure that
the ascendant bloc of power and the descendant bloc of
power have to consolidate their positions is the PGN
(National General Budget), the use of State resources.
When one closely examines the importance of the
consolidation of initiatives, for example, the contemporary

28
rise of China, or the modification of political structures in
the case of North America, it becomes abundantly clear
that the use of the PGN is the decisive factor.”
When García Linera speaks of the “ascendant” and
“descendant” blocs of power, he is of course referring to the
government and the opposition within this self-proclaimed
“process of change.” For us, this expresses the dispute
between the factions of the big bourgeoisie – the
bureaucrat- and comprador- factions, as opposed to a
struggle between the exploited and the exploiters.
Noteworthy here is also the Vice President’s confession of
using the State’s economic power to “consolidate political
positions” and propping up one of the factions of the big
bourgeoisie: “Simple things, such as [if] we have to buy
tractors; who do we buy them from? The businessman
linked to PODEMOS [Tuto Quiroga’s party]? Or the
businessman linked to the MNR [Gonzalo Sanchez de
Lozada’s party]?... Agreements are consolidated in these
distributions that are later cashed in when they raise their
hands [to vote for a particular resolution – TRANS.] in
Congress…”
The government of Evo Morales, which calls itself a
“people’s government,” does nothing but use the old State to
court compatible capitalists, and to undermine (with great
indifference) those with whom it is incompatible. At the
political level, it wrests permanent or temporary allegiance
from allies or opponents. The economic redistribution, over
which so many liberal economists fawn, is exclusively
favorable to the ruling classes to whom the old State offers
billions of dollars, while at the same time allocating mere
crumbs to the people through the Juancito Pinto and
Dignity bonuses, which require $200m annually.

29
 That is why the propaganda of the decolonization of
the State, of “getting rid of old State practices,” and of the
State being at the service of the people serves simply to
deceive the masses. In reality, García Linera is exposing the
way in which the bureaucratic-bourgeois program has been
consolidated – that is, in the same way that the plans of the
comprador-bourgeoisie were consolidated before. The only
difference is that, now, there are elements within the
government who were born in the popular sectors, although
with a tired and worn-out essence – old wine in new bottles.
García concludes his idea of managing the economy
with the goal of consolidating the “emerging power” with an
interesting hypothesis: “This is a personal hypothesis… For
States in the midst of transition, the main tool for the
consolidation of the ascendant power bloc is the PGN, more
so than the police, more so than discourse, and apart from
the issue of social mobilization…”
The “States in the midst of transition” to which he
refers are the countries of the Third World. From our
perspective, they are those countries in which bureaucrat-
capitalism has developed on a semi-feudal, semi-colonial
basis, in varying degrees of development and subjugation.
The important thing about García’s hypothesis is that it
shows that the contradictions between the factions of the
bourgeoisie or contradictions with the landlords are non-
antagonistic, that they are not contradictions aimed at
destroying the bureaucrat-landowner State or the other
factions of the bourgeoisie. Ultimately, it is a matter of
dividing up spaces of power and resources from the old
State that can be taken advantage of – this struggle takes
place by maintaining certain interests while yielding to
others.

30
 In the process of revolution, the masses are assigned
the task of destroying the old State and building a new one
to create a society with neither exploiters nor exploited, to
put an end to the domination of capital over the forces of
labor. Here, the central role of the armed forces as the
backbone of the defense of the old State, is decisive.
García’s statements are but further proof that we are not
facing a revolutionary process, nor that his “process of
change” is a “step forward” towards the construction of a
new society.

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5. The Union Aristocracy

32
 The bureaucrat-bourgeoisie, through discourse
dressed up in popular or revolutionary garb, seeks to co-opt
the masses and trade union leadership to impose its
program. To this end, it applies a corporatist policy to
appropriate the popular movement, and, when it fails to win
over the union leadership, it divides them or creates parallel
organizations.
In Bolivia, the comprador-bourgeoisie has also sought
to win over leadership in the popular movement, though
without much success. On the other hand, the comprador-
bourgeoisie and landowners form associations that join
together large and small agricultural, livestock, and lumber
producers. This strategy allows them to lump together so-
called “agro-industrialists” with small and medium-sized
producers in order to disguise class contradictions. In this
way, they can stand up to the government and present their
organizations as representing everyone.
In the popular movement, the masses serve as an
arena of contention, in which each faction of the big
bourgeoisie seeks support for its own political program. The
government, in charge of the administration of the state and
buttressed by the smuggling-in of revolutionary discourse,
makes the most of this policy of co-opting leaders of the
popular sectors – particularly cocaleros from the Chapare
and peasant and trade union leaders (merchants.) The
mining cooperatives, contested even by the opportunist
functionaries, have also been his allies since the beginning of
the administration, with only one “incident” in October 2006
– the Huanuni incident, in which several miners died.
Support for these structures has come at a cost.
Apart from money spent to mobilize their bases, these
leaders have received new government positions, checks to

