June 18, 2000

Editor's Note:

The C.I.A.'s history of the 1953 coup in Iran is

made up of the following documents: a historian's
note, a summary introduction, a lengthy narrative
account written by Dr. Donald N. Wilber, and, as
appendices, five planning documents he attached.
On April 16, 2000, The New York Times on the Web
published the introduction and several of the
appendices.

The Times has now decided to publish the main body

of the text after removing certain names and
identifying descriptions. The editing was done after
consultations with historians who believed
there might be serious risk that the families of
some of those named as foreign agents would face
retribution in Iran.

The introductory summary and the main body

of the document are inconsistent on a few dates
and facts. In its reporting on the document, the
Times has relied upon details presented in the
main body of the text.

The table of contents provides navigation throughout

the document. Each entry is linked to the relevant
section of this file. The table of contents page
appears at the end of each chapter and appendix.
 ._-_/·.-~--~~~=---------!
I
~ __:fD~~:~~:.'.~~~~ --~(. ::.~ ___ _i:_~~~~,j:;~- .
CAMPAIGN TO- iNSTALL PRo-WESTERN GOvERNMENT. IN ·IRAN

AU.T.HORl~
\._
~·~~~_:_:_::~=-c------::---...-----w----:--:--::~-~_j
rx.:... 0 t! ~ I?

TARGET
. r..
Prime Minister Mossadeq and his government

OBJECTIVES
. ' • . ... ; ..:. •• ·.~ i'. ~).~~·;. ;:: •
Thro~gb legal. or quasi-legal. methods to effect the fall of the Mossadeq ::"(:1.f:~~i;;:: ~;;~
. ·. . . . \ . . . .:.:~:.:~;:·\}.~~:~);;,
government; and ·.·. · ·. '•·'~·.:::·.:-.i·~-~= ~t~~··
. ·.-- . .. ~..,~ :;~~-~~ '··{~ ~ ~~ i~fof:i~Jl.
.• ..i.....:..:.:~·.-:.· ..:..
To replace it with a pro-Western government "under the Shah's le~erst1i};;"}f:~:X:.~~1~
~ti; ~~edi 7;.,; i.~ ':Prl,.; Miniat8r . ·.. • .·..•.. • · · · ···, Zt·\~!.~\-~!:.~
.. ,. ..· .
I. . ... ·.
CIA ACTION
; .
I
Plan of aetion was implemented in four phases:
\ "1.
.. \
·.\

··-: .~
{ ....
.
· to strengthell the Shah's will tO exercise his constitutional power and to sign
.

..
those decrees necessary to effect the legal removal or Mossadeq as Prime ·

I Minister~

~._.,:, , .. ··.. . . . 2. Welded together and coordinated the efforts or those political fac- .

~~~~~=!!~;~~~~
i or .· ; '· .. fully influential clergy,- to "gain their support and bacldrig any·tegal ac~on

taken by the Shah to accomplish Mossadeqts removal;

. ---
a•. disenchant

the Iranian population with the myth of Mossadeq's patriotism., by exposing· ·· .

• t. -~ : •
• • • "";"' , .... 0:';- •

his collaboration with the Communists and his manipulation of constitutional . . ;~.·:: .: :.
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designed to reveal to .Mossadeq and to ~e general populace that increased

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. . .. ~

Moasadeq and his government..

RESuLTS

coun~rac'Hon to neutralize the plane

was launched in .the interim period between the original and .final J?~Days
0 0

to educate the Iranian population to the fact that. in view of the dissoluti~n·. ·.;. '
)- · .-: <-:· ·.
ot the Majlis {effected by ~Ioasad.eq at an earlier stage to prevent i~a-··voting '. ;..·~:':~
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/ bini out of power)' ~d the Shah'a decree removing Mossadeq as Prime ·
. Minister,; Moaaadeqts continued exercise ot the powers -of that office was

illegal and that authority to goYern the people rested ·solely and completely

in the banda or the Shah.

The Natlonalls~ and the Communists during this period inadvertently , ·.: :..
. . ' .. ·,.~~-*\~.i:Y:~i::::--:::
assisted our eauae through their premature attempts to promote a repubU~ ~,~.~~l-:~\:.
. .. ~ . . ' . -::')·f~~ l;,~ .): ~. ::;·

ean government. nta theme was contrary·to the public's opinion,. whose ·:r~~~~;~\'.:. '.;~'
. . . . . . .. · ·, ):':¥~~··;~;. ~.:~~ ·f~:-
sympathies were with tbe Shah. The Shah's dramatic night out of the ;_:. .:·:r·.;_~:f)f::~,
. . :. -~··.:~ ~;;. ~~-.j~~i..~::". :. ::~
country served to further intensify bls people's sense of loyalty to him..· ·.;. ;~ ··' .~..,::::·~~ :. . ·
• • l • •• •J ..... ' ; :~: ..

..
These actiona resulted in Uteral revolt of the population#

t,.,J ')Ct,.Civ.t1 ~v t.e) Jtt~cd -Itt~ f.of"l1.te. , .6-.e,. wa...r to..lc.~ or~..-
mllitary,\W.ere fer-ced to act~ queUing :the l"!e'tfland gamed strength on-the- '
~ ~u ... d.-e.' wo.J .(.,ve.e....L -1-6 fl c: e o ,._. l7 '-1( S'~
:btOmentum of the sitnatioxa iD 8\i:PPB'P't of the Shah:

The ouster of Mossadeq was success!ully accomplished on 19 Aug 1953.

NOTE

.. ·.;

2. .an adequate amount of u.s. interim economic aid would be

.. ...;.. : ·' .
forthcoming to the successor government. \' ~- .: .
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 (U) ''ZENDEBAD, SHAH!":
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
AND THE FALL OF IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER
MOHAMMED MOSSADEQ, AUGUST 1953

Scott A. Koch

U:Yc~n•¥<1 Staff
"'-'""'...... _. Intelligence """"'.''"J
Washington, DC
1998
CLBY: 2176075

DECLASON: XI,
DRVFROM: LIA 3--82, MET 31-87
Table of Contents
 (U) Source and Classification Note

[_

J
(U) I have also examined relevant records from the Department of State, the
Department of Defense, and the National Security Agency. These records were not as
plentiful or as helpful as I had hoped. I was nonetheless able to fill in some gaps with
documents from these organizations. The vast majority of surviving documents on the
operation itself remain with CIA. but for the reasons· provided below even these are not as
numerous as one mivht t>Yru>rt
c

IV
early 1980s, CIA's History Staff prepared transcripts of these documents and sent them to
the Department of State's Office of the Historian, then researching a volume of the
Foreign Relations of the United States There is every reason to believe that these
transcripts, produced under the supervision of a professional historian, are authentic. The
matters in the transcripts correspond in and subject with events as we know
them.
(U) The microfilm itself apparently has been destroyed, in with
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) guidelines. According to
NARA, the microfilm had to be kept for 20 and then could be destroyed. The
of destruction had to be kept for five years, at which point it too could

v
 Copyright Notice

This publication contains copyrighted photographs that may not be reproduced or

used further without explicit written permission from the copyright holder.
 Chapter 1

(U) Iran and the United States to 1951

(U) During the height of the Cold War in the 1950s, Washington considered the
Middle. Ea$t in general1ffid Iran in particular to be among the great strategic prizes in the
geopoliti~ and ideologiQal struggle against the Soviet Union. It was not always so. For
almost 175 years~ Atri~fi~an policymakers ignored Iran because they had no reason to do
otherwise. ,,,
.' ' · {'

(U) That plumged during World War II and the immediate postwar years. During
the war. Iran was an important route for American aid to the Soviet Army, engaged in a
life--or-death struggle with Hitler's Wehrmacht.l Soviet troops remained in northern Iran
immediately after the war, encouraging pro-Communist separatist regimes in Iranian
Azerbaijan and in the Kurdish region. For a time it appeared to Washington that Moscow
would demand the "unification" of Iranian Azerbaijan with Soviet Azerbaijan, but this
problem evaporated once Stalin understood that the United States would not permit such
an aggressive move. 2
(U) The United States would have preferred to withdraw from the Persian Gulf
after the end of World War II, but the postwar British retreat and retrenchment "East of
created a vacuum that the US felt obligated to fdl After London announced that.if
could no longer military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey, President Harry
publicly March 1947 that the United States would support free
pressUJ:CS.113 For J.mn. the Truman Doctrine---as this pledge camo to bo Jmown-moant
that tho United States was replacing Britain as the main goopolitic:al COWltetweight to tho
Russians. .
(U) For the fimt thn:e years after President Truman's declaration, the United
States paid relatively little attention to Iran even though that oil~rlch COWltty was
experiencing serious economic problems. widespread discontent with tho govomment.
and gro~ rurltation hv tM Tmfeb:-Jran' s Comrnnni:~t Partv.

1 . I !l.l!llJ.l$!iWiiW 1.P'
(0) Bven without dle most basic intelligence on fran.~two e1e1neu,ts
granted William Knox D' Arcy an oil concession covering three-fourths of Persia (as Iran
was known untill935),lranian oil had helped fuel the British economy in peace and
war. 8 The United States was then producing enough oil for its needs, but it knew that
Western Europe depended on oil exports from the Middle East. ln January 1951, nine
months after Hillenkoetter's letter to Acheson, the Central Intelligence Agency's Office
of National Estimates (ONE) wrote that the British economy would suffer if it lost Iranian
oiL The loss of all Middle Eastern oil. ONE said, would have profound and far-reaching
the economies of the Western bloc.9
in Middle and the <1u1f rel!ion threatened the

.,

• ._,. _ Before the

Cold War, the domestic politics of what later came to be called the Third World had
made no impact on American foreign policy decisionmaking. During the Cold War,
Washington could not afford the luxury of indifference because doing so would spur
Soviet intrigue. Domestic politics almost anywhere abroad-and especially in
strategically valuable areas-;--became important arenas for the international ideological
struggle betWeen East and West. Washington was determined to win this struggle
through policies promoting long-term democratization. The result, American officials
hoped, would be $tability-and victory.

(U) Twisting the British Lion's Tail: Mohammed Mossadeq Nationalizes the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company

(U) An Islamic fundamentalist assassinated Iranian Prime Minister General Ali

Razmara on 7 March 1951.11 Razmara's death set in motion a series of events that were
to bring American and British officials face to face with Mohammed Mossadeq, one of
the most mercurial, maddening, adroit, and provocative leaders with whom they had ever
dealt.l2
 [

_}
(U) immediate concern was a struggle for control of the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). By 1950 the British oil concession in Iran, which the Shah
had renewed in 1949, was a sore point in relations between the two countries. In March
1951, when Mossadeq was a member of the Majlis {the Iranian Parliament), he submitted
a bill, which the Majlis quickly passed, nationalizing AIOC. He signed the bill into law
on 1 May 1951, just three days after the Shah appointed him Prime Minister.
Nationalization went into effect on 2 May 1951 and was made retroactive to 20 March
1951.
(U) AIOC's nationalization brought Mossadeq and Iran into immediate conflict
with Britain. The British government owned half of AIOC' s stock and did not intend to
let Mossadeq nationalize its assets without adequate compensation as required under
international Iaw.14

(U) Britain Responds to ''The Antics of Incomprehensible Orientals"

(U) The two countries tried to resolve the dispute, but differing negotiating styles
and the personalities involved hindered these efforts. Many Britons found Mossideq' s
seemingly impossible demands and unp~ctably shifP.ng arguments inexplicable. LP.
Elwell-Sutton captnred the mood of British policymakers at the time when he wrote,
<Really. it seemed hardly fair that dignified and correct western statesmanship should be
defeated by the antics of incomprehensible orientals."l5
(U) Mossadeq found the British evil, not incomprehensible. He and millions of
Iranians believed that for centuries Britain had manipulated their country for British ends.
Many convinced that British was at the root of · domestic
Mossadeq told US W. Harriman,
British] arc. You do

(
 were like people everywhere; some bad, some good. was not persuaded. "You
do not know them," he insisted. 'cyou do not know them:•t6
(U) When it seemed clear that Tehran had no intention of compensating London
AIOC' s assets, the British mounted a multi-pronged effort to reassert control over the
company. They hoped legal and economic pressure would convince Mossadeq to settle
on British terms. If not, they were prepared to force him from office and replace him with
someone open to compromise on terms favorable to the AIOC.
(U) London first asked the International Court of Justice to arbitrate the dispute.
Mossadeq rejected two British proposals because neither of them addressed the issue of
Iran's sovereignty o.ver its own oiL The British refused to deal directly with
Mossadeq. They used economic weapons and then tried ostentatious military maneuvers
in the Persian Gulf to try to weaken Mossadeq's negotiating position.
(U) In September 1951, Britain placed an embargo on shipments of steel, sugar,
iron, and oil-processing equipment shipments to Iran-that is, on almost anything that
the Iranians could exchange for dQllars. The AIOC laid off 20,000 oil workers at the port
at Abadan and Mossadeq had to put them on the government payrolL Gradually, the flow
of Iranian oil to the rest ·of the world stopped.
(U) A British airborne brigade arrived in Cyprus and a Royal Navy cruiser and
four destroyers exercised near the oil facilities at Abadan. The display of British force
did not intimidate Mossadeq; he announced that the first shot would start a world war.
(U) Britain also considered covert action options while it maneuvered
diplomatically and militarily. According to C.M. Woodhouse, MI6' s Chief of Station in
Tehran, the idea of overthrowing Mossadeq came from the Foreign Office, not British
intelligence. Woodhouse himself thought that any move against Mossadeq had to have
American support and participation. London had neither until the inauguration of
President Dwight Eisenhower in January 1953.17
c· . . . -- .. ·-· ..
(U) Mossadeq Challenges tbe Shah

(U) At the same time that he was quarreling with the British, Mossadeq also ,was
struggling against the Shah. He insisted that the Shah should reign and not rule. To that
end, he worked to enhance the power of the Majlis at the Shah's expense. The flash point
came in July 1952, when Mossadeq resigned during a dispute over whether the Shah or
the Prime Minister should appoint the war minister.
(U) During the elections for the 17th Majlis earlier in the year, vote-tampering by
the Iranian Royal Court had convinced Mossadeq that the government's survival.
depended on control of the military. On 16 July he demanded the right to appoint himself ·
minister of war. The Shah refused and Mossadeq resign&f.l9 Mossadeq appealed
directly to the public and accused the Shah of violating the Constitution. ·
(U) Mossadeq's resignation initially appeared to be a shrewd political move that
underncored his mastery of Iranian polities and his ability to gauge and exploit public
opinion. The Shah appointed Ahmad Qavam, Prime Minister during the Azeri crisis with
the Soviet Union in 1947, to succeed Mossadeq. In response. the National Front, a broad
coalition formed in 19~9. organized mass demonstrations in Tehra.Ii demanding
Mos~9,q· s retut:n/·'Qle demonstrations turned violent-69 people died and more than
750 we(e inju~u't the Shah refused to u8e the police or the military to restore order.
,~ ;{t l ,j " i d'V¢t' _•."

Qavani lacked ·· ·· ·~ S\Jpport and was unable to organize counter-demonstrations. For

five da:ys the 1N .. · 'Ftont controlled the streets of Tehran and other cities. On 21 July
1952 the Shah b6wed to the pressure and replaced Qavam with Mossadeq.20
M Once back in power. Mossadeq struck back at the Shah and the military. He
transferred. Reza Shah's lands back to the State, appointed himself Minister of War,
forced the Shah's twin sister Princess Ashraf to leave the country, and forbade
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi from communicating directly with foreign diplomats. By May

19(U) M. Reza Ghods,lran in the. Twentieth Century: A PoUtical History {Boulder,

Rienner Publishers, 1989), p. 186. Mossadeq wrote
I cannot continue in office without having the responsibility for the
MinistryofWar, and since Your Majestydidnotooncede to this. I feel I
not enjoy the full of the Sovereign and. therefore. offer
resigna1tlonto the way another government which be
 to speciahst !~and shah
all the he had fought for and 194 t."ll
The Prime Minister also the opportunity to
forcibly retired many Royalist officers, cut military
add to the insult, Mossadeq transferred 15,000 men from the military to
the military's bureaucratic rivaL 'n1ese acts fueled smoldering resentment the
"'"""'''~"'
nTTtf'P.r<:and those few royalists Mossadeq 's
Mossadeq used his popularity and ability to control the streets

simply diplomatic relations in October 1952. AU British personnel

country in an overland exodus at the beginning of November 1952.23
Mossadeq's apparent political triumph rapidly turned sour. T11e National
to unravel in late 1952 and early 1953 as the Prime Minister grew
increasingly dictatorial. By November 1952, Ayatollah Abul Quassem~Kashani, a. key
[s)amic cleric in the National Front, had turned against Mossadeq and quit the Front, as
had Muzaffar Baqai's Toilers' Party. Kashani's defection was a particularly hard blow
U\A,""""""' his group. the Warriors of Islam, included the bazaar merchant'> of Tehran and
many mullahs (Islamic clerics). Support from these two groups historically has been
critical to Iranian governments. 24
(U) The reasons for the defections were complex. Although 30 of the 79 deputies
the 17th Majlis, convened in February 1952, belonged to or identified with the
National Front, they represented different constituencies and interests were united only in
their opposition to the British. In addition, nationalization of the AJOC did not produce
the bonanza for Iran that Mossadeq had hoped it would. He began to demand more and
more power from the Majlis, and when the legislature granted the Prime Minister what
amounted to dictatorial powers. Ayatollah Kashani resigned as Majlis speaker. Toilers'
Party leader Muzaffar Baqai compared Mossadeq to Hitler and praised the army as a

(U) Some groups in the National Front continued to back Mossadeq. Iran
Party still supported him, as did the Third Force, a splinter group expelled from the
Prime Minister could count on Qashqai
 tribes and-more ominously--the Tudeh, Iran's Communist Party. As support for
Mossadeq narrowed, the Tudeh would soon be the only group willing to take to the
streets on his behalf
(U) Ayatollah Kashani's defection and increased squabbling among the deputies
effectively paralyzed the Majlis. Opposition politicians-including former Mossadeq
allies like Kashani-blocked the Prime Minister's legislation. In early June 1953,
fistfights broke out in the Majlis. The Prime Minister won a temporary victory when
Abdullah Moaumi, a Mossadeq supporter, succeeded Kashani as speaker in a close '
Majlis vote (41 to 31) on 1 July 1953. Mossadeq recognized, however, that the Majlis
was hopelessly deadlocked and that dissolution and new elections were necessary to
break the stalemate.27
(U) Under the Iranian constitution only the Shah could dissolve the Majlis. The
government could request him to do so. Mossadeq knew the Shah would not agree to
such a proposal, so he devised a plan to achieve the same end. He asked all National
Front members and supporters to resign, which they did, and simultaneously announced
the dissolutio~ of the Majlis. The Iranian people, he held, could ratify or reject his
decision in a referen~~ on the theory that popular will superseded the constitution.
Iranian scholar ErVand :Abrahamian has noted the irony in Mossadeq' s rationale.
0 • \• ', \ •• '

"Mossadeq, ,the can8ti~P.onallawyer who had meticulously quoted the fundamental laws
against the sha:p.,u Abrahamian wrote, "was now bypassing the same laws and resorting to
the theory of the general wi11.''2B
(U) From 3 to 10 August 1953, Iranians voted on Mossadeq' s bold and
unconstitutional act. The results of the rigged election were never in doubt. M;ossadeq
purposely excluded rural areas from the balloting, ostensibly because it would take too
long to ~ount the votes from remote areas. The ballot was not secret. and there were
separate polling places for "yes,. and "no." In the end, Mossadeq claimed victory, gaining
·~over 2,043,300 of the 2,044,600 ballots cast throughout the country and 101,396 of the
101.463 ballots cast in the capitat:•29
(U) The dissolution of the Majlis and the tainted referendum alienated Iranian
liberals and conservatives alike. Jamal Imami, a pro-British member of the Majlis,
warned that Mossadeq was leading the country toward anarchy. Ayatollah Kashani
u\A>•uu~.u the referendum illegal under Islamic religious law. At his trial in 1953,
acuons on the grounds popular the
remainder of the Majlis elections," he told the court ''What else was left to us but
consulting the people in a most democratic method of direct plebiscite?"30
(U) A US Embassy assessment cabled to Washington shortly after the referendum
stated that the dissolution of the Majlis "will graphically demonstrate truism of
[Mossadeq's] regime that as opposition and discontent have mounted, Mossadeq has
moved steadily in authoritarian direction using technique of mobocracy to maintain his
hold on power and to eliminate influence Shah." Nonetheless, the Embassy thought
Mossadeq's continued appeals to the street could boomerang because he lacked "any real
authoritarian aside from armed forces." To compensate, according to the
Embassy, he would be forced to rely increasingly on the Tudeh, thereby alienating the
non-Communist followers of his Govemment31

(U) Mossadeq Looks for American Support

(U) Mossadeq hoped for US support in his struggle against the British. Like many
in the Third World immediately after World War II, he saw the United States as an anti-
colonial power. His hopes were not entirely misplaced; the Truman administration saw
some merit in his position.
(U) Secretary of State Acheson thought that the British were overly preoccupied
with their oil interests and that London did not fully understand the broader Communist
threat He saw Mossadeq as a potentially important part of the solution to the problem of
Soviet influence in the Middle East In Acheson's view, the Iranian Prime Minister
would in time become an effective bulwark against Soviet penetration into Iran. To that
end, Washington consistently urged London to reach an equitable settlement with ~ehran.
Acheson apparently was convinced that an agreement would strengthen the Iranian
government and promote regional stability. 32
(U) Other considerations, however, complicated the Truman administration's
approach. The United States was loath to side publicly with Iran or put excessive
pressure on London. Washington needed cooperation and support from Britain-
America's closest ally--elsewhere in the world. The war in Korea was not yet over, and
pre:se11ce of British combat was an important symbol of Anglo-American
lrgaruzattcm (NATO), created in 1949, was still
~LV.JJUA•VU as
 and detennination. Vigorous American support for Mossadeq would have complicated
American foreign policy in other parts of the world as well.
(U) President Truman had no patience with ~ose refusing to view the Anglo-
Iranian problem in a global context. When the US Ambassador to Iran, Henry Grady,
wrote to Truman complaining that the White House was not listening to his advice, the
President let him know exactly where he stood. "Let me tell you something about the
Iranian Situation from this end.'' he wrote.

(U) [we] held Cabinet meetings on it-we held Security Council

meetings on it, and Dean, Bob Lovett, Charlie Sawyer, Haniman and all
the senior staff of the Central Intelligence discussed that awful situation
with me time and again. . . We tried . . . to get the block headed
British to have their oil company make a fair deal with Iran. No, they
could not do that. They know all about how to handle it-we didn't
according to them. ·

(U) We had Israel, Egypt, Near East defense, Sudan, South Africa, Tunisia, the
NATO treaties all on the fire. Britain and the .Commonwealth Nations were and
are absolUtely essent[(1/. if these things are successful. Then, on top of it all we
have Korea.'and'Indo<!hina. Iran was only one incident.· Of course the man on
the ground in each ~ne of these places can only see his own problem.33
.·. ·..:'~'{~!:: f

33(U) Farhad Diba, Mohamnu:ld Mossadegh: A Politia:tl Biography (London: Croom Hel~.
~6). pp. 131-32, citing papers ofHenrv C'd'Mv H'mnh~~is:: ActriM. ,
t.
r:.

]
\ u) Although the documents m ciA· s rues do not indicate that Smith relayed
concerns to President Truman, he evidently did so because the administration
subsequently let London know that the US Government disapproved of lillY military
a British cibinet meeting in September 1951. the government of

J
II
Prime Minister Clement Attlee decided that it '"could not afford to break with the United
States on an issue of this kind. "'39 A potential military crisis had passed.

r.

39(U) H.W. Brands, Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire,
1918-1961 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 234.
40(U) Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African
John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant of State for Near Eastern. South Asian.
and African Bohlen, the Department of State member

[
 Minister Clement Attlee that It not to
on an tssue this kind. '"39 A potential military had v«<>·""'"

39(U) H. W. Brands, Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire,
1918-196/ (New York: Oxford University 1991), p.
Henry A. Assistant Seaetary of State
D. Deputy of
 It had no roots and would •cpass and its leaders fall as soon as it is demonstrated that their
policies have brought Iran to the brink of ruin."48
(U) More specifically, American officials feared that a British failure to
compromise with Mossadeq would enable him to whip up Iran's virulent nationalism
further, with potentially disastrous results. The West might well lose so much of its
influence that it could not stop Tehran from moving the Soviet orbit. Or the Iranian
political situation could simply descend into chaos. in which case the Soviet-backed
Tudeh-lran's best organized, best fmanced, and most effective political organization-
would be ready to fill the vacuum. In the State Department's view, such developments
would jeopardize the security and stability of the entire Middle East, would serve notice
that the West could not preserve the independence of important Third World states, and
could deprive the West not only of Iran's oil but ultimately that of its Arab neighbors as
weU.49
(U) In contrast, the British regarded Iran as basically a conservative country that
would not seek Soviet help nor collapse internally if London held out for the kind of oil
settlement it wanted. The British also feared that a ·~ad" settlement (one not on their
terms) would severely diminish their global political and economic power. already ·
starting to decline ;With the post-World War IT emergence of independence movements in
much ofthc(~lrltish:~J:llpire.SO
(U))Th,e·olt1y~uggestion for resolving these differences offered in the State
Dep~e~t~·~ .ii~~:memorandum further consultation to determine the "political.
military, econorilic~·.and psychological effects of the loss of Iran to the west as balanced
against the politicai and economic effects of an agreement with the ~ans on the oil
situation which might prejudice other concessions elsewhere and diminish British
prestige througij.out the world., The memorandum concluded-that unless the US ~d
United Kingdom agreed on the importance to the West of an independent Iran, there was
little chance the two would be able to forge a common policy.51
(U) Eleven months later the National Security Council set forth basic US policy
toward Iran. NSC 136/1 emphasized that the United States was committed to preventing
Iran from falling under communist control and that Iran's strategic position, its oil, 8.9-d .its
vulnerability to Soviet political subversion or military attack made it a tempting ta;r&~t for
Soviet expansion. If the Tudeh Party seized or attempted to seize control of Irhlii~ .
J;mrentmc:nt. the document argued, the United States should, in yonjunction with the · ·
to militarily,

lntl1l1Cn1ce was warling:

inte:res1ts. The State
(U) American Policy Turns Against Mossadeq

(U) Dwight Eisenhower did not immediately turn his attention to Iran after taking
the oath of office in January 1953. His campaign pledge to end the Korean war had
priority. and only weeks after the inaugural festivities Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin died.
The new administration was faced with reevaluating Soviet-American relations. Under
these circumstances, events in Iran receded into the foreign policy background-
temporarily. 53
British had never of a covert to remove
Mossadeq, and continued to test the American response. After Mossadeq severed
diplomatic relations with Britain in October 1952, the indefatigable Woodhouse met in
London with Foreign Office officials, including Anthony Eden, to consider options
available to Britain. According to Woodhouse, Eden said that no covert operation would
succeed unless it had American support. Woodhouse "took his words as tantamount to
permission to pursue the idea furt.her with the Americans, particularly with the CIA"
This he did, arriving in Washington in mid-November 1952 after Dwight Eisenhower's
victory.54

J
 (U) President Truman's and Secretary Acheson's policy of encouraging the parties
to reach an equitable oil settlement had reached a dead end. Neither the British nor
Mossa.deq appeared willing to back off from .their publicly stated positions, which each by
this time held with something approaching religious fervor. To London's relief. the new
US administration abandoned the search for a negotiated end to the crisis. Perhaps now,
the British h~ped. Washington would finally begin to see Mossadeq as the demagogue
Londo_n 'thought he was and take appropriate action. / ·
c:

::J.
;
· (tl) J\lSO mMarch 1953, Stare Deparunent offictatS and Btlmfi .t<~retgiflV1I1USter
Anthony Eden met to discuss the Iranian situation. Eden found the Amencans much
more receptive to the British viewpoint than they had been under Truman and Acheson.
The co~ap~ of'tf!e.:Anglo-Iranian oil negotiations had changed the Americans'. attitude;
. Was~ol).~o'f"'W~dered Mossadeq a sou~ of instability and feared that his
contimied temim' ilivit¢ !.Iudeh ~up. _. 1
r=. ~ I .·'

J
.. · (0) 1'fie Uriitea'"States suspectea me »Ovtets ur tcy111g totaJre advantageof tht} ·
deteriorating situation in Iran. In the US view. Soviet leaders undoubtedly saw·'· ~..~,~:;•'' :.
Mossa.deq' s troubles as a diplomatic opening, and if he wanted to ttj to play M<?sOO.w
against Washington, the Soviets would let him. The Kremlin would help him. 'I:hc?:.
""t'
!

..]
 to the of
at a minimum, and beyond that, a
of influence.

c.
 ~ ~"' ~

only eight more days. President Eisenhower apparently had already made the decision to
oust the Iranian Prime Minister.

(U) Moosadeq's Successor: Ayatollah Kashani ot Fazlollah Zahedi?

{U) At this point, there was no consensus on who should replace Mossadeq. US
officials briefly considered backing Ayatollah Kashani, the former Mossadeq ally. 'fho
had a Iar.z~ following and had ~me a stridefUmmqnent of tl!e Px¥.!te Minis~
r:

1
\0) (Jpmion-graduilly Settled on Generat Fliifoflili Zithedi as Mossadeq's
successor. 2Ahedi had served as an irregular soldier nuder the Shah's father. Reza Shah,
in 1915 and subsequently rose through the ranks of the Iranian Army. In 1942 the British
arrested him for his activities under Nazi agent Franz Mayer and deported him to
PalestiiJ.e. 2Ahedi worked for the Germans because of his anti-British views; he was not
generally thought to be pro-Nazi. The British released him on VB Day in 1945. Zahedi
retired from the army in I 949 and subsequently served illa series of mostly honorary
P!lSts. E[e; WiS Mlnist:er of the. Interior ~~b:J2.~ . -, ~
(.
 UiUdUJon the public scene [not] noted and
W1Ivu;uons.•'63
The State Department that he was not
~JAAJ•u'-""' "friendly to the United States and
•'64 Even more importantly, he was to

(U) Whoever succeeded Mossadeq would be able to count on US support In

March 1953, an internal memorandum by the State Department's Office of Greek,
Turkis~ and Iranian Mfairs outlined the steps tl1e United States was likely to take if
Mossadeq felL Although American officials would limit their public pronouncements to
expressions of unwtllingness to interfere in the internal affairs of another country,
privately they would use non-US channels to assure the Shah and new prime minister that
\Vashington was eager to h~lp. Sensitivity to Iranian concerns that the country was being
turned into a foreign base would preclude ostentatious and immediate American Qlilitary
assistance, but privately tlle Americans could assure Tehran that meaningful military aid
(trucks, communication equipment, and other items that also had civilian uses) would be
wanted with a minimum of cost and attention. If such an operation went sour,
Washington could disavow any knowledge or connection.
c .

.)
\ u) Available documents do not indicate who authorized CIA to begin planning
the operation, but it almost certainly was President Eisenhower himself. Eisenhower
biographer Stephen Ambrose has written that the absence of documentation reflected the
President•s style:

(U) Before going into the operation, Ajax had to have the approval of the
President. Eisenhower participated in none of the meetings that set up Ajax; he
received. only oral reports on the plan; and he did not discuss it with his Cabinet
or the NSC. 1Establishing a pattern he would hold to throughout his Presidency,
he kept his.distanee and left no documents behind that could implicate the
President in any projected coup. But in the privacy of the Oval Office, over
cocktails, Q.e was kept informed by Foster Dulles, and be maintained a tight
control over the activities of the CIA.69
c
; 1
 Chapter31

(U) Planning the Operation

: ~c. .. :
., ,,
•
;•

(U) r-Kennit "Kim" Roosevelt, grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt, was

the chief of NEA Division.!;headed the Dhision. '
--_A 1938 Harvard graduate. Roosevelt had embarked on a scholarly career
teaching government to undergraduates-first at Harvard and then at the California
Institute of Technology. He joined the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)_during World
War II and worked for the chief of the organization's Secret Intelligence Branch in the
Near East. After the war he compiled the official OSS war report and then returned to the
~~~~as a writer for the Saturday Evening Post.2 In 1947 he published Arabs. Oil.
gmU:J.IlJ!;;rt:J1JlJitliJ2r.!..Qlr:.Jh!~U!J!;f!JL~U.:. C.M. Woodhouse of MI5 wrote in his
and tm(tgttltan,/e "'''"vu.
 r.

