CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
LAMBINO v COMELEC The framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft
G.R. No. 174153; October 25, 2006
Facts:
Raul Lambino and others (the Lambino Group) filed a
petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution under Republic Act No. 6735 (RA 6735) or
the Initiative and Referendum Act. The Lambino Group
alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952
individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%)
of all registered voters, with each legislative district
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its
registered voters.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution by modifying certain sections of Article VI
(Legislative Department) and Article VII (Executive
Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled
"Transitory Provisions." These proposed changes will
shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
The COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due
course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an
enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the
Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the Lambino Group's initiative petition
complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on amendments to the Constitution through a people's
initiative
Held:
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the
basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a
people's initiative.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the
governing constitutional provision that allows a people's
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution.
This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number
of registered voters of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
of the proposed constitutional amendment" should
be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign
such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before
they sign there is already a draft shown to them."
The framers also "envisioned" that the people should
sign on the proposal itself because the proponents
must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition" is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the
people. This means two essential elements must be
present. First, the people must author and thus sign the
entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on
their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text
of the proposed amendments is first shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such
complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
"directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition
that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either
written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so
attached, the petition must state the fact of such
attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the
several millions of signatories to the petition had seen
the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time
constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of
signatories had seen the full text of the proposed
amendments before signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed14 the
concept of people's initiative from the United States
where various State constitutions incorporate an initiative
clause. In almost all States15 which allow initiative
petitions, the unbending requirement is that the
people must first see the full text of the proposed
amendments before they sign to signify their assent,
and that the people must sign on an initiative
petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies
only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its
revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional
convention can propose both amendments and revisions
to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution
provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths
of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of
amending the Constitution. The first mode is through
Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members.
The second mode is through a constitutional convention.
The third mode is through a people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second
modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or revision of,
this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII,
referring to the third mode, applies only to
"[A]mendments to this Constitution."
The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a
clear distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of
the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that
only Congress or a constitutional convention may
propose revisions to the Constitution. The
framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative
may propose only amendments to the Constitution.
Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly
withhold from the people the power to propose revisions
to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions
even as they are empowered to propose amendments.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an
amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the
earliest cases that recognized the distinction described
the fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an
instrument of a permanent and abiding nature,
and the provisions contained therein for its
revision indicate the will of the people that
the underlying principles upon which it rests,
as well as the substantial entirety of the
instrument, shall be of a like permanent and
abiding nature. On the other hand, the
significance of the term "amendment" implies
such an addition or change within the lines of the
original instrument as will effect an improvement,
or better carry out the purpose for which it was
framed.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic
principle in the constitution, like altering the principle
of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-
balances. There is also revision if the change alters the
substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the
change affects substantial provisions of the
constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly
refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes
without altering the basic principle involved. Revision
generally affects several provisions of the constitution,
while amendment generally affects only the specific
provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows
amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like
in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part
test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The
quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is
"so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions."36 The court
examines only the number of provisions affected and
does not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of
the proposed change in the constitution. The main
inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far
reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a
revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure
of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a
change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan"
includes "change in its fundamental framework or the
fundamental powers of its Branches."38 A change in the
nature of the basic governmental plan also includes
changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of
government and the system of check and balances."39
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the
Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely
an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's
proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on
the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive -
affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire
Constitution.40 Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter
substantially the basic plan of government, from
presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature.
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
A change in the structure of government is a revision of
the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal
branches of government in the present Constitution are
reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers
in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the
legislative and executive branches is a radical change in
the structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the
locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers
and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of
Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances
within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the
Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift
from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the
Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber
of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere
amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group's
proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the
changes will radically alter the framework of
government as set forth in the Constitution.
IMBONG v COMELEC
G.R. No. L-32432 September 11, 1970
Facts:
Two petitions for declaratory relief1 were filed pursuant to
Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132 by petitioners Manuel B.
1 those required of members of the House of
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person
interested in a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any
question of construction or validity arising from the
instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and for
a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only
issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of
construction or validity of the provisions in an instrument or
statute.
