AGUILAR

Calleja vs. Executive Secretary GR 252578 07 December 2021

FACTS:
The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020, or Republic Act No.11479, is the subject of 37 different petitions for
certiorari and/or restrictions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in this case.
In this joint petition, the petitioners primarily question the legality of Sections 4 to 12 of the ATA because they
are thought to be overbroad and facially ambiguous, which they claim to limit protected speech. They claimed
that the definition of terrorism and its variations are illegal, rendering the law completely invalid or leaving the
ATA with "nothing to maintain its existence."
Party-list members, current and former members of Congress, members of non-governmental and socio-
civic organizations, Indigenous Peoples' groups, Moros, journalists, taxpayers, registered voters, members
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, students, and academicians are among the parties who have filed
petitions.
The UNSC's list of terrorist organizations is automatically adopted by the Anti-Terrorism Council in resolution
No.10, which is released on September23,2020. The resolution also instructs the relevant agencies to swiftly
impose and carry out the necessary sanctions from the moment the UNSC and its relevant Sanctions
Committee designate a group as a terrorist organization. According to Section36, AMLC was also instructed
to issue an ex parte freeze order to seize the funds and property of the specified organizations, people,
businesses, and other entities listed on the UN Consolidated List.
The CPP-NPA and 16 organizations connected to the Islamic State and other Daesh-affiliated organizations
in the Philippines have been designated as terrorist organizations by a number of resolutions that the ATC
has also issued. Based on information gathered and compiled by the National Intelligence Committee (NICA),
which includes petitioner Casambre, the ATC also designated a number of people as terrorists.
Incidentally, two Aetas were arrested in August 2020. They were the first individuals to be charged for
violating Section 4 of the ATA for allegedly firing at the military which led to the death of one soldier. This
case was subsequently dismissed by the RTC of Olongopa for insufficiency of evidence.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not detention without warrant of arrest under Section 29 of the ATA unconstitutional
for being an executive warrant of arrest?

2. Whether or not the 14-day or 24-day period violate the 3-day limit for detention without judicial
charge under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution?

RULING:
 1. No. Section 29 of the ATA properly construed does not provide for an executive warrant of arrest
nor warrantless arrest on mere suspicion. Under Section 29, a person may be arrested without
a warrant by law enforcement officers or military personnel for acts defined or penalized under
Section 4 to 12 of the ATA but only under any of the instances contemplated in Rule 9.2 ie. arrest
in flagrante delicto, arrest in hot pursuit, and arrest of escapees, which mirrors Section 5 of Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. Hence, when the circumstances for a warrantless arrest under Section
5 of Rule 113 or Rule 9.2 are not present, the government must apply for a warrant of arrest with
the proper court. The participation of the ATC only comes after the valid warrantless arrest is
made; the ATC could issue a written authorization to law enforcement agents only to permit the
extended detention (14-day or 24-day period) of a person arrested after a valid warrantless arrest
is made under Rule 9.2.

2. No. Section 29 of the ATA is an exception to Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code based on
Congress’ own wisdom and policy determination relative to the exigent and peculiar nature of
terrorism and hence, requires as a safeguard, the written authorization of the ATC, an executive
agency comprised of high-ranking national security officials.

Section 29 does not amend Article 125 of the RPC but supplements it by providing an exceptional
rule with specific application only in cases where: 1) there is probable cause to believe that the
crime committed is that which is punished under Section 4 to 12 of the ATA; and 2) written
authorization is secured for that purpose.

Moreover, the three-day period in the last paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
is irrelevant to terrorism because it is applicable only in cases of invasion or rebellion when the
public safety requires it.

AGUILAR
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARCELINO CAGA Y FABRE
2016-08-22 | G.R. No. 206878| DEL CASTILLO, J
Facts:
Caga was charged with the crime of rape for having carnal knowledge of "AAA" with her and her
boyfriend.
"AAA '' and her boyfriend, Randy Bomita, went to Caga's residence at No. 2027 Kahilum II,
Pandacan, Manila for a drinking spree. After consuming about four bottles of Red Horse Grande, "AAA'' and
Randy decided to spend the night at Caga's house since they were both very intoxicated. In fact, "AAA''
vomited a couple of times due to her alcohol intake.
Caga was already asleep on a foam cushion on the floor when "AAA" and Randy slept beside him.
While still intoxicated and asleep, "AAA" felt someone kiss her vagina. At first, she thought it was her boyfriend
Randy who did it. She tried to push him away as she had menstruation at that time, but failed to stop him as
this person proceeded to kiss her on the lips and then went on to take undue liberties with her person. Indeed,
in no time at all Caga succeeded in mounting her and in penetrating her private parts with his penis. All the
while, "AAA" thought that it was her boyfriend Randy who was having coitus with her.
When she ("AAA") slowly opened her eyes, a tiny glimmer of light coming from the window revealed
that it was Caga who had copulated with her while she was in a drunken stupor. "AAA" then became
hysterical. She started hitting and slapping Caga and accused him of violating her. She also kicked Randy
who was still asleep on the floor. She yelled at Randy exclaiming, "Bakit mo ako pinabayaan?"
"AAA" immediately reported the incident at the Barangay Hall and the Police Station in Pandacan,
Manila; and thereafter submitted herself to a medical examination at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH).
RTC of Manila, Branch 263 rendered judgment finding Caga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the,
crime of rape.
Appellant appealed to the CA contending that the RTC gravely erred in finding him guilty based only
on the incredible, implausible and uncorroborated testimony of "AAA." The CA however, rejected this posture.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable Doubt of the crime of Rape. (YES)
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the RTC and the CA correctly found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
Under Article 266-Aof the RPC, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
1.By using force, threat, or intimidation;
2.When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
3.By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
4. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
The Court concludes that Caga did engage in sexual activity while falling asleep despite being under the
influence of alcohol. It is entirely immaterial that the prosecution's evidence did not establish the presence of
physical force, threat, or intimidation because, as the evidence at bar shows, Caga raped an unconscious
and extremely intoxicated woman-a fact that was duly alleged in the Information and duly established by the
prosecution's evidence during the trial. The case thus falls under the second paragraph of rape: "when the
offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious." It is entirely immaterial that the
prosecution's evidence did not establish the presence of physical force, threat, or intimidation because, as
the evidence at bar shows, Caga raped an unconscious and extremely intoxicated woman-a fact that was
duly alleged in the Information and duly established by the prosecution's evidence during the trial.
In the case at bench, physical force, threat or intimidation is not necessary, for the simple reason that an
unconscious and extremely intoxicated woman cannot freely and voluntarily give her consent to engaging in
sexual intercourse.
As the court has repeatedly ruled, "[i]n rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of
the victim, provided the testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things." The victim appeared to be straightforward, positive, and convincing in her testimony
during her testimony.
The Court was genuinely convinced and satisfied by the victim's personal demeanor that the accused did in
fact commit the alleged offense. If the victim's purpose was anything other than bringing the perpetrator of
her sexual abuse to justice, she would not have consented to go through the pain of a public trial and subject
herself to ridicule and embarrassment.
The appellant Marcelino Caga y Fabre is hereby directed to pay "AAA" civil indemnity, exemplary damages,
both in the amount of 75,000.00, as well as the upgraded sum of 75,000.00 in moral damages, subject to the
MODIFICATIONS that are made. Since the decision is final, interest on all damages awarded will accumulate
at a rate of 6% annually until they are all paid.

ARCIAGA
 BENITO ASTORGA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 154130 October 1, 2003

FACTS:
Benito Astorga is the mayor of Daram, Western Samar. A group of people from Regional Special
Operations Group which includes Elpidio Simon, Moises dela Cruz, Wenefredo Maniscan, Renato Militante
and Crisanto Pelias from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources were sent to conduct an
investigation together with SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian of the Philippine National
Police as their escort, regarding possible illegal logging activities. On September 1, 1997, at around 4:30 to
5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, the team found two boats measuring 18 meters in length and 5 meters in
breadth. They found out that those boats belong to Mayor Astorga, when Mayor Astorga found out about this,
he went to the place and had a heated altercation with the team that lead to Mayor Astorga calling for back
ups, when he saw that they were outnumbered by the DENR team, ten armed men arrived.

Mayor Astorga asked the DENR team to come with him to his house to have dinner, After dinner,
Militante, Maniscan and SPO1 Capoquian were allowed to go down from the house but not to leave the
barangay. On the other hand, SPO3 Cinco and the rest just sat in the house until 2:00 AM when the team
was finally allowed to leave.

Mayor Astorga was charged with Arbitrary Detention for illegally detaining the DENR team, where
he was found Guilty by the trial Court.

ISSUE: Whether Benito Astorga was guilty of Arbitrary Detention.

RULING:
Yes, Mayor Astorga is guilty of Arbitrary Detention. Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public
officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a person. The elements of the crime are: (1) That
the offender is a public officer or official; (2) That he detains a person; (3) that the detention is without legal
grounds.

In this case, that the offender is a public officer is undeniably present. Also, the records are bereft of
any allegation on the part of petitioner that his acts were spurred by some legal purpose. On the contrary, he
admitted that his acts were motivated by his “instinct for self-preservation” and the feeling that he was being
“singled out.” The detention was thus without legal grounds.

What remains now is the determination of whether or not the team was actually detained. The
prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the curtailment of the victim’s liberty need
not involve any physical restraint upon the victim’s person. If the acts and accusations of the accused can
produce such fear in the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the victim is
compelled to limit his own actions and movements in accordance with the wishes of the accused, then the
victim is, for all intents and purposes, detained against his will.

