Consti Cases

 Pamatong v COMELEC, GR No. 161872, April 13, 2004

Facts :

- Pamatong filed COC to COMELEC but was declared as nuisance together with 35
other applicants.
- Pamatong justified that he is the most qualified and capable of waging a national
campaign
- Pamatong filed a petition for writ to the supreme court stating that comelec violated his
right of “equal access to opportunities for public service”

Issue : W/N the petitioner’s right of equal opportunity to hold for public office is violated?

Ruling : No. The provision in the constitution is considered not self-executing and there is
no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the “equal access” provision.
Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II the provision does not contain
any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action.

It was not the intention of the framers for the state to accommodate as many people
as possible in public office. The equal access may be subjected to limitations. It is the
power of the COMELEC to enforce the law through the Omnibus Election Code on
Nuisance Candidates.

 CoTesCUP vs. Secretary of Education, October 9, 2018

Facts :

- Council of Teachers and staff of Colleges and Universities of the PH filed a petition
assailing the constitutionality of RA 10533 of K-12 Law and other related issuances of
DepEd, CHED, DOLE, TESDA implementing the K-12 Basic Education program
mandating the compulsory of basic education from 10 years to 13 years. It violated the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)

Issue: W/N the K-12 Law is unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the rights under the
Article XIV (Education/ Medium of Instruction) and Article XIII (Labor protection)

Ruling: No. there is nothing in the Article 26 that would show that the state is prohibited from
making the kinder and HS compulsory. CMO 20 s. 2013 TOR is lifted.

 Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993

Facts:
 - The plaintiffs are minors represented by their parents filed a complaint (as taxpayer’s
class suit) to Branch 66 Makati RTC claiming that under the Sec. 16 of Art. II of the
Constitution, they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resource treasure—virgin tropical forest. Deforestation have distorted and disturbed the
ecological balance and environmental tragedies. Prayed to cancel all existing Timber
License Agreement and cease and desist from processing of TLA.
- Respondent motioned to dismiss because no cause of action and raises a political
question.
- RTC sustained the motion to dismiss citing it would result in impairment of contracts
which is prohibited by the Consti.

Issue: W/N the plaintiffs cause of action is valid

Ruling: Yes. The complaint focuses on the fundamental legal right—to a balance and
healthful ecology.

8. Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

 Chavez v Judicial and Bar Council, GR No. 202242, April 16, 2013

Facts:

- Petitioner questioned the The Judicial and Bar Council’s composition in 1994 where they
added an 8th member from both the chambers of the congress having ½ voting right.
- Petitioner cited that under the 1st Paragraph of Section 8, Art. 8 of the Consti, the JBC
shall only be composed of 7 members: 3 ex-officio member, 1 Sec. of Justice, 1 IBP, 1
private sector, 1 from Congress

Issue: W/N the composition of JBC as to having 8 members is valid and constitutional.

Ruling: No. The words in Constitution must be interpreted as verba legis of in its
ordinary meaning and ratio legis est anima or the intent of the framers.

 Social Justice Society v Dangerous Drugs Board, GR No. 157870, November 3, 2008

Facts:

- SJS seeks to prohibit the Dangerous drug act (RA 9165) paragraph c,d,f,g, section 36 on
the grounds that they are unconstitutional.

A.)The school and employers shall determine the manner of drug testing and
B.) it could harass a student deemed undesirable
C.)breach of their right against undesirable searches

Issue: W/N the provisions under the RA 9165 is unconstitutional adding a qualification if
of the Senators
W/N the Act is violating their privacy
 Ruling: No. The need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial
to override the individual’s privacy interest under the premises. To prevent end deter
drug use among employees.

-It is in accordance to the student handbook which relates to the academic freedom on the
institution.

9. Amendments and Revisions in the Constitution

• Lambino v COMELEC, GR No. 174153, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160 (2006)

Facts:

- In 2006, Lambino filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify
their petition to modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and
Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII
entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
- Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act
- Thy alleged that their group had support of 6.3M individuals constituting 12% of
registered voters, 3% each of registered voters in the legislative district,.
- COMELEC denied their petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 as
inadequate or lack of enabling law

Issue:

-W/N the initiative of the petitioner is compliant to Sec 2 Art. 17 of the Constitution on
amendments of the consti through people’s initiative. 12:3 rule—No. document of proper
filing (presenting/ disclosing the whole document and signing every page)

-W/N they are proposing revision or amendment.- Revision

-W/N RA 6735 or the Initiative Referendum Act is sufficient grounds for their petition- In a
minute resolution, RA 6735 will suffice as a implementing law re: proposing changes to the
Constitution to implement Sec. 2 Art 17

Ruling. No. It must be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of
at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein

-The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such
proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a draft shown
to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself
because the proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.”
 1. Not a direct proposal by the people (needs to be presented the full amendments first
before they sign)
2. Not an Amendment but a Revision
a. Amendments by Con Ass. Congress: ¾ votes each chamber
b. Amendments by ConCon: 2/3 votes of senate
c. Amendments by People’s Initiative
d. Revision by Con Ass: ¾ votes each chamber
e. Revision by Con Con: 2/3 votes of senate

 Imbong and Gonzales v COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28

-interest in running for candidates for delegates of ConCon, questioning the constitutionality of
RA 6132 (Act re: Representation of a ConCon) claiming it prejudices their rights as candidates.

ConCon shall be composed of 320 delegates proportioned to districts

Issues: W/N the RA 6132 is unconstitutional?

1. W/N Sections 2, 4, 5 and par. 1 of 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 are valid provisions/ due process?
2. W/N it has the power to enact the implementing rules while acting as legislative body?
3. W/N the appointment provided for in Sec. 2 is reasonable?
3. W/N the Congress has the authority to call for a constitutional convention?

Ruling:

1. Yes. All public official and employees as resigned from the date of filing of COC are
sustained because it’s an application and in consonance with the prohibition in Art 12. Thus,
there is no denial of due process
2. Yes as it is with the competence and power of the congress. As long as the IRR does not
violate any provision of the constitution.
3. Yes. The Constitution does not expressly require appointment on the basis of the
population in each district. Congress may allocate one for each district to avoid unwieldy
convention.
4. Yes. Pursuant to Art 17, Congress, As acting Con Ass. ¾ votes on each chamber of the
congress.

 Occena v COMELEC, 104 SCRA 1

Facts: Petitioners, Samuel Occena and Ramon Gonzales, suing as taxpayers, petitioned
for the prohibition against the validity of the three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions
proposing constitutional amendments, which goes further than merely assailing their
alleged constitutional infirmity.

Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines

naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was
approved by the vote of 122 to 5;

Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the
National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and
 Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote
of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention

Issue: W/N the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to propose amendments?

Ruling: It was vested by the provisions of the 1976 amendments, having same function
with National Assembly, which one is to propose amendments, and of the 1973
Constitution, in its transitory provisions, upon special call by the Prime Minister.

The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have
the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as
the interim National Assembly.

In the interim Batas Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister
Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue of such impotence Its authority
to do so is clearly beyond doubt

Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or
entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an
Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted
to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate
about the validity of the new Constitution.

