70) G. R. No.

L-4044 July 9, 1952

Pedro C. Hernaez and Asuncion dela Rama Vda. de Alunan, in her own behalf and as
administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Rafael R. Alunan, plaintiffs
and appellees,
vs.
Hon. J. Howard McGrath, Attorney General of the United States, defendant and
appellant. Republic of the Philippines and Dr. Nicanor Jacinto, intervenors and
appellants.

This case of ejectment and damages with which the alleged forged signed deed of
sale has privoted on the alleged none sale of the coveted property by the
plaintiff. The controversy sprung from the alleged sale of the subject land by the
petitioners to the defendant corporation during the times of the Japanese
occupation in our country. Apparently, the notarized document went lost and the
other copies from the notary public were burnt or lost during the ongoing war.
Later on, the said deed of sale to the corporation were denied to have been signed
by plaintiffs and that they may not have sold the property as they have no need to
do so. Moreso, that if indeed there is a deed of sale, it would be a forged one.

Issue: Whether there was indeed a sale between the plaintiff and the defendant
corporation?

Ruling: Yes, regardless of which side had the burden of proof, the probabilities of
forgery are very remote and the direct evidence for the defendant has abundantly
and convincingly established that the property was sold by its former owners for
valuable consideration.

71) G.R. No. L-23264 March 15, 1974

Romulo Tolentino, petitioner

vs.
Helen Villanueva and Honorable Corazon Juliano Agrava, Judge of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court, respondents.

Petitioner is seeking a reversal of the denial of his petition for the annulment of
his marriage with the private respondent. He alleged that his consent was obtained
through fraud becase right after their marriage celebration, he found out that she
is pregnant but they have not had sexual relations with her prior to said ceremony.
During the proceedings, petitioner was ordered to submit to the fiscal for
investigation to determine whether collusion exists between the parties. And to
this order that petitioner did not submit.

Issue: Whether the report of the Fiscal is a vital to the proceedings for the
nullity of marriage?

Ruling: Yes, as the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to
intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the
marital bonds.

72) G.R. No. L-5877 Sept. 28, 1954

The People of the Philippines, plaintiff and appellee,

vs.
Arturo Mendoza, defendant and appellant.

Appellant first got married to Jovita de Asis and later on to Olga Lema while the
first marriage was still subsisting. After Jovita died, he contracted another
marriage with Carmencita Panlilio. Thereafter, he was charged with bigamy and the
court a quo convicted him of Bigamy the he is appealling on this petition.

Issue: Whether the latest marriage of the petitioner constitue bigamy?

Ruling: No, this statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted
by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its
performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as
distinguished from mere annulable marriages.

73) G.R. No. L-19671 Nov. 29, 1965

Pastor B. Tenchavez, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
Vicenta F. Escaño, Et. Al., defendants-appellees.

80) G.R. No. 143826 August 28, 2003

HEIRS OF IGNACIA AGUILAR-REYES, Petitioners,

vs.
Spouses CIPRIANO MIJARES and FLORENTINA MIJARES, Respondents.

The disputed Lot and the apartments built thereon were part of the spouses’ Vicente
and Ignacia Reyes conjugal properties having been purchased using conjugal funds
from their garments business. Vicente sold said Lot to respondent spouses Cipriano
and Florentina Mijares. Vicente also filed a petition for administration and
appointment of guardian with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, and
misrepresented therein that his wife, Ignacia, died and that he and their 5 minor
children were her only heirs.

Whether the act of vicente in selling the lot without the consent of his wife is
valid?

NO. Under the regime of the Civil Code, the alienation or encumbrance of a
conjugal real property requires the consent of the wife. The absence of such
consent renders the entire transaction merely voidable and not void.

81) G.R. No. 152716 October 23, 2003

ELNA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner,

vs.
BRUNO FEHR, respondent.

The marriage between petitioner and respondent was terminated, following that is
the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of property. Suite 204, LCG
Condominium is declared the EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY of respondent, BRUNO FRANZ FEHR.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order with regards to the
said property. Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on installment basis
at the time when petitioner and respondent were living exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-
ownership should apply in accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code.

