Marine Policy 75 (2017) 19–28

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Marine Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol

Forecasting geopolitical risks: Oceans as source of instability MARK

⁎
Juan L. Suárez-de Vivero , Juan C. Rodríguez Mateos
University of Seville, Department of Human Geography, María de Padilla s/, 41004 Seville, Spain

A BS T RAC T

The publication of reports on geo-political risks in the world sponsored by intelligence agencies, university
institutes and think tanks are valuable instruments in societies that are being increasingly exposed to the effects
of globalisation. Although all express mention of geo-political risks of a maritime nature is absent from these
documents, it is an interesting exercise to determine: i) Which geo-political risks or threats have a maritime
dimension or imply derivations whose occurrence may be linked to maritime space? ii) Which processes or
tendencies in the use, occupation and governance of maritime space can fall into the category of geo-political
risk? The basic aim is to address the forms that instability and geo-political risks take in the ocean world. If the
risks stated in the chosen literature are examined from the maritime perspective, it is possible to perceive
‘secondary’ risks whose size and reach can become major contingencies for international stability. They
therefore should not be ignored in the prognosis and evaluation of geo-political risks. In as much as societies'
political organisation continues to rest on the nation-State, the dominance of the maritime component in the
territorial basis is a permanent source of tensions and conflicts. In parallel with this, the displacement of
economic expectations and the supply of traditional and new resources to the marine environment broadens the
spectrum of risks and threats.

1. Introduction
In recent times, there has been a proliferation of analyses of the
world's political, economic and social situation, of the way it has
evolved and of trends1 They are valuable tools in societies being
progressively exposed to the effects of globalisation, where crises can
barely be contained within their original areas. International organisa-
tions (governmental and non-governmental), large corporations, aca-
demic institutions and think tanks compete with their production while
at the same time they need their diagnoses and forecasts in order to
make decisions on short-, medium- and long-term actions.
It is common for this type of document to identify and list the so-
called ‘geopolitical risks’.2 Their existence is considered to be akin to a
return to the political atmosphere that prevailed during the Cold War
[1–3], with the relative stability in the world ushered in by the collapse
of the Soviet Union disrupted by the invasion of Crimea and the
resurgence of political tensions triggered by changes to borders and
territorial expansionism (South China Sea).
‘Geopolitical risks’ is one of the five categories identified in the
World Economic Forum's3 (WEF) Global Risks Report. The others are
economic,4 environmental, social and technological risks. ‘Geopolitical
risks’ heads the five categories in the WEF report5 and are currently a
focus of attention not only in the area of social sciences and geo-
strategy, but especially in the analytical forecasts sought by financial
corporations and the insurance sector,6 which are extremely alert to
vulnerability and exposure to different types of risk in the world. In the
sense that the term is used in this type of literature, geopolitical event
alludes to episodes of instability and uncertainty which, despite the

⁎
Corresponding autor.
E-mail address: vivero@us.es (J.L. Suárez-de Vivero).
1
The selection made for this study includes 14 institutions and 19 reports (Table 1).
2
The expression ‘geopolitical risks’ is commonly used in the jargon of the finance and insurance sectors with which some of these reports are linked; Section 2 of the article includes
more detailed information on sources.
3
The latest is the 11th Global Risks Report (2016) and, like its predecessors, it is based on the annual Global Risks Perception Survey [4].
4
There are numerous examples of types of ‘geo-economic’ tensions that can produce global risks and instability: currency wars, shadow banking (banking activity not subject to the
checks and balances of formal banking institutions), economic slowdown, internal and external socioeconomic polarisation, fluctuating raw materials prices, etc. [5]. Moises Naim
alludes to similar issues in his latest work [6].
5
In 2015, geopolitical risks were ranked first in terms of likelihood; in 2016, two of these risks – inter-State conflict and failure of national governance – are among the top ten risks in
terms of likelihood, with weapons of mass destruction in second place due to the size of their impact [4,7].
6
The Global Risks Report receives wide dissemination as it is linked to the World Economic Forum (also known as the Davos Forum) and its strategic partners are the Marsh &
McLennan Companies and the Zurich Insurance Group, world leaders in insurance.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.10.009
Received 10 October 2016; Received in revised form 11 October 2016; Accepted 11 October 2016
Available online 20 October 2016
0308-597X/ © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
J.L. Suárez-de Vivero, J.C. Rodríguez Mateos Marine Policy 75 (2017) 19–28

wide variety of types, duration and scale are clearly linked to and Table 1
identified with a territory, and, particularly, with the political institu- Selected institutions and reports.
Source: Author
tion that exercises sovereignty: the State.7 It is, therefore, the institu-
tion of the State and its territorial component which is this article’s Institution Document/Yearly Report/Publication
object of interest, as it is essentially a geopolitical entity.
The chosen sets of reports have widespread repercussions in the Bank of New York (BNY) Mellon
Corporation
• Managing Geopolitical
Investment Decision-Making
Risk in
political, financial and academic spheres due to their source or
authorship. However, there is a noticeable lack of maritime topics in
Centre for International
Development and Conflict
• Peace
2014)
and Conflict (various years: 2008–

