1.00 WHAT IS A SPECIAL PENAL LAW?
A person may not have consciously
Special penal laws are laws that punishes acts not
defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code.
1.01 IS THE REVISED PENAL CODE APPLICABLE
IN SPECIAL LAWS?
The general rule is that Special laws are not subject to
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
“Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special penal laws are not
subject to the provisions of this Code.
This Code shall be suppletory to such laws, unless
the latter should specially provide the contrary.”
1.02 DIFFERENTIATE CRIMES PUNISHED UNDER
THE REVISED PENAL CODE FROM CRIMES
PUNISHED UNDER THE SPECIAL PENAL LAW.
a. In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code,
they are generally regarded as mala in se, the act
committed
in inherently wrong or immoral; under a special
penal law, crimes are regarded as mala prohibita or
the act is merely prohibited by law;
b. In crimes under the Revised Penal Code, good
faith is a proper defense; in a special penal law,
good faith is not a defense;
c. Under the Revised Penal Code, the stages of
execution (consummated, frustrated or attempted)
is considered in arriving at the proper penalty to be
imposed; in a special penal laws, they are not;
d. Under the Revised Penal Code , the degree of
participation of the offenders (principals,
accomplices, accessories) is taken into
consideration on the penalty imposable; in a
special penal law, it is not;
*Exceptions:
1. Under Anti-Terrorism Act, there may be
accomplices and accessories.
2. Likewise, under Section 13 of or R.A. 7610
or the Anti-Torture Act, there may be principals
and accessories.
3. Under Section 2 of R.A. 7080, or otherwise
known as the Anti-Plunder Law, as amended
by Section 12 of R.A. 7659, it provides that in
the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation as provided under the Revised
Penal Code, shall be considered by the Court.
e. Under the Revised Penal Code, the modifying
circumstances are appreciated in determining the
penalty
imposable; in a special penal law, they are not;
f. The Revised Penal Code uses the nomenclature of
penalties provided under the Revised Penal Code,
it a special
penal law, it does not;
1.03 DIFFERENTIATE “INTENT TO COMMIT A
CRIME” TO “INTENT TO PERPETRATE THE ACT”
When the crime is punished by a special law,
as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary.
It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to
perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent
to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act
must be distinguished.
intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to
commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature
of things, the crime itself.
In intent to commit the crime - there must be
criminal intent;
In intent to perpetrate the act - it is enough
that the prohibited act is done freely and
consciously.
1.04 ARE SPECIAL LAWS AMENDING CERTAIN
PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
CONSIDERED MALA PROHIBITA?
No, special laws which are intended merely as
amendments to certain provisions of the Revised
Penal Code are
mala in se and still subject to its provision.
Presidential Decree No. 532
Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law
Definition of terms.
Piracy - any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or
the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its
cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its
complement or passengers, irrespective of the value
thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things, committed by any
person, including a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall
be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be
considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter
provided.
Highway Robbery/Brigandage - the seizure of any
person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful
purposes, or the taking away of the property of another
by means of violence against or intimidation of person
or force upon things of other unlawful means,
committed by any person on any Philippine Highway.
Punishable acts:
Piracy. Qualifying circumstances: if rape, murder,
homicide, physical injuries or other crimes is
committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or
when the offenders abandoned the victims without
means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is
accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel.
Highway Robbery/Brigandage. if kidnapping for
ransom or extortion, murder, homicide, rape, physical
injuries or other crimes is committed as a result or on
the occasion thereof.
Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or
abetting piracy or highway robbery/brigandage:
anyone who knowingly and in any manner aids or
protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as
giving them information about the movement of police
or other peace officers of the government, or acquires
or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands
or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or who
directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or
highway robbery or brigandage shall be considered as
an accomplice of the principal offenders and be
punished in accordance with the Rules prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code.
ARTICLE 122 RPC VS PD 532
Article 122. PIRACY
“any person who, on the high seas or in Philippine
waters, shall attack or seize any vessel or, not being a
member of its complement nor a passenger, shall
seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its
equipment, or personal belongings of its complement
or passengers.”
PD 532ANTI-PIRACY AND ANTI-HIGHWAY
ROBBERY LAW
“Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking
away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo,
equipment, or the personal belongings of its
complement or passengers, irrespective of the value
thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things, committed by any
person, including a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall
be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be
considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter
provided.”
Committed where: Article 122 of RPC, on the high
seas or in Philippine waters while PD 532, in Philippine
waters only
Committed by who: Article 122 of RPC, OUTSIDER:
NOT MEMBERS OF ITSCOMPLEMENT OR
PASSENGERS OF THE VESSEL while PD 532,
INSIDER AND OUTSIDER: committed by any person,
including a passenger or member of the complement
of said vessel
Modes of committing:
Article 122 of RPC:
1.By attacking or seizing a vessel on
the high seas or in Philippine waters;
2. By seizing in the vessel while on the
high seas or in Philippine waters the whole or
part of its cargo, its equipment or personal
belongings of its complement or passengers.