r.
J
-·<-·
 (U) The Americans Review the Preliminary Plan

\ u J Ac:wromg to the military attaches, it was important to recognize the

difference between allegiance and control. The Shah enjoyed the allegiance of almost all
Iranian Army officers; they had been raised to regard their monarch as a symbol of loyalty
patriotism. Whether wielded "control" was more problematic. His failure to
assert himself Mossadeq was confusion and consternation as officers
v"'"'ru"'}; him the Prime Minister. The attaches concluded
more than the would
comply with his orders with a sense of relief and with f,he hope of attaining a state of
stability.u28
(U) Mossadeq, through Army Chief of Staff General Riahi. a Mossadeq loyalist.
actually controlled the Anny. Iranian officers considered legal-and would obey-any
order of the Shah coming from·the Chief of Staff. The officer corps considered the
Shah's silence about the Chief of Staff's actions as implied consent Failure to follow
orders even under these conditions was tantamount to treason. The American military
attaches concluded that if the Shah opposed the Chief of Staff, or if the Chief of Staff
with the Shah's support opposed the Prime Minister, Mossadeq's control of the Army
would evaporate.29
c:.
 J
The First Phase: Convincing the Shah

L
 us

J
[
I
Middle East: Excursions Incursions Prina~tOJil.
the
 (U) Final Approval

top officials did: of John Dulles; Secretary

Defense Wilson; ocr Allen Dulles; Undersecretary of State and fanner OCr
Walter Bedell Smith; Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy; Robert Bowie,
Department's policy planning (and subsequent CIA Deputy
LJUVV~'"'' of Intelligence in the late 1970s); Henry Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for
Middle and US Ambassador to Iran Loy lienderson. 61
After Roosevelt's briefing, Secretary of State Dulles polled the meeting.
Allen Dulles and Walter Bedell Smith were strongly in favor of proceeding; the others
agreed but were less enthusiastic. Henderson did not like covert operations but thought
Unit"~ <::t-:ttt><: h:ui "" r-hr.ir,. ;,-, thic ,..,,.a 62

-
(U) Nor did CIA have to notify
Dulles may have infonnally told
of its impending operation. Allen
Senators like Richard Russell, as well as key
the was files

I lis orders and

64(U) ~~December 1974 the Hughes-Ryan Amendment required a Presidential

covert Executive 1
all ~t10C!lUal
J
 Chapter3

(U) Execution and Initial Failure

[.

J
J
 (U) Securing the Firmans

(U) The first phase of the operation began on 15 July 1953, when Asadollah
Rashidian went to the French Riviera to meet Princess Ashraf. He explained to her that
Mossadeq posed a continuing danger for Iran and that she should convince her brother to
dismiss him. She was unenthusiastic.

1.. v 1 1uc c nncess

also was con vi need that Mossadeq would do whatever he could
to prevent her return. She had already written to the Prime Minister three times, saying
that she wanted to come back to Iran because she could no longer afford to live in Europe.
When she saw, with some prompting, that a surreptitious visit to the Shah might improve
her chances of returning home permanently, she began to wann to the idea.

t UJ anu
rrmcess 1\.SlUal a.ui.vcO i.u 1enran on Z:J July 1~.:>.:> met WUll ner brother
four days later. She was unable to convince him to sign the firmans and left Tehran the
following day.

45
[

:r
 • a (U) Manucherr Fannanfannaian, a member of the- Iranian nobility, was present
L
when Nassiri brought the documents to the Shah and relates in his memoirs the
circumstances of this historic event One afternoon the Shah was relaxing outside with a
circle of friends. A butler approached and whispered into the Shah's ear, and the Shah
replied loudly, '!ell him to come " A man in a dark suit whom Fannanfannaian did
not recognize appeared from behind some trees and, after a few words with the Shah,
presented him with a document The Shah asked if anyone had a pen; Fannaufannaian
offered his. After signing the document, the Shah noted that the pen would be worth
much more now that he'd used it to the paper. "A fortune?" Fannanfannaian
..Perhaps," the monarch replied. "Perhaps it will bring us all luck as welL"
Fannanfannaian writes that he "found out later that the messenger had been sent by
Kermit Roosevelt and the document the Shah had signed appointed General Zahedi prime
minister."2S

26(U) Nassiri later became the bead of SAVAK. In 1978, former Agency officec Miles Copeland
met General Nassiri to discuss Ayatollah Khomeini and the deteriorating situation in Iran.
Copeland found Nassiri "even stupider than Kim [Roosevelt] said he'd be." The General regaled
Copeland with "fairly bloodthirsty details of how he could have put au end to the demonstrations
within a if only the Shah had given him free rein." Miles Copeland, 11ze Game Player:
r'nnf,-<:<dnm: nf thtt (London: Aurum Press, 1989),

..., was not

Sundav was the

-+7
the
Co., 1961), p.
 :1
,<L:>~>auiJ1 Henderson, who had left Iran to distance himself from the
operation, to Tehran on 16 August He immediately sought and received an
with Mossadeq. The ambassador asked the Prime Minister if he believed the
had him and appointing Zahedi. Mossadeq replied that he
that he would not believe them he saw them, and that
him.

1
i\merican
 violent and
<:: statutes in Tt>:hnm tnrn down 44
[

]
 Chapter 4

(U) Victory

Sunday 16 August: Roosevelt and the Station Regroup

J
1
 (U) TEXT BOX: "A Terrible, Terrible Coincidence" in Rome

(U) When the Shah arrived in Rome on 18 August, CIA faced a potential disaster.
By coincidence, DC! Allen Dulles was there on vacation. When the Shah checked into the
Excelsior Hotel, Dulles was standing next to him trying to do the same thing.
(U) John Waller remembers that he got a call from Frank Wisner between 0200
and 0300. lVuner was agitated. "He's gone to Rome," Wisner told Waller. ((A terrible,
terrible coincidence occurred. Can you guess what it is?" Waller could not.
(U) uwell," Wisner continued, "he went to the Excelsior Hotel to book a room
with his bride, and the pilot, there were only three of them, and he was crossing the street
on his way into the hoteL Guess, . . . can you tell me, I dot1 't want to say it over the
phone, can you imagine what may have happened? Think of the worst thing you can think
of that happened. "
(U) Waller said, "He was hit by a cab and killed."
(U) "No, no, no, no," Wt'sner responded impatiently, by this time almost wild with
excitement. aWell, John, maybe you don't know, that Dulles had decided to extend his
vacation by going to Rome. Now can you imagine what happened?"
(U) Waller answered, "Dulles hit him with his car and killed him."
(U) Wisner did not think it was fimny. "They both showed up at the reception
desk at the Excelsior at the very same moment. And Dulles had to say, 'After you, your
Majesty. •"25
(U) The meeting between Dulles and the Shah was completely fortuitous but
fraught with embarrassment/or the US Government and CIA had the news media learned
of it. They did not, so the incident passed unnoticed. Wisner's reaction strongly suggests
that the meeting was coincidental. It was unlikely that he would have called Waller at
0200 in a panic and revealed sensitive information over an open telephone line if there
had been aplanfor the DC/ to meet the Shah inRome.26

c
]
(_
~~--)- .....
(U) At this point. members of lnmian Zuhrkhanek (exercise clubs)--weightlifters,
wrestlers. and acrobats-appeared at the head of the crowd. Their involvement was
almost certainly the work of the Rashidian brothers and was a brilliant stroke that showed
a profound understanding of lnmian psychology.
(U) Iranians idolize acrobats and weightlifters in the same way that many
Americans idolize baseball, basketball, or football players. The sight of these men
tumbling or exercising in unison with dumbbells drew a crowd in an astonishingly short
time. Moreover, the country's most famous athlete, Shaban ''Bi Mohk" (Shahan "the
Brainless,.) Jaffari, was in the lead and began chanting pro-Shah slogans. The effect was
electrif·.:--16
c

- .J
(U) The swelling crowd headed for the offices of the pro-Mossadeq and anti-
American newspaper. Bakhtar Emruz. Security forces watched passively as the crowd
demolished the newspaper's office. By 1000 the crowd was headed for Mossadeq's
residence at 109 Kakh (Palace} Street. which was ringed with tanks and troops loyal to
the Prime Minister. '
(U) The troops guarding the residence were unsure of what was happening. When
confronted with the large. angry crowd, some of the soldiers opened fire. The fighting
escalated as pro-Shah troops returned fire. Mossadeq climbed over the wall surrounding
his hou~. ~nd l".<:r.ane.d
c

•
 (U) The and fervor of the demonstrations were critical in encouraging the
military to come down on the side of the Shah and Prime Minister Zahedi. Although
some members of the officer corps opposed Mossadeq, Roosevelt could not be certain
that their units would follow their orders in the of that the general
population would them up. The Iranian anny has a long tradition waiting to see
who contml-; 1h~ <:treets before it acK
 (U) The broadcast in the afternoon of 19 August was confused and chaotic, but
there was no doubt that pro-Shah forces had captured and were controlling Radio Tehran.
The first indication came when the announcer said, 'The people of Tehran have risen
today and occupied all the government offices, and I am able to talk to you all through the
help of the armed forces. The government of Mossadeq is a government of rebellion and
has fallen.''4l Seven minutes later, amid much confusion and shouting on the air, a Col.
Ali Pahlavon said,

(U) Oh people of the cities, be wide awake. The government of

Mossadeq bas been defeated My dear compatriots, listen! I am one of
the soldiers and one of the devotees of this country. Oh officers, a
number of traitors, like Hoseyn Fatemi, wants to sell out the country to
the foreigners.
(U) My dear compatriots, today the Iranian royalists have
defeated the demagogue government by which Fatemi was ruling. The
Iranian nation, officers, army.. and the police have taken the situation in
their hands.
(U) Premier Zahedi will assume his post There is no place for
anxiety. Keep tranquit42

(U) The broadcast stopped. After seven minutes it continued with a woman shouting,

(U)On people of Iran, let the Iranian nation prpve that the
foreigners cannot capture this country! Jranianslove the King. Oh
tribes of Iran, Mossadeq is ruling over your country without your
knowledge, sending your country to the government of the hammer and
sickle.43

(U) A major from the Iranian army said that he was an infantry officer "retired by
Mossadeq, the traitor. We proved to the world that the Iranian army is the protector of
this country and is under the command of the Shah." Much confusion followed, after
which Radio Tehran played the national anthem and then went off the air.44

19

the
[

]
(U) Zahedi began broadcasting that he was the legally appointed head of the
government.48 He also promised, to Roosevelt's chagrin, that he would boost livipg
standards, provide health services to the ooor, and modernize agriculture.49

I I
[
[.

J
(U) General Zahedi half-entered the plane and kissed the Shah's knee, then
backed from the door to allow the 34-year--old Emperor to descend. The Shah
wore the gold-braided blue gray uniform of the Air Force Commander in Chief
that had been specially flown to Baghdad for his return. His eyes were moist and
his mouth was set in an effort to control his emotions. 58

The Mossadeq era was over.59

J
c
 ChapterS

(U) Aftermath
 (U) ll1e different J.Ild widely separated home ga.rrisons of the. battalions made
them unlikdy co--conspirators against the. new regime.. 'TI1e chance that any of these
battalions would refuse to follow l.ahcdi's orders was remote.
(U) ·n1e five brigades in the Tehran garrison had not covered themselves with
glory during the civil unrest ousting Mossadeq, and 13atmangelich and Zahcdi no doubt
tlwught it prudent to have other troops in t11e capital who probably would not hesitate to
crush a Tudeh-led coup attempt Batmangelich clearly intended these forces for more
than ceremonial purposes; trooos do not parade or pass in review with live ammunition.

(U) Byroade noted that a revolution of nationalism was sweeping Asia and that
any effective leader had to base his program on nationalist aspirations or face political
suicide. Zahedi, therefore, was not Likely to reverse many of Mossadeq's policies.
13yroade warned that American policyrnakers would be unwise to assume "Iran will tum a
new face toward the West in me immediate future." Nonetheless, he argued, Zahedi
merited American support. His fall, in Byroade's opinion, would "open me way to chaos
~md a struggle for power in which only the Tudeh organization would be likely to win."2
(U) Two complications affected American support for me new Iranian Prime
Minister. Zahedi lacked solid political support in his own right He could expect the
Shah to mwart his efforts to create a strong government. since the Shah distrusted any
strong leader--or anyone who might emerge as a strong leader.
(U) Zahedi' s options were limited. He could not become a military dictator' as
long as the military remained loyal to the Shah, nor could he seek broad-based civilian
support without calling for new Majlis elections. The Majlis was notorious, in Byroade' s
words, for its "destructive criticism" and there was no guarantee that a new Majlis would
cooperate with Zahedi. In short, Byroade wrote, "there is no cause for jubilation that our
problems are ended in Iran. On the contrary, the future can be expected to bear
remarka.ble similarity to the recent past."3 It was a sobering antidote to the euphoria at
the highest levels of CIA.

1 U) Memorandum from (Henry A.] Byroade, NEA, to Mr. Bowie, SIP, " J:ran," 2 1 August l953 ,
RG 59, Records of the State Department, Records of the Office of Greek. Turkish, and l.ranian
Mfairs, Lot 57, D 529, Box 4D, NARA.
2(0) Ibid.
3(U) Ibid.