Requisites of an action for declaratory relief:
(1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
(2) the terms of said documents and the validity
thereof are doubtful and require judicial
construction;
Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both lawyers, taxpayers
and interested in running as candidates for delegates to
the Constitutional Convention. Both impugn the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it
prejudices their rights as such candidates.
Petitioner Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law
as well as the particular provisions embodied in
Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Imbong
impugns the constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of
said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds
advanced by petitioner Gonzales.
As a background, on March 16, 1967, Congress, acting
as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the
Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 which called for a
Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional
amendments to be composed of two delegates from
each representative district who shall have the same
qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on
the second Tuesday of November, 1970 in accordance
with the Revised Election Code.
After the adoption of said Res. No. 2 in 1967 but before
the November elections of that year, Congress, acting as
a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 4914
implementing the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 and
practically restating it into the provisions of said
Resolution No. 2.
On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a
Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4
amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16,
1967 by providing that the convention "shall be
composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the
existing representative districts according to the number
of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a
representative district shall be entitled to at least two
delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as
Representatives,"1 "and that any other details relating to
the specific apportionment of delegates, election of
delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional
(3) there must have been no breach of the documents
in question;
(4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or
the "ripening seeds" of one between persons
whose interests are adverse;
(5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination;
and
(6) adequate relief is not available through other
means or other forms of action or proceeding.
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
Convention shall be embodied in an implementing
legislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with
the provisions of this Resolution."2
On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative
body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132, implementing
Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A.
No. 4914.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 6132 is constitutional.
Held:
I. Sections 4 and paragraph 2 of Sec. 8(a) of
RA 6132 are constitutional.
The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which considers,
all public officers and employees, whether elective or
appointive, including members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, as well as officers and employees of
corporations or enterprises of the government, as
resigned from the date of the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, was recently sustained by this Court, on the
grounds, inter alia, that the same is merely an
application of and in consonance with the prohibition in
Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and that it does not
constitute a denial of due process or of the equal
protection of the law. Likewise, the constitutionality of
paragraph 2 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 was upheld.4
II. The enactment of R.A. No. 6132 by
Congress acting as a legislative body in the
exercise of its broad law-making authority,
and not as a Constituent Assembly is
constitutional.
Without first considering the validity of its specific
provisions, we sustain the constitutionality of the
enactment of R.A. No. 6132 by Congress acting as a
legislative body in the exercise of its broad law-making
authority, and not as a Constituent Assembly, because
— provide for such implementing details
1. Congress, when acting as a
Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art.
XV of the Constitution, has full and
plenary authority to propose
Constitutional amendments or to call a
convention for the purpose, by a three-
fourths vote of each House in joint
session assembled but voting
separately. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4
calling for a constitutional convention
were passed by the required three-
fourths vote.
2. The grant to Congress as a
Constituent Assembly of such plenary
authority to call a constitutional
convention includes, by virtue of the
doctrine of necessary implication, all
other powers essential to the effective
exercise of the principal power granted,
such as the power to fix the
qualifications, number, apportionment,
and compensation of the delegates as
well as appropriation of funds to meet
the expenses for the election of
delegates and for the operation of the
Constitutional Convention itself, as well
as all other implementing details
indispensable to a fruitful convention.
Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 already
embody the above-mentioned details,
except the appropriation of funds.
3. While the authority to call a
constitutional convention is vested by
the present Constitution solely and
exclusively in Congress acting as a
Constituent Assembly, the power to
enact the implementing details, which
are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2
and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132, does
not exclusively pertain to Congress
acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such
implementing details are matters within
the competence of Congress in the
exercise of its comprehensive legislative
power, which power encompasses all
matters not expressly or by necessary
implication withdrawn or removed by the
Constitution from the ambit of legislative
action. And as lone as such statutory
details do not clash with any specific
provision of the constitution, they are
valid.
4. Consequently, when Congress, acting
as a Constituent Assembly, omits to
after calling a constitutional convention,
Congress, acting as a legislative body,
can enact the necessary implementing
legislation to fill in the gaps, which
authority is expressly recognized in Sec.
8 of Res No. 2 as amended by Res. No.
4.
