REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

August 15, 1974 Ponente: Justice Zaldivar

I. Issue:
● When did the “taking” under the power of eminent domain occur?
● What is the fair and just value of the land to be expropriated?

II. Facts:
● This case involves three (3) parcels of land all of which is registered in the
register of deeds in Pampanga when the Republic filed a complaint for eminent
domain on June 26 1959:

a. TCT No. 13631 Containing an area of 759,299 square meters registered

in the name of Alfonso Castellvi

b. TCT No. 8708 Containing an area of 450,273 square meters registered in

the name of Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun

c. TCT No. 8708 Containing an area of 88,772 square meters registered in

the name of Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun

● In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market
value of the above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for
the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total
market value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of the
lands be fixed at P259,669.10

● The trial court (CFI of Pampanga) issued an order fixing the provisional value of
the lands at P259,669.10.

● Castellvi alleged, among other things, that the land under her administration,
being a residential land, had a fair market value of P15.00 per square meter, so
it had a total market value of P11,389,485.00 particularly the Philippine Air
Force, had been, despite repeated demands, illegally occupying her
property since July 1, 1956, thereby preventing her from using and
disposing of it, thus causing her damages by way of unrealized profits. This
defendant prayed that the complaint be dismissed, or that the Republic be
ordered to pay her P15.00 per square meter, or a total of P11,389,485.00, plus
interest thereon at 6% per annum from July 1, 1956;

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● Toledo-Gozun alleged, among other things, that her two parcels of land were
residential lands, in fact a portion with an area of 343,303 square meters had
already been subdivided into different lots for sale to the general public P15.00
per square meter, so they had a total market value of P8,085,675.00;

● The trial Court appointed three commissioners:

a. Atty. Amadeo Yuzon, Clerk of Court, as commissioner for the court
b. Atty. Felicisimo G. Pamandanan, counsel of the Philippine National Bank
Branch at Floridablanca, for the plaintiff
c. Atty. Leonardo F. Lansangan, Filipino legal counsel at Clark Air Base, for the
defendants

● Commissioners submitted their report and recommendation, wherein, after

having determined that the lands sought to be expropriated were residential
lands, they recommended unanimously that the lowest price that should be paid
was P10.00 per square meter, for both the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun

● The Commissioners also recommended that an additional P5,000.00 be paid to

Toledo-Gozun for improvements found on her land; that legal interest on the
compensation, computed from August 10, 1959, be paid after deducting the
amounts already paid to the owners, and that no consequential damages be
awarded.

● All parties objected to the findings of the assessment regarding the lands in
question. The Republic, which insisted that the price to be paid for the lands
should be fixed at P0.20 per square meter

● Decision of the Trial Court:

a. The court finds that the unanimous recommendation of the
commissioners of ten (P10.00) pesos per square meter for the three
lots of the defendants subject of this action is fair and just.

b. "The plaintiff (The Republic) will pay 6% interest per annum on the total
value of the lands of defendant Toledo-Gozun

c. Castellvi, interest at 6% per annum will also be paid by the plaintiff to

defendant Castellvi from July 1, 1956 when plaintiff commenced its
illegal possession of the Castellvi land when the instant action had not
yet been commenced to July 10, 1959

● The Republic filed a motion for a new trial and/or reconsideration, upon the
grounds of newly-discovered evidence, that the decision was not supported by
the evidence, and that the decision was against the law, This motion for new trial
and/or reconsideration was denied by the court.

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● The Republic argues that the "taking" should be reckoned from the year 1947
when by virtue of a special lease agreement between the Republic and
appellee Castellvi, the former was granted the "right and privilege" to buy the
property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease, and that in the event of
such sale, it was stipulated that the fair market value should be as of the time of
occupancy

● Appellee Castellvi, on the other hand, maintains that the "taking" of property
under the power of eminent domain requires two essential elements:
a. entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more
than a momentary or limited period,

b. devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property

● The Republic occupied Castellvi's land from July 1, 1947, by virtue of a contract,
on a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to June 30 of the succeeding
year) under the terms and conditions therein stated.

● "'Taking' under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as

entering upon private property for more than a momentary period, and, under the
warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise
informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof."

