Vda de Molo vs.

Molo
G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Digested by Jonah B. Bucoy

Facts:
Mariano Molo, who passed away in 1941, left behind two wills—one from 1918 and
another from 1939. Survived by his wife Juana and nieces and a nephew, the latter
will faced initial probate but was later disallowed due to the petitioner's failure to
prove its proper execution. Subsequently, Juana pursued the probate of the earlier
1918 will, encountering opposition from the same relatives who argued that the
revocatory clause in the disallowed 1939 will still invalidated the prior will from
1918.
In the legal proceedings, the Court of First Instance initially admitted the 1939 will
to probate but reversed its decision upon opposition. The subsequent attempt to
probate the 1918 will led to a dispute over the validity of the revocatory clause and
its impact on the prior will, creating a complex legal situation regarding Mariano
Molo's testamentary intentions.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the revocatory clause in the disallowed 1939 will nullifies the prior
1918 will.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the revocatory clause in the disallowed 1939 will does not
nullify the prior 1918 will. Citing the doctrine established in the case of Samson v.
Naval, the court emphasized that a subsequent will containing a clause revoking a
previous will, when disallowed for non-compliance with legal requirements, cannot
produce the effect of annulling the previous will. The revocatory clause was
declared void.

The court applied the principle of dependent relative revocation, stating that the
failure of the new testamentary disposition, upon which the revocation depends, is
equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition. In this context, the
revocation of the original will does not occur, and the prior will remains in force.
The court rejected the argument that the revocatory clause in the 1939 will could
affect the validity of the 1918 will, upholding the latter's standing for probate.