 Three theories on position of constitutional convention v regular

departments of government (Mabanag v Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1)

Facts: This is a petitioner for prohibition to prevent the congressional resolution proposing
an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance
thereto. Petitioners are 8 senators, 17 representatives, and the presidents of the
Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party. Petitioners allege
that the resolution is contrary to the Constitution.

The 3 senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first
session of Congress due to alleged irregularities in their election. The 8 representatives
since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in
the election of the Speaker, although they had not been formally suspended.

They were not considered in determining the required ¾ vote in order to pass the
resolution proposing the amendments of the constitution. If these members of Congress
had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been
short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.

Issue: W/N the SC has jurisdiction to prevent the enforcement of a congressional

resolution proposing an amendment of the constitution)- In the exercise of that power,
Congress, of course, is governed by the Constitution. However, whether submission,
intervening procedure or Congressional determination of ratification conforms to the
commands of the Constitution, call for decisions by a "political department" of questions of a
type which this Court has frequently designated "political." And decision of a "political
question" by the "political department" to which the Constitution has committed it
 "conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of . . .
government." State court assumed jurisdiction to determine whether the proper
procedure is being followed between submission and final adoption

the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent assembly —

violates the Constitution is essentially justiciable not political, and, hence, subject to judicial
review, and, to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag
v. Lopez Vito, (supra) the latter should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the
Court are unanimous on this point.

W/N the resolution was duly enacted by the Congress.

Ruling:

-Yes. There’s merit on the petitioner that this is a confusing jurisdiction which is a matter
of substantive law. However, It is a doctrine that political questions are not within the province
of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred
upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on the
principle of the separation of powers. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the
meaning of political question.

-No. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress
in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The
exercise of this power is even independent of any intervention by the Chief Executive.

We deem it unnecessary to decide the question of whether the senators and representatives who
were ignored in the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote were members of Congress
within the meaning of section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution. The petition is dismissed
without costs.

 Judicial Review of Amendments (Sanidad v Comelec, 78 SCRA 333)

Facts: In1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a
national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve,
among other things, the issues of martial law, the assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President
of his present powers.

In 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son, commenced L-44640
for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking enjoin the Commission on Elections from
holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and
effect Presidential Decree. Consti do not grant the incumbent President to exercise the
constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.

Issue: Whether or not the incumbent Philippine President has the power to propose amendments to the
present Constitution in the absence of the interim National Assembly which has not been convened.

Ruling: The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question.
8 This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the of normally
exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the
 power to propose amendments of the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the
period of transition

the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing
amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to
assume the power of a constituent assembly

the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the
incumbent President.

READ: Gatmaytan-Magno, D. “Changing Constitutions: Judicial

Review and Redemption in the Philippines” UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal (2007)

-In Marcos regime, the Supreme Court legitimized Marcos’ illegal efforts to enrich himself in
power. (Javellanna- Justices could have been constrained by the possible impact of different
ruling on the future of SC and the safety of its members)

The public perception and respect of the Court is directly affected by the Court’s decision.

-In Arroyo’s administration, SC stopped Arroyo’s attempt to constitutional change. (Lambino v.

Comelec)

 Doctrine of Proper submission

 Gonzales v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (1967)

The Congress passed 3 resolutions simultaneously.

- Resolution of Both Houses (RBH) 1 proposing amendments to the Constitution so as to
increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided
in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180.
- 2. calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be
composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district to be elected in the
general elections
- 3. proposing that the same Constitution be amended so as to authorize Senators and
members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned
constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently,
Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, became Republic Act No. 4913
providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned resolutions
be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections.
ISSUE(S):
1. Is Republic Act No. 4913 constitutional?- YES
2. W/N Congress can simultaneously propose amendments to the Constitution and call for the
holding of a constitutional convention?- YES
RULING: The constituent power or the power to amend or revise the Constitution, is different
from the law-making power of Congress. Congress can directly propose amendments to the
Constitution and at the same time call for a Constitutional Convention to propose amendments.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in
the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people
— as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours— to make, and, hence, to
amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution
merely because the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is
said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of
Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the
members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when
performing the same function, for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution — they
are the very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself.

 Almario v Alba, 127 SCRA 69

Facts: The Filipino electorate will vote in a plebiscite to approve the amendments to the
Constitution proposed by the 6 Comelec Resolutions. Petitioners seek that the electorate be given
more time to study the meaning and implications of Resolutions 105 and 113 before they be
asked to answer Questions 3 (“grant” as an additional mode of acquiring lands belonging to the
public domain) and 4 (the undertaking by the government of a land reform program and a social
reform program)

Issue: W/N Q3 and Q4 can be presented to the people on a later date.

Ruling: No. This is a political question. The necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the proposed
amendments are beyond the power of the courts to adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not
“grant” of public land and “urban land reform” are unwise or improvident or whether or not the
proposed amendments are unnecessary is a matter which only the people can decide. The
questions are presented for their determination.

Assuming that a member or some members of the Supreme Court may find undesirable any
additional mode of disposing of public land or an urban land reform program, the remedy is to
vote “NO” in the plebiscite but not to substitute his or their aversion to the proposed amendments
by denying to the millions of voters an opportunity to express their own likes or dislikes.

Further, Almario et al have failed to make out a case that the average voter does not know the
meaning of “grant” of public land or of “urban land reform.

 Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 (1973) (Read Opinion of Justices Concepcion,

Makasiar and Zaldivar)

Facts: Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the immediate implementation of
the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are acting
without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the
ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to
 approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the
ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to
ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void."

Javellana said that the Presidential Decree no. 73 "has no force and effect as law because the
calling ... of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription
of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of
public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress ...," and
"there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15,
1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to
inform the people of the contents thereof."

Ruling: When a power vested in said officer or branch of the government is absolute or unqualified,
the acts in the exercise of such power are said to be political in nature, and, consequently, non-
justiciable or beyond judicial review. Otherwise, courts of justice would be arrogating upon
themselves a power conferred by the Constitution upon another branch of the service to the
exclusion of the others. A question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be
exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to
some other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act.

Concepcion opinion
This Court cannot dictate to our principal, the sovereign people, as to how the approval of the
new Constitution should be manifested or expressed. The sovereign people have spoken and
we must abide by their decision, regardless of our notion as to what is the proper method of giving
assent to the new Charter.

Zaldivar Opinion

Zaldivar voted to grant the relief being sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution

Makasiar Opinion
Makasiar kung i-investigate din nila 'yung validity ng PD 1102, the Court will encroach upon the
sovereign power of the ppl kasi sila nag-ratify

Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and

Teehankee, voted to grant the
relief
being sought, thus upholding
the Za
 Tolentino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-34150, Oct. 16, 1971, 41 SCRA 702

Facts: Tolentino wanted to restrain the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will amend the
Constitution specifically on the provision of the voting age which will be reduced from 21
years old to 18 years old.

The main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other
implementing resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no
force and effect as laws as far as they are in contravention to Section 1 Article XV of
the Constitution. Under the said provision, the proposed amendment in question cannot
be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other
amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention.

Issue: Is there any limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which
is violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment
contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there is, and it is the
 condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same
Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. It
being indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only
the first amendment the Convention propose We hold that the plebiscite being called for the
purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not
authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention
and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void.