● Requisites of Taking under the power of eminent domain:

a. The expropriator must enter a private property: This
circumstance is present in the instant case, when by virtue of the
lease agreement the Republic, through the AFP, took possession
of the property of Castellvi.

b. The entrance into private property must be for more than a

momentary period: The aforecited lease contract was for a
period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the
property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory.
The fact that the Republic, through the AFP, constructed some
installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the
entry into the land was transitory

c. Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or

color of legal authority: This circumstance in the "taking" may be

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 considered as present in the instant case, because the Republic
entered the Castellvi property as lessee

d. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise

informally appropriated or injuriously affected: It may be
conceded that the circumstance of the property being devoted to
public use is present because the property was used by the air
force of the AFP.

e. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such

a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property: Castellvi remained as owner, and
was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown
by the renewal of the lease contract from year to year

● Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, 16 the "just compensation" is to

be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint

● As a general thing, we should say that the compensation of the owner is to be

estimated by reference to the use for which the property is suitable, having
regard to the existing business or wants of the community, or such as may be
reasonably expected in the immediate future

● The evidence shows that Castellvi broached the idea of subdividing her land into
residential lots as early as July 11, 1956 in her letter to the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. The location of the Castellvi land justifies its
suitability for a residential subdivision. As found by the trial court.

● The lands of Toledo-Gozun are near the barrio schoolhouse, the barrio chapel,
the Pampanga Sugar Mills, and the poblacion of Floridablanca. Its conversion
into a residential subdivision was tentatively approved by the National Planning
Commission.

● The assessment of the lower court is quite high. It is the SC’s considered view
that the price of P5.00 per square meter would be a fair valuation of the lands in
question and would constitute a just compensation to the owners thereof, in the
year 1959 the land of Castellvi could be sold for from P3.00 to P4.00 per square
meter, while the land of Toledo-Gozun could be sold for from P2.50 to P3.00 per
square meter.
III. Ruling:
● The "taking" of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just
compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when
the complaint for eminent domain was filed.

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 ● The “taking” of the Toledo-Gozun property commenced The taking of those lands,
therefore, must also be reckoned as of June 26, 1959.
● The lands concerned value is fixed at 5.00 Php per sqm

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as

Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
defendants-appellees.

Facts:
Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the
Banilad Estate in Cebu City as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18060. which
superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT3272 (T-3435) issued to her by the
Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the
government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate.
Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot,
with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo
Avenues.

In March 1958, Amigable's counsel wrote to the President of the Philippines, requesting
payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. In
February 1959, Amigable filed in the courta quo a complaint, against the Republic of the
Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways
for the recovery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 square meters of land
traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.

The defendant-appellees denied the allegations of the compliant and argued that: : (1)
that the action was premature; (2) that the right of action for the recovery had already
been prescribed; the action being a suit against the Government cannot prosper due to
the doctrine of non-suability; and that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that
appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff
had no cause of action against the defendants.

On July 1959, the court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of
her lot in question on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its
consent; that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide
plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00, the same being a
money claim against the government; and that the claim for moral damages had long

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prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not
given its consent to be sued.

Complaint was dismissed. Plaintiff appealed to the CA.

Issue:
The issue is whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the
facts of the case.

Held:
The court cited the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu which held that
the aggrieved party may properly bring a lawsuit against the government without
violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent when the
government appropriates property from a private landowner for public use without
following the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale.

Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her
certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion
of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot.

As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of
land in question at any time because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.
However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither
convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road
purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation
which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for
the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.

In addition, plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land
from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government.

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G.R. No. L-119694 May 22, 1995
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., for and in behalf of 139 members,
represented by its President, Amado P. Macasaet and its Executive Director Ermin
F. Garcia, Jr., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FACTS
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is before this Court assailing the
constitutional validity of Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on
Elections ("Comelec"). PPI is a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and
magazine publishers.

Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772.

Sec. 2. Comelec Space. — The Commission shall procure free print space of not less
than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every
province or city for use as "Comelec Space" from March 6, 1995 in the case of
candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence of
said newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be obtained from any magazine or periodical of
said province or city.
Sec. 3. Uses of Comelec Space. — "Comelec Space" shall be allocated by the
Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the
newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make
known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs
of government.
"Comelec Space" shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital
election information.
Sec. 4. Allocation of Comelec Space. — (a) "Comelec Space" shall also be available to
all candidates during the periods stated in Section 2 hereof. Its allocation shall be equal
and impartial among all candidates for the same office. All candidates concerned shall
be furnished a copy of the allocation of "Comelec Space" for their information, guidance
and compliance.

PPI asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the
ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government,
and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of
Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same time
process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary
servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

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Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC may demand PPI to provide free “COMELEC SPACE”
for vital election information.

HELD:
No, to compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space" of the dimensions
specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half page), amounts to
"taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes.
The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under the
rubric of expropriation of private personal property for public use. The threshold
requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to be examined
here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the
taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent
Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print
space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness
or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem.
Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been
granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative
authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and
administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be
assumed.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution,
but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently
the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought
to be avoided by respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is
read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper
publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or
perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution
No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and
magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the
purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does
not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will,
in the kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec
purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain.