The Original Compromise: What the Constitutionʼs Framers Were Really Thinking

David Robertson

https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199796298.001.0001
Published: 2013 Online ISBN: 9780199979707 Print ISBN: 9780199796298

Search in this book

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/book/2838/chapter/162459987 by University of Toronto user on 15 January 2024

CHAPTER

3 The Remedy 
David Brian Robertson

https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199796298.003.0003 Pages 35–45

Published: January 2013

Abstract
The delegates agreed that the country required a national government that could mount an e ective
military defense and nurture the nation's prosperity. They understood that they had a unique
opportunity to persuade the American public to accept far-reaching changes. They accepted that the
Convention had the authority to propose a new Constitution. The delegates dismissed monarchy and
rejected pure democracy as options. A more capable national government was acceptable only if it was
based on republican principles: the people must exercise supreme authority over the government, and
the representatives of the people make important public policy choices. Majorities had to determine
government action. Government powers had to be separated. These general principles guided more
speci c choices about way the national government should be designed. But these principles were too
ambiguous to determine exactly how to design speci c institutions, or to reconcile the interests and
ideas that divided Americans.

Keywords: Convention authority, public opinion, monarchy, democracy, republican government, majority
rule, separation of powers
Subject: US Politics
Collection: Oxford Scholarship Online

The sense of crisis made it urgent to change the course of the United States. The delegates all were
nationalists, in the sense that they agreed that the country required an e ective national government,
capable of mounting an e ective military defense and nurturing the nation’s prosperity. The Convention
had a unique opportunity to overhaul the national government and persuade Americans to accept far-
reaching changes. The delegates overcame two serious concerns: rst, that the Convention lacked the
authority to reconstitute the national government, and second, that Americans would not accept the
proposals they produced.

Monarchy was the most common form of government in eighteenth-century Europe, but the delegates
dismissed monarchy as an option for the United States. A more capable national government was acceptable
 only if it was based on republican principles: the people must exercise supreme authority over the
government, and the representatives of the people make important public policy choices. Government’s
authority had to be derived from the people, majorities had to determine its actions, and its powers had to
be separated. These open-ended principles guided—but could not decide for them—more speci c choices
about the way the national government should be designed.

Was It Necessary and Timely to Reconstruct the Nationʼs Government?

The Virginia delegates began the Convention debates with a forceful argument for a thorough overhaul of

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/book/2838/chapter/162459987 by University of Toronto user on 15 January 2024

the national government. James Madison asserted that he would not be afraid to consider anything that
1
would bene t the safety, freedom, and happiness of the nation. George Washington privately wrote that all
2
the delegates seemed to share this view. For John Dickinson of Delaware, a highly respected delegate from
p. 36 the smallest state, “All agree that the confederation is defective” and “all agree that it ought to be
3
amended.” As soon as Roger Sherman took his seat, he “admitted that the Confederation had not given
su cient power to Congress and that additional powers were necessary, particularly that of raising money
4
which he said would involve many other powers.”

Many delegates also believed that there never would be a better moment to change the nation’s path and
create a more e ective, durable national government. The United States was at a critical turning point, and
political support for replacing the Articles of Confederation would never be stronger. When Edmund
Randolph concluded his presentation of Virginia’s plan for a new government, he exhorted the delegates
“not to su er the present opportunity of establishing general peace, harmony, happiness and liberty in the
5
U.S. to pass away unimproved.” Randolph later warned that there are circumstances in which “the ordinary
cautions must be dispensed with; and this is certainly one of them…. The present moment is favorable, and
6
is probably the last that will o er.” Another delegate heard Randolph say, “We would be Traitors to our
7
Country if we did not embrace this parting Angel.”

Other delegates ampli ed Randolph’s conviction that this was the moment to rebuild the government.
Alexander Hamilton bluntly insisted that the “crisis … which now marked our a airs, was too serious to
8
permit any scruples whatever to prevail over” everyone’s duty to “the public safety & happiness.”
Hamilton asserted, “This was the critical moment for forming” a government that possessed “su cient
stability and strength to make us respectable abroad.” It was miraculous that the delegates were engaged in
9
“tranquil & free deliberations on the subject,” but it “would be madness to trust to future miracles.”
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina “was extremely anxious that something should be done, considering
10
this as the last appeal to a regular experiment.” Despite his sharp criticism of the plans of the largest
states, Delaware’s Gunning Bedford admonished the delegates “that something should be immediately
11
done. It will be better that a defective plan should be adopted, than that none should be recommended.”