7L
L

73
-

J
11
c

.................. ]
(U) Until the archives of the former Soviet Union are it will be
for scholars to know the exact re,asons why the Tudeh did not act Perhaps
Bahrami was right in that it was only the Tudeh was unprepared, but
reasons are had dead only five months, and
the new were probably reassessing his policies. They almost certainly recognized
importance of Iran to the United States (and to the Union) but been
unsure how much freedom of action they had. In any event, Tudeh was so
directed from Moscow, it is unlikely that Iranian on their
own to rio nothine

)
(U) Whatever ill effects or career damage Lavrentiev suffered from Mossadeq's
fall were temporary. He eventually returned to his post in and stayed until May
1955, when Moscow rec~led him to participate in a commission trying to resolve
outstaruiinu Sovid-lranian horriPr :mrl fin:mcial disnntf'<:,
c.
 1
\VJ .:>Ct;lCI.<UJ Vl Jlat.C UUUv.:> UlU uv~ nccU Koosevelt's admonition. The Secretary

was already contemplating a similar operation in a country half a world away from Iran
and much closer to home)O Officials in CIA's Directorate of Plans had been working
since 1952 on sehemes to depose Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz. Like Mossadeq.
Arbenz was willing to tum a blind eye to Communist machinations in his country.
Unlike Mossadeq, however, Arbenz appeared to be a Communist sympathizer. Even the
most bitter anti-Mossadeq partisans did not claim the Iranian Prime Minister was a
'-"'"""""'"~or a sympathize{.. ]
-
L

J
the

19
 c.

..]

Control from Headquarters would necessarily

movementf · J;
(U) There was another important distinction Iran and Guatemala. Arbenz
controlled a comparatively stable Guatemalan Government; Mossadeq presided over a
-
shambles. At the start of 1953, . to Iranian specialist A Samii,
an old ship swept away by a storm with no one aboard capable of dealing with

[
the attendant frenzy." By August. Mossadeq "was barely holding on to the broken sails
of his sinking ship. Everything considered, whatever might be said of the morality or the
legality of American action, it still should not be characterized as having overthrown a
stable regime in Iran."35 What worked in Iran, Roosevelt sensed, probably would not
work in Guatemala because the circumstances were so different
[

J
 Chapter 6

L J

(U) During the 1979-81 Iranian hostage crisis, a reporter President Jimmy
Carter whether he thought that "it was proper for the United States to restore the Shah to
throne in 1953 against the popular will within Iran." Instead of correcting the
reporter's loaded question, the President replied, 'That's ancient history, and I don't think
appropriate or helpful for me to go into the propriety of something that happened 30
years ago."l
(U) Many diplomatic historians, intelligence historians, and political scientists do
not consider TP AJAX "ancient history." Eighteen years after President Carter's remark,
the questions implicit in the reporter's query persist and continue to stir controversy.

L
 policy of the Zahedi Government that the United States obtained at minimal cost2 would
last for 26 years. Secure in the knowledge that the US would support Iran against the
USSR, the Shah was able to tum his attention to domestic matters. He began a series of
far-reaching modernization efforts, including land reform and steps toward the
emancipation of women.
(U) TPAJAX came at a time when the events in pre-war Europe were a fresh
memory. Americans had seen how Nazi subversion could destroy a country like
Czechoslovakia. They had seen the consequences of weakness and appeasement before
Nazi and Japanese demands. They had suffered the incalculable cost of failing to act
when action might have s~opped further aggression. Many were determined never again
to let the appearance of weakness and indecision encourage aggression.
(U) Neither the White House" nor State Department had the slightest doubt that the
Soviets; coveted Iran and would do whatever they could, short of war, to bring that
country within the Soviet orbit The Azeri crisis of 1947 showed that unless checked,
Stalin would continue to test the West's resolve.
(U) Stalin's death in March 1953 added a dangerous element of ambiguity to
Soviet intentions. Who would succeed the late dictator, the "breaker of nations"?3
\Vould Soviet policy become more or less aggressive? Would the Soviets reoccupy
Iranian Azerbaijan? Would they encourage the Tudeh to topple Mossadeq? The White
Honse, the ~tate Department, and CIA struggled to find answers to these questions.
(U) Sending American troops to Iran was never a practical option for logistical
and political reasons. An American military occupation almost certainly would have led
to war. The USSR would have invoked the terms of the 1921 Treaty of Friendship
Between Iran and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and occupied the
northern part of the country. Iran would have been divided into· a Communist no~ and a
free south. Fear of partition lay behind Washington's objection to the proposed British
occupation of the port city of Abadan early in the oil nationalization crisis.
(U) A covert political operation promised to attain American foreign policy and
strategic in objectives Iran without the threat of war. CIA gave the Eisenhower
administration flexibility where diplomacy had failed and military action was not
practical. In addition, CIA gave the US Government "plausible deniability:•· If a covert
action went awry. the President could deny American involvement With these
cortstotera.uoJilS in mind, widely held Western outlook on the international

J
term.
J
more and
did leave Tehran, to return only
the Throne
 l • --
(U) Although there is no doubt that Mossadeq captured the imagmation of
of Iranian society with the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in
1, his political support dwindled steadily. By August 1953 he did not command mass
support. TI1e Tudeh and splinters of the National Front were the only political parties
willing to support him.
(U) TI1e pro-Shal1 sentiments of the Tehran crowds on 19 August 1953 were
Although CIA had a hand in starting the demonstrations, they swelled
spontaneously and took on a life of their own that surprised even Kermit Roosevelt
Many average Iranians seemed convinced that they had to choose between the Shah and
Communism. In marching against the Tudeh, Iranians were supporting the Shah. Iran
exvert Oon~ltf Wilh<*r'.;: nlan to make this choice exolicit had worked.

{U) Before dismissing reports those Khorramabad as propaganda, it

must be remembered that CIA was able to influence directly events only in the capital
only barely. Roosevelt had neither the money nor to
took m
 ______________..........

J
(U) American University's Amos Perlmutter belongs to the school of thought that
considers Mossadeq 's fall inevitable regardless of Western actions. In a foreword to
Zabih's The Mossadegh Era: Roots of the Iranian Revolution Perlmutter writes that
CLJ.\'s "role in these climactic events was not very significant, despite some of the heavily
unsubstantiated claims of the old boys such as Kermit Roosevelt."

(U) To a large extent. the return of the Shah and the downfall of
Mossadegh were made possible by divisions among the political forces
of the left and right, the left split among nationalists, Marxists and
Communists and the right split among the reactionary and xenophobic
clergymen and their more liberal counterparts.8

(U) Perlmutter is correct in saying that Iranian political divisions made the fall of
Mossadeq possible, but merely because something is possible does not ensure that it will
happen. CIA's role was _significant Without Kermit Roosevelt's leadership, guidance,
and ability to _put som~. backbone into the key players when they wanted to quit. no one
would have moved against Mossadeq. Iran had many political factions but few legitimate
leaders-and even f~wer leaders with the discipline and will necessary to take risks.
(U) A key difference between Mossadeq and his domestic opponents was his ·
ability to control the streets. Although much of the National Front had deserted the Prime
Minister, the Tudeh, by this time Iran•s only disciplined political party, rallied to him
when its aims and Mossadeq's coincided. Tudeh demonstrations intimidated the ,
opposition and kept the army on the sidelines. Mossadeq's opponents would have been
unable to overcome these disadvantages without outside help.
(U) The notion that Mossadeq would have fallen anyway ignores the realities of
Iranian politics. No group was able, without help, to contest control of the streets of
Tehran with the Tudeh. The opposition needed a rallying point and a psychological
trigger. Rnn«"'""'lt nrovidt>.rl both and gave Tehranians a choice between the Shah and the

1
Tudeh. Ordinary Iranians were to
when they through the in th~ <:tr~~t<:

.1
(U) Historians that Mossadeq would have fallen anyway fail to answer a
\Vithout intervention, would replaced him? In
August 1953 Iran seemed more likely to degenerate into chaos than to experience a stable
transfer of power from Mossadeq to someone No potential prime minister was
strong enough to command a majority in the Majlis, or even to form a coalition
government out of the factions and splinter groups comprising Iranian politics. If
Ayatollah Kashani, whom the US had briefly considered supporting in mid-1953, had
somehow been able to succeed Mossadeq, his government might have resembled
Avatoll~h Khom~ini's regime more than Fazlollah Zahedi's.

J
(U) If the United States and United Kingdom had not intervened in Iran's chaotic
politics in August 1953, would Ayatollah Khomeini have been able to launch his Islamic
Revolution 25 years later? Asking this question is like asking whether World War II
would have been fought if Germany had won World War I and Hitler had remained an
obscure corporal. We cannot know the consequences of events that did not happen, but
we can engage in informed speculation.
(U) Revisionists contend that CIA stifled Iran's drive to democracy and
strengthened the rule of the autocratic Shah, thereby making Khomeini's revolution all
but inevitable. Despite its faults, in this view, Mossadeq's Government represented the
popular will. His government reflected a vision for Iran's future that the Shah did not
share. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi wanted to transform Iran into a modem Westernized
state; his people preferred a more traditional society.
removing Mossadeq, the revisionists """'''u"
UUlUVUlU Iranian
UULlVUUll,UU,

J
 (U) A problem with this thesis is that Mossadeq's Iran was not moving toward
democracy. The Prime Minister's increasing political isolation and the fragmentation of
National Front, as documented above, had.weak:ened his position and made him
desperate. His dictatorial grab for power from the Majlis alienated his former allies and
gained him new political enemies. Iran was, to repeat Iran specialist Kuross Samii' s apt
metaphor, "an old ship swept away by a storm with no one on board capable of dealing
with the attendant frenzy."lO
(U) In fact, Khorneini's revolution was a reaction against secularism,
modernization, and the Shah's misrule, not a push for a return to the. National Front. The
streets of Tehran rang with shouts of fanatical support for Khomeini rather than nostalgic
calls for Mossadeq. The Ayatollah was not interested in Mossadeq or the things he stood
for. The last thing Khomeini wanted was a secular government with multi-party
participation. He would have called for fundamentalist revolution against any
government, including a National Front or Tudeh Government, that promoted
modernization, the emancipation of women, and secularization.
(U) Edward Shirley, the former CIA DO employee who journeyed through
revolutionary Iran, argues that the revisionist thesis also underestimates the role the
clerics played in TPAJAX. Without the support of Ayatollahs Kashani and Behbehani,
Shirley doubts the covert political action could have succeeded. What the ayatollahs did
in 1953 with American and British help, they might have been able to do later without
such help. Alternatively, given Mossadeq's growing political weakness and isolation
from Iranian society, the clerics may have defeated him and the National Front in general
elections.
(U) In short, according to Shirley, the 1953 aborted-democracy theory is
appealing, but is "too convenient in its diabolization of the CIA and MI6. and too Persian
in its determination to make someone else responsible for failure., '

[
Gentlenum Dulles
 Postscript

(U) The Shadow of the Pahlavis

J
(U) The Iranian still believes that the British and Americans are
ominipotent and that if they removed Mossadeq, either or both somehow put the mullahs
in power. Edward Shirley's Know Thine Enemy: A Spy's Journey into Revolutionary
recounts several conversations he had with Iranians while traveling through that
One asked Shirley for help:
 told it did not matter what "'It matters what the
Americans and the Englisss think. They hold The Englisss always had

J
into Iran York:
and
3 (U) Harold Bloom, The Pri!!Ciple: A Scientific Expedition into the of
History (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995), pp. 264-70. SAVAK's successor in the
Islamic Republic of Iran is the Vezarat-e Ettela'at va Aminat-e Keshvar (VAVAK), known in tl1e
West as the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). According to historian Carl Wege,
VAV AK "is noted primarily for assassinating Iranian dissidents abroad" and has been doing so
since the revolution in 1979. Its first victim was the Shah's nephew Shahriar Shafiq (in Paris,
December 1979), but is most famous vietim was former prime minister Shapour Bakhtiar,
assassinated in August 1991. Carl Anthony Wege, "Iranian Intelligence Organizations,"
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 10 (Fall 1997): 289. Heritage
Foundation Senior Policy Analyst James Phillips writes that "more than a dozen Iranian
dissidents have been assassinated in European cities since 1987." VAVAK even struck in the
'
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r.:J·,~if -~ .' . ·. · .· .. :·· 2/-. Should M~·s·s~deq ·r~quest Shah take initiative. dissolve 1~jlis Shah
~;;::,~i!j;;_,_>.,'.:~~:·_:·~~ .·.. "WOUld . refuse~; it: is·1 hovrever doubtecf_:vecy ~uch \\nether. Mossa.deq , ..uuld preser.t
~:6~~ '<·:·~;;:.<.::·:;;:.:. . -~",·.-.-such. reque-st'
'to':·shah as' this· wUl_d be· re·co@-iizing shah·. rias authority "rule" rather

:;I;~,tj:_w~~~t~~'~{~!f~t~;-·· ~,,~~~li~~,·i.~_. _~,:~t~~;t/<j; ,·

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;:~.·;·· :·. l.-'· · · "1. )~ro-govt ~, offic1als in Tehr§l-n post office .:depa~ment d~stroying all
~-~". -~· copies opposition n€n,;eipapers. mai1.ed to' provinces • .'.:~·~;~·:.-.:.::.,;. ~·>-: . :'::.' ';·<::·.,:·
:,: ~- -" !·.- ... >:-· .... ·:.: -· . ..' :. . .
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F· , _. 2. Opposit?-cin _-in_.HajliS- now con~'ists 20_-.deputies .·firmly connnitted to and
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C01383672

F?:J:.~: l:r. Roc;;cvelt

1. Ee rcsicne.tion lkti:::-nall·:o-.-.:::::snt Fro.ction a.n:i possibility a!~tc;;;pt

l·~os:·.deq d.issolve Eajlis, this :wessL!t;e covBrs sugr:;e~tcd r0action •

. 2. O?p:>si tion 17iUSt stress by r:;ver:y t'1eans 1·,.;-;d renains of K~jlis is lc-.-[P..l
~:1:1 ~6::-:oc1"..:.ti.ccc:1ter of £CVC:'!":.-:10rrt as cp;;,o.:.ed J~:cssc;.deq d.ictc.to::,~~·!:~p. As ::.··.ny
7"\:J.::.sit.le O')':•ositic·n ce-:-mties r.:'-lst state K::;jlis still alive and as f;';i':.l1Y o.f v-.s::'l
;;:.n be F·2'~;2ded ;nust tr:..ke 1-x.st i..rl l·:ajlis p-.1ryose c<~rry on business of b::>Ciy.
R~ccgnize ~~11 be necessary eA7end money this purpose and dete~~!e precisely
Y.~1o does 1-f:in.t.

3. Leca.J f:.rgu::tent to be put up that if eichty bstes.d of 136 '\·,·ere fu.'1ctio.·.int

le~:olly l·;£:jlis then no :r·et:son 1·k1y thirty should not function.

4. As soon poss5.ble 0}.1f!Osition de?uties to meet then elect ne1i officers c.;-;d .
cs·::. : .. it~~es. 'l':'1en by int•:::rnal re[l.:.1:::tions e.xcuse from attend.ance rn<.:=21be:L's t:ctior:al ·
J.::;ve::.t;nt F:"<i cti on c.s this o.cti on solve quol"'\:!m p:;·o ble:n si...'1ce q'-lo!"llin bz.sed on nu.::.ber
eL·cted r.,-;:r:!bers not excu;;;ed .from atte:1G.ing sessions.

5. .,•.s cc·roJ.le..ry ite::.:s ttree r-.11d focr- op:po~iticn 1-:vuld state that resicr1:.t.ivn
F:.·r,ctio:-J illecal since not done in ·v.sy laid dc•v:n by in-~r;:"'iill rc£._>.;l~tior;s ::c.~l:..s.

6. f...fter rur.::.p i·:ajlis r.;e:ets should be ready t:.ake foll·:''\·d.n,G steps if v;hen
di.rect.c::d:

A. By suppl art 60 SUi1rr;-,on l{ossadeq appear before it. lihen i.r.:;nores order
C:en::'.lnce hi.'n to :3"'J.r,re:~,e Court as per suppl art 69.
B. Pass r..ajority vote no confidence in !•i:ossadeq c.s per suppl art 69.
\
8td:i. on to ke"'p i:K mind that only,Sh::.h by art. 4S as amen.:ied has c.uthority
7.
dissolve J.:ajl:i.s a.."'ld must not be c.llo'h·ed do so~_}:.U.st also. rem.ember suppl art 54
gives Shcili authority call sp.ecial meeting l·fu~?-~s~-
. .
8. Realize none above sugsestior.s easy execute~ '\':hen hav·e your
re;:;ction to 1
eral'line better able deterruine ho>v rr.odi.f.y pla.n to cover l·~jlis situation. J;ow in-
cline believe if w-e able stre=:s liationa.l J·~ove:;:;:,ent not legally resigned and still
r::e:::bers then can have Shah caJl session at time required by plan. Also feel im:::ed:
ate bast by m~Lbers fits into bast concept of plan.
,
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1 •. 3c..!ladi clo.ir;-.s to ht=.."N follo-vr~ng r.ilit?.r'/ &:3se;ts, c..nd h;:.s follo·.,-:L'1g

o: r:.ction:

.t.•

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·.
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...

.-.. :.:r:,.·"i:Lli~£ ~v:i ~- i.~2.l s~.:.ici-..:: eH t--::- P).~vr:=.-:.. -:.~!:.1 :1:JVe, he

'· f-1.!1Ce tt

c.::. :.:::.s :'-c_ .. ~l :"o:"': :'"';e in o;ie -:.f I .. ol}c.;i~·._s \,e-:~-s:

(1) 3hc.h to c.rpoi~!t ~=-hPdi ?:ri~:·.e !:.inis~e.r

o~'~'ice by 11 ~-;cc·nstitut:i.c.::al acts 11 •

(2) s:-jah to d:.s::J.~=-s I-::)~~r;c.Jeq . .,. it~~.a~..lt c.::-·:)Oi.s.'"'ltirq~ s·-icCeSSO:'; ~ahedi

11
te:..r,:::-ar;:r ~;j,lit<:n-;: Gov;;rr:or 11 r··=n.:.in::; S<:'lE-ction or ?l•i:-.e :·:ir.ist"'r by 1:c.jlis •

(3) ~-ha.h c.:;;oint...ent Z:=:J~cli to rephce F....i.oo.hi c:.s Chief Staff;

ic:J€di.:.:lte arrest Riahi by Zah.;:;di.

( i+) S:i3.h IS a;:·poin~;:-.;:;nt Z.::..!~~C.i·.;.:~""1i:3t;~ C::..1rt; b:-.. ed.iate isolction

k:.ini, ;.rr·eSE;:1t ::in Cou!·t. ••

B.

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F?..OH: !Ir. R.onevelt

Following r0ceived from stc:.tion 16 July:

1, Accordi!1& on·::: Cppv:s:.t:.on dE:pt:.ty "rasicr:3tion 11 of indepen::ent a.:-td.
Opposition deputies 15 July - follo·,>:tng siEilar ;~cti.on by n·~;;.bers r-::-·o..J.;o;osac1cq
l~aticnal i~oVETIG!'it Fracticn - ~:as t!cor.side!'nci 11 c:.ct of :3t:,;;tGQ' a:i.J:;·::<l at he~.dlng
off p'..l.blic r~.i.'e!"'endu::t by l·:.os;;<::d•::q.

Objective of Ka.tional Front 11 rc;sit:!1E:tionn 1'."2s to close J:ajlis L:-!Cl

A,
thus el~iln&te ir.fl~ence of Opposition in that rody.

B. !{.::ssadeq ir.tended ·:ain Ofposittc:n's unccnciit:!.0!1a.l S1~rre:·.d.sr by

"rigt:c.d 11 refcrencw. ,,·hich \•muld h~;ve resulted in his becc·::-.i."lt; C:}:7tplete dictator.
i' c. In aruounc:Lng 11 r.::si::::.e~don 1 " o't.i;er G.e:'::t:! es, !:;:,,:.ny of v.!'lo'll fig~:t.ir.g
. ! .

'"! secretly ar:cinst dict.ato1·ship 11 1 oste:r:sibly re:;,oyed r.::ces.dty fe>r !-~cesdeq to go,
through •d.th rei'ere:-:.du:.n plam.

1I
D. Op~of.ition's '1.2.ce in h0le 11 _, ·a.ccOl\·::.:·l~ to sou. ce, is thct resiEnc:.ti.::1s
are not. le[al unle~s br·:mt;ht up ln Eajlis s::::c:sicn o?.:-v'i ::ccepted by ass~:-.bled
de~1:1ti,•s. Th•.1s_, u.,"'l=.er p:·.a,~el:t sit..:.r-.t.:..c·n_, no o:·.a h·· ..s in .;,'c,ct. ;.'c;sic:·J9d and J.:ajlis
sessio:;,s ::.;,e.y r-:;cor.Ye::e c..t any tir-.~ a.ctior: is •1-::G;;:;d - for sx&.mple: to t <:.ke
Parli1'll~.entary a ~tion to 112-.~-:.e ne~ot :-'r·.L·.e E:L"li~tcr,

3. Opposition C:cr•uty e-xplained that Opposit ·on :h"-r-d core" of 15 .~e;:-:-:..1ti€·S

1

agreed enter ~~jlis th::.t hour "until !·:::=.s?.deq is replsced". He sc..id

Op:>osition agreed this strate@Y earlier i."l_ evening c:t m;:,~ting\ Th~s
is plan: · • · \.
· A. Deputies 1-dll remain in ?arlia..;;ent building.

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4. He ~lso stated th~t:

Jl.. • 'V;,.i}.l:_;..)_.l.I.;J..L:J.l .1. ~ \...ot:.:..·~ W.J...;.J.f:,

•~•ere fro;n11.
B, Cppositivn agre-3d str;.y off Etr.:o-d.s tnd i."l ho::-,e d.uri.'1g 21 J'J.ly
de:tonstrr-tio.!"l.S,

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~>:- ~·~ .~:::!.' ·:~ ~
To: Mr. Waller

22nd July 1953

:···· .... ~

, I
I have been asked to tell you th&t Mr. Roosevelt
i
I'!. wishes you d.na Mr. Wilber to pursue the question of the
t

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preparation
' .
of an official American statc·r:1ent to follow a

- I·
"successful" coup.
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. .. EO 13526 3. 3 (b) (1) >25Yrs

APPROVED FOR RELEASED:

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C01383707
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Follo1d.ng is proposed te..--:t of State Dep.:..rtrr.ent rele<::set

This s:i..hl,,t.ion :b T.;;·<'.n !';:~'3 lc,;-:g ( ..:, ;n t1·,-3 · n;~~ject of f::L'c::.t concex'l1 to us.
11

!·~cunting political '"~d. :.::,c._;:·_~ .. -:i.c te.:.:::,i.c ::s t.h~l~'.) lEYe ap;,-.a;rc,ntly l;;;d the Ir<onian
people, 1,,;.,.,1or the le::1d2rship of thdr S!~:::.h, to seek a ne-..,. goverr.raent. DeYclo?-
ment's in Iran c:.re nlovi.ng very rapidly and, •Hilile ,. -a o.re 1:;a't.chir!g the situ.:::.tion
closely, \-.:e do not yet b.ve ·:;uffid.s::t t.::..si.s for tr-1ch co::cr•.;nt at this ti1::e, i·.re
assu..rna fr·o;n .fc:.di c;,.:~.h !-:E.s ch·nn his :. 1 ~:n•.::Jval to the nc;., gove:::·n:.:·:s-nt (or: w.~e
are ghd to nif...o tro!ll e:t'-'t ~.. :tsilt3 '!::y n.:\'r ,sovcr.J;::c:nt 11 ) thst the w;·vi goY:::·I'J';';l::mt will
.foll0\'1' a 'policy of Jr.a:i..;,Ld.ni:r!g Il·s.n 1 s i:K!ependence a:1d prc::toting its eco:)o::·ic
and social "·ell ceir_g, '"hich is v.-hat the U,S, hss alv.:~.~·s "'1.shed for Iran. This
goverrcent has long sought. to ass,ist Iran to r..aintain ~ts territorial inteerity,
economic health and position in the co:;-.:nunity of free na.tions, Iran, u.n:ior · ·.
pre-..i.ous governments since the ..,.,'ar, hO'.s r-eceived 1..!:-,erican aid, Pr·ovi.ded the new
gove:rru:tent desires }t;;Jerican assistance, and, as ve hope, int<m·::s to wcrk in t~e
best interests of Ir-:>.n, the u.s. expects to be aHe to c!:lntbt:.e to extend a
j,.
helping hand and to cooperate in buildir..g Ir.;.n' s strE-ngth to r·.?sist cc:,'!.r.'.mi:;t
subversion."

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE:
27 -Jun-2011
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.j
I EO 13526 3.3(b)(1 )>25Yrs •.
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/ CLASiiiFICAT!ON REVIEW EO f2C65,

CONDUCTED ON
llERIVATIV£ CL iiYl
:~· .-'\ {nAY &' :

0 DECL 0 Nl\'/11CR TO .ill /I fi'V '>'tiV

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 C01383715
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EO 13526 3.3(b~(1 )>25Yrs

jCONFIDENTIALI

APPROVED FOR RELEASE:

27 -Jun-2011

: - - - - ~··- ..... --~-··-- 4• ·- ·-··

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S<!c:Jri~ lnfcrmatio_n:

20 August 1953

MFMCR.ANDUH FOR: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT I Prop~sed C~endatl,on for COtWnnications Personnel

wo have serviced the TPAJ AX Operation. ... ..
. . .... . .a.:.«*"~'l .
. . .; .... I
L.
.....
''"'··-:
i
1
............... 1. ! suggestion bas been made to me which I heartily endorse
\ and pass on to you as a recommendation for yOlU' aotim -- that the.
\
\ communications personnel -who have serviced the TPAJAX ope~ation
receive a special commendation :tro=L you. If you agree that such
a commandat.ion should be given, I should appreciate it 1:r you
could associate myself' and our starr personnel, who are a;oare of
the long hours or hard work put in by the canmunicaticns people,
with· the corn.11e.ndation.

2. I am sure that you are avare of the exceptionally heavy

volume o! traffic which this operation has necessitated. The
COl'llintmica~icns personnel involved have conducted themselves vith
conspicuous-energy and efficiency. Although I do not know all the
facts, I a111 sure that many of them vorked extra hours and through-
out the nights. Just one illustration of the zeal \mich has marked
their activities is the fact that en tP~ first messages fr~ Teheran
yesterday the com:nunications people b~at our es'ti.lnated deadline
(as to the earliest time "-"B could expect to have tr.e messages in
front or us) by nearly two hours. I was also most favorably impressed
by the serious and expeditious treatme.nt -of the midnight message to
. the DirectorJ J about lihich I .called you·. · .

3. My sug:;es tion. wrould be that you address the proposed com-

mendatioo to General HcClella..-,d~ to be ahawn by him to aJ.l hands,
both here and in the field, who -w~re involved. If you approve of
this su~gestion 1 I will bo glad to qrav up the caa~endatian for
your s:l.cnatura that is unless you would prefer_ to do so y~sel!. .,
~
.... .- I"'! .. • \:·.·~,, :,:·~:.~
;- ,': .•~"1••. :i
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.,. ·.• - - ;_·· . ·, ·• C!.ASSIFICATIOH_l. mE_w:..mi~:J.'.·

.. , .-.. ~. ·' · CONDUCTED (Jlf · ·.
~, ... DERIVATIVE. CL.: ·:!12!2:i?a~ 4 ~ • 1
0 DE:CL 0 DD\'1!1\!ll TO £!1!'"•.-r..r,--;~,)J-
FRANK G•. \-J!Sfl!::R REVW ON · .,.:z '~ ,,r. Ay q r -
Deru ty Director ( Plar.s) DERIVED FiiDII \'I '1 c ....... 1- '.

DD/P:FGT:1/vwh 20 At.O.gust 1953

Distribntion: Jor.n ",<Taller concurs i·• this reca:~mendation .,.... '·
-~·
-..
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C01383715
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20 August 1953

}1E1ffi.A1TDUM FOR: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Proposed Corr~endation for Communications Personnel

who have serviced the TPAJAX Operationc

1. A suggestion has been made to me which I heartily endorse

·and pass on to you ·as a recOlllr.lendation for your action -- that tlie
co!"'.mur.ications personnel '\-rho have serviced the TPAJAX operation
receive a special commendation from youo If you agree that such
a commendation should be given, I should appreciate it i f you
could associate myself and our staff personnel, who are aware of
the long hours of' hard work put in by the communications people,
with the commendation&

2. I am sure that you are avrare of the exceptionally heavy

volume of traffic which this operation has necessitated 0 The
corr.munications personnel involved have conducted themselves with
conspicuous energy and efficiencyo J..lthough I do not ·1mow all the
facts, I am sure that many .of them :t·wrked extra hours and through-
out the nights. Just one illustration of the zeal. which has marked
their activiti8s is the fact that on the first messages from Teheran
yesterday the communications people beat our estL~ated deadlin~
(as to the earliest time we could expect to have the messages in
front of us) by nearly two hours. I was also most favorabiy impressed
by the serio~s and exleditious treatment of the midnight message to
the Director_ _about Which I called you.

3D l~ suggestion would·be that you address the proposed· com-

mendation to General "1'1cClelland, to be shoW11. by him to all hands, ·
both here and in the field, who were involved" If you approve of
this suggestion, I will be glad to dralol" up the co,:-nmendation for ··
. ---· I
your signature -- that is unless you n•ollld prefer to do so yourself' •

' FRANK G. WISNER

Dern ty Director (Plans)

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26 August 1953
',

UEi.KlRANDUY FOOa CNEA DIVISION

SUBJECT: Co::nme..~dation

1. YJ11ilc you have expressed your appreciation of

Headquarters support, a."ld particularly that ot John l:aller.t
CHE.1U t..'rds is to notify you 'for:nally and officially, that
John 'f:al.lcr is to be cornnended for his work in TPAJAX.

2. From the time the operation bcean to develop" up

to the pea..tc and through this follo'=';-up phase" he ha:s demon-
strated diligence~ intelliEence, a~d hidh level of jud~nt
in his support to the field action. He m.a.nil'estcd a real
approciation of tho fiald activities L~ the appropriate
support that Beadqua.rters co~ furnish. He .further de!!!On-
strated a hitil level of ability to deal lfith and elicit
guidance of senior State Departnent officers. 'l'hroubhout,
he r.laintained cal!w.~ess and
objectivity 'lrllich, in no small
measure, contributed to the successful result.

l"RANK o. msurn
Deputy Director
.
(Plans).
'

. ._, ,
DD/P:i 18/24/53
Distribution:
Orlg - Adse
1 - PD/c (subj rue)V
1 - DD/P subj file
1 - DD/P chrono file
C01383723
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Hr. l>ii~ner ·asked ·t~-~i· 'i.e is troubled· about <th~::> ;' :· ·

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EO 13526 3.3(b)(1 )>25Yrs

APPROVED FOR RELEASE:
21-Jun-2011

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12065 .-

·- COHDUCTED {lfl ~ 0 In A y·,.v J ,
DERIVATIVE e.t. !:Y ~ ~ ·
0 DEll!. 0 C:!IW~;IO zZ'I.A,::: '
REVW Oli ·. ~-? lH ..:1,1 1 I
liERIVtD FROM i''l•7 t"'
C01383738
,. :l.
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... 4

St!EJI:DT

1. General J:s<1sct.an, KU:i.t:;;:ry Govc...-rnor of Tclrran_, 1-'?s been as~lgno.i

l:y I'ri:i!S }:inister Zahedi task or diroctin.g co1.111~'Vid.e craekdc-..m on l'udeh !'arty.
- . . .. . . .
2. · !~..s of S Se?te::n'ber Da.ds~tan na.a ·s.rrcstro /J2 T--ur:1cll w.cnbers includ:-
ingt gortt<:za (:asff'l-l J 'Davud I!cruzi ~nd }~UE;ud Zbnfl..i, !!ham D.e.usets.n e-or~.Siders .
Dcs'b~·ra of '1"-~eh Csnh~a.J. Cc~1ittoe. · · · · · · :
3·. Tht:t::!·.:.31'U1 file T-de~ -:::~cr..bcr.s;.-_v~ are arrested~ .aro to ba hl..-Ttished.
i;..o It;r:i.::tan.
. .
rzlnting ~~~SGS have been

5. Dadscte.n cl.,~~s !lr~rt of 11 'I1.rle.b ~~-~qt"-'1.!'tl3r.s bas ooen rclde::J and

cs.;tu.red oocu::Jr;n.ts tt:rned ever t-0 T.r-.;.n.1.an 0-2.
6. Tuc'lcll Fart.y is nc,.,; yril:t:!ng N'c.:s- n~rsr..:i.;t.rs in Sorl&t F1:1'b-assy-.
rar.c::--s c.re t:r<:..!:s;:crtcd in dil:..lc:r~'l.tiC cir:s to :lu.'llG.nlan Lega.tion. There 'l'udeb nE:wS-
p~l!?E:!'S r.;.re ;.laced ln "tu...•1r3lcs vith :r..o't.:sraper etteln.a.t and J~eymn· en top. Nwsrnpe...'""S
•• f•l
are then ta'ten by diplO:!>..a.tic ~;.TS to four Gietributic!l f>Oints: J'avadiyeh (near> .
.
: ~:;.
railroad et:st~cn); 1-l.oft.'l.hW. {~es.r Dc·sba.n 'raJ:r-eh llrl'ield); lt.ajid.ieh Ere-.;ecy; and ·
one n!i!etcr:!ined roint.. From t'h.esa rcinte1 b'.mdles .are trs.:rtm into unlicensed · ·
jeeps which ti-.l'w. bu~l~s on~ streets~·.. . :. _::~.;;,/·.·.~:-·'.·:: ~. }· .. ~~ ~··;.:_:.:T:" _:~:-:.... ,·: ~:... \ ~- <:·· ,... _ .
. .: 7. Yi tl'J.n.. Govern:nent nw r.dnist~ers ·. gan()rally Iagreed .on.·· o~ting ere . . ·. .: .
Tu~eb. rae;uoors i'ro:n Govern:nent run!stri.es. I!..irrl,.sters. do 1~ Tuaeb nembere ani.·. :
~t uncover thm. ZaheC!i continua to preas for· action~ ·, ':.::?. ~ .:-_-:.) ~-.!.!.;.;·>:·;'. ,,.~;~ .:·~-,:.~:"2., ·.:)· ;;,<\
net
{WnsM rr...on Cc::::tent •. I
vie--rs on tr.J s subj:ect.)
I:for !'vTt~er. ~nfonM.tion.
· ·. ·- -· ·: . '·
Gf;'tT!eral. Zahedi
· . ' · . ·
:e.oneerning 'a'·::
s. Tuaeh PartY i~
TJDV. unt1er~ hit is trying· tO .rO'l"l:! e~i,tion ~ · ·
~{ossadeq el~ents. Da.dsetan states e::a.;;hat!cally that b·e has severed l·tO~saceq- '-.
Ttrleh alllc.nea ·and that Baz.o.ar has a'ha.rdonod 11ossade:t. Dadset~ is' ·vatching closelr
for ross:i ble sotu•ces or fins.ncial.
. .
support rcrr "lt:iieh Party..
- . ... . .. . . •.

·;
t
. Acting Chief" ·: /
Division of' Near fust
I

and L.~ica. . I
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1;. . ;
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. ·~ ~.o 13526 3.3(b)(1 )>25Yrs .·

·- .·

:·r:A-=p-=p-=R-=o~v=E=o-=F.,..,O_,.R--R-EL_E_A_S_E_:~
21-Jun-2011
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C01383752
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,.,
21 Septer;,ber 19 53

FROl{: ~:r. Roose-..--elt

1. The t"u deputy Chie.fs of staff~ Generals Akhavi and Dehim.i, are intrl-
guing·to renove Chief of Staff Batrr~gelich in favor of General Arfa.
....Jiobj~ctive is to uE.ke J..rfa another P..azmara. ·.
L..__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

I Ian interview ;d.th ?rime Einister Zahedi' revsaled foll01d.ng:

1. The Iranian Goverri!Zlent -ha.s been financially supporting Ayatollc:.h Ee~1behani.
Zahedi is willi..n.g to give Eehbehani 1 s candidate·s jobs of less importance
than key positions. HO\·.'Bver, Eehbeh~ni's son Jalfar \IE!lts the portfolio of
Ki.nister of national Economy. Sach an appointment is impossible and
failure of the Pri1n.e l~inister to carry it out has resulted in the estro.nge-
ment of the P*1e. 1-!i.nister c...nd Ber,beha..Tl1.
: ·..
. . . ~ .
. ~· . _l..t:dd.i .liuri1 the Deputy Prine Hini:ster.J has helped. Za:-Dedi· greatly and "''ill
·.. not be ·reUloved unless he ttdoes so:nething -,:rong. 11 . . . •:, . • .·~. . .: : · ·

·~·~y····~~l~n~l: ~aidar :is' tq·-~e .remov~ ·a·~ h~ad -~~ the ·.s~c~:~·c::~li~~ -~~~:·-~~~th~~
. I
... I
. . .: ··!
.~·:::. ·r
··, ·l ..;-,:·..··_.·:. :posit~on iS/~f~, r~. him~·. . . · ·.. . ~ ~-:._ :-.: · · ..:.:.<: . . :·"?~, ._. . ' · ·-~./_~:::F~i·~f,~;~:-~.:·:·:>.
.o:~·ief ~~' Po~ice Gene:ral ~vi Koq~a.:n~ may be removed ~- th_~- ~~f-.,~t~~-·:.· ·:~-~-·-.
li.
i
4•
·1...

·<"•.:. 5.~ Sharif. Th-'.ami,·.h~~ of the Seve~ Y~ar Plan ·Organi~tion, has:be~ ~st·ro~t.ed -
to change certain corr-..lpt appointments in his department. If the Prima
Ii Uinister's instructions are not carried out promptly, Ir...ami is· to. be
removed.. · -· ...··- :~ .. -· ..'" : . .
I "
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EO 13526 3.3(b)(1 )>25Yrs ..
,,. I i
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C01383765
; ~~.. \lo'-b
2h SeptG::;~ber 1953

FR0!1: Hr. Roosevelt

1- Z:::.hedi intends to issue a press statei:".ent. linking Tudeh Party-, former

Priwe M"i-.ister l{o3sadeq a.'ld others to sabotage of the Ir2.nia<1 Air Force
planes on 22 September.
2. Close ad.-..risers of Zahedi are ureing him to d:!.sci:::s·cr.ief of Staff
Batm~~gelich ~~ediately because of the sabotage incident.

3~ Zahedi 'oT3.11ts the Shah to dis:n.iss ,Deputy Chiefs of Staff, General AY...hc.vi
and General Deihimi, but prefers to give Bc.tm<>..ngelich one \veek to rid
the Army of unc'tetsirable elej!lents.

4. Za.'·H:lcii desires to retain himself the post of J.~inister. of L11terior in order

to control ele_?tion for the next 1>-~ajlis.

5. Zahedi has .sent five messages to the Shah :requesting that the .S~eh o:r-der
the lulitary Tribunal to e:x.7edit~ execution of l1cssadeq ami others • The
Shah has not yet complied. ..

'
''
6. Zah~di is meeting with.Gene;al Heda~t, Minister of National Defense,~
I
and Batmangelich at 1400 hom·s Tehran time on· 23 September to issue.. .. .
instructions that the Tudeh and other dangerous .ele..nents must be ~rged . \
i · '"·.-:·.· .. _. . _.........
. Fqrce~
i'ro111 the J.rmed -·'Within one week.~'.· . :,~·---:
. .· ·.·:· .
.: .:.. ;:.·· . . · . .· ..

I . ~, :: :::\·.:. A. , ... ·. ~ ;;;.~_;;:;?,;::· .':c- ·.·. ~:... :/.". ·> ·. .·

·~ . ,.·.,~

I. . , ·. '. ~- .. :- EO 13526 3.3(b )( 1)>~SYrs , .. . . .: .

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.· ; ... ·- -·- ·- .. ·-·· -· - ·- . --- -~--·· ~-·- ~-- -· . ...

APPROVED FOR RELEASED DATE: :,....

06-21-2011
. : ....

CLA!SJFIIiATioN R:EVJ~W 120 £o . 65. ·- ·

CONDUCTED ON i<IJ /11.4 Y: r/.
.,. ·- DERJVATIYE·CL R' f.
0 DECL 0 DOVIJICR TO @CJII'./7'11~ ,J
REVW ON d 'I ,'; ~,/.) ,J-;; · .
D'ERIYEil FROM [\ "1.'-.

:•
 ;

00

I~ ':- ,, o
. 2 October 195.3

1. The Shah has decided that former ?rime Minister Hossadeq must
be tried and condemned to deatl\ 1 but he has not decided whether !{:::~ssadeq
should then be pardoned by royal decree and innnediately banished from
Iran or Lr.m1ediatezy executed.

2. The Shah believes that a:ny dela~ in disposing of Jiossadeq 1

follo1·d. ng the trial~ l'10uld invite .Tudeh (and pro-:Mossadeq) counter-
attack under a slogan such as "Save 1-~ossa.deq_ 's Lif~".

I
!
3. In the event of a Tudeh move (see paragraph 2 above) prior to
--·. jI the sentencing of Mossadeq, the Shah_has ordered that Kossadeq be
ld.lled· i,m;-:,ed?-ately by his guards. · · . · ·
li 4. The Shah is. greatly disturbed bi 'a report, \-ll'lich he received
that the Tudeh ~1..1.1 attack 'h.oithin thirty days. · .. . . . ·
i
. . S .;.,. •r • ~. • .1\
•• 0 • • • • ·.~ •

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9 Octc·l :r 19 53

FROI~: 1!.r. Roosevelt

1. On 6 October Prime l·J.nister Z&..hed.i stated that he considered the

closing of the Senate by former Pri:ne c.anister Hossc.:ieq illegal despite the
Shah's fir.-uan because the Senate is part ·or
the Ir;:ni2.n organic law. '

2. Zahedi has been promised bt senators that they ~~11 not hold
for~A.l session until t~e l·2jlis is convened.

3. Ze..hedi o.nd Ho;cyn Ha1dd, pro-Zahedi Eajlis Deputy, had violent

disa.greeraents over pr:Jposed Se!1de re-opening. 1-iaY.Jd threatened to "beat".
any senator "r/no attE!m,pted to attend a session of the Senate. Zahedi declared
that he 1vould order Ha.kki shot if he molested the senators.

4. On 26 Septe!nbar Za'l1edi gave l·~ullah Behbehani lO,O::X) tomans

(appro)d~ately $1,200) and again on 3 October 5,000 tomans (approximately
~6DO).

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1. At 1200 hciura. on 10 October .Prime lHnist.er •( 'o , .. , t"o, •:•• ••'~
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Z?.hedi
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stating that J.atter ~were diff'ichlt. tq work vd.th~.~·.· Shams .Qanatabadi; .'\\"ilO was
present, concurred 1-rl.th'Kashani 1 s statement~ · .,.,., -.~-·.::: ·,.: · · ... ·
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3. Zal:led.i is. trying.·t.o' split revived National Front

woo.in~g~K:-a-s-=-h-a-ni-=--a-v-.ra.-y-f=r-o_m__Jother leaders.,····,:- · ·,-. · · :: :· :.. ·· ~ ·. .': , ;
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C01384521
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~
OUR H.'.TIOJ~AL CEA.FJ.CTER

As long as foreigners have been coming to Iran - since _the days of Shah

Abbas -they have written m~ny flattering thinbs about Iranians in their books

published in Italy. Germany, France a·nd England. They complimented us highly

and .listed us as the most polite people in the world and among the most hos~

pitable. They told their readers in Europe and America that we were polite to

visitors and very tol~rant of men of a different race and religion. Chardin,

tho astute French observer of the Iranian scene, made a very profound state-

ment on this characteristic of polite'ness. ·The foreign travelers in Iran have

described us as a bentle people with a wonderfully rich culture - a people that

likes to spend lon5 hours in friendly discussion but that abhors any form of

physical violence. They wrote that Iranians love poetry, art and beauty and
•
despise vulgarity and incivility.

We lranians are proud of our reputation abroad and believe that it is

justified. There have been times in our past when we have not lived up to our

reputation. Ire reoember with shame what happened to lk.jo:r Imbrie many years ago

when a few people forgot ou:r traditions of hospitality and tolerance. We have

long been determined that suoh events do not recur in our country. ·
•
But what·has happened in Iran since the dictator Mossadeq made an alliance

with the Soviet Tudeh Party? In place of our··traditional friendliness. p611te•

ness,#and hospitality, Iranians are becoming rude and unfriendly. Some of our

people have been insulting foreigners on our streets.- In place of our traditional

tolerance, Iranians are acting increasingly hateful tawards people who are

different. Some of our people have e~~n gone so far as to have thrown acid
on the wife of.the Arbentine P_mbassador. In place of our traditional gentleness

!APPROVED FOR RELEAS~D: 21 JUN 2011!

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and abhorrence of violence, Iranians are becoming noisy and rough and are re-

sorting to physical violence. Some of our people h£:tve attacks foreigners and

hnve stoned foreign cars and many times in recent days groups of our people hav~

fouLht each other - even in the }~jlis. Already our reputation of old is being

destroyed in Europe and America. It is reported tho.t Secretary Dulles v.-a.s ad-

vised not to visit our country because of the danLers of physical violence.