5. The fact that a bill providing for such
implementing details may be vetoed by
the President is no argument against
conceding such power in Congress as a
legislative body nor present any
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difficulty; for it is not irremediable as
Congress can override the Presidential
veto or Congress can reconvene as a
Constituent Assembly and adopt a
resolution prescribing the required
implementing details.
III. The apportionment provided for in Sec. 2 of R.A. No.
6132 is reasonable.
[Petitioner Gonzales asserts that Sec. 2 on the
apportionment of delegates is not in accordance with
proportional representation and therefore violates the
Constitution and the intent of the law itself, without
pinpointing any specific provision of the Constitution with
which it collides.]
Unlike in the apportionment of representative districts,
the Constitution does not expressly or impliedly
require such apportionment of delegates to the
convention on the basis of population in each
congressional district. Congress, sitting as a
Constituent Assembly, may constitutionally allocate one
delegate for, each congressional district or for each
province, for reasons of economy and to avoid having
an unwieldy convention. If the framers of the present
Constitution wanted the apportionment of delegates to
the convention to be based on the number of inhabitants
in each representative district, they would have done so
in so many words as they did in relation to the
apportionment of the representative districts.5
The apportionment provided for in Sec. 2 of R.A. No.
6132 cannot possibly conflict with its own intent
expressed therein; for it merely obeyed and implemented
the intent of Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly
expressed in Sec. 1 of Res. No. 4, which provides that
the 320 delegates should be apportioned among the
existing representative districts according to the number
of their respective inhabitants, but fixing a minimum of at
least two delegates for a representative district. The
presumption is that the factual predicate, the latest
available official population census, for such
apportionment was presented to Congress, which,
accordingly employed a formula for the necessary
computation to effect the desired proportional
representation.
Even if such latest census were a preliminary census,
the same could still be a valid basis for such
apportionment.6 The fact that the lone and small
congressional district of Batanes, may be over-
represented, because it is allotted two delegates by R.A.
No. 6132 despite the fact that it has a population very
much less than several other congressional districts,
each of which is also allotted only two delegates, and
therefore under-represented, vis-a-vis Batanes alone,
does not vitiate the apportionment as not effecting
proportional representation. Absolute proportional
apportionment is not required and is not possible when
based on the number of inhabitants, for the population
census cannot be accurate nor complete, dependent as
it is on the diligence of the census takers, aggravated by
the constant movement of population, as well as daily
death and birth. It is enough that the basis employed is
reasonable and the resulting apportionment is
substantially proportional. Resolution No. 4 fixed a
minimum of two delegates for a congressional district.
While there may be other formulas for a reasonable
apportionment, we are not prepared to rule that the
computation formula adopted by Congress for
proportional representation as directed in Res. No. 4 is
unreasonable and that the apportionment provided in
R.A. No. 6132 does not constitute a substantially
proportional representation.
The impossibility of absolute proportional representation
is recognized by the Constitution itself when it directs
that the apportionment of congressional districts among
the various provinces shall be "as nearly as may be
according to their respective inhabitants, but each
province shall have at least one member". The
employment of the phrase "as nearly as may be
according to their respective inhabitants" emphasizes
the fact that the human mind can only approximate a
reasonable apportionment but cannot effect an
absolutely proportional representation with mathematical
precision or exactitude.
IV. Section 5 of RA 6132 is constitutional.
Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is attacked on the ground that it is
an undue deprivation of liberty without due process of
law and denies the equal protection of the laws. Said
Sec. 5 disqualifies any elected delegate from running
"for any public office in any election" or from assuming
"any appointive office or position in any branch of the
government until after the final adjournment of the
Constitutional Convention."