But did the Convention have the authority to seize the moment and reconstruct the national government?
On May 30, the delegates overwhelmingly voted for the proposition “that a national government ought to be
established consisting of a supreme Legislative, Judiciary, and Executive,” that is, a government
fundamentally di erent from the Confederation. General Pinckney of South Carolina immediately
questioned whether the Convention had the authority to take this necessary step, and Elbridge Gerry of
12
Massachusetts shared his uncertainty. These questions did not stop the delegates from continuing to build
a new government plan.

Later, the smaller states raised these doubts as a tactic to try to stop Virginia’s plans for the new
p. 37 government. William Paterson of New Jersey directly challenged the Convention’s authority to propose
far-reaching changes in the Confederation government. The Convention and the states, he argued, had
agreed to a Convention only to reform the Articles; “the people of America were sharpsighted and not to be
 deceived,” he claimed. Paterson invoked political pragmatism, arguing, “We have no power to go beyond
the federal scheme, and if we had the people are not ripe for any other. We must follow the people; the
people will not follow us.” The delegates, he asserted, should return home and ask the states for more
13
authority to revise the nation’s government. New York’s John Lansing claimed that “New York would
never have concurred in sending deputies to the convention, if she had supposed the deliberations were to
turn on a consolidation of the States, and a National Government” (but Lansing admitted “that there was no
14
certain criterion of the public mind on the subject”).

For the vast majority of the delegates, the nation’s perilous situation overwhelmed such doubts about the
Convention’s authority. George Mason considered the existing system dissolved “by the appointment of
15

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/book/2838/chapter/162459987 by University of Toronto user on 15 January 2024

this Convention to devise a better one.” Charles Pinckney “thought the Convention authorized to go any
length in recommending, which they found necessary to remedy the evils which produced this
16
Convention.” Pennsylvania’s James Wilson “conceived himself authorized to conclude nothing, but to be at
17
liberty to propose any thing.” Randolph, answering claims that voters had not authorized the creation of a
national government, discounted the doubters’ claims and argued that no state would have had the
18
boldness to identify all the Confederation’s weaknesses in a public statement. Madison and Hamilton
emphasized that the Confederation could not be repaired. “The States sent us here to provide for the
exigencies of the Union,” Hamilton pointed out. “To rely on & propose any plan not adequate to these
exigencies, merely because it was not clearly within our powers, would be to sacri ce the means to the
19
end.” In the end, despite their doubts about the Convention’s warrant, General Pinckney and William
Paterson both signed the Constitution.

Public Opinion and Constitutional Reform

The delegates knew that, if their nal plan were unpopular with American citizens, the Constitution would
be rejected and the moment for government reconstruction would be lost. George Mason observed, “If the
Government is to be lasting, it must be founded in the con dence & a ections of the people, and must be so
20
constructed as to obtain these.” Hamilton believed the delegates had to persuade the people to embrace an
adequate government: “We must devise a system on the Spot—It ought to be strong and nervous [that is,
vigorous], hoping that the good Sense and principally the Necessity of our A airs will reconcile the People to
21
it.”

p. 38 Delegates who did not like one provision or another naturally tried to argue that the public would reject the
Constitution if the objectionable provision were included. Gerry was especially quick to raise this objection
throughout the Convention. In June, he insisted that “it was necessary to consider what the people would
22
approve,” as all legislators do. In August, Gerry observed, “We cannot be too circumspect in the formation
of this System. It will be examined on all sides and with a very suspicious eye.” Americans had revolted
against the abuses of the British government, and Gerry said that this recent experience “will produce a
23
critical attention to the opportunities a orded by the new system to like or greater abuses.” Delegates who
opposed Virginia’s plan employed these doubts tactically, questioning whether such far-reaching changes
were politically practical. Paterson preferred more modest changes in the Confederation “because it
24
accorded … with the sentiments of the people.” Lansing reminded the delegates that the states had
rejected a proposal to tax imports only four years earlier, and asked if “so great a change” in public opinion
could “have already taken place”? Trusting that the people would embrace a far-reaching overhaul of the
25
government “would be trusting to too great an uncertainty.”

Delegates who wanted a strong national government challenged these assumptions about public opinion.
Madison said, “No member of the Convention could say what the opinions of his Constituents were at this
time,” much less their opinions in the months after the Constitution became public. “The distinguished
 delegates who wrote it would give it more authority, as would the support of “all the most enlightened &
respectable citizens. Should we fall short of the necessary & proper point, this in uential class of citizens
will be turned against the plan, and little support in opposition to them can be gained to it from the
26
unre ecting multitude.” For Gouverneur Morris, Americans’ opinions “were unknown. They could not be
known. All that we can infer is that if the plan we recommend be reasonable & right; all who have reasonable
27
minds and sound intentions will embrace it.” Mason tried to turn Lansing’s argument against him,
inferring that the alternative, simply “to augment the powers of Congress, never could be expected to
28
succeed.” Wilson pointed out that the people were not demanding the reform of their state governments
29
to solve the nation’s problems, but instead expected relief from “the National Councils.”

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/book/2838/chapter/162459987 by University of Toronto user on 15 January 2024

Madison and his allies turned questions about the Convention’s authority to their advantage, arguing that a
worthy Constitution would win public support. When the Convention received the formal proposal for the
Connecticut Compromise, Madison implored the delegates to write a Constitution “which would be
espoused & supported by the enlightened and impartial part of America,” because the “merits of the system
p. 39 alone can nally & e ectually” win public support. The people of states like Delaware and New Jersey
would “acquiesce under an establishment founded on principles the justice of which they could not dispute”
30
and which would protect them from the commercial interference of neighboring states. In August, Wilson
tried to enlarge the delegates’ understanding of public opinion. Wilson said he was

acting & responsible for the welfare of millions not immediately represented in this House….
[W]hat [would he] say to his constituents in case they should call upon him to tell them why he
sacri ced his own Judgment in a case where they authorized him to exercise it? Were he to own to
them that he sacri ced it in order to atter their prejudices, he should dread the retort: did you
31
suppose the people of Pennsylvania had not good sense enough to receive a good Government?

Privately, Madison wrote to Thomas Je erson, then in France, “that the public mind will now or in a very
little time receive anything that promises stability to the public Councils & security to private rights, and
32
that no regard ought to be had to local prejudices or temporary considerations.” When he wrote this letter,
the Convention was putting the nishing touches on the Constitution. Only its adherence to republican
principles enabled the delegates to take the critical step toward a stronger national government.

A Republican National Government

The American people—and the delegates themselves—would only accept a strong new national government
if it were a republican government, with ultimate authority based squarely on the will of the people. All the
33
states had built republican governments during the American Revolution. While the delegates disputed
whether the public would accept this or that provision, Mason advised the delegates to step back and re ect
on the shared republican values that united the country. According to Madison’s notes, Mason said that:

Much has been said of the unsettled state of the mind of the people. He believed the mind of the
people of America, as elsewhere, was unsettled as to some points; but settled as to others. In two
points he was sure it was well settled. 1. in an attachment to Republican Government. 2. in an
attachment to more than one branch in the Legislature. Their constitutions accord so generally in
both these circumstances, that they seem almost to have been preconcerted. This must either have
34
been a miracle, or have resulted from the genius of the people.

p. 40 In a letter to his son, Mason expressed his con dence that the delegates as a group valued republicanism as
35
much as he did. Roger Sherman declared, “Government is instituted for those who live under it. It ought
36
therefore to be so constituted as not to be dangerous to their liberties.”
 For Mason, republican governments derived their strength from “the love, the a ection, the attachment of
the citizens to their laws, to their freedom, and to their country. Every husbandman will be quickly
converted into a soldier when he knows and feels that he is to ght not in defense of the rights of a
37
particular family, or a prince, but for his own.” James Wilson observed that the widely respected French
political philosopher Montesquieu favored “confederated Republics. I am for such a confederation if we can
38
take for its basis liberty, and can ensure a vigorous execution of the Laws.” For Wilson, “A confederated
39
republic joins the happiest kind of Government with the most certain security to liberty.”

