Deontological Ethics

Mr. Francis A. Villamora

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Using a person: a preliminary
exercise

š The trolley problem again.

š Give a record of you feelings after seeing the following
pictures.

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 Part 1
Kant and deontological
ethics

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Deontology

š The theory of duty or moral obligation.

š Duty:
š Role-related duty
š General duty
š Obligation:
š Requirement set on a person because of his/her identity.

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Basic Kantian themes

1. Personal autonomy:
p The moral person is a rational self-leglislator.
2. Respect:
p Persons should always be treated as an end, not a means. ‘No
persons should be used.’
3. Duty:
p the moral action is one that we must do in accordance with a
certain principle, not because of its good consequence.

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Kant’s philosophy:
š What can I know?
š Critique of Pure Reason
(1781)
š What ought I do?
š Groundwork for the
Metaphysic of Morals
(1785); Critique of
Practical Reason (1788)
š What can I hope for?
š Critique of Judgment
(1790); Religion within
the Limits of Reason
Alone (1793) Immanuel Kant
(1724-1804)

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Phenomena and Noumena

š Phenomena:
š things as they appear to us; empirical and therefore changeable.
š Noumena:
š things-in-themselves, which can’t be known by the use of senses.
š Kant argues that if there is such a thing as moral reality, it must
be founded on the noumena, and this is because…

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The moral law is in its character
absolute, and it can allow no
exception. And empirical
knowledge simply cannot
establish such a law.

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 Part 2
Kant’s Conception of Moral
Values

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The moral worth

š On Kant’s view, the moral worth of an action is not determined

by its consequences because:

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1. It is possible that someone does something out of evil intention, but ends
up bringing good consequences to society.
2. It is also possible that someone does something out of good intention, but
ends up bringing about bad consequences.
3. The consequences of an action are not under our control.
4. We can only control our motives when acting as a moral person.
5. Therefore the moral worth of an action is given by our good will.

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The right motive

š ‘For example, it is always a matter of duty that a dealer should not over
charge an inexperienced purchaser; and wherever there is much commerce the
prudent tradesman does not overcharge, but keeps a fixed price for everyone,
so that a child buys of him as well as any other. Men are thus honestly served;
but this is not enough to make us believe that the tradesman has so acted from
duty and from principles of honesty: his own advantage required it;

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š it is out of the question in this case to suppose that he might besides have a
direct inclination in favour of the buyers, so that, as it were, from love he
should give no advantage to one over another. Accordingly the action was
done neither from duty nor from direct inclination, but merely with a selfish
view.’

(http://eserver.org/philosophy/kant/metaphys-of-morals.txt)

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š The right motive can be a motive out of either:
š self-interest,
š sympathy (natural inclination), or
š a sense of duty (the voice of conscience).
š Only the final motive will count on Kant’s view.

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Hypothetical Vs categorical
imperatives

š Hypothetical imperative:
š What I ought to do if some conditions hold.
š E.g., Maxim: I ought to attend the lecture if I want to pass my
examination.
š Categorical imperative:
š What I ought to do unconditionally.
š E.g., Maxim: I ought not to murder no matter what goal I have.

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Two formulations of the
categorical imperative

1. Act only on that maxim that you can will as a universal law.
2. Always treat humanity, whether your own person or that of
another, never simply as a means but always at the same
time as an end.

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One Kant’s view, all moral imperatives are
categorical imperatives.
They are universally valid and have equal
forces to EQUALLY FREE and
RATIONAL AGENTS.

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An example: why lying is
wrong

š If we use consequences as the basis of moral worth,

sometimes lying is right because it makes a lot of people
happy.
š But the maxim that supports lying cannot pass the ‘universality
test’ and the ‘humanity test’.

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Lying is wrong because:

1. If everybody lies, then words lose its function to express truth.

The principle of lying therefore cannot be universalized.
2. Lying can be successful only if we use other people’s
ignorance. But in this case we are treating them only as a
means to our ends.

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Freedom and the kingdom of
ends

š Given that all rational beings are equal, a

kingdom comprising those beings must not
favour any party or treat the other as inferior.
š It follows that in the kingdom of ends
everybody should be equally free and should
not be a means to other people’s end.
š The law thus set up is a contract between free
and rational agents.

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Morality is thus a matter of social
contract made between free and
rational agents.

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 Part 3
Questions about Kantian
Ethics

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Motivational problems

š Why should I obey to the moral law?

š Answer: Because I want to be a wholly free (autonomous) person
who acts on the principle that I find most reasonable.
š Why should I respect other persons?
š Answer: This is simply because rational persons are equal.

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Freedom or equality?

š Is autonomy or equality the fundamental value in ethics? What

if they conflict each other?
š Answer: In principle they do not conflict each other, because both
are built up in the idea of reason.
š But in practice…?

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Conflicts of duties

š If duty A conflicts with duty B, how can they be universalized?

š Example:
š I have a universal duty not to kill the Fat man.
š I also have a universal duty to save the five workers.
š What should I do?

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Non-rational beings

š The moral law is set up by rational agents who

mutually respect each other. Non-rational
beings such as animals are not protected by
that law because they don’t have this sense of
responsibility.
š If we have a duty not to be cruel to animals, it
cannot be for their sake, but for the reason
that we will hurt our own rationality in doing so
(that we will develop a bad personality in this
practice).

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Some questions to consider

š If I am a Kantian, should I support:

1. Participatory democracy?
2. Representative (market) democracy?
3. Capitalism?
4. Revolutionary Marxism?
5. Confucian ethics?
6. Anarchism?

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 Part 4
Application:
Research ethics

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Using human beings in
experiments

š Stanley Milgram’s experiment

š Philip Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Study
š Main question:
š When will be wrong to use a person in academic research?

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The doctrine of informed
consent

š The Nuremberg code:

The voluntary consent of the human subject is
absolutely essential. This means that the person
involved should have the legal capacity to give
consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise
free power of choice, without the intervention of any
element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching,
or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and
should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension
of the subject matter involved as to enable him to
make an understanding and enlightened decision.

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Autonomy: A Kantian
interpretation

š By saying that we respect persons as autonomous

agents, we imply that they are having equal
statuses with us, that we cannot treat them as a
means only.
š Using somebody implies an imbalanced power
structure, meaning that the users are
š in a higher rank;
š have more power;
š have ends in the action plan that the inferior party
cannot share.

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 Autonomy thus requires that if I am to
be treated as a means, I must also be
able to recognize the experimenter’s
end as my end. If I can recognize the
promoting of collective interests as an
end that I share without contradiction, I
can say being deceived is my choice.
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MILGRAM’S SHOCK THEORY

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The Stanford Prison: A case study

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Final questions

š Which experiment is more unethical according to Kantian

ethics?
š Is the respect to autonomy something absolute? Is a lesser
degree of autonomy totally unacceptable?
š How can we respect people when they are not fully rational?

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References

š Driver, Julia, Ethics: the Fundamentals, Blackwell Publishing,

ch.5
š Mackinnon, Barbara (2007), Ethics: Theory and Contemporary
Issues, Thomson Wadsworth, ch.5.
š Rachels, James (1995), The Elements of Moral Philosophy,
McGraw-Hill, ch.9 & 10.

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