True and False Pleasures in Plato's Philebus

Rumpelstiltskin's Pleasures: True and False Pleasures in Plato's "Philebus"
Author(s): Dorothea Frede

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1985), pp. 151-180
Published by: BRILL
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Rumpelstiltskin'sPleasures:
Trueand False Pleasures
in Plato's Philebus*
DOROTHEA FREDE
Everyonewho is moderatelyfamiliarwith Plato'sdialogueswill have the

impression that pleasure according to Plato is a mixed blessing; often
enough he refuses to regard it as a good - let alone the good - for
mankind. It is easy to see the reason for this critical attitude: Pleasure
(often paired with desire - "hdone kai epithymia"cf. Phdr.273d;
Rep.328d;429d; 555d;574a;Gorg.484det pass.)is whatluresthe soul away
fromthe straightand narrowpath of virtueand entwinesit with all sortsof
conflicts and confusions.Pleasureis thereforeoften treatedby Plato as a
necessaryevil; necessarybecause of our vegetativeand materialneeds (cf.
Tim.62-64;Rep.581e), an evil because it opens the soul to all sorts of
dangerous and uncontrollabledesires (I may merely refer to the unruly
horse in Phdr.253c-255a,the anarchyof desiresin the Rep.438dff;562aff;
58le, and the discussion of the mortal part of the human soul at the
beginningof the Phdo.64cff).
I. Theelusivenatureofpleasure
But while it is clearwhy Plato holds pleasurein such low esteemit remains
unclearwhat, precisely,he takesthe natureof pleasureto be.' Sometimesit
seems that pleasure (and its often neglected counterpart,pain) is just
regarded as a function of the body which consists in the satisfactionof
* This article is part of a larger project. I am currentlyworking on a manuscriptfor a

book with the title "Plato's Critique of Hedonism", with the main emphasis on the
Philebus.Though Gosling/Taylor in theirbook TheGreekson Pleasure(called G/T from
now on) have made great progress in clarifying the history of hedonism, not all issues
have been settled or settled in a satisfactoryway.
1 On a closer look at the relevant texts the picture is much more bewilderingthan my
summary shows. G/T give a very good and extensive survey. On the problem of
adequatelyrenderingPlato's idiom in English,cf. esp. p. 175.
Phronesis1985. Vol.XXX/2 (AcceptedFebruary1985) 151

physical needs such as hunger, thirst and sexual drive (cf. Gorg.49leff;
Prot.337cet pass.; Rep.389e;439a et pass.). And even when pleasureis
expresslyattributedto the soul, it is attributedto its lowest,mortal,part.In
his often harsh rejectionof hedonism Plato (and/or Socrates)revealsan
otherworldlyascetismaccordingto which thislife is a life in prisonand the
body is the tomb of the soul (cf. "soma"= "sema"in Gorg.493a;Crat.400c;
Phdo.65e-69e;Rep.442a/b). "Not to be born is best,"Plato seems to have
felt, in agreementwith Theognis and other pessimistsafter him, and the
philosopher,so we are told, is well advisedto suppressthe lowestpartof the
soul as much as possiblewhile cultivatingthe spiritualpartin a continuous
process of purification for this life as well as for life after death (cf.
Phdo.67b; 69b/c and the mythsin Gorg.and Rep.).
That this picture of Socrates/Plato as an ascetic thinker for whom
wisdom and pleasureare incompatibleis at least one-sidedcan be seen in
manypassagesboth in earlierand in laterdialogues.In the Protagoras,for
instance,Socrateshimself recommendsa kind of "hedonisticcalculus"in
whichvirtuefunctionsas the artof measuringpleasureand pain (351bff),a
positionwhich is nowherecorrectednor even questionedin the restof the
dialogue. In Rep.IX Plato distinguishesbetween lower and higher pleas-
ures,and in the Symposiumand Phaedrusthe divineoriginof philosophical
Eros (and its satisfaction,one can suppose) is elevated, and some peda-
gogicalvalue is attributedeven to what is beautifulto the sensesbecauseit
leads man to the higher love of the true and the good. How this ambi-
valencein Plato'streatmentof pleasurecan be explainedis a muchdebated
questionwhich I cannot go into here.2
The main topic in the Philebus, the rivalrybetween knowledge and
pleasureas candidatesfor the highest good, appearsalreadyin a central
passage in the Republic,VI, 505b. As Socrates claims there, both the
championof the "many",namelypleasure,and the championof the "more
refined",knowledge,run into the same difficulty.The hedonists cannot
maintaintheir candidatewithout a differentiationbetweengood and bad
pleasures,while the intellectualistshave to admit that only knowledgeof
the good is good. In both cases the definitionis circularand presupposes
the definitionof the good Socrates,as we all know, professesto be incap-
able of giving more than a descriptionof the offspringof the good and
resortsto the similes of Sun, Line, and Cave to do so. The Philebus,thus,
2An extensive discussion of the relevant passages of the Symposiumand the Phaedrus
will be part of my largerproject.
152

raisesthe very questionthat was left somewhatin mid-airin the Republic3
and (after a long discussion of the concept of pleasureand its different
kinds) comes to the conclusion that neither pleasure nor knowledge
deservethe gold medal in the contestaboutthe rankof the highestgood: in
fact the best kind of knowledgeobtainsonly thirdplace, the best pleasures
the fifth, in the final prize-giving(66aff).
The Philebusis consideredby most interpretersfor variousreasonsto be
one of the latestdialogues.4If the passagein Rep.VI is not a laterinsertion,
Plato must have seen the questionof the relationshipof both pleasureand
knowledgeto the good as unfinishedbusinesswhichhe could not then deal
with. On a closer analysis it turns out that the Philebusin fact picks up
manyloose ends fromdifferentearlierdialogues(and this accountsfor the
sometimes not immediately clear strategy followed by Plato and the
longwindednessof the dialogue lamented by some commentators).That
Socratesis backon the scene and his old whimsicalself againis then easyto
explain, regardlessof whether the Philebusis an early-lateor a late-late
dialogue.5.
Unfortunatelythe Philebusseems to raisemorequestionsthan it settles,
and not only with respectto the attemptto determinewhat the natureOf
pleasure is, what kinds of pleasuresthere are, and what criteriafor their
evaluationshould be used. The firstpartof the dialogue,whichis supposed
to pave the way towardsa better understandingof the complexityof the
natureof pleasureby teachingus how to handle the unity and pluralityof
all kinds of generaand species("forms"),alreadypresentsa majorstumb-
ling block.There is no consensusamong the expertsabout the meaningof
the two most relevant passages, 14c-19c and 23b-28a, nor about their
3The passage in Rep.V, 505b5-d3 may very well be a later insertion since it does not
contributeanything to the topic discussed before and after, i.e. that everyone in the case
of the good wants what really is good ratherthan what appearsto be good for himself. If it
is a later addition then it points forward to the Philebus,since Rep.IX does not take up
that issue.
4 This has been questioned by Waterfield(1), pp. 237-9, and I am inclined to agree with
him. The Philebusobviously straightensout unclaritiesin Rep.IXand is closely related to
the Symposiumand its "Heraclitean"doctrine, so that one might feel tempted to regard
the Phil. togetherwith the Tim.as an earlierlate dialogue than otherscholarsdo. There is,
of course, the possibility that Plato "shelved" problems for a long time without losing
trackof them.
5 I cannot share Waterfield'sverdict that the Philebus is a "bad example of the earlier
dialogue form" (I) p. 271/2. 1 think that the dialogue is carefully staged, the partners
portrayedin a vivid enough way. The readerjust gets lost in the many difficult passages
and loses the perspectiveof the dialogue as a whole.
153

connection,nor about the use which Plato later makesof the new dialec-
tical method.The commentaryby J.C.B.Gosling(1975)does not offer any
final solutions but displays a battlefield of differingopinions.6I refrain
from enteringthat battle here but try to find my way aroundit by simply
giving an indicationof how, accordingto my interpretation,the dialogueis
stagedas a whole.7
Socratescontends that knowledge,understanding,etc., are the highest
good, while Protarchus,his usually open-minded,cooperative,if at times
slow, opponent,defends the position held by his friend,the beautifulbut
lazy and blas6 Philebus,that pleasureof all sorts deservesthe first place.
Socrates'demand for a differentiationand qualificationof these global
claims starts the whole discussion.At first Protarchusdoes not want to
admit the necessityfor any differentiationwith respectto the goodnessof
pleasure(12d/e); this is the reasonwhy Socratespointsout the problemof
the unity and plurality of such widely and variously used concepts as
pleasureand knowledgeand recommendsa new kindof dialecticalmethod
(15dff.). As it seems, however, no use is made of this method; instead
Socratesresortsto afourfold divisionof "all things"that also seems to be
new (23cff.).Again,the expertsdo not agreeon the meaningand use of this
division. For our purposeshere it is sufficientto know that all thingsare
supposed to fall under four headings, i.e. (a) into the categoryof peras,
limit, measureor number;(b) the categoryof apeiron, what is unlimited,
indeterminate;(c) the successfulmixtureof (a) and (b); and (d) the cause of
that mixture,the underlyingor active rationalprinciple(26e).8
Even though this summarymust seem cloudy to anyone but the most
ardent admirers of the Philebus, it is not difficult to guess into what
categoriespleasure and knowledgemust fall, namely pleasure into the
unlimited(which seems fine to Philebuswho is interestedin the more and
more)and knowledgeinto the causesof good mixtures.
What interests us here are just the basic assumptionson which the
furtherdeterminationof the natureof pleasureis based.Pleasureand pain,
while themselvesindeterminate,occur (phainesthon,3lb/c) in connection
with the third kind of entities, the right mixtures, such as health and
6 Cf. esp. Gosling (3) pp. 144ff; 185ff;cf. also p. 81f.