In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. In spite of their pleas, the witnesses
and the complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go home. This refusal was quickly followed by the call
for and arrival of almost a dozen “reinforcements,” all armed with military-issue rifles, who proceeded to
encircle the team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the witnesses. It was not just the presence of
the armed men, but also the evident effect these gunmen had on the actions of the team which proves that
fear was indeed instilled in the minds of the team members, to the extent that they felt compelled to stay in
Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The intent to prevent the departure of the complainants and witnesses against their will
is thus clear.

ARCIAGA
 PEOPLE vs. JUMAWAN
G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children. On
February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant,
raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December
12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.
As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems
between her and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and
she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm.However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed.
He would immediately remove her panties and,sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged
method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would
threaten her into submission.
One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but
she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her
reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: “Why are you lying on the cot?”, and to instantaneously order:
“You transfer here to our bed.”
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her
forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted
the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she
fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed. The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before
long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by
warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding
on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing
to bend her legs. The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his
own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her.
As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do that
to me because I’m not feeling well.” Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely
fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because he took over the control and management of their
businesses, and to cover up her extra-marital affairs.

ISSUE: Whether there can be a marital rape in this case.

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their wives’ bodies.
Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.

The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the
elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause.The
Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. The
various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic
notions about the consent and property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even
the slightest scrutiny.
The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional. Said
exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution for the rape of his
wife. The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he
will be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her. Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes
the crime without regard to the rapist’s legal relationship with his victim.

The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which was raised by the accused. The
accused argued that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless the
contrary is proved.

According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage.
A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her,
and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes
the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.

Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of RAPE

BANGASAN
 JASPER AGBAY v. THE HONORABLE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY, et al.
[G.R. No. 134503. July 2, 1999.]

FACTS

• On September 7, 1997, Petitioner, together with a certain Sherwin Jugalbot was arrested and detained at
the Liloan Police Station, Metro Cebu for an alleged violation of R.A. 7610, the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."

• The following day, or on September 8, 1997, a Complaint for violation of R.A. 7610 was filed by Joan
Gicaraya for and in behalf of her daughter Gayle against petitioner and Jugalbot in the 7 th Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu City.

• It was stated in the complaint that the accused JUGALBOT, did then and there, willfully, feloniously and
unlawfully, conspiring, confederating, helping accused AGBAY in manipulating to finger the vagina of GAYLE
FATIMA AMIGABLE GICAYARA while on board a tricycle going to their destinations.

• Upon initial investigation of the Bgy, Captain of Bgy. Catarman, Accused SHERWIN JUGALBOT was
released and accused JASPER AGBAY is presently detained in Liloan Police Station Jail.

• On September 17, 1997, the petitioner was ordered released by the said court after he had posted bond.

• On September 26, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for delay in the delivery of detained persons against
the private respondents SPO4 Nemesio Natividad, Jr., SPO2 Eleazar M. Salomon and other unidentified
police officers stationed at the Liloan Police Substation in the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas.

• The petitioner alleged that on November 10, 1997, the 7th MCTC of Liloan, Metro Cebu issued a resolution
containing the probable cause for the crime in Violation of Republic Act 7610 and recommended that an
INFORMATION be filed against Jugalbot and Agbay.

• On October 10 1995, by virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1995, of the Office of the
Ombudsman, the case for delay in delivery filed by petitioner against herein private respondents was
transferred to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military for its proper disposition

ISSUE

Whether or not the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court constitutes delivery to a "proper
judicial authority”.

RULING:
YES, the filing of the complaint with the MTC constitutes delivery to a proper judicial authority because the
complaint was filed with a judge who had the power to issue such an order. Under the RPC, "Judicial
Authority" refers to "the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the
temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed a public offense as may be
established by law. Therefore, the very purpose of Article 125 of the RPC has been duly served with the filing
of the complaint with the MCTC.

BANGASAN
 EDMISAEL C. LUTAP vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 204061 (February 5, 2018)
FACTS
• At the time of the incident or on April 27 2004 where AAA was only six (6) years old, the petitioner,
who was also known as "Egay", frequently visits the house of AAA’s family, being the best friend of
AAA's father.
• Around 6:30 o'clock in the evening of April 27, 2004, AAA and her younger siblings, BBB and CCC,
were watching television in their sala, together with the petitioner. Meanwhile, their mother DDD was
cooking dinner in the kitchen separated only by a concrete wall from the sala.
• AAA was then wearing short pants and was sitting on the floor with her legs spread apart while
watching television and playing with "text cards” while BBB, on the other hand, was seated on a chair
beside CCC, which is five steps away from AAA.
• The petitioner was seated on the sofa which was one foot away from AAA when he touched AAA's
vagina but AAA reacted by swaying off his hand.
• BBB saw petitioner using his middle finger in touching AAA's vagina and then went to where DDD
was cooking and told her that petitioner is bad because he is tickling AAA's vagina.
• AAA brought the victim inside the room and asked her if it were true that petitioner tickled her vagina
and answered that she was able to sway his hand.
• DDD again asked AAA how many times have petitioner tickled her vagina and AAA answered,
"many times in the petitioner's house" and that he also "let her go on the bed, remove her panty,
open her legs and lick her vagina.
• DDD confronted petitioner and asked why he did that to AAA and the petitioner said that it was
because AAA's panty was wet and that he was sorry.
• On April 28, 2004, DDD brought AAA to Camp Crame for medical examination but since the doctor
was not available, AAA was examined only on April 30, 2004.
• In defense, the petitioner denied the accusations against him and testified that he merely pacified
AAA and BBB who were quarreling over the text cards. In addition, the testimony of Melba Garcia, a
Purok Leader, was also presented to the effect that she personally knows petitioner and that the
latter enjoys a good reputation.
• The RTC found petitioner guilty as charged and gave full credit to AAA's and BBB's candid
testimonies that petitioner inserted his finger in the vagina of AAA.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of attempted rape.
RULING
NO, because based on the victim’s testimony, he only touched her private part and licked it, but did not insert
his finger in her vagina. Under the law, the mere touching of a female's sexual organ, by itself, does not
amount to rape nor does it suffice to convict for rape at its attempted stage. Since there was neither an
insertion nor an attempt to insert petitioner's finger into AAA's genitalia, the petitioner can only be held guilty
of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness. Therefore, the court finds the petitioner GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Section 5 of R.A. 7610 and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its minimum period as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months
and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal in ·its medium period as maximum. He is also ORDERED to PAY
private complainant moral damages, exemplary damages and fine in the amount of PhP15,000.00 each and
civil indemnity in the amount of PhP20,000.00.

DELA CRUZ, DANIEL

 G.R. No. 179080 November 26, 2014
EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE and GENEROSO MARFIL alias "TAPOL", Petitioners, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts
This is an appeal from the Decision dated November 18, 2005 and Resolution dated June 19, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in G.R. CR No. 26418, which set aside the November 15, 2001 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Kidapawan City, Cotabato.

Petitioners Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde and Generoso Marfil alias "Tapol" were charged with the crime
of Violation of Domicile under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The Information dated May 3,
1990 reads:

The undersigned accuses EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE AND GENEROSO MARFIL Alias
"TAPOL" of the crime of Violation of Domicile, committed as follows:

That at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of May 14, 1989, at Sitio New Lantawan, Barangay Greenhills,
Municipality of President Roxas, Province of Cotabato, Philippines, the above-named accused EDIGARDO
GEROCHE, being a Barangay Captain and the rest being CAFGUs, hence, persons inauthority, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with garand rifles, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, without proper judicial order, entered the house of ROBERTO MALLO by forcibly
breaking the door of said house against the will of the occupants thereof, search the effects of the house
without the previous consent of the owner and then mauled one of the occupant BARILIANO LIMBAG
inflicting injuries to the latter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The petitioners mauled him, striking with a garand rifle, which caused his injuries. They looked for firearms
but instead found and took away his airgun. Roberto Limbag, Baleriano’s nephew who was living with him,
witnessed the whole incident and corroborated his testimony.

On November 15, 2001, the trial court found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Less
Serious Physical Injuries under the Article 265 of the RPC. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of arresto mayor maximum, that is, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. According
to the RTC, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioners are public officers, which is an essential element
of Article 128 of the RPC

The prosecution who has that onus probandi failed to prove one of the essential elements of the crime; on
the issue of whether or not all the accused were public officers; while it is true that accused were named
CVO’s and the other as a barangay captain and that even if the same were admitted by them during their
testimony in open court, such an admission is not enough to prove that they were public officers; it is for the
prosecution to prove by clear and convincing evidence other than that of the testimony of witnesses that they
were in fact public officers; there exist a doubt of whether or not all the accused were in fact and in truth
public officers; doubts should be ruled in favor of the accused; that on this lone and essential element the
crime charged as violation of domicile is ruled out; that degree of moral certainty of the crime charged was
not established and proved by convincing evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt; The CA reversed the
decision and convicted the accused for Violation of Domicile.

CA ruled that they are guilty of Violation of Domicile considering their judicial admissions that they were
barangay captain (in the case of Geroche) and part of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (in the
case of Garde and Marfil).

Hence the petition to SC. They argue that there is double jeopardy since the trial court already acquitted
them of Violation of Domicile and such judgment, being now final and executory, is res judicata. Petitioners
insist that their appeal before the CA is limited to their conviction for the crime of Less Serious Physical
Injuries, focusing their arguments and defense for acquittal from said crime, and that the CA violated their
constitutional right to due process when it convicted them for Violation of Domicile.

Issue
Whether or not, accused can avail the constitutional rights to double jeopardy?