Ever since the alliance between the dictator Mossadeq and the Tudeh Party,

Iranians have been less polite, less hospitable, and less tolerant. Iranians

have been rude, rough, and unfriendly. Uany of our people are actint more like

Bolsheviks than like Iranians. Dictator !lossadeq, you are co:rruptin0 the char-

acter of the Iranian people. You have case aside the qualities that have made us
•
a breat people and you are destroyint our reputation abroad.

Uany of us·:.. but not enough of us- are aware that the fundamental tactics

of the cornmunitts in Iran is to undermine and discredit everything that keeps

the country together, such as family ties and parental authority, respect for

law and order, loyalty to the government and the throne. If they can corrupt

our characters then all the rest that they desire will f'ollow along easily. That·,
• ·-
is the great trap into which Mossadeq has fallen, to join with the communi:ta in

encouraging us to be rude, uncouth and coarse~ We Iranians must stop acting like

Bolsheviks and remain true to our traditional national character.

.
•'
C01384520 O
.( J-9 . JlOSE:J..DEQ'S SPY S!::EVICE
,.

Uossadeq says he is the s~vior of Irun, but he does strante thin~s for a

savior. Uossadeq says he ·wants to save Iran from the army and he has cut down the

funds for the army and has stirred hatred among the officers and men. But many

of us remember what it was like in Iran before we had an army. Many o~ us remember

the raiding and pillacing of the tribes. Many of us remember the burned village~,

the stolen goods~ the disruptions to trade and travel. We would like to ask

Jlossadeq how he will save· Iran from the tribes without an army. We imagine he

will ask his ~ood friends, the murderous Qashqai Khans. to protect us.

Mossadeq says he ~ill save Iran from the lando~~ers. However~ he has re-

ceived large sums from landowners s~ch as the J..minis. We too v:ant to save Iran

froni the lando..,mers but we wondered what }fossadeq does with this money. Does he
..
use it to help our farmers buy their own land? No( Mossadeq uses this money

to build up h5s priv~te spy service. And does he.spy abainst the Soviet Tudeh

Party that tried to rob Iran of Azerbaijan? No: He spies atainst his friends

who helped bring that national movement into power and -v;ho helped Iran regain ita

oil. Jlossadeq 's spies are protecting Iran b~· watching the homes of Hakimi• Shayegan.

Uaki, Dr. B~ghai, Haerizadeh and Shams Qanatabadi. They are protecting Islare by .·

Tiatching the homes of Ayatoilah Kashani. Ayatollah Behbehani. Lullah Hasan Falsafi.

Navab Safavi and the },{aajid-i-Shah. They are ._guarding at;a:inst Bolshevism by

watching the headquarters of the Iran Party, the Third Force, The Sumka ?arty.
··'

and the Arya Party. They protect us from enemy propab~nda by spying on the

newspapers Tehran-i-Mossavar, Jebheh Azad, Kayhan, and Mard-i-Asia. They are

safeguarding our &.rmy by watching the 'officers Club~ the Retired Officers Club •

and the house of General Rtahi.

Is this the way you save Iran, }!.ossadaq? We know what you want to save.

You want to save Mossadeq's dictatorship in Iranf

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RELEASE: 21 JUN 2011

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 - ----.--'r''f>.Tm T II T

CONFIDEN·r iAL

BRITISH-AMERICAN PLANNING TALKS, WASHINGTON,

10 AND 11 OCTOBER 1978

SUMMARY RECORD

US-SOVIET RELATIONS
l. Mr Kr e i s berg said that t h e fundamental problem wa s to find
the right b alance between cooperation and competition in their
relations with the Soviet Union . Soviet a ctivities in Africa
presented a dilemma. In the Horn, there had been pressure from
the Saudi Arabians for American arms supplies to Somalia, but
they had held off because of continuing WSLF activities in the
Ogaden, while encouraging other countries to press the Russians
and Cubans not to cross the Somali border and not to become
involved in Eritrea. Even the Libyans, Algerians and Iraqis
were concerned about Soviet involvement in the area, and partly
as a result the Soviet Union was now trying to reach a negotiated
s ettl ement in ~ritrea with the help of the South Yemenis and the
Libyans . Mr Kreisberg was les s concerned that the Russians would
succeed in consolidating a bastion of power in Ethiopia . They
were not meeting al l the wishes of the Ethiopian Government, who
were in turn not paying for the $1 billion worth of arms which
they had received. Mengistu was resisting Soviet pressure to set
up a Marxist party and had sent Ethiopian supporters of the Soviet
line out of Addis Ababa. The prospect was of the Russians becoming
increasingly bogged down.
2. In Southern Africa the future extent of Soviet involvement
was still an open question. In Afghanistan and South Yemen the
Russians had been taking the opportunities which offered themselves:
there was no linked operation such as the Irani an s and Saudis
imagined. Afgh~nistan was not yet a Sovi e t cli ent state , and its
present government was very insecure. The Russians would probably
wish to avoid military intervention unle s s there was a disaster.
The Indians were, however , a lready very concerned and had told
Moscow that there could be a confrontation if Soviet troops moved

/into

CONFIDEN'FIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL

into Afghanistan . This coul d restr~in Soviet behaviour, s~nce

they thought of India as a m~jor long-term goal .

3- In other parts of the world,the Ru ssians would continue to

p~obe opportunities while avoiding serious risks. They were not
doing well in the Far East, and had handled relations with Japan
badly. They were losing ground in ~orth Korea and were being
refused military facilities at Cam Ranh by the Vietnamese, who
were also keen to improve their own leverage through better
relations with the US. In the Middle East, the only Soviet
option was to provide new weapons, eg to Syria, but the Syria ns
would remain independent. There were new problems with Iraq.
In Eastern ~urope, Soviet dominance continued, and would even be
increased by the growing economic dependence of the Eastern
European countries on the Soviet Union, especially for oil.
This dependence would however place major strains on the relation-
ship. In addition, the heavy industry sector of the Soviet economy
was in bad straits, and there would be increasing energy constraints.
4. Human rights issues had also become easier. Between 26,000
l and 30,000 Jewish and other emigrants would be allowed out of the
Soviet Union this year. The problem of Mr Crawford, the American
businessman arrested in Moscow, had been solved, and US-Soviet
trade was up 60% this year over the comparable period last year.
5. Against this background, in which Western attitudes and
Soviet interest in d~tente had helped to limit the achievement of
Soviet objectives, the Russians evidently wished to move ahead
with the cooperative side of their relationship with the US and
business as usual was resuming. A SALT Agreement was likely by
the end of the year, and there would be another meeting in three
or four weeks' time on conventional arms transfers, where there
had been much more progress than had originally been thought likely.
The Indian Ocean talks might be reopened within the next couple of
months in response to Soviet pressure: they had reduced their
force level to what it had been before their intervention in the
Horn. The only obstacle would be if there was further Cuban
involvement in Africa. The Soviet Union wanted to maintain the
transfer of technology and more generally might see advantages in
increasing the pitch of US-Soviet relations. Provided major
disputes could be avoided in future, eg over human rights, the
outlook was good.
/6.
2
CONFIDENTIAL
 - - --·- "'"'..,........,.mT A T

CONFIDENTIAL

6. Mr Shinn, Country Director f or the Soviet Union, said that

t he Ameri can rea ction to the problems of the summer over the
disside nt tri al s, the journal ist s a ccused of slander and
Mr Crawford had been compartmentalised. This had h ad some
success , and Mr Blumenthal was planning to go to Moscow in
December for the next meeting of the jointUS-Sovie t Economic
Committee and Trade Council. The chairman of the l a tter,
Mr Verity (also chairman of ARMCO) had seen Mr Brezhnev in Moscow
on 7 October; the latter had emphasised the Soviet interest in
trade.
?. Nevertheless, the global reach of the Soviet Union would
continue to cause problems, particularly perhaps in Southern
Africa. There was a rumour that Cuban troops would be sent to
Mozambique. It was also important that the West should respond
adequately to the Soviet military build-up in Eastern Europe. On
human rights, time tended to be a healer. There had also been
great advances in the Soviet Union over the last 10 years, of
which insufficient account was taken in the West. This was part
of the general evolution of Russia since the emancipation of the
serfs in 1861. (Mr Lake interjected that he was not sure whether
to talk of evolution or rather of a cyclical process.)
8. Another problem was the succession to Brezhnev. He had had
two heart attacks and wore a pacemaker. He also had problems with
his nervous system, but it was probably his cardio-vascular
problems which would kill him. He was the personification of the
peace programme agreed at the 24th and 25th Party Congresses, and
his successor might take a harder line, following a tradition of
reacting against previous leaders once they have disappeared.
In any case, the period of the succession was bound to interfere
with the Soviet decision-making process. It would be more important
than ever during this time for Western leaders to avoid statements
or actions which would play into the hands of immoderate elements
in the Soviet leadership counting on gaining support through anti-
Western policies.
9. Mr Crowe commented that, while he agreed with the general
lines of what had been said, he would put the emphasis a little
differently. He doubted whether it could be shown that the Russians
/had

3
CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL

had been constrained by Western actions - Third World feeling

was 8DOther matter . What we were now seeing might be less an
upturn in East- West relations following relative Soviet failures
than a hiatus in t hose aspects of international affairs most
affect ing East-West relation s. The situation in the Horn was
quiesc ent b ecAu se the Russians had achieved their objectives in
the Ogaden and did not want in any case to become embroiled in
Eritrea . Rhode sia and Namibia had not come to the boil for them;
but they could in the coming months. The sting had gone out of
the human rights confrontation but that was because the Belgrade
Review conference had passed and the Russians had successfully
asserted control over their dissident situation. The detente
process - arm s control, trade and other contacts - were on or
coming back on course. But we still had come no nearer to finding
ways of constraining Soviet behaviour where it ran cormter to our
interests. This particularly applied to Africa.
10. On the Western side little leverage was available. Human
rights were an important instrument of policy. They put the Soviet
Union on the defensive. But we should be careful not to let them
take control of policy itself. The next Olympic Games were relevant
in this connection. SALT was probably a significant constraint on
\
Soviet policy. But once the SALT agreement passed the Senate, the
Russians would feel less inhibited since it would be some time
beiore SALT III reached a delicate stage. The absence of this
constraint might show itself particularly in Africa over the next
two or three years. In theory economic leverage would be helpful,
but it was hard to bring about, and the Russians did not react well
to threats even if delivered privately. But the US Administration
had b a nned the Tass computer sale and delayed licensing for oil
drilling equipment. He would be interested to know how far this
was domestically motivated and how far regarded as a use of
leverage. A particular difficulty was the bleak prospect of
coordinating the policies of all the Weste rn countri es which would
have to be involved. An effort in this direction might increase
the strains between the US and Europe. These were traditional as
far as the French were concerned. But care had to be exercised
in not giving the Germans cause to doubt the predictability of the
Americans as allies. The Germans had their own particular interests
/eg

4
CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL

eg over proliferation issues, crui s e mi s siles and emi grati on of

ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe. But whi le the Sovi et Union
would try to exploit differences, we hRd no doubt abou t the
fundamental solidity of the German position. ( Mr Lake s a i d
privately that Herr Kinkel - with whom he had recentl y had
US-German planning talks - had made a point of reassuring him
on this point: the US Administration had no doubts in this r e gard . )

11. Mr Laporte commented that, on past form, it was profitless to

speculate on what might happen after BrezhBev's departure.
Mr Shinn said that, to get support for his detente policies with
the US, even Brezhnev might have to make concessions to hard-liners
in the Politburo, eg over support for the national liberation
movements in Africa.

12. Mr Lake agreed with Mr Crowe that the Russians had not been
constrained by detente considerations from doing anything which
they would have wanted to do in Africa, including giving encourage-
ment to ZAPU. They had not shown themselves to be constrained by
SALT, and were keeping their present low profile in Southern Africa
and Eritrea for their own reasons. It would indeed be desirable to
use the present hiatus to establish a policy to help control future
Soviet behaviour where it harmed Western interests. Was it possible
to develop a code of conduct for detente? How could leverage be
made workable? He had at first thought there was much to be said
for a code of conduct but was now an agnostic if not an atheist on
it, not least because the West should not impose restrictions on
its own right to provide military help to friendly Third World
countries. Nor could pressure of public opinion achieve a great
deal. The Tass and Dresser episodes had, however, not been merely
a response to domestic pressure; they were intended to signal
that the US was serious. An imminent danger now was in the Horn.
There had been an increase in the activities of Somali liberation
forces in the Ogaden, and the Cubans remaining there were unable
to cope with the resulting harrassment. An obvious response was
to hit back at Somalia. How could we stop this? Mr Crowe said
that the trouble was that the Somalis would be bringing retribution
on themselves since they were the aggressors. They could not
benefit from it and we should use the limited leverage available
,
to us to try to persuade Siad Barre to reduce his support for the
Ogaden insurgents.
5 /13.
CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL

13. Mr Shinn expanded on the difficulties of economic leverage

in such cases. Following the TASS computer and Dresser oil
equipment episodes, the second of which had been bungled by the
Washington bureaucracy, the National Security Council would
henceforth be reviewing potential sales in the light of political
as well as nationa l security i ntere s t s, particularly for energy
related exports. Mr Lake sugge s t ed that Soviet Jewish emigration
figures were going up partly b ecause the Russians wanted the
measures imposed by Senator Jackson and Congressman Yanik to be
removed. Mr Shinn thought that the emigration figures showed
that the US could be successful when a low profile could be kept.
Where dissidents attracted public attention, ~owever, they could
force the Administration to take a high profile. Mr Crowe pointed
out that the Soviet authorities had an overriding interest in
keeping the dissidents under control, by means of exemplary trials
if necessary. As far as pressure on the Soviet Union was concerned,
the US had the advantage over other Western countries that they
still had the incentive of MFN and Eximbank credits to offer;
other countries had already conceded these.

ll~. Summing up, Mr Lake said that the Administration continued

to believe that linkage did not work well at a time of political
competition. He confirmed that although the Dresser episode had
been intended as a signal, no deep thought had been given in the
US Administra tion to the use of economic leverage, but "God help
us on Rhodesia".

AFRICA
15. This session was attended by Tom Thornton of the NSC staff.
Mr Lake said that the three issues of Namibia, Rhodesia and South
Africa needed to be faced in conjunction, but using a different
approach for each. Rhodesia, for instance, was a more natural
subject for oil sanctions than was Namibia, even though it might
be desirable to step back on the Rhodesian issue if nothing could
be worked out in the next few months. He thought oil sanctions
against Namibia would be wholly inappropriate, since they would
lead, when they failed, to demands for enforcement and even more
extreme measures. On South Africa itself, Vice-President Mondale
/had
6
CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL

had to ld the South Afric ans that their relations with the US
would d e teriora te if there wa s no p r ogress on apartheid. Sooner
or later, the fact would h ave t o b e fa c ed that there had been no
such progress.

16. On future options for change with in South Africa , Mr Lake

said he was grateful for the British di s cussion paper (by Pl anning
Staff) and asked to see the Annex prepared by Research Department
(it has been sent to him). Mr Crowe outlined the p aper, concluding
that in his view it was difficult to see how a federa l solution ,
which was bound to be extremely complex and which the whites would
wish to dominate at the upper level, could work. Mr Lake agreed
that it would be difficult to handle taxation, foreign policy and
defence in a situation in which the necessary goodwill between the
component parts would be totally lacking (a reference to Cyprus
was made). Mr Crowe continued that assuming one man, one vote i n
a unitary state was not feasible and some kind of federal solution
was equally unworkable, partition was the only logical answer.
Although the present Homelands policy, as a part of apartheid, was
unacceptable, a partition solution built on the consolidated
Homelands in vastly extended geographical areas and with a fair
share of resources was conceivable. It would however require
considerable sacrifices from the whites, including either the
partition of or special arrangements for the industrial area round
the Rand. It would also require population transfers. It could
only be a last resort. The trouble was that the white population
of South Africa could see no viable alternative to their present
policies, and most discussion was based on ways of trying to make
them more acceptable to international and black opinion. But a s
the internal situation in South Africa deteriorated, with internal
and international pressures, and the present policy was seen as
increasingly unviable, debate could be opened up a nd new
possibilities discussed. This was inevit ably a long- t erm process.
It was in the We stern interest for the West to encourage the
evolution of such discussion and, while condemning apartheid, to
show sympathetic understanding for any viable solutions which might
emerge. This required the West not to foreclose any options which
could lead to such a conclusion, for example by stressing one man,
one vote in a unitary sta te or condemning out of hand any kind of
/partition
7
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 CONFIDENTIAL

partition. Mr Thornton s a id tha t his impression was that all

schemes were probably unworkable, but he a greed t h at we should
not foreclose options by calling for one man , one vote. Mr Lake
commen ted that Mr Mondale had a cquiesced in this phr a se onl y
after persistent questioning by a journalist. Mr Crowe suggest ed
that merely not foreclosing options was a passive policy. We
should try and encourage an internal debate in South Afri ca a s
conditions made this possible. Mr Lake said that they would have
to talk to the South African Government about apartheid in the
next few months. It might however be more helpful to work
unofficially, eg by organising conferences. The Administration's
view was that the West should not specify a list of measures for
the South African Government since the latter could then claim
they had satisfied Western demands. Mr Crowe agreed but said
that we could still try and establish trends and encourage debate.
Mr Cornish suggested that it was important to address ourselves to
black opinion as well as to the whites. Ms Speigel suggested that
a useful course of action would be to encourage black and white
leaders to talk directly to each other. The former were willing
to recognise the security needs of the latter.

17. Mr Thornton suggested that, if sanctions were inevitable,

it might be useful in our own interest to make the period of
disruption as short as possible. This would mean trying to
maximise rather than minimise their effect. Mr Crowe questioned
whether sanctions would make white South Africans amenable; they
would hit the blacks hardest, including in other African countries,
increase unrest, violence and repression, exacerbate racial
tensions and reduce willingness to negotiate on anything other
than extreme terms. He doubted whether Western democratic
governments could sustain policies aimed at such effects. Y~ Lake
pointed out that revolutions tended to happen when conditions
started to deteriorate after having improved for s ome time.
Sanctions a t the right moment, it was argued, might hRve such ~ n
effect. His own view, however, was that a lthough sanctions were
inevitable, they would not helJ) on the ground. As far as Congress
was concerned, relations with the Administration were such that
Congress would tend to do the opposite of Administration policy.
/For

8
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For the moment Congressional pressure was directed at making

the Administration pursue a harder policy towards South Africa,
eg by cutting off Eximbank credits. Once the Administration
adopted a policy of sanctions, however, the pressure might be
in the other direction. His general thought was that we should
try to make it clear that we could not be expected to solve the
problem of South Africa. We should avoid being cast as a
deus ex machina, as was the case with Rhodesia.

18. Asked about his attitude to sanctions on the immediate

Namibia problem, Mr Lake commented critically on the current
proposal to cut off flights to South Africa. This would not
have a major economic impact, but would drive the South African
whites into the laager by diminishing their communications with
the out side world . Our aim should, on the contrary , be to
preserve con~unicati ons. He would prefer action in the field of
high technology and in the field of finance , but he thought air
communications the front-runner. He thought it important not to
thre aten specific sanctions in the talks between the Five and
the South Africans the following week (Mr Growe agreed). Oil
sanctions would not work, since South Africa had two to three
years' reserves. Moreover, the re would be pressure for the West
to mount a blockade to implement sanction s . Mr Crowe thought
that the Iranians would be cooperative - only a small proportion
of their oil went to South Africa. Mr Lake said that he would
nevertheless prefer action on loans to South Africa where we
could keep our skirts clean. If funds continued to flow eg
through Singapore there would be nothing that we could do to
stop it. He made it plain that, given that sanctions were
inevit able but without value on the ground, his ideal would be
sanct ions which looked good at the UN, did not put a burden of
enforcement on the West and was relatively cost-free to both
South Africa and the West.

Angola
19. Mr Lake said that the Angolans wRnted to improve relations
\\lith the US for economic reasons, and hDd put out signals through
the I>ortuguese . In addition to wanting more economic help than
(the

9
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 CONF.LDENTIAL

the Russians could prov ide, Neto hoped to solve his internal

security and border problems , particul arly as little had been

don e in practice to c arry out his agreement with Mobutu. The
American reply was that they were willing to talk about more
normal relations, but that the Cuban presence in Angola was
s till a complicating factor. It was indeed in the American
interests to see the border problems solved, but he felt a
political and moral concern a r ising out of previous Western
support for UNITA. It was important not to promote the
military defeat of UNITA by Neto, yet how could political
reconciliation be encouraged? Mr Thornton said that UNITA
continued to receive supplies, perhaps via Zaire from Europe.
There was no current evidence of support from South Africa, but
this did not prove that it was not being given. Even with a
Namibia settlement some supplies could come through the Caprivi
Strip. Mr Lake added tha t the difficulty was that the Cubans
would not leave until the UNITA issue was settled. So long as
the Cubans were there, normalisation was difficult if only for
Congressional reasons. How could we get Savimbi and ~eto to
reach a political solution? Mr Crowe agreed that a political
solution was preferable, but willingness to negotiate had to
come from Savimbi too. He suggested that it could be mistaken
to attach too many conditions (Cuban withdrawal, political
settlement, etc) to normalisation since otherwise the Americans
would never reach a position in which they could influence the
Angolan Government. It might be necessary to accept that the
West - or the US - did not have the ability to determine the
outcome of a struggle for power and trying to do so in Angola
might only encourage Savimbi to keep going. Mr Lake said that
it would be politically difficult to go very far until the
Cubans had left, and maybe it would be necessary to wait for a
while. In the meantime, the Angolans were trying to reopen the
Benguela railv.Jay.