That the citizen does not have any inherent nor natural
right to a public office, is axiomatic under our
constitutional system. The State through its Constitution
or legislative body, can create an office and define the
qualifications and disqualifications therefor as well as
impose inhibitions on a public officer. Consequently, only
those with qualifications and who do not fall under any
constitutional or statutory inhibition can be validly elected
or appointed to a public office. The obvious reason for
the questioned inhibition, is to immunize the delegates
from the perverting influence of self-interest, party
interest or vested interest and to insure that he dedicates
all his time to performing solely in the interest of the
nation his high and well nigh sacred function of
formulating the supreme law of the land, which may
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endure for generations and which cannot easily be
changed like an ordinary statute. With the disqualification
embodied in Sec. 5, the delegate will not utilize his
position as a bargaining leverage for concessions in the
form of an elective or appointive office as long as the
convention has not finally adjourned. The appointing
authority may, by his appointing power, entice votes for
his own proposals. Not love for self, but love for country
must always motivate his actuations as delegate;
otherwise the several provisions of the new Constitution
may only satisfy individual or special interests,
subversive of the welfare of the general citizenry. It
should be stressed that the disqualification is not
permanent but only temporary only to continue until the
final adjournment of the convention which may not
extend beyond one year. The convention that framed the
present Constitution finished its task in approximately
seven months — from July 30, 1934 to February 8,
1935.
Thus the challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5
of R.A. No. 6132 is a valid limitation on the right to public
office pursuant to state police power as it is reasonable
and not arbitrary.
The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the
Constitutional Convention is likewise constitutional; for it
is based on a substantial distinction which makes for real
differences, is germane to the purposes of the law, and
applies to all members of the same class.7 The function
of a delegate is more far-reaching and its effect more
enduring than that of any ordinary legislator or any other
public officer. A delegate shapes the fundamental law of
the land which delineates the essential nature of the
government, its basic organization and powers, defines
the liberties of the people, and controls all other laws.
Unlike ordinary statutes, constitutional amendments
cannot be changed in one or two years. No other
public officer possesses such a power, not even the
members of Congress unless they themselves, propose
constitutional amendments when acting as a Constituent
Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution. The
classification, therefore, is neither whimsical nor
repugnant to the sense of justice of the community.
The inhibition is relevant to the object of the law, which is
to insure that the proposed amendments are meaningful
to the masses of our people and not designed for the
enhancement of selfishness, greed, corruption, or
injustice.
Lastly, the disqualification applies to all the delegates to
the convention who will be elected on the second
Tuesday of November, 1970.
V. Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is
constitutional.
[Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is impugned by
both petitioners as violative of the constitutional
guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws,
freedom of expressions, freedom of assembly and
freedom of association.]
The guarantees of due process, equal protection of the
laws, peaceful assembly, free expression, and the right
of association are neither absolute nor illimitable rights;
they are always subject to the pervasive and dormant
police power of the State and may be lawfully abridged
to serve appropriate and important public interests.8
OCCENA v COMELEC
G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
Facts:
In 1981, three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments were
challenged by petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon
Gonzales, former delegates of 1971 Consti, for their
alleged constitutional infirmity.
Issue:
Whether or not the Resolutions are unconstitutional.
Held:
Petitioners were unable to demonstrate that the
challenged resolutions are tainted by unconstitutionality.
We come to the crucial issue, the power of
the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose
amendments and how it may be exercised. More
specifically as to the latter, the extent of the changes that
may be introduced, the number of votes necessary for
the validity of a proposal, and the standard required for a
proper submission.
(1) The existence of the power of
the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable.
The applicable provision in the 1976
Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as
pertinent it reads thus: "The Interim Batasang
Pambansa shall have the same powers and
its Members shall have the same functions,
responsibilities, rights, privileges, and
disqualifications as the interim National
Assembly and the regular National Assembly
and the Members thereof." 14 One of such
powers is precisely that of proposing
amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its
Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National
Assembly with the power to propose
amendments upon special call by the Prime
Minister by a vote of the majority of its members
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
to be ratified in accordance with the Article on born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a
Amendments. 15 When, therefore, foreign country to own a limited area of land
the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call for residential purposes was approved by the
of the President and Prime Minister vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with
Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the
body it acted by virtue of such impotence Its Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of
authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No.
could and did propose the amendments 3 on the amendment to the Article on the
embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2
(2) Petitioners would urge upon us the proposition with 1 abstention. Where then is the alleged
that the amendments proposed are so extensive infirmity?