NOTE: VIOLENCE IS NOT
MENTIONED
while PD 532, Any attack upon or seizure of
any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part
thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal
belongings of its complement or passengers,
irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things,
NOTE: by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things
Distinguish Highway Robbery under PD No. 532
from Robbery committed on a highway.
A: Highway Robbery under PPD 532 differs from
ordinary Robbery committed on a highway in these
respects:
(1) In Highway Robbery under PD 532, the robbery is
committed indiscriminately against persons who
commute in such highways, regardless of the
potentiality they offer; while in ordinary Robbery
committed on a highway, the robbery is committed
only against predetermined victims;
(2) It is Highway Robbery under PD 532, when the
offender is a brigand or one who roams in public
highways and carries out his robbery in public
highways as venue, whenever the opportunity to do so
arises. It is ordinary Robbery under the RPC when the
commission thereof in a public highway is only
incidental and the offender is not a brigand; and
(3) In Highway Robbery under PD 532, there is
frequency in the commission of the robbery in public
highways and against persons traveling thereat;
whereas ordinary robbery in public highways is only
occasional against a predetermined victim, without
frequency in public highways.
Cases:
In PP vs Maximo Dela Pena, the SC ruled that the
appellant is guilty of piracy.
PD 532 defines piracy as follows:
“Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking
away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo,
equipment, or the personal belongings of its
complement or passengers, irrespective of the value
thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things, committed by any
person, including a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters shall
be considered as piracy.”
In this case, Maximo Dela Pena and his armed
companions boarded the pump boat of the Nacoboan
along the river bank of Barangay San Roque and took
13 sacks of copra, personal belongings of the victims
as well as the boat’s engine, propeller tube and tools
at gun point before leaving them in an island is
considere piracy under PD 532.
In PP vs Catantan, the SC ruled that it was not a grave
coercion but piracy under PD 532. Under the definition
of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as
penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this
case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While it
may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled
to go elsewhere other than their place of destination,
such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing
their boat. The testimony of one of the victims shows
that the appellant actually seized the vessel through
force and intimidation.
Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 (RA 11479)
Terrorism Defined and Punishable Acts.
Section 4. Terrorism.- Subject to Section 49 of this
Act, terrorism is committed by any person who, within
or outside the Philippines, regardless of the stage of
execution:
(a) Engages in acts intended to cause death or
serious bodily injury to any person, or
endangers a person's life;
(b) Engages in acts intended to cause
extensive damage or destruction to a
government or public facility, public place or
private property;
(c) Engages in acts intended to cause
extensive interference with, damage or
destruction to critical infrastructure;
(d) Develops, manufactures, possesses,
acquires, transports, supplies or uses
weapons, explosives or of biological, nuclear,
radiological or chemical weapons; and
(e) Release of dangerous substances, or
causing fire, floods or explosions.
when the purpose of such act, by its nature
and context, is to intimidate the general public
or a segment thereof, create an atmosphere or
spread a message of fear, to provoke or
influence by intimidation the government or
any international organization, or seriously
destabilize or destroy the fundamental political,
economic, or social structures of the country,
or create a public emergency or seriously
undermine public safety, shall be guilty of
committing terrorism and shall suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment without the benefit
of parole and the benefits of Republic Act No.
10592, otherwise known as "An Act Amending
Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 of Act No. 3815,
as amended, otherwise known as the Revised
Penal Code". Provided, That, terrorism as
defined in this section shall not include
advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work,
industrial or mass action, and other similar
exercises of civil and political rights, which are
not intended to cause death or serious
physical harm to a person, to endanger a
person's life, or to create a serious risk to
public safety.
Section 5. Threat to Commit Terrorism.- Any person
who shall threaten to commit any of the acts
mentioned in Section 4 hereof shall suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of twelve (12) years.
Section 6. Planning, Training, Preparing, and
facilitating the Commission of Terrorism.- it shall be
unlawful for any person to participate in the planning,
training, preparation and facilitation in the commission
of terrorism, possessing objects connected with the
preparation for the commission of terrorism, or
collecting or making documents connected with the
preparation of terrorism. Any person found guilty of the
provisions of this Act shall suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment without the benefit of parole and the
benefits of Republic Act No. 10592.
Section 7. Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism.- Any
conspiracy to commit terrorism as defined and
penalized under Section 4 of this Act shall suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment without the benefit of
parole and the benefit of Republic Act No. 10592.
There is conspiracy when two (2) or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission
of terrorism as defined in Section 4 hereof and
decide to commit the same.
Section 8. Proposal to Commit Terrorism.- Any
person who proposes to commit terrorism as defined in
section 4 hereof shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years.
Section 9. Inciting to Commit Terrorism.- Any
person who without taking any direct part in the
commission of terrorism, shall include others to the
execution of any of the acts specified in Section 4
hereof by means of speeches, proclamations, writings,
emblems, banners or other representations tending to
the same end, shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of twelve (12) years.
Section 10. Recruitment to and Membership in a
Terrorist Organization.- Any person who shall recruit
another to participate in, join, commit or support
terrorism or a terrorist individual or any terrorist
organization, association or group of persons
proscribed under Section 26 of this Act, or designated
by the United Nations Security Council as a terrorist
organization, or organized for the purpose of engaging
in terrorism, shall suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment without the benefit of parole and the
benefits of Republic Act No. 10592.
The same penalty shall be imposed on any person
who organizes or facilitates the travel of individuals to
a state other than their state of residence or nationality
for the purpose of recruitment which may be
committed through any of the following means:
(a) Recruiting another person to serve in any
capacity in or with an armed force in a foreign
state, whether the armed force forms part of
the armed forces of the government of that
foreign state or otherwise;
(b) Publishing an advertisement or
propaganda for the purpose of recruiting
persons to serve in any capacity in or with
such armed force;
(c) Publishing an advertisement or propaganda
containing any information relating to the place
at which or the manner in which persons may
make applications to serve or obtain
information relating to service in any capacity
in or with such armed force or relating to the
manner in which persons may travel to a
foreign state for the purpose of serving in any
capacity in or with such armed force; or
(d) Performing any other act with intention of
facilitating or promoting the recruitment of
persons to serve in any capacity in or with
such armed force.
Any person who shall voluntarily and knowingly join
any organization, association or group of persons
knowing that such organization, association or group
of persons is proscribed under Section 26 of this Act,
or designated by the United Nations Security Council
as a terrorist organization, or organized for the
purpose of engaging in terrorism, shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years.
Section 11. Foreign Terrorist.- The following acts are
unlawful and shall suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment without the benefit of parole and the
benefits of Republic Act No. 10592:
(a) For any person to travel or attempt to travel
to a state other than his/her state of residence
or nationality for the purpose of perpetrating,
planning, or preparing for, or participating in
terrorism, or providing or receiving terrorist
training;
(b) For any person to organize or facilitate the
travel of individuals who travel to a state other
than their states of residence or nationality
knowing that such travel is for the purpose of
perpetrating, planning, training, or preparing
for, or participating in terrorism or providing or
receiving terrorist training; or
(c) For any person residing abroad who comes
to the Philippines to participate in perpetrating,
planning, training, or preparing for, or
participating in terrorism or provide support for
or facilitate or receive terrorist training here or
abroad.
Section 12. Providing Material Support to
Terrorists.- Any person who provides material support
to any terrorist individual or terrorist organization,
association or group of persons committing any of the
acts punishable under Section 4 hereof, knowing that
such individual or organization, association, or group
of persons is committing or planning to commit such
acts, shall be liable as principal to any and all terrorist
activities committed by said individuals or
organizations, in addition to other criminal liabilities
he/she or they may have incurred in relation thereto.
Section 16. Surveillance of Suspects and
Interception and Recording of Communications.-
The provisions of Republic Act No. 4200, otherwise
known as the "Anti-Wire Tapping Law" to the contrary
notwithstanding, a law enforcement agent or military
personnel may, upon a written order of the Court of
Appeals secretly wiretap, overhear and listen to,
intercept, screen, read, survey, record or collect, with
the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic,
mechanical or other equipment or device or technology
now known or may hereafter be known to science or
with the use of any other suitable ways and means for
the above purposes, any private communications,
conversation, discussion/s, data, information,
messages in whatever form, kind or nature, spoken or
written words (a) between members of a judicially
declared and outlawed terrorist organization, as
provided in Section 26 of this Act; (b) between
members of a designated person as defined in Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 10168; or (c) any person
charged with or suspected of committing any of the
crimes defined and penalized under the provisions of
this Act: Provided, That, surveillance, interception and
recording of communications between lawyers and
clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their
sources and confidential business correspondence
shall not be authorized.
The law enforcement agent or military personnel shall
likewise be obligated to (1) file an ex-parte application
with the Court of Appeals for the issuance of an order,
to compel telecommunications service providers (TSP)
and internet service providers (ISP) to produce all
customer information and identification records as well
as call and text data records, content and other cellular
or internet metadata of any person suspected of any of
the crimes defined and penalized under the provisions
of this Act; and (2) furnish the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) a copy of
said application. The NTC shall likewise be notified
upon the issuance of the order for the purpose of
ensuring immediate compliance.
Section 29. Detention Without Judicial Warrant of
Arrest. - The provisions of Article 125 of the revised
Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any law
enforcement agent or military personnel, who, having
been duly authorized in writing by the ATC has taken
custody of a person suspected of committing any of
the acts defined and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act, shall, without
incurring any criminal liability for delay in the delivery
of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities,
deliver said suspected person to the proper judicial
authority within a period of fourteen (14) calendar days
counted from the moment the said suspected person
has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and
taken into custody by the law enforcement agent or
military personnel. The period of detention may be
extended to a maximum period of (10) calendar days if
it is established that (1) further detention of the
person/s is necessary to preserve evidence related to
terrorism or complete the investigation; (2) further
detention of the person/s is necessary to prevent the
commission of another terrorism; and (3) the
investigation is being conducted properly and without
delay.
Immediately after taking custody of a person
suspected of committing terrorism or any member of a
group of persons, organization or association
proscribed under Section 26 hereof, the law
enforcement agent or military personnel shall notify in
writing the judge of the court nearest the place of
apprehension or arrest of the following facts: (a) the
time, date, and manner of arrest; (b) the location or
locations of the detained suspect/s and (c) the physical
and mental condition of the detained suspect/s. The
law enforcement agent or military personnel shall
likewise furnish the ATC and the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) of the written notice given to the
judge.
The head of the detaining facility shall ensure that the
detained suspect is informed of his/her rights as a
detainee and shall ensure access to the detainee by
his/her counsel or agencies and entities authorized by
law to exercise visitorial powers over detention
facilities.
The penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years shall be
imposed upon the police or law enforcement agent or
military personnel who fails to notify any judge as
provided in the preceding paragraph.
Section 33. No Torture or Coercion in Investigation
and Interrogation. - The use of torture and other
cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment or
punishment, as defined in Sections 4 and 5 of
Republic Act no. 9745 otherwise known as the "Anti-
Torture Act of 2009," at any time during the
investigation or interrogation of a detained suspected
terrorist is absolutely prohibited and shall be penalized
under said law. Any evidence obtained from said
detained person resulting from such treatment shall
be, in its entirely, inadmissible and cannot be used as
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or
administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or
hearing.
Absorption Principle.
The doctrine of absorption is a principle peculiar in
criminal law. In order for the doctrine to apply, the
crimes must be punished by the same statute and the
trial court must have jurisdiction over both offenses.
Doctrine of absorption of common crimes. Also called
Hernandez doctrine. The rule enunciated in People v.
Hernandez [99 Phil. Rep 515 (1956)] that the
ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof,
and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be
punished either separately therefrom or by the
application of Art. 48 of the Rev. Penal Code. [Enrile v.
Amin, GR 93335, Sept. 13, 1990]. It held that the crime
of rebellion under the Rev. Penal Code of the Phils. is
charged as a single offense, and that it cannot be
made into a complex crime.
Calleja vs Executive Secretary
Synopsis.
Facial challenge to a statute. – A law or
governmental regulation is susceptible to a facial
challenge as it involves or targets free speech,
expression, and its cognate rights. The doctrines of
strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
analytical tools developed for testing ‘on their faces’
statutes in free speech cases.
Vagueness doctrine, a law is constitutionally
defective when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.
Overbreadth doctrine, a law may be struck down as
unconstitutional if it achieves a governmental purpose
by means that are unnecessarily broad and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms.
Strict scrutiny standard is a two-part test under
which a law or government act passes constitutional
muster only if it is: (1) necessary to achieve a
compelling State interest; and (2) the least restrictive
means to protect such interest or narrowly tailored to
accomplish said interest. It is not limited to free speech
cases, and is employed by the courts when the law or
government act interferes with other basic liberties
guaranteed under the Constitution. In free speech
cases, it is applied when the restraint is content-based.
A content-based prior restraint on speech is
constitutionally permissible if it passes the clear and
present danger rule, i.e. the speech may be restrained
only if there is substantial danger that the speech will
likely lead to an evil which the government has a right
to prevent. Using the Branderbug test, constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is (a) directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is (b) likely to incite or
produce such action.
Case Ruling:
The SC ruled that RA 11479 is not unconstitutional
to its entirety. Section 4 of R.A. No. 11476 consists
of two parts: the main part provides for the actus reus,
the mens rea, and the imposable penalty; the second
part is the proviso.
The main part is not unconstitutional. It cannot be
assailed through a facial challenge since the acts
constitutive of the crime of terrorism under paragraphs
(a) to (e) of Section 4 are clearly forms of
conduct unrelated to speech. The constitutionality of
the main part — being a primarily non-speech
provision — must stand.
The proviso is unconstitutional.
The “Not Intended” Clause of Section 4’s proviso is
unconstitutional under the strict scrutiny test, as well
as the void for vagueness and overbreadth doctrines.
The proviso reads:
Provided, That, terrorism as defined in this section
shall not include advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage
of work, industrial or mass action, and other similar
exercises of civil and political rights, which are not
intended to cause death or serious physical harm
to a person, to endanger a person’s life, or to
create a serious risk to public safety.
(a) The proviso is a proper subject of a facial
analysis, because based on its text, it is a
provision that innately affects speech and
expression as it directly pertains to
“advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of
work, industrial or mass action, and other
similar exercises of civil and political
rights.”
(b) “Not Intended Clause” is void for
vagueness as it has a chilling effect on the
average person. Before the protester can
speak, he must first guess whether his
speech would be interpreted as a terrorist
act under Section 4 and whether he might
be arrested, indicted, and/or detained for
it.
Also, the SC ruled that t h e d e s i g n a t i o n a n d
proscr iption prov isions in AT A is
ONLY PARTIALLY u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .
The second and third modes of designation are
constitutionally problematic, and must be struck
down.
(1) While the State has established a compelling
interest, the means employed under the second mode
of designation, i.e. adoption by the ATC of request for
designations by other jurisdictions or supranational
jurisdictions after determination that the proposed
designee meets the criteria for designation of UNSCR
No. 1373, is not the least restrictive means to achieve
such purpose. Under this second mode of designation,
unbridled discretion is given to the ATC in granting
requests for designation based on its own
determination. Likewise, there appears to be no
sufficient standard that should be observed in granting
or denying such requests. The ATC is left to make its
own determination based loosely on “the criteria for
designation of UNSCR No. 1373,” without any further
sufficient parameters for its guidance. This may
therefore lead to a quid pro quo designation with the
requesting jurisdiction at the expense of the rights of a
prospective designee. There are also no proper
procedural safeguards and remedies for an erroneous
designation in this respect. There are no remedies
provided under the second mode. There is no process
for delisting, nor any automatic review provision. The
lack of a remedy aside, there exists other suitable
alternatives which are far less intrusive and potentially
injurious to protected rights. These include the
adoption of an internal watchlist by law enforcement
agencies or the maintenance of a database to monitor
potential threats, and judicial proscription under
Section 26.
(2) The third mode of designation also fails to meet the
strict scrutiny test and is overly broad.
The means employed by the State under the third
mode, i.e. designation on the basis of finding of
probable cause, are not narrowly drawn to meet such
interest. Same as in the second mode of designation,
however, there are no proper procedural safeguards
and remedies for an erroneous designation under the
third mode, thereby creating a chilling effect on speech
and its cognate rights and unduly exposes innocent
persons to erroneous designation with all its adverse
consequences. Another cause of concern in allowing
this mode of designation is the lack of discernible
criteria in the statute by which the ATC may determine
“probable cause to designate.”
Republic Act No. 9745
Anti-Torture Act of 2009
Punishable acts.
(a) Physical torture – any form of treatment or
punishment inflicted by a person in authority or
agent of a person in authority upon another in
his/her custody that causes severe pain,
exhaustion, disability or dysfunction of one or
more parts of the body
(b) Mental/Psychological Torture - acts committed by a
person in authority or agent of a person in authority
which are calculated to affect or confuse the mind
and/or undermine a person's dignity and morale.
(c) Other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment - deliberate and aggravated treatment or
punishment inflicted by a person in authority or agent
of a person in authority against another person in
custody, which attains a level of severity sufficient to
cause suffering, gross humiliation or debasement to
the latter.
Persons criminally liable as Principals.
a. Any person who actually participated or induced
another in the commission of torture or other cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment or
who cooperated in the execution of the act of torture or
other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment by previous or simultaneous acts.
b. Any superior military, police or law enforcement
officer or senior government official who issued an
order to any lower ranking personnel to commit torture
for whatever purpose.
c. The immediate commanding officer of the unit
concerned of the AFP or the immediate senior public
official of the PNP and other law enforcement agencies
for any act or omission, or negligence committed by
him/her that shall have led, assisted, abetted or
allowed, whether directly or indirectly, the commission
thereof by his/her subordinates and if he/she has
knowledge of or, owing to the circumstances at the
time, should have known that acts of torture or other
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment
shall be committed, is being committed, or has been
committed by his/her subordinates or by others within
his/her area of responsibility and, despite such
knowledge, did not take preventive or corrective action
either before, during or immediately after its
commission, when he/she has the authority to prevent
or investigate allegations of torture or other cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment but
failed to prevent or investigate allegations of such act,
whether deliberately or due to negligence.
Torture as separate and independent crime.
Torture as a crime shall not absorb or shall not be
absorbed by any other crime or felony committed as a
consequence, or as a means in the conduct or
commission thereof. In which case, torture shall be
treated as a separate and independent criminal act
whose penalties shall be imposable without prejudice
to any other criminal liability provided for by domestic
and international laws.
If the commission of any crime punishable under Title
Eight (Crimes Against Persons) and Title Nine (Crimes
Against Personal Liberty and Security) of the Revised
Penal Code is attended by any of the acts constituting
torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment under R.A. No. 9745, the
penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum period.
Republic Act No. 10591
(Amending P.D. 1866 and R.A. 8294)
Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation
Act
Punishable acts:
● Unlawful Acquisition, or Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition
● Absence of Permit to Carry Outside of Residence
● Unlawful Manufacture, Importation, Sale or
Disposition of Firearms or Ammunition or Parts
Thereof, Machinery, Tool or Instrument Used or
Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms,
Ammunition or Parts Thereof
● Arms Smuggling
● Tampering, Obliteration or Alteration of Firearms
Identification
● Use of an Imitation Firearm
● Planting Evidence
● Failure to Notify Lost or Stolen Firearm or Light
Weapon
● Illegal Transfer/Registration of Firearms.
Use of Loose Firearm in the Commission of a
Crime.
when inherent in the commission of a crime
punishable under the Revised Penal Code or other
special laws, shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
if the crime committed with the use of a loose
firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum
penalty which is lower than that prescribed for illegal
possession of firearm, the penalty for illegal
possession of firearm shall be imposed in lieu of the
penalty for the crime charged
if the crime committed with the use of a loose
firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum
penalty which is equal to that imposed for illegal
possession of firearms, the penalty of prision mayor in
its minimum period shall be imposed in addition to the
penalty for the crime punishable under the Revised
Penal Code or other special laws of which he/she is
found guilty.
if the violation of R.A. 10591 is in furtherance of, or
incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion
of insurrection, or attempted coup d’etat, such violation
shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of
rebellion or insurrection, or attempted coup d’etat.
if the crime is committed by the person without
using the loose firearm, the violation of R.A. 10591
shall be considered as a distinct and separate offense.
P.D. 1866, as amended by R.A. 8294
Punishable act:
● Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition
or possession of explosives.
As an aggravating circumstance.
When a person uses of explosives, detonation agents
or incendiary in committing any of the crimes defined
in the Revised Penal Code or special laws and which
results in the death of any person or persons.
However, when a person uses of explosives,
detonation agents or incendiary in furtherance of, or
incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion,
insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat, such
shall be absorbed as an element of the crimes of
rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup
d'etat.
Cases:
In PP vs Olarte, the SC ruled that the
WARRANTLESS ARREST IS VALID AND THE HAND
GRENADE SEIZED FROM ACCUSED-APPELLANT
IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. In the case at hand,
the chain of custody rule does not apply to an
undetonated grenade (an object made unique), for it is
not amorphous and its form is relatively resistant to
change. A witness of the prosecution need only
identify the hand grenade, a structured object, based
on personal knowledge that the same contraband or
article is what it purports to be—that it came from the
person of accused-appellant. Even
assuming arguendo that the chain of custody rule
applies to dispel supposed doubts as to the grenade's
existence and source, the integrity and evidentiary
value of the explosive had been sufficiently established
by the prosecution. In this instance, the presumption
that the prosecution's witnesses have been regularly
performing their official duty should be upheld absent
any clear and convincing evidence of ill motive.
In the case of warrantless arrest, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
circumstances where a warrantless arrest is
permissible:
1. In flagrante delicto: The person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense in the
presence of the arresting officer.
2. Hot pursuit: An offense has just been
committed, and the arresting officer has
personal knowledge that the person to be
arrested committed it.
3. Escaped Prisoner: The person to be arrested
is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment.
In PP vs Gaborne, the SC ruled that the
accused is guilty of murder and frustrated murder.
Evidently, accused-appellant's intent to kill was
established beyond reasonable doubt. This can be seen
from his act of shooting Elizan and De Luna from behind
with a firearm while they were innocently singing and
drinking.
In view of the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 8294
and R.A. No. 10591, to Presidential Decree No. 1866,
separate prosecutions for homicide and illegal
possession are no longer in order. Instead, illegal
possession of firearm is merely to be taken as an
aggravating circumstance in the crime of murder. It
is clear from the foregoing that where murder results
from the use of an unlicensed firearm, the crime is not
qualified illegal possession but, murder. In such a case,
the use of the unlicensed firearm is not considered as a
separate crime but shall be appreciated as a mere
aggravating circumstance. Thus, where murder was
committed, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms
is no longer imposable since it becomes merely a
special aggravating circumstance. The intent of
Congress is to treat the offense of illegal possession of
firearm and the commission of homicide or murder with
the use of unlicensed firearm as a single offense.
In the case at hand, since it was proven that accused-
appellant was not a licensed firearm holder, and that he
was positively identified by the witnesses as the one
who fired shots against the victims, the use of an
unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of
Murder and Frustrated Murder should be considered as
an aggravating circumstance thereof.
Bar Q and A’s:
1. X, a police officer, placed a hood on the head of W,
a suspected drug pusher, and watched as Y and Z,
police trainees, beat up and tortured W to get his
confession. X is liable as
A. as accomplice in violation of the Anti-Torture Act.
B. a principal in violation of the Anti-Torture Act.
C. a principal in violation of the Anti-Hazing Law.
D. an accomplice in violation of the Anti-Hazing Law.
2. X, Y and Z agreed among themselves to attack and
kill A, a police officer, but they left their home-made
guns in their vehicle before approaching him. What
crime have they committed?
A. Conspiracy to commit indirect assault.
B. Attempted direct assault.
C. Conspiracy to commit direct assault.
D. Illegal possession of firearms.
3. A postal van containing mail matters, including
checks and treasury warrants, was hijacked along a
national highway by ten (10) men, two (2) of whom
were armed. They used force, violence and
intimidation against three (3) postal employees who
were occupants of the van, resulting in the unlawful
taking and asportation of the entire van and its
contents.
a) If you were the public prosecutor, would you charge
the ten (10) men who hijacked the postal van with
violation of Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise
known as the Anti--Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery
Law of 1974? Explain your answer. (5%)
ANSWER:
No. If I were the public prosecutor, I would charge the
ten men of violation of RA 6539, The Anti-Carnapping
Act. All the elements of carnapping are present. (1)
there was actual taking of a motor vehicle, the postal
van; (2) the postal van belonged to another; (3) the
taking was done with intent to gain; and (4) the taking
was done without the consent of the owner and with
force, violence and intimidation against the 3 van
employees who were occupants thereof.
It is not highway robbery under PD 532 because there
was no showing that the 10 men were a band of
robbers organized for the purpose of committing
robbery indiscriminately. What was shown is one
isolated hijacking of a postal van, hence, carnapping.
b) If you were the defense counsel, what are the
elements of the crime of highway robbery that the
prosecution should prove to sustain a conviction?
(5%)
ANSWER:
The elements of highway robbery under PD 532 are:
1. That there is unlawful taking of property of another;
2. That said taking is with intent to gain;
3. That said taking is done with violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things or other
unlawful means; and
4. That it was committed on any Philippine highway.
To sustain a conviction for highway robbery, the
prosecution must prove that the accused were
organized for the purpose of committing robbery
indiscriminately. If the purpose is only a particular
robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if
there are at least four armed men. (People vs.
Mendoza, GR 104461, February 23, 1996; Filoteo, Jr.
vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 79543, October 16, 1996)
4. a) Who are brigands? (5%)
ANSWER:
When more than 3 armed persons form a band
of robbers for any of the following purposes: (1) to
commit robbery in the highway; (2) to kidnap persons
for the purpose of extortion or to obtain ransom; or (3)
to attain by means of force and violence any other
purposes, they shall be deemed highway robbers or
brigands. (Article 306, RPC)
b) Distinguish brigandage from robbery in band as
to elements, purpose of the offender, and
agreement among the offenders. (5%)
ANSWER:
The following are the distinctions between
brigandage and robbery in band:
1. As to elements: The elements of brigandage
are: (a) that there be at least 4 armed persons; (b) that
they form a band of robbers; and (c) that their purpose
is either to commit robbery in the highway, or to kidnap
persons for the purpose of extortion or to obtain
ransom, or to attain by means of force and violence
any other purposes, WHEREAS the elements of
robbery in band are: (a) that there be at least 4 armed
persons: and (b) that they took part in the commission
of a robbery.
2. As to purpose of the offenders: In
brigandage, the purpose of the brigands is either to
commit robbery in the highway, or to kidnap persons
for the purpose of extortion or to obtain ransom, or to
attain by means of force and violence any other
purposes, WHEREAS in robbery in band, the purpose
of the robbers is to commit robbery, not necessarily in
the highway.
3. As to agreement among the offenders: In
brigandage, the agreement among the brigands is to
commit robbery in the highway, WHEREAS in robbery
in band, the agreement among the robbers is to
commit only a particular robbery.
5. AA was arrested for committing a bailable offense
and detained in solitary confinement. He was able to
post bail after two (2) weeks of detention. During the
period of detention, he was not given any food. Such
deprivation caused him physical discomfort. What
crime, if any, was committed in connection with the
solitary confinement and food deprivation of AA?
Explain your answer. (5%)
ANSWER:
The crime committed is Violation of RA 9745, The Anti-
Torture Act. Food deprivation and confinement in
solitary cell are considered as physical and
psychological torture under Section 4(2) of RA 9745.
6. Q: A postal van containing mail matter, including
checks and treasury warrants, was hijacked along
a national highway by ten (10) men, two of whom,
were armed. They used force, violence and
intimidation against the three postal employees
who were occupants of the van, resulting in the
unlawful taking and aspiration of the entire van
and its contents.
(A) If you were the public prosecutor, would you
charge the ten (10) men who hijacked the postal
van with violation of Presidential Decree No. 532,
otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974? Explain your
answer.
(B) If you were the defense counsel, what are the
elements of the crime of highway robbery that the
prosecution should prove to sustain a conviction?
(2012 Bar)
A:
(A) No. I would not charge the 10 men with the crime
of highway robbery. The mere fact that the offense
charged was committed on a highway would not be the
determinant for the application of PD No. 532. If a
motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a
highway is forcibly taken at a gunpoint by the accused
who happened to take a fancy thereto, the location of
the vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking would not
necessarily put the offense within the ambit of PD 532.