7 Though I do not hold the view that the "dialecticalpan" is only loosely connectedwith
the rest of the dialogue, the question of truthand falsity does not depend directlyon the
readingof those passages.
8 In spite of the criticismby Gosling (3) (pp. 163-165; 191-196),I generally agree with
Strikerthat while in 14c-19cPlato tries to work out what a genus ("form")is, the passage
23b-28aexplains what kinds of genera of onta there are.
154

harmony(3 lb/c). Such harmoniousmixturescan be disturbed- and this is
the point where pleasuresand pains come in: pain consistsin the disturb-
ance, pleasure in the restorationof such a harmony. This definition is
accepted by Protarchuswithout demur after Socrates explains it by an
example of the most ordinarykind: hunger and thirst are processesof
"emptying",of disruptionor destruction,while eatingand drinkingare the
corresponding processes of "refilling" or restoration (3le/32a). Plato
sometimes uses other expressions as synonyms (such as "lysis" or
"diacrisis"32d/e) but most of the time he sticksto the "filling"metaphor.9
To the modem reader this theory must seem strangeas soon as he turns
awayfromthe obviousclassicalexamplesof hungerand thirst.For a better
understandingwe have to take a look at the developmentof the notion of
pleasurein some of Plato's earlierdialogues.This will show at the same
time how the criteriafor the evaluationof pleasureevolved.
In the ProtagorasSocratesmakes no attemptto define pleasureat all;
agreementabout its nature seems to be presupposed,and Socrates,in a
ratherun-Socraticway, brushesaside Protagoras'attemptto arguefor the
qualificationthat only decentpleasuresare to be regardedas good (351c).
The only differentiationbetweendifferentkindsof pleasuresis the amount
of pleasure achieved (356b), and virtue becomes nothing but the art of
measuringthe size of pleasureand pain. Whatkind of measuringit should
be is deferredto 'elsewhere'(357b). It is a matterof debate(fromwhichwe
have to abstainhere) why Socratesprofessessuch an unmitigatedhedon-
isticpositionwithouteven positingthe Socraticquestionaboutits nature.10
9 The "filling" denotes ratherthe naturalprocess than an intentionalact. Gosling (3) is
rightin pointingout that Plato here is not so much concernedwith conceptualanalysisas
with the characterizationof the conditions of the occurrenceof pleasures (p. 75). (The
conceptual analysis does become important in connection with the "true and false
pleasures"later). I do not agree, however, with Gosling that Plato does not give us an
account of the nature of pleasure in the Philebus.The problem is that there are as many
differentkinds of pleasuresas there are kinds offillings. Socratesrightlywarnedus of the
multiplicityof the kinds of pleasures(cf. 12c/d). I suspect that this is the reasonwhy the
new dialectic is not applicable in the case of pleasure(cf. 20c).
10 I am not persuaded by any of the argumentsI have seen that Socratesor Plato who
were so critical of the pleasurescherished by their contemporariesever subscribedto an
unconditional hedonistic position. In this connection I side ratherwith Zeyl, as against
Taylor, Irwin (2), and G/T. From very early on Plato insists that there is a distinction
between what is liked and what is good, as witnessedby the Lysis(where we alreadyhave
the distinction between what is good, bad and neithergood nor bad - and the intended
but not accomplished solution is that it is the "in between"that is friendof what is good,
cf. 218bff) and the Euthyphrowhere the upshot of the argumentis that the hosion is not
just what the gods happen to like (take pleasurein) but what is worthliking.
155

The first attempt to come to grips with the natureof pleasureis to be
found in the Gorgias.The need for somethinglike a definition arisesin
connection with the question of what advantagesCallicles'strong man
(who in his natural superiorityjustifiably commits injusticein the con-
ventionalsense) can derivefromhis way of life (49leff). Callicles,who had
declaredearlierthat he would not pay lip-serviceto conventionalmorality
and therebyget into Socrates'trapsas Gorgiasand Polusbeforehim, does
indeed speakwith almostbrutalfrankness:the strongman can fulfil every
one of his desires, revel in all sorts of dissipations, take all liberties
imaginable(492c), in short,he can live a life of excesses.As he phrasesit,
"Thatis what living pleasantlyconsistsin, that as much pleasureas pos-
sible flows in (494b)!"And in the pursuitof the satisfactionof his desireshe
will not be impeded by considerationsof other people'spropertyor even
theirlives.11
Socrates,it should be noted, does not object to the determinationof
pleasure as the fulfilling of desire itself; his objectionis just that such a
life-style is comparableto the labours of Sisyphus,it is like filling a jar
withoutbottom with a sieve, alwaysdrivenby ever new needs and desires
and hunting for their fulfilment (493a/b). Worse, Callicles also has to
admitsuch pleasuresas the scratchingwhen one itchesand all sortsof little
ticklishpervertedpleasuresa pederastmay dream of (Socrates:"only on
the head?"494el) - at which point even Callicles'unconventionalfeeling
of decencymakeshim protest:"youare disgusting,Socrates"(494e).More
important than the scruples of the unscrupulousis Socrates' serious
objectionthat all Callicleanpleasuresare connectedwithpain since desire
necessarilyimplies pain. Eating-when-one-is-hungry is a pleasuremixed
with pain, lypoumenonchairein(496e5),and when satietyhas been reached
both pain and pleasure have disappeared.Hence Callicles'strong man
exhaustshimself in the pursuitof ever renewedpainfulpleasures.
I cannot go into the details of Socrates'refutationof Callicles'concep-
tion of the goodnessof the strongman'slife.12What is importantfor us is
that it is the filling of a lack itself that is called pleasure and not an
accompanyingor resultingfeeling as one might have supposed.13 It is
eating-when-one-is-hungry, the activityitself, that is the pleasure,and as
soon as the hungeris gone the pleasureis gone also. (In fact,as we all know,
For a furtherelucidation of the problemscontained in these passagesin the Gorg.cf.
Irwin(2) notes p. 195ff.
12 Cf. Irwin(2) pp. 196/7; 204/5; cf. G/T pp. 178ff.
13 On the omission of any terminologyoffeeling in connectionwith the elucidationof the
natureof pleasurecf. Gosling (3) p. 75.
156

eatingwhen one is not hungrycan be a pain.) Socratesdoes not go into any
furtherdiscussionof the questionof more complex pleasures,nor does he
askwhetherall pleasuresare of this kindor how soul and body cooperatein
this kind of "'filling".14
What is clear, however,is that alreadythe simple
case of the replenishmentof a physiological need such as hunger is a
complex process which is not adequately interpretedby Irwin in his
commentaryof the Gorgias(p. 202) as "I enjoyin one partand feel pain in
another."There are no separate parts here, for pleasure and pain are
inseparablyentwined.
In the final argumentCalliclesis broughtto the concessionthatone must
distinguishbetween different kinds of pleasures,better and worse ones
(499b). For not only are Callicleanpleasuresmixedwith pain and include
disreputableones like the pleasure of scratching,but moral evaluations
come in too. For Callicleshas to concede that children,fools and cowards
have theirown pleasures,just as muchas his grandiosestrongman(497eff).
As a consequenceof this Callicleshas also to admitthat thereis some kind
of expertisein our choice of pleasures,an expertise,moreover,which is
comparableto medicine,i.e. a real techne,not to a knacklike coolking(cf.
501a). Only knowledgeguarantees success even for the hedonist. The
necessity of a combination of pleasure and knowledge is not further
worked out in the Gorgiasnor are criteria for the moral evaluation of
pleasuresand pains introduced.It is clear that Plato must have regarded
this state of the discussion as unsatisfactoryand in need of further
development.
In Republic,IX, 180dff no rivalrybetweenpleasureand knowledgeis at
stake; Plato rather attributesto each part of the soul its own kind of
pleasure (580d) and lets Socrates convince his audience that the philo-
sophers'pleasuresand lives in general are not only the best but also the
most pleasant (583a: hedy). That Plato here feels obliged to introducea
kind of 'philosophic hedonism' is not surprisingif one rememberswhat
purposethe argumentsin Book IX are supposedto serve, namely to fulfil
Socrates' promise to show that justice in and by itself is a beneficial
possessionfor the soul of its possessorand thatit guaranteeshis happiness.
This has, in principle,alreadybeen achievedin Book IV, wherejusticewas
describedas healthand harmonyof the soul, while injusticewas seen as its
sickness and disharmony.Pleasure,however, has not been mentioned in
that connection and Plato seems to have felt the need to demonstratethe
14 Plato evidently does not take the gourmet'spleasures into consideration.Concerning

the question of the connection between pleasure and perceptioncf. G/T p. 178ff.
157