Charles Pinckney argued at length that Americans’ culture, habits, and economy required a republican
government: “The people of the United States are perhaps the most singular of any we are acquainted with.”

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/book/2838/chapter/162459987 by University of Toronto user on 15 January 2024

They were divided by “fewer distinctions of fortune & less of rank” than the inhabitants of other nations.
“Every freeman has a right to the same protection & security,” and a small property holding “entitles them
to the possession of all the honors and privileges the public can bestow,” producing “a greater equality,
than is to be found among the people of any other country.” In a new nation like the United States,

possessing immense tracts of uncultivated lands, where every temptation is o ered to emigration
& where industry must be rewarded with competency, there will be few poor, and few dependent—
Every member of the Society almost, will enjoy an equal power of arriving at the supreme o ces &
consequently of directing the strength & sentiments of the whole Community. None will be
excluded by birth, & few by fortune, from voting for proper persons to ll the o ces of
Government…. Our true situation appears to me to be this—a new extensive Country containing
within itself the materials for forming a Government capable of extending to its citizens all the
blessings of civil & religious liberty—capable of making them happy at home. This is the great end
of Republican Establishments.

Pinckney blamed the national crisis on “the weakness & defects” of a moribund government, and not on the
40
people themselves.

The delegates rejected monarchy out of hand. The world’s leading governments were monarchies in 1787,
p. 41 but Mason “hoped that nothing like a monarchy would ever be attempted in this Country. A hatred to its
41
oppressions had carried the people through the late Revolution.” Wilson re ected that the size of the
United States seemed to require a monarchy, but the nation’s “manners are against a King and are purely
42
republican.” Gerry said that “there were not 1/1000 part of our fellow citizens who were not against every
43
approach towards Monarchy.” In the rst week, even Dickinson, who frankly described limited monarchy
as “one of the best Governments in the world,” conceded that this form of government “was out of the
question” for the United States because “[t]he spirit of the times—the state of our a airs, forbade the
44
experiment, if it were desirable.” When James McClurg proposed an unlimited term for the national
executive, Gouverneur Morris, who supported the idea, felt it necessary to make clear that he did so not to
establish a monarch but to make republican government work better, “to establish such a Republican
45
Government as would make the people happy and prevent a desire of change.”

Many of the delegates cited the British constitutional monarchy as the best government in the world, but
they considered the British model unsuitable for American circumstances. For Wilson, an admirer of the
46
British system, it “was inapplicable to the situation of this Country.” Hamilton also liked the British
model, but he understood that it would be politically unwise to propose “any other form” than a republic
47
without a king. Charles Pinckney pointed out that the “peculiar excellence” of the British constitution
could “not possibly be introduced into our System” because the United States lacked the landed nobility that
balanced the commoners and the king in the British system. Instead of the king, the nobles, and the
commoners, each of whom controlled one branch of British government, the United States had only
commoners, making it impossible to form a government like Britain’s, “consisting of three branches, two
48
of which shall have nothing to represent.” (The Articles of Confederation prohibited the Confederation
 Congress from granting any title of nobility, and the Convention unanimously added this prohibition to the
49
Constitution).

The delegates also rejected democracy in its purest form, the direct participation of the people in
governance. While some delegates used the term “democracy,” they rejected the idea that the people should
directly deliberate and make government decisions. When he introduced the Virginia Plan, Randolph
identi ed “the democratic parts” of the state constitutions as the “chief danger” the nation faced. None of
50
the state constitutions had “provided su cient checks against the democracy.” In June, Hamilton
observed that “The members most tenacious of republicanism were as loud as any in declaiming against the
51
vices of democracy.”

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/book/2838/chapter/162459987 by University of Toronto user on 15 January 2024

Madison criticized direct democracy, and he distinguished it from the admirable democratic form of
52
government he advocated at the Convention. Direct democracy threatened both government e ectiveness
p. 42 and Americans’ liberty. He believed in a democratic government, based on direct election of one
legislative house, but the choices of which subsequently would be ltered by the decisions of institutions
53
that were not directly selected by the people: a second legislative house, an executive, and a judiciary.

John Dickinson believed that Britain’s example taught Americans to nurture a government attuned to their
own nation’s culture: “Experience must be our only guide. Reason may mislead us.” Reason had not
produced the treasured practice of trial by jury. “Accidents probably produced” the discoveries that shaped
the development of British government, “and experience has given a sanction to them. This is then our
54
guide.”

The Requirements and Ambiguities of Republicanism

Republican principles placed three conditions on the new national government. First, the people must be the
ultimate source of government authority. Government action, the delegates believed, is legitimate only
when made by institutions controlled by the citizens. The delegates had to ensure that national policy-
55
makers would be accountable and responsive to the people. Madison said, “The people were in fact, the
56
fountain of all power, and by resorting to them, all di culties were got over.” “In free Governments,” said
57
Benjamin Franklin, “the rulers are the servants, and the people their superiors & sovereigns.”
“Notwithstanding the oppressions & injustice experienced among us from democracy,” observed Mason,
58
“the genius of the people is in favor of it, and the genius of the people must be consulted.” Mason believed
that “you should draw the Representatives immediately from the people. It should be so much so, that even
59
the Diseases of the people should be represented—if not, how are they to be cured?”

Second, rule by the people implied majority rule—majorities should determine government actions.
Madison pointed out, “According to the Republican theory indeed, Right & power being both vested in the
60
majority, are held to be synonymous.” Wilson asserted, “The majority of people wherever found ought in
all questions to govern the minority,” and added, “If the majority cannot be trusted, it was a proof … that we
61
were not t for one Society.” Sherman argued that “to require more than a majority to decide a question
62
was always embarrassing as had been experienced in cases requiring the votes of nine States in Congress.”

Third, republicanism required that government institutions with di erent policy responsibilities must be
kept separate. A strong national government needed an executive leader and a national court—but a
republican national government required that these new bodies be kept independent enough to prevent any
p. 43 single part of the government to control all its power. Separate institutions would have to make the laws
(a legislature), to enforce the laws (an executive), and settle disputes about the laws (a judiciary). The abuse
of uni ed power had occurred in Europe over and over again. The republican state constitutions all
63
separated government branches. To further separate the power to make laws, most states had created
 bicameral legislatures, that is, legislatures with two chambers, sometimes distinguished as a larger house of
representatives and a senate with fewer members than the house.

The delegates generally agreed that a republican national government required the same kinds of
institutions. Pierce Butler observed that he had “opposed the grant of powers to Congress heretofore,
because the whole power was vested in one body. The proposed distribution of the powers into di erent
64
bodies changed the case, and would induce him to go great lengths.” Nathaniel Gorham wrote that all the
delegates agreed on the separation of powers, and the delegates endorsed a national government consisting
65
of “a supreme Legislative, Executive and Judiciary” early in the Convention.

Madison reasoned, “If it be a fundamental principle of free Government that the Legislative, Executive &

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/book/2838/chapter/162459987 by University of Toronto user on 15 January 2024

Judiciary powers should be separately exercised; it is equally so that they be independently exercised,” and
66
the delegates agreed in principle. As Madison explained (and later elaborated in The Federalist Number 51),
the independence of these institutions had to be guaranteed by more than mere written guidelines.
Independence meant that the legislature, executive, and judiciary should have substantial powers that other
branches could not remove, so that any branch could stop the e orts of ambitious leaders in other branches
from encroaching on the authority of other branches and throwing the system out of balance. As Madison
told the delegates,

If a Constitutional discrimination of the departments on paper were a su cient security to each

against encroachments of the others, all further provisions would indeed be super uous. But
experience had taught us a distrust of that security; and that it is necessary to introduce such a
balance of powers and interests, as will guarantee the provisions on paper. Instead therefore of
contenting ourselves with laying down the Theory in the Constitution that each department ought
to be separate & distinct, it was proposed to add a defensive power to each which should maintain
the Theory in practice. In so doing we did not blend the departments together. We erected e ectual
67
barriers for keeping them separate.