/SOUTH-WEST ASIA

10
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SOUTH-WEST ASIA

North Yemen
20.
Mr Kreisberg said that the US had sta rted a massive
$ 300 m military assistance programme to North Yemen~ their
fourth largest. F5B fighter s, tanks and armoured personnel
carriers were the main components, and American training would
be necessary. The programme would be paid for by Saudi Arabia.
This step was being taken in response to strong pressure from
the Saudis resulting from their concern about South Yemen.
The US Administration had agreed in order to show tha t they
were not solely interested in the price of oil. Nevertheless
the decision might bring problems. It would presumably result
in an increased programme of Soviet and Cuban assistance to
South Yemen, and the North Yemenis might be encouraged to build
up guerrilla forces in the south of their country to raid over
the border. In the longer run, it should not be forgotten that
North Yemen had more people than Saudi Arabia . As part of the
~ process, the Saudi Arabians wished to get rid of a Soviet presence
~- ~ in North 1emen and to bring about a more amenable government there.
~t\ ~ ... ~ ~ - . .Lt .'t~~ - ------------------~--·
~ ~ o.-- ~ ~ \S""" r
~rr~~~fghanistan
Q ~' 21. Mr Kreisberg said that it was far from clear that the
,.~. . ,.... present government would survive, and many of the original
.c;.t
s-,....... participants in the coup have already been ousted. The Soviet
Union would probably prefer not to intervene directly, partly
because of Indian concern over the integrity of Pakistan.
Mr Thornton suggested that the Indians were developing a lively
regional interest which was to be encouraged. Mr Lake wondered
how the Soviet Union could be discouraged if it were tempted to
intervene. Mr Crowe agreed that the Rus s ians would be most
reluctant to intervene. A call for help from the survivors of
a coup might be difficult to resist. But much would depend on
the circumstances. The Rus sians would think hard before being
seen to attack the Afghan army, even though there could be no
doubt about the outcome. If they did invade there would be little
the West could do directly apart from stirring up international
concern. Mr Thornton thought that one reason for Soviet
intervention might be the worry that if they held back, a right-
/wing
11
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 CONFIDENTIAL

wing Afghanistan government might be i nst alled , increasing

American influence. Mr Crowe wondered whether any government
in so small and powerless a country as Afghanistan could pos e,
or be thought to pose, a significant threat to Soviet security.
Mr Lake said tt~; Soviet military intervention, reflect ing a
development of/Brezhney Doctrine, would have serious consequences
for East-West relations.

Iran
22 . Mr Henry Precht, Country Director for Iran, opened his
remarks by saying that in his view recent events in Iran were the
worst foreign policy disaster to hit the West for many years. He
said that the current shooting by the military and growing labour
difficulties were a foretaste of the chaos to come. Government
, reactions were tardy and inept, and there was the danger that they
• might come to believe that the West wanted to divide up Iranian oil
supplies with the Soviet Union. More and more the Shah was being
opposed by the whole country. The Army and the Police were on his
side, but he could not be sure how they would behave under pressure.
7, The Shah seemed to have given up, Sharif Emami was doing nothing to
~ capture the public imaginiation, and martial law was brutal. It
' was difficult to see how the Shah could survive. Mr Crowe said
that our assessment was also gloomy but less hopeless than
I
v Mr Precht's. The Shah still had the Army and the opposition,
though united against him, was not united on its positive goals.
The Shah had indeed been depressed and left things to his Prime
Minister, but he was listening to advice, for example from
Sir A Parsons. In our view it was essential to stand behind the
Shah and give him our full support. We also believed it essential
that the Shah should proceed with his programme of elections next
June. Mr Lake agreed that liberalisation should continue. He
a lso agreed that it was essential to maintain solidarity with the
Shah: he could not imagine a successor regime which would not b e
worse for Western interests. Mr Precht said that one matter on
which the oppositio.n was increasingly united was the belief that
the Shah must go. ~ven middle-class people were beginning to waver
in the way t hey saw their interests. Muharram would produce further
serious disturbances in December, current wage settlements were
highly inflationary and the only effect of the Government's
/corruption
12
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corrup tion campaign was to p ar a l yse the bureaucracy .
Professor Bull, whose earlier p r edic tions on Iran had been borne
out by r e c ent events, had t a ken the view that the Shah wou l d not
be able t o maintain power . The immed~ a te succession would
probably go to a military r egime, either of the gen era ls or of
some unknown co lonel , in wh i ch case the d angers would considerabl y
increase. Neverthele s s , Mr Precht c onc l uded, it was the r ight
policy to support the Shah and pre ss for lib eralisation and the
inclusion of outsiders in the government.

23 . The other Americ ans showed surprise at the d ep th of

.Mr Precht's gloom. Mr Kreisberg a sked whet h er we were harmi ng
both the Shah and ourselves by trying to s hore him up . Mr Precht
said that the answer to both questions was yes, but we had no
alternative. He expected Sharif Emami's government to fall before
the end of the year. Of the opposition , on ly Khomeini had any
stature. Matters would not be helped by the fact that Mr Precht
was having to review State Department records for the years
between 1952 and 1954 with a view to release under the Public
Information Act, with possibly damaging consequences for the UK
as well as the Shah.

24. Mr Crowe expressed the view that if tha t were the case, he
h oped HMG would be consulted. He commented that if Mr Precht was
right and the worst came to the worst, we should have to do what
we could to get on terms with the Shah's successors. One major
fact in our favour was that Iran under any regime would continue
to have a strong interest in selling oil to the West. If the
Soviet Union wanted Iranian oil they would have to pay the going
rate in hard currency. Damaging to Western int erests though the
Shah's fall would be, it need not be ca taclysmi c and it was i n our
interest to see that it was not. Mr Precht pointed out t ha t t he
US pres s would nevertheless take a change very badly. US p ubl ic
opinion, particularly in Congress , would be parti cularl y a ffe c ted
b y a successor government in Iran breaking present t i e s with Israel,
as it would inevitably do. Nevertheless, he agreed that the
situation should be manageable in the l onger run. Mr Lake pointed
out that sinc e the successor government would continue t o need
Amer ican he l p with their military e quipment t h ey might be brought
/to
13
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 CONFI DENTI AL

to see the importance of good re l at i ons with the US, but added
that the Russ i ans would n ev ertheless benefit. I1r Crowe asked
about CENTO and the effect on Iran of Pakistan's withdrawal .
Mr Lake thought that Pakistan wa s now dr awi ng ba ck f rom its
earlier loss of interest and threat to wit hdraw. He had no
wish to raise the question of what shou ld be don e with the
organisation. Mr Crowe agreed that the Sha h had other worries
on his plate for now. Mr Precht reported the I ranians as having
said that CENTO meant nothing to anybody, either the Soviet Union
or the US.

CHINA, EASTERN AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

25. For this session the chair on the American side was taken
by Dick Holbrooke. Mr Crowe led off by referring to Western
security and economic interests, and to the implications for them
of the new policies associated with Teng and the Sino-Soviet
dispute. His judgment was that both were here to stay, that they
could give China a continuing interest in good trading and
political relations with the West and in regional and perhaps
wider stability. They were therefore both in the Western interest
and the West should encourage them by reciprocating Chinese
interests; this would also give us an ability to restrain Chinese
activities in support of violent change, eg in Africa. The
Chinese wanted to build up a Western and Third World coalition
against the Soviet Union, but we had to take due account of the
importance of our relations with the latter.

26. On the Chinese side, one question was progress in the

normalisation of their relations with the US. Presumably the
ending of diplomatic relations and the end of the security treaty
with Taiwan could be reconciled with a trade liaison office and
continuing military assistance. But no doubt the Americans would
not just leave Taiwan to its fate, if only because it was important
to preserve credibility with the South Koreans and Japan. Perhaps
China would understand this, since she would not wish to weaken
the stability of the region. Mr Crowe wondered whether Taiwan, i f
it lost confidence in the US, might be driven by insecurity into
/closer
14
CO.Hi'IDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL

closer ties with the Soviet Union. Mr Holbrooke rejected this

possibility. The Russians would certainly try to play foot sie
with Taiwan . But Taiwan was an isl a~d of traders. Their exports,
the 1 2th largest in the world, were to the West, and they would
have no confidence in any offers of security from the Russians.
They knew that exports would su£fer badly at the hands of the US
Congress if they played games with the Russians. The chances of a
closer alignment with the Soviet Union were therefore, in his view,
zero.

27. Mr Crowe went on to suggest that our aim should be to respond

to Chinese interest in the West, and to try to create a network of
mutually dependent relations. The Soviet Union could be expected
to react strongly, since they would like to isolate China. There
was an argument that new leaders, alarmed at an ever stronger China
in close relations with the West and Japan, might even go so far as
to repudiate detente and become more adventurist. Mr Crowe believed
that the Soviet Union's own interest in detente was so strong as to
prevail, more particularly as the Western contribution to Chinese
modernisation would be relatively marginal whether in the civil or
the military field. If we limited arms sales to defensive weapons
and handled matters unprovocatively, this would not constitute or
increase a threat to the Soviet Union. In support of this it
b eh oved us to make moves towards the Soviet Union at the same time
as we did towards China. The US might have an opportunity to do
this by continuing normalisation with a SALT agreement. As far as
the UK was concerned, if we sold arms to China we might expect
penalties from the Soviet Union in the trade field. There might
also be some Soviet signals through the vehicle of current East-West
negotiations, but if we handled the matter carefully the Soviet
Union would see it as in its interest to go on dealing with us.
It followed that there was no China card for us to play.

28 . Turning to other countries in the region, Mr Crowe said that

Japan was increasing in self-confidence and had a growing feeling
that she had a contribution to make, eg to ASEAN, though little of
the aid they promised had yet been spent. We should encourage
them to do more, particularly in Africa, and to spend more on
defence.
/29.
15
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29 . As far as Sout h Korea was concerned, Mr Crowe had bean

s truck on his visit there in February by the depth of their
concer n about withdrawal of American land forces and the loss
l ess of c ombat capabili t y than of deterrence. Mr Holbrooke
agre ed that in Febr u ary there h ad been a cri sis in US- Korean
r el ation s , but s aid t hat President Carter's agreement in March
t o s low down the withdrawa l s had r estor ed t he s itu ation, thus
pr eventi ng a ca tastrophic det er i oration i n regional relations.

SOUTH-EAST ASIA (much of thi s ground is covered by Washingt on

telno 4046 of 12 October)
30. Mr Holbrooke then turned to South-East Asia, which he said
was the most interesting part of the Far East at the moment. He
asked Mr Crowe to convey to Dr Owen that the ASEAN countries
attached the highest importance to their forthcoming meeti ng with
the European Community. Style and personal involvement would be
vital, even if there was little that could be done on substance.
He hoped Dr Owen would show his appreciation for the impressive
way the ASEAN countries had coordinated their responses to the
dazzling amount of attention they had received from Vietnam andChina .
Mr Vance had made an excellent impression on the ASEAN Foreign
Ministers in New York in August. The latter had, however , referred
with grea t emphasis to their coming talks with the European
Community. Mr Holbrooke had told M. Simonet of this.

31. Mr Crowe said that the Community were considering what could
be done in the trade field. It was hard to find concessions there ,
but we fully realised the political importance of the meeting.
Mr Holbrooke said that the ASEAN countries wanted the kind of
preferential arrangements for trade and commodities, eg in the
form of quotas or guaranteed orders, which Japan had offered.
He recognised that this was not possible. But the Common Fund
was of great importance to them, and Mr Vance had made it clear
to their Forei gn Ministers tha t he attached importance to progress
and a satisfactory outcome on this. The ASEAN countries were the
moderates in the G77. It was strongly in our interest to show
them support on this issue. (In a later discussion on the Common
Fund after Mr Holbrooke had left, Mr Crowe pointed out that the UK
was not behind the US on t he out s tanding issues (second window,
voluntary contributions, direct contributions to first window).
Mr Lake thought the US Administration would come out all right on
16 / the
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 CONFIDENTIAL

the second window but was split down t he middle on the first. )
They attached importance to having a Common Fund Agreement before
Ul'JCTAD V.

32. Mr Holbrooke went on to ask whether the Australians and

New Zealanders would increasingly take the place of Britain over
the next years in the South Sea islands, eg the Solomons and
Fiji. Mr Crowe said that this was indeed the way things were
going. Mr Holbrooke said that this was a logical arrangement ,
but needed to be made clear.

China
33. Mr Holbrooke said that the US, and President Carter personally,
were absolutely committed to normalisation. But there was no time-
table. He could see the attractions of tying it into the SALT II
process, but the timing was not in US hands and he did not see it
happening. It would be wrong to accept the Chinese line that it
was soley for the Americans to decide when they wanted to go ahead.
It was essential to avoid weakening Taiwan's security and economic
prosperity, and certain non-official relations between the US and
Taiwan needed to continue. The Japanese formula was useful, but
the US could not adopt it as it stood. In particular, the Americans
would have to go through certain necessary legislative steps.
Congressional approval would be needed to set up a Trade Office in
Taiwan and to continue ~imbank credits, which, as the law stood,
could be made only to ~ates. Taiwan was the second biggest
recipient of such credits, which were also an important confidence
factor for commercial loans.

34. Mr Crowe asked whether it followed from this that it was the
~hinese who would have to make a move. Mr Holbrooke said that the
Chinese would not change their three conditions, but would have
to indicate that they would be ready to accept ''follow-on relati ons
with the people of Taiwan". On security, China would not attack
Taiwan as long as they had Soviet divisions on their border and
Taiwan was well enough defended. His personal view was that the
Chinese would in any case not want to invade. They did, however,
want the US to endorse publicly the fact that the Communist Party

/of

17
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of China had beaten the Kuomintang . Once this was accepted, China
would be pr epared t o work out an arrangement under which Taiwan
would b e a qua r an ti ned isl and of export earners, very like Hong Kong,
on whi ch he was impressed with the signs from the Chinese that they
did not want to make an i s sue out of its future.

35 - Fundamenta lly, Mr Holbrooke cont inued, i t was a domestic

problem in the US . At pre sent Congress did not b elieve that Taiwan
would not be endang ered. He wa s una ble to forec ast how long it
would take for this view to change, given tha t t he e nd ing of the
defence guarantee did not mean that defenc e supplie s could not
continue. This a~sumed that the Chinese would accep t continuing
American defence supplies; if they did not, the position would b e
a very difficult one.

36. Mr Crowe asked what would happen if at a later stage China

wanted to threaten Taiwan. 1'1r Holbrooke said that the process of
normalisation would not make the US any less ready to react strongly
to what would amount to an almost total destabilisation of Asia.
Such a Chinese move would be imaginable only if a new Chinese
leadership thought that the Soviet Union did not matter but that
Taiwan did. Such people did not exist.

37. The present Chinese leadership was conservative, much more

interested in state than in Party relations. The big question was
whether the current line of modernisation, the revision of the
education system and the great leap outwards were merely a swing
of the pendulum which might swing back towards renewed factionalism,
or whether, with Mao literally coming apart at the seams, Teng's
path would prevail. It was a hard question. Mr Crowe suggested
that, although there would be further variations round the trend,
the next Cultural Revolution would not be as drastic as the las t
one as more people became involved in the fruits of progress.
With the experience of past disturbances and economic failure s,
most Chinese leaders and people had a strong interest in a more
consistent policy of modernisation. Mr Holbrooke said that the
CIA had pointed out that there were a number of people, like the
students who had been through the universities in recent years wi th
more ideology than training, who were being unfavourably affected
by current developments. Their resentment would be building up.

/Teng
18
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Teng, on t he other hand, was in a hurry. He had told

Dr Brzezin s ki that he had lost 12 years of his own life and
had l itt l e t ime lef t . In conclusion Mr Holbrooke said that be
shared the conven tional wisdom but di d not wish to leave the
problem unex ami ned.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
38. Mr Holbrooke said that the current level of Sino-Soviet
riva lry wa s important to the global balance, a nd tied down a
quart er of all Soviet troops. (Mr Crowe pointed out that t he
Soviet military build-up in the East had not been at the expens e
of the Western front. r1r Holbrooke agreed, but said that some
military planners did not.) Soviet military strength on their
part of the border continued to increase. On their side, the
Chinese had moved from Mao's three-world view to bipolarity :
the enemies of my enemy are my friends. They even wanted
relations with Saudi Arabia.

VIETNAM
39. Vietnam, Mr Holbrooke said, was China's most serious recent
problem. The Chinese appeared to believe that it had become a
Soviet military base, an Asian . Cuba. Mr Holbrooke's own view,
and tha t of Mr Vance and Mr Lake and most of the rest of the
State Department, was that the Vietnamese had fought for 30 years
for their independence and would not hand it over to the Soviet
Union or allow Soviet bases to be set up. In recent months the
Vietnamese had dramatically changed their foreign policy in favour
of ASEAN, Western Europe and the US. They wanted relations with
the latter and were ready to drop their demands for US aid. The
Chinese saw this as a trick by the Soviet Union and Vietnam to
induce the US to make good the aid which China had previously been
giving. In the American view, however, there were four reasons
for the new Vietnamese line:

(i) They had come to realise that their demands for

aid had only weakened their case with the US Congress;
/ (ii)

19
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 CONFIDENTIAL

( ii) the Vietnamese were very uns ettled ov·er the break
with China;

(i ii ) they had serious interna l d i fficulties with thei r

economy , r efuge es , floods and t h e Cambodian war;
( i v) they were extr e mely anxious to avoid becoming
excessively dep endent on t he Soviet Union, and hence
were turning to the Europ ean Communi ty, France and
Japan for aid.

40. It was in the strategic interest of t h e US, and of the

countries of South- East Asia, for the American s to estab lish
relations with Hanoi, in order to dilut e Vietname se d ependence
on the Soviet Union. They would therefore move i n t hat direc t ion .
I t would be easier than the normalisation of rela t i on s with China,
and they would not be unmindful of the inter-re l a t i on ship between
the two and of Chinese reactions . But they would not allow China
to dictate American policy to the third l a rgest Communist state,
given its potential for destabilising the area .

KOREA

41. The US had barely weathered two very difficult yea rs. The
three major problems were Koreagate, now in its d eath throes;
human rights, a continuing problem but one of lesser intensity;
and troop withdrawals. Prime Minister Fukuda had asked
President Carter in March 1977 to s ay he would reduce, not with-
draw, American forces. The President's refusal to renege on his
electoral commitment had much upset the J apanese. Since March,
however , the timetabl e for the withdrawa ls had been extended,
Congress had agreed compensation, and the pot had been kept f rom
boiling over. Accordingly, Ha rold Brown would be going to Korea
in November i n order to be present at t he creation o f a new
defence command. Next year, Mr Holbrooke was optimistic that the
relationship could be built up, and it mi ght be possi ble to
encourage North and South Koreans t o talk t o each other. I t was
helpful tha t North Korea was swinging towards Peki ng; Mos cow in
turn was playing footsie wi t h Sout h Korea and wou ld have t o be
wa tched. Mr Hol br ooke gav e the hi story of variou s approaches to
the US Admini s tra tion from the North Koreans through a Canadi an
/academic
20
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 CONFIDE...~TIAL

academic, the Pakistanis, t o t he Presi dent- elect in Plains ,

Georgia, and vi a Tito and Ce au sescu (Mr Lak e subsequently
referred to the s e conta cts as s en s itive and not to be quoted
back to other Americans). The pr op o sal s had be en f or direct
North Korean-US talks, and e a ch time the American r e spon se had
been to say that the South Korean s must a lso be involved. On
one occasion, however, Mr Holbrooke had been falsely reported
in the South Korean press.

JAPAN
42. Mr Holbrooke said that US-Japanese strategic relations had
so far not been weakened by the growing trade problems. The
Soviet-Japanese breach was a help with both US and Japanese public
opinion. Nevertheless, anti-Japanese protectionism within the US
was very alarming indeed. Mr Strauss, who in fact walked softly
despite brandishing his big stick, was now being attacked in
Congress for not being hard enough on Japan. Unfortunately, the
Japanese surplus had risen to $18b this year, even though in
volume terms it had at last started to go down. The question was
what further action we could take. The Europeans, for example
Mr Cortazzi, had suggested a joint US-European Community attack
on the problem. But this was not the way to approach the Japanese,
who were far more important to the US than the Europeans imagined
and who would be driven into isolation. Mr Crowe pointed out that
the gentle approach appeared not to be showing results. The
Europeans fully appreciated Japan's strategic importance but they
appreciated also the importance of vast Japanese surpluses which,
if continued, would themselves produce consequences which could
properly be ca lled strategic. The Europeans did not want a
ganging-up on Japan but they did think coordination was necessary
so that we all said consistent things. I1r Lake underlined the
dangers of driving the Japanese psychologically back into themselves.
Their tendency, if they thought they were being picked on, would be
to build up their military strength, including perhaps nuclear
weapons, and behave even more aggressively in the economic field.
Mr Crowe said that we could point out to the Japanese that we were
treating them similarly to the way in which we treated the Germans
when they had large surpluses - through pressure to reduce them.
/The
21
CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL

The most importan t point was that we should a l l be saying the

same thiug to J apan, even if we said i t at diff erent t imes.
Mr Holbrooke continued to argue a gainst f orming u p against the
Japanese, but he agreed that the Tokyo Summit would produce a
good deal of pressure on Mr Fukuda and s a id that Pre siden t Car ter
was conducting an exchange of messages pre s sing t he importance of
the Japanese keeping the commitments they had made a t Bonn. He
repeated that continental Europeans did not share the American
assessment of the strategic importance of Japan. He stressed
that the US did not wish to isolate Japan ~which was c entral to t he
foreign policy of the United States.

EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM

43. Mr Lake said that the French and German planners, who had
recently also visited Washington, had given the impression that
the European currencies would be able to slither about within the
snake. He had made it clear that from the American point of view
there were political as well as economic dangers in a two-tier
system. Mr Crowe gave an account of the advantages and disadvantages
of the current proposals, emphasising the importance of a solution
which would be durable, would impose symmetry of obligations and
which would not impose a deflationary bias to the disadvantage of
the weaker economies. The UK would not wish to see a system which
weakened the dollar or undermined the IMF. Ms Walker could see
that some kind of EMS would be a useful contribution to the
construction of Europe. But she shared British doubts about the
dangers of a deflationary bias to the scheme. She also feared that
the UK, by remaining aloof, might weaken its ability to influence
the details. Mr Blumenthal as well as Mr Vance understood the
political importance of the EMS. The main American concern was not
the effect on the dollar or the IMF, but the effect on Europe :
would it strengthen or weaken Europe? If the former, the US would
support, if not, they would have reserva tions. Mr Lake thought
that if tl1e result were a two-tier European Community, with the top
tier eonsisting of members of the EMS, thi s could be very damaging
politically. Mr Crowe said that it was the British purpose in the
negotiations to get the deta ils settled in ways which did not
weaken the weaker economies which, we agreed, would be bad for
Europe as well as the ~h. We had perhaps not handled the issue well
/publicly
22
CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL

publicly, but we were participating fully and constructively

in the negotiations, not staying a loof. As regards a two-tier
Europe, he hoped the Americans would not in the future regard a
top tier which included at least the FRG, France and the UK as
the leading countries as automatically a bad thing. After
enlargement i t might be the only way to keep the stronger
countries, and especially the FRG, fully involved in making the
Community a success if they were able to move ahead faster than
the smaller and more backward countries. The process was bound
to be an evolutionary and delicate one and would need the
acquiescence - perhaps through major re source transfers - of the
second tier countries. But it need not be bad for Europe or,
therefore, for the US. Mr Lake found the thesis an interesting
one - his concern seemed to centre on whether the UK would be in
the top tier.