superiorityof the highestkind of virtueeven on the hedonist'sown ground.
Of the three argumentsin Book IX only the third one (583b-587a)is
relevantto this discussion.It is emphasizedby Socratesthat it is the most
importantone and he claims to have got it from "one of the wise men"
(583b5).The doctrinethat Socratesprofesseshere in a way preparesus for
what we find in the Philebus.That the passageat 583b-586cthrowssome
light on the problem of truth and falsity of pleasure and pain in the
Philebushas, of course, been seen by some of the commentators,'5and
Gosling/Taylorhave devoted a whole chapterto it (cf. p. 97-128).Since I
do not alwaysagreewith what othershave said about it I want to indicate
brieflywhat seems to me most relevant.Plato does not only differentiate
betweendifferentkinds of pleasuresfor the differentpartsof the soul: he
also introducescriteriafor theirevaluation,some of which reappearin the
Philebus,i.e. that the lower kinds of pleasuresare not really true (oude
panaleths) or pure (oude kathara)but shadow-painted(eskiagraphemene,
583c).16 A little later it is also mentionedthat they are mixed,and further
epithets are introducedsuch as genuine (gnesion,587b/c) and stable (be-
baion,586a6).WhatPlatomeansby thoseepithetsand how theydifferfrom
one anotheris farfromclear,but we can drawsome conclusionsabout this
when we look at the way the natureof pleasureis depictedby Plato.
The passage in Book IX consists of three parts, in which Plato uses
differentthough relateddefinitionsof pleasure;as can easily be seen, the
definitions refer only to different aspects and supplement, rather than
supplant, one another. In the first part of the text (583c-585a)Socrates
countersthe opinion that pleasureis only liberationfrompain (584b/c) by
pointingout that there are reallythreestatesof the soul, namelypleasure,
pain, and the neutral state of rest. Since both pleasure and pains are
motionsneithercan be identicalwith rest. On the basis of this distinction
Socratescan rule out the paradox(he calls it "trickery"- goeteia 584a1O)
that pleasureis merelythe end of pain, and pain the end of pleasure.Since
Socratesthinksthat Glaucon needs such enlightenment("so that you will
no longer think that .. .") and the argument is mentioned again in the
Philebus (44c, also with "trickery"),it must have been a position and
conception that someone actually used. We do not have to go far to see
15 The connection was first discussed by Murphy;cf. also Waterfield(1) p. 297f.
16 Anotherimportantfeaturethat Book IX has in common with the Philebusis the theme
of the comparisonof different life-styles. While in Rep.IX the philosopherwins even on
the hedonist'scount, a wedge is driven in the Philebusbetween knowledgeand pleasure.
What is still maintainedin the Philebusis that the good personis more successfulthan an
inferiorone.
158

whatits basisis: the Callicleanpleasurespresupposesucha circularmotion
wherepain is resolvedinto pleasureand pleasureinto pain.The definition
of pleasure and pain as motion is introduceden passantand not further
discussedhere.
The distinctionbetween rest on the one side and pleasureand pain on
the otherallowsSocratesto determinewhichpleasuresaretrueandpureas
opposed to those that are mere "shadow-paintings". What preciselydoes
he mean by "true"and "pure"?On a closer look it turnsout that he uses
them in threedifferentways, dependingon the aspectand explanationof
the natureof the pleasuresand pains in question.
(1) In the argumentthatestablishesthe differencebetweentruepleasure
and liberation from pain (583c-585a) he metaphoricallydescribes true
pleasures,whichstartfromthe neutralstage,as a motionthatis goingtruly
"upward",while those thatstartwith pain and end withthe achievementof
rest come from "below" (584d). He claims that they are regarded as
pleasuresbecause the soul from inexperienceconfuseswhat merelyseems
to be "up"with what trulyis. The metaphorof the upwardand downward
movementsand the epithet "shadowlike"remind us of the simile of the
Cave and are very probablymeant to do so. One cannot tell from the text
whether the so-called pleasures accordingto Plato are simply not to be
regardedas pleasuresas false friendsare no friendsat all.17Plato gives
somewhatconflictingmessageswith regardto this point. On the one hand
the motion from below (liberation from pain) is treated like a pseudo-
pleasureand the motion from the true above to the state of rest (end of
pleasure)as a pseudo-pain(584d/e); on the otherhand he also claimsthat
they are not "pure"(584cl) - which seems to suggestthat he does regard
them as pleasures albeit impure ones. Even the eidola and shadows are
somewhatlike what they are shadowsof.
(2) A differentsense of "true"and "pure"is used in the followingpartof
the argument in Rep.IX (585a8-586c5)where Socrates drops the term
"motion"and uses "'filling"instead (without any mention of a shift). A
closer look at the text shows that it should be understood against the
backgroundof a special physiologicaltheory- "if to be filled with whatis
akin to nature is pleasure (585d1)". The reason for the shift in his ter-
minology from motion to filling is, it seems to me, that in the present
17If this were so a large group of ordinaryeverydaypleasureswould be ruled out, i.e. all
those where there is mere restorationas in hunger and thirst.Since this questionis treated
again, more extensively, in the Philebus Plato seems to have seen there at least an
ambiguitythat needed to be removed. On this issue cf. G/T p. 106ff, "modificationsof
the basic picture".
159

passageit is no longer the direction,the up and down, thatmattersbut the
objectof pleasure,i.e. what the person is filled with.And such filling, as
Plato expresseshimself,is "truer"the "morereal"its objectis (595b9/10).
At this point obviously the "degreesof realitytheory"comes in, as it has
been establishedin Sun, Line and Cave, i.e. that a higherdegreeof being
implies a higherdegree of truth.So we are now told that "themore being
(ousia) obtains, the more truth there is and the more filling with what is
more truly"- and that only knowledgecan bringthat about.18Platodoes
not, at this point, declarethe pleasuresof the lower partsof the soul to be
false, but he winds himself through almost untranslatableformulations
with the help of comparativeconstructions:"that which is more really
filled with real thingswould more reallyand trulycause us to enjoya true
pleasure,while that which partakesof the less trulyexistentwould be less
trustworthyand less true pleasure"(585e).In this sense of "true"none of
the pleasuresthat involve sense-perceptionare fully "true",not even pure
smellsthat do not startwith pain, i.e. whichwere"true"in sense (1).
(3) The last paragraph(586b7-587a5)introducesyet anothersense in
whichthe lowerkindsof pleasuresare not "true":theyaremixedwithpain
(memeigmenaislypais:586b7 - truthis mentionedin this sectionat 586d/
e). Muchof what Platosays here would suggestthat he has revertedto the
firstkind since he calls them eidolaof truepleasures,but it is clearthathe
does not have mere liberationfrom pain in mind. For in the mixtureshe
mentionshere,the pain actuallyintensifiesthe pleasureand is describedas
an 'active',violent state in the soul, no mere emptinessas in hungerand
thirst,but wrath,envy, ambitionor greed(cf. 586c/d). Socratesis here not
suggestingthat these pleasures are not pleasures,in spite of the use of
"eid3la"and "eskiagraphemenai" (586b8).They are "astrueas theycan be
and truestif they follow the rightprinciple"(586d/e).
From what I have indicated it should be clear that the problemsand
unclaritiesand possibleinconsistenciesare due to the fact that the concept
of true and false pleasuresin Rep. IX is tied to the "degreesof reality"
theory and needed revisionwhen Plato revisedthat, togetherwith a rev-
ision of the meaningof the criteria"true","pure",etc. Whatremainsopen
is whetherPlato noticed at the time that he used "true"in threedifferent
ways, namely as in (1), what reallyis a pleasureand not merelyliberation
18 G/T have claimed that there is a "fatal ambiguity"which restson the conflation of
replenishmentand repletion (cf. pp. 122ff): "In the RepublicPlato shows no signs of
seeing this ambiguity".I think that replenishmentbut not repletionwould be the pleas-
ure, i.e. motion but not its end. The end, rest, is seen as the desired good but what is
enjoyed is the motion towardsit, i.e. eating.
160

from pain, (2) pure (in what it consists in) and (3) unmixedwith pain.
Whetherhe did or only realized it later, the Philebusclearly shows that
Plato saw this as a loose end which needed to be tied up.19What seems to
be missingin Rep.IX is the propositionalsenseof "true".We can claim this,
of course,only e silentio;but thereis no indicationthateven the truthof the
pleasuresof the mind is consideredunderany other than the threeaspects
listed above. The Philebusthus breaksfreshground.
II. The physiology ofpleasure in the Philebus.

It has not been denied in the recentliteraturethat Platomakesa freshstart
in the Philebusby workingout the conceptionsof pleasureand pain, that
he introducesthe aforementioneddivisionintoperas,apeiron,mixtureand
causefor this purpose,and also triesto clarifythe distinctionsbetweenthe
differentkinds of pleasuresand the criteriafor theirevaluation.But as to
what, precisely,is to be regardedas the result of these clarificationsthe
experts have not reached any agreement.This is especially true for the
questionof the notion of true and false pleasures.One reproachagainst
Plato'streatmentof this issue which has been raisedtime and againis that
he workswith an ambiguousconcept of truthand that this leads to a not
always clear and coherent theory. As Gosling expresses it, "it seems
impossibleto acquitPlato of the chargeof rankequivocation"(Gosling(3)
p. 212).
Againstthis claim I want to maintain(withoutbeing able to discussall
the relevantquestionshere)that at least in the PhilebusPlatois fully aware
of the equivocation but distinguishes carefully between the different
meanings and even indicates it terminologically.20 The long part in the
middle of the Philebus (3lb-53c) falls into the following sections: (a) a
19 On the true and5and the criterionfor true pleasurescf. G/T pp. 320ff. Cf. "thatin fact
only the best man has any real pleasures"(325). It seems indeed as if only those who are
nourishedby the forms have real/true pleasures.For agnoia and aphrosyn?are kenotites
(585b4). If only those pleasuresare really good that fulfil all three conditions there is an
"overkilleffect" in Rep.IX, i.e. we have a very austerehedonisticposition. I am not sure,
however,how strongly this is meant by Plato.
20 Cf. 41a7 kat'allon tropon ..., where he is dealing with the estimated amount of
pleasure;since this was a topic dealt with already in the Protagoras,a simple conflation
with the "propositional"kind of falsity is very unlikely. Cf. also the third kind 42c5:
pseudeis eti mallon . . . - these are "even falser" (as pleasures, not propositions), because
they are not pleasuresat all but liberations from pain. Waterfieldpoints out rightly that
Plato distinguishedbetween the "true"of logical theory and colloquial usages of true -
(I) p. 22.
161