WHEREFORE, all of the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed, without special
pronouncement as to costs.

Magallona v Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, July 15, 2011

RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the demarcation lines of the
baselines of the Philippines as an archipelago. This is in consonance with United Nation
Convention of the Law on Sea (UNCLOS) I.

RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included Section 2 in which the
government reserved the drawing of baselines in Sabah in North Borneo.

RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments, which are in
compliance with UNCLOS III in which the Philippines is one of the signatory, shortening one
baseline while optimizing the other and classifying Kalayaan Group of Island and Scarborough
Shoal as Regimes of Island.

Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the constitutionality of RA
9522:- it reduces the territory of the Philippines in violation to the Constitution and it opens the
country to maritime passage of vessels and aircrafts of other states to the detriment of the
economy, sovereignty, national security and of the Constitution as well. They added that the
classification of Regime of Islands would be prejudicial to the lives of the fishermen.
petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included – its failure to reference either
the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of islands to
determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal

Sec 2 of UNCLOS. the "REGIME OF ISLANDS," each island has its own territorial sea,
contiguous zone, EEZ, and continental shelf. Contested Islands outside our configuration.

- "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles,"
- save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical
miles

The drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty
regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical
miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive
economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III
delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations
members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine
areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters
and submarine lands along their coasts.

the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the
waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris.
Issues:

1. WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit; and
2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional

KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one hand and on the other hand they had to consider that these
are located at non-appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago.
So, the classification is in accordance with the Philippines sovereignty and State’s responsible
observance of its pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept) obligation under UNCLOS III.

Ruling:

SC:1. The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit, since it is the
citizens who will be directly injured and benefitted in affording relief over the remedy sought.

2. - baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS States Parties to mark out specific basepoints
along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting
points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS on
archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer: 'Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic
baselines drawn in accordance with article 47

-The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago

-Inside the baseline, islands should be closed together.

-Because Scarborough Shoal is far, we cannot say that it is near to the Philippines although we
are still allowed by the international law to claim them as our own (Contingency Sea).

Republic vs. Province of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867, 21 January 2020

The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, counters in its Consolidated
Comment65 that while the Municipality of Kalayaan is indeed within the Province of Palawan's
territory, there is nonetheless no law granting the province territorial jurisdiction over the continental
shelf between these areas, where Camago-Malampaya is located. As such, it argues, the Province
of Palawan is not entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the Natural Gas Project.

On December 11, 1990, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic or National Government),
through the Department of Energy (DoE), entered into Service Contract No. 38 with Shell
Philippines Exploration B.V. and Occidental Philippines, Incorporated (collectively
SPEX/OXY), as Contractor, for the exclusive conduct of petroleum operations in the area known
as "Camago-Malampaya" located offshore northwest of Palawan. Exploration of the area led to
the drilling of the Camago-Malampaya natural gas reservoir about 80 kilometers from the main
island of Palawan and 30 kms from the platform. The Provincial Government of Palawan
asserted its claim over forty percent (40%) of the National Government's share in the proceeds of
the project. It argued that since the reservoir is located within its territorial jurisdiction, it is
entitled to said share under Section 290 of the Local Government Code. The National
Government disputed the claim, arguing that since the gas fields were approximately 80 k.ms
from Palawan's coastline, they are outside the territorial jurisdiction of the province and is within
the national territory of the Philippines.

Issue:
a.Whether Palawan is entitled to 40% share in the proceeds of the Project? (Is the reservoir
within the territorial jurisdiction of Palawan so that it is entitled to such share?) NO

b.Corollary, is the Doctrine of Federal Paramountcy Applicable in the Philippines? NO

Ratio:

First Issue:
No. The Local Government Code does not define the term "territorial jurisdiction." Provisions
therein, however, indicate that territorial jurisdiction refers to the LGU's territorial boundaries. In
the creation of municipalities, cities and barangays, the Local Government Code uniformly
requires that the territorial jurisdiction of these government units be "properly identified by
metes and bounds:. The intention, therefore, is to consider an LGU's territorial jurisdiction as
pertaining to a physical location or area as identified by its boundaries. That "territorial
jurisdiction" refers to the LGU's territorial boundaries is a construction reflective of the
discussion of the framers of the 1987 Constitution who referred to the local government as the
"locality" that is "hosting" the national resources and a "place where God chose to locate His
bounty." It is also consistent with the language ultimately used by the Constitutional
Commission when they referred to the national wealth as those found within (the LGU's)
respective areas. By definition, "area" refers to a particular extent of space or surface geora
geographic region.

The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of
government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits
of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are
Ultra vires (acting beyond legal authority).

Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly
conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's
welfare. This is the evil sought to be avoided by the Local Government Unit in requiring that the
land area of a local government unit must bespelled out in metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions

Clearly, therefore, a local government’s territorial jurisdiction cannot extend beyond the
boundaries set by its organic law.
Cruz v Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, GR No. 135385, December 6, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing
rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on
the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is
nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with
the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same
time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of
private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of
ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

Aznar v. COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703 (1990)

On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate of
candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the
January 18, 1988 local elections.

Petitioner Jose B. Aznar filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of Osmeña
on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States
of America.

On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued
by the Immigration and Deportation Commissioner certifying that private respondent is an
American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-21448 and Immigrant
Certificate of Residence No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958,
respectively.

At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), petitioner presented the following
exhibits tending to show that private respondent is an American citizen: Application for Alien
Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration signed by private respondent dated
November 21, 1979; Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 in the name of private
respondent dated November 21, 1979; Permit to Re-enter the Philippines dated November
21, 1979; Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980.

Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that
he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President
Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport; that he
has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the
country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines
since 1965.

On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim
the winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, private respondent
was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.

Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for
disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private
respondent is not a Filipino citizen.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Osmena has lost his Filipino Citizenship and thus be disqualified as a
candidate for the Provincial Governor of Cebu Province.

HELD:

Petitioner failed to present direct proof that Osmena had lost his Filipino
citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these
are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship;
and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a
foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose
his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode
of losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States
of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was
issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-
enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being
an American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance
required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws."

Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are
not. Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States
does not concern Us here.

By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private
respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that
private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the
petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.

Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere
fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino. In the case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that
he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed,
there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is
even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that
the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands
to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no
renunciation either "'express" or "implied".

Mo Ya Lim Yao (husband) Lau Yuen Yeung (wife) v. Commissioner of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292

Petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of injunction against the Commissioner of Immigration,
“restraining the latter and/or his authorized representative from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen
Yeung to leave the Philippines and causing her arrest and deportation and the confiscation of
her bond, upon her failure to do so.”

On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a
non-immigrant. She stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that
she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching
Ping for a period of one month. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on March 13,
1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire on April 13, 1961.

On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake,
among others that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before
the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his
discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly
allow. After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the
Philippines up to February 13, 1962.

On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo
Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of respondent to confiscate
her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized
stay, she brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took
place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung
could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak
either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino
name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-
in-law.

ISSUE:
Should Lau Yuen Yeung become ipso facto a Filipino citizen, upon her marriage to a Filipino
citizen?