in character that they go far beyond the limits of
As to the requisite standard for a proper
the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang
submission, the question may be viewed not
Pambansa as Successor of the Interim National
only from the standpoint of the period that must
Assembly. For them, what was done was to
elapse before the holding of the plebiscite but
revise and not to amend. It suffices to quote
also from the standpoint of such amendments
from the opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking
having been called to the attention of the people
for the Court, in Del Rosario v. Commission on
so that it could not plausibly be maintained that
Elections 18 to dispose of this contention. Thus:
they were properly informed as to the proposed
"And whether the Constitutional Convention will
changes. As to the period, the Constitution
only propose amendments to the Constitution or
indicates the way the matter should be resolved.
entirely overhaul the present Constitution and
There is no ambiguity to the applicable
propose an entirely new Constitution based on
provision: "Any amendment to, or revision of,
an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is
this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a
of no moment; because the same will be
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which
submitted to the people for ratification. Once
shall be held not later than three months
ratified by the sovereign people, there can be
after the approval of such amendment or
no debate about the validity of the new
revision." 21 The three resolutions were
Constitution. The fact that the present
approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa
Constitution may be revised and replaced with a
sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5
new one ... is no argument against the validity of
and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg.
the law because 'amendment' includes the
22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7,
'revision' or total overhaul of the entire
1981. It is thus within the 90-day period
Constitution. At any rate, whether the
provided by the Constitution. Thus any
Constitution is merely amended in part or
argument to the contrary is unavailing.
revised or totally changed would become
immaterial the moment the same is ratified by
the sovereign people."
3 theories on position of constitutional convention v
(3) That leaves only the questions of the vote
necessary to propose amendments as well as regular departments of govt
the standard for proper submission. MABANAG v LOPEZ VITO
The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a G.R. No. L-1123 March 5, 1947
constituent body, can propose amendments. In
that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It Facts:
would be an indefensible proposition to assert
that the three-fourth votes required when it sits This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the
as a legislative body applies as well when it has enforcement of a congressional resolution proposing an
been convened as the agency through which amendment to the Constitution. The validity of the
amendments could be proposed. That is not a above-mentioned resolution is attacked as contrary to
requirement as far as a constitutional convention the Constitution.
is concerned. It is not a requirement either when,
as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa
Three of the plaintiff senators and eight of the plaintiff
exercises its constituent power to propose
representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote
amendments. Moreover, even on the
of the Commission on Elections as having been elected
assumption that the requirement of three- fourth
senators and representatives in the elections held on
votes applies, such extraordinary majority was
April 23, 1946. The three senators were suspended by
obtained. It is not disputed that Resolution No.
the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session
1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-
of Congress following the elections, on account of
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alleged irregularities in their election. The eight
representatives since their election had not been allowed
to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the
election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although
they had not been formally suspended.
As a consequence, these three senators and eight
representatives did not take part in the passage of the
questioned resolution, nor was their membership
reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-
fourths vote which is required in proposing an
amendment to the Constitution. If these members of
Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in
favor of the proposed amendment would have been
short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch
of Congress.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction (to
prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution
proposing an amendment to the Constitution)
Held:
The respondents deny that this Court has jurisdiction,
relying on the conclusiveness on the courts of an
enrolled bill or resolution. There is some merit in the
petitioners' contention that this is confusing jurisdiction,
which is a matter of substantive law, with conclusiveness
of an enactment or resolution, which is a matter of
evidence and practice. This objection, however, is purely
academic. Whatever distinction there is in the juridical
sense between the two concepts, in practice and in their
operation they boil down to the same thing. Basically the
two notions are synonymous in that both are founded on
the regard which the judiciary accords a co-equal
coordinate, and independent departments of the
Government. If a political question conclusively binds the
judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly
certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the
"enrolled bill rule" born of that respect.
It is a doctrine that political questions are not within the
province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power
to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the
courts by express constitutional or statutory provision.
This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the
separation of powers. The difficulty lies in determining
what matters fall within the meaning of political question.
The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and
precedents and authorities are not always in full
harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this
ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the
political departments of the government.
The Coleman vs. Miller case, a relatively recent decision
of the United States Supreme Court is authority for the
conclusion that the efficacy of ratification by state
legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal
Constitution is a political question and hence not
justiciable. The Court further held that the decision by
Congress, in its control of the Secretary of State, of the
questions of whether an amendment has been adopted
within a reasonable time from the date of submission to
the state legislature, is not subject to review by the court.