them, particularly as regards references to the seas and oceans, bearing Management (CIDCM) – Univ.
in mind that geopolitics by definition implies the existence of a spatial of Maryland
imperative which, in the case of the oceans-and as is well-known-, Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS)
• Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative
comprises over 70% of our planet. There is a broad range of reasons
why this is so and, although these reasons are not the object of this
Chartered Insurance Institute
(CII)
• Global
beyond
Political Risks in 2015 and

paper, mention should at least be made of the questions surrounding Council on Foreign Relations • Foreign Affairs journal
the territoriality of maritime spaces [11], especially the fact that the (CFR) • Preventive Priorities Survey: 2016
(drawn up by the Centre for Preventive
domain of the State's territorial basis is linked to emerged spaces, and
Action)
the low occupation and exploitation rates of marine basins compared to Eurasia Group • Top Risks 2015
emerged land. Maritime territory has nonetheless progressively ac-
quired greater importance in global politics since the second half of the
European Strategy and Policy
Analysis System (ESPAS)
• Global Trends to 2030: Can the EU meet
the challenges ahead?
German Marshall Fund (GMF) • Transatlantic Trends. Key findings 2014
• Global
20th century, and more especially since the new codification of the Law
Institute for Economics and Peace Peace Index 2015. Measuring
of the Sea, the effects of which are still causing changes to the make-up
peace, its causes and its economic value
of national maritime spaces and, in the final analysis, to the so-called
marine areas located outside national jurisdiction [12]. Although there
International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS)
• Strategic Survey 2015. The Annual
Review of World Affairs
is no express mention of geopolitical risks (or geopolitical threats8) of a QinetiQ/Lloyd's Register Group
Ltd./Univ. of Strathclyde
• Global Marine Trends 2030
maritime nature in these documents, it is an interesting exercise to
Stratfor Global Intelligence • Annual Forecast 2016
determine: i) what geopolitical risks or threats have a maritime
dimension or derivations that may occur in maritime space? and ii)
US National Intelligence Council
(NIC)
• Global Governance 2025: At a Critical
Juncture (drawn up in conjunction with
what processes or tendencies in ocean use, occupation or governance the EU Institute for Security Studies)
can fall into the category of geopolitical risk? The focus developed • Global
World
Trends 2025: A Transformed

herein seeks to demonstrate the relevance of the territorial changes

• Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds
that have occurred in the maritime area over recent decades for
political entities and their conflicts – brand new components that
• Mapping the Global Future. Report of
the NIC's 2020 Project
emerge in the reports previously alluded to – and that in this way World Economic Forum • Outlook on the Global Agenda 2015
acquire a broader significance through the generation of ‘secondary • The Global Risks Report 2016, 11
Edition (also 2014 and 2015)
th

(maritime) risks’ that derive from those already identified in said

documents. Episodes that are either objects of attention due to their
implications for maritime security and threats to States, and activities
of a strategic nature that do not correspond to geographical or political
phenomena, therefore fall outside the scope of this focus.
An examination of documents prepared by financial institutions,
insurance agencies and strategic studies institutes provides an initial
glimpse of the perception of the elements with which instability is
identified and which, in the final instance, are used to label the so-
called geopolitical risks, and how these might be expressed in the
marine domain.
2. Forecasting world geopolitics
Finances and geo-strategy combine through different types of
institutions (intelligence agencies, university institutes and think tanks,
or through a combination of these) in supplying abundant forecasts or
simply prescriptive material on the political, economic and social
situation, and for this they define various categories with the aim of
objectifying a diagnosis. The ‘geopolitical risk’ category is one that is
commonly used and is growing in relative importance. For the purpose
of this article, documents have been selected that are available on the
Internet and that are regularly drawn up by reputed international
institutions in the field of international relations and economics. The
goal is not, therefore, to undertake a comprehensive analysis or
inventory of this type of literature, but to gain a conceptual overview
based on a type of document in which the term ‘geopolitical risk’ is
commonly found.
Periodic reports drawn up by institutions such as the Council on
Foreign Relations (CFR), Eurasia Group, International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS), Stratfor Global Intelligence, the US National
Intelligence Council (NIC) and the World Economic Forum (Table 1)
are specifically of special interest for this analysis.
One of the key reports is the The Global Risks Report published
annually by the World Economic Forum (WEF). The most recent
reports for 2015 and 2016 list a number of global risks9 and classify
them in different categories: economic, environmental, social, techno-
logical and geopolitical [4,7]. The WEF stated in 2015 that some of the
greatest risks in terms of likelihood were environment-related (extreme
weather events), another that was economic (high structural unem-
ployment or underemployment) and three geopolitical (inter-State
conflict with regional consequences; failure of national governance10;
state collapse or crisis11), whilst it gave some geopolitical risks as those
with the greatest impact, including the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and, once again, inter-State conflicts with regional
implications [7] (along with water crises, the rapid and massive spread
of infectious diseases and the failure of climate-change mitigation and
adaptation). The report for the current year (2016) gives a greater

7
Three of the five types of geopolitical risk in the mentioned WEF report are related to 9
The latest WEF report defines a global risk as ‘an uncertain event or condition that, if
State action (governance, inter-State conflicts, failure of the State itself). There are more it occurs, can cause significant negative impact for several countries or industries within
detailed lists [8, p.11] that identify the action, place or crisis, geopolitical trends or the next 10 years’ [4].
10
processes, perceived as threats [9,10] This refers to the failure of Rule of Law, corruption and political deadlock, for
8
Three global revolutions are identified as challenges for Europe in the cited ESPAS example.
11
report [9], one of which is the global geopolitical revolution. Such a crisis includes aspects such as civil conflict, military coups, failed States, etc.