Whether the property used by a man and woman during their cohabitation without the
benefit of marraige is governed by the law on co-ownership under art. 147?

YES. Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a common property of petitioner and

respondent and the property regime of the parties should be divided in accordance
with the law on co-ownership. Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar. This provision creates a
co-ownership with respect to the properties they acquire during their cohabitation.

82) A.M. No. 1022-MJ May 7, 1976

REDENTOR ALBANO, complainant,

vs.
MUNICIPAL JUDGE PATROCINIO C. GAPUSAN of Dumalneg, Ilocos Norte, respondent.

Respondent Gapusan notarized a document for the personal separation of the spouses
Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta and for the extrajudicial liquidation of
their conjugal partnership. It was also stipulated in that document that if either
spouse should commit adultery or concubinage, as the case may be, then the other
should refrain from filing an action against the other.

Whether respondent Gapusan as a member of the bar should be censured for having
notarized the agreement mentioned?

YES. To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law considers as
void "any contract for personal separation between husband and wife" and "every
extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership" (Art. 221, Civil Code). Respondent Gapusan as a member of the bar
should be censured for having notarized the void separation agreement.

83) A.M. No. 1637 July 6, 1976

IN RE: ATTY. RUFILLO D. BUCANA, respondent.

Respondent Notary Public Rufillo D. Bucana was required by the Court to show cause
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for having notarized an Agreement
executed by the spouses Gonzalo Baltazar and Luisa Sorongon wherein the afore-
mentioned spouses agreed therein that "in case anyone of them will remarry both
parties offer no objection and waive all civil and criminal actions against them"
and that the afore-mentioned Agreement was "entered into for the purpose of
agreement to allow each and everyone of them to remarry without objection or
reservation. Respondent claims that the notarization of the questioned document
was due to his negligence.

Whether the affidavit is valid as it was notarized?

NO. There is no question that the afore-mentioned Agreement is contrary to law,

morals and good customs. Marriage is an inviolable social institution, in the
maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested for it is the
foundation of the family and of society without which there could be neither
civilization nor progress.

84) G.R. No. L-44903 April 22, 1977

RUFINO MAGBALETA, ROMANA B. MAGBALETA, AND SUSANA G. BALDOVI, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG AND CATALINO MAGBALETA, respondents.

This is a Petition for certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus, with preliminary

injunction, against the orders of respondent judge. The judge ruled on the matter
when there is no allegation in respondent's complaint that the suit, being between
members of the same family, earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made
before the same was filed, allegedly in violation of Article 222 of the Civil Code
and Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. Respondent judge premised his
refusal to dismiss the complaint upon the sole ground that one of the defendants,
petitioner Susana G. Baldovi is a stranger. hence the legal provisions
abovementioned do not apply.

Whether it is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before
a litigation is allowed between family members when a stranger is also a party to
the case?

NO. Such efforts to compromise is not a jurisdictional pre-requisite for the

maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the family is a party thereto,
whether as a necessary or indispensable one. It is neither practical nor fair that
the determination of the rights of a stranger to the family who just happened to
have innocently acquired some kind of interest in any right or property disputed
among its members should be made to depend on the way the latter would settle their
differences among themselves.

85) G.R. No. L-8639. March 23, 1956.]

In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minors Pablo Vasquez Ernesto Vasquez, Maria
Lourdes Vasquez and Elizabeth Prasnik. LEOPOLDO PRASNIK, Petitioner-Appellee, v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

Leopoldo Prasnik and Paz Vasquez lived together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage and out of this relation four children were born who are the
minors he is now seeking to adopt. The Solicitor General interprets art. 338 of the
new civil in the sense that in order that a natural child may be adopted by his
natural father or mother there should not mediate between them an acknowledgment of
the status of natural child by the father or mother and since petitioner has
expressly admitted in open court that the minors subject of this proceeding are his
natural children, he is therefore disqualified to adopt under the law.