HELD:
YES. The Court persuaded that it is in the best interest of all concerned that under Section 15
of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized,
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines
under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he
takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4.
As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there will be
instances where unscrupulous persons will attempt to take advantage of this provision of law by
entering into fake and fictitious marriages or mala fide matrimonies. We cannot as a matter of
law hold that just because of these possibilities, the construction of the provision should be
otherwise than as dictated inexorably by more ponderous relevant considerations, legal, juridical
and practical. There can always be means of discovering such undesirable practice and every
case can be dealt with accordingly as it arises.
Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Accordingly, there is at least one decision of this Court, wherein it seems it is quite clearly
implied that this Court is of the view that under Section 16 of the Naturalization Law, the widow
and children of an applicant for naturalization who dies during the proceedings do not have to
submit themselves to another naturalization proceeding in order to avail of the benefits of the
proceedings involving the husband.
SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. — In case a petitioner
should die before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor children may
continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and
minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during
the life of the petitioner.
Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an applicant for
naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a
naturalization preceeding, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow
that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common
sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing appellants’
petition for injunction is hereby reversed and the Commissioner of Immigration and/or his
authorized representative is permanently enjoined from causing the arrest and deportation and
the confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby declared to have
become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao
alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen on January 25, 1962.
Djumantan v. Domingo, Jan. 30, 1995

-Bernard Banez, married to Marina Cabael, left Philippines went to Indonesia to work and
converted to Islam. May 17, 1974 married petitioner Djumantan.

January 1979 petitioner went to Manila as “guests” of Banez where latter executed “Affidavit of
Guaranty and Support” to Djumantan and children as “temporary guests” under Immigration Act
of 1940.

In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner.
March 1982, immigration status of petitioner was changed to permanent by virtue of same Act
and has been issued alien certificate of recognition a month after.

Leonardo, Banez’s eldest son with Cabael, filed a complaint with the Ombudsman, then referred
to CID (Commission on Immigration and Deportation).
Petitioner was detained, then manifested at first to depart voluntarily, but later changed heart,
and moved for the dismissal of the deportation case by arguing that she was married to a
Filipino.

September 1990, the CID revoked Djumantan’s visa and disposed that her marriage to Banez
was irregular.

August 14, 1994, Bernard Banez died. Son leonardo withdrew objection to grant Djumantan
permanent visa.

Djumantan Contentions: CA denied reconsideration

Respondents have no right to order her and Banez to live separately.
Her marriage to Banez was valid under Article 27 of P.D. No. 1085, the Muslim Code
Articles 109 CC, 68 FC, 34 MC (Muslim Code), and especially Article 110 CC, husband and wife
obliged to live together. Article 110, husband is required to fix conjugal residence.

Marina Cabael Contentions:

CID could no longer order deportation because power had prescribed under Section
37(b) of immigration act. Her marriage to Djuamantan was irregular.

Issue: W/N Djumantan is considered as a Filipino citizen having been married to a Filipino?

Held:

No. Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino does not make her a Filipino Citizen. There is no
law guaranteeing aliens married to a Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be
given permanent residency, in the Philippines.

Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen
and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of her
extended stay here as an alien.

ISSUES
1. First issue is Djamantan’s immigration status. Was her admission to the country legal?
2. Does her marriage withdraw her from operation of immigration laws?
 3. Did the right to deport her prescribed?
4. [Main petition] Was she validly married to a Filipino citizen?

RULING
1. No. She was not lawfully admitted into the country and she did not lawfully acquire
permanent residency. There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws. The
subsequent privileges were misrepresentation. Never was the marriage disclosed to the
immigration authorities in her applications for temporary visitor’s visa and for permanent
residency.
2. No. The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the
operation of the immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of aliens
3. Yes. Section 37(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 provides that “entering through …
false and misleading statements” is a ground for deportation. Aliens who acted under
clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 shall be arrested and deported anytime but will prescribe after
five years. In Lam Shee v. Bengzon, Court ruled clause 1 prescribes after 5 years. CID’s
action manifested their action to arrest and deport Djumantan.
4. Yes, there is a law. But her false statement during entry does not ipso facto make her a
Filipino citizen. She must have declared it. Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino
husband does not ipso facto (not a proper process) make her a Filipino citizen (or
exempt her on immigration laws) and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from
the country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien

Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, GR No. 221697, March 8, 2016

In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9,
2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005.

Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally
adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN
ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore
Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized
American citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating

medical condition, who then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted
her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and finally went home for good to the
Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.

On JULY 18, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration granted her petition declaring that she
had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and
obtained a new Philippine Passport.

RA 9225- without renouncing her foreign citizenship; not recognize dual allegiance
Repatriation- renounce the foreign citizenship through notarization
Derivative Citizenship- children below 18 whose parents re-acquire PH citizenship
In 2010, before assuming her post as appointee Chairperson of the MTRCB , she
renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to
Reacquisition of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her American
passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the
ground particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino
citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved
as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in
want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed
misrepresentation in her COC.

On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6
that POE is qualified as candidate for Presidency.

HELD:
YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied
the constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.
(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her
physical features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found
as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 245k or 99% probability that
residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical
parents are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial evidence are admissible under
Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as
based on the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely
exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens

(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to
the country where they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN
Convention Law.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she
satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently)
coupled with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a
new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines,
Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon
permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was granted
by the SC.

In re: Vicente Ching, Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999

In 1964, Vicente Ching, a CPA, was born in Bangar, La Union. His mother is a Filipina and his
father is a pure Chinese. Under the 1935 Constitution, when her mother married his father, she
lost citizenship. In 1999, he applied for admission to the Philippine bar but his admission was
conditional. He was required to present further proof (aside form voters registration, CPA, and
member of SB) that he is a Filipino. Vicente Ching did not elect his citizenship until 1999; his
age of maturity (21 yrs old) was 1985 pursuant to strict compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to
Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino
Citizen." (a) the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and
(b) said election must be made upon reaching the age of majority.

Issue: Can Vicente Ching be considered as a Filipino even after his election of citizenship was
filed not on reasonable time (meaning upon reaching age of maturity, you are given up until 3
years to elect citizenship)?

Held:

No, he was not admitted. In Cuenco v. Secretary of Justice, one must elect Filipino citizenship
only within the three (3) year period. It is not an inflexible rule.

Co v. HRET, G.R No. 92191-92, 199 SCRA 692 (1991)

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the 2nd district of
Northern Samar. His adversaries, which include petitioners Co et al., filed election
protests against him averring that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Phils. and that
he is not a resident of the 2nd district of Northern Samar and therefore he did not satisfy
the qualification for representatives mandated in Art VI, Sec 6 of the Constitution. It is
argued that Ong does not even have real properties in that district. Respondent HRET
found for Ong, hence his petition for certiori.

Ong was born of a natural-born citizen mother and a Chinese father who was later
naturalized while Ong was a minor. Ong was born in the said district of Samar and grew
up there. Their house was twice burned and, in both times, they rebuilt their residence
in the same place. After elementary, he pursued his studies in Manila and practiced his
profession as CPA in the Central Bank of the Philippines as examiner. Later, he
engaged himself in the management of the family business in Manila. He married a
Filipina. In between, he made periodical journeys back to his home province. However,
Ong does not have property in the district.

Issues:
(1) Is Ong a naturally-born Filipino citizen?
(2) Is Ong a resident of the 2nd district of Northern Samar?

Held:
(1) Yes. When Ong’s father was naturalized, Sec 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act
squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this country.
Thus, it was the law itself which elected Philippine citizenship to him when he was only
9. Election through a sworn statement when he turned 21 (age of majority) would have
been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who is already a Filipino citizen.
Moreover, formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos, when the time to elect came up, there are acts
of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding and, in this case, Ong’s establishment
of his life here are themselves formal manifestations of choice.

(2) Yes. The domicile of origin of Ong, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at
Laoang, Samar (in the district). Although no merit was found in the petitioners’ argument
that Ong does not even have property in the district, the Court nonetheless held, for the
sake of argument, that did it is not required that a person should have a house in order
to establish his residence and domicile because that would tantamount to a property
qualification. It is enough that he should live in the municipality. Although he studied in
Manila and practiced his profession therein, the periodical journeys made to his home
province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.

Bengson v. HRElectoralTribunal, G.R No. 142840, May 7, 2001

April 27, 1960

o Teodoro Cruz,respondednt, was born a natural-born citizen of the Philippines in
Tarlac
o Both his parents are Filipino

November 5, 1985
o Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps without the consent of PH and took an oath of
allegiance to USA
o As per CA 63, Section 1(4), he lost his PH citizenship by rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country

June 5, 1990
o Cruz was naturalized as a US citizen

March 7, 1994
o Cruz acquired PH citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630

1998
o Cruz ran for and was elected as representative of the 2nd district of Pangasinan
o He defeated Antonio Bengson III

Bengson III filed a petition for quo warranto ad cautelam

o Contention: Cruz is not qualified to be a member of HRET since he is not a natural-
born citizen under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution, which provides
No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five
years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Prior to election: you file your contention before the COMELEC
After election: you file your contention before the HRepElecTribunal

Issue:
Can Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship?

Ruling:
Yes. A natural-born citizen is one who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular
country without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth and (2) by naturalization.
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of PH citizenship.
Naturalization
1. As a mode of initially acquiring PH citizenship
· Governed by CA 473
2. As a mode of reacquiring PH citizenship
· Governed by CA 63
CA 63 enumerates 3 modes by which PH citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen:
1. By naturalization
2. By repatriation
3. By direct act of Congress
Repatriation may be reacquired by those who lost citizenship due to the following:
1. Desertion of the armed forces
2. Service in the armed forces of the Allied forces in WWII
3. Service in the US armed forces at any other time
4. Marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien
5. Political and economic necessity
The effect of repatriation is the recovery of the original nationality.

According to Section 1 of RA 2630, Cruz may reacquire his PH citizenship by taking an

oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with the
local civil registry. Thus, Cruz recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen,
which he reacquired at birth.

Tecson v. Comelec, 424 SCRA 277 (2004)

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualified FPJ and
to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made
a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy claiming to be a natural born Filipino
citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners, mother, Bessie Kelley
Poe, (as an american, and his father, Allan Poe, as a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo
Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe as a Filipino citizen,
he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child
of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on to
assertions & first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to ascertain Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessie Kelle and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe,
married Bessie Kelle only a year after the birth of respondent.

Petitioners also questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking cognizance of and
deciding the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. The asserted that under Section 4(7)
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the case

Held:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Based on the evidence presented
which the Supreme consider as viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of
Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died
on September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death
certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence
of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place
of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. Considering
that the allegations of petitioners are not substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have
been benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there
is no doubt that Allan Poe father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And,
since the latter was born on August 20, 1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which constitution
considers as citizens of the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando
Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or not he is
legitimate or illegitimate.

Mercado v Manzano, GR No. 161434, March 3, 2004

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for
vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Respondent was then declared
the winning candidate; however its proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition
for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was
not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition
of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on
the ground that he is a dual citizen and, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code provides
that persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position.

Respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under
Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he
was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States,
San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen under
US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his
Filipino citizenship. From these facts, respondent is a dual citizen - both a Filipino and a US
citizen.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Manzano is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.

HELD:

The petition was dismissed. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
Dual allegiance- as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a
situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli.

Dual citizen- he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a person,
ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states.

Considering the citizenship clause under Article IV of the Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle
of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. dual allegiance is the result of an
individual’s volition (freewill).
While dual citizenship is involuntary,.

By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, Manzano elected Philippine
citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of
candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual
citizen. On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no
doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
Article 4, Sec. 1, Par. 2 of the Consti states that those whose fathers OR mothers are citizens of
the Philippines regardless of the place/country they were born for as long as one of your parents
is a Filipino citizens at the time you were born. (Jus Sangunis)

Mahtani v Republic, 859 SCRA 605, GR 2111118, MARCH 21, 2018

He was born on 4 August 1970 in Bombay, Republic of India. He is currently a citizen of the
Republic of India

He is married to Anna (Ana) Patricia Celdran-Mahtani with whom he has (3) children

He first arrived in the Philippines with his mother, Vandana Chandru Mahtani, on 21 May 1971
on board Philippine Airlines Flight No. PR 307 when he was nine (9) months old. He returned to
India shortly thereafter and pursued his studies there. He would, however, visit the Philippines
every so often

He has continuously resided in the Philippines for more than fifteen (15) years since 21 August
1992 – the date when he arrived to establish his permanent residence in the Philippines

He is engaged in a lawful lucrative occupation. He is currently the Vice-President for

Operations of Sprint International, Inc., which is the importer, manufacturer, and exclusive
distributor of Speedo swimwear and athletic gear in the Philippines

RTC find the petition of Mahtani meritorious and admitted him as a Filipino citizen pursuant to
Commonwealth Act No 473.

OSG, Mahtani's failure to prove that he has a lucrative trade (failed to present evidence that
he has been paying taxes), profession, or occupation. Also, the Republic averred that Mahtani
failed to present credible persons as character witnesses.

CA granted the petition in favor of the Republic through the OSG.

Issue: Can Mantani’s petition be granted despite not having presented ITR and has a lucrative
occupation (contemplation of law speaks of adequacy and sustainability)?

Ruling:

We find that Mahtani indeed failed to prove that the requirement under Section 2, Paragraph 4
of Commonwealth Act No. 473 as amended was complied with. It must be shown that the
employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over
his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment,
sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones becoming the object of charity or a public
charge. No sufficient proof that it is enough to create an appreciable margin of income over
expenses

Republic v. Judge De la Rosa, 232 SCRA 785

1) to annul the Decision dated February 27, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court,... Branch 28, Manila,
in SP Proc. No. 91-58645, which re-admitted private respondent as a Filipino citizen under the
Revised Naturalization Law... during Martial Law compelled him to seek political asylum in the
United States, and... eventually to renounce his Philippine citizenship.
He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available remedy for his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. He tried to reacquire his Philippine citizenship through repatriation and direct
act of Congress. However, he was later informed that... repatriation proceedings were limited to army
deserters or Filipino women who had lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to foreigners
(Rollo, pp. 49-50). His request to Congress for sponsorship of a bill allowing him to reacquire his
Philippine citizenship failed to... materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of
the House of Representatives in his favor (Rollo, p. 51). He attributed this to the maneuvers of his
political rivals.
Issues:
He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available remedy for his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. He tried to reacquire his Philippine citizenship through repatriation and direct
act of Congress. However, he was later informed that... repatriation proceedings were limited to army
deserters or Filipino women who had lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to foreigners
(Rollo, pp. 49-50). His request to Congress for sponsorship of a bill allowing him to reacquire his
Philippine citizenship failed to... materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of
the House of Representatives in his favor (Rollo, p. 51). He attributed this to the maneuvers of his
political rivals.
Ruling:
In view of the finding in G.R. No. 104654 that private respondent is not yet a Filipino citizen
Principles:
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised
Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2) that he resided
continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he... is able to speak and write English
and any one of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the
date of the filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed
a declaration of intention... or if he is excused from said filing, the justification therefor.

Republic v. Huang Te Fu, G.R No. 200983, March 18, 2015

Huang Te Fu, Chinese from Taiwan, arrived in Manila in August 1982, petitioned to become a
naturalized Filipino citizen. Married Irene Chan who is a naturalized Filipina from 2000; and has 2
children. Worked as a General Manager of his family’s business. He has all the qualifications
required and none of the disqualifications under Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.

CA contended the following:

1) he does not own real estate in the Philippines;

2) he does not have some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation;
3) he is not gainfully employed, as he merely worked in the business owned by his family and was
merely given allowances by his parents for the daily expenses of his family;
4) in an August 2001 Deed of Sale covering a parcel of land in Antipolo City he and his wife
14

supposedly purchased, respondent falsely misrepresented himself as a Filipino citizen, thus

exemplifying his lack of good moral character; - "had nothing to do with the preparation" thereof and
was "unaware" that his citizenship was even indicated therein – "he just signed the document as
requested by the broker so that the property will be registered in the name of his wife
5) his income tax returns for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 reveal that his actual monthly income
differs from his monthly income as declared in his petition for naturalization, leading to the
conclusion that either he is evading taxes or concealing the truth regarding his income; he does
not personally file his income tax returns and that he merely received salaries in the range of
P15,000.00 per month considering that he is employed in a family corporation, expenses are taken
care of by his parents who own the corporation, and
6) on cross-examination by petitioner, he could not cite any of the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution which he is supposed to believe in. he was not confronted by the former
about these principles during the proceedings

Issue: whether x x x respondent x x x has duly complied with the rigid requisites prescribed by
commonwealth act no. 473, otherwise known as the revised naturalization law, as to entitle him to be
admitted as a citizen of the Philippines

Ruling:

his or her spouse’s income should not be included in the assessment for lucrative employment. His
income is not enough for the support of his family. By his own admission, most of his family’s daily
expenses are still shouldered by his parents who own the zipper manufacturing business which
employs him. This simply means that respondent continues to be a burden to, and a charge upon,
his parents; he lives on the charity of his parents. He cannot support his own family on his own.

it is even doubtful that respondent is carrying on a trade at all. He admitted during trial that he was
not even listed or included in the payroll of his family’s zipper business. If this is the case, then
he may not be considered an employee thereof. One of the most effective pieces of evidence to
prove employment – aside from the employment contract itself and other documents such as daily
time records – is a worker’s inclusion in the payroll. an intent to evade taxes or to conceal the
24

true nature of his employment and the amount of his salary or income.

proof of respondent’s lack of good moral character. It is also a violation of the constitutional
prohibition on ownership of lands by foreign individuals. First of all, as a foreigner living in a
foreign land, he should conduct himself accordingly in this country – with care, circumspect, and
respect for the laws of the host. Finally, as an educated and experienced businessman, it must be
presumed that he acted with due care and signed the deed of sale with full knowledge of its import.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The November 29, 2011 Decision and March 7, 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91213 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
The September 24, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96 in Nat.
Case/Spec. Proc. No. Q-05-55251 is likewise ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent’s
Petition for Naturalization in said case is DISMISSED.

Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R No. 195649, April 16, 2013

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections

COMELEC: Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real
intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to
enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between
Arnado’s unexplained use of a US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship and renounced his US citizenship.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and
who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case
and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to
Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division
correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government
Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s
candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who
obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.

Ruling:

Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when there has not yet
been any proclamation of the winner. Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact
that the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for
the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC 30 are present and therefore
would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to
elevate the matter before this Court.

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required
to qualify one to run for an elective position. This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing
one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a
disqualification to run for an elective local position. In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a
Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which
date he first used his American passport after renouncing his American citizenship.

Labo v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989)

Petitioner Labo was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City. Private

respondent Lardizabal, the losing candidate, filed a petition for quo
warranto questioning petitioner’s citizenship. The latter claims that
petitioner is a naturalized Australian citizen, having married an Australian
citizen. Records also showed petitioner’s oath and affirmation of
allegiance to the Queen of Australia. These were not denied; petitioner
however claimed that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst
only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship
and that his naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found
that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous.

Ruling:

NO. CA No. 63 enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may

be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2)
express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. All of
which are applicable to the petitioner. In connection with this, Article IV,
Section 5, of the present Constitution provides that, “Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”

Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in

Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the
Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not
automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of
Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between
him and his adopted country. What we must consider is the fact that he
voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and
knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility
that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims,
does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of
the Philippines.

Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be

reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not
point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly
conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he
has complied with PD No. 725, providing that:

… (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may
reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the
Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No.
270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on
Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of
registration.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily
recovered after its renunciation. It may be restored only after the
returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country he
has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive
loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished
by election to public office.

Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727 (1996)

Respondent, Juan G. Frivaldo, was alleged by the Quitermo Hermo and Comelec of the ff: (1) that
the proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with
law; (2) that private respondent is an alien, whose grant of Philippine citizenship is being questioned
by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and (3) that private respondent is not a duly registered voter.

(1) that private respondent is an American citizen, and therefore ineligible to run as candidate for the
position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon;
(2) that the trial court’s decision
re-admitting private respondent as a Filipino citizen was fraught with legal infirmities rendering it null
and void;
(3) that assuming the decision to be valid, private respondent’s oath of allegiance, which was taken
on the same day the questioned decision was promulgated, violated Republic Act No. 530, which
provides for a two-year waiting period before the oath of allegiance can be taken by the applicant;
and
(4) that the hearing of the petition on February 27, 1992, was held less than four months from the
date of the last publication of the order and petition. The petition prayed for the cancellation of
private respondent’s certificate of candidacy and the deletion of his name from the list of registered
voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon.

Private respondent alleges that the precarious political atmosphere in the country during Martial Law
compelled him to seek political asylum in the United States, and eventually to renounce his
Philippine citizenship. the public was well-informed of his petition for naturalization due to the
publicity given by the media.

Ruling:
The RTC never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The
proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and
void for failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the Revised
Naturalization Law. (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing,
without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the
petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was
allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his
oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.

The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines is meritorious.

Naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure
prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the
requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those
which he believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value.

RA 9139 Sections 2 and 6 of the Admin Revised Naturalization Law, particularly:

(1) that the petitioner is of good moral character;
(2) that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years;
(3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one of the principal dialects;
(4) that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until his
admission to Philippine citizenship; and
(5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the justification
therefor.