"physiology"21of pleasure and pain (3 lb-36c); (b) truth and falsity of
pleasureand pain in a propositionalsense (36c41b); (c) partlytrue and
false pleasuresin the sense of "overrated"in degree (41b-42c);(d) plea-
sures confused with the state of rest (42c-44d);(e) pleasuresintrinsically
mixed with pain (44d-50e); (f) pure and impureobjects of pleasureand
pain (50e-53c).Of these sectionsonly (a) and (b) containnewdoctrine;(d),
(e),(f) correspondto what is said in (1), (3), (2) in Rep.IX, while (c) refersus
back to the "artof measuringpain and pleasure"in the Protagoras.
I have to confine myself here to points (a) and (b) and will just try to
work out in what sense and on what basis Plato ascribespropositional
characterto certain kinds of pleasure and can, therefore,attributetruth
and falsityin the literalsense to them.
The question of the nature of pleasure is approachedin a rather
circumspectway and dealt with on a largerscale than in any of the earlier
dialogues; the strategyPlato follows and the purposeof the distinctions
madeare not alwaysclearand have puzzledmodem commentators.Thisis
partlydue to revisionsof older doctrineconcerningthe natureof pleasure
(to which most commentatorshave not paid sufficient attention)22but
mostof all to the almostsurreptitiousway in whichSocratespavesthe way
to the "propositional"pleasuresthat Protarchusfinds so hardto accept.23
What is at firstsight surprisingis that Socratesin this partintroducesonly
twokindsof pleasures,(1) what I suggestwe call the "immediatepleasures"
of filling and emptyingof the body (32b), and (2) the expectationof such
fillings. This limitation is surprising,not only because later on in the
dialogue we find other kinds of pleasures but also because Socrates
presentsthe type (2) pleasuresas representativeof all kinds of pleasures
since they are pure and unmixedwith pain (32c)and can thereforebe used
as the basisfor answeringthe questionwhetherthe wholegenusof pleasure
is a good as such or whethergoodnessis just a contingentpropertyof some
of them.24
21 "Physiology"is meant in the originalsense and includes psychologicalfeatures.
22 That the doctrineis new is indicated by the fact that Socratesalmost dictateshow the
termsare to be understood:cf. tithometha(32b6); tithei(b9).
23 What adds to the impression of disorganizationis the insertionof the passageon the
"most divine" state of rest in 32e-33c2. I cannot discuss the change of position that it
shows in comparison with Rep. IX nor the purpose it serves in the Philebus.There are
three states mentioned that are in between or beside pleasure and pain: a divine
motionlessness,as in this section, an intermediaryhuman life (42a-43c), and the state
between pleasureand pain discussedin 35ef.
24 In which sense pleasure and pain are not mixed in the pleasuresof anticipationis not
discussedhere. It standsto reason that everyexpectationis pleasantonly if it promisesthe
fulfilmentof a lack.
162

Before we can turn to the question of what makes the pleasures of
expectationso specialwe have to look at the definitionof the "immediate"
pleasures. In the definition that Protarchusaccepts Socrates does not
confine himself to the "filling"metaphor(cf. 32al) but gives a very wide
definitionthat incorporatesthe new ontologyof perasandapeiron:"When
the naturalstate of a living organism,constituted,as I have maintained,of
the unlimited and the limited, is destroyed,that destructionis pain; con-
versely,whensuch organismsreturnto theirown truenature,thisreversion
is invariablypleasure"(32a/b, Hackforth'stranslation).
This definition in purely physical terms is nowhere questionedin the
dialogue; but that even the immediatepleasuresare not confined to the
body but essentiallyconstitutedby the soul becomes apparentwhen the
much morecomplexphenomenonof the pleasuresof expectationsof such
fillings is unravelled.The somewhatimpromptuorder of Socrates'expla-
nation of the nature and origin of such pleasures indicates that he is
introducingnew doctrine:all expectationis based on memory,but before
this can be discussedsense-perceptionhas to be explained,then the dis-
tinction between memoryand recollectionmust be observed,and finally
the role of desirein the whole processhas to be elucidated(33c-35d).Let us
take a closer look at the details of Plato'sexplanationof how perception,
memoryand desirebringabout pleasuresof expectation.
The first step is a clarificationof what happens in sense-perception
(33d-34a): a sense-perceptionis an affection of both body and soul, a
disturbance(seismos)that affectseach one individuallyand together(idion
te kai koinon hekatera,33d). Of those disturbancesonly those that reach
the soul are perceived, i.e. only what the soul experiencescounts, even
though the primaryexperienceis perceivedwith and through the body.
Socratesdoes not explicitlysay that the immediatepleasuresare percep-
tions but it is clear that he must have this in mind: perceiveddisturbances
of the naturalharmonyare pains, perceivedrestorationsare pleasures.25
Memory,so Socratescontinues,is the preservationof such perceptions
while recollectionis the soul's capacity to recaptureby itself what it has
experiencedwith the body "as much as possible"(34b), and this does not
only apply to perceptionsbut to all mathemataas well.
Why does Plato go into these details?He gives us the reasonshimself:it
showswhat the soul is capableof independentlyof the body,i.e. that(apart
from the primaryexperience)it possessesan almostcomplete autonomy.
25Concerning this point cf. the "mechanics"of the physical pleasures in the Timaeus,
64a-65b.
163

For once the soul has undergonea seismoswith the body it can retainthat
experienceor re-experienceit in an authenticway all by itself,sinceeven in
the primaryaffectiononly what touchesthe soul counts as the experience.
We may perhaps want to object that no rememberedtoothache is as
painfulas a real one, but Platowould attributethat to incompletememory
or recollection.The more sensitive (and hypochondriac)among us are
quitecapable of recallingthe horrorto perfection.26
After this relativeautonomyof the soul is establishedPlatoturnsto the
questionof the role that desireplays in the processof the generationand
recollection of pleasure. The reason for Socrates' somewhat tortuous
descriptionof the desiringperson'slongingsfor the statethatis oppositeto
the one he is presentlyin emerges only gradually.It is obscuredby his
inconsistent treatment of the notion of "thirst"and "being thirsty".
Sometimes thirst is just the "pain of being emptied of fluids"(34e9-11;
35b4);then it is called the "desirefor the fillingwith drink"(34d/e; 35al).
On reflectionit is clear why Plato wavershere. Hungerand thirst,eating
anddrinking,were the standardexamplesof pleasuresand painsin Plato's
earlierdialogues- "to lypoumenonchairein as we found in the Gorgias.
Here Platoindicatesthatthirstis notjust painfuldeprivationbutcontainsa
reference to the object the person is deprived of. Thirst in this sense
includesmemoryof the previousexperienceof fulfilment.Beforea person
has undergonethis kind of experiencehe would not knowwhat he needs
(as some pediatriciansnowadayshold, newborninfantscannotdistinguish
betweenhungerand stomach-pain);but thirstfor the experiencedperson
alwayscontains the desire for the appropriatefulfilment.Why Platogoes
throughthis somewhatpainstakinganalysisis indicatedin the summaryin
35d: since it is memory that directsthe soul towardswhat it desires,it is
apparentthat "it is to the soul that all impulseand desire,and indeed the
determiningprincipleof the whole creaturebelongs"(35d).
The emphasis on the autonomy of the soul and the need for a link
betweenthe presentstate of deprivationand futurefulfilmentare not the
only reasonswhy Plato includes an explanationof the natureof desirein
the discussionof the "physiology"of pleasure.That its purposeis more
specificand crucialfor what follows becomesapparentin the passagethat
concludes the physiology and leads into the problem of true and false
pleasures,35e-36b. Socrates there asks Protarchusyet anotherpuzzling
26 How soul and body interact in pleasure and pain was not investigatedin the Gorgias
nor in Rep.IX, where the different kinds of pleasures were merely assigned to the
differentpartsof the soul.
164

question:Whathappenswhen a personstands"inthe middlebetweenpain
and pleasure",i.e. when he is in pain because of the deprivationbut
remembersthe pleasuresthatwould end it and desiresthem?Is this stateas
a whole a state of distressor of pleasure(35e/36a)?Protarchusanswersthat
the personwould be in twofoldpain: in additionto thepathoson account
of the body there would be "pain of the soul in desire for a (positive)
expectation".27 Socrates'reply shows what is crucialin the role he assigns
to desire:desireoriginatesfroma pain but does not itselfconstitutea pain.
A further,second, pain only ariseswhen the soul realizesthat there is no
hope for a fulfilment.The pain would be counterbalanced,however,if the
soul had a clear hope that therewas going to be a fulfilment(36a-b).What
is the reason for this distinction between single or twofold pain and
assuagementby positiveexpectation?
Plato, so I want to suggest, takes this trouble in order to put the dif-
ference between desire and hope into full relief. Both are related to the
futureand have the same object:thattherewill be fulfilment,thatI will get
whatI need. To the unskilled"desiringthat ... ." and "hopingthat... ." may
almostseem to amount to the same thing. This Plato denies: hope, in the
sense of "clearexpectation",is a pleasureand can activelyinterferewith a
present state of pain, while desire cannot. The distinction between
immediatepleasurewhichis an aisthesis,desire,and hope seems to be new
in the Philebus;in the Theaetetuspleasures,pains,desiresand fearsare all
listedunderthe title of "aisthesis"(156b).28Withrespectto the pleasuresof
hope Socratesraisesthe questionwhetherthey can be trueor false.
III. True andfalse pleasures in the propositional sense.