Held
NO. When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he or she waives the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court,
which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate. An appeal confers upon the
appellate court jurisdiction to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase (or reduce)
the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. The appellate court may, and generally does, look
into the entire records to ensure that no fact of weight or substance has been overlooked, misapprehended,
or misapplied by the trial court.

Thus, when petitioners appealed the trial court’s judgment of conviction for Less Serious Physical Injuries,
they are deemed to have abandoned their right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it becomes
the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the assailed judgment. Petitioners could
not have been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC by finding them guilty of
Violation of Domicile as charged in the Information instead of Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The Court adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the CA. In their testimony before the open
court as well as in the pleadings they filed, neither Geroche denied that he was a barangay captain nor Garde
and Marfil refuted that they were CAFGU members. In holding such positions, they are considered as public
officers/employees
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision dated November 18, 2005 and Resolution dated June 19,
2007 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 26418 finding petitioners Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde
and Generoso Marfil alias "Tapol" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Domicile, penalized under
Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be imposed is
an indeterminate sentence from two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as maximum.

DELA CRUZ, DANIEL

 G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. SALVADOR TULAGAN, ACCUSED-

APPELLANT
Facts:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 17, 2015 in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 06679, which affirmed the Joint Decision dated February 10, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Criminal Case Nos. SCC-6210 and SCC-6211, finding accused-appellant Salvador Tulagan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of sexual assault and statutory rape as defined and penalized under Article
266-A, paragraphs 2 and 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), respectively, in relation to Article 266-B.
In Criminal Case No. SCC-6210, Tulagan was charged as follows: That sometime in the month of September
2011, the above-named accused, by means of force, intimidation and with abuse of superior strength forcibly
laid complainant AAA, a 9-year-old minor in a cemented pavement, and did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously inserted his finger into the vagina of the said AAA, against her will and consent. Contrary to
Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7610.
In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211, Tulagan was charged as follows: That on or about October 8, 201, the
above-named accused, by means of force, intimidation and with abuse of superior strength, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with complainant AAA, a 9-year-old minor
against her will and consent to the damage and prejudice of said AAA, against her will and consent. Contrary
to Article 266-A, par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7610.
For the defense, Tulagan claimed that he did not know AAA well, but admitted that he lived barely five (5)
meters away from AAA's grandmother's house where she lived. He added that the whole month of September
2011, from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., he was gathering dried banana leaves to sell then take a rest after 1:00
p.m. at their terrace, while his mother cut the banana leaves, he gathered at the back of their kitchen.
He said that he never went to AAA's house and that he had not seen AAA during the entire month of
September 2011. Tulagan, likewise, claimed that before the alleged incidents occurred, his mother had a
misunderstanding with AAA's grandmother, who later on started spreading rumors that he raped her
granddaughter.
After trial, the RTC found that the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof in two offenses of
rape against AAA. It held that all the elements of sexual assault and statutory rape was duly established. The
trial court relied on the credible and positive declaration of the victim as against the alibi and denial of Tulagan.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt [of] the
crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d), in relation to R.A. 7610 in Criminal
Case No. SCC-6211 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
the victim in the amount of fifty thousand (Php50,000.00) pesos; moral damages in the amount of fifty
thousand (Php 50,000.00) pesos, and to pay the cost of the suit.
Likewise, this Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for
the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 and he is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years of
prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the victim in the amount of thirty thousand (Php30,000.00)
pesos; and moral damages in the amount of twenty thousand (Php20,000.00) pesos, and to pay the cost of
suit. SO, ORDERED.
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed with modification Tulagan's conviction of sexual assault and statutory rape.
As for Tulagan's imputation of ill motive on the part of AAA's grandmother, absent any concrete supporting
evidence, said allegation will not convince us that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the victim
and her supporting witness was tainted with arbitrariness or blindness to a fact of consequence.
We reiterate the principle that no young girl, such as AAA, would concoct a sordid tale, on her own or through
the influence of her grandmother as per Tulagan's intimation, undergo an invasive medical examination then
subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive was other than a fervent desire
to seek justice.
We also reject Tulagan's defense of denial. Being a negative defense, the defense of denial, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, as in the instant case, deserves no weight in law and cannot
be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses, like AAA, who testified on
affirmative matters.
Since AAA testified in a categorical and consistent manner without any ill motive, her positive identification
of Tulagan as the sexual offender must prevail over his defenses of denial and alibi.
Here, the courts a quo did not give credence to Tulagan's alibi considering that his house was only 50 meters
away from AAA's house, thus, he failed to establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus
criminis when the rape incidents took place. "Physical impossibility" refers to distance and the facility of
access between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed.
There must be a demonstration that they were so far away and could not have been physically present at the
crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. In this regard, Tulagan failed to prove
that there was physical impossibility for him to be at the crime scene when the rape was committed. Thus,
his alibi must fail.
For the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, We take this opportunity to reconcile the provisions on Acts of
Lasciviousness, Rape and Sexual Assault under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8353 vis-a-vis Sexual Intercourse and Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610, to fortify the earlier decisions of the Court and doctrines laid down on similar issues, and to clarify the
nomenclature and the imposable penalties of said crimes, and damages in line with existing jurisprudence.
Prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 or The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 on October 22, 1997, acts constituting
sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, were punished as acts of lasciviousness under
Article No. 336 of the RPC or Act No. 3815 which took effect on December 8, 1930.

Issues:
Whether or not, RA 7610 is only applicable to children used as prostitutes as the main offense and the other
sexual abuses as additional offenses.
Ruling:
The instant appeal has no merit. However, a modification of the nomenclature of the crime, the penalty
imposed, and the damages awarded in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for sexual assault, and a reduction of
the damages awarded in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for statutory rape, are in order.
Clearly, the objective of the law, more so the Constitution, is to provide a special type of protection for children
from all types of abuse. Hence, it can be rightly inferred that the title used in Article III, Section 5, "Child
Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse" does not mean that it is only applicable to children used as prostitutes
as the main offense and the other sexual abuses as additional offenses, the absence of the former rendering
inapplicable the imposition of the penalty provided under R.A. No. 7610 on the other sexual abuses
committed by the offenders on the children concerned.
Justice Caguioa asserts that Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 is clear - it only punishes those who
commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other sexual abuse. There is no ambiguity to speak of that which requires statutory construction to
ascertain the legislature's intent in enacting the law.
In light of the foregoing disquisition, we hold that Tulagan was aptly prosecuted for sexual assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in Criminal Case. No. SCC-6210 because it was alleged and proven
that AAA was nine (9) years old at the time he inserted his finger into her vagina. Instead of applying the
penalty under Article 266-B of the RPC, which is prision mayor, the proper penalty should be that provided
in Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period. This is because
AAA was below twelve (12) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, and that the act of
inserting his finger in AAA's private part undeniably amounted to "lascivious conduct."[129] Hence, the proper
nomenclature of the offense should be Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, in
relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be that which
could be properly imposed under the law, which is fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of
reclusion temporal. On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower
in degree, which is reclusion temporal in its minimum period, or twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months. Hence, Tulagan should be meted the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12)
years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six
(6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for
statutory rape, we affirm that Tulagan should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance with
paragraph 1(d), Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal is DENIED. The Joint Decision dated February 10,
2014 of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. SCC-6210 and SCC-6211, as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals Decision dated August 17, 2015 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06679, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. We find accused-appellant Salvador Tulagan:
1. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210, and is sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months... and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. Appellant is ORDERED to PAY AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00
as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
2. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Statutory Rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) and penalized in Article 266-
B of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with modification as to the award of damages.
Appellant is ORDERED to PAY AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. Legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed
on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

DELA CRUZ, DOLORES

Feliciano Galvante,
petitioner,
vs.
Hon. Orlando C. Casimiro, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices, Bienvenido C. Blancaflor, Director,
 Dennis L. Garcia, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer,
SPO4 Ramil Avenido, PO1 Eddie Degran, PO1
Valentino Rufano, and PO1 Federico Balolot,
respondents.

G.R. No. 162808, 552 SCRA 304, April 22, 2008

Facts:

Private respondents confiscated from petitioner one colt pistol super .38 automatic with serial no. 67973, one
short magazine, and nine super .38 live ammunitions. The confiscated materials were covered by an
expired Memorandum Receipt dated September 2, 1999.
Consequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed against petitioner an Information for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Relation to Commission on Elections (Comelec) Resolution No.
3258 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
Pending resolution of Criminal Case, petitioner filed against private respondents an administrative case for
Grave Misconduct, before the Internal Affairs Service (IAS), Region XIII, and a criminal case, for Arbitrary
Detention, Illegal Search and Grave Threats, before the Ombudsman.
Petitioner alleged that upon arrival at the house of retired police Percival Plaza, together with Lorenzo
Sanoria, Delfin Ramirez and Pedro Ramas, He immediately went down of the jeep but before he could call
Mr. Plaza, four policemen in uniform blocked his way.

That the four policemen were [private respondents] PO1 Romil Avenido PNP, PO1 Valentino Rufano, PNP
both member of 142nd Company, Regional Mobile Group and PO1 Eddie Degran PNP and PO1 Federico
Balolot PNP members of 1403 Prov'l Mobile Group, all of Bunawan Brook, Bunawan, Agusan del Sur; who
all pointed their long firearms ready to fire. He raised his arms and heard
[private respondent] PO1 Avenido saying, "ANG IMONG PUSIL, IHATAG" which means "Give me your
firearm," to which I answered, "WALA MAN KO'Y PUSIL" translated as "I have no firearm," showing his
waistline when he raised his T-shirt. His other companions on the jeep also went down and raised their arms
and showed their waistline when the same policemen and a person in
civilian attire holding an armalite also pointed their firearms to them to which Mr. Percival Plaza who came
down from his house told them not to harass me as I am also a former police officer but they did not heed
Mr. Plaza's statements.