20
J.L. Suárez-de Vivero, J.C. Rodríguez Mateos
Table 2
Types of geopolitical risks and threats by publication.
Source: Author
Global geopolitical risks/tendencies addressed in a ‘broad/general’ way in the reports
The Global Risks Report (2015
and 2016)/ World Economic
Forum
Mapping the Global Future
(2004)/ US National
Intelligence Council
Global geopolitical risks/tendencies addressed ‘geographically’ in the reports
Preventive Priorities Survey
(2015 and 2016)/ Council of
Foreign Relations
Global geopolitical risks/tendencies addressed with a ‘mixed’ focus in the reports
Top Risks 2015/Eurasia Group
Annual Forecast 2016/Stratfor
Global Intelligence
Marine Policy 75 (2017) 19–28
Table 2 (continued)
Global geopolitical risks/tendencies addressed in a ‘broad/general’ way in the reports
military action aimed at it
• Fall in oil and raw materials prices and its
• Risks: impact on the development of emerging
• Failure of national governance powers
• Inter-State conflict with regional • New role of Turkey as a regional power
consequences Strategic Survey 2015. The • Oil prices
• Large-scale terrorist attacks Annual Review of World • Transnational terrorism
• State collapse or crisis Affairs/ International • Wars and other conflicts in the Middle
• Weapons of mass destruction Institute for Strategic East and the north of Africa
• Tendencies: Studies • Competition and tensions in the Asian
• Changing
governance
landscape of international Pacific (economic rivalry, opposing
maritime claims, threat from North Korea,
• Increasing national sentiment etc.)
• Shifts in power • Tense relations between Russia and the
• Appearance of new global actors/change in West – Russia's new role in Eurasia
geopolitical outlook • Internal political problems in Latin-
• Continuation of US leadership, but at a American countries
high cost • Political instability in the EU
• New challenges for governance/weakening
of States’ capacity (slow down in
• Complex situation in sub-Saharan Africa
(epidemics, civil conflicts, penetration of
democratisation process, tensions, radical Islam, weak institutions)
corruption etc.)
• Generalised lack of security (social
tensions, extremist movements, etc.)
•
degree of likelihood to climate (extreme weather events, climate
Changes to ongoing international
change, natural catastrophes) and social risks (large-scale involuntary
terrorism
• Spread of radical Islamic ideology migration), with inter-State conflicts relegated to 4th place and failure
• Proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction
of national governance to 6th. Only the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction is mentioned with respect to degree of impact and
• Increased pressure on international
institutions that are in many cases
ranks second in a set of risks where the environment and social issues
incapable of addressing new challenges
have once again grown in importance, along with the impact of the
price of energy and the fiscal and financial crisis. Large-scale terrorist
attacks and state collapse or crisis [4] are also considered to be risks,
• Intensification of Syrian civil war
•
albeit with less impact and likelihood. Be that as it may, despite slight
Ongoing conflict in Libya
• Heightening of tensions between Israel
and Palestine
differences from one year to the next, in recent times the role of
geopolitics can be seen to be growing among large-scale risks (Table 2).
• Intensification of political violence in
Turkey (connection with Syrian conflicts
In fact, few geopolitical risks can be found in the 2008–2011 reports
(failed States, global governance issues, corruption, instability in the
and Kurdish nationalism)
• Increased political
terrorism in Egypt
instability and
Middle East), and they are not always towards the top of the annual
rankings. In fact, during the 2012–2014 period these kinds of risks do
• Increased violence and instability in
Afghanistan
not appear on the list at all, although they make a strong comeback in
2015 [4]. Apart from listing and analysing major geopolitical risks,
• Ongoing fragmentation of Iraq (ISIS,
Sunni-Shiite conflict
WEF reports also spotlight certain global trends.12 Of these, the
• Ongoing conflicts in Ukraine
following are wholly geopolitical in nature: a) changing landscape of
• Terrorist attacks on USA and allies international governance (changes in institutions and global or regio-
• Cyber attacks on key US infrastructure nal agreements which, on occasion, can derive in the weakening of
• Tension produced by North Korea international governance and ‘crises’ in the international rules of the
• Tensions between China and other States
in the South China Sea due to opposing
game); b) increasing national sentiment (progressively taking root
jurisdictional claims
among peoples and leaders and which can affect countries' positions on
• Political instability in EU due to the mass
arrival of refugees (racist attacks, possible
the national and international stages); c) shifts in power (the rise of
non-State actors and emerging countries compared to traditionally
isolated terrorist attacks) predominant State actors) [4,7].
Like the WEF, another major institution, the US National
• The politics of Europe Intelligence Council, analyses geopolitical risks in a broad way and
• Russia selects major issues or tendencies that, in one way or another, can arise
• The effects of China slowdown in almost any part of the world. Thus, one of its reports [13] lists some
• Weaponisation of finance
• ISIS, beyond Iraq and Syria
of these as: the weakening of State power and changes in national
• Weak incumbents
governance; changes in the international geopolitical outlook due to the
• The rise of strategic sectors appearance of new actors; increased general lack of security (both
• Saudi Arabia vs. Iran internal and external threats), due to the weak States and the spread of
• Taiwan/China
• Turkey
• Tension between US and Russia
•
12
In this analytical context ‘tendency’ can be defined as a behaviour pattern and the
Resurgence of nationalism in Europe
direction that global events take during a specific period of time. We refer, specifically, to
(Euro scepticism, racialism, EU
the way that geopolitical phenomena with the greatest impact and geographical reach are
fragmentation/disagreement on major
evolving in one way or another (sometimes the change can be negative, and others,
challenges: migration, economic crisis)
• Weakening of ISIS due to intensified
(continued on next page)
positive). The WEF report defines ‘tendency’ as: ‘A long-term pattern that is currently
taking place and that could contribute to amplifying global risks and/or altering the
relationship between them’ [4].
21
J.L. Suárez-de Vivero, J.C. Rodríguez Mateos
Fig. 1. World maritime jurisdictions.
extremist ideologies (reflected in many cases in terrorist actions); and
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Table 2).
For its part, in its latest Preventive Priorities Survey (2015–2016)
the Council of Foreign Relations makes a selection of potential
geopolitical conflicts based on geographical criteria [14,15]. It con-
siders some to be ‘highly likely’ (Syrian and Libyan conflicts, Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, political violence in Turkey, political instability –
including terrorist attacks- in Egypt) and others to be ‘moderately
likely’. Broadly-speaking, these geopolitical tensions are located in the
North Africa-Near East ‘arc of crisis’, although other crises are also
identified in unrelated areas (North Korea) and a heightening of
tension in areas bordering on Russia (Ukraine, the Black Sea, Central
Asia, etc.) (Table 2). The financial aspect of this type of risk since the
20th century has been, quite simply, the list of geographical areas of the
planet shaken by political instability.13 The 2016 WEF report also
includes a regional focus and sets out geopolitical risks and the degree
to which they occur in each part of the world. In consequence, the
report considers that failures in national governance are the principal
global risk (ahead of economic, environmental and social risk) in Latin
America and sub-Saharan Africa and that this is also a major aspect
(although not so intense) in Northern Africa-the Near East, Central
Asia and the Far East. In terms of intensity, another risk, inter-State
conflict, can be placed on the same level as energy issues in Russia-
Central Asia. [4].
The reports drawn up by the Eurasia Group [16], the Stratfor
consulting firm [17] and the International Institute for Strategic
Studies [18] follow a very similar line. These reports (Table 2) adopt
a focus that could be called ‘mixed’, i.e., a perspective that combines the
identification of major problems/general ‘blanket’ risks with a list of
specific, spatially localised risks. As can be observed (Table 2), apart
from certain differences the three reports analyse risks in different
regions in the world that essentially coincide with the previously
indicated areas. The generic risks usually cited are the EU's internal
instability, Russian/Western tensions and certain geo-economic as-
pects (oil market, ‘financial wars’, etc).
13
The BNY Mellon reports includes a geographical list of the main geopolitical events
since the First World War and their impact on the Dow Jones Index [8, p.11]
22
Marine Policy 75 (2017) 19–28
3. Oceans as source of political instability
It can be ascertained from the above analysis that the State's
(emerged land) territorial domain is the core location where the various
geopolitical risks identified in the literature occur and are concentrated,
and the institution itself is both an object and a generator of risk. A
more in-depth vision of the changes and innovations taking place in
marine politics on the global scale14 [20–22] gives glimpses of
tendencies and enables events to be specified that presage the
displacement towards maritime space of geopolitical episodes to date
restricted to terra firma, with the oceans becoming a further source of
political instability. This statement is based on the following: i)
Modification of the composition of the State's territorial basis (as there
is a greater number of coastal States with a greater area of maritime
territory than terrestrial territory)15; ii) Environmental degradation
and natural hazards16 are progressively being associated with and
related to the marine environment; iii) Seas and oceans are a focus of
growing economic expectations. The blue economy and blue growth
concepts are at the heart of most maritime policy initiatives and,
particularly, marine spatial planning. Each of these facts, variously and
together, can trigger actions or episodes of a geopolitical nature that
14
“The most developed countries are shaping a new vision of the oceans that leaves
behind the navalist mentality of the nineteenth century and in which, at least on a formal
level, the environment is one of the fundamental lynchpins (sustainability and ecosystem
management; blue growth) and a new order of priorities arises: food security has been
displaced by energy security and leadership is based more on innovation, knowledge and
the new technologies than the naval power-expansion of trade alliances” [19, p. 23].
15
Changes in States' sea-land territorial composition (when the maritime component
is considered to be made up of the various jurisdictional spaces claimed or recognised in
the Law of the Sea) are an ongoing process. One of the jurisdictional concepts that is
being modified – on occasion considerably – by the maritime space on which rights of
sovereignty or jurisdiction are exercised, is the continental shelf beyond the outer limit of
the EEZ [23,24]. Up to this moment in time (21.04.2016), 77 submissions have been
presented to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf [25].
16
The World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) [26] defines natural hazards as ‘…
severe and extreme weather and climate events that occur naturally in all parts of the
world, although some regions are more vulnerable to certain hazards than others.
Natural hazards become natural disasters when people's lives and livelihoods are
destroyed. Human and material losses caused by natural disasters are a major obstacle
to sustainable development’.
J.L. Suárez-de Vivero, J.C. Rodríguez Mateos
Fig. 2. EEZ surface by development level [28].
may have destabilising effects or lead to a potential risk.
3.1. Maritime territory
The modification of the State's territorial basis is one of the most
important geopolitical phenomena with the greatest repercussions on
the global scale, as it alters the basic parameters of the spatial
distribution of sovereignty and jurisdictional rights in the seas and
oceans as a whole (Fig. 1). From the point of view of ocean governance,
it means that over half of the oceans are regulated by instruments and
mechanisms pertaining to international relations. For the Earth as a
whole this implies that 37% of the planet's surface does not come under
State national jurisdiction. Water masses that come under the ‘high
seas’ regime are in the centre of major ocean basins, with the majority
of regional seas under national jurisdiction.
The high seas, which have historically been common property and a
free space, can, in certain geographical areas, become the focus of a
jurisdictional conflict due to the continental shelf being delimited
beyond 200 miles, as free access to the waters and exclusive rights to
the underlying sea floor can overlie the same column of water and
seabed.17 An acute imbalance can be observed in the relationship
between level of development and EEZ surface area, with a positive
correlation between human development and access to maritime space
(and vice versa) (Fig. 2).
On the national scale, a comparison among the cases of Australia,
Portugal and Sri Lanka and the relative weight in each of these States
have maritime and terrestrial components, illustrates this phenomenon
of change to the State's territorial basis (Fig. 3). Territorial expansion
over maritime space is a geopolitical trend driven by very active factors
connected with demographic and economic development. Marine
basins are not only territorial capital in the form of ‘living spaces’ that
enable States to grow organically as was proposed by 19th century
positivist geography [29–31], but also areas where territorial tensions
and conflicts are engendered and, as such, new arenas of geopolitical
instability.
The maritime dimension of supra-national institutional conglom-
erates – from military alliances to economic blocks (Table 3) – is also a
perspective that should be borne in mind, both because of the
17
This has been the case to date in approximately 6.5% of marine basins which, in
surface area terms, equates to 23.5mKm2 [27].
23
Marine Policy 75 (2017) 19–28
importance that maritime interests may gain in strategic terms (the
EEZ of NATO members is 15% of the oceans) and due to strictly
economic and commercial implications (69% of the world EEZ comes
under the jurisdiction of G20 members).
3.2. Failed States
If a coastal State expands its sovereignty and jurisdictional rights
over adjacent maritime space, it also implies extending the degree of
institutional quality developed by said State. Such is the case of failed
States.18 On the global scale, the set of States with a rating that places
them on a high level of alert according to the Fund for Peace,19 extend
their rights of sovereignty over a surface area of approximately eighteen
million square kilometres, which equates to approximately 10% of the
oceans (63 coastal States out of a total of 178 States in the FFP index).
However, there appears to be much greater spatial impact on the
regional scale, with over a quarter of the waters of some basins being
‘contaminated’ with political and institutional instability (Table 4) and
the most widely reported effect of this being episodes of piracy.20
3.3. Maritime borders
At the beginning of the 1990s, the United States Department of
State [35] gave the figure of 420 maritime borders,21 counting enforced
agreed borders, borders subscribed to but not enforced, and potential
borders (excluding those of the territorial sea created before 1925).
18
Collins English Dictionary gives the following definition of a failed State: A weak
state where social and political structures have collapsed to the point where the
government has little or no control. The most widespread indicator of this phenomenon
is the Failed State Index compiled by the Fund for Peace (FFP) [32] (http://global.
fundforpeace.org/). The term ‘failed State’ was replaced by that of ‘fragile State’ in 2014’.
19
The highest score in the index in 2015 was 114.5 (very high alert) and the lowest
(very sustainable) 17.8. In the present article we take the very high alert, high alert, alert
and high warning categories (above 80) to represent the most fragile States and,
therefore, the most unstable.
20
Maritime piracy brings the question of security into sharp focus. According to the
ICC International Maritime Bureau [33], the five most affected regions in the world by
number of incidents are: SE Asia (128), Africa (79), the Indian subcontinent (26), North
and South America (18) and the Far East (13). A comprehensive, up-to-date bibliography
of this phenomenon is available at the Piracy-Studies. Org, Research Portal for Maritime
Security [34].
21
This publication breaks borders down into the following categories: maritime,
continental shelf and fishing, continental shelf, territorial sea and fishing [35, p. 5].
J.L. Suárez-de Vivero, J.C. Rodríguez Mateos Marine Policy 75 (2017) 19–28