23
CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL
@
OOrFIDENTLUJ
eference ~~., :?.??.?.~~..
11r Gor~m (I1ED)

.AJ~GJ.;0-AI1ERICAN PLANNING TALKS: IH.AN

spoke at lunchtime, you asked me to minute about
~'ben vle
the exchange that took place in our Anglo- American Planning ~\
Tal ks in \JAshington on 10 October. "'--~

2. I"'r Precht , the Country Director for Iran , led for the
Americans . He opened his remarks by saying that in his viev,
current events in Iran vrere t he worst foreign _policy di saster
thot had hit the West in many yea~s . He went on to describe
the situation there i n cataclysmic terms, essentially that the
lvhole population of the country was united against the Sha~.J~
wanted~--J.s remova • He nevertheless thought that current us
and British po licy of support for the Shah was right and that
there would be nothing to be gained (and serious damage to be
done) in trying to reinsure. Since his analysis and his policy
conclusions were so obviously at odds (as much to the evident
surprise of the American policy p l anners as to ourselves), we
had some discussion of this point . l'1r Precht vJas not to be
moved from his gloomy analysis, held out very small hopes of
the Shah surviving, but could see no alternative to what we
were doing . His was essentially a policy of despair .
3. Our Embassy in Washington commented to us that they had
not heard such a . pessimistic analysi s before, even from Precht
himself . They checked it out quickly vri th contacts in the NSC
(including Quandt) . QuRndt ' s s~~dinat~ on the Iranian side
volunteered that he had heard tlle 'We..,Cli£ -tTi e\nJ of Iran from the
State Department \··hich he described as "bullshi t'' and Quandt ' s
o~n views supported this in le ss colourful language . Tony Lake ,
tbe Head of the American Poli cy Planning Staff , commented at the
end of our meeting that he and his colleagues had said a number
of indiscreet and sensitive things in the course of our discussions
mentioning Iran as one of them, and asked us to be very careful of
I the way tve handled it . So I report Precht ' s vieHs to you as only
one element in the Washington analysis, but a nonetheless
disturbing and p ossibly s i gnificant one given lrecht ' s position .
It m!.t~t be that Precht was letting his hair dov-rn and giving vent
to his true views in the forum of informal Planning Talks and that
be may have been a iming to get ~ message over to hi s own policy
planners . I do not have my notes with me, but 't 'e \·Till in due
cou.rse produce a slightly fuller account .
4. On a completely different subject in youT area , Precht let
out i 11 the course of our discussion that he ,,:as having to go
through the J'ecords of the 1952/53 1'1ossadeq period v,i th a vie~\v
to their release under the Freedom of Informafion .ct . lie said
/that

CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDErTIAL

that if released ,~here_wo_~ld b_~ some very _§mb_arrassing things

allout tbe Brjtish in them . I made a strong p itch that He should
b~ consulted vlhich t,r8s , I am sure , noted , although s omebody
commented that there were established procedures for this sort
of t hing . I imagine t hat i t i s Ameri can documents about the
Briti sh rather than documents on whi ch Ffr1G have any li en which
are invol ved . But you shoul d be aware of thi s possibility .

<' B L C~
Pl anni ng Staff

12 October 1978

CONFIDENTIAL
 L U~ l'"l JJ EN 1' .IAL/ECLI P SE
-'
L--1)~ b . rJ_______
British Embassy ~ '-fl?."- 1
3 i 00 1\ <~ t u tt~ ll.v n c N\ V W ton DC UOOS ;..c~ ~
lOS( C )r4 0 1. (In) (¥- "'::{ . )
T I pt
~~ ~

B L Crowe Esq
Planning Staff n .
FCO
Dt 13 Oc t ober 1978

IRAN

1. You will recall the extremely gloomy assessment Henry Precht,

the Country Director for Iran, gave at the planners• meeting on
10 October.

2. Precht told Richard Muir t he next day that he hoped we had

not been too shocked by his analysis. He implied that in
retrospect he recognised that he had been over-pessimistic.
Nev rtheless, he thought it important to have a clearer idea of
what lay over the precipice. Precht confirmed that there is as
yet no agreed inter-agency assessment on Iran.. The view he gave
us on 10 October was a personal one and although shared by some in
the State Department, reflected neither an agreed departmental
nor inter-agency view.

3. The NSC staff have made it clear that they do not share
Precht's view and told us privately that they are inclined to put
mor e weight on Sir A Parsons' assessme nt than those of the
American Embassy in Tehran (or of the State Department). It is
good to see from Tehran telegram no 678 of 12 October to the FCO
that Ambassador Sullivan does in fact share Sir A Parsons's view.
He nry Precht has now accepted Sullivan's viewl

R J Carrick

•
 CONFIDENTIAL ECLIPSE

~~ ~~~\'2..--.. ® I

Mr Cullimore PUSD

IRAN: THE GHOTBI PAMPHLET J.ND THE MUSS.lDEQ PmiOD

1 ID my letter of 6 October I referred to the instruction e
received trom the Secretary of State to brief him about the
Ghotbi pamphlet and to produee an analysis of the Mussadeq period.
Research Department and our :Embassy in Tehran have kindly
responded.
2 1eanwhile, at the recent Anglo/American talks held in
Washington, the Americans revealed to Mr Crowe, in contidenoe,
that they were having to exauile their own recorda of the :ussadeq
period because of the requirement to rel ease them under the
Freedom ot Information Act. You will no doubt wish to consider
/21 what bearing this development will have on our own record of the
~I time. 1 attach a copy of Mr Crowe's minute to me and, in order
I to put the earlier paragraphs into perspective, I also attach
~·copy of Mr Carrick's letter of 13 October to him, which reveals
/.":1 aome division of opinion among th~ Ameri~.aus about the current
~ developments in Iran. The talks 1n ~ashington were , of course ,
held under planners• rules and should not be quoted back to the
.lm.erieans.

R S Gorham
Middle East Department
1? October 1978

CC with ene
Mr Gregory, Library & Records
lleaearch Dept
 f""(\1\T-"RT n"RN'l' TAT,

CONFIDENTIAL

Si r A Duff

ANGLO- AMERICAN PLANNING 1'ALKS e

Our annu a l p l anning tal ks with were held
in Wa shington on 10 and 11 October. On the American side,
Tony Lake wa s supported b y Paul Krei sberg , Jenonne Walker and
other members of - the ir Policy Planning Staf f as appropriate,
plus representa tives of the geographical bure aux and the NSC
s taff. Mr Squire, f1r Weston and Mr Carrick att e nded for the
Embassy at different time s . I was a ccompanied by Mr Cornish
--- and by Mr Bone of Research Department. I attach a record
which - although it looks long - is something of a summary.
Mr Lake emphasised that some of the comments t hey wer e mak ing,
e g on US arms transfers to North Yemen, conta cts with Nor t h
Korea and Iran were highly sensitive and should not be referred
to in conversations with other American officia l s . Thi s i s in
fA ct no more than the norma l ground rules of our p l anni ng talks .
As always in these t a lks, the Americans were pretty op en with
us and did not attempt to concea l contradictory vi ews on t heir
own side, eg on the future in Iran.
?. Because of the length of the record, it may be useful if
I pick out very briefly what struck me as the sa lient points:
(a) The initial American line on East-West relations
was optimistic . There was a feeling that things
(including contacts) were going back to norma l, wi th
the view expressed that the current improvement in
East-West relations was because of successes in Western
policy . I questioned this and in discussion the
Americans tended to admit that the United State s was in
no better a position to stop things going wrong agai n
in Africa, over human rights or other areas of
difficulty. Mr Lake was sceptical about economic
leverage although he saw economic measures a s use ful
si·gnals.
(b) On South Africa, Mr Lake agreed with my the s i s
that we should avoid foreclosing any options for
internal change. In particular we should not nail our
colours to the mast of one man, one vote and should not ,
in the way ~e condemn the homelands, exclude partition
solutions. Particularly in private conversation, he was
extremely cautious on sanctions: he did not believe t hey
would put effective pressure on the South Africans
(whether in respect of Naaibia, Rhodesia or apartheid);
indeed they would make t he situation in South Africa
worse while damaging the West. He saw sanctions as
/ inevitabl e
 CONFIDENTIAL

inevitable but as damage limiting ways of cop ing wi th

African pressures , not achieving result s on th e ground.
(c) On Ango la , Mr Lake emp~a~ised t he.politic a l an~
moral objecti on s , by no rmal 1s ~n ~ relat1 ons, of seem~ng
t o give Neto a free hand t o f1n1 sh of f UNITA, even 1f
this was th e pr e condition fo r getting rid o f the Cubans .
He took note of counter- arguments wit hout being evi d ent l y
persuaded by t hem .
(d ) Aft er strong urging f rom Saudi Arabi a , and on
e s senti a lly p olit i cal grounds, the Americans were
launching an e normou s military supply progr amme f or
North Yemen. The Saudi s were p aying .
(e) Although Mr La k e did not think tha t Soviet mi lita ry
intervention in Afghan i stan was very likely, he was
worried about t he effects i f it did happ en.
(f) The Sta t e Depa rtment Country Director wa s extreme l y
pessimistic about the Sha h's prospects; Mr Lake and his
colleagues less s o.
(g) Mr Holbrooke s ha red our general appro a ch on China .
He expressed doubts a bout the long-term f u t ure stability
of the current Chinese mode rni sat ion p oli cy, but did not
dissent from wha t he c a lled the "conventiona l wisdom" .
Although given an opening, he said nothing about p ossible
British arms s al e s. He empha si sed the commi tment of the
Administration to normalisation but said t hat t he Chinese
would have to accept continuing US milita r y a s sistanc e t o
Taiwan outside the renounced security treat y and a "fo l low-
on relationship with tile people of Taiwan . " It was the ref ore
for the Chinese to move, although the US would need to
legislate to continue Eximba nk loans a nd set up a trade
office. He could not tell how long it would t ake but
thought that the timing of SALT II would no t be right to
bring both off together.
(h) He said that the US would move closer t o Vietnam .
They believed that Vietnam wished to escape fro m tota l
Soviet influence and the US should reciprocate thi s
interest. They di s a greed with the Chinese an alysi s of
Vietnam a s a lready subservient to the Soviet Union .
~i) He made a special point of emphasising the political
1mportanc e of t he November EEC/ASEAN Mini sterial meeting .
While recogni s ing tha t the Community could do l ittle
s ubsta ntive on t he economic side, he a rgued that pr esent-
ation and "massage " wer e a ll important. He hoped that
Dr Owen would give i t hi s personal attention and would in
par ticular comaend t he succees ot the JSEAN countries in
coordinating t eir res.poaeee o · t . . . .e approaches. He
 CONFI DENTIAL

al s o argued strongly for ~oves on the Common Fund as a

gesture to ABEAN, for whom it was a hi gh pr i ority and
who ~ere moderates in the G77. Mr Vance had str essed
the 1mportance of thi s in his succe s sful meeting with
ABEAN Fo r eign Ministers in New York (Holbrooke covered
the same ground with Mr Jay - Wa shington telno 4 046) .
(j) Mr Holbrooke spoke strongly against joint US-
European Community approaches to Japan on economic
matters: the co&~inen~l Europeans did not sha re the
American appr~ ci ation of the enormous strategic
importance of Japan to the US, and the US would do
nothing whichmight drive Japan into isolation, a danger
they regarded as real.
(k) Korea. Mr Holbrooke was convinced that relations
with South Korea were now restored and on an even keel
after the near "catastrophe" in confidence in the e arly
months of this year .
(l) On EMS, the American concern was not at all about
probable effects on the dollar or the IMF, but entirely
about the effects on Europe. If the EMS strengthened
the Community they would welcome it, but they fe a red it
would weaken it and even more so after enlargement.
Their concern therefore exactly mirrored ours and they
supported our efforts to see the EMS without a deflationary
bias which would penalise the weaker countries. They
clearly hoped we would approach the ne gotiations with a
"yes but" attitude which they saw as having the best
chance of influenc ing events , rather than the "no because"
a ttitude they thought we had come close to adopting .
(m) Two additional points emerged in the margins of the
meeti~g and are not reflected in the record.

(i) US-Europe: the Americans were not seriously

concerned about the state of US-European relations. They
recognised as an unfortunate fact of life that President
Carter's rai s ing of a number of functional issues which
cut ·across geographical rel ationshi ps caused difficultie s
for partners and their relations with the US . But they
regarded this as a natural and manageable process. The
Germans, in their planning talks just before ours (they
were in Washington before APAG, we after it) had expressed
no concern about US policies and indeed had gone out of
the ir way to impress on the Americans their reliability as
nn ally (Bahr and all that) . The French in their planning
talks had r a ised the subject, especially in the East-West
context, but in terms which the Americans rega rded as
mischievous; they felt that they had "demolishedu the French ..
/(ii)

CONF'I DEh"TIAL
 CON It'I DE.NTIAL

(ii) Mexico: relations with f'"lexico are .

preoccupying the Americans much more tha~ I had reallsed.
Tney have sudd enly woken up to but not d1gested the fnct
that they have as a neighbour an oil producer of potentially
s~ udi proportions. Aside from the rather ra sh talk of
"leverage" which this might in the eyes of some give the US
over OPEC, the State Department planners were playing with
ideas involving a special deal with Mexico under which the
Mexicans would receive an over-the-odds price for their
oil in exchange for measures to cope with the massive
illegal emigration problem - eg creation of jobs in the
Mexican border a reas plus a US willingness to accept the
agricultural and other exports thus engendered. The problem
was that the Mexican Government have hitherto shown little
interest, despite inducements, in developing the North.
For the Americans the problem is that, on present trends
with "wetback" immigration , there will be more A..rnerican
chicanos than blacks by 2000 AD.

B L Crowe
Planning Staff
19 October 1978
Conied to:
Private Secretary Heads of: ~AD
FS/l"lr Judd ACDD
PS/Mr Rowlands CSAD
PS/Lord Goronwy- Roberts Defence Dept
PS/Mr Luard EAD
PS/PUS EESD
Mr Butler EID(I)
Mr Cortazzi FED
Mr Graham FRD
Mr Hibbert HK&GD
Mr Fergusson MED
Mr Fretwell PUSD
Mr Hall Rhodesia Dept
Mr Mansfield SAD
Mr Moberly SAmD
Mr Murray SEAD
Mr Thomas Research Dept
Mr. Weir M&CD
He"" d of Chancery
Washington

C NFID.E!fl' T..
 RESTRICTED

Mr Crowe

TALKS WITH THE US PLANNERS: IRAN

G>l-. 1. The PUS has noted paragraphs 23 and 24 of the record of your
talks in Washington on 10 and 11 October. He thinks that you did
well to mention to Mr Precht, the State Department Country Director
for Iran, the desirability of UK/US consultation about the release
of State Department 1952/4 records on Iran, the publication of
which might prove damaging to HMG. He would be grateful if you

~
~ (or MED) could ensure that the Embassy follow up your remarks, and
establish what the risks are, and when the State Department
propose to raise them formally with us.

24 October 1978 J 0 Kerr

PS/PUS

cc: Mr Leahy
Miss Blayne,._._
Mr Lucas

RBSTRICTED
 CONFIDENTIAL

Anglo-American Planning Talks : Iran

I note from paragraph 3 of the record of the Anglo-American
Planning Talks distributed by Mr Crowe on 19 October that the
Americans are reviewing State Department records on Iran for the
years 1952-54 with a view to release under the Public Information
Act; and that this could have damaging consequences for the UK
as well as the Shah. I imagine we are looking into this. I
should be grateful to be kept informed .

(G G H Walden)

10 November 1978

cc: PS/Mr Judd

PS/Mr Luard
PS/PUS
Sir A Duff
Mr Graham
Mr Leahy
Mr Weir
Mr Lucas
Miss Blaney (Library & Records)

CONFIDENTIAL
 COliPIDEBTUL

f>S R II

ftr Streau, Security D

!RAW: REI..F.ASE 01' CONJ']J)~UL~ORDS

1 1 I atts~h a draft letter t c \~aahingto
a o ou~ t hG sub~eet we di~~ussed on the
telephone today. I should i.,..a grateful
if you wuuld amend the draft or add to it
as you see tit. When s clean version has
beeo prepared, I Shall clear it with
Iir Wsldon and flr Kerr. Such guidance as
you are able to give to r~ Muir on ho'W to
play his band would, I am sure, be most
welcome.

I S Gorham
Middle East Department

COUI IJEftUL
 1'.1. ...I.....UJ • l l.JLI.J
OSR II

I egistry
No DRAFT LETTER Type 1 +

-- Sf CtiRITY CLASSIFICATION
.... . ..,.........-
To:-
from

t ~ r !\f' , ~ t. R S Gorham
Sr.t ret. R S .Muir WASHINGTON Telephone No. Ed.
t 'nnfif1,.nthl.
Rt•tri• trc\.
l'nd:t~'H h•d Dtpartmeht
.............___...--------o
l' RtV 1\CY M MOO NG
-~- _,___.

............................... In C'onfldenc

IRAN: RELEASE OF CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS

c c }\liss Blayney
1,ib & Rec 1 You will by now have your own copy of Brian Crowe's
record of 19 October of the British-American Planning Talks
Mr Streams 4!1
I
t..

Security D held earlier in that month in Washington. In paragraph

23 of the main record, Precht is quoted as sayin g that
he was having to review State Department records for the
years 1952-54 with a view to releasing them under the
Public Information Act. He thought that this could hAve
damaging consequences for British interests as well as
for the Shah. Brian Crowe made a strong pitch thAt we
should be consulted during this exercise.

2 The PUS has now asked if you could follow up th·i s point
with the State Department and discover whether tb ey pr·opose
to raise the matter formally with · us. As we undrq·s t8nrl .i.t: ,
American Government policy on these tbin p;s j s to pro t ;f:lr~ t;
British information which is clearly identifir1bJP rts s11e h.
'rhus there would be no dif ficnl ty in t1>ei r removin r; frnrn
their 0\-10 files copies of ou.r telegrams e tc befor e t. hn mr1 · n
files are released under the Public Information Ar · ..
however, would we he placed in th e case of Ameri~nn
documents which refer to n joint Anglo/ Amerj cDn poe:• i L 1Ptl
about, say, the removal of ~lnssnii]q in the snmmrr~ rd' !n
Recause of recent developments, thPre i 9 :l f~O ·rl ,.h
1 ublic opinion in this country \1onld on . .,, .,; n ' '' · ·
that chapter in Iran • s history and it woul t, t b
essential for us to agree on A joint apprn ·~h ,,, • · ,, ~~rr
the dAmage which could be done to our int· ,·st.s.
 •

·. ·'
1

London

.. Mar c h .2 4 ·, 1~75

I
Your !otter · af Februnry 3, 1975 inquir es as to
the protection the Unitod States Governm en t cc.n afford
to classified information received from Her Maj~sty's
Gov ernment consistent with the amendments to the Prcedo m
o f I n f o r ma t i on Ac t '"hi c h b e came e f f e c t i v c F c h r t: n r y 1 9 ,
1975 . The responsible agencies in Washin~ton have
e x a mi n c d t h i s mat t e r v e r y c are f u 11 y , and I c'!. m aut L o l"' -
i zec.l to inform you th at the United Sto.tcs Gov ernl~'cnt
c a n an d w i 1 1 co n t i n u e t () p r o t c c t c 1 a s s j f i c d in f o ·:- j ! l a t i on
or ma t e rial furnish ed by foreig11 g ov ernr~. c~;its and intel -
natjonal organizations · a nd held by th o United St:--:. tcs
on t h e understan ding ·Lhat it be kept in confidenc0 on I,
c s s en t i a 1 1 y tho s am c b as i s n. s in t h e p ~ s t . \'.' c arc \v c l 1
a \i :t r e o f )' o u r Go v c r n men t r s c o ll c e r n o '! c :r· t h c s e a nH·· rul -
J:! en t s an d w i 1 1 s p are n o e £ f o r t t o ens u r 0 pro t e c t i o n o f
s e cr 0 t s your Go ve Tnmen t s .hare s \-:i th ours.

Tho am ended Freedom of I nf0T!t;. c~ tion /\~~t, 5 L1 .S.C.

S e ction 52 2 (il) (1) 1 exempts matt~rs that ure i l (c.) spe ci . ,.
£ i c a 11 .Y aut h o r i z e d u n d e r c r i t e r .i. a c s t a b 1 i ~) 11 e d b .v CJ n
ex ecv.tivc order to be k ept secret in the ~.. nteresi_ of
n a t j 0 ~1 ~ 1 d c f e n s c o r f o x e i g n p o 1 i c y and ( iJ ) a r e in f tl c i"
properly c1 ass ~fi e d pursuant to such c :x ocu tiv e ord o r."
T h c a p p 1 i c n b 1 c ex e c u t i v c o :i~ d e r ~ E .. 0 • 11 GS 2 1 w h i e h
establishes the standards for cl ass if i c c"Cion to he applied
by t h c co u r t s 1 rem a in's un. ~ h an g e d ~ S c c t i o Tl 4 ( C ) o f t h. H ·t:
order commands:

"Cl a ssified information or material fux·nishod to ·

t h c U n i t e d ·S t a t e s by a f o r o i g n go v e J~ n n1 0 n t o r i n t c r n a t i o n r:. 1
o r g n n i t.. a. t :i_ on s h a 11 e i t h e r r c t a in i t s o 1' i g i r£a 1 c l as :: i f i -
cation or b e ass~[!ncd n Unit od States c.la z. sific~tic'llc

.
t

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Si r 'i h o lrt \1 s Br i mc 1 o "-' ~ ~ Gc 1,1 G , 0 n E •
• P e r )ii n. n c n t Un d e :c ·· S e c :;: c t ~ r y o f S t u i.. o J
Fore~ gn nn l! Commo rn·J~ 2.1 th 0 ffi c0 ~
Londono
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In either case, the classification shall a ssure a dcer 0c

o f pro t e c t i on c q u i v n 1 en t t o t h a t r e q u i r e c. by t h e go v c r r! -
men t o r i n t c r n at i on a 1 or g an i z a t :1. on v; h i c h fur n i s h c c1 the
information or material."

Accordingly, Section S(B)(J) of the Order provides

f o r t h e .ex c mp t ion from the Gen c r a 1 De c 1 as s i f i c n t i 0 n
Schedule of 11 Classifi ed information or material fuYnishcd
by foreign governments or internati o nal or ganiza tion s
and held by tho U~ited States on th e understa ~di n g that
it be kept in confidence . " Heads of Departments have
additional authority to require continued protection of
........... such material after the 30-yoar peri od for decl assifjc'
\.. . '
tion stipulated in Section S(E) of th e Order in cases
where such protection is essential.

As )' o u h a v e p o in t e d o u t , t h e Co n g r e s !;• h a. s g i v c n t h e
J u cl i c i a 1 Br a n c h o f Go v·e r n men t au tho r i t )' t. o e- x :1 nd n e c 1 a !.: s i ·
ficu documents ·in c amera to determine \..rhcthe r such
r e c o 1~ d s s h a 11 b e \ ·1 i t h h e 1 d u n d c r an)' o f t h e e x c m. p t i o n s •
II o \\ e v e r , a s was c mph :.1 s i z c d in t h e . r o c en t d e c i s i o n o £ t h e
1

United States Court of Appeals in th e c a se of J: n op£ v.

Cvlby ( 4 th Circ., February 7, 1975), t.he courts ar6 110t
:required t o ex2.mine documents; th e y may rely on affidr..vits
of off:l cj flls of th e Execu tiv e Br8uc1: to establi s h t..it.e
pT. 0 pr j_ ~ t )' 0 f c 1 s c: i f i cat i 0 n .
Q In a ny ev (? n ~- I the c 0 u r t s
rt r e on 1 y a u t h o r i z c d to c x a mi n c c 1 a s s i f i e ~ ma t or i a J ~ n
c am c r a . Un 1 e s s an d u n t i 1 t h c r e i s a f :i. :-& ~ ::. j u c! i c i ~- 1
decision 0::: dcrin6 declassification)' the: s cal0d d ocu ments
would be covered by a protective ord e r of the court :
"' i t h v i o 1 a t i on s s u b j e c t t o con t em p t p r o c e e ·di n r; s •

In the case of cl assified information or matcYinl

r o c c i v c d from for e i g n g ov er n me n t s on t h e u n d c 1: s t and in g
that it he kept in confidence, the question for jud icial ·
d c t o :r ir. j n a t i on i s on e o f o b j e c t i v e fa c t a 11 d n o t t h e rn o r e
s u b j e t: t i v e and d i f f i c u 1 t d c term in ci. t ion of \•; h c t h e r d is -
closure would cause damage to th E; nr:ttional security.
T nus , my G o v ern l!l c n t i s con f i d c n t t h n. t t h e c our t s h' i 1 1
no 1 or J e :r disc 1 o s u T e of c 1 ass if j e d in f c~ r Jna t ion r e c {; i v e d
f 1' c !:£ f o r e i ~ n go v c r n :n c n "c s in co n f i c. l (! n c. e an d r e q 'l i 1 c c. to
l')e J.').'Otc.ctcJ by the' exp·re:. ~ provisioJ.~ of 13,0 , 1165~.
if cn't' ~ v c r ,· t 0 en sur o this 1' e s \J 1 t ~ i t is i 1·1port r. n t 1·. h t.> t a
• <: 1 c ~ j:' r o c o 7.' d b c ma d c "' h c i 1 s t; c h in f o 'J.. u r: t i o n i s :.~ i:. ·: : e :i v e ~
f .c "' r.. r.~. f c. r 0 i ~ n. g o v e r n men t .
. 6
.. .•
•

...
t

.. ' ..
 \
. ·..,

\\'o find that Her ~iajesty' s Government has boc~n con-

s i s t l! il t 1 Y eo o d i n a s s u r in g t h e p r o p e r ' .i rl en t i f i c a t i o 11 o £
0

/
c 1 a s s j , f i o d do c u mc n t s t ran s m i t t e d t o c f f i c i n 1 s o f t j·, c
/
Un ited St a. tes GoveTnment on the under standing tltat they
I arc to be held in confidcJ-: cc. The Department of Sta'l:c

I
!' an d t h c o t 11 e r i n t e 1' e s t c d a g on ~ i c s \·t i 1 1 i s s u e t h c n c c c s -
sary instructions to• nl l per son n e l to ensuru thn.t all
/ U . S • t e ]_ C g r \1 InS ) lO em 0 rUn d i a 11 d . 0 t h C 1" c1 0 C UJ!1 e rl t S T e C 0 1' d in g
classified information received in confid ence from
foreign governments an d inte rna tion a l organizations aro
ma r k e d wi t h t he a p p r o p r i a t c i n d i c a to r s . You , mJ. )' \'J i .s h
to cons i d c r author i zing )' o u ·r E 1.1b a~ s y in Wash in r. t c n to
initiat e discussions with appropriatn U.S. officials to
,. . cl e t c T min c wh e t h e r fur t h e r o 1· 111 o r c s p e c i f i c a x·1' ('- n g e n~ c n t s
'-
L are necessary.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office 'fL.."-~~~ ~ ~vv·~ ~
London SW1 A 2AH ~1 I tf-i.Lr . c:S Tl.. '" k. t f-t
Telephone 01•
Cld~ctb\t. ' Q.u+- ~ 4~~((
~ ~ ~ "~ ;,.. "' ~ J)l)~' '
I«At- ~ ~·~~ ~ ~~ .
Your reference
R J S Muir Esq
Our reference NAP 333/1
Date 16 Novemb e.r 19'/8

IRAN: RELEASE OF CONFIDENTIAL HECOBDS

1. You will by now have your o\-m copy of Brian Crowe 's r ~co:rd
nf 19 Octoher of the British-American Plnnning Tnlk s held PtJrliPr·
in that month in '\tJashington. In para ~?;raph 23 of the main rcc0r(l,
I'raeht is quoted as saying that hP. wo s having to r eview StAtP
DPpal"tment papers for the years 1952-54 with a view to relf'osjnt":
th€'m under the Public Information Act. He thoue ht that this co ul(l
hn v n damaging consequences for British interests as well as for
the Shah. Brian Crowe made a strong p itc h that we should be
con Bulted during this exerc ise.

2 . 1'he PUS basluow asked if you could foll ow up thi s poinL ""d Itt
Lh 0 StAte Depart;ent and oiscovc-r whether they propO S(' to r ·~j n(" I; IH
mnt. t;Pr formelly wjth u s . Thny hove r~i ven u s .f:i.r.m cnnn ~h ;qr}r, lll )Ill'~ I'
.\.n t h e post that they can ond wjll p-rotect At;ainst di selo s nl't ' thr-
/ iufo-rmntion which Hl"'G has c;i vPn th~m in r.on.fidence ( s ee ~hr .nt.l.nchf'rl
l~tt.er~ of 1975 from Rona l d Spiers to Sir Thomas Brimelo'\1-r). nrt 0l'fl
r1 l_r's ol'e rel~ase(l under the FrPedom of Informatio n Act , th ~r('
sho nlt1 b~ no difficulty fo r the Am ericans in first r()mo vinp; rr ''Hfl
th P lll cop i e s of any tel egrams e t c from us and US do cument n wh 1 rh
l'P~ord otrr vie,~s, even in t h e case of papers wliich nre not [.; I, T' i ~ ~ t; l .y
spr.1kin e: ''official information furni s h e d by a forej p11 govcrnm (>l l t: " .
7
' . "'-'h~t
is not so clear is whether they co11lo withhold Am , . 1(' ~ n
d0C'Uro ents which referred to j o int .An e;lo/US vieNs abn11 t., f i8..Y, the
r tno val of Musaddiq in 1953 . In the c urrent sjt11.:1ti on , th c r r- in ::1
t"oo d ch~nce that public opinion will once Clf\ain fo c n ~~ on th:"' t
!"'h·q,tor jn Iran' s history . 'We hope ther efo-re that th e liR
nd,, ini t:·d ;r·' t.ion would a gree on a joint approach to rnitllUl L ~1e t l1 '
'l, r' wh l.~._~ h could b e done to our interests by t h e relf :-' .nA '"
'" ('nr·(lu .

• •• I'+-.
 CONF lDENTl.A.L

4. I assume that you will have a word with Roger Carrick before
speaking to the State Department as I am told that · he h andles the
Embassy's general problems about the protection of British
information in US hands.

R S Gorham
Middle East Department

cc Miss Blayney , Library & Records

Mr Streams, Security D
Mr Cullimore, PUSD
Mr Kerr./

f:1 C\~ TTY14'lJffi T A T

 CONFIDENTIAL

British Embassy ,.....<Ov- ""~\,..___

31 00 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington DC 20008
Telex Domesttc USA 89- 2370/89-2384
Telex International 64224(WUI)/248308(ACA}/440015(1TI) /
Telephone (202) 462-1340 V \1 --'=' . .
--~~- Jytfl..
Your reference
R S Gorham Esq
Our reference
MED
Date 14 Dec ember 1978
Foreign & Commonwealth Office

IRAN: RELEASE OF CONFIDENTIAL ~!~S

1. You wrote to me on 16 Nove~~ I have mentioned r

the matter several times to Henry Precht.
2. The position at present appears to be that the papers
are still with Precht who has had no time recently to
pursue his review. The British Desk are seeking to
establish whether the Department can agree to withold
both American and British documents. I will let you
know as soon as we obtain clarification of this point.

R J S
- Muir

CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL

T• ,,...x Dome tic USA 8"-2370 89-2384

Tdox lnte:n"t•onal 64224(V1 UIJ/248308(RCA)/44001 5(1TI)
Telephone (20.2) 462- 1340

~--~-----------------------------------------------
R S Gorham Esq
Our reference
Middle East Department
Foreign & Commonwealth Office Datf' 22 December 1978 ~
I"'-'{(, '
l

(1-?0 ~\
IRAN: RELEASE OF CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS ~!C.,_,
1. .
I h ave now con f 1rme d , as I sa1. d 1n
. my 1n .~ (~.
. t er1m rep 1, y t o your
l etter of 16 November, that the State Department papers for 1952
to 1954 are still with Henry Precht, the Country Director for
Iran. His clearance (and that of other interested agencies) is
required before the State Department Historian can release the
documents . Precht has confirmed to me that he intends to continue
to sit on the papers.
2. I have now also spoken to the State Department Associate
Historian and to the UK Desk Officer. The position is that the
Historian has just begun, with his approach to Precht and other
agencies, the clearance process. This is expected to take until
the end of 1979; the Historian will then require another year to
process the documents for publication. Even were the Historian
to receive immediate clearance from interested agencies it would
therefore be early 1980 before the documents reached the public
domain. Although there is a 20-year review, current regulations
allow interested agencies to delay publication for up to 30 years;
if they wish to secure a delay beyond that the case must go to
the Secretary of State who can order the Historian to delay
publication further (but the Department of State or other agencies
would have to have a very strong case for delaying beyond 30 years).
It is therefore within the power of Precht or his colleagues in
other agencies to delay publication until at least 1982.
3. The Historian's standard practice is to send copies of any
British documeqts he intends releasing to the US Embassy in
London with a request that we agree to their publication. We
have a veto . (The clearance process on the 1952-54 Iran pap er s
has not yet got this far.) But there is no requirement on the
Historian to consult us about any other documents. The Associate
Historian made it very clear that he had in the past resisted
requests from other governments for joint consultation and would
resist very strongly any such request from us. He acknowledged,

N~r, f ~~~ . •
/however,

....,.~J.,~ CONFIDENTIAL
.,
•
•l:•Jcl ~~- - ~.,;, - ~
w.&A " r tt;.. ,~.. ..lt ,
,

., ,,
 CONFIDENTIAL

however, that were we to approach the State Department with a

particular request that documents not be released, we mi ght
be successful. The UK Desk officer indicated that he would
be prepared to support an approach of this kind. But, as
the Associate Historian pointed out, our interest here coincid e>
with those of the Iranian desk who are consequently likely t o
remain our best advocate.
4. We would certainly have no objection to making a more
formal request for the kind of consultation proposed in para 3
of your letter but my conclusion from this preliminary round is
that we would not have much success.
5. Footnote: the Historians have read the 1952-54 papers and
find them a "marvellous compilation".

R J S Muir

Copies: Miss E C Blayney, Library & Records, FCO

Mr Streams, Security Dept, FCO
C A K Cullimore Esq, PUSD, FCO
J 0 Kerr, PS/PUS, FCO
M J Williams Esq, JIC Secretariat, Cabinet Office

CONFIDENTIAL
 Refer~~~-~:....~.~) J .... -

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 ,

MEETJNG HELD AT 4 . 00 PM ON 20 DECEMBER 1978

JRAN: POL ICY REV lEW

Present: Secretary of State

Minister of State, Mr Judd
' Pus·
Mr J A N Graham
Mr M S Weir L

Mr I T M Lucas •
Hr D Stephen
Mr G G H Walden
Mr R S Gorham
Mr P Lever

1. The Secretary of State opened the meeting by referring to

Tehran telegrams 997 and 998 giving Sir A Parsons• latest
a sse ssment of the situation in Iran. Mr Weir stressed the
growing polarisation between the opposing s1des and the lack of
middle ground. Dr Owen asked whether Dr Sadighi had relations
with Khomeini and was told that there was no evidence that the3
were linked. Mr Weir said that the latest plans for a coaliti
government were un1mpressive. There was also some contradicti
between the Ambassador's comment that the worst outcome would
a continuation of the present war of attrition and his concl
that we had no choice but to let things run their course.
2. Dr Owen asked whether The Queen was titular Commander-
of the British Armed Services. He thought that this could
out to be an essential issue for the Shah and there might be
advantage in his invoking the British precedent - if it fi
to give up his executive powers as Commander-in-Chief in fa
a purely symbolic role. Was there any constitutional advic
we could offer to steer the Shah in the right direction?
also noted the ambiguity about the Shah's promise to beha
constitutional monarch. Did he mean sticking to the 1906
• or just restriding his role further to that of a European
3. Mr Weir said unfortunately the initiative with Sadi~-­
already been blown because the latter had talked to the
Khomeini would move quickly to undermine Sadighi, but there
no alternative but to allow him to proceed. He agreed with
Sir Anthony Parson~ recommendation that we should refraiD ~~
active intervention. We could not help any ot the pa
agreement but we had performed a useful role by re
the Embassy's conversation with opposition leadere
what the Americans were now up to as we bad DO i4ea
conciusions reached by the Ball Committee.
 I

4 . Dr Owen said that we could tel l the American s f rom him

that ve expected them to exchange views frankly with us.
Sir Michael Palliser said he had left the US Ambassador i n no
doubt ab out this the previous day . Mr Judd a ske d about t he
repqrt t hat the Americans were flyin g 1n a number of Persian
scholars to make contacts with t he opposition. Mr Stephen
said t hat this story ha d been produced by Mr Halliday.
5. Dr Owen asked whether he should be doing mor e in Iran .
Mr Lucas said that the telegrams from Tehran gav e the i mpression
that the Shah counted for more than he a c tually do e s. In his
view, the Army wer e c a l ling the shots and the opposition held
the initiative . The Army could still decide one day to tell the
Shah to go . - if f or instanc e they thought the country was f acing
economic collapse . Mr Judd pointed out that th e British
Ambassador was now l abelled as a close adviser to t he Shah and
th is would cause troubl e f Gr u s. Mr Weir said that this should
not necessarily prove harmful. Everyone knew we had relations
with the Government, the Armed Servi c es and members of the opposition
Mr J udd stated that it was time we c ooled down our relations with
the Shah. Dr Owen sa i d that th is h~d i n fact probably already
happened, but Sir Ant hony Par sons c ould not refuse to see the Shah
when he asked f or h im. Dr Owen's own impression was that power
was now more disp ersed, ·and one sign of this was the difficulty
Axhari wa s h av ing with his generals.- - -In any case a natural
threshhold would b e crossed when Sir Anthony Parsons left Tehran;
Mr Graham would not h ave the s ame intimate relationship with t
Shah. The timing of Sir Anthony Parsons' departure (15 Janua-~-~{
seemed exactly right. ET Owen added that access to General
was very important . Such free access and frank conversation
he impossible if the I r ani ans .t hought we were undermining t lie
or planning to s t op arms deals. Mr Lucas said that it was eo
known i n Government who the British were talking to, and the
was nothing we could do to disabuse public opinion of its no
about the Brit ish role in Iran. Mr Judd referred to the pri
position the Br itish Government had enjoyed in Iran and said
1-.Te likEd play ing the game of confidential adviser. But ha
Embassy done en ough to get out and around the bazaars to &~nw
op i nion there? Mr Weir said that the answer was probab
~ during the r e cent boom years our top priority had, rightly
export promotion. Sir M Palliser agreed .
6 . nr ·owen a sked who were the leaders of the opposition
much we kn ew about them? It was time to scan the Army 118
detail t o see who among the middle ranking to senior offic
clos est to the Mullahs. 'We should look for a "devout gen...._
We should take pains to keep close to the Army (although ~··-~
r ecognised the risk of appearing too closely ideotiti
We must pursue British national interests, ...among whic
to get our debts paid. He was alarmed to see troa
of 18 December to the Prime Minister bow bacll7 be
 ,

overdrawn. We must pursue oil barter and get some of these

illions back on board before it was too late . Frr Judd
repeated that we must learn more about the oppos~t ~o n. Dr Owen
agr~ed and said that he had the impression that the organ~s at1on
of the recent big demonstrations had come from the student
leadership (and not .from the Communist Party). We s h oul d look
uarticularly at, the University l ists of those Iranians b etween
~

the ages of 30-45 who had studi ed abroad and had now gone b ack
to Iran. Mr Weir said that the Americans had suggested that
Iranian students returned fro m t he US had played an important
part in underground or ganisation. Dr Owen s a id t ha·t the wav e
of active dissent dur in g the pa st 10 years again ~ the Shah's
regime had been most significant . Many of these s t udent s who had
taken part in demonstrations, masked for fea r of reprisa ls , would
have gone back. How could we get at them and find out about their
thinking? He did not think i t woul d be poss ibl e through our
existing Embassy sta ff. Ther e were, h owever, p eople on the l e f t
in this country who would know who to get in touch. Should we not
ask them for help? Who were the academics who c ounted ? The
names of Professor Nancy Lambton an d Mr Peter Avery were men t i oned
but dismissed. Mr Lucas s aid t ha t Dr Chubin ha d been v ery
reliable, b ut of cours e would not be suitable to go out to Iran
on our b ehalf. Dr Owen said the objec t of the exercise would be
to find out wha t wa s going on in Iran because of the enigma ot the
recent demonst r ation s, ra t h er t han to sugge st sympathy or support.
There was to be no hedging of b e ts.
7. Mr Gr aham sugge s t ed that certa i n steps could be taken
strengthen Embassy staff i ng. Sir Michael Palliser referred
present staff ing pa tt ern of t he Emba s sy -and said that the emp
would n eed not to be shifted away from concentration on exp --~
promot ion. He suggested that Mr Jay be asked to speak to t
Amer icans about the Ball ex ercise. There was no point in ta
to t he American Embassy here. Mr Graham said that, although
to t h e prob l em, h e wanted to ask whether we were clear in
about wha t we wanted to see happen in Iran. What was the r
rec ipe? Ve didn't seem to have a preferred option. ~Dr~~~~
with emphasis that in a con~sing - si~ation~e -should
• ol d naval maxim "in a fog slow right down but don ' t change
The BBC Persian Service, for instance, had proved a liabili
one r esp ec t but it was also 8 form of insurance for us with
opposi tion. We had taken a firm decision not to interfere
t he BBC and h e thought that we had got that problem into
perspec tive.
B. Summing up, Dr Owen listed the following :points which ~~-­
wanted exami ning:-
(i)
·- Theconstitutional position of Western monarcbie
respect to control over the Armed ~orces:
( ii) A study of Iranian officers of middle re aaa
senior officers to identity aQ7 who bad liDka w
Muslim bierarc~:

I
 \S COPY
THE ORlG\NAL H S BEEN RETAINED
'N THE DEPf. 'T tENT UNDER
s TIO 3 ( ) F THE
PUBLI R~Q g AQT
, \958

( iii) A similar attempt to identify former leaders of the

Iranian student community abroad who had returned to Iran:
, (~v) As a guiding principle, we ~hould maintain our support
for the Armed Services (eg 1n arms sales) and keep close
to their leaders:
(v) We should give the highest priority to getting paid for
our major outstanding debts: ·
(vi) We should make adjustments in Embassy staffing: the
overriding commercial priority of the past should be
moulded now by political sensitivity:
( vii) We should review the language capability of Embassy staff
and appoint people ~ho can establish links with any new
leadership that starts to emerge:
(vi i i) We should ensure that our military attaches were politically
sensitive and developed informal links with middle officers:

(x) We should explore afresh Mr Judd's idea of holding seminars

on Iran; another option would be to try to stimulate otbe*.s
to send out independent-minded people, some of whom s}!~.C1::
be left-orientated academics and to listen to their ·r·~- · ·
findings on their return: ··:.~·
. .~,

( xi) We should also use journalistic expertise from papers l~e

the Financial Times and if their correspondents were coming
back to this country, younger diplomats should try to ~alk
to them for information. '( .-·
9. Looking back on his own time as Minister of State, Dr OweD:f ik
sai~ that, like Mr Judd, he had conducted his own review or our~~~~:
~ol1cy towards Iran. No-one could say we had not been warned .b7.~
our Ambassador about the future. He and we had constantly pose~~
the problem could the Shah survive? We had always been driven · to ·.
the conclusion yes but it was not a blind judgement: we had not
assessed correctly the strength of Muslim revival. He did not
• feel that be had been misled about Iran. Even now it was uncertain
whether we had come to the wrong conclusions. An ever present fact
was that we were grossly over-committed economically and that this
had been done deliberately by this Government as much as their
predecessors to offset the oil price rise. We could not ignore the
real politics of the situation. We could end up with the worat ·or
all worlds if we simply shifted our ground now. Before 8Q7 sbi~
our policy we wanted to know more about the alternatives. Be ~
therefore wanted us to make a real effort to widen our anteDDae
gain a new insight and understanding or the countr.J. Be vae

••• /c
 ,

convinc ed there was more to the present trouble than di ssidence

organi sed by the Mullahs . There was an organ i sing ha nd which
he personally believed came from the studen ts who had studied
abroad. His own b et was t h at i f t he Shah went he would be 1
replaced by a devout general wi th t he support of t he middle
ranks of the Army. It wou ld in t his s i tuation be of litt le or
no help ~o be thought t o have changed our p os i tion and h edged our
bets, though if we could be in a pos i tion of trust with any new
leadership this would hel p . Final ly we s. hould not assume that '
the Shah was finished. He had not y e t t ried conducting a severe
crackdown and that might well be the last and only option. It
would be very unpleasant politically for Britain if he did crack
down but it might work in I ran where gi ven the absence of an
alternative and the threat of chaos, the re c ould be a greater
acceptance of the ruthless exercise of power than we in the ~est
could easily imagine l et a Yon e support. The Secretary of State ,
concluded tha t while we should continue to think about any,
conceivable solution we were not to advocate or be thought to be
l
advocating solutions, nor should we become involved in advising
the Shah or others about what t hey should do. We should continue
to press pri vately and publicly for a coalition government to be
formed , elect i ons to be held and the modernisation to be contin .
Realis t i cally we must, even if the Shah survived, recognise tba t)
woul d b e desir able for it to be a very changed role for the Shah -
a t r ue con s titutional monarch, and that Iran would henceforth
be a le ss attra cti v e tra ding outlet. Also we would certain
s ee reduc ed military sales and much more oil barter. deals.
would also be a fairly long recovery period in which there
be latent ho stility to the US and Britain who would be seen
having support ed the Shah and helped to cheat the people ot
change t hat t hey thought was in their grasp •

•
 ,

DISTRJBUTION

f1ED
PS (2)
PS/ Mr Judd
PS/PUS
Sir A Duff
Mr Weir
1'1r Stephen
HM Ambassador TEHRAN (Secret & Personal)