That the discussionwhich follows the distinctionbetweendesireand hope
is supposed to contain the central questionin this part of the dialogue is
indicatednot only by the carefulpreparationin the "physiology"but also
by dramaticmeans.Protarchus,who up to thispoint has followedSocrates'
argumentationwillingly, refuses to accept the distinction: how could
pleasuresbe false (36b)? And he is not dissuadedwhen Socratessugges-
tively lines up pleasuresand pains with fears,opinions and expectations.
27 The awkwardnessof Protarchus'answer shows that he has not yet masteredthe tools
that Socrates'analysis provides,36a: kata de tOnpsychPnprosdokiastinipoth.
28 Not too much should be made of the enumeration in Theaet.however, since Plato
already in Rep.IX distinguishes different kinds of pleasure (not all of which would be
aistheseis as, e.g., the pleasures of the mind). It is still significant that epithymia is
classified as an aisthesis.
165

Only opinions can be true or false, claims Protarchus.To convincehim of
"false pleasures"Socrates works out a rather careful analogy between
opinion(doxa)and pleasure.Afterconcedingto Protarchus,at leastfor the
time being,29that there can indeed be no doubt about whetherone ex-
periencespleasure or not, he suggests a distinctionbetween the mental
activity,i.e. the opiningor being pleased,and the objectof the activity,i.e.
what the opiningor being pleasedis all about.In both casesit is clearthat
whether or not one jusifiably (orthos) opines or is pleased, one really
(ontos) has an opinion or is pleased. But should, nevertheless,only
opinions be true or false while pleasuredoes not admitany qualifications
(37b)?Since they had been classifiedas apeira,as indeterminate,pleasures
admitat leastof degrees,of moreor less, as was settledearlier.Shouldthey
not also admit positive and negativequalifications(37d)?30In the case of
opinionsthe "positive"consistsin theirtruth,for if an opiniongoes wrong
it misses its object and cannot be regardedas right or as opining rightly.
The analogue,so Socratessuggests,should hold for pleasuresand pains.If
they go wrongone cannotcall them rightor properor useful.31
At thispoint Socrates,so it seemsat leastat first,commitsa fatalmistake.
Insteadof continuingto stickto the analogyhe suppliesProtarchuswiththe
decisivecue: do not pleasuresoften "go along"with false opinions(37e)?
Protarchusreadilysnatchesthe cue: this is preciselyit, the opinionis true
or false but not the pleasure!
Every interpreter must ask himself (and most actually have) why
Socrates ruins his own analogy and does not claim that at least in a
derivativesense one can maintain a distinction between true and false
pleasures.32This would seem sufficientat leastfor his mainpurpose,i.e. to
29 Whetherthis is meantseriouslyby Socratesor isjust adopted for the momenthas been

questioned by Gosling, Kenny, and Penner. The referenceto the possibility,discussed
later, that a false pleasure may be something that is no pleasureat all, is invalid because
the antihedonist'sposition is different; the dyschereisdo not acknowledgeany pleasures.
30 As mentioned earlier, the differentiation by degree is introduced in the Protagoras
(356cfl) in the "artof measuringpleasure and pain",and the distinctionbetween better
and worse pleasures is (reluctantly) accepted by Callicles in the Gorgias(499b). But
nothing furtheris said about these distinctions.
31 The frequent repetition of "ge" shows a certain defensiveness and cautiousnesson
Socrates'side (cf. 37a9; a12; b3; c4; c8; d2; el; e8; elO).
32 In 42a 10 Socratesrefersback to the relationshipbetween pleasureand doxa, using the
expression "anepimplasan ": "the true and false beliefs fill the pains and pleasureswith
their predicament".Gosling ((I) p. 48; 53) and Kenny(p. 48) translateit by "infect",but
that might be too weak because this mayjust mean that that they have an impactwhile a
mergerseems ratherto be what Plato has in mind.
166

establishthat pleasureis not a good as such. For only a fool would readily
enjoy what is not the case. If Socratesundermineshis own analogy this
must indicatethat he himself is not satisfiedwith it but wants to establish
the truthor falsityof pleasurein the primarysense.He attemptsto do so in
the lengthy argument which is the center of criticism of present-day
scholars(38a-41a). I willjust try to indicatewhat I see as its crucialpoints.
At firstSocratesseems only to elaboratefurtheron the analogybetween
opinion on the one side, pleasureand pain on the other,in orderto show
how opinions come about, namely from sense-perceptionand memory
when the soul in a kind of dialoguewith itself or with someone else comes
to an agreementabout something(38cff).33 The soul thus receiveslogoi
which it retainsso thatthey arewritteninto it as into a book and, if they are
writtenin the appropriateform, the logoi can be true or false. Besidesthe
scribe in the soul, there supposedly is also a painter at work painting
picturesthatcorrespondto the logoi; and thesepicturesare alsocapableof
being true or false (39b/c).
So far nothinghas been said aboutpleasuresand pains,but at this point
they are drawnin and the whole argumentis quicklybroughtto its end.
The firststep is thatlogoi and paintingscan be aboutwhatlies in the future.
As admitted earlier,the soul can entertainpleasuresand pains through
memoryall by itself withoutthe body; hence the soul can anticipatefuture
pleasuresor pains(39d/c). Furthermore,hopes arelogoi or paintingsabout
the future,some of which are true and some false (the god-belovedpeople
areusuallyright,the wickedwrong).34Now opinionsmay reallyopine but
not about what is the case, was the case or will be the case, and the same
should apply to pleasures(and pains): they are really pleasuresbut not
aboutwhat is, was or will be. What appliesto hope (one kind of pleasure)
also applies to other emotions such as fear or anger. The end of the
argumentis reached (4la/b) when Socrateswants to know whether the
falseness and the wickednessof a pleasure are one and the same thing.
Protarchusemphaticallyagrees that they are different,hence we are to
conclude that there is truth and falsity of pleasure as an acknowledged
independentphenomenon.
33 The silent dialogue of the soul refers to the Theaetetus.The elucidation of false
pleasuresobviously presupposesthe discussionof false statements.
34 Gosling (3) p. III sees this as a "moralisticdigression."I just want to suggestone very
simple explanation (though this may not be all there is to the passage): Protarchushad
denied earlierthat expectations(prosdokiai)are true or false. The divine backup would
guaranteethat thereis antecedenttruthand falsity.About the successof the god-beloved
cf. Prot. 345c; Symp.212a/b; Phdr.273e; Tim.53c; Laws730c.
167

Is Protarchusconvinced?One cannot be sure. But it seems that he is at
least somewhat restive;for when Socratessuggeststhat they should look
for more false pleasuresin a different sense he just replies "if there are
any", but goes along with the further investigation,which we will not
pursuehere (cf. 41b).
Letus look at the argumentin detail.Manyquestionsremainopen and a
lot of criticism has been ventured against it. Does the whole argument
(suppose we accept if for the moment) apply only to pleasuresof anti-
cipation?What, precisely, happens in those anticipations?Why are the
picturesincluded, and how are we supposed to understandthe example
Platouses of someonewho "oftensees himselfas receivinga lot of gold and
great pleasureson account of that. And he sees himself painted as he is
terriblypleased with himself' (40a)?The "picturing"has been especially
focussedupon by the critics. It has been claimed that Plato confusesthe
picturingand the picture, and that while one might admit the truth or
falsityof thepicture,thepicturingas such cannotbe regardedin thatway.
Gosling in particularhas come back to this point time and again,i.e. that
Plato confuses the picture of a pleasurewith the pleasurein the picture,
thatthoughpicturingand picturearecoterminoustheyare,nevertheless,to
be distinguished.35
The interpretationwhichis mostsympatheticto Plato'sattempttojustify
"trueand false" pleasureshas been venturedby Penner.36He points out
that Plato consciouslymakes use of the ambiguityof "opining"and "the
opined",and "being pleased"and "whatone is pleasedabout",and that
Platodoes so to establisha mentalstatethatwe wouldcall a "propositional
attitude".The scribe and the painter accordingto this interpretationare
introducedto fulfil this functionin the soul;whatis acquiredby themis not
a momentary thoughtor pleasurebut a propercommunicableopinionthat
can be sharedby otherpeople, i.e. a propositionor objectivepicture.What
justifies calling the propositionalattitudespleasuresis that not only does
the pleasureaccompany the belief, i.e. is a pleasurewith- but is a pleasure
in - the belief, a pleasure taken in the things believed.The reasonwhy
Socrates lets his own analogy collapse is that he, as Penner expresses
himself(p. 175),"redirectsProtarchusin just thisway, so thatbelief ceases
to be whatit was before,the believingand becomesthe thingbelieved- the
35 Cf. "conflation"Gosling (l) p. 52; (2) p. 43; (3) p. 314; Kenny p. 52; "understandable
mistake"Dybikowskip. 164/5; G/T p. 125; 188;436; 438.
36 Penner somewhatwavers between ascribingto Plato a consistentenlightenmentabout
the propositionalcharacterof true and false pleasures and assuming only an implicit
understanding(p. 171-3).
168