While we were raising our arms [private respondent] SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr. went near my owner type
jeep and conducted a search. To which I asked them if they have any search warrant. That after a while they
saw the super .38 pistol under the floor mat of the petitioner’s
jeep and asked for the MR of the firearm but due to fear that their long arms were still pointed to them, He
searched his wallet and gave the asked document. He further alleged that he was detained by Police Chief
Rocacorba for two days having been released only after posing a bail.
Consequently, petitioner filed an Affidavit of Desistance with both the IAS and Ombudsman
absolving private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot, but maintaining the private
respondent Conde alone be prosecuted in both administrative and criminal cases. The IAS then issued a
Decision finding all private respondents guilty of grave
misconduct even if they were merely being enthusiastic in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty.
The RTC dismissed the case against the petitioner. On the other hand, the Ombudsman dismissed the
charges against private respondents for lack of probable cause.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman properly dismissed the criminal complaints filed against the private
respondents.

Ruling:
Yes. Public respondents' dismissal of the criminal complaint for illegal search which petitioner filed with the
Ombudsman against private respondents was proper, although the reasons public respondents cited for
dismissing the complaint are rather off the mark because
they relied solely on the finding that the warrantless search conducted by private respondents was valid and
that the Affidavit of Desistance which petitioner executed cast doubt on the veracity of his complaint. Public
respondents completely overlooked the fact that the criminal complaint was not cognizable by the
Ombudsman as illegal search is not a criminal offense. Nevertheless, the result achieved is the same: the
dismissal of a groundless criminal complaint for illegal search which is not an offense under the RPC. Thus,
the Court need not resolve the issue of whether or not public respondents erred in their finding on the validity
of the search for that issue is completely hypothetical under the circumstance.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

DELA CRUZ, DOLORES

G.R. No. L-65952 July 31, 1984

Lauro G. Soriano, Jr., petitioner,

vs.
 The Honorable Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines, respondents

Facts:
Thomas N. Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged with the City Fiscal of Quezon City. The
case was assigned for investigation to petitioner Lauro Soriano who was then an Assistant City Fiscal. In the
course of the investigation, the petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for dismissing the case.
Tan reported the demand to the National Bureau of Investigation which set up an entrapment. Because Tan
was hard put to raise the required amount only P2,000.00 in bills were marked by the NBI which had to supply
one-half thereof. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 7393 charging Soriano of violation of Section 3, par. (b) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as
“Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”.
The Sandiganbayan found him guilty of the crime charged. It likewise denied the motion for reconsideration,
hence, this petition.

Issues:
1) Whether or not the preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint conducted by a Fiscal is a
"contract or transaction" so as to bring it within the ambit of Section 3 (b)... of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
2) Whether or not convincing him of bribery under the Revised Penal Code would violate his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.

Ruling:
1)No. Sec. 3 par. (b) of R.A. 3019 provides that:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for
himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene
under the law.
The petitioner contended that assuming for the sake of argument, petitioner's guilt, the facts make out a case
of Direct Bribery defined and penalized under the provision of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and not
a violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The evidence for the prosecution
clearly and undoubtedly support, if at all the offense of Direct Bribery, which is not the offense charged and
is not likewise included in or is necessarily included in the offense charged, which is for violation of Section
3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The prosecution showed that: the accused is a public
officer; in consideration of P4,000.00 which was allegedly solicited, P2,000.00 of which was allegedly
received, the petitioner undertook or promised to dismiss a criminal complaint pending preliminary
investigation before him, which may or may not constitute a crime; that the act of dismissing the criminal
complaint pending before petitioner was related to the exercise of the function of his office. Therefore, it is
with pristine clarity that the offense proved, if at all is Direct Bribery.
This was contrary to the contention of the Sandiganbayan that the above-quoted provision would show that
the term 'transaction' as used thereof is not limited in its scope or meaning to a commercial or business
transaction but includes all kinds of transaction, whether commercial, civil or administrative in nature, pending
with the government. The Supreme Court held that it was obvious that the investigation conducted by the
petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it a transaction because this term must be construed as analogous
to the term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some... consideration as
in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the
petitioner. Thus, the Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting
him of violating Sec. 3 par. (b) of R.A. No. 3019.
2)No. The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code
because to do so would be violative of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. The Supreme Court disagreed. A reading of the information which has... been
reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the
right to be informed.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Sandiganbayan is modified in that the petitioner
is deemed guilty of bribery as defined and penalized by Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years
of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay a fine of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos. The rest of the
judgment is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.

DOMINGO
Carlos Celdran y Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 220127 March 21, 2018
FACTS:
In celebration of the second anniversary of the May They Be One Campaign (MTBC) and the launching of
the Hand Written Bible which coincided with the feast of Saint Jerome, a throng of people composed mainly
of catholic dignitaries intermixed with those different religions such as members of the military, police, media,
non-catholics, students, representatives of various religious organizations gathered around the Manila
Cathedral in the afternoon of September 30, 2010.
While Brother Edgar J. Tria was a reading a passage from the Bible around 3:00PM, petitioner entered the
Manila Cathedral clad in a black suit and a hat. Petitioner went to the center of the aisle, in front of the altar
and suddenly brought out a placard emblazoned with the word “DAMASO.” Commotion ensued when
petitioner started shouting while inside the church saying “Bishops, stop involving yourself in politics,”
disrupting and showing disrespect to an otherwise solemn celebration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner is guilty of the crime of Offending Religious Feelings under Art. 133 of the RPC
HELD:
Yes. The Higher Court ruled that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
only questions of law may be raised. Any resolution as to questions of fact will not be entertained by the
Court. The findings of fact made by the trial courts are accorded the highest degree of respect especially
when the MeTC, the RTC and the CA have similar findings. Absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness
or capriciousness committed by the lower court[s], its findings of facts, especially when affirmed by the CA,
are binding and conclusive upon this Court.
The question of whether petitioner offended the religious feelings of those who were present during the
celebration of the MTBC is a question of fact which will not be entertained in the present petition.

DOMINGO
People V. Manolito Oyanib
G.R. No. 130634-35, March 12, 2001

FACTS:
• Joint trial of two cases filed against Oyanib: (1) Crim Case No. 6012, for the killing of Jesus
Esquierdo; (2) Crim Case No. 6018, for the killing of Tita Oyanib, wife of accused.
 • Manolito and Tita were married in 1979; 2 children; living in Iligan City.
• They separated de facto in 1994 due to marital differences, with Manolito keeping custody of their
children; Tita lived nearby, renting a room at the second floor of Edgardo Lladas’ house.
• Manolito exerted efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of their children, but to no avail. Tita
was very reluctant to reconcile but instead, she was open about her relationship with other mean
and would flaunt it in front of Manolito.
• One instance, Manolito chanced upon Tita and Jesus in a very intimate situation by a hanging
bridge. He confronted them and reminded Tita that she was still his wife. They ignored him and
threatened to kill him.
• On September 4, 1995, Manolito went to the house where Tita was staying to inform the latter of
the meeting at the school re: the failing grades of their child. Upon reaching the house, he heard
kissing sounds. He opened the door using a hunting knife and caught Tita and Jesus having sexual
intercourse, Jesus on top of Tita, with his pants on his knees.
• Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek but the latter immediately stabbed the former.
• Lladas, upon hearing a commotion on the second floor of his house, went to check and found
Manolito stabbing Jesus while sitting on the latter’s stomach. Tita was sprawled on the floor with
her duster smeared with blood; she died on the way to the hospital.
• Jesus and Tita died of multiple stab wounds.
• Accused surrendered and admitted killing his wife and her paramour but invoked the exceptional
circumstances under Article 247, RPC.
• RTC: convicted him of Homicide and Parricide; with 2 mitigating circumstances:
passion/obfuscation and voluntary surrender.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused is entitled to the exceptional privilege under Article 247.

RULING:
Yes. Accused invoked Art. 247 of the RPC as an absolutory and an exempting cause. An
absolutory cause is present where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and
sentiment there is no penalty imposed.
Art. 247 prescribes the following essential elements for such a defense, which must be proved by
the accused by clear and convincing evidence:
1. That a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with
another person;
2. That he kills any of them or both in the act or immediately thereafter; and
3. That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he/she has
not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.

The death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after
chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply, the killing by the husband of his wife must concur
with her flagrant adultery.
GONZALES
G.R. No. 193960 January 7, 2013
KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, Petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDING
JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS-QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR,
ANGELES CITY
(PAMPANGA); AND ABC,1 Respondents.
FACTS:
Karlo Angelo Dabalos was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of Angeles
City.That on or about the 13th day of July, 2009 KARLO willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use personal
violence on the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainant’s back, shoulder and left eye, in
violation of Section 5(a) of the Republic Act 9262. In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her
relationship with petitioner had ended prior to the subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she
sought payment of the money she had lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from
petitioner if he was responsible for spreading rumors about her which he admitted. Thereupon, private
respondent slapped petitioner causing the latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information.
The RTC denied petitioner’s motion. It did not consider material the fact that the parties’ dating relationship
had ceased prior to the incident
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will favor the accused?
RULING:
The court ruled that for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a
consequence of such relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship
had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such
relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed.
While the degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 2668 of the Revised Penal Code are the same,
there is sufficient justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent is
to purposely impose a more severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm women
with whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the end in view of
promoting the protection of women and children.
the petition is DISMISSED.