RA 9139 only applies on:

Foreigners/ aliens who are born in the PH and continue to reside

Court Naturalization applies to:

Foreigners who are not born in the PH.
Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED
from continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to
VACATE his office and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since
Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995--the very day the term of
office of governor (and other elective officials) began--he was therefore already
qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and
responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already
qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that
should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with
the purpose for which such law was enacted.

Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, 169 SCRA 364

Yu was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, valid for 5 years and renewed for the same period upon
presentment before the Portuguese consular.

In 1978, he was naturalized as a Filipino citizen.

In 1981, he applied and was issued a Portuguese passport (which will expire in 1986) by the consular in
Tokyo. He declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed/ Companies
registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. Filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.

Issue: W/N the acts of applying for a foreign passport and declaration of foreign nationality in
commercial documents, constitute an express renunciation of one’s citizenship acquired through
naturalization

Held: Yes. The facts constitute an express renunciation of Yu’s Philippine citizenship acquired through
naturalization. It was made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.

He had full knowledge and legal capacity after renouncing Portuguese citizenship after naturalization, and
such renewal of his passport and representing as Portuguese in documents resumed or reacquired his
being a Portuguese. Thus it is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.

Citizenship is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient.

Wherefore, petitioner’s motion for release from detention is DENIED. Respondent’s motion to lift
the TRO is GRANTED.

Fivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727, June 28, 1996

1) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three
successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office
due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship
thru repatriation;
2) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in
favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have
intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid votes

3) incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the position
of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said post inasmuch
as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred"?

Issues:

1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may
it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when? The fact that ten other persons, as certified to
by the Solicitor General, were granted repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively
against the existence of favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee.

He successfully obtained under PD 725; as is was not repealed the Transitory Provisions of
the 1987 Constitution. No express repeal was made because Pres Aquino did not
categorically/impliedly state that PD 7225 was being repealed or rendered without any legal
effect.

2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to
his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?

3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317
considering that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo
warranto case"?

4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing
jurisprudence?

5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed
Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of Sorsogon,
considering that they were not rendered within the period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?

Ruling:

1. Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization
21

or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654 and during the oral argument in this
22

case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to
do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of
Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case,
his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and
procedural defects

Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully passed through the third and last mode of
reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor General
himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for
co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said Decree
at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists that he -- not Lee -- should have
been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of
Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the
highest number of votes in the elections and since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.

In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully
served his country and his province prior to his naturalization in the United States -- a naturalization
he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred
and could not in conscience embrace -- and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-
establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to offer once
more his talent and services to his people.

1) Valid repatriation? Yes. According to law, citizenship may be reacquired by 1) direct act of
Congress, 2)by naturalization or 3) by repatriation under P.D 725. The law does not specifically
state a particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for
residence (at least 1 year residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age(at least
35 years old on election day).

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office to

ensure that no alien, or person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and
our country or a unit of territory thereof. An official begins to govern or to discharge his
functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to
begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on the very day the term of his office began, he
was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold office and to discharge the functions
and responsibilities thereof as of said date. The law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification
distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. The Local
Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to
vote actually.

In other words, the law’s purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective
official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern—and not anywhere else.

In fact, petitioner voted in all the previous elections. The prime issue of citizenship should be
reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of
the certificate of candidacy. The repatriation of the petitioner retroacted upon the date of filing of
his application.

2) Disqualified? No. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a
person’s future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for
that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.

3) Comelec jurisdiction? No. The Constitution has given the Comelec ample power to "exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications
of all elective provincial officials. Such power to annul a proclamation must be done within ten
(10) days following the proclamation. Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee's
proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.
4) Lee winner? No. The fact remains that Lee was not the choice of the sovereign will. Lee is
just a second placer. The rule is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A
minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

Romualdez v. RTC, 226 SCRA 408, 415 (1993)

Kabataan Party List v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015

Gonzales v. COMELEC, L-40117, February 22, 1975

Macalintal v. COMELEC, 405 SCRA 614 (2003)

G.R. No. 238467

MARK ANTHONY V. ZABAL, THITING ESTOSO JACOSALEM, AND ODON S.

BANDIOLA, Petitioners
vs.
RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, President of the Republic of the Philippines; SALVADOR C.
MEDIALDEA, Executive Secretary; and EDUARDO M. ANO, [Secretary] of DILG

In February 2018, resident Duterte first made public his plan to shut it down during a business forum
held in Davao under a state of calamity on April 26, 2018 to October 25, 2018.

fewer tourists had been engaging the services of Zabal (sand castle) and Jacosalem (driver) such
that their earnings were barely enough to feed their families- they were deprived of the source of
their livelihood. infonnal economy sector. never guaranteed and is susceptible to changes in
regulations and the overall business climate. They must follow for the public good and welfare,

ISSUE: W/N Proclamation No. 475 is an invalid exercise of legislative powers- altered the
relationship between the State and its people by increasing the former's power over the latter
through violation of constitutional rights to travel and to due process (because only the violators
should be punished)- Anchored on Section 16 of Republic Act (RA) No. 10121, otherwise known as
the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010, or the authority given to the
President to declare a state of calamity. Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution The power of
control, in turn, refers to the authority to direct the performance of a duty, restrain the commission of
acts, review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units, and
prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs. must yield to general welfare- The
temporary inconvenience that petitioners or other persons may have experienced or are
experiencing is but the consequence of the police measure intended to attain a much higher
purpose, that is, to protect the environment, the health of the people, and the general welfare.
Indeed, any and all persons may be burdened by measures intended for the common good or to
serve some important governmental interest.
Petitioner: President Duterte can only call the attention of the LGUs concerned with regard to rules
not being followed, which is the true essence of supervision, but he cannot lay down the rules
himself as this already constitutes control. the devolution of powers upon LGUs pursuant to the
constitutional mandate of ensuring their autonomy does not mean that the State can no longer
interfere in their affairs. This is especially true in this case since Boracay's environmental disaster
cannot be treated as a localized problem that can be resolved by the concerned LGUs only. The
magnitude and gravity of the problem require the intervention and assistance of different national
government agencies in coordination with the concerned LGUs.

Respondents maintain that prohibition is not proper in this case because the closure of Boracay is
already a fait accompli (already in effect when the president issued the proclamation leaving them no
option but to accept it)

Respondents: The petition is in the nature of a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation
(SLAPP) under Rule 6 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, or
a legal action filed to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse that any person,
institution or the government has taken or may take in the enforcement of environmental laws,
protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights.

HELD: No locus standi. therefore, what Zabal and Jacosalem could lose in this case are mere
projected earnings which are in no way guaranteed, and are sheer expectancies characterized as
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest,

Bandiola fails to expressly provide specifics as to how direct injury on the premise that his right to
travel was affected by the proclamation.

Proclamation No. 475 does NOT constitute an impairment on the right to travel. inspection, testing,
demolition, relocation, and construction could not have been implemented freely and smoothly
with tourists coming in and out of the island not only because of the possible disruption that they
may cause to the works being undertaken, but primarily because their safety and convenience might
be compromised. not direct but merely consequential; and, the same is only for a reasonably short
period of time or merely temporary. does not actually impose a restriction on the right to travel, its
issuance did not result to any substantial alteration of the relationship between the State and the
people. The proclamation is therefore not a law and conversely, the President did not usurp the law-
making power of the legislature.