thing which is written or that which is painted. There is a shift in the
meaning of opinion (doxa) from opining (doxazein) to the opined (to
doxazomenon)in 39elO."
As far as Plato'sown understandingof what he is doing is concerned,
Pennersuggeststhat there are threepossibilities:
(A) Platodoes not see the ambiguity,nor the "in"- "with"- contrast,
(B) Plato consciously exploits the ambiguity and the breakdownin the
analogyis planned,or
(C) Platois unawareof the ambiguityof doxa but has a clearconceptionof
the perceptualor cognitiveanalogy.
Penner himself prefers (C) and claims that Plato with respect to the
meaning of "doxa" was unaware of the distinction between doxa as a
processand doxa as a product,and that the same applies to the notion of
pleasure. As a process-wordit signifies "enjoying",while as a product-
wordit signifieswhat the pleasureis taken in. Had Platobeen fully aware
of the ambiguity,so Pennerclaims,he would have chosen product-beliefs
and product-pleasuresand have realizedthatprocess-beliefsand pleasures
aretrueonly by extension.
I preferoption (B) and want to claim that not only did Platonot commit
the unforgivable sin of confusing the pleasure in the picture with the
pictureof the pleasure,as Goslinghas it, but also thatPlatodid not commit
the forgivablesin of conflatingproduct-and process-word,which is what
Pennerassumes.Thereare,indeed,two differentsensesin whichPlatouses
doxa: at first in the active sense, i.e. = doxazein("to opine"),and in this
sense the opinion can "make a mistake"(harmartanein,37aff) and that
aboutwhichthe mistakeis made is called the doxazomenon,the "opined".
This active sense of doxa = doxazeinis maintainedup to 38b9 (so far we
have had only two things,(a) the activedoxa and (b) what it is about;and
the same goes for pleasureand what one is pleased about). But when the
scribeand the painterare introducedthey are takingover the activefunc-
tion that the anthropomorphicdoxa had so far, and "doxa"adopts the
passivesenseand is explicitlyequatedwith the logos(38e).In the scribeand
paintersimilewe have, thus, threethings:(a) the author,(b) the writingor
painting,and (c) what is written and painted, the subjectmatter(cf. esp.
39a).37As I want to claim, (c) is what Platosees as constitutingthe true or
false pleasure in the primary sense, while (b) the writing or painting,
37 The minute descriptionof the origin of the logos thus finds a naturalexplanation:the
(passive) opinion, i.e. the product,has an independentexistence and its truthand falsity
Ire investigatedhere, not the "veracity"of the scribeor painter.
169

thoughno doubt pleasanttoo, is trueor false only in the derivativesenseof
"erring",writingor painting faultily. Since Pennerdid not pay sufficient
attentionto the fact that Plato quite deliberatelyand conspicuouslydis-
tinguishesbetweenthese threefactorsinvolvedin the caseof falseopinions
and pictures,he is not reallyable to rejectwhole-heartedlythe reproachof
confusion ventured by Gosling et al. but maintains only that as they
presentit, it is "disproportionate" (p. 177).
What Pennerand others seem not to have realizedis why Plato in his
argumentfocusses on hope as the crucial kind of pleasure.At first one
would think that hope is not a particularlygood example by which to
demonstratethe truth or falsity of pleasure. For, granted that there is
somethingpleasurableabout hopes, they are often very vague, and while
we do speakof false hopes we may not want to speakof trueones without
furtherjustification.38I may hope that I will pass an exam but not yet
expectthat I will do so. But we should note here that Platodoes not speak
of any kind of hope but of those where there is definite expectationthat
theywill be fulfilled,en elpidiphaneratouplertthiesesthai (36a/b). So Plato
is not concernedwith caseswherethe outcomeis seen as a merepossibility,
but with caseswherecertaintyis assumedand what is writtenandpictured
in thegrammataor eikonesaredefinitefacts.Thatthisis the salientpointin
Plato'sargumentis indicatedwhen he tells us what the hopes in question
are.They are called logoi: "thereare logoi in each one of us whichwe call
hopes"(40a6) - and, so one has to add, if they have the appropriateform
they can be regarded as what we would call propositions and can,
therefore,be true or false.
Whatis presupposedhere is, then, a definitecommitmenton the speak-
er's(or scribe'sor painter's)side, i.e. to thedescriptionof the pleasure.Only
when I definitely expect "that I will pass the exam"can the anticipated
pleasurebe regardedas true or false. But if Platowas concernedonly with
definite expectations,why did he not stick to the expression"prosdokia"
ratherthan "elpis",the scepticalreadermightask at thispoint. I thinkthe
explanationis simple. Prosdokiaican be pleasantor unpleasantand the
addition of this qualificationwould give Protarchusopportunityto raise
the same objectionas he did earlier:that there are reallytwo things,the
expectationplus the pleasureor displeasure."Hope"allowsus to regardit
as a unitary phenomenon. Is this interpretationborne out by the text?
Plato'sown exampleis difficultto evaluatesince it is not primafacie clear
38 Protarchushas earlier rejectedthe possibilityof true and false fearsand expectations.

So Socratesnow has to argue that we in fact often do regardour expectationsas certain.
170

what,precisely,are the pleasuresof the man who sees the paintedillusions
of possessinga lot of gold and many pleasureson accountof that (40a).A
lot hingeson the evaluationof the example,and differentinterpretershave
read it in differentways. I thereforewant to suggest a differentexample,
where logoi are clearly implied, namely that of Rumpelstiltskinin the
GrimmTale.
IV. Rumpelstiltskin's Pleasures

Many a child has been amused by Rumpelstiltskin'striumph-songand
remembersthat by chantingit out loud Rumpelstiltskincommitteda fatal
mistake:
To-day I bake; tomorrowI brewmy beer;
The next day I will bringthe Queen'schild here;
Ah, lucky 'tis that not a soul doth know
That Rumpelstiltskinis my name, ho! ho!
Rumpelstiltskin,I take it, does notjust entertaindaydreams- he is taking
it for grantedthat the Queen will not know his name, and that he will get
the child. Not all hopes are of that assertivekind, some of them are very
vague indeed, but Plato speaks of "clearhopes that it will be fulfilled".
(The Greek futureindicativeis even more committalthan the English).39
We have thus to distinguishbetweenmere hopes and clear hopes. Since in
discussionsthisdistinctionhas createdsome confusionIjust wantto cite an
examplethat shows how untidy our everydaylanguageoften is and what I
meanby "merehope".In a statementquotedin the New YorkTimes(Nov.
28, 1984, B7) the surgeon DeVries said about the recoveryof the patient
who received an artificial heart: "We hope he can go home before
Christmas,but I think that is probablyvery,very unrealistic".
To returnto Rumpelstiltskin.We have to ask ourselves,of course,what,

precisely,Rumpelstiltskindoes enjoy. Is he not just gloating, as Gosling
39 Gosling (1) p. 49 denied that such committmentsare what Plato could have in mind. I
disagree. His example (1) p. 49, of the excited schoolboy who (falsely) thinks that he
enjoys the greasy food he manages to steal from the larder while what he enjoys is the
adventure, should be changed; e.g. the schoolboy falsely enjoys "eating up the
headmaster'sfavouritedessert"(falsely, because it is not the favouritedessertor because
thereis more of it). Kenny thinks that the main point is that of a misclassification(p. 50):
that we expect (like King Midas) that something will be pleasant while it will not. This
does not go well with Plato'srepeated assertionthat pleasuresin present,past and future
are alike in this respect(cf. 40d).
171

thinks about the man in Plato's example, picturing himself in the
possession,revellingin it - as sometimesthe merethoughtof something
pleases one or makes one shudder?His pleasuresmay be called well-
foundedor ill-foundedbut not true or false, as the objectorsto this theory
would retort. To answer the question what Rumpelstiltskinenjoys we
wouldhave to ask him whetherit is the pictureor the logosor whatever,so
we cannot be quite sure. We can, however, make hypothesesabout his
mentalstate.Whatkinds of thoughtsor picturesmusthe entertainto meet
Plato'sstandards?
We have to take a step back here and look at the "physiology"of
pleasureagain.A pleasuresupposedlyis the filling of a lack or restoration
of the properstate.The soul can undergosucha processwithor withoutthe
body; once the soul has experiencedsomething,it can reproduceit all by
itself- fill itselfwith whatit lacks.Some suchfillingscan consistin definite
logoior picturesrepresentingreality.It mightat thispointbe objectedwith
David Hume that reproductionsin memoryare "lesslively and forcible"
than the original experience,but Plato, as I said earlier,seems to think
otherwise.At any rate, the vividnessdoes not change truthor falsity(but
perhapsthe degreeof pleasure).For Platoit only mattersthatpleasuresare
constitutedby processes in the soul over which the soul has complete
control.And if one reflectson the notionof the "filling","restoring",etc.,it
becomes clear why Plato does not conceive of pleasureas an indistinct
feeling of euphoria or elation that can arise at any occasion,an epiphe-
nomenon,as Protarchusseems to have in mind. For Plato thereis in each
case of pleasureonly one motion in the soul, i.e. the positivereceptionof
what the soul desires.There is not (a) one motion- e.g. Rumpelstiltskin's
thought that he will get the Queen's child, and (b) another one
accompanyingor succeeding the first one, something like an indistinct
glow. "Pleasure"is for Plato,then, the name of a largevarietyof things;in
the Philebus,I take it, it designatesthree classes, namely thoughts,per-
ceptionsand feelings.40
What all pleasures have in common is merely that they are positive
processes,each one determinedand qualifiedby the objectenjoyed.More
we cannot say before a certain pleasure is specified. Rumpelstiltskin's
pleasuresmay consistin variousobjectives.He mayjust feel triumphantin
a diffuseway, in which case his wordswould not be meantas a committal,
and thereis then no questionof truthor falsity.We oftendo not meanwhat
40I have to admit that this claim needs furtherdiscussion,especiallyas far as the notion
and status of feeling (love, jealousy etc.) are concerned.
172