GONZALES
G.R. No. L-8583. July 31, 1956
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO HILVANO, Defendant-Appellant.
FACTS:
On September 22, 1952 Mayor Fidencio Latorre of Villareal, Samar designated Francisco Hilvano, councilor,
to discharge the duties of his office. Vice-Mayor Juan Latorre issued notice that he was assuming the duties
of the absent mayor. However, Hilvano refused to yield, arguing that he had been designated by the Mayor.
According to the opinion sought by the Vice-Mayor from the Executive Secretary and Provincial Fiscal, under
sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code it was the Vice- Mayor who should discharge the duties of the
Mayor during the latter’s temporary absence. Notwithstanding such opinion which was exhibited to him —
Hilvano declined to vacate the post, which he held for about a month, appointing some policemen,
solemnizing marriages and collecting the corresponding salary for mayor. Francisco Hilvano was prosecuted
and was convicted of usurpation of public authority under Republic Act No. 10.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was guilty of usurpation of public authority? (YES)
RULING:
The Court ruled that he was rightfully convicted with usurpation of authority or official functions.There is
actually no reason to restrict the operation of Article 177 to private individuals. Articles 238-241 of the Revised
Penal Code penalize all kinds of usurption of official functions by public officers, said articles punish
interference by officers of one of the three departments of government (legislative, executive and judicial)
with the functions of officials of another department. By invoking the designation by the Mayor; after he had
been shown the letter of the Executive Secretary and the opinion of the provincial fiscal, he had no right
thereafter stubbornly to stick to the position. He is sentenced to an indeterminate term of four months of
arresto mayor to two years of prision correccional.

GOTICO
People of the Philippines v. Glecerio Pitulan y Briones | G.R. No.: 226486 |
January 22, 2020

FACTS:
Glecerio Pitulan was charged with direct assault with murder of Police Officer 1 Aldy Monteroso, direct assault
with frustrated murder of PO1 Benito De Vera, and direct assault with attempted murder of PO1 Alberto
Dionisio. On April 20, 2003, it was alleged that the group of PO1 Monteroso responded to a report that of a
group of armed men, Glecerio Pitulan together with other five men (Eufemio Pitulan, Sergs Pitulan, Edward
Pitulan, Felomino Pitulan and Augusto Torres), aboard a Hyundai van was acting suspiciously. Thus, the
officers, in complete uniform, rode their police mobile patrol to the reported location. The officers saw a van,
with plate no. PVY-701, matching the description of the vehicle they were looking for. They ordered the van
to halt, but it gave chase instead, until the officers overtook and blocked its path.
The officers ordered the riders to step out of the vehicle. When all but the driver complied, PO1 Monteroso
opened the door opposite the driver's side to check on him. However, as soon as he did so, the driver—who
was later identified as Pitulan - shot him thrice on the chest. Simultaneously, the Pitulan and his group,
wrestled with PO1 De Vera and PO1 Dionisio. One (1) of them was able to get PO1 Monteroso's gun and
fired at PO1 De Vera, injuring him in the shootout.
Pitulan then attempted to escape, but on his way, he encountered PO3 Cortez and his team who were
responding to a radio message of the gun battle. PO3 Cortez's team ordered the van to stop and attempted
to approach the van. However, its driver, whom he later identified as Pitulan, opened fire at their patrol car.
The officers fired back and, in the shootout that ensued, hit the van's left tire. The other van passengers
turned out dead in the shootout, leaving Pitulan to surrender to the police.
In ruling that treachery attended PO1 Monteroso's killing, the trial court noted that PO1 Monteroso was shot
thrice after opening the door opposite the driver's side, leaving him no opportunity to defend himself.
Moreover, since the officer was killed during the performance of his duties, Pitulan was convicted of the
complex crime of direct assault with murder.
As for the other charges, the trial court found no conspiracy among the van's passengers who were involved
in the shootout. Hence, it acquitted Pitulan of direct assault with attempted murder and direct assault with
frustrated murder against PO1 Dionisio and PO1 De Vera, respectively. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction. It found the police officers' testimonies clear that it was Pitulan who fired successive shots at PO1
Monteroso, the same one who drove off only to be arrested by PO3 Cortez's team. It also affirmed the trial
court's findings that the killing of PO1
Monteroso was attended with treachery, qualifying the complex crime to direct assault with murder.
The Court of Appeals dismissed Pitulan's contention that in failing to present the gun and conduct paraffin
and ballistic testing, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It held that paraffin
testing is extremely unreliable for not being conclusive as to whether the nitrates came from the discharge of
a firearm. Moreover, it stated that the lack of ballistic testing does not affect the evidentiary value of an
eyewitness' positive identification of the assailant, as in this case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Gilbert Pitulan is guilty of killing PO1 Monteroso?

RULING:
Yes. The lower courts correctly convicted accused-appellant for the killing of PO1 Monteroso. In People v.
Tuniaco, the Supreme Court held that the presentation of the murder weapon is not indispensable to prove
the corpus delicti, as its physical existence is not an element of murder. To prove the corpus delicti, the
prosecution only needs to show that: (a) a certain result has been established and (b) some person is
criminally responsible for it.
Here, the prosecution was able to fulfill the twin requirements and prove the corpus delicti. First, it offered in
evidence PO1 Monteroso's death certificates showing the cause of his death as “hemorrhagic shock
secondary to a gunshot wound to the chest.” Second, it established the identity of the shooter through the
clear and positive testimony of PO1 De Vera, a credible eyewitness. Even without the gun, there is no dispute
that the prosecution sufficiently established the corpus delicti.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals is correct in ruling that paraffin and ballistic testing are not indispensable to
prove accused-appellant's guilt. In De Guzman, this Court discussed that paraffin testing is conclusive only
as to the presence of nitrate particles in a person, but not as to its source, such as from firing a gun. By itself,
paraffin testing only indicates a possibility, not infallibility, that a person has fired a gun.
Similarly, ballistic testing establishes only a likelihood that a bullet was fired from a specific weapon. By itself,
it is not enough to prove when the weapon was fired and who fired the weapon.
In Lumanog, this Court held that ballistic testing, along with the presentation of the weapon and bullets used,
are indispensable if there is no credible eyewitness to the shooting. To sustain a conviction, it is sufficient
that the corpus delicti is established and the eyewitness, through a credible testimony, identifies the accused
as the assailant.
Finally, in People v. Casanghay, this Court ruled that the absence of paraffin and ballistic testing is not fatal
to the prosecution's case. It has no effect on the evidentiary value of an eyewitness testimony positively
identifying the accused as the assailant.
The Supreme Court found Pitulan guilty of complex crime of direct assault with homicide. The prosecution
was not able to establish the existence of treachery. It is not possible that PO1 Monteroso was in no position
to defend himself at the time of the attack. The Court has held that when a police officer had been forewarned
of brewing violence, he or she could not have been completely taken by surprise by the attack. In such
instance, therefore, treachery could not have attended the killing.
During the trial, Pitulan denied the accusations against him, claiming that he was just sitting in front of his
house when a person approached him and asked for help in delivering the shabu to a customer. According
to Pitulan, he agreed to deliver the shabu out of pity because the person told him that he was sick and needed
money for his medication. The trial court found Pitulan guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to life
imprisonment and a fine of P500,000. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Ratio: The prosecution must establish all the elements of the crime charged to secure a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. In a prosecution for Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs under Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165, the prosecution must prove that the accused sold, delivered, or distributed any dangerous
drug, regardless of the quantity. The prosecution must also prove the identity of the buyer, the object and
consideration of the sale, and the corpus delicti or the substance seized.
GOTICO
CELSO M.F.L. MELGAR v. PEOPLE, GR No. 223477, 2018-02-14
Facts:
Melgar, the petitioner, was accused of violating Section 5 of RA 9262 or also known as the Anti-Violence
Against Women and their Children Act of 2004.
It was alleged that in the year 1995, a certain ‘AAA’ had a romantic relationship with Melgar which resulted
to the birth of their illegitimate child ‘BBB’. As evidenced by BBB’s Certificate of Live Birth, Melgar
acknowledged that he is the paternal father of the former. There are also numerous photographs showing
Melgar with BBB, entered into as evidence.
However, in the preceding years, AAA’s relationship with Melgar later turned sour. When BBB was just about
one (1) year old, Melgar stopped giving support which prompted AAA to file a case for support, which was
eventually granted and resulted to both parties entering into a compromise agreement. Despite such, Melgar,
having the means and capacity to give financial support, still refused to give support for AAA and their son,
BBB, and even sold a property, which was supposed to, among others, answer for the support of BBB, from
2001 to 2010 pursuant to their compromise agreement.
This had caused mental or emotional anguish to AAA and BBB. As such, the former was constrained to file
the instant criminal case against Melgar. To substantiate her claims, AAA averred that Melgar could afford to
provide support of P8,000.00/monthly because he has a lavish lifestyle with his family.
The Regional Trial Court, in their decision, found Melgar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
5 (e) of RA 9262 because they have found Melgar to have committed economic abuse against AAA and their
son, BBB, when he stopped supporting them and when he sold the property which was supposed to answer
for his support.
In 2015, the Court of Appeals affirmed Melgar's conviction. Melgar then filed a petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Melgar's refusal to give support to AAA and their illegitimate son, BBB, is considered a
violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262?