Fig. 3. State's territorial base. Comparison Australia, Portugal and Sri Lanka.

Table 3 geopolitical chessboard. The result is a geographical scenario (Fig. 4)

EEZ alliances and political blocs. dominated by the proliferation of borders, which entails a potential
Source: Author
increase in territorial conflict.
Alliance/political bloc % EEZ/Oceans % EEZ/Total
In some cases, territorial make-up and relative location can lead to
a greater proliferation of borders. Spain is a case in point, with its six
G20 34 69 land borders becoming 22 maritime borders requiring agreements with
OECD 25 51 seven States (plus delimitations with the Area in a number of places).
NATO 15 31
APEC 13 28
However, the maritime border/geopolitical risk link is today best
EU 8 15 represented by the case of China and its ‘dashed line’ in the South
BRICS 6 11 China Sea,22 i.e., the delimitation of waters by a dotted line that
ASEAN 3 7 includes islands and rocky banks in said sea, principally the Spratly
MERCOSUR 3 5
Islands and the Paracel Islands, with an approximate surface area (as
ARAB LEAGUE 1 3
there is no precise delimitation) of over 700,000 Km2. Another six
countries are affected, apart from China: Vietnam, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan.
Table 4
Failed states. Geographical distribution.
Source: Author based on The Fund for Peace (www.fundforpeace.org) 2015. 3.4. The environment and security
Failed States
Both international and supra-national maritime policies, as well as
Total jurisdictional waters (EEZ+ECS) World maritime space/ domestic policies, are paying growing attention to a wide range of
(sq. Km) area (%) environmental issues, given the impact that they can have on economic
activities or the broad sphere of security which, in turn, includes the
18,2 millions 10
economy. The United Nations, the European Union and the United
Maritime Regions. Percentage of maritime jurisdiction linked to failed States are cases that illustrate the way that the environmental dimen-
States sion has become one of the components involved in shaping geopoli-
Red Sea and Gulf of Aden 73,1
Eastern African Seas 51
ROPME/RECOFI Area 41,6 22
The U-shaped dotted line was formally announced by the Kuomintang in 1947, at
Mediterranean Sea 22 which time it was made up of 11 segments, two of which were located in the Gulf of
East Asian Seas 14,9 Tonkin. A new map was included in a note to the United Nations in 2009, this time with 9
South Asian Seas 14,4 segments (omitting those of the Gulf of Tonkin), although at a later date another was
added, to the North West of Taiwan [36]. This claim is peculiar in as much as it is not
determined by any baselines and likewise there are no map coordinates. Apart from
Other borders must be added to these, produced by continental shelf China, there are another six affected countries: Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines,
delimitations beyond 200 miles (from 2001 to date 77 submissions [see Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. The initiative seems to be clearly aimed at subjecting said
waters to Chinese maritime influence and the country has mobilised both its navy and
note (15)], some of which are the joint borders of various countries). paramilitary and civil organisations to this end. An attempt has been made to use the
The new borders are transforming the territorial basis of States at the Monroe Doctrine to explain this action in doctrinal terms, albeit from the opposite angle:
same time that they are amending the large pieces of the global the definition of an offensive security space [37].