we say. Or he may just muster with glee all the possibilitiesand enjoy
talkingaboutthem;and talkingthe talk or picturingthe pictureis what the
pleasurewould be all about, and again there would be no truthor falsity
implied (though the picturingmay be very pleasant). The only way in
which Rumpelstiltskin'spleasurescan be true or false is when he enjoys
what his thought is the thoughtof and when the thought consists in an
assertionaboutfacts (present,past or future).We do make such commit-
mentswhen we talk aboutpleasuresin the presentor past.An athletewhen
askedwhat he enjoyedmost, the winning(when he ran throughthe finish
line), the ceremony afterwards,the party, the girls, etc., might say - "I
enjoyedmost that I won",wherethe propositionis what the pleasureis all
about. The same may be true in Rumpelstiltskin'scase. We do not know
why he wanted the Queen'schild or what he wanted to do with it. But in
orderto have trueor false pleasureshe has to have definiteexpectationsin
the propositionalform"thisis going to be the case . . .",i.e. he mustsee it as
settled. What he hopes for, in other words, must be "will-be's"and not
"'maybe's".
Besides the pleasuresthat consist in logoi, Plato also wants to include
pleasuresthat consistin pictures,in visual representations.I think that we
should granthim that extensionas long as it is clear that what is meant is
not the visualizingbut the visualized(though the visualizingitself would
also be pleasant,just as expectingcan be enjoyedas well as the expected).
Pleasurestakenin what is anticipatedare often the mostintensiveones and
so is the disappointmentwhen they turnout to have been false.Ourhaving
been so sure somehow makesit worse.41This is why.Rumpelstiltskinwas
seized by such a furywhen his hopes where thwartedthat he tore himself
asunder.It is a commonplacethat one should not be pleased too soon: the
"falsepleasure"seems to aggravatethe disappointment.
That not hopes of all sortscan be true or false is clear. Rumpelstiltskin
must know what he wants and think he is going to get. How does one
acquiresuch knowledge?Plato has explicitlyprovidedthe answerto this
question.Firstly,in the "'physiology"he describeshow the soul experiences
a certaincommotionand can reproduceit, "re-experienceit", all by itself.
Secondly, the functionsof the scribe and painter in the soul provide the
requiredknowledge/picture.As Plato has it, the scribe does not just jot
41 "Propositional"pleasures must be what in German is meant by "freuen, dass", not
"freuenauf"."Vorfreude"does imply a certainamountof confidence but not certainty.It
can thereforebe disappointedbut not falsified. In everydaylanguage the borderlinesare
not always clear, it has to be admitted. G/T mention "precognition"without clearly
explainingwhy that account should be consideredas "extremelyimplausible"(p. 430).
173

down notes about what happensnor does the painterjust take something
like snap-shots. What is written into the soul is the result of an often
exerciseddialogue of the soul with itself or with someoneelse, when from
memory or sense-perceptionsopinions or logoi are formed (the silent
dialogue remindsus of Theaet.189c-190aand is presumablymeantto do
so). The descriptionof the painter'sjob makesit even more obvious that
Platodoes not have the simple intake of sense-perceptionin mind,for the
textindicatesthatthe picturesarepicturesconstruedin accordancewith the
logoi, not photos of the world.The painteroperates,as Platosays,when a
personabstractswhat he previouslyjudged or said fromsightor any other
form of perceptionand, as it were, sees in his mind'seye "the imagesof
whatwasjudged and stated(39b/c)". Delightin suchpicturesmaythen be
a rathercomplex affair, but this much is clear: that we take such delight
only when we regardthe pictureas true.
So far,only trueand false hopes about thefuturehave been considered.
The parableof the scribeand paintersuggests,however,thatany kind of
logoscould provideus with pleasure.Furthermore,Platodoes claim at the
end of the passagethat our pleasuresalso concernwhat is presentor past,
and can be false when what we take to be the case is not the case, was not
the case, or will not be the case (40d; cf. 39c).I may, e.g., be verydelighted
when I am told that I have won in the lotteryand someonewavesa (false)
checkundermy nose - and be almostas furiousas Rumpelstiltskinwhen I
find out that it wasjust an April fool's-dayjoke. But why, then,does Plato
mostof the time confinehimselfto futurepleasures?Is itjust because,as he
says in 40d, most of our hopes are mistaken?42
I think that somethingmore importantis at stake and it is strangethat
this point seems not to have occurredto those of Plato'scriticswho do not
wantto accepthis "falsepleasures"of anticipation.It is this:in the case of
thingspresentor past it would have been much harderfor Socrates,if not
impossible, to persuade Protarchusthat pleasuresare anythingbut the
directapprehensionsof the thingsenjoyed.That pleasuresare eventswith
propositionalcontent would be hard (and is hard) to explain to anyone
who is not trainedin philosophyand does not have the appropriatevoca-
bulary at his disposition. What is special about future pleasuresis not
that only in their case do we have logoi but that we have only logoi. For
whatwe have in our mindsat that time is clearlyonly a logos,and whatwe
enjoy- if we do notjust enjoy the muchcriticizedanticipationin the sense
42 The point would be that in the case of ill-foundedand thwartedhopes the fabity in the
directsense would be most easy to pinpoint because a logos is all there is.
174

of picturing - is the anticipated event as it is described or pictured in our
minds itself. In addition,in the case of futurepleasuresit is quite obvious
that often there is a wide discrepancybetweenwhat is enjoyed"as a fact"
and what is in fact going to happen.
Plato does not, and need not, confine himself to pleasuresof "prognos-
tication".43It is easy to see that in the case of present or past pleasures
"truth"and "falsity"in the same sense are possible.We do not have to go
into the depictionof gruesomefalse pleasureslike thoseof poorThyestesat
the fateful dinner, there are more delightfulexamples:severalyears ago
therewas a reportin the newspapersthat a Germantouristhad got off the
plane en route to San Franciscoin Bangor,Maine (where the passengers
had to go throughcustoms),thinkinghe was alreadyin San Francisco.He
managedto stay therefor two whole weeks thoroughlyenjoyinghimselfin
"SanFrancisco"until he found out the truth.Now, he did not "truly"enjoy
thathe "wasin San Francisco",or the "beautyof San Francisco"etc., nor
did he enjoy the "little town in Maine"'becausehe did not know that that
was wherehe was. He might,in fact, have ragedand fretted,had he found
out the truth earlier.So the pleasureof "havingseen San Francisco"was
false while he was really enjoying himself thinking that he was in San
Francisco.One can make up similarcases for false pleasureaboutthe past,
notjust past pleasures.Someone may for a long time be immenselypleased
and proud about alleged achievementsin the past and find out one day
that the achievementswere not his or did not come about at all and that
otherpeople hadjust made fun of him.
To placate the sceptics about true and false pleasureswe have to admit
that only such pleasurescan be true or false where there is a clear and
precisepropositionor a clear and precisepictureof the supposedfacts.As
statedearlier,many of our "positiveexpectations"are too vagueto qualify.
And such vagueness is the reason why we are often quite helpless when
somethingcomes trueof which we had no clearconception.Someonewho
unexpectedly wins a million dollars in a lottery may at first be more
stunned than pleased while his neighbourwould have knownwhat to be
pleased about. The reasonfor this is that the scribeand the painterin the
first man's soul have not worked out yet what it means to be rich. All
qualificationsof a person'spleasuresdo in fact depend on the qualityof
43The critics of Plato's doctrine about false anticipatorypleasures are faced with the
consequence that if only the picturingwere at stake the same would have to hold for
present and past pleasures, in which case there would always be mere phantasizing,not
enjoymentof what is or was.
175

theirwork.So one may, in Plato's(as well as in Aristotle's)"sense,judge a
person'scharacterfrom his pleasures.They show what the scribeand the
painterin his soul have been doing.
Are theseconsiderationssufficientto dispelour misgivingsaboutPlato's
notion of trueand false pleasures?To judge fromthe criticalcommentson
Plato's theory, in spite of Penner'sexplanationof the propositionalcha-
racterof the kind of pleasuresin question,it does not seem so.45 What
obviouslystandsforemostin the way arelinguisticconsiderations.We have
bcome accustomedto be wary of brushingthe fabricof languageagainst
the pile. Plato however,seems to have been quite awareof the linguistic
and conceptualawkwardnessof speakingof trueand falsepleasures,as can
be seen from the way Protarchusrejectsvariousattemptsto make it palat-
able. Protarchusdoes not seem here to speakjust for the naive everyday
hedonistbut as if everyonewouldagreewithhim (cf. 37e/38a), and I takeit
thateveryonewho holds that pleasureand pain arejust epiphenomena that
accompany("gowith")beliefs,sensationsand activities would in fact agree
with him.
Plato, however,seems to have thoughtthat not just a linguisticchange
but a revisionof the ontologyof pleasuresshouldbe made;and I see thisas
one of the main objectivesin the Philebus.We have to choose, therefore,
between Socrates'and Protarchus'analysis and ontology of pleasure.I
cannot enterinto a discussionof the advantagesor disadvantagesof sucha
revisionhere, but want to turnto one final point.
It would be all very well, the opponents of such a theory will say, if
pleasureswere just propositionsor pictures.They are, however, mental
events,and how can mentalevents be trueor false?46This objectionseems
to be especiallypertinentto an interpretationthat claims (as mine does)
that for Plato in the Philebusthe basic model of pleasureis still that of a
"filling".Fillings are, after all, processes and not propositions,even if
propositionsare involved."Fillingmyselfwith propositions"can at bestbe
44 Cf. EN lI, 3, 1104b4:"We must take as a sign of characterthe pleasure or pain that
ensues on acts. . .".
45 Gosling (3) and G/T mention Penner's interpretation with approval but insist,
nevertheless,that Plato conflates the two cases and in the case of "futurepleasures"just
means gloating (cf. Gosling (3) p. 216/7; G/T 190; Appendix A p. 429ff.). In the case of
Rumpelstiltskinthere is certainly also gloating, but in many cases of "futurepleasures"
no mere malicious phantasizingneed be in question.
46 Cf. Waterfield(2) p. 24 who doubts that event and belief are reconcilable;and G/T on
the activityof picturingand propositionalcontent p. 435f.
176