Ruling:
Yes. RA 9262 is considered a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children perpetrated by women’s intimate partners, i.e., husband, former husband, or any
person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in, inter alis, economic abuse.
Under Section 5(e) of the said Act, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an
act of violence against women and children. In this case, all the elements of violation of the said provision
are present, as it was established that: (a) Melgar and AAA had a romantic relationship, resulting in BBB’s
birth; (b) Melgar freely acknowledged his paternity over BBB; (c) Melgar had failed to provide BBB support
ever since the latter was just a year old; and (d) his intent of not supporting BBB was made more apparent
when he sold to a third party his property which was supposed to answer for, among others, his support-in-
arrears to BBB. It is also noteworthy that the deprivation or denial of support, by itself and even without the
additional element of psychological violence, is already specifically penalized therein.
MAUN
ENRIQUE “TOTOY” RIVERA v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 138553, June 30, 2005
___________________________________________________________________

FACTS:
 • On May 6, 1993, in the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet an information for direct assault was filed against
herein petitioner, Enrique Rivera.
• The accused allegedly attack Inspector Edward Leygo who is a policeman.
• Inspector Leygo and other police officers came upon a truck unloading sacks of chicken dung at the
stall of accused which was located along the Halsema Highway at Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet.
• Inspector Leygo advised the driver to stop unloading the manure as it violates La Trinidad Municipal
Ordinance which prohibits, among others, the loading and unloading of chicken manure along the
sidewalks or road shoulders or within 15 meters from the center of the Halsema Highway located at
La Trinidad, Benguet.
• Later in the evening, the accused was caught doing the same thing again.
• According to the driver he was just following the instructions of the accused.
• Inspector Leygo confronted the accused but Rivera proceeded to challenge him to a fistfight and
thereafter grappling and hitting the said policeman on his face and injuring him in the process while
the latter was actually engaged in the performance of his official duties.
• The trial court convicted petitioner of the crime of direct assault.
• The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
• The petitioner filed for review on certiorari.
• He contended that Inspector Leygo was not engaged in the performance of his duty during the attack.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of direct assault.

RULING:
Yes. Under the RPC, direct assault is committed by any person or persons who, without a public uprising,
shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while
engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.

In this case, the accused (1) punched Inspector Leygo who is a policeman and a person in authority, (2)
during the performance of his official duty.

The court disagreed with the contention of the accused that Inspector Leygo was not engaged in the
performance of his duty during the said attack. It is a matter of record that at the time of the assault, Inspector
Leygo was engaged in the actual performance of his official duties. He was wearing the designated police
uniform and was on board a police car conducting a routinary patrol when he first came upon the truck
unloading chicken manure.

WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, the Court hereby
renders judgment finding the accused Enrique "Totoy" Rivera GUILTY.
MAUN
RUSTAN ANG v. CA
G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010
____________________________________________________________________________

FACTS:
Irish Sagud and Rustan Ang became "on-and-off" sweethearts until Irish decided to break up with Rustan
after learning that he had taken a live‐in partner whom he had gotten pregnant. Before Rustan got married,
he tried to convince Irish to elope with him. Irish, however, rejected his proposal. She changed her cellphone
number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. He used two cellphone
numbers for sending his messages. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.

Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with her face on the
figure. The sender's cellphone number was one of the numbers that Rustan used. After she got the obscene
picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly
scandalous pictures of her. He also threatened to spread the picture through the internet.

Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora and the police in apprehending Rustan. Under police
supervision, she contacted Rustan and asked him to meet her at the Lorentess Resort. When Rustan came,
police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900
cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being questioned at the police station, he shouted at
Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"

Rustan claims that he went to meet Irish because she asked him to help her identify a prankster who was
sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender's number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted
the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to
Irish from his cellphone. According to him, this explained why the obscene messages appeared to have
originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture to
him.

RUSTAN’S CONTENTION:
• The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused Rustan had a
"dating relationship" with Irish for the case to fall under VAWC.
• Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered a form of
harassment
• Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her
getting one could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or
psychological distress.

The RTC found Irish's testimony completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner. The trial
court found Rustan guilty of the violation of R.A. 9262. The CA affirmed the RTC decision and denied Rustan’s
MR. Rustan filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the requisite "dating relationship" under the VAWC law existed between Rustan
and Irish?
2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this case, already
constitutes a violation of R.A. 9262?

HELD:
1. YES. Section 3 (e) of R.A. 9262 provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation where
the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of
the relationship. In this case, the two of them were romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits,
 from October to December of 2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship of mutual
trust and love.

2. YES. Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence against
women.

This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough. The
object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly
committed would license isolated ones.

What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be determined based on the
circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing
Irish's head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely,
any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees
herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture
with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals

MERCADO
G.R. No. 207949 July 23, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARMANDO DIONALDO y EBRON, RENATO DIONALDO y EBRON, MARIANO GARIGUEZ, JR. y
RAMOS, and RODOLFO LARIDO y EBRON, Accused-Appellants.

Facts:
• At around 8 o'clock in the morning of May 16, 2003, Roderick Navarro (Roderick) dropped his brother
Edwin Navarro (Edwin) off at the Health Is Wealth Gym in Caloocan City. Thirty minutes later, he received
a text message from another brother who told him that Edwin had been kidnapped.

• Records show that three (3) men, later identified as Armando, Renato, and Mariano, forcibly dragged a
bloodied Edwin down the stairway of the gym and pushed him inside a dark green Toyota car with plate
number UKF 194.3 Upon receiving the message, Roderick immediately reported the incident to the
police.

• During the investigation, Rodolfo, an employee at the Health Is Wealth Gym, confessed to PO3 Acebuche
that he was part of the plan to kidnap Edwin, as in fact he was the one who tipped off Mariano, Renato,
Armando and a certain Virgilio Varona (Virgilio) on the condition that he will be given a share in the
ransom money. Rodolfo gave information on the whereabouts of his cohorts, leading to their arrest on
June 12, 2003.

• In the early morning of the following day or on June 13, 2003, the PACER team found the dead body of
Edwin at Sitio Pugpugan Laurel, Batangas, which Roderick identified.

• During the arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty and interposed the defenses of denial
and alibi. Except for Rodolfo, they individually claimed that on said date and time, they were in their
respective houses when they were taken by men in police uniforms, then subsequently brought to Camp
Crame, and there allegedly tortured and detained.

• In a Decision14 dated June 13, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 129 (RTC), in
Crim. Case No. C-68329, convicted accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention, sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

• It also held that the crime of Kidnapping had been committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, which
is punishable by death. However, in view of the suspended imposition of the death penalty pursuant to
Republic Act No. (RA) 9346,16 only the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed. Further, the RTC
found that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, as the accused-appellants’ individual
participation was geared toward a joint purpose and criminal design.

Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention

Ruling:
The Court is constrained to modify the ruling of the RTC and the CA, as the crime the accused-appellants
have committed does not, as the records obviously bear, merely constitute Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention, but that of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in view of
the victim’s (i.e., Edwin’s) death, which was (a) specifically charged in the Information, and (b) clearly
established during the trial of this case. Notably, while this matter was not among the issues raised before
the Court, the same should nonetheless be considered in accordance with the settled rule that in a criminal
case, an appeal, as in this case, throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court
can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment.
After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by RA 7659, Article 267 of the same
Code now provides:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another,
or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats
to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents,
female or a public officer;

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present
in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.

MERCADO
[ G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JERRY SAPLA Y GUERRERO A.K.A.
ERIC SALIBAD Y MALLARI, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Facts:
 • In an Information dated 14 January 2014, the appellant was charged with violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

• At around 1:20 in the afternoon of January 10, 2014 at Talaca, Agbannawag, Tabuk City, Kalinga,
accused knowingly had in his possession, control, and custody four (4) bricks of marijuana leaves,
a dangerous [drug], with a total net weight of 3,9563.111 grams and transport in transit through a
passenger [jeepney] with Plate No. AYA 270.

• Prosecution established that on 10 January 2014, at around 11:30 in the morning, an officer on duty
at the RPSB office received a phone call from a concerned citizen, who informed the said office that
a certain male individual [would] be transporting marijuana from Kalinga and into the Province of
Isabela. PO2 Mabiasan then relayed the information to their deputy commander, PSI Ngoslab, who
subsequently called KPPO-PAIDSOTG for a possible joint operation.

• At around 1:00 in the afternoon, the RPSB hotline received a text message which stated that the
subject male person who [would] transport marijuana [was] wearing a collared white shirt with green
stripes, red ball cap, and [was] carrying a blue sack on board a passenger jeepney, with plate number
AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela.

• The passenger jeepney arrived at around 1:20 in the afternoon, wherein the police officers at the
Talaca checkpoint flagged down the said vehicle and told its driver to park on the side of the road.
Officers Labbutan and Mabiasan approached the jeepney and saw [accused-appellant Sapla] seated
at the rear side of the vehicle.

• The police officers asked [accused-appellant Sapla] if he [was] the owner of the blue sack in front of
him, which the latter answered in the affirmative. The said officers then requested [accused-appellant
Sapla] to open the blue sack. After [accused-appellant Sapla] opened the sack, officers Labbutan
and Mabiasan saw four (4) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves, wrapped in newspaper and
an old calendar.

• PO3 Labbutan subsequently arrested [accused-appellant Sapla], informed him of the cause of his
arrest and his constitutional rights in [the] Ilocano dialect. PO2 Mabiasan further searched [accused-
appellant Sapla] and found one (I) LG cellular phone unit. Thereafter, PO2 Mabiasan seized the four
(4) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves and brought [them] to their office at the Talaca
detachment for proper markings.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure conducted by the police officers in the instant case.