24
J.L. Suárez-de Vivero, J.C. Rodríguez Mateos
Fig. 4. World's maritime borders.
tical stability in the maritime domain. International initiatives, such as
those taken by the United Nations (and its specialised agencies23), are
characterised by taking a global –and supra-regional-integrated (the
state of the marine environment included in socio-economic aspects)
vision, essentially catering to general interests,24 in order to contribute
to the sustainable management of human activities in relation to the
oceans, and all the while within a framework defined by principles and
norms enacted by international institutions and adopted by States [41,
p.1]. This so-called Regular Process for Global Reporting and
Assessment of the State of the Marine Environment is an ambitious
initiative (thirteen years passed from its original adoption to the
conclusion of the first report) weighed down by the immensity of its
aim and the difficulties intrinsic in multilateral projects, yet it is also
one that is essential and absolutely necessary due to the very nature of
the marine ecosystem and the fact that it is the supra-national
institutions that are best placed to make universal interests prevail.
The strategic vision prevails in essentially national approaches (the
European Union and the United States) and environmental conflicts
23
The furthest reaching action taken by the United Nations in relation to the role of
the oceans and the impact of human action is the so-called Regular Process for Global
Reporting and Assessment of the state of the Marine Environment, including Socio-
economic Aspects (Regular Process). This initiative was adopted at the World Summit on
Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, 26 August-4 September 2002) and its aim is ‘to
establish by 2004 a regular process under the United Nations for global reporting and
assessment of the state of the marine environment, including socio-economic aspects,
both current and foreseeable, building on existing regional assessments (the ‘Regular
Process’)’ [38]. The First Global Integrated Marine Assessment (or World Ocean
Assessment I, 2015) is the first product of this initiative's first cycle. The report has 54
chapters [39]. An Ad hoc Steering Group co-led by two UN agencies, UNEP and the
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO (IOC/UNESCO), was cre-
ated to implement the initiative. Their work was reviewed by the Joint Group of Experts
on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection (GESAMP).
24
The proposal for the study [40, p.1] links the capacity of the ocean's basins to world
population: in 2015, a fifth of a cubic metre of the ocean corresponded to each of the
planet's inhabitants; in 2050, with a population of 10,000 million, this will fall to an
eighth of a cubic metre.
25
Marine Policy 75 (2017) 19–28
are considered from the angle of security, which is evaluated on the
basis of risks and threats to ‘…economic development, free trade,
transport, energy security, tourism and good status of the marine
environment’ [42, p.2]. From this perspective, the events that can be
considered to be maritime security risks and threats are clearly stated
in the EU Maritime Security Strategy, with those of an environmental
nature forming a major, lengthy section that ranges from natural
disasters – climate change – to pollution and dumping [42, p.7,8].
Environmental aspects are similarly recorded in relation to chal-
lenges, risks and threats from a geopolitical perspective in the case of
the United States. The maritime security strategy25 [43] identifies six
categories of threats.26 One of these is destruction of the environment,
due to its possible negative impact on a region's economic viability and
political stability. On the environmental policy level, a political action
mechanism is available to address stewardship of the marine environ-
ment27 that promotes ecosystem based management, and marine
spatial planning is presented as an instrument to contribute to
conservation and the development of economic activities, to resolve
conflicts between users, and to use the oceans and their resources
sustainably.
25
The National Strategy for Maritime Security text contains eight maps and is
similarly coordinated with other supporting maps, including those of the Maritime
Transportation System Security Recommendations and the Maritime Commerce Security
Plan. For more details see Homeland Security at https://www.dhs.gov/national-plan-
achieve-maritime-domain-awareness
26
Nation-state threats, terrorist threats, transnational criminal and piracy threats,
environmental destruction and illegal seaborne immigration [43, p.3–6].
27
To this end the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force was formed as part of The
White House Council on Environmental Quality. Its recommendations are set out in a
2010 document [44]. In the same year the National Ocean Policy was created and set up
the National Ocean Council, which in 2013 published the National Ocean Policy
Implementation Plan [45].
J.L. Suárez-de Vivero, J.C. Rodríguez Mateos
3.5. From blue economy to blue growth
Economic expectations pinned on the potential of the oceans to
drive development and boost economic growth transfer political
tensions hereto essentially restricted to States' terrestrial territory to
the maritime space. This does not mean that the role that the oceans
have historically played in supporting political, economic and military
power or the debates surrounding the primacy of land or sea powers
should be neglected [20]. What arose as an initiative for the resolution
of development issues, the eradication of poverty and improved food
supply (green economy/blue economy/blue growth)28 in the context of
the United Nations and some of its agencies, came to form part of a line
of strategy to address the challenges of globalisation in the sphere of
the European Union,29 steered by knowledge, innovation, resource
efficiency, competitiveness, job creation, and social and territorial
cohesion, all within the sphere of a social market economy [47, p.3]
(at least as it was formally presented). Thus since its inception the
concept of blue growth has become consolidated in the EU as a firm
intention transcending simple conservation and development (which
are more specific objectives of the Small Island Developing States
[SIDS] and coastal developing countries) and aspires to construct a
new strategic vision of the oceans that is beginning to be announced
with the new maritime policy: the so-called EU Integrated Maritime
Policy [48]. The EU, the United States, organisations such as the OECD
and other types of regional initiatives have turned maritime sectors
(what is today referred to as the blue economy) into the ‘new economic
frontier’ [49] and, in the context of the deep financial crisis that arose
in 2007, the seas and the oceans have become an island of economic
growth (blue growth).30 Economic expectations for marine basins are
beginning to acquire a dimension that turns the latter into crucial
pieces on the geopolitical chessboard and an area where State interests
and conflicts are played out, not to mention the high geo-economic
value that they have on their own: in short, a factor that could
potentially become a geopolitical risk.
4. Discussion
The interest of this article lies not so much in an examination of
marine-related facts that might impact international relations (or,
more specifically, the geopolitical chessboard), but rather in the way
in which general geopolitical risks identified by certain institutions, as
described in Section 2, can be transferred to and played out in
maritime space. The basic aim of the article is to reveal the forms that
instability and geopolitical risks take in the ocean world and, more
especially, the consequences for current geopolitics of States’ new
territoriality as a result of their expansion over widespread areas of
maritime space, prompted by changes to geographical balances and the
28