We believe that the Solicitor General has not made a correct interpretation of that
article for he is confusing the children of the person adopting with the minors to
be adopted. A cursory reading of said article would reveal that the prohibition
merely refers to the adoption of a minor by a person who has already an
acknowledged natural child and it does not refer to the adoption of his own
children even if he has acknowledged them as his natural children.

Whether the interpretation of the solicitor general is correct?

NO. The prohibition merely refers to the adoption of a minor by a person who has
already an acknowledged natural child and it does not refer to the adoption of his
own children even if he has acknowledged them as his natural children. It should be
borne in mind that the rights of an acknowledged natural child are much less than
those of a legitimate child and it is indeed to the great advantage of the latter
if he be given, even through legal fiction, a legitimate status.

86) G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003

ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM"), respondent.

Dr. and Mrs. Lahom legally adopted Jose Melvin whom they cared for since he was 2
years old. Eventually, years later Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the
decree of adoption on the grounds of Melvin's callousness and utter indifference
towards her. Melvin contends that Petitioner had no cause of action in view R.A.
No. 8552 which deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier
granted under the Family Code.

Whether the adopter can rescind an adoption?

NO. R.A. No. 8552 has withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind
the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be
undesirable. However, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, She
can for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing
to an undeserving child, such as his legitime, his share in the disposable portion
of her estate.

87) G.R. No. L-41405 October 22, 1975

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE HABEAS CORPUS OF SHERYL LIM. LUISA CHUA LIM,
petitioner,
vs.
SOA PIN LIM and NONITA MACARIO, respondents.

Luisa Chua Lim filed a special proceeding of habeas corpus against her husband, Soa
Pin Lim, and her maid Nonita Mamario, to recover custody of Sheryl, their eleven-
month old child.
In Civil Case No. 1786-0, Soa Pin Lim prayed for the issuance of "such orders as
are necessary and proper to make defendant Luisa Lim perform her duties as a wife.
A temporary arrangement is made in that the mother, Luisa Chua Lim, should have the
custody of the child, subject to the father's right to visit her and to the outcome
of Civil Case No. 1786-O.

Whether the agreement is justified?

Yes. That agreement is justified under article 363 of the Civil Code which provides
that "in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children,
the latter's welfare shall be paramount" and that "no mother shall be separated
from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons
for such measure". Article 17 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code is more explicit.
It provides that "in case of separation of his parents, no child under five years
of age shall be separated from his mother, unless the court finds compelling
reasons to do so"

88) G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.

Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor

illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. Stephanie has been using her
mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be
her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to
"Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to
"Catindig," his surname.

May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of
her natural mother as her middle name?

YES. There is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.

89) G.R. No. L-18127 April 5, 1967

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGES OF NAME OF GERTRUDES JOSEFINA DEL PRADO, THRU HER
NATURAL GUARDIAN CORAZON ADOLFO CALDERON, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

Petitioner is an illegitimate child, born out of a bigamous marriage contracted by

Manuel del Prado with Corazon Adolfo, the surname "Del Prado" which the petitioner
carries is a stigma of illegitimacy, by reason of which she has become the subject
of unfair comments. It is the desire of the petitioner to have her surname changed
from "Del Prado" to "Calderon "which is the surname of her foster father, the
husband of her mother.

Whether the child can only use the surname of his natural father?

NO. While it is true that the Code provides that a natural child by legal fiction
shall principally enjoy the surname of the father, yet, this does not mean that
such child is prohibited by law, from taking another surname with the latters
consent and for justifiable reasons." In this case, Romeo C. Calderon declared in
open court his consent to the petitioner's adopting his surname, especially so
because he is the one supporting her.

90)G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962

ELISEA LAPERAL, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor.

Petitioner Elisea L. Santamaria given a decree of legal separation from Mr. Enrique
Santamaria in view of this fact she prayed that she be allowed to change her name
and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name, ELISEA LAPERAL.

Whether a wife can use his maiden surname after a final decree of legal separation
from his husband?

NO. The language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal
separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed
before the legal separation. This is so because her married status is unaffected by
the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum.