Understanding e Government Failure in The Developing Country Context A Process Oriented Study

Information Technology for Development
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Understanding e-government failure in the

developing country context: a process-oriented
study
Panom Gunawong & Ping Gao
To cite this article: Panom Gunawong & Ping Gao (2017) Understanding e-government failure in
the developing country context: a process-oriented study, Information Technology for Development,
23:1, 153-178, DOI: 10.1080/02681102.2016.1269713
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INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT, 2017
VOL. 23, NO. 1, 153–178
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02681102.2016.1269713
Understanding e-government failure in the developing

country context: a process-oriented study
Panom Gunawonga and Ping Gaob
a
School of Public Administration, Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration, Chiang Mai University,
Chiang Mai, Thailand; bGlobal Development Institute, The University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
This research aims to investigate the underlying process-based Actor-network theory;
causes of e-government failure. Through the lens of actor-network accumulated process;
theory, this paper presents a process-oriented study of the failure developing countries;
of Thailand’s Smart ID Card project. Adding to the extant e-government failure;
process-oriented study;
knowledge on e-government failures that attributes this Thailand
phenomenon to internal and external factors, this paper argues
that the reason the project failed was a cumulative process of
failure to create and maintain the actor-network. Policy
implications for developing countries to efficiently manage their
e-government initiatives are given, such as adopting an open
principle in setting e-government project objectives and initiating
the actor-network; implementing the e-government target in
stages based on prepared environment; allowing an
e-government system to evolve according to the degree of
readiness in the information and communications technology
(ICT) system design, implementation and local adoption; and
including large, nationwide projects as part of a national
informatization strategy.
1. Introduction
This paper addresses one important topic covered by this journal: national initiatives that
facilitate the contribution of information and communications technology (ICT) to econ-
omic growth and structural change in the context of developing countries. Since the
mid-1990s, the widespread adoption of Internet-based ICT has encouraged many
countries, both developed and developing, to adopt e-governments, which were expected
to transform the public administrative system and to improve the efficiency of public
service (Holliday, 2002; Wescott, 2001). As early as 2003, 198 countries had implemented
e-government projects (Haldenwang, 2004). According to Navarra and Cornford (2005,
p. 9), “e-government involves the creation, development and interlinking of a variety of
social, institutional and technological ecologies to deliver services which are perceived
as legitimate, innovative, useful and welfare enhancing.” This statement implies that
e-government projects are complex and involve multiple tasks, including constructing a
CONTACT Ping Gao ping.gao@manchester.ac.uk Global Development Institute, The University of Manchester,
Arthur Lewis Building, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK
Sajda Qureshi is the accepting Associate Editor for this article.
© 2017 Commonwealth Secretariat
154 P. GUNAWONG AND P. GAO
large-scale ICT infrastructure, restructuring public activities, and offering a broad range of
public services. Because of their complexity, e-government projects generally risk undesir-
able outcomes, for example, budget overspending, falling behind schedule, fewer func-
tions, and failure to achieve the original objectives of the project (Goldfinch, 2007). The
situation in the developing world, where 80% of e-government projects have failed to
achieve part or all of their main goals, is even more severe (UNDESA, 2003). Some projects
– for example, Thailand’s Smart ID Card project, which is analyzed in this paper – have even
been abandoned.
As a widely existing phenomenon, e-government failure has recently received
increased research attention from both information systems and public administration
scholars (Goldfinch, 2007; Gronlund & Horan, 2005). However, most studies have
focused on developed countries, but e-government failure in developing countries
appears poorly understood (Ciborra, 2005; Stanforth, 2007). Moreover, the majority of
the literature has focused on identifying the external economic and technological
elements and internal organizational factors that impact the implementation and adop-
tion of e-government projects. We lack knowledge of the dynamic processes that different
causes accumulate, leading to e-government failure. The process drivers that lead to
e-government failure are poorly understood.
Through a case study of Thailand’s Smart ID Card project, this paper aims to address
these research gaps and to enhance our understanding of the underlying process-
based causes of e-government failure in the context of a developing country. Our research
question is as follows: how do different causes emerge, accumulate and ultimately lead to
e-government project failure?
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature on e-govern-
ment in developing countries, focusing on failure phenomena. In Section 3, we introduce
the actor-network theory (ANT), justifying it as an appropriate theoretical lens for our
research. In Section 4, we describe the case background and data collection and data
analysis methods. In Section 5, we draw upon ANT terminologies to dissect the case of
Thailand’s Smart ID Card project. The final two sections discuss the theoretical findings
on e-government failures. Useful lessons are drawn for countries to prevent failures in
their e-government initiatives. We also discuss the potential of ANT to uncover the
deep causes of the ICT project failures.
2. E-government and its failure in developing countries

This paper focuses on the failure of e-government projects in developing countries. In
accordance with Bharadwaj, Keil, and Mähring (2009), we address implementation
failure, which is defined as the failure of an e-government project to be implemented,
failure to be deployed or failure to achieve its main targets as planned (UNDESA, 2003).
To obtain an overall view of the extant knowledge and identify the research gaps regard-
ing the causes of the failure of e-government in developing countries, we conducted a sys-
tematic literature review. We referred to the structured and systematic approach of
Webster and Watson (2002) in selecting the relevant journals and articles for review.
First, e-government is a research subject in the disciplines of public administration and
information systems (Goldfinch, 2007; Gronlund & Horan, 2005; Heeks & Bailur, 2007).
Seven information system journals and seven public administration journals were selected
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT 155
for review, all of which were ranked as “best quality” by the ISI Web of Knowledge. Inves-
tigations were then undertaken one issue at a time and one article at a time. Only a few
articles were found on e-government in developing countries, indicating that high-level
research on this topic has been rare in both fields. Next, we searched the electronic
journal database in our library and identified six journals that focus on e-government.
We then scanned every issue of these six journals. To identify relevant articles, we first
read the titles and then the abstracts of the articles. We read the full texts of the articles
that the screening indicated were relevant to our theme. Forty-three articles were found to
be useful. Last, to ensure the inclusion of articles from back issues, we investigated the ABI
and EBSCO databases using the keywords “e-government in developing countries” and
“electronic government in developing countries.” It was found that most of the relevant
articles located in this manner were the same as those identified using the first two
methods. We found only eight additional relevant articles. These 51 articles included
both empirical and documentary research. Because the objective of this review is to
explore real and implicit e-government phenomena in developing countries, we ultimately
selected the 36 empirical articles for review. The selected journals are listed in Appendix
1. The review results are documented in Appendices 2 and 3. Specifically, Appendix 2 sum-
marizes the research foci, findings, frameworks, analytical approaches, and methods of the
selected articles. Appendix 3 categorizes the factors that cause e-government failures in
developing countries.
The literature review result disclosed important research gaps. First, the majority of the
literature on e-government in developing countries has addressed the issue of e-govern-
ment service adoption by citizens, e-government usage in organizations, and e-govern-
ment website design. Taking e-government in Malaysia as example, Isa, Suhami, Safie,
and Semsudin (2011) have investigated the usability and accessibility of Malaysian e-gov-
ernment websites. Lean, Zailani, Ramayah, and Fernando (2009) have focused on the
factors influencing the intention to use e-government services among citizens in Malaysia,
identifying the elements of trust, perceived usefulness, perceived relative advantage, per-
ceived image, and perceived complexity. Hussein, Karim, Mohamed, and Ahlan (2007)
have analyzed the organizational factors that influence e-government success in selected
public-sector agencies in Malaysia, including top management support, decision-making
structure, management style, managerial ICT knowledge, goal alignment, and resource
allocation. Seng, Jackson, and Philip (2010) have examined cultural barriers and enablers
in organizations that have either impeded or facilitated the implementation of e-govern-
ment initiatives. They contrasted two cases in Malaysia: one displaying constraining
characteristics that impeded e-government service use and the other displaying enabling
characteristics that facilitated use. Second, some scholars have revealed that many e-gov-
ernment project implementation processes are flawed (Gronlund & Horan, 2005). Never-
theless, this research primarily uses model- and category-based frameworks to identify
several factors that have constrained the implementation of e-government projects,
including retarded economic growth, low productivity, lack of skilled personnel, bad ICT
infrastructure, poor Internet access, high computer illiteracy, and so on, in the developing
world (Chen, Chen, Huang, & Ching, 2006). Both the failure process and the dynamic mech-
anisms of this complex phenomenon have been largely ignored. Specifically, of the 36
empirical articles, only 3 articles were process-oriented studies; in contrast, the other 33
articles held static views of the e-government failure phenomenon (Appendix 2). Finally,
e-government projects are typically complex in nature, and their implementation requires
many actors with varied resources for and different interests in these projects. If actors are
to work together efficiently, they must be co-ordinated. However, papers normally focus
on the role of one specific type of actor in a particular e-government initiative, such as citi-
zens and public agencies (Chircu, 2008; Rowley, 2011). They often fail to provide a full
picture of the common efforts of various actors.
In concluding the literature review, we argue that more research efforts are required to
understand the process of e-government project implementation, during which various
challenges can appear at various stages. Furthermore, we should focus on the interactions
of different actors when collectively addressing the emerging challenges that determine
the success or failure of a project (Madon, Sahay, & Sahay, 2004). In this paper, we draw
upon ANT to investigate these phenomena in the case of Thailand’s Smart ID Card
project to shed light on the deep roots of the causes of the failure of e-government in
the developing world.
3. ANT as an analytical lens

In this section, we introduce ANT terminologies and methods, showing that ANT offers an
appropriate lens to investigate the causes and processes of e-government failure.
3.1. The ANT literature

In this article, we aim to demonstrate that e-government failure occurs through a cumu-
lative process. ANT serves as the theoretical lens for a case study of the Thai Smart ID Card
project. ANT defines an actor-network as composed of both human and non-human
elements. It allows researchers to uncover and expose the motivations and actions of
various human actors, which cause them to attempt to align their interests around the
non-human “artifact” (Walsham & Sahay, 1999). ANT offers researchers a powerful tool
to analyze the development and usage of a technological artifact as a socio-technological
process (Lyytinen & Yoo, 2002). Some examples of such research efforts include the follow-
ing. Monteiro (2000) has applied the ANT method to examine the construction of infor-
mation infrastructure by different private and public organizations. Lyytinen and Fomin
(2002) have interpreted the historically negotiated process of the design of the first gen-
eration of mobile telecommunications standards. They note both that diverse groups of
social actors, namely, government organizations, engineers, entrepreneurs, consumers,
and so on, must engage in this process and that the interests of those groups must be
aligned. Faraj, Kwon, and Watts (2004) demonstrate how actors have acted and reacted
both to each other and to the emergent technological definition of the Internet
browser. They observe that a spiral development pattern has incorporated a complex
interplay among various actors around beliefs regarding what a browser should be.
They attribute the complex interdependence of disparate elements of the Web browser
of today to the attempts of actors to skew the development process to their advantage.
Allen (2004) explains the early development of personal digital assistant technology by
describing the enrollment strategies of various actors.
Particularly relevant to the research objectives of this paper, ANT by its nature can offer
researchers rich insights into the failure of a technological project, which is a type of non-
human artifact, through the lens of actor-network building and maintenance. More specifi-
cally, ANT attributes this failure to the failed creation and maintenance of an actor-
network, which is evident from the original works by the founding ANT theorists. Law
and Callon (1992) trace the actor-network of the failed project of a British military aircraft,
which consisted of the existing industry, labor, and government. These actors failed to
align themselves with each other to develop and produce a new aircraft. Consequently,
the shape and fate of this project were determined by the degree of privacy for project
builders to make mistakes without interference by other actors (Stalder, 2002). Latour
(1996) explains the demise of Aramis, the revolutionary public transportation system of
Paris. He argues that this technological system failed not because any particular actor
killed it but because the actors collectively failed to sustain it by negotiating and adapting
to a changing social situation (Tatnall & Gilding, 1999). Callon (1986) uses ANT as a theor-
etical lens to investigate the declining scallop population in St. Brieuc Bay. The main actors
in this network include three researchers, their associated scientific community, the gov-
ernment, and fishermen. Because the scallops were fished to species-threatening levels,
the fishermen were concerned about their livelihoods. The researchers wanted to exper-
iment with new Japanese intensive-farming techniques in an attempt to restock the bay.
In explaining various stages of scallop development, the author offers an account of not
only how power relationships were constructed, maintained, or destroyed within the
network but also how certain actors persuaded others to comply.
In recent years, scholars have drawn upon ANT to understand how and why ICT projects
fail to be implemented or used. For example, Gao (2007) analyzes the causes of failure to
implement a wireless local-area network standard in China, which was that different actors
established two contradictory networks, namely, counter-networks (Castells, 2000), that
could not cooperate in key project implementation decisions. Mähring, Holmström, Keil,
and Montealegre (2004) explores why a technological project could not deliver the
intended outcome. Sarker, Sarker, and Sidorova (2006) explain the implementation
failure of an ICT-supported business process change initiative. Agreeing with Gronlund
and Horan (2005), they find that the properties of the social structure constructed by differ-
ent actors in an ICT project determined the success or failure of the project. Our paper
extends the application of ANT to the analysis of e-government failure.
3.2. ANT terminologies

ANT aims to describe the process through which a society of actors tie themselves
together into networks built and maintained to achieve a particular goal (Stalder, 2002).
Callon (1986) calls this process of actor-network formation and maintenance “translation,”
which is divided into four moments: problematization, interessement, enrollment, and
mobilization. The process of a project from formation to collapse can be described as
failure in translation. Crises can appear during any stage. If crises cannot be addressed
and therefore accumulate, the translation process will fail to proceed and the actor-
network can collapse (Greener, 2006; Mähring et al., 2004). This paper uses the four
moments of translation as the core method for analyzing Thailand’s Smart ID Card project.
The implementation of e-government projects can be delineated as a process of the
association and disassociation of the actor-network. When using ANT to interpret the
sequence of events that led to business process change failure at a telecommunications
company in the United States, Sarker et al. (2006) provide a good summary of the relevant
terminologies of actor-network translation, a term originally coined by Callon (1986).
Based on these two works, the following table introduces the ANT vocabulary used in
our case study (Table 1).
Translation involves creating a temporary social order or the movement from one order
to another through changes in the interest alignments in a network (Sarker et al., 2006).
Problematization is the first moment of translation. At this moment, the focal actor, an
organization with the capacity of establishing and controlling an actor-network, creates
the project and identifies other participating actors from its point of view. One major chal-
lenge for the focal actor is to negotiate with others to establish an obligatory passage
point (OPP) that is acceptable to all. The OPP is a certain point that forces all actors to con-
verge on a shared topic, purpose, and action plan. The OPP relates to the process through
which the focal actor convinces all other actors to accept the proposal of a network. Each
actor must pass the OPP to achieve its interests (Callon, 1986). For example, in the British
military aircraft project, the project management of designing a new strategic jet fighter
became an OPP between representatives of government and aerospace engineers (Law
& Callon, 1992).
At the interessement moment, the focal actor convinces the other actors to align
their interests around the project target and motivates them to overcome obstacles
to passing through the OPP. In doing so, the focal actor often must manipulate
necessary devices, such as standards, budgeting, meetings, debates, and conversa-
tions, to lure others into fitting positions in the network (Callon, 1986; Sarker
et al., 2006).
Table 1. ANT vocabulary used in this case study.

Vocabulary Definitions
Actor Any human or non-human element that causes others to become dependent upon itself and translate
their will into its language (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1996; Sarker et al., 2006)
Artifact A non-human actor created by an actor-network (Walsham & Sahay, 1999)
Actor-network A heterogeneous network of aligned interests, including people, technology, and organizations
(Walsham & Sahay, 1999)
Betrayal A situation in which actors do not abide by the agreements arising from the enrollment of their
representatives (Callon, 1986)
Device A tool or thing used by the focal actor in locking other actors into proper positions in the process of
interessement, for example, texts, conversations, meetings, and debates (Callon, 1986)
Enrollment The third moment of translation, in which the other actors in the network accept (or become aligned
with) the interests and roles defined for them by the focal actor (Callon, 1986)
Focal actor The actor with the capacity to establish and control an actor-network (Callon, 1986)
Interessement The second moment of translation involving negotiation with actors to accept the definition of the
focal actor (Callon, 1986)
Mobilization A set of methods used by the focal actor to ensure that all the actors’ representatives or spokespersons
act according to the agreement and do not betray the initiator’s interest (Callon, 1986)
OPP A situation that must occur for all the actors to be able to achieve their interests, as defined by the focal
actor (Callon, 1986; Sarker et al., 2006)
Problematization The first moment of translation, during which the focal actor defines the identity and interests of the
other actors as consistent with its own, establishes translation as an OPP, and thus renders itself
indispensable (Callon, 1986)
Swift translation A process by which an embedded actor-network rapidly inherits actors, relationships, roles, and
agreements from its host actor-network with little involvement of thorough negotiation (Mähring
et al., 2004)
Translation The alignment process of the interests of different actors to the interests of the focal actor (Callon,
1986; Law & Callon, 1992)
Trojan actor A potentially fatal threat by an actor to its host actor-network that can betray the initial
problematization (Mähring et al., 2004)
If interessement is successful, enrollment will occur when the focal actor negotiates
with other actors to define their roles in creating or implementing the technological arti-
fact, and uses various strategies to convince them to align their interests with their desig-
nated roles (Callon, 1986). At this moment, swift translation, which is a process in which an
actor rapidly inherits relationships, roles, and agreements from its host actor-network, can
occur. A Trojan actor-network, which is a betrayal of the host actor-network established in
the initial problematization stage, might emerge (Mähring et al., 2004).
The final moment is mobilization, which aims both to keep the actors’ interests aligned
with that of the focal actor and to ensure that the actor-network works as a single unit to
achieve the goal as planned. Failure in mobilization indicates that the actor-network is
betrayed by some actors and will collapse (Callon, 1986).
4. Research methods
4.1. Case study design
A case study in general is suitable for answering “how” or “why” questions about a con-
temporary set of events (Yin, 2002), and in particular our research objective of under-
standing how do different causes emerge, accumulate, and ultimately lead to e-
government project failure. Thailand’s Smart ID Card project will serve as our study
sample. This project was initiated in 2003 by the Thai Cabinet as part of its desire to
use smart ID cards, a state-of-the-art technology, to revolutionize the national public
administration system and transform Thailand into a world leader in public service mod-
ernization. The use of new ICT in the public sector was expected to reduce corruption,
increase transparency, and improve governance. The project was to be implemented in
four stages and to conclude by 2007. However, as shown in Table 2, the stage goals
were not achieved according to that timeline. Only 12 million ID cards were ultimately
issued, far fewer than the original target of covering all 64 million Thai citizens (Depart-
ment of Provincial Administration, 2004). Moreover, these cards had no electronic func-
tionality and could not replace the identity cards, civil servant cards, and medical care
cards that people already used. During the process of the Smart ID Card project
implementation, various problems continued to emerge, cumulatively leading to
project failure.
The Cabinet was the focal actor of the Smart ID Card actor-network, making
decisions about key issues regarding the project. Other main actors included the Min-
istry of ICT, the Ministry of the Interior, and the citizens. The Ministry of ICT was the
national authority regulating the ICT industry therefore was (of course) ordered to
take over card production in the Smart ID Card project. The Ministry of the Interior
was responsible for citizen database management. It was in charge of card distribution.
The citizens were the card users. These actors had different interests in and varied
resources available to, this project and accepted different responsibilities (Table 3).
For the purpose of coordination, the Cabinet formed the Committee for the Integration
and Reform Registration System (CIRRS). Chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, the
CIRRS included relevant ministers, high-ranking officers from various government
departments, and ICT and management experts. The Smart ID Card project is a good
case for us to understand the technological and social factors that determine the
Table 2. Intended goals and outcomes of the smart ID card project.

Intended goals Outcomes of project implementation
Phase 1, 2004 . An ICT vendor was awarded the contract to produce 12
million smart ID cards under the supervision of the Ministry
. To produce the 1st batch of 12 million smart ID cards of ICT.
. A test by the NECTEC found that all the ID cards produced
and issue them to citizens
.
had misspecifications.
To replace medical treatment cards and social security
. The smart ID cards could not be used electronically or
cards
. To enable smart ID card holders to access both public replace any other cards.
. The Ministry of ICT, therefore, was opposed to the Ministry
and private services via electronic machines or
of the Interior issuing them to citizens.
websites
Phase 2, 2005 . The Cabinet forced the Ministry of the Interior to accept the
1st batch of 12 million smart ID cards.
. The cards began to be officially issued to citizens in
. To produce and issue the 2nd batch of 26 million
October 2005.
smart ID cards
. Production of the 2nd batch of 26 million smart ID cards
. To replace cash cards, debit cards, credit cards, and
telephone cards with the smart ID cards was not completed on a timely basis.
. The smart ID cards could not be used electronically or
. To use the smart ID card for residence registration,
replace any other cards.
referenda, and elections
Phase 3, 2006 . Bidding for the production of the 2nd batch smart ID cards
• To produce and issue the 3rd batch of 26 million smart did not go through.
ID cards . In August 2006, the Ministry of the Interior stopped issuing
• To replace passports, driving licences, debit cards, and smart ID cards because it had run out of stock.
credit cards with the smart ID cards . In September 2006, a military coup overthrew the
government in Thailand and interrupted the Smart ID Card
project.
Phase 4, 2007 . The Smart ID Card project was investigated by the new
• To give the smart ID card alternative uses, such as dual government for corruption and a lack of transparency.
contact, in other words, either contact or contact- . A magnetic card was issued to citizens and was used
less instead of the smart ID cards.
Table 3. Actors in the actor-network of the smart ID card project.

Actors Goals and interests Resources and challenges Tasks
Cabinet Revolutionizes Thai public Has a strong political will but lacks Negotiates with, collaborates
services using the Smart financial and legitimate resources and with, and motivates the other
ID Card project technological capability, in addition to actors
being unstable
Ministry of Gains leadership in cutting- Lacks knowledge, experience, and Produces blank, high-capacity
ICT edge technology of smart technological resources smart ID cards
ID cards
Ministry of Has centralized control over Has only fundamental citizen data; Distributes smart ID cards to all
the citizen data different databases are not integrated citizens, allowing them to have
Interior access to useful public services
Citizens Enjoy improved public Lacks readiness for new public services Adopt smart ID card services
services
consequences of an e-government project in a developing country context. This impor-

tant case occurred in the past decade. It is not a new case, but academic analysis of it
has yet to be published. Moreover, e-government failure remains common today when
emerging ICT is used. The findings from the Thai Smart ID Card case have both aca-
demic and practical significance.
4.2. Data collection and analysis

According to Rose, Jones, and Truex (2005, p. 146), the process of actor-network formation
“cannot be understood in isolation from the situational conditions which both make it
possible, and frame its subsequent interpretation.” Accordingly, we have adopted a con-
textual, process-oriented research approach (Holmes & Poole, 1993; Langley, 1999). The
ANT terminologies (Table 1) are the unifying lexicon of our research and the four
moments of translation form the research structure that guides our data collection and
analysis. In particular, we follow the processes of problematization, interessement, enroll-
ment, and mobilization to narrate the failure process of the Smart ID Card project. Follow-
ing Latour’s (2005) argument that an ANT analysis should take the actors as the study
subjects, we articulate the specific roles and actions of different actors at each translation
moment. Furthermore, we link the dynamic social and institutional contexts to the actor-
network translation process, drawing upon specific social and institutional contexts to
understand why actors in the Smart ID Card project failed to form and maintain an
actor-network and why the translation could not succeed.
We needed to collect data on the process of the Smart ID Card project (Table 2), the
interrelations of the various actors (Table 3), and the contexts. For this purpose, we first
conducted documentary research. Initially, we gathered general information about the
e-government and the Smart ID Card project in Thailand from the websites of various gov-
ernment organizations, for example, the Ministry of the Interior (http://www.moi.go.th).
We also referred to newspaper clippings (available from Thai newspaper databases in a
Thai university library) both for more detail and to trace the past events of the project.
We searched online newspapers using keywords such as “ID card,” “identity card,” and
“Smart ID Card project” in both Thai and English. Overall, 442 newspaper clippings were
collected for this study. Reports of public media interviews and speeches both by high-
level government officials (such as ministers and the Prime Minister) and by key
persons in the Smart ID Card project were found in the news. The aforementioned data
sources helped us obtain the real scenarios of the project and offered us insights into
the interests and roles of the different actors and their involvement in the project. More-
over, we were able to access all the minutes of the 2003 CIRRS meetings that discussed key
issues concerning the design and diffusion of the smart ID card. The 64 pages of minutes
were particularly useful for us to understand the process of actor-network formation in this
project.
To draw a full, detailed picture of the Smart ID Card project, we interviewed 41 execu-
tives, officials, scholars, and citizens, all of whom participated in this project. The interview
arrangements are summarized in Appendix 4, with the names of the informants redacted.
The interviews were semi-structured. Before the interviews, we contacted our informants
by letter, introducing the objective of our research and clarifying the purpose of the inter-
view. We informed the interviewees that in the interviews, they would be asked to outline
the process of the Smart ID Card project and to identify milestone events. To broaden the
points of interest regarded as relevant by the interviewees, we did not follow a question-
naire during the interviews (Blaikie, 2000). However, for each interviewee, we specifically
prepared some questions based on his or her experience and knowledge strengths
regarding the project. The interviews, which were conducted in Thai, were recorded,
with each interview lasting approximately 45 minutes.
The above methods, including documentary research and interviews, yielded a report
of more than 1000 pages, which outlined the contour of a sequence of events and exhib-
ited both specific decision-making outcomes and the reasons for those outcomes. We
then coded the report with the ANT terminologies provided in Table 1. Finally, we
depicted the process of the Smart ID Card project as consisting of four moments of trans-
lation, during which a sustainable actor-network failed to be formed for reasons such as
actor betrayal and inadequate devices for use, and so on, leading to project failure.
To validate data from different sources, we performed data triangulation (Blaikie,
2000). For documentary research, this study used multiple sources of data to
compare the data for consistency. With regard to interview information, the interview
scripts obtained from multi-informants were compared to justify the logic and coher-
ence of the answers. Subsequently, the data from both the documentary research
and the interviews were compared again for consistency of information to create a logi-
cally coherent justification for the analysis. In interpreting the collected data, we
engaged in two types of dialogical reasoning to develop an empirically based under-
standing through dialogues (Monteiro, 2000; Reznitskaya et al., 2009). First, during dis-
cussion between the authors, we triangulated the data from one perspective that had a
deep background in the Thai government system and from another perspective that
analyzed the data from the viewpoint of an outsider generally entrenched in electronic
business research from the ANT perspective. As another dialogical perspective, the
authors engaged in discussion with the interviewees who acted as practitioners in
the Thai e-government context.
5. Case study of the failure of the smart ID card project

5.1. Flaws in problematization
The life cycle of an actor-network begins with the problematization stage, when the focal
actor selects actors. The focal actor must also determine the project objective, which is the
OPP that should align the various actors’ interests (Callon, 1986). In the actor-network of
the Smart ID Card project, the Cabinet as the focal actor established the objective of
the project as the issuance of smart ID cards to all 64 million Thai citizens. This objective
was infeasible and could not work as a rational OPP that would hold important actors
together. Each actor faced obstacles in undertaking efforts to achieve its individual task
and to pass the OPP. For example, the Ministry of ICT was responsible for supplying
blank smart ID cards, although it did not have knowledge of card design and lacked experi-
ence in organizing card production (Table 3).
To understand the background of the Smart ID Card project initiative and the OPP set
by the Cabinet, we examined the minutes of the 2003 CIRRS meetings in which the project
plan was discussed. Meetings were held on 20 January, 5 March, 30 April, 19 June, 31 July,
and 12 December. We found that from the start, the Cabinet was determined to establish
the Smart ID Card project with a high target. The Ministry of ICT and the Ministry of the
Interior did not object to the decision of the Cabinet because they were eager to
receive enormous government investments. The setting of an irrational objective for the
Smart ID Card project turned out to be the starting point of the failure to maintain the
actor-network. The head of an ID card issuing station made the following statement:
In creating this project, the Cabinet ignored the interests of citizens. They did not consider the
readiness of our society and the capability of the public sector to adopt the smart ID card. As a
result, the project objective was set to have Thailand become the world leader in e-govern-
ment by equipping every Thai citizen with a smart ID card. This was impossible to accomplish
within even 10 years. This project was very complicated, involving more than 60 million citi-
zens. In my opinion, it had already failed when it was initiated.
5.2. Incompletion of interessement

At the interessement moment, the focal actor uses various devices to lock important actors
into their respective positions and to establish a balance of powers between actors, ensur-
ing that these actors can overcome a series of obstacles and go through the OPP (Callon,
1986). In the actor-network of the Smart ID Card project, the interessement moment was
incomplete because of the inefficient use of relevant devices (Table 1), which further jeo-
pardized the actor-network. The Cabinet was not fully aware of the obstacles experienced
by the various actors while performing their respective tasks in the actor-network; thus, it
offered little help in addressing these problems. At the CIRRS meeting on 12 December
2003, the Ministry of the Interior said that it could not function as the hub of different
types of citizen data, which was the designated goal of the Cabinet. However, there
was no evidence in the meeting minutes that the Cabinet had attempted to maneuver rel-
evant public agencies possessing various citizen data to develop and build their database
and information systems under a coherent plan by the Ministry of the Interior. Moreover,
the Ministry of ICT reported that it was unable to issue the cards to the public by the dead-
line. Again, the Cabinet failed to undertake efficient steps and to utilize effective devices to
help this actor overcome these problems and pass the OPP (Table 3).
First, the government budget could have been a device for the focal actor to control
other actors (Stanforth, 2007). However, the budget available to the Cabinet for the
Smart ID Card project was limited, restricting its capabilities of the Cabinet to organize
the actor-network. An official from the Ministry of Interior described the scenario as
follows:
The project was enormous. The money allocated by the Cabinet was not enough to get the
jobs done. This budget was not sufficient even for the Ministry of ICT to produce blank
smart ID cards or the Ministry of the Interior to construct a technology infrastructure for citi-
zens all over the country to use the cards. Other agencies were almost not considered, for
example, hospitals that needed money to develop information systems compatible for the
ID cards and public agencies in remote northeastern areas requiring investment in network
infrastructure, computing equipment, and training to offer services to the card owners.
Second, although a standard could have offered non-human artifacts a universal

language for interaction within the actor-network (Markus, Steinfield, Wigand, & Minton,
2006), this device was ignored. A high-ranking officer from the Ministry of the Interior in
charge of citizen database management said that each organization developed its own
database within its own capabilities but neglected to integrate with other organizations.
He believed that the lack of a common database standard across public sectors severely
hindered the implementation of the Smart ID Card project.
Third, although a variety of actors within the actor-network could have referred to laws
and government regulations to effectively enforce the interessement (Callon, 1986; Sarker
et al., 2006), such devices were unavailable for the Smart ID Card project. Consequently,
the actors involved could not be locked into proper positions in designing, producing,
and diffusing Smart ID cards. A researcher from a Thai university made the following
comments:
According to the relevant Thai laws, when contacted by a citizen, a public agency must require
him to provide a photocopy of his identity card. This means in practice that the smart ID card
cannot be used in a smart way. Regardless of how much personal information the card can
offer and how good the information systems are in processing the smart ID card services,
the public agencies would still offer the same services and do the same thing as they normally
did. We need new laws and regulations to ensure that different organizations work together to
make the smart ID card function smartly.
5.3. Uncontrolled chaos in enrollment