Ruling:
Both the RTC and CA erred in convicting the accused-appellant. The Court finds for accused-appellant Sapla
and immediately orders his release from incarceration.

As eloquently explained by the Court in People v. Tudtud (Tudtud), "the Bill of Rights is the bedrock of
constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their rights as human beings, democracy cannot
survive and the government becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in
Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on
governmental power.”

And in the Bill of Rights, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is "at the top of the hierarchy
of rights, next only to, if not on the same plane as, the right to life, liberty, and property, x x x for the right to
personal security which, along with the right to privacy, is the foundation of the right against unreasonable
search and seizure."

The right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures is found in Article III, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution, which reads:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Hence, as a rule, a search and seizure operation conducted by the authorities is reasonable only when a
court issues a search warrant after it has determined the existence of probable cause through the personal
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses presented before the court, with
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized particularly described.

Because of the sacrosanct position occupied by the right against unreasonable searches and seizures in the
hierarchy of rights, any deviation or exemption from the aforementioned rule is not favored and is strictly
construed against the government.

Surely, probable cause justifying an intrusive warrantless search and seizure cannot possibly arise from
double hearsay evidence and from an irregularly-received tipped information. A reasonably discreet and
prudent man will surely not believe that an offense has been committed and that the item sought in connection
with said offense are in the place to be searched based solely on the say-so of an unknown duty guard that
a random, unverified text message was sent to an unofficial mobile phone by a complete stranger.
Therefore, with the glaring absence of probable cause that justifies an intrusive warrantless search,
considering that the police officers failed to rely on their personal knowledge and depended solely on an
unverified and anonymous tip, the warrantless search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla was an invalid
and unlawful search of a moving vehicle.
The necessary and inescapable consequence of the illegality of the search and seizure conducted by the
police in the instant case is the inadmissibility of the drug specimens retrieved.

According to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Known as the exclusionary rule, "evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable
searches and seizures [is] deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding."
OCONG
G.R. No. 217978 January 30, 2019
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.

NANCY LASACA RAMIREZ a.k.a. “ZOY” or “SOY,” accused-appellant

TAGS: Qualified Trafficking, Republic Act 9208, “Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003”
FACTS:
The Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force conducted an entrapment operation based on surveillance
of a widespread sexual service sale of young girls in Lapu-Lapu City. They disguised themselves as
customers, negotiating prices for minors’ services. In the KTV bar, BBB, a 15-year-old minor, initiated the
negotiation and when the accused appellant, Nancy Ramirez, learned that the poseur-customers needed two
more girls, she approached them and told them that she could provide another pair of girls. After they agreed
that the four girls would cost P2,400.00 for sexual services, Ramirez then told the girls to accept the money
that customers would give them.
Thereafter, the group hailed a taxi headed for a motel, and a police officer handed the money to one of the
girls. As soon as the girl accepted the money, they introduced themselves as police and the girls were turned
over to the team leader. Ramirez was later arrested after BBB identified her as the pimp.
After a due hearing, the regional trial court held that Ramirez was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of qualified trafficking of persons. Ramirez appealed before the Court of Appeals, but the CA denied
her appeal and affirmed the lower court’s decision.
Hence, the accused-appellant appealed assailing, the RTC and CA’s decision through a handwritten letter
before the Supreme Court insisting that on the night of the incident, she was merely in the area with her sister
to watch a live band. She claims that she only met BBB that night, and that BBB suddenly dragged her to
look for two (2) more girls. She further alleges that it was BBB who negotiated with the two (2) customers
and that she had no idea what was going on. Finally, she submits that BBB pointed to her as a pimp only
because the police officers threatened to detain her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution proved accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt of qualified
trafficking of persons. (YES)
HELD:
The court held that the prosecution established that on the night, accused-appellant approached a police
officer and offered him the sexual services of four (4) girls, two (2) of whom were minors, for P2,400.00. Both
minor victims testified that this incident was not the first time that accused-appellant pimped them out to
customers, and that any payment to them would include the payment of commission to accused-appellant.
The accused-appellant hired children to engage in prostitution, taking advantage of their vulnerability as
minors. AAA’s and BBB’s acquiescence to the illicit transactions cannot be considered as a valid defense.
The accused-appellant cannot use as a valid defense either BBB’s and AAA’s consent to the transaction, or
that BBB received the payment on her behalf for based on the jurisprudence the victim’s consent is rendered
meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human
trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor’s consent is not given out
of his or her own free will. (People vs Casio)
Further, the crime is still considered trafficking if it involves the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring
or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation” even if it does not involve any of the means stated under
the law. Trafficking is considered qualified when the trafficked person is a child.

DISPOSITIVE:
The Appeal is DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of having violated Republic Act No. 9208, Section 4(e),
as qualified by Section 6(a). She is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P2,000,000.00. She is further ordered to pay P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages to each of the minor victims, AAA and BBB.

DOCTRINE:
Republic Act No. 9208 defines trafficking in persons as the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring,
or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by
means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation
which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
The crime is still considered trafficking if it involves the “recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or
receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation” even if it does not involve any of the means stated under the
law. Trafficking is considered qualified when “the trafficked person is a child.

THE ELEMENTS OF TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS HAVE BEEN EXPANDED TO INCLUDE THE

FOLLOWING ACTS:
1. The act of “recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining,
harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders;
2. The means used include “by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person”,
and
3. The purpose of trafficking includes “the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
OCONG
G.R. No. 242682

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
NERISSA MORA a.k.a. NERI BALAGTA MORA and MARIA SALOME POLVORIZA, Accused
NERISSA MORA a.k.a. NERI BALAGTA MORA, Accused-Appellant

FACTS:
On November 26, 2011, Nerissa Mora persuaded AAA, who was still a minor, to travel with her to Buraburan,
Buhi, Camarines Sur. Mora arrived and left AAA in Maria Salome Polvoriza's Otoy's Videoke Bar (Otoy's).
Polvoriza then locked AAA in a room, barred her from leaving, and took her phone, destroying its SIM card.
Thereafter, was forced AAA to work as an entertainer at Otoy's as "Rizza M. Raada," forcing her to take
shabu, dance naked, and even have sex with the customers.
After eight (8) months, AAA escaped from Polvoriza's custody and returned to her father, to whom she
narrated her ordeal. Her father then took AAA to the police station to report the incident, as well as to a
medico-legal, who confirmed, among other things, that AAA had multiple hymenal lacerations, which could
have resulted from consensual and forcible sexual contact.
An information was filed before the trial court, Mora claimed that when she first met AAA, she thought that
the latter was already of age based on her physical appearance. Polvoriza maintained that she first saw AA
expressed her desire to work in Otoy’s and he initially declined as she did not hire entertainers but
nonetheless, she let AAA stay because she was "nice”. After due trial Mora and Polvoriza guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of a crime of qualified trafficking. Aggrieved, Mora and Polvoriza separately appealed to
the CA which upheld the decision of the lower court. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mora's conviction for Qualified Trafficking in Persons should be upheld. (YES)
HELD:
The Court held that the appeal is without merit. Under Section 3 (a) of RA 9208 defines the term "Trafficking
in Persons" as the "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without
the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or
other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs."
In this case, Mora and Polvoriza were charged with Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 (e) in
relation to Section 6 (a) of RA 9208. Section 4 (e) of RA 9208.
As correctly ruled, Mora and Polvoriza are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged as the
prosecution had clearly established the existence of the elements24 thereof, as seen in the following: (a)
Mora, through deception and by taking advantage of AAA's vulnerability as a minor, was able to "convince"
the latter to go to Buraburan, Buhi, Camarines Sur; (b) upon arrival thereat, Mora took AAA to Polvoriza's
videoke bar, i.e., Otoy's, and left her there; and (c) since then and for the next eight (8) months, Polvoriza
forced AAA to work as a prostitute in Otoy's, coercing her to perform lewd acts on a nightly basis, such as
dancing naked in front of male customers and even having sex with them. In this regard, the courts a quo
correctly found untenable Mora and Polvoriza's insistence that it was AAA who voluntarily presented herself
to work as an' entertainer/sex worker in Otoy's, as trafficking in persons can still be committed even if the
victim gives consent -. most especially in cases where the victim is a minor;
In this regard, case law instructs that "[t]he victim's consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive,
abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive,
abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's consent is not given out of his or her own free will.

ONERA
AAA v. BBB
G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018

FACTS:
1. In 2006, petitioner AAA and respondent BBB got married in Quezon City. They had two children: CCC
and DDD.
2. In May 2007, BBB worked as a chef in Singapore and acquired his permanent resident status thereafter.
AA claimed that BBB sent little to no financial support and that she had to work more hours and take
additional jobs because of this. She also alleged that they were virtually abandoned, mistreated, and that
she was abused sexually and physically. BBB was supposedly having an affair with Lisel Mok whom he had
been allegedly living with in Singapore.

3. In 2011, the investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and
emotional anguish through his alleged marital infidelity. A warrant of arrest was issued against BBB. BBB
continued to evade the arrest. In 2013, BBB filed a motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since
his acts were committed in Singapore and hence, had transpired outside the jurisdiction of the Philippine
court.

ISSUE:

Whether Philippine courts can exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting psychological violence under
R.A. No. 9262 committed through marital infidelity, when the alleged illicit relationship occurred or is occurring
outside the country.