33
finance “projects,” and vehicles to travel and to make
countless trips to Venezuela or Cuba. Union leaders not
aligned with the government receive absolutely nothing.
Rather, they are fought with great force, denounced as
“allies of the right-wing,” and their protests are repressed,
resulting in injury and even death. Here, we can point to
the case of the Yungas cocaleros in Vandiola (two dead), the
“homeless” in Oruro (one dead), INSA [Instituto Normal
Superior Adventista] students in Arani (one dead), the
mobilization of Sucre (three dead), miners in Caihuasi (two
dead), and free trade zone workers in Patacamaya (one
dead). This doesn’t even take into account the political
responsibilities of the government in events that have
unfolded in areas like Huanuni, where it made a promise to
salaried miners and cooperative miners, which culminated in
confrontations that resulted in several deaths and injuries.
Repression against the popular sectors who are not
aligned with MAS is but one mechanism used to nullify
them. The other mechanism is the creation of parallel
unions, movements, and/or leaders. For example, in its first
year in power, the MAS lacked explicit support from the
Bolivian Workers’ Center (COB), therefore, it organized the
People’s General Staff (EMP). The masistas established this
organization with the intention of mobilizing the masses in
their favor, but the organization was stillborn, and the
attempt resulted in failure. Revisionism and opportunism
proclaim that the “popular organizations” that have popped
up over the past year have been generated by the masses to
“control” the MAS, so that it does not deviate from its path.
This ridiculous assertion is meant to hide the fact that the
government corporately manages a union stratum that
benefits from government handouts. This is the case of

34
CONALCAM (the National Committee for Change), an
organization created within the MAS and consisting of some
MAS militants.
Both the creation of CONALCAM and CORELCAM
(the Regional Committee for Change) in El Alto boast the
auspice and approval of the government. Government
ministers have appointed their leaders. For example, Fidel
Surco, president of CONALCAM, directly coordinated the
mobilizations in the Government Palace during the
confrontations with media luna.

35
6. The Role of Revisionism

36
 In our country, there exists no revolutionary party.
That is why, throughout its history, the Bolivian people
could never clearly identify enemies of the revolution. The
Communist parties in name only have always kept in line
with the bureaucrat-bourgeoisie, and have even
characterized some military governments as “progressive.”
Here, it is important to bring up the participation of
revisionists in the Popular Democratic Unity (UDP)
government, which they called leftist, as clear evidence of
the fact that they have always advocated in favor of the
revisionist thesis of the “lesser evil,” and of “blocking the
road to the right-wing.” Many of these parties end up
fighting “against the dictatorship” and for the “return of
democracy.”
In addition to this, there are many self-proclaimed
leftist or “intellectual” organizations strongly influenced by
post-modernism and indianismo. These “leftists” deny,
either covertly or overtly, the role of the proletariat in the
revolutionary process, as well as the necessity of a
revolutionary Party. One of the principal representatives of
this tendency is Vice President Álvaro García, who is
accompanied by a whole troupe of “thinkers” who raise up
“new theories” on the subject of revolutionary
transformation. These “visionaries” identify indigenous
people, local movements, or “social movements” as the
transformational elements of society. There are even those
who have suggested that the new historical protagonist is
the migrant. This series of speculations serves to deny the
historical role of the proletariat, and mainly, of its Party.
On the other hand, there is the narrowness of
Trotskyism, which lacks a strategy for [the conquering of]
power, and which, with its obrerismo [workerism],

37
underestimates the role of the peasantry as a class. Though
there is a Trotskyist tradition in our country, this particular
experience has proved disastrous. It has led the masses to a
dead end and permanent defeat. Their disregard for the
revolutionary potential of the peasantry has caused this
sector to develop an animosity toward Marxism.
In general terms, the revisionists are either
participants in the government, or maintain an eclectic
position towards the so-called “process of change.” There are
Communist parties in name only in the government, as well
as self-proclaimed leftist organizations (like the PCML
[Communist Party of Bolivia (Marxist-Leninist)], PCB
[Communist Party of Bolivia], PS [Socialist Party], MG [?],
and others) whose purpose is to organize themselves as the
government’s ideological shield, and to justify the reformist
program of the MAS. Their argument is always centered on
fear of a Yankee imperialist intervention. To counter their
fear, they work to prop up the government, while
supporting concessions to the comprador-bourgeoisie and
the landowners. When the government reconciles their
interests with the transnationals via new taxes or
“nationalization,” or with the landowners and comprador-
bourgeoisie via pacts – as was the case in the constitutional
proposal – they call upon the people to “deepen this
process.” This “deepening” is nothing other than the
execution of the government’s bureaucrat-bourgeois
program. But, at its core, it serves to restructure the old
landowner State in order to vivify it and betray the true
interests of the masses.
When revisionism identifies “errors” in the
government, it attributes them to the “bad officials.”
“Comrade Evo” is the “good one,” while the ministers

38
surrounding him are the “bad ones.” They have even put
forward the theory of a “captive President” with which they
clean the image of Evo Morales so that the masses remain
confident in the caudillo.
Now, these revisionists – staunch supporters of
“front-ism” in the past, and who even bore weapons in
alliance with Catholic, indianista, and foquista tendencies –
blame their defeat on the conception of the Party, when
they in fact never applied the Leninist conception of the
Party in the first place. They attempt to “generate” a
strategy of power from the popular organizations, without
the need to organize a political vanguard, and to deny the
role of revolutionary violence. Its clearest objective is to
fabricate electoral organizations to run in the “democratic”
elections.
Power grows from the barrel of a gun. This is
reaffirmed by the political practice of our people in recent
years. The rebellion of October 2003 could not advance any
further due to a lack of political leadership, i.e., of a
revolutionary party, as well as the absence of a
revolutionary armed force. At that moment, the popular
organizations sought to organize a National Assembly. Many
shouted out “There is new power.” But power is neither
generated nor sustained by the speeches of popular leaders.
That is the great lesson of the popular movement – the need
for political organization. That concrete moment also
showed the limitations and difficulties faced by those of us
who have taken up Maoism, and has presented future
problems for us.

39
7. The Necessity to Organize a Proletarian Party

40
 Without a revolutionary party, the Bolivian people
will be unable to realize their dreams of liberation. We
Communists must organize and build the proletarian Party
that is capable of becoming the organized vanguard of the
people, to wage revolution. That is the most urgent task at
this moment. Without that conception, there can be no
revolutionary Party.
The continuous mass struggle points out the urgent
need to construct the people’s revolutionary vanguard. The
Bolivian people have a rich history of confronting the ruling
classes, but they have lacked the proletarian leadership
necessary to wage revolution. Throughout these years of the
formation and development of bureaucrat-capitalism in our
country, the Communists have been unable to fulfill their
role. They have not been able to clearly identify enemies of
the people. Attempts to generate the popular movement to
build the path to revolution – meaning the creation of the
three instruments of the revolution: the Party, the Army,
and the [United] Front – have been deviated by revisionist
leaders who have betrayed the masses, and have been
converted into electoral organizations or frentista
organizations, to avoid the path of revolutionary violence.
Nevertheless, the crisis of bureaucrat-capitalism
worsens without respite. The periods of the restructuring of
the State are increasingly brief. That is why the only way
out for the exploited Bolivian people is to wage New
Democratic Revolution, a process which implies, as a
fundamental task, construction of the Communist Party.
From our conception, this construction involves
particular characteristics in accordance with the struggles of
the Bolivian people, guided by Marxism-Leninism-Maoism,

41
applied to the concrete conditions of our country, including
its particular [social] laws and its tradition of struggle.
The Party of the proletariat is not to participate in
elections, or to achieve certain improvements in the difficult
living conditions of the masses. It must be a Party used to
wage revolution through People’s War, to wage the New
Democratic and Socialist Revolutions, and to tread the path
to Communism through Cultural Revolution. Therefore, the
construction of this Party is the strategic task of all
Bolivian Maoists.

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8. Don’t Vote, Develop a Real People’s Movement

43
 The old State is preparing to restructure itself via a
new Constitution. This will not present a solution to the
grave problems plaguing our people. The constitutional
proposal intends only to seal the pact of the ruling classes,
and to implement the bureaucrat-bourgeois program, thus
providing a brief respite to the old bureaucrat-landowner
State.
The conditions of misery, exploitation, and servitude
will not be alleviated by constitutional reform. To reach a
real solution, it is necessary to wage a true revolution and
put an end to the source of all these evils: semi-feudalism
(the exploitation of our people at the hands of the
landowners), bureaucrat-capitalism (exploitation by the big
bourgeoisie), and imperialist oppression.
People do not conquer their rights and their
liberation through the amendment of laws, but through the
application of revolutionary violence, and by taking power
into their own hands to transform our country into a just
society that puts an end to exploitation, truly reconquers
our resources, transforms our productive apparatus, and
guarantees nourishment, education, and health to our
people.
The Bolivian people must construct a popular
movement, independent of the government and with a clear
class perspective. Constructing the popular movement will
not be easy. But, with revolutionary leadership, it will
succeed, thereby tossing aside reformist deception, and
heading down the revolutionary path.
Our people can expect nothing from these elections.
On the contrary, they must reject this act orchestrated by
the old State and its ruling classes. Don’t vote! Neither
“yes,” nor “no.” Both these options are designed to endorse

44
either the government or the opposition. We reject this very
system that generates hunger, misery, and exploitation. We
are aware that our voice is small, but our position is
principled. History has taught us that those who are in this
moment a minority can tomorrow be a majority. The main
thing is to have the correct ideology and point out the
correct path. Chairman Mao pointed out: Our path is
winding, but our future is bright. This is even truer today,
particularly because we are going against the tide, and we
must master it. We strongly oppose this exploitative system.
Therefore, we reject the appeal by the ruling classes to vote.
It is necessary for our people to organize and retake the
revolutionary path.
Don’t vote! Develop a real people’s movement!
Construct the Party of our class!
Down with the old bureaucrat-landowner State!
Conquer the land and destroy the latifundio!

Bolivia, January 2009

Revolutionary People’s Front, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist

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