During the enrollment phase, the focal actor enrolls other actors in the actor-network and
undertakes mobilization measures to ensure that these actors can accept the interests that
it has defined for them (Callon, 1986; Madon et al., 2004). In our case, errors in the enroll-
ment moment, together with impairments at the earlier problematization and interesse-
ment moments, resulted in a chaotic, out-of-control actor-network.
At the earlier problematization moment, the Cabinet assigned the Ministry of ICT the
task of producing a large number of blank smart ID cards, a high-tech artifact, within a
rigid, short timeframe (see Table 2). However, this ministry did not have the ability to
achieve this task. It had to enroll an ICT vendor in the actor-network of card production.
Unfortunately, this vendor was not strong in ID card design and production and had
not previously been involved in this business. This new actor had to perform a swift trans-
lation of its original interests, aligning its new interests with that of the Ministry of ICT. To
be specific, this vendor needed to explore a new area – smart ID cards – based on its estab-
lished technological advantage, which was not card design and production. Simul-
taneously, without powerful devices such as budgeting, the Ministry of ICT found it
difficult to manage the swift translation of the vendor and to help it overcome the tech-
nological obstacles to passing the Cabinet-established OPP. Indeed, the Ministry of ICT
could not influence the swift translation strategy of the vendor, which had strong political
support. Finally, the vendor successfully persuaded the Cabinet to accept its card design
and new specifications. The National Electronics and Computer Technology Centre
(NECTEC) conducted tests on blank card samples. The test results revealed problems in
the card design, specifically in the security mechanism and the memory storage manage-
ment solution. A director from the Ministry of ICT confirmed that the card was embedded
with a microchip that had limited memory space and information processing capability;
moreover, it did not support connections with major public databases. In addition, the
card did not have a solid structure, instead consisting of three layers that rendered it sus-
ceptible to damage and forgery.
The cards were issued when an integrated smart ID card infrastructure had not yet been
established. The citizen database was composed of several sub-systems controlled by
different government branches, none of which could communicate with each other
(Bangkok Post, 2005). However, because the Cabinet was eager to see a successful
Smart ID Card project put into place, it sided with the vendor. Under strong pressure
from the Cabinet, the Information and Communication Committee of the House stated:
“The project should not be scrapped due to what were considered minor technical
glitches” (Bangkok Post, 2009). The House urged the Ministry of the Interior to quickly
issue the cards to citizens notwithstanding the fact that the cards were made to the
wrong specifications.
Consequently, the Ministry of ICT lost control of the non-human artifact, the blank smart
ID card, and its actor-network responsible for card design and production. The cards were
produced according to the wrong specifications. Such a smart ID card could be called a
Trojan actor, the emergence of which was fatal to the host actor-network (Mähring
et al., 2004). In the citizens’ hands, it functioned as a normal card, not as the expected
smart ID card.
5.4. Betrayal in the actor-network

According to Sarker et al. (2006), flaws in translation can cause betrayal in the actor-
network, which can lead to a breakdown in the associations among actors and the immo-
bilization of the actor-network. In our case, the various problems described above in the
first three stages of translation led to betrayals across the entire actor-network. Specifically,
the Ministry of ICT and the ICT vendor betrayed the actor-network by not producing ID
cards with appropriate properties pursuant to the correct specifications. The swift trans-
lation of the vendor led to the appearance of a Trojan actor: the wrongly designed
card. This demolished the actor-network of the Smart ID Card project, which could not
accomplish its mission. Because of this series of betrayals, the Smart ID Card project ulti-
mately collapsed. In the end, this e-government initiative failed.
6. Discussion
6.1. Causes of the failure of the smart ID card project: a contextual analysis
Interpreting the Thai Smart ID Card project case using ANT terminologies, especially the
translation concept, we find that errors existed from the beginning of the social translation
process, that is, the problematization moment. The initial actor-network did not include
independent, professional organizations with valuable technological knowledge and prac-
tical experience in ICT project design and implementation. Consequently, an infeasible
objective was set, causing the focal actor to fail to establish an OPP that could hold the
important actors together. This failure was the starting point of the failure of the Smart
ID Card project. The interessement moment was incomplete because of a lack of strong
devices. The budget was insufficient, restricting the progress of the project. Other impor-
tant devices such as standards, laws, and regulations were not in place. Consequently, the
Cabinet could not motivate the actors to commit to their designated roles in the actor-
network. The enrollment moment presented an uncontrollable, chaotic status. Consistent
with Lambright (1994) and Mähring et al. (2004), chaos at the enrollment moment arose
from the effects of the inefficient management of swift translation, which in our case
occurred between the technology vendor and the Ministry of ICT in card production. Con-
sequently, we saw the emergence of a Trojan actor, the malfunctioning blank smart ID
cards. Finally, betrayals of the different actors in the actor-network caused the Smart ID
Card project to collapse.
According to Walsham (1997), contextual analysis is critical for an actor-network study

because such an analysis allows people to understand the mechanisms of actor-network
formation and maintenance and explains the success or failure of a project. E-government
practices tend to reflect the existing structures and ongoing reform processes of a country
(Nour, AbdelRahman, & Fadlalla, 2008; Wescott, 2001). Particularly in developing countries,
a national ICT project is often strongly affected by its political environment (Ciborra, 2005;
Gao, 2007). In Thailand, politics substantially interfered in the operations of public
agencies. It was normal for unqualified, but politically connected companies to receive
large shares in a national project, which was what occurred with the vendor responsible
for the ID card production in our case. The politicians often presented their own interests
in decision-making. The Smart ID Card project had been established through hype by poli-
ticians, who used it both to advance their political interests and to influence the public.
Moreover, the Thai political situation was unstable. The Thai government experienced fre-
quent reshuffles and the party controlling the Cabinet changed frequently. Throughout
the translation process, different cabinets played the role of the focal actor overseeing
the project. The instability of the focal actor led to the instability of the actor-network.
The initial ambition for the Smart ID Card project was not shared by new governments.
The enormous investment required could not be committed, and the actor-network of
the project was out of control. One senior officer told us, “Public policy changed every
time that we had a new Cabinet.” This policy discontinuity hindered progress. The
Cabinet, as the focal actor, had conflicting interests when aligning itself with the
project. Often, there were conflicts within the actor-network between actors supported
by different politicians.
6.2. Theoretical reflections

From the ANT perspective and through a process-oriented case study, this paper reveals
the dynamic mechanism of e-government failure. Our research contributes to the litera-
ture by validating the following general theoretical proposition: ICT project failure is a
cumulative process during which different challenges emerge at different stages. At
each stage, specific problems must be resolved to ensure that the actor-network survives
to the next stage, that the network is maintained, and that the project is successfully
implemented.
In addition to enriching the theoretical understanding of the mechanisms of ICT project
failure, this paper establishes the theoretical foundation for using ANT as a vehicle to dis-
close the mechanisms of ICT project failure. In line with Sarker et al. (2006), we argue for
using the four moments of translation as the core structure for investigating the project
process. Some ANT terminologies, for example betrayal, devices, swift transition and
Trojan actors, are particularly useful for explaining the underlying causes of success or
failure accumulated at various moments of translation (Table 1).
6.3. Policy implications