If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a
proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political
question. The two steps complement each other in a
scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be
noted that the amendatory process as provided in
section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution
"consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and
ratification." There is no logic in attaching political
character to one and withholding that character from the
other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly
political function performed by the Congress in its
sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its
charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this
power is even independent of any intervention by the
Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous
attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public
interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the
validity of a proposal than into that of a ratification.
We deem it unnecessary to decide the question of
whether the senators and representatives who were
ignored in the computation of the necessary three-
fourths vote were members of Congress within the
meaning of section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine
Constitution. The petition is dismissed without costs.
Judicial review of amendments
SANIDAD V COMELEC 78 SCRA 333
Facts:
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a national
referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other
things, the issues of martial law, the assembly, its
replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period
of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise
by the President of his present powers.1
Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the
President issued another related decree, Presidential
Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential
Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of
presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of
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voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens
Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-
plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly,
Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of
Presidential Decree No. 991.
On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President
issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the
questions to be submitted to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree
recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's
continued opposition to the convening of the National
Assembly evinces their desire to have such body
abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment,
providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted
directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of
October 16.
On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and
PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son, commenced L-
44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking
to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to
declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos.
991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to
the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No.
1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections
to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-
Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose
amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16
has no constitutional or legal basis.
On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the
comment for respondent Commission on Elections, The
Solicitor General principally maintains that petitioners
have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in
nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at this
state of the transition period, only the incumbent
President has the authority to exercise constituent
power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards
normalization.
On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was
instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the
1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power
to propose amendments to, or revision of the
Constitution during the transition period is expressly
conferred on the interim National Assembly under
Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.3
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction was filed on October 5, 1976 by RAUL M.
GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO
SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714, to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the
forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.
These last petitioners argue that even granting him
legislative powers under Martial Law, the incumbent
President cannot act as a constituent assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution; a referendum-
plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935
and 1973; the submission of the proposed amendments
in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the
plebiscite a nullity; to lift Martial Law, the President need
not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-
year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the
Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those
citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.
Issue:
Whether or not the incumbent Philippine President has
the power to propose amendments to the present
Constitution in the absence of the interim National
Assembly which has not been convened.
Held:
We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be
devoid of merit.
I
Justiciability of question raised.
1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the
petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V.
Sanidad) possess locus standi to challenge the
constitutional premise of Presidential Decree Nos. 991,
1031, and 1033. It is now an ancient rule that the valid
source of a stature Presidential Decrees are of such
nature-may be contested by one who will sustain a direct
injuries as a in result of its enforcement. At the instance
of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of
public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for
the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 4 The breadth
of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries all appropriation
of Five Million Pesos for the effective implementation of
its purposes. 5 Presidential Decree No. 1031
appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out
its provisions. 6 The interest of the aforenamed
petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of
these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them
with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees
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appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regards
taxpayer's suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to
entertain the same or not. 7 For the present case, We
deem it sound to exercise that discretion affirmatively so
that the authority upon which the disputed Decrees are
predicated may be inquired into.
2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at
bar as a pure political one, lying outside the domain of
judicial review. We disagree. The amending process
both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial
question. 8 This is especially true in cases where the
power of the Presidency to initiate the of normally
exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under
the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose
amendments o the constitution resides in the interim
National Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15,
Transitory provisions). After that period, and the regular
National Assembly in its active session, the power to
propose amendments becomes ipso facto the
prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1,
pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The normal
course has not been followed. Rather than calling the
National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent
assembly the incumbent President undertook the
proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed
amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the
people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for
amendments, written in lambent words in the very
Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable
issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991,
1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the
force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid,
thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a
justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to
pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article X of the new
Constitution provides: "All cases involving the
constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law
may shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court
en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may
be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of
at least ten Members. ..." The Supreme Court has the
last word in the construction not only of treaties and
statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The
amending, like all other powers organized in the
Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited
power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that
authorities to determine whether that power has been
discharged within its limits.