In this case, the crime committed is violation of the
Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 (People v. Punk, GR No.
97471, February 17, 1993). Moreover, there is no
showing that the 10 men were a band of outlaws
organized for the purpose of depredation upon the
persons and properties of innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to another. What
was shown is one isolated hijacking of a postal van. It
was not stated in the facts given that the 10 men
previously attempted at similar robberies by them to
establish the “indiscriminate” commission thereof
(Filoteo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 79543, October
16, 1996).
(B) Under Section 2 of PD 532, highway robbery is
defined as “the seizure of any person for ransom,
extortion, or other unlawful purposes, or the taking
away of the property of another by means of violence
against or intimidation of person or force upon things
or other unlawful means, committed by any person on
any Philippines highway.” Hence, the elements of
highway robbery are:
(a) Intent to gain;
(b) Unlawful taking of property of another;
(c) Violence against or intimidation of any person;
(d) Committed on a Philippine highway.
To obtain a conviction for highway robbery, the
prosecution must prove that the accused were
organized for the purpose of committing robbery
indiscriminately. If the purpose is only a particular
robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if
there are at least four armed participants (See People
v. Mendoza, GR No. 104461, February 23, 1996).
7. Q: Distinguish Highway Robbery under PD No.
532 from Robbery committed on a highway. (2000
Bar)
A: Highway Robbery under PPD 532 differs from
ordinary Robbery committed on a highway in these
respects:
(1) In Highway Robbery under PD 532, the robbery is
committed indiscriminately against persons who
commute in such highways, regardless of the
potentiality they offer; while in ordinary Robbery
committed on a highway, the robbery is committed
only against predetermined victims;
(2) It is Highway Robbery under PD 532, when the
offender is a brigand or one who roams in public
highways and carries out his robbery in public
highways as venue, whenever the opportunity to do so
arises. It is ordinary Robbery under the RPC when the
commission thereof in a public highway is only
incidental and the offender is not a brigand; and
(3) In Highway Robbery under PD 532, there is
frequency in the commission of the robbery in public
highways and against persons traveling thereat;
whereas ordinary robbery in public highways is only
occasional against a predetermined victim, without
frequency in public highways.
8. Q: (a) Ka Jacinto, an NPA commander, was
apprehended with unlicensed firearms and
explosives. He was accordingly charged with
illegal possession of said firearms and explosives.
He now questions the filing of the charges on the
ground that they are deemed absorbed in a
separate charge of rebellion filed against him.
Decide the issue.
(b) Suppose Ka Jacinto, using one of the
unlicensed firearms, shot and killed his neighbor
in an altercation. May the charge of murder and
illegal possession of firearms be deemed absorbed
in the separate charge of rebellion filed against
him? Resolve the matter with reasons. (1990) Bar
A:
(a) The charge of illegal possession of firearms and
explosives is deemed absorbed in the crime of
rebellion, such possession being a necessary means
for the perpetration of the latter crime. (Elias v.
Rodriguez, 107 Phil 659)
(b) The charges here could not be absorbed in the
separate charge of rebellion as it is clear that the act of
murder, coupled with the possession of an unlicensed
firearm, was not in furtherance of the rebellion.
9. Q: PH killed OJ, his political rival in the
election campaign for Mayor of their town. The
Information against PH alleged that he used an
unlicensed firearm in the killing of the victim, and
this was proved beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution. The trial court convicted PH of two
crimes: Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearms.
Is the conviction correct? Reason briefly. (2004
Bar)
A: No. The conviction of PH for two crimes is not
correct. Under the new law on illegal possession of
firearms and explosives, RA 8294, a person may only
be criminally liable for illegal possession of firearm if
no other crime is committed therewith; If a homicide or
murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, such use shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
PH therefore may only be convicted of murder and the
use of an unlicensed firearm in its commission may
only be appreciated as a special aggravating
circumstance, provided that such use is alleged
specifically in the Information for Murder.

10. Can a crime in Special Penal Laws absorbed in

crimes in Revised Penal Code?
A.: A violation of a Special Law can never
absorb a crime punishable under the Revised Penal
Code.
In the case of People vs. Rodriguez,[39] it
was held that the use of firearms is an
element of rebellion, so a rebel cannot be further
prosecuted for illegal possession of
firearms. As explained by the Court:
“While it is true that in the crime of rebellion there is no
allegation that the firearm in
question is one of those used in carrying on the,
rebellion in that the same was borne by the
accused without a license, the same would lot [“not”,
sic] make the present charge different
from the one included in the crime of rebellion, for it
appears front the record that one of
the firearms used in furtherance thereof is the same
pistol with which the accused is now
charged.
“In fact, that pistol was presented in the rebellion case
as evidence. Nor is the fact that
there is no allegation in the rebellion case that the
carrying of the firearm by the accused
was without license of any consequence, for it can be
safely assumed that it was so not only
because the accused was a dissident but because the
firearm was confiscated from his
possession.”