RULING:
YES, the court held that Philippine courts can exercise jurisdiction over cases involving R.A. No. 9262 even
if the offense committed occurred outside of the country. jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint, in which the essential elements of psychological abuse under
R.A. No. 9262 is present in this case.

the elements of VAWC act is as follows:

▪ The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;
▪ The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a
common child. As for the woman’s child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or
living within or without the family abode;
▪ The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
▪ The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional
abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar
such acts or omissions.

As correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 provides that the case may be filed
where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. While
the psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an
indispensable element of the offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or
emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant.
What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of violence
against women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some acts
material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while
some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have
been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking
cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime
may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.

ONERA
Mallari v. People
G.R. No. 224679, February 12, 2020

Facts:
1. The Olongapo Police Station 3 received a report of an altercation on the ground floor of GenX Billiard Hall
on Gordon Avenue. PO2 Navarro and SPO3 Merza went to the scene and found two groups of women
fighting and pulling each other’s hair out. Among them is the drunk Jonah Mallari y Samar, herein petitioner.

2. Once the fight was over, the police officers asked the women involved to file their proper complaints in the
police station. However, Mallari shouted at them, "Wala kayo pakialam sa akin, hindi ako sasama sa inyo."
She then grabbed PO2 Navarro by the collar, slapped his cheek, and kicked his legs several times. PO2
Navarro was treated in the hospital for the minor injuries sustained.

3. The municipal trial court found Mallari guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct assault upon an agent of a
person in authority. The Court of Appeals denied Mallari's Motion for Reconsideration. She then before the
Supreme Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, claiming that the CA erred in sustaining her conviction.

4. Among Mallari’s contentions were the following: (1) PO2 Navarro's testimony that she repeatedly kicked
and slapped him was inconsistent with his injury of a slightly swollen cheekbone. It was her who suffered
several injuries as PO2 Navarro allegedly held her feet, pulled her to the ground and caused her to hit her
head, neck and buttocks, despite no aggression coming from her; (2) Assuming that she did kick PO2
Navarro, petitioner asserts that she was fully justified in doing so as the officer unnecessarily held her feet,
which constitutes unlawful aggression on her honor and dignity.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct assault upon an agent of a person in
authority. (NO)

Ruling:

In the case at bar, the MTC, RTC, and the CA all consistently found that the petitioner slapped and kicked
PO2 Navarro while he was on official duty as a police officer. However, petitioner should not be held guilty of
direct assault, but rather, of the crime of resistance or disobedience under Article 151 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Petitioner is charged with the second mode of direct assault (by any person who, without a public uprising,
shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while
engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance).

Its elements are the following:

1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a
serious resistance.
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in the actual performance
of official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the past performance of official duties.
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the exercise
of his duties.
5. That there is no public uprising.
The second, third, fourth, and fifth elements of direct assault are present in this case. However, the first
element of the offense is not present. To be considered as direct assault, the laying of hands or the use of
physical force against the agent of a person in authority must be serious.

Previous convictions for direct assault against an agent of a person in authority involve force that is more
severe than slapping and punching. Hence, the laying of hands or using physical force against agents of
persons in authority when not serious in nature constitutes resistance or disobedience under Article 151, and
not direct assault under Article 148 of the RPC.

For Article 151 to be proven, two key elements must be shown: (1) That a person in authority or his agent is
engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender
resists or seriously disobeys such person or his agent.

For this reason, the Supreme Court modified the decision of the CA, finding Mallari guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of resistance or disobedience and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of arresto mayor
and a fine not exceeding P500.00.

SY
Alberto vs Dela Cruz
GR L-31839, June 30, 1980
FACTS:
During the trial, Orbita was charged for helping Denaque, a prisoner, to escape, and there were claims that
Gov. Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda also participated in the said escape. The prosecutor investigated but found
insufficient evidence to charge Gov. Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda. Despite this, the judge overruled and
included their names in the charges. The Supreme Court eventuallydismissed the charges against Gov.
Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda since they were not liable under the relevant provisions of the law. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda may be prosecuted for the escape of Denaque under Article
156 and Article 223 of the RPC?
HELD:
No, Gov. Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda cannot be prosecuted for the offense of Article 156 of the RPC because
this violation is typically committed by an outsider who helps someone escape from jail. Given their roles as
the provincial jailer and assistant provincial warden, respectively, they cannot be held responsible for
Denaque's escape under Article 156. Additionally, the Court determined that the two cannot be charged
under Article 223 of the RPC since this requires that the public officer involved either consented to or connived
in the prisoner's escape while in their custody or charge. As there is no proof that Gov. Cledera and Lt.
Esmeralda aided or consented to Denaque's escape, they cannot be held accountable under Article 223.
Consequently, the petition was granted, and the criminal charges against Gov. Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda
were dismissed.

SY
People of the Philippines v. Jonathan Baay y Falco
G.R. No. 220143 June 7, 2017
FACTS:
Upon arraignment, accused appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.
The following are the events that led to the filing of the complaint and Information, as narrated by the victim,
and her mother. Victim, ‘AAA’, testified that sometime in July 2005, the accused-appellant invited her to go
to the forest. Upon arrival thereat, the accused-appellant pulled down her shorts and underwear, then inserted
his penis in her vagina and started a pumping motion. It lasted quite long, after which, a white liquid came
out of the penis of the accused-appellant. Thereafter, she went home. After the incident, the victim got
pregnant. Victim’s age is comparable to a child of around 4 to 5 years old because of mental retardation.
AAA testified that her mother coached her on what to say in court and to point to the accused-appellant as
the one who had sex with her.
RTC found that the prosecution was able to prove that the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge with
victim and convicted him with Statutory Rape. SC held that if the victim of the rape is a person with mental
abnormality, the crime committed is only simple rape.
ISSUE:
WON the CA, in affirming the decision of the RTC, erred in convicting the accused-appellant of Statutory
Rape?
RULING:
Yes, in the case at bar, it is not disputed that AAA was already 22 years old when she was raped even though
she has a mental age of 4 to 5 years old. The term statutory rape should only be confined to situations where
the victim of rape is a person less than 12 years of age. If the victim of rape is a person with mental
abnormality, deficiency, or retardation, the crime committed is simple rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1
(b) as she is considered "deprived of reason" notwithstanding that her mental age is equivalent to that of a
person under 12. In short, carnal knowledge with a mental retardate whose mental age is that of a person
below 12 years, while akin to statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d), should still be designated
as simple rape under paragraph I(b).

TAMBALO
People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Deniega Y Espinosa
G.R No. 212201 | June 28, 2017

FACTS:
1. AAA who was then sixteen years old but with the mental capacity of a six-year-old child, was out of
their house with some neighbors to watch a basketball game.
 2. Upon returning home, BBB, AAA’s mother noticed that the latter’s pants were wet and then asked
AAA to remove her pants, thereupon, she smelled her underwear which emitted the scent of semen.
3. AAA eventually admitted that, at the basketball court, the accused-appellant whom she calls Dodong
undressed her, made her lie down, removed his pants and underwear, went on top of her, and
inserted his penis in her vagina, and made “up-and-down” movements.
4. Deniega denied the allegations and contended that he busied himself by painting the house of a
neighbor, then he went to GMA Cavite to have his electric fan repaired and subsequently, had a
drinking session with his friend at the latter’s house.

ISSUE:
Whether or not sexual intercourse with a woman who is of advanced age but has a mental capacity of a child
below 12 years old constitutes statutory rape?
RULING:
Yes. It is a settled rule that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retarded, with amental age
below 12 years old, constitutes statutory rape.
Statutory Rape is committed when:
1. The offended party is under twelve years of age; and
2. The accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or
intimidation, whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness, or whether it was done
through fraud or grave abuse of authority.
It is enough that the age of victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse.
In the present case, the information alleged that the victim, at the time of the commission of the crime, was
16 years old but with a mental age of a 6-year-old child. The prosecution established these facts through
AAA’s Birth Certificate, Clinical Abstract prepared by a medical doctor who is a psychiatrist from the National
Center for a Mental Health, as well as the testimonies of the doctor and the victim’s mother.
Rape under Article 266-A(1)d of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is termed statutory rape as it departs
from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes in statutory rape is the carnal knowledge
of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation, and physical evidence of injury are
irrelevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the woman's age and whether carnal knowledge took
place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender
years, the child’s consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern good from evil.
TAMBALO
Benjamin Pangan Y Rivera vs. Hon. Lourdes F. Gatbalite
G.R No. 141718 | January 21, 2005

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Benjamin Pangan was found guilty of simple seduction, when his counsel submitted the case
for a decision without offering any evidence due to his constant absence during the hearing.
2. Petitioner was then apprehended and detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell at the order of the trial
court.
3. Later, the petitioner filed for a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, contending that his arrest was illegal and
unjustified on the ground that his penalty has prescribed after five years and that having been able to
continuously evade service of sentence for almost nine years, his criminal liability has long been totally
extinguished.
4. The trial court then denied the said petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty already prescribed?

RULING: No. Article 93 provides that “The period of prescription of penalties shallcommence to run from the
date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence".

Says ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping
during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. xxx"

Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is
serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence by
escaping during the term of his sentence. This must be so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict
evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment." That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the provisions of the
second sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have
taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using
picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or
employees of the penal institution, . . ." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term
"jail breaking."

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93
and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who
has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
In this case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the execution of the judgment for his
conviction, he was already in hiding. Now petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because he has
ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence.
But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those who are
deserving. Petitioner's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he
committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.
Petitioner, however, has by this time fully served his sentence of two months and one day of arresto mayor
and should forthwith be released unless he is being detained for another offense or charge.