Political questions are neatly associated with the
wisdom, of the legality of a particular act. Where the
vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity
of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or
non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the
wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in
proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his
constitutional authority to perform such act or to
assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether
the amending process confers on the President that
power to propose amendments is therefore a downright
justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the
actuation of the President would merely be a brutum
fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be
amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed
or the authority assumed was valid or not.10
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in
pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the question
of the President's authority to propose amendments and
the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of
the proposal to the people ultimately lie in the judgment
of the A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not
that the people themselves, by their sovereign act,
provided for the authority and procedure for the
amending process when they ratified the present
Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, the
constitutional provision has been followed or not is the
proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves
of course who exercise no power of judicial but by the
Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested
that power, a power which includes the competence to
determine whether the constitutional norms for
amendments have been observed or not. And, this
inquiry must be done a prior not a posterior i.e., before
the submission to and ratification by the people.
Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court or, prior
constitutional cases underline the preference of the
Court's majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in
the amending process as one of non-political impression.
In the Plebiscite Cases, 11 the contention of the Solicitor
General that the issue on the legality of Presidential
Decree No. 73 "submitting to the Pilipino people (on
January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating
fund s therefore "is a political one, was rejected and the
Court unanimously considered the issue as justiciable in
nature. Subsequently in the Ratification
Cases12 involving the issue of whether or not the validity
of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102. announcing the
Ratification by the Filipino people of the constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention,"
partakes of the nature of a political question, the
affirmative stand of' the Solicitor General was dismissed,
the Court ruled that the question raised is justiciable.
Chief Justice Concepcion, expressing the majority view,
said, Thus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We
rejected the theory of the respondents therein that the
question whether Presidential Decree No. 73 calling a
plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the
ratification or rejection of the proposed new Constitution,
was valid or not, was not a proper subject of judicial
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
inquiry because, they claimed, it partook of a political
nature, and We unanimously declared that the issue was
a justiciable one. With Identical unanimity. We overruled
the respondent's contention in the 1971 habeas corpus
cases, questioning Our authority to determine the
constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the
Presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, despite the
opposite view taken by this Court in Barcelon vs. Baker
and Montenegro vs. Castaneda, insofar as it adhered to
the former case, which view We, accordingly,
abandoned and refused to apply. For the same reason,
We did not apply and expressly modified, in Gonzales
vs. Commission on Elections, the political-question
theory adopted in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito." 13 The return
to Barcelon vs. Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,
urged by the Solicitor General, was decisively refused by
the Court. Chief Justice Concepcion continued: "The
reasons adduced in support thereof are, however,
substantially the same as those given in support on the
political question theory advanced in said habeas corpus
and plebiscite cases, which were carefully considered by
this Court and found by it to be legally unsound and
constitutionally untenable. As a consequence. Our
decisions in the aforementioned habeas corpus cases
partakes of the nature and effect of a stare decisis which
gained added weight by its virtual reiteration."
II
The amending process as laid out in the new
Constitution.
1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments
ordains:
SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution may be
proposed by the National Assembly
upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or by a constitutional
convention. (2) The National Assembly
may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members, call a constitutional
convention or, by a majority vote of all
its Members, submit the question of
calling such a convention to the
electorate in an election.
SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution shall be
valid when ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be
held not later than three months after
the approval of such amendment or
revision.
In the present period of transition, the interim National
Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is
conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the
Transitory Provisions reads:
SECTION 15. The interim National
Assembly, upon special call by the
interim Prime Minister, may, by a
majority vote of all its Members, propose
amendments to this Constitution. Such
amendments shall take effect when
ratified in accordance with Article
Sixteen hereof.
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the
constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy
and period of transition. In times of normally, the
amending process may be initiated by the proposals of
the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional
Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the
Members of the National Assembly. However the calling
of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the
electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of
all the members of the National Assembly. In times of
transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority
vote of all the Members of the National Assembly upon
special call by the interim Prime Minister,.