Useful lessons can be drawn from the case of the Thai Smart ID Card project for other
countries implementing national ICT projects. A project should begin with the formation
of a feasible objective that is acceptable to all the key actors. The focal actor should adopt
an open principle in initiating the actor-network. It must enroll relevant actors in the actor-
network and ensure that actors with strong interests and key resources have the oppor-
tunity to voice their concerns. The focal actor should implement measures both to
prevent the emergence of conflicts between actors and to resolve such conflicts if they
emerge. Necessary devices like budgets, laws, standards, and so on, should be available
so that the focal actor can maneuver to help each actor play its designated role in the
actor-network.
The outcome of an ICT project relies on the selection of a focal actor that can efficiently
manage the actor-network. The focal actor as the central unit plays a critical role in the
passage of e-government initiatives (Wescott, 2001). Ideally, the focal actor should be pro-
vided with a state of stability so that its interests in the maintenance and operation of the
actor-network can be sustained (Law & Callon, 1992). However, Thailand’s Smart ID Card
project was managed by an unqualified actor, the Cabinet, which experienced frequent
reshuffles. It would have been better to have an independent Parliamentary committee
to lead the project. Moreover, particularly in developing countries, the e-government
target should be implemented in stages and the e-government system should evolve
according to the degree of readiness, including domestic capabilities for ICT system
design and implementation, political status, local adoption level, and so on (Nour et al.,
2008). For example, Malaysia initiated an e-government plan as early as the mid-1990s,
but it was not until the mid-2000s that its e-government Internet portal began to offer
a broad range of services across the country, including a Generic Office Environment,
Electronic Procurement, a Human Resource Management Information System, a Project
Monitoring System, Electronic Services Delivery, an Electronic Labor Exchange, an
E-Sharia Court, and so on (Lean et al., 2009). The Smart ID Card project lacked the
support of a prepared environment. Finally, if possible, large nationwide projects such
as the Smart ID Card project should be included in the national informatization strategy.
Informatization is the production and use of ICT hardware, software, and services (Kraemer
& Dedrick, 1994; Seifert & Chung, 2009). One example of such a strategy is provided by the
State Council of China, which in 2005 published its National Informatization Development
Strategy 2006–2020. This publication established China’s 15-year goals for informatization
development, which included providing information infrastructure nationwide, building
an information-oriented national economy and society, enhancing the ability to apply
information technology among the public, and so on (People’s Daily, 2005). This type of
national strategy is a strong device for managing the actor-network in an e-government
initiative (Gao, 2007; Holliday, 2002).
7. Conclusions
Adding to the extant literature attributing e-government failure to several internal and
external factors, this paper demonstrates that this phenomenon should be investigated
as a cumulative process incurred by the failed creation and maintenance of an actor-
network around a feasible objective. Furthermore, from the ANT perspective, the founda-
tional causes of the failure of an ICT project can be traced and explained both by following
the four moments of the social translation process and by referring to other relevant ANT
terminologies as listed in Table 1. Specifically, the focal actor must ensure the smooth
translation of the actor-network by actively resolving various problems at different
moments. At the initial problematization moment, the focal actor must invite relevant
actors to contribute their ideas to establish the objective of the actor-network, thus ensur-
ing that the objective is feasible in terms of technology, timing, and finance. The formation
of an improper project objective can be the starting point of the failure of the actor-
network. At the interessement moment, the key challenge of the focal actor is to
support the other actors in the network in their efforts both to play their roles properly
and to prevent betrayals from occurring by employing various financial, technological,
and administrative devices. At the enrollment moment, the key challenge for the focal
actor is the mobilization of other actors to work on the tasks assigned to them. One key
concern of the focal actor is to avoid the emergence of Trojan actors. The focal actor
should be guaranteed a stable status.
This research has limitations that should be addressed in future work. In the Smart ID
Card project, it is evident that the actor-network failed to achieve stability, and mobiliz-
ation was not achieved. Accordingly, this paper analyzes only how different actors
betrayed the actor-network (leading to its failure) rather than considering the mobilization
moment in full terms. To explore the full strength of ANT, it would be ideal to select a case
presenting all four of the moments. Moreover, to expand the findings of this case study
regarding e-government failure, future research should consider different types of ICT pro-
jects by different types of organizations and in different countries. It is also necessary to
contrast successful cases with the Smart ID Card project in Thailand.
Acknowledgements
We thank the Review Editor, Gerald Grant, and the two reviewers for their constructive and detailed
comments, which helped us to improve our work and ultimately make it publishable.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Panom Gunawong is a lecturer in the School of Public Administration, Faculty of Political Science and
Public Administration at Chiang Mai University, Thailand. Dr Gunawong holds a Ph.D. in Develop-
ment Informatics from the University of Manchester, UK. His core areas of research are e-govern-
ment, social media in public administration, failure analysis and actor-network theory.
Ping Gao is with the Global Development Institute, the University of Manchester. His research
focuses on IT innovation and standardization, especially in the Chinese context and from govern-
ment perspective.
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Appendix 1. The selected journals for review
• Annual Review of Information Science and Technology

• Electronic Journal of e-Government (EJEG)
• Electronic Government: An International Journal
• Electronic Journal of Information Systems in Developing Countries
• Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions
• Government Information Quarterly
• International Journal of Electronic Government Research
• Information & Management
• Information Systems Journal
• Information Systems Research
• Journal of European Public Policy
• Journal of Government Information
• Journal of Information Technology
• Journal of Management Information Systems
• Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
• Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
• Journal of Social Policy
• MIS Quarterly
• Public Administration and Development
• Public Administration Review
Appendix 2. Summary of review articles on e-government in developing countries.
Analytical
Articles: authors, titles, and outlets Research focus Research findings Framework approach Method
Abanumy, A., Al-Badi, A., & Mayhew, P. (2005). E- Performance evaluation E-government websites had low accessibility Model based: W3C Static view Quantitative
government website accessibility: In-depth of e-government because of a lack of services, policies, and ICT web content research:
evaluation of Saudi Arabia and Oman. Electronic application experts accessibility questionnaire
Journal of e-Government (EJEG), 3, 99–106.
Al-Fakhri, M. O., Cropf, R. A., Kelly, P., & Higgs, Assessment of Government websites were ineffective Category based Static view Quantitative
G. (2008). E-government in Saudi Arabia: Between e-government because of a lack of regulations, trust, research:
promise and reality. International Journal of Electronic implementation training, and knowledge in society and questionnaire
Government Research (IJEGR), 4, 59–82. public agencies
Arif, M. (2008). Customer orientation in e-government Assessment of Government websites failed to achieve their Model based: Static view Qualitative research:
project management: A case study. EJEG, 6, 1–10. e-government objectives because of a lack of standardized Customer interview
implementation procedures, trained employees, and poor orientation model
knowledge management
Chang, I.-C., Li, Y.-C., Hung, W.-F., & Hwang, H.-G. User acceptance of e- Users rejected e-tax because of the slow speed Model based: Static view Quantitative
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT

(2005). An empirical study on the impact of quality tax application of the system and awareness of security and Technology research:
antecedents on tax payers’ acceptance of Internet privacy acceptance model questionnaire
tax filing systems. Government Information Quarterly
(GIQ), 22, 389–410.
Chen, D.-Y., Huang, T.-Y., & Hsiao, N. (2006). Performance evaluation E-complaints reduced the cost of citizen No framework Static view Quantitative
Reinventing government through on-line citizen of e-complaint involvement but failed to increase citizen research:
involvement in the developing world: A case study application satisfaction because there was no questionnaire
of Taipei city mayor’s e-mail box in Taiwan. Public organizational reform to support the new
Administration and Development, 26, 409–423. system
Chhabra, S., & Jaiswal, M. (2008). E-government Performance evaluation Issues of government websites included Category based Static view Mixed methods:
organizational performance framework: Case study of e-government transparency, organizational culture, ICT questionnaire,
of Haryana State in India – a log linear regression application infrastructure, and regulatory environment interview
analysis. IJEGR, 4, 57–80.
Ciborra, C., & Navarra, D. D. (2005). Good governance, Assessment of e- E-government in Jordan faced problems Theory based: New Process- Qualitative research:
development theory, and aid policy: Risks and government design because of the government’s top-down institutional oriented interview, meeting
challenges of e-government in Jordan. Information policy, demands, less citizen involvement, economics theory study
Technology for Development, 11, 141–159. and new technology
(Continued)
173
Continued.
174
Analytical
Fu, J.-R., Chao, W.-P., & Farn, C.-K. (2004). Determinants User acceptance of e- E-tax users were more satisfied than non-users Model based: Static view Quantitative
P. GUNAWONG AND P. GAO

of taxpayers’ adoption of electronic filing methods in tax application Technology research:
Taiwan: An exploratory study. Journal of Government Acceptance questionnaire
Information, 30, 658–683. Model
Gupta, M. P., & Jana, D. (2003). E-government Assessment of E-government reduced manpower and Category based Static view Qualitative research:
evaluation: A framework and case study. GIQ, 20, e-government increased automation and transparency interview
365–387. implementation
Higgo, H. A. (2003). Implementing an information Performance evaluation Factors hindering e-finance included fear of Category based Static view Qualitative research:
system in a large LDC bureaucracy: The case of the of e-finance employees, failure to learn lessons, interview
Sudanese Ministry of Finance. Electronic Journal of application insufficient standardization, and a
Information Systems in Developing Countries (EJISDC), bureaucratic system
14, 1–13.
Holliday, I., & Yep, R. (2005). E-government in China. Performance evaluation E-government in China was a surface change Model based Static view Quantitative
Public Administration and Development, 25, 239–249. of e-services rather than a fundamental system reworking research: online
survey
Hung, S.-Y., Chang, C.-M., & Yu, T.-J. (2006). User acceptance of e- The high acceptance of taxpayers can be Model based: Static view Quantitative
Determinants of user acceptance of the e- tax application explained from subjective norms and Theory of Planned research: e-mail
government services: The case of online tax filing perceived behaviour control Behaviour questionnaire
and payment system. GIQ, 23, 97–122.
Hussein, R., Karim, N. S. A., Mohamed, N., & Ahlan, Assessment of e- Factors predicting success of Framework based Static view Quantitative
A. R. (2007). The influence of organizational factors government e-government included goal alignment, research:
on information systems success in e-government implementation management style, and centralized decision- questionnaire
agencies in Malaysia. EJISDC, 29, 1–17. making
Hwang, C.-S. (2000). A comparative study of tax filing User satisfaction of e- Manual tax filing methods had a lower rate of Category based Static view Quantitative
methods: Manual, Internet, and two-dimensional bar tax application user satisfaction than 2D barcodes and research:
code. J. of Government Information, 27, 113–127. Internet filing methods questionnaire
Joia, L. A., & Zamot, F. (2002). Internet-based reverse Performance evaluation E-auctions were successful in terms of Framework based Static view Quantitative
auctions by the Brazilian government. EJISDC, 9, 1– of e-auction efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency research:
12. observation
Joia, L. A. (2007). A heuristic model to implement Success/failure analysis Three key success factors for e-government Category based Static view Qualitative research:
government-to-government projects. IJEGR, 3, 1–18. project were security system, organizational observation,
culture, and sufficient training interview
Joia, L. A. (2008). The impact of government-to- Success/failure analysis This project had a positive effect on the Framework based Static view Quantitative
government endeavors on the intellectual capital of intellectual capital of public agencies research:
public organizations. GIQ, 25, 256–277. questionnaire
Kumar, R., & Best, M. L. (2006). Impact and Assessment of The project failed because of a lack of trained Category based Static view Qualitative research:
sustainability of e-government services in e-government personnel, sustained public leadership, interviews,
developing countries: Lessons learned from Tamil implementation consistent evaluation and monitoring, and observation
Nadu, India. The Information Society, 22, 1–12. the involvement of all stakeholders
Lau, T. Y., Aboulhosen, M., Lin, C., & Atkin, D. J. (2008). Assessment of e- The e-government was in the development Framework based Static view Quantitative
Adoption of e-government in three Latin American government stage research: online
countries: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. implementation survey
Telecommunications Policy, 32, 88–100.
Luna-Reyes, L. F., Gil-Garcia, J. R., & Cruz, C. B. (2007). Assessment of e- E-government development was impacted by Theory based: Static view Qualitative research:
Collaborative digital government in Mexico. GIQ, 24, government organizational form, digital divides, and Institutional interview
808–826. implementation networks of decision makers and theory
stakeholders
Luna-Reyes, L. F., Gil-Garcia, J. R., & Estrada-Marroquin, Assessment of e- E-government initiatives were affected by Theory based: Process- Quantitative
M. (2008). The impact of institutions on government technology decisions and designs, and Institutional oriented research:
interorganizational IT projects in the Mexican federal implementation organizational structures, goals, and theory study questionnaire
government. IJEGR, 4, 27–42. performances
Madon, S. (2004). Evaluating the developmental Evaluation of e- E-government improved trust between Model based: Sen’s Static view Qualitative research:
impact of e-governance initiatives. EJISDC, 20, 1–13 government initiative citizens and the state, along with services notion of interview
impact and citizens’ quality of life capabilities
Mitra, R. K., & Gupta, M. P. (2008). A contextual Performance evaluation There were positive impacts on internal Framework based Static view Quantitative
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT

perspective of performance assessment in e- of e-government efficiency, employee satisfaction, and public research:
government: A study of Indian Police Administration. application satisfaction questionnaire
GIQ, 25, 278–302.
Mirchandani, D. A., Johnson, J. H., Jr., & Joshi, K. (2008). Assessment of e- E-government foci should be the integrated Framework based Static view Mixed methods:
Perspectives of citizens towards e-government in government platform, reliability of information, and questionnaire,
Thailand and Indonesia: A multigroup analysis. implementation citizen involvement interview
Information Systems Frontiers, 10, 483–497.
Mutshewa, A. (2007). The information behaviors of Assessment of e- Problems included insufficient standardized Category based Static view Qualitative research:
environmental planners: An exploratory study. GIQ, government information, a lack of skillful officers, and a interview
24, 429–442. implementation bureaucratic system
Parajuli, J. (2007). A content analysis of selected Performance evaluation Four main problems: lack of privacy, low Category based Static view Quantitative
government web sites: A case study of Nepal. EJEG, 5, of e-government accessibility, less interactivity, and few research: online
87–94. application usability features survey
Rahardjo, E., Mirachandani, D., & Joshi, K. (2007). E- Performance evaluation Issues for improving e-government included Category based Static view Quantitative
government functionality and website features: A of e-government website quality, citizen acceptance, and a research:
case study of Indonesia. Journal of Global Information application variety of necessary services questionnaire
Technology Management, 10, 31–50.
Sahu, G. P., & Gupta, M. P. (2007). Users’ acceptance of User acceptance of e- The acceptance rate was low due to the Framework based Static view Quantitative
e-government: A study of Indian Central Excise. government anxiety of users, less skilfull employees, and a research:
IJEGR, 3, 1–21. application lack of ICT facilities questionnaire
175
(Continued)
Continued.
176
Analytical
Santos, E. M. (2008). Implementing interoperability Assessment of e- E-government standardization was difficult Category based Static view Mixed methods:
P. GUNAWONG AND P. GAO