Gouverneur Morris argued that each branch had to have a stake in its own power and in stopping other
68
branches from intruding on that power, so that “[v]ices as they exist, must be turned against each other.”

p. 44 It was particularly important to keep Congress under control. Madison argued that abuses in the state
legislatures proved the need for carefully limiting legislative power, particularly by strengthening the
executive, because

Experience had proved a tendency in our governments to throw all power into the Legislative
vortex. The Executives of the States are in general little more than Cyphers; the legislatures
omnipotent. If no e ectual check be devised for restraining the instability & encroachments of the
latter, a revolution of some kind or other would be inevitable. The preservation of Republican
69
Government therefore required some expedient for the purpose.

Because the legislature would have such power, Madison believed it was especially crucial to arm the other
70
branches with political weapons to defend their powers.

To keep the powerful national legislature in check, most delegates believed that it had to consist of two
separate legislative houses. Wilson argued, “If the Legislative authority be not restrained, there can be
neither liberty nor stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing it within itself, into distinct and
independent branches. In a single house there is no check, but the inadequate one, of the virtue & good
71
sense of those who compose it.” Bicameralism in a legislature was a “source of stability,” Dickinson
72
believed. Even the champions of the New Jersey Plan, which retained the unicameral Confederation
Congress and gave it additional power, conceded that bicameralism was an important check in a powerful
 73
legislature. Roger Sherman “admitted two branches to be necessary in the State Legislatures, but saw no
74
necessity for them in a Confederacy of States.” Still, the pragmatic Sherman agreed to a bicameral
legislature to overcome the intractable dispute over representation in Congress. On May 31 and again after
they rejected the New Jersey Plan, the Convention overwhelmingly approved a bicameral legislature, in
75
which each house could propose and had to agree to new laws.

But it is essential to point out that these general republican principles did not provide guidance for most of
the speci c decisions the delegates made in Philadelphia. Republicanism did not specify precisely how
76
powers should be separated, checked, and balanced. After all, republican governments in Rhode Island and
other states were producing awful policies. Each of the state republics had implemented these basic

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/book/2838/chapter/162459987 by University of Toronto user on 15 January 2024

principles in a di erent way, and none of the states o ered a satisfactory example of how to separate
powers and ensure that government would produce good results. Republicanism provided no guidance on
the method for choosing o cers of the government, judges, or the upper house of the legislature.
Pennsylvania’s 1776 Constitution was unusually democratic; Pennsylvania (as well as Vermont and Georgia)
77
had a single house legislature.

p. 45 Republican values did not determine who would be eligible to vote, or to serve in o ce. They did not specify
what powers the government should have, what powers any one branch should have, or how the
independence of the branches would be guaranteed. They did not speak to the problem of ratifying the
Constitution. Most important, they did not determine what, if any, powers the existing states should
exercise in the new constitutional order. In other words, republicanism established some very general
guidelines for the Constitution, but these principles could not resolve the con icts that tormented the
delegates as they confronted speci c choices about government design. Other factors, such as ideas,
interests, politics and individual visions for the new government, shaped these choices.

The Challenge of Reconstitution

All the delegates aspired to a more capable national government as a necessary remedy for the nation’s
crisis. Doubts about public opinion and their own authority did not deter them in the task of building this
government. Their agreement on republicanism and rejection of monarchy gave them a basic foundation for
moving forward. But the republican ideal created far more questions than it answered. Should new national
authority be broad or narrow? Most important, how could the people ultimately control the government and
still ensure that it would pursue policies that would be good for the nation?