POLICE POWER As defined, it consists of (1) imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in
order to foster the common good. It is not capable of exact definition but has be purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace."

The temporary closure of Boracay as a tourist destination for six months reasonably necessary
under the circumstances. Oposa warned that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology
and to health are given continuing importance and the State assumes its solemn obligation to
preserve and protect them. It further taught that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. It was the most practical and
realistic means of ensuring that rehabilitation works in the island are started and carried out in the
most efficacious and expeditious way.

To repeat, police power constitutes an implied limitation to the Bill of Rights, and that even liberty
itself, the greatest of all rights, is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the
greater number.
The City of Bacolod v Phuture Vision Co, Inc., GR No. 190289, January 17, 2018

Respondent submitted documents for application for renewal of Mayor’s permit. Prior to
issuance of permit, On March 2007, around 6AM, respondent discovered that their bingo outlet
was padlocked by agents of the City Legal Officer of Bacolod.

Issue: W/N the petitioners’ act of closing the bingo outlet was tainted with malice and bad faith
and that they have no legal authority to shut down its operations especially since PAGCOR itself
had already issued provisional Grant Of Authority in its favor.

W/N the petitioners gave due notice and hearing as to the closure of the said business- NO due
notice but they did not issued a business permit in the first place so it is lawful. The
respondent have no right to operate bingo since there is no permit yet.

Held:
SC cannot hold petitioners estopped from invoking their immunity from suit on account of
having raised it only for the first time on appeal.
Petitioners are not liable for damages.

 Evasco v Montanez, GR No. 199172, February 21, 2018

Respondent contending that Ordinance No. 092-2000 is unconstitutional for being overbreadth
in its application, vague, and inconsistent with the National Building Code of the Philippines
(National Building Code).

Further, DPWH Secretary Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr. issued National Building Code
Development Office (NBCDO) Memorandum Circular No. 3 directing all local government
building officials to cease and desist from processing application for, and issuing and renewing
billboard permits pursuant to Pres. GMA’s AO no 160 due to Typhoon Milenyo.

the city government issued another Order of Demolition, this time directed against Prime
Advertisements & Signs (Prime), on the ground that the latter’s billboards had no sign permits
and encroached on a portion of the road right of way. The city government ordered Prime to
voluntarily trim its structures. Otherwise, the same shall be removed.

HELD:

Congress may delegate this power to local government units. Once delegated, the agents can
exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
Congress may delegate this power to local government units. Once delegated, the agents can
exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.

Party-List Election (Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC)

Facts:

Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties,
organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two
requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional representation.

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification
of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector."

HRep=>250 congressmen district

Party list=20% of the total Hrep

Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system," which
should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First, "the system was
conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the
House of Representatives." Second, "the system should represent the broadest sectors of the
Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party system." (Boldface in the original.)
Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold requirement of RA 7941, it
concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have at least one
representative."

Issue:
Comelec en banc resolved only the issue concerning the apportionment or allocation of the
remaining seats. In other words, the issue was: Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to
party-list solons be given (1) to the thirteen qualified parties that had each garnered at least two
percent of the total votes, or (2) to the Group of 38 - herein private respondents - even if they had
not passed the two percent threshold?

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent
allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time? No this percentage is a
ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled up has been left to Congress. "proportional
representation"

2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of
RA 7941 constitutional? YES. The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the
framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a
republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is
exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected
persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people.

3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be
determined? rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively
referred to as "parties") according to the votes they each obtained.

For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to two
additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the
same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party.
Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seats has
already been predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first one is
entitled.

to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two percent vote requirement "will
mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives to thirteen organizations representing two political parties, three coalitions and four
sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x x. Such strict application of the 2%
'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the Constitution and the legislature -- to develop
and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives x x x."
Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission from complying with the constitutional and statutory
decrees for party-list representatives to compose 20% of the House of Representatives."

Ruling:

Question: with this kind of formula, essentially, walang makakakuha ng additional seats since
wla ring round off kasi at ibabase dapat ung number dun sa first party…

Ang LADLAD LGBT Party v COMELEC, 618 SCRA 32 (2010)

Facts:

On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC. Before
the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented
sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that
LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal
attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with
the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual
members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.

Comelec dismissed the petition citing moral grounds. this definition of the LGBT sector makes it
crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs. statement of dislike
and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.

Ang ladlad filed a reconsideration. There was a 3-3 tie, the chairman being the tie-breaker.
Dismissed. it cannot be said that Ladlad’s expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the
nation as a whole. marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nation’s

ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on behalf of COMELEC not
later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010. Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a
Comment in support of petitioner’s application.

The CHR (Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae) opined that the denial of Ang
Ladlad’s petition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHR’s motion to intervene.

Issue: W/N Ang Ladlad is compliant to register as party-list organization in the Comelec.

Ruling:
As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, "the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is
not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with
the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at
least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044
members in its electronic discussion group. Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national
LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT
networks:"

Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors.

Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC, GR no. 203766, April 2, 2003-does not necessarily mean that
partylist representative belongs to the marginalized sector they represent as long as they have the
advocacy to represent the same.

the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to grant Partido ng
Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National Capital
Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because
PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply
for registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an organization
that seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented

13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7
January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the
printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC to
include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013
party-list elections.

Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions.

Issues:
first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either
by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their
existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; and they do not belong to the
marginalized sector

second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong
Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections. Who are considered marginalized

Ruling:
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the
qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we
remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are
qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.

The Party-List System The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one
for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice.
"the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."
the party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the
members of the sectors. the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting the law become
because when we make an enumeration we exclude those who are not in the enumeration. 2 nd, who
comprise the farmers. Let us just say the farmers and the laborers. These days, there are many
citizens who are called "hyphenated citizens." A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a
farmer.

Ruling:
That means that the maximum that any party can get out of these 50 seats is 15. When the parties
register they then submit a list of 15 names. They have to submit these names because these
nominees have to meet the minimum qualifications of a Member of the National Assembly. At
the end of the day, when the votes are tabulated, one gets the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets
10 percent or 15 percent of the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a women’s party gets 2 1/2 percent and
anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and the 50 seats are apportioned
among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.

There is no reason why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special
interest group, should not have a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there
are three or four labor groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets only
one percent or five of them get one percent, they are not entitled to any representative. So, they will
begin to think that if they really have a common interest, they should band together, form a coalition
and get five percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are the
dynamics of a party list system.

The purpose of this is to open the system. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way,
they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in
legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list
system.

Political parties, particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the
party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.

The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party is really organized
along a specific sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the political party may submit a
list of individuals who are actually members of such sectors. The lists are to be published to
give individuals or organizations belonging to such sector the chance to present evidence
contradicting claims of membership in the said sector or to question the claims of the
existence of such sectoral organizations or parties. This proceeding shall be conducted by
the COMELEC and shall be summary in character. In other words, COMELEC decisions on
this matter are final and unappealable.

PARTY-LIST SYSTEM is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations;
(2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional
parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional
parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any
particular sector.