standards for electronic government: An exploratory government because of a lack of resources, technological questionnaire,
case study of the E-PING Brazilian framework. IJEGR, implementation incompatibility, and changes in the interviews
4, 103–112. technological context
Shi, Y. (2007). The accessibility of Chinese local Performance evaluation Chinese local government websites had Model based: W3C Static view Quantitative
government Web sites: An exploratory study. GIQ, of e-services significant accessibility problems model research: online
24, 377–403. survey
Stanforth (2007). Using actor-network theory to Success/failure analysis The trajectory of e-government projects Theory based: ANT Process- Qualitative research:
analyze e-government implementation in depended on the associations between the oriented interview, memo
developing countries. Information Technologies and actors study
International Development, 3, 35–60.
Subramanian, M. & Saxena, A. (2008). E-governance in Performance evaluation The project increased efficiency and service Category based Static view Qualitative research:
India: From policy to reality. A case study of of e-government speed, but lacked political will, the need for interview
Chhattisgarh online information system for citizen application change, and an ICT infrastructure
empowerment (CHOICE) project of Chhattisgarh
state of India. IJEGR, 4, 12–26.
Tseng, P. T. Y., Yen, D. C., Hung, Y.-C., & Wang, N. C. F. Performance evaluation E-government projects could be improved by Category based Static view Qualitative research:
(2008). To explore managerial issues and their of e-trade application having a concrete plan, reducing user interview
implications on e-government deployment in the resistance, and increasing employees’ ICT
public sector: Lessons from Taiwan’s Bureau of skills
Foreign Trade. GIQ, 25, 734–756.
Wang, Y.-S., & Liao, Y.-W. (2008). Assessing e- Success/failure analysis Five factors supported e-government success: Model based: De Static view Quantitative
government systems’ success: A validation of the De system quality, information quality, service Lone and McLean research:
Lone and McLean model of information systems quality, usefulness, and user satisfaction model questionnaire
success. GIQ, 25, 717–733.
Wangpipatwong, S., Chutimaskul, W., & Papasratorn, User acceptance of e- Perceived usefulness, ease of use, and Model based: Static view Quantitative
B. (2008). Understanding citizen’s continuance government computer self-efficacy affected citizens’ Technology research: online
intention to use e-government website: A composite application continuance intentions acceptance model survey
view of technology acceptance model and computer
self-efficacy. EJEG, 6, 55–64.
Wong, K., Fearon, C., & Philip, G. (2007). Understanding Stakeholder To enhance e-government development, Theory based: Static view Qualitative research:
e-government and e-governance: Stakeholders, involvement in e- citizens should be considered partners and Stakeholder interview
partnerships and CSR. International J. of Quality & government relevant stakeholders should be included theory
Reliability Management, 24, 927–943. development
Appendix 3. Categorization of factors for failure of e-government in

developing countries
Factors for the failure of e-government Articles

1. Lack of knowledge of e-government among Al-Fakhri, Cropf, Kelly, and Higgs (2008); Arif (2008); Ciborra and
both society and public agencies Navarra (2005); Higgo (2003); Kumar and Best (2006); Subramanian
and Saxena (2008)
2. Lack of capable and skilfull public employees in Arif (2008); Higgo (2003); Kumar and Best (2006); Mutshewa (2007);
e-government Sahu and Gupta (2007)
3. Lack of a standard setting in hardware, Arif (2008); Holiday and Yeb (2005); Hussein, Karim, Mohamed, and
software, and information Ahlan (2007); Mutshewa (2007); Parajuli (2007)
4. The problem of the digital divide Kumar and Best (2006); Lau, Aboulhosen, Lin, and Atkin (2008);
Subramanian and Saxena (2008); Wong, Fearon, and Philip (2007)
5. Outdated regulations and laws for e- Al-Fakhri et al. (2008); Chhabra and Jaiswal (2008); Lau et al. (2008);
government requirements Luna-Reyes, Gil-Garcia, and Cruz (2007)
6. A lack of ICT infrastructure, especially in remote Chhabra and Jaiswal (2008); Kumar and Best (2006); Subramanian and
areas Saxena (2008)
7. Failure to focus on the desires of citizens Abanumy, Al-Badi, and Mayhew (2005); Arif (2008); Lau et al. (2008)
8. Negative attitudes towards e-government Al-Fakhri et al. (2008); Luna-Reyes et al. (2007); Subramanian and
development Saxena (2008)
9. Lack of awareness in designing applications Abanumy et al. (2005); Parajuli (2007); Shi (2007)
10. Focus on ICT rather than citizens’ needs Tseng, Yen, Hung, and Wang (2008); Wong et al. (2007)
11. Flaws in policy settings, leading to problems Ciborra and Navarra (2005); Mutshewa (2007)
in the implementation process
12. Lack of security and privacy in e-government Holiday and Yeb (2005); Parajuli (2007)
applications
13. Applications not in the languages of various Holiday and Yeb (2005); Parajuli (2007)
groups of citizens
14. Lack of a partnership among stakeholders Wong et al. (2007)
15. Lack of a strong political will to support the e- Subramanian and Saxena (2008)
government initiative
16. Lack of financial support Kumar and Best (2006)
Appendix 4. Interview arrangements
Informant# and interview

time Informant organizations and roles in the project Interview topics
#1 . An official, Ministry of Interior . Project background
2009 November . Monitor issuance and management of Smart ID Card . Responsibility for the project
in the provinces . Obstacles in organizations
. Problems in design,
implementation
#2–3 . Officials, Ministry of Interior . Project background

2009 November . Facilitate technical issues of the Smart ID Card in . Responsibility for the project
regional areas . Obstacles in organizations
implementation
#4–8 . Heads, Smart ID Card Issuing Stations, Ministry of . Project background

2009 November Interior . Responsibility for the project
. Issue ID cards . Obstacles in organizations
implementation
#9–13 . Officials, Ministry of ICT . Project background

2010 May . Coordinate nationwide implementation of Smart ID . Responsibility for the project
Card project . Obstacles in organizations
implementation
#14–15 . Officials, NECTEC . Project background

2010 May . Provide strategic plan for national ICT initiatives . Responsibility for the project
. Obstacles in organizations
implementation
#16–17 . Officials, Office of the Public Sector Development . E-government in Thailand

2010 June Commission . Project background
. Responsible for e-government policy and . Problems in design,
implementation implementation
#18–20 . Scholars, a Thai university . E-government in Thailand

2010 July . Interested in public sector ICT projects . Project background
implementation
#21 . CEO, a Thai ICT manufacturer . Project background

2010 July . Work with public agencies as a sub-contractor . Responsibility for the project
. Obstacles in organizations
implementation
#22–41 . Citizens . Project background

2010 August . End users of the Smart ID Card project . Responsibility for the project
. Opinions in design,
implementation

Understanding e Government Failure in The Developing Country Context A Process Oriented Study

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Information Technology for Development

ISSN: 0268-1102 (Print) 1554-0170 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/titd20

Understanding e-government failure in the

Panom Gunawong & Ping Gao

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02681102.2016.1269713

Published online: 11 Jan 2017.

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Understanding e-government failure in the developing

2. E-government and its failure in developing countries

3. ANT as an analytical lens

3.1. The ANT literature

3.2. ANT terminologies

Table 1. ANT vocabulary used in this case study.

Table 2. Intended goals and outcomes of the smart ID card project.

Table 3. Actors in the actor-network of the smart ID card project.

consequences of an e-government project in a developing country context. This impor-

4.2. Data collection and analysis

5. Case study of the failure of the smart ID card project

5.2. Incompletion of interessement

Second, although a standard could have offered non-human artifacts a universal

5.3. Uncontrolled chaos in enrollment

5.4. Betrayal in the actor-network

According to Walsham (1997), contextual analysis is critical for an actor-network study

6.2. Theoretical reflections

6.3. Policy implications

Appendix 1. The selected journals for review

• Annual Review of Information Science and Technology

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT

P. GUNAWONG AND P. GAO

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT

P. GUNAWONG AND P. GAO

Appendix 3. Categorization of factors for failure of e-government in

Factors for the failure of e-government Articles

Appendix 4. Interview arrangements

Informant# and interview

#2–3 . Officials, Ministry of Interior . Project background

#4–8 . Heads, Smart ID Card Issuing Stations, Ministry of . Project background

#9–13 . Officials, Ministry of ICT . Project background

#14–15 . Officials, NECTEC . Project background

#16–17 . Officials, Office of the Public Sector Development . E-government in Thailand

#18–20 . Scholars, a Thai university . E-government in Thailand

#21 . CEO, a Thai ICT manufacturer . Project background

#22–41 . Citizens . Project background

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