2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already
settled that the incumbent President is vested with that
prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially
convene the interim National Assembly. Speaking for the
majority opinion in that case, Justice Makasiar said: "The
Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the
President the determination of the time when he shall
initially convene the interim National Assembly,
consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and
order in the country." Concurring, Justice Fernandez,
himself a member of that Constitutional Convention,
revealed: "(W)hen the Delegates to the Constitutional
Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they
were aware of the fact that under the same, the
incumbent President was given the discretion as to when
he could convene the interim National Assembly; it was
so stated plainly by the sponsor, Delegate Yaneza; as a
matter of fact, the proposal that it be convened
'immediately', made by Delegate Pimentel (V) was
rejected. The President's decision to defer the convening
of the interim National Assembly soon found support
from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January
10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973
Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the
convening of the interim National Assembly. In the
referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies
("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold
the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again,
in the referendum of February 27, 1975, the proposed
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
question of whether the interim National Assembly shall
be initially convened was eliminated, because some of
the members of Congress and delegates of the
Constitutional Convention, who were deemed
automatically members of the I interim National
Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that
referendum of January, 1973, the people had already
resolved against it.
3. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the
state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a
Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of
lawmaking. lt is not legislating when engaged in the
amending process.16 Rather, it is exercising a peculiar
power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter
itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in
Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular
National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory
Provisions (for the National Assembly). While ordinarily it
is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the
nation by virtue of constitutional conferment amending of
the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political
science a distinction is made between constitutional
content of an organic character and that of a legislative
character'. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not
of law.17 Such being the case, approval of the President
of any proposed amendment is a misnomer 18 The
prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove
applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The
President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption
of amendments to the Constitution. 19
IV
Authority of the incumbent President to propose
amendments to the Constitution.
1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is
constitutionally consigned to the interim National
Assembly during the transition period. However, the
initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully
addressed to the judgment of the incumbent
President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the
President opted to defer convening of that body in utter
recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in the
period of transition, the power to propose amendments
to the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly
upon special call by the President (See. 15 of the
Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of
the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the
interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the
bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to
assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly
vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative
functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been
legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the
interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot
validly discharge the function of that Assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but
adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power.
This, of course, is not to say that the President has
converted his office into a constituent assembly of that
nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather,
with the interim National Assembly not convened and
only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation,
the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon
the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the
people to propose amendments to the Constitution.
Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the Supreme
Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments
without constitutional infractions. For the President to
shy away from that actuality and decline to undertake the
amending process would leave the governmental
machineries at a stalemate or create in the powers of the
State a destructive vacuum, thereby impeding the
objective of a crisis government "to end the crisis and
restore normal times." In these parlous times, that
Presidential initiative to reduce into concrete forms the
constant voices of the people reigns supreme. After all,
constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like
the President now, are mere agents of the people .26
2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As
early as the referendums of January 1973 and February
1975, the people had already rejected the calling of the
interim National Assembly. The Lupong
Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian,
the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, and the
Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, representing
42,000 barangays, about the same number of
Kabataang Barangay organizations, Sanggunians in
1,458 municipalities, 72 provinces, 3 sub-provinces, and
60 cities had informed the President that the prevailing
sentiment of the people is for the abolition of the interim
National Assembly. Other issues concerned the lifting of
martial law and amendments to the Constitution .27 The
national organizations of Sangguniang Bayan presently
proposed to settle the issues of martial law, the interim
Assembly, its replacement, the period of its existence,
the length of the period for the exercise by the President
of its present powers in a referendum to be held on
October 16 .28 The Batasang Bayan (legislative council)
created under Presidential Decree 995 of September 10,
1976, composed of 19 cabinet members, 9 officials with
cabinet rank, 91 members of the Lupong
Tagapagpaganap (executive committee) of the
Katipunan ng mga Sangguniang Bayan voted in session
to submit directly to the people in a plebiscite on October
16, the previously quoted proposed amendments to the
Constitution, including the issue of martial
law .29 Similarly, the "barangays" and the "sanggunians"
endorsed to the President the submission of the
proposed amendments to the people on October 16. All
the foregoing led the President to initiate the proposal of
amendments to the Constitution and the subsequent
issuance of Presidential Decree No, 1033 on September
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
22, 1976 submitting the questions (proposed
amendments) to the people in the National Referendum-
Plebiscite on October 16.

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