The blue economy concept arose at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable
Development (the “Rio+20”, 2012) that promoted ‘Green Economy’ and conceived it as
an instrument to eradicate poverty and attain sustainable development [46].
Participating countries at the 2014 32nd FAO Regional Conference for Asia and the
Pacific supported the regional initiative to step up aquaculture for blue growth with the
aim of improving the supply of fish for food and thus improve ways of life < http://www.
fao.org/asiapacific/perspectives/blue-growth/es/ > (01.05.2016).
29
This is the direction followed in the Europe 2020 document, A European strategy
for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth [47].
30
The European Commission published the Blue Growth Communication,
Opportunities for marine and maritime sustainable growth, in 2012 [50]. In the
United States this same perception of an opportunity to breathe new life into what had
already been dubbed the ‘Blue Economy’ was expressed in the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation in 2009 [51]. Its importance for the national
economy is estimated at 2.7% of GDP and it creates 2.7 million jobs [52]. The blue
economy is also the core objective of the activities of the Indian Ocean Rim Association
(with 18 member countries). The OECD's Ocean Economy in 2030 report makes a
(conservative) estimate that the world's ocean economy (2010) makes a contribution of
USD 1.5 trillion, which equates to 2.5% of world added value [49, p.13]. The European
Commission's estimate for the EU as a whole is €500 billion per year, and the creation of
some 5.4 million jobs in the employment market [50].
26
Marine Policy 75 (2017) 19–28
redefinition of geopolitical spaces.
This said, there are maritime processes, such as those analysed in
Section 3 (maritime territory, failed coastal States, maritime borders,
the environment/security and economy and blue growth) that are
powerful drivers in the creation or triggering of geopolitical risks,
whether due to their individual effects or their combined impact, but
they are nevertheless neither perceived nor identified as disrupting
elements in the context of said reports.
If the risks stated in the chosen literature are examined from a
maritime angle, it is possible to discern ‘secondary’ risks of a size and
reach that can result in major contingencies for international stability.
For example, freedom of navigation could be threatened as a con-
sequence of weak jurisdictional control and the expansion of property
rights. In general, jurisdictional expansion entails a strengthening of
the State's territorial basis and its economic opportunities, whilst at the
same time placing a greater demand on institutional resources and
governmental material resources. For example, the responsibility of
managing almost half of the world's EEZ falls to Small Island
Developing States and developing coastal States (Fig. 2) whilst many
of these lack the institutional capacity that enables them to be solvent
actors of multilateral governance.31 The move from the bipolar system
of the Cold War to the current multipolar world is, perhaps, one of the
geopolitical events with the greatest potential to transform any
disputed space into an area of power, and this is also true of the
oceans, as a greater number of centres of power are unfailingly linked
to the creation of more naval power.32 Yet this is already one of the
effects of the proliferation of ‘offshore States’ [20] that require greater
military means to control their territories: States’ claims for exclusive
economic zones has resulted in 30% of the planet's surface area being
placed under national jurisdiction [19, p.24] and given rise to a large
number of States – some 60 – where over 80% of the territory is sea
[20, p.62].
In maritime space, the geopolitical risks associated with State
limitations, deficiencies and crises (failure of national governance,
State collapse, inter-State conflict in the WEF report) are leading to
severe restrictions on ocean governance in areas under national
jurisdiction, as well as in the high seas and the Area. Not only does
the institutional deterioration of political organisations further aggra-
vate geopolitical risks, but also the expansion and strengthening of
societies' maritime dimension: the composition of the State's territorial
basis (prevalence of the maritime component), the growth of the
maritime (or blue) economy, and increased natural hazards in the seas
and oceans, with a consequent heightening of tension and the
proliferation of geopolitical risks. A new indicator of the phenomenon
of the strengthening of societies' maritime dimension and the new
requirements to which maritime States are being subjected is the
expansion of maritime spatial planning found in the new seas and
oceans management paradigm, the negative impacts of which have
barely begun to be evaluated [55]. The internal consequences of these
new processes of maritime policy formulation – including marine
spatial policy – should be considered to be of particular significance,
due to their promoting internal debate between the various politico-
administrative levels and their role in marine governance, questioning
the centralising vision and requiring the presence of sub-national levels
in issues traditionally found on the level of international relations [56].
Intra-State tensions thus become destabilising elements as a result of
the profusion of actors competing for ‘maritime power’, the economic
analogy of naval power.
The amalgamation and patchwork of processes and tendencies in
dimensions such as technology advances, law, the economy, the
environment and international relations is, perhaps, the dominant
31
103 international treaties are applicable in the Mediterranean Sea [53] and 23% of
its jurisdictional waters belong to failed States [27].
32
This is the scenario given in the Global Marine Trends 2030 study [54, p.137] in a
possible rise of the Green Crescent scenario.
J.L. Suárez-de Vivero, J.C. Rodríguez Mateos
feature of ocean affairs, along with the conviction that these two-thirds
of the planet – the oceans – are a great asset, not for finding solutions,
but as simple palliatives to contend with risks, threats and global
uncertainties in the short/medium term.33 Thus the maritime presence
and influence of blocks and alliances between States should be taken
into account when weighing up their importance and influence (the
OECD occupies half the world's EEZ). Notwithstanding, even in the
case of the OECD there is no shared maritime policy – for the time
being. This is, however, the case in the European Union.
5. Conclusions
Maritime spatial elements are taking on such great relevance that
they cannot be excluded from the prognosis and evaluation of
geopolitical risks. In so far as the political organisation of societies is
still based on nation-States, the predominance of the maritime
component in the composition of their territorial basis is a permanent
source of tensions and conflicts. In parallel with this, the transfer of
economic expectations to the marine environment and the supply of
traditional and new resources broaden the spectrum of risks and
threats.
Both more developed societies (in the minority, but possessors of
widespread areas over which they exercise property rights) and the
developing world (highly populated and made up of numerous States
which have uneven access to the marine domain) are being progres-
sively exposed to maritime geopolitical risks. The latter, in particular,
are hampered by their weak jurisdictional control and the difficulties
that they have for operating as effective actors in ocean governance.
This, in turn, converts them into a further geopolitical risk for the
development of the societies to come, more dependent on ocean use
and, in the final analysis, more in need of proper management and
preservation of the seas and oceans. If blue is the colour of the fledgling
future economy, it is no less that of emerging geopolitics.
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