understoodmetaphorically,if at all. So we would be back at squareone
and faced, once more,with Penner'sown misgivings(p. 177).
At this point it is importantto note that the linguisticawkwardnesshas a
ratherharmlessreason and that the metaphysicalchange is not nearlyas
drasticas it seems at first. For few of our so-called normalpleasuresare
propositionalin the firstplace. Reading,writing,playingtennis,travelling,
makingmoney,engagingin politics,or smellingrosesare activitiesand not
trueor false but edifying,relaxing,exciting,costlyetc. They are immediate
pleasuresand consist in activities.But are the true and false pleasuresof
anticipationnot also activities?We have to distinguishhere betweenwhat
the activity(and pleasure)consistsof and what it consistsin. In the case of
the pleasuresthat are only activities,the activityis .at the same time the
process and the intentional object of the pleasure. In the case of pro-
positional pleasures, however, the filling, i.e. the thinking,believing, is
what constitutes the pleasure but is not its intentional object. We have to be
precise here: of course, there would be no "being pleased that . . ." if there
were no believing, thinking, picturing. But these processesare only the
necessaryconditions,not what the pleasureis takenin - as it would be if
the intentionalobject werejust to "believethat. . .". In the case of Snow-
White's evil stepmotherwe might be justified in saying that "she enjoys
believing she is the fairest of all" but she herself does not enjoy the
believing but the belief that she is the fairest of all.47
If we reviewour everydaypleasureswe will find thatfew of ourpleasures
are of the propositionalkind, hence our and Protarchus'initial astonish-
ment that there should be false pleasuresis quitejustified as long as one
thinksof exampleslike wine, woman(man) and song.Therecan, of course?
be "sometingwrong"with such pleasuresbut they are not true or false in
the director even in an extendedsense.
Why then does Plato devote so much thought to those cases of false
pleasures?One reasonmay be that they are intellectuallymost interesting
since they concern the logical sense of truth and falsity. But, more
importantly,Platowantsto drawour intentionto the factthatthebeliefson
which certain pleasuresare based are part of the intended object,which
becomes most obvious in the case of future pleasureswhere the logos is,
afterall, all there is. The importanceof the descriptionof a pleasurecomes
to the fore this way. Without the descriptionthe pleasurewould not be
41The queen is not at all interestedin her mental activity,in her trulyor falsely believing,
but takes pleasure in her uncontested beauty.
177

what it is, e.g. the evil queen mayjust admireand enjoy her own beauty,
withoutany thoughtof Snow-White.48
But that is not all. The awarenessof the importanceof the descriptionof
a pleasureputscertainpsychologicalandethicalfeaturesinto relief.49Some
people, e.g., can only enjoy gifts if they know that they are expensiveor if
someone else is therebydeprivedof them. In comedythe ignoranceof the
true descriptionof an alleged pleasureis often exploited,as Plato points
out himself. Sometimesthe resultof such comic ignoranceis tragic,as in
Thomas Mann'sstory "Marioand the Magician"where Mariokisses the
ugly old magicianunder hypnosis,thinkingit was his sweet-heart.To be
exposed thus in his most secret and sweetestpleasurecauses the terrible
ragein which he then kills the magician.
More important are the ethical consequences involved in "pro-
positional" pleasures. While it seems innocuous enough to enjoy the
activitiesof reading,makingmoney,lookingat oneselfin the mirror,under
a certaindescriptionthese arenot innocuous.It is viciousto enjoy'"making
the money that belongs to widowsand orphans,"or for the step-motherto
enjoyher beauty"overSnow-White'sdead body".Thus,whenwe evaluate
our pleasureswe should take into accountwhat their intentionalobjects
are, as given in the descriptions.Enjoyingsomeone else's ruin, enjoying
watchingsomeone else make a fool of himself,are morallychargedpleas-
ures, accordingto Plato (48ff). That such implicit intended objects that
come to the fore when one gives a completedescriptionof a pleasureare
more often involved in our everydaypleasuresthan we want to admit to
ourselvesis obvious. It is known that people who thoroughlyenjoyed a
beef-stewin a restaurantlaterfelt nauseawhen they leamed thatdog-food
had been served. So there are hidden or implicit propositionscontained
even in immediatepleasuresconcerningthe objectsof the pleasures.
It seems,then, thatPlatohas put his fingeron somethingveryimportant:
thatcertainpleasuresare specifiable,identifiableand evaluableonly when
their propositionalcontent is taken into consideration;the pleasure is
thereforenot separablefrom its provenience,as Protarchushad wantedto
maintain(cf. 38a; 12d7).This is quite a tum around,for it meansthat the
48 Even the Queen's simple pleasure in her beauty implies a proposition,upon closer
investigation.Gail Fine has plausibly argued for the Theaetetusthat ali knowledge,even
that of direct acquaintance,implies knowledge of truth(p. 379). One can arguesimilarly
that most pleasures involve at least the identification of the object of pleasure, i.e. a
proposition.
49 This has first been discussed by B.A.O. Williams whose article has inspired all the
interpretationsthat have been sympatheticto "propositional"pleasures.
178

pleasurein question(in the relevantsense) is not to be identifiedwith the
elation, the ripple that the soul undergoes, but with what the pleasure
consistsin. The experiencingitself, the beingfalselypleased,when it refers
to the process, is then indeed false in a derivativesense. Plato himself
pointsout what may happen in such a psychologicalprocess:the soul, i.e.
the "active"doxa, makes a mistake(cf. 37e). What counts for Plato as the
pleasure is not the seismos, the elation the soul undergoes,but what the
pleasureconsistsin. This is what Plato,it seems to me, wantedto teachus in
the partof the Philebusthat was here underdiscussion:thatwhatcounts is
what the scribeand the painterhave been doing, not what I actuallyfeelat
a particularoccasion,though,perhaps,strangeemotionalreactionsshould
make us go back and take a closer look at the the scribe'sand painter's
work and make revisions,if necessary.50That pleasuresand pains should
be subjectedto moral evaluationis suggestedin earlierdialogues(cf. the
"better and worse" pleasures in Gorg. 499b), but only "propositional"
pleasurescan be analyzed and judged in the same way as opinions and
beliefs are. This seems to me to be the achievementof the part of the
Philebusthat was here underdiscussion.
Centerfor Hellenic Studies, Washington
BIBLIOGRAPHICALREFERENCES
Ionly enumeratethe writingsto which I refer in the article.For a more

comprehensivebibliographycf. G/T pp. 473-476.
Bolton, R., "Plato's Distinction between Being and Becoming",Reviewof Metaphysics
1975, 66-95
Dybikowski,J. C., "False Pleasureand the Philebus" Phronesis 1970, 147-65
Fine, G., "Knowledgeand Logos in the Theaetetus"PhilosophicalReview 1979
Gosling, J. C. B., (I) "False Pleasures:Philebus35c-41b",Phronesis1959,44-54
(2) "FatherKenny on False Pleasures",Phronesis 1960,41-5
(3) Plato, Philebus,Oxford 1975
Gosling, J. C. B./Taylor, C. C. W., The Greekson Pleasure,Oxford 1982
50 Do I want to maintain that Plato decidedly takes pleasurein the product-ratherthan

in the process-senseall along? I am very hesitantto commit myself to this alternative,not
only because Plato did not have an explicit conception of "proposition"in our sense (of
which he would say that they are timeless, interpersonaletc.) but also because many
pleasures are themselves intentional processes, as "the pleasure that I am getting richer
every day". So a clear separationof process and productis not always possible.
179

Irwin,T., (I) Plato's Moral Theory,Oxford 1977.
(2) Plato, Gorgias,Oxford 1979.
(3) "Plato'sHeracliteanism",PhilosophicalQuarterly1977, 1-13
Kenny, A., "False Pleasuresin the Philebus:A Reply to Mr. Gosling", Phronesis 1960,
45-52
Moravcsik,J. M., (1) "Reason and Eros in the Ascent-Passageof the Symposium",Essays
in AncientGreekPhilosophy,N.Y. 1971.
(2) "Forms,Nature and the Good in the Philebus': Phronesis1979,81-101
Murphy,N. R., The Interpretationof Plato's Republic,Oxford 19602.
Penner, T. M., "False Anticipatory Pleasures: Philebus 36a3-41a6", Phronesis 1970,
166-178
Striker,G., Peras undApeiron,Goettingen 1970
Taylor,C. C. W., Plato, Protagoras,Oxford 1976
Waterfield,R. H. H., (l) "The Placeof the Philebusin Plato'sDialogues",Phronesis1980,
270-305
(2) Plato, Philebus,Penguin 1982
Williams, B. A. O., "Pleasureand Belief', Proceedingsof the AristotelianSociety 1959,
57-72
Zeyl, D. J., "Socratesand Hedonism - Protagoras351b-358d",Phronesis1980,250-269
180


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Rumpelstiltskin's Pleasures: True and False Pleasures in Plato's "Philebus"

Author(s): Dorothea Frede

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Everyonewho is moderatelyfamiliarwith Plato'sdialogueswill have the

* This article is part of a larger project. I am currentlyworking on a manuscriptfor a

Phronesis1985. Vol.XXX/2 (AcceptedFebruary1985) 151

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6 Cf. esp. Gosling (3) pp. 144ff; 185ff;cf. also p. 81f.

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natureof pleasurecf. Gosling (3) p. 75.

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14 Plato evidently does not take the gourmet'spleasures into consideration.Concerning

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II. The physiology ofpleasure in the Philebus.

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III. True andfalse pleasures in the propositional sense.

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29 Whetherthis is meantseriouslyby Socratesor isjust adopted for the momenthas been

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38 Protarchushas earlier rejectedthe possibilityof true and false fearsand expectations.

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IV. Rumpelstiltskin's Pleasures

To returnto Rumpelstiltskin.We have to ask ourselves,of course,what,

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Centerfor Hellenic Studies, Washington

Ionly enumeratethe writingsto which I refer in the article.For a more

50 Do I want to maintain that Plato decidedly takes pleasurein the product-ratherthan

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True and False Pleasures in Plato's Philebus

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