Notes
1 RFC May 31, I, 53.
2 RFC May 31, I, 53; George Washington to David Stuart, July 1, 1787, RFC III, 51.
3 McHenry Notes, RFC May 30, I, 42.
4 RFC May 30, I, 34–35.
5 RFC May 29, I, 23.
6 RFC June 16, I, 255.
7 Lansing notes, June 16, RFC 1987 Supplement, 79.
8 RFC June 18, I, 282–83.
9 RFC June 29, I, 467.
10 RFC July 2, I, 511.
11 RFC July 5, I, 532.
12 RFC May 30, I, 34.
13 RFC June 9, I, 178; June 16, I, 250.
14 RFC June 16, I, 249; June 20, I, 336.
15 RFC June 4, I, 101.
16 RFC June 16, I, 255.
17 RFC June 16, I, 253.
18 RFC June 16, I, 255.
19 RFC June 18, I, 283.
20 RFC August 29, II, 451.
21 Lansing notes, June 29, RFC 1987 Supplement, 127.
22 RFC June 12, I, 215.
23 RFC August 14, II, 285–86.
24 RFC June 16, I, 250.
25 RFC June 16, I, 249–50.

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/book/2838/chapter/162459987 by University of Toronto user on 15 January 2024

26 RFC June 12, I, 215.
27 RFC July 5, I, 529.
28 RFC June 20, I, 338.
29 RFC June 16, I, 253.
30 RFC July 5, I, 528.
31 RFC August 14, II, 287–88.
32 James Madison to Thomas Je erson, September 6, 1787, RFC III, 78.
33 Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969),
46–90, 150–61.
34 RFC June 20, I, 339.
35 George Mason to George Mason Jr., June 1, 1787, RFC III, 32.
36 RFC June 26, I, 423.
37 Mason dra of speech, RFC June 4, I, 112.
38 King notes, RFC June 1, I, 71.
39 Pierce notes, RFC June 1, I, 74.
40 RFC June 25, I, 398, 402, 404.
41. RFC June 4, I, 102.
42 King notes, RFC June 1, I, 71.
43 RFC June 26, I, 425.
44 RFC June 2, I, 87.
45 RFC July 17, II, 36.
46 RFC June 1, I, 66; June 7, I, 153.
47 RFC June 18, I, 288.
48 RFC June 25, I, 398–99, 403.
49 RFC August 28, II, 439–42.
50 McHenry notes, RFC May 29, I, 26–27.
51 RFC June 18, I, 284–86.
52 RFC June 6, I, 135.
53 RFC May 31, I, 49–50.
54 RFC August 13, II, 276.
55 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 55–57; Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1967), 280–86.
56 RFC August 31, II, 476.
57 RFC July 26, II, 120.
58 RFC June 4, I, 101.
59 King notes, RFC June 6, I, 142.
60 RFC June 19, I, 318.
61 RFC July 13, I, 605; September 8, II, 548.
62 RFC August 29, II, 450.
63 M. J. C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1967), 128; Wood, The Creation
of the American Republic, 150–61.
64 RFC May 30, I, 34.
65 Nathaniel Gorham to Theophilus Parsons, June 18, 1787, RFC 1987 Supplement, 94; RFC May 30, I, 35; August 7, II, 196.
66 RFC July 19, II, 56; see Dickinson comments on the separation of powers, RFC June 2, I, 86.
67 RFC July 21, II, 77.
68 RFC July 2, I, 512. In The Federalist, Madison expressed a similar idea, writing, “Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition.” Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Middletown, CT:
Wesleyan University Press, 1961), Number 51, 349.
69 RFC July 17, II, 35. Even Thomas Je erson, the champion of democracy, was concerned about the possibility of legislative
despotism. See Madisonʼs essay in The Federalist Number 48, 355.
70 RFC July 21, II, 74.
71 RFC June 16, I, 254.
72 RFC June 2, I, 86.
73 RFC June 16, I, 251.
74 RFC June 20, I, 341.
75 RFC May 31, I, 48; June 21, I, 358.

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/book/2838/chapter/162459987 by University of Toronto user on 15 January 2024

76 Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, 154.
77 On the separation of powers in the Pennsylvania Constitution, see Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 449–51;
Robert F. Williams, “The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade: Pennsylvaniaʼs Radical 1776 Constitution and Its
Influences on American Constitutionalism,” Temple Law Review 62 (Summer 1989): 541–74.