MARGINAL SCIENCE Recognizing inconclusiveness: When you read scienti c reports, they
usually include direct or indirect clues to whether the data are inconclusive,
We’ve learned fairly well how to evaluate cases in which we have good
evidence whether or not the models t the world.
We will now re ne our methods for analysing models that are
inconclusively supported.
We will go a little beyond the text and distinguish a range of
inconclusive cases.
Recall that models are inconclusively supported by a particular set of data
if there is more than one available, plausible model that predicts that data.
The idea is that, when there is more than one good explanation of the
facts, then those facts can’t help us decide which explanation is better.
We are going to call all such inconclusively supported models
“marginal science.”
However, as we shall discover, not all marginal science is equally
marginal.
1 2
We’ll look primarily at marginal models that are not only inconclusively
supported, but which are also very far outside of the scienti c mainstream.
In such cases, it will usually be easy to imagine more mainstream
models that can also explain the data.
Further, most of these “far out” marginal models will be extremely vague, in
that they make few, if any clear predictions. As such, it will be easy to create
other vague alternatives.
In fact, this vagueness explains why people nd the predictions of far-out
marginal models so “accurate”: vague predictions are easy to ful l.
Understanding Scienti c Reasoning (Ch. 4) treats any scienti c model or set
of models as marginal if they are inconclusively supported.
In reality, however, this chapter is largely about what philosophers and
scientists usually call pseudoscience: mock science.
Scientists and philosophers have often tried to develop criteria that would
clearly distinguish what they believe to be genuine science — e.g., physics,
biology, and chemistry — from “mock sciences” such as astrology,
biorhythms and parapsychology, etc.
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that is, whether there are other easily available, plausible models.
Such clues include:
(a) Direct mention or strong hints of alternative models in the report
(b) The model under consideration was designed so it could explain the
known data. The model has not yet been tested by predicting new
data
e.g., Mendel’s factor model was designed to predict the 3
talls : 1 short ratio.
(c) Generally speaking, it seems not too hard to imagine other, similar
models that could also explain the data
(d) The model con icts with currently accepted models, but so far has
only passed very few tests
In this last case, the model is not only inconclusively supported by the data;
it also fails to be plausible by contemporary standards
As we shall see, this means that such a model can often be taken to be
refuted by the evidence that supports contemporary standards
What is Science?
Positivist/Logical Empiricist proposed criterion: Something is science
only if it’s empirically veri able; otherwise, it’s not science.
Problem with this criterion: The de nition is too narrow, since even
mainstream science is not fully veri able, and so would be excluded by
the de nition as not scienti c.
Every scienti c model makes an inde nite number of predictions.
For example, the double helix model predicts that every DNA molecule
will have the structure of a double helix, with identical amounts of
adenine as cytosine.
There are of course, many other sorts of predictions, involving X-
rays, chemical interactions, and so on.
Thus to truly verify the model would involve making an in nite number of
experiments, which clearly cannot be done. (You may also recognize this as
the problem of induction.)
Karl Popper’s proposal: A model/theory is scienti c only if we can test it for
empirical falsity.
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That is, if a model is scienti c, we can propose experiments for which the model
might make false predictions; if there are no clearly imaginable, empirical tests,
then the model isn’t falsi able, and so isn’t scienti c.
Problems with Popper’s proposal: Too narrow: Much accepted science is at
least currently unfalsi able, and so would be excluded. Some theories and
models are accepted as worth investigating either because
(a) they seem promising, and further developments might show how to
test them; or
(b) they are coherent with, or make sense of accepted science: e.g.
general relativity, the big bang, string theory, etc.
Giere’s version: The failure to nd a foolproof de nition of genuine science has
made Giere leery of the project.
Instead, he proposes that we describe astrology, creation science, crystal
therapy, etc. as “marginal sciences.”
These sorts of models count as sciences insofar as they make claims
about the world. They are marginal in that they are not (yet) supported by
the available data.
This leaves open the possibility that future evidence may support them.
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Apparent problem: Giere’s criteria for distinguishing what is currently
marginal from genuine science — namely, inconclusive support — puts
astrology, biorhythms, etc. on a par with many apparently scienti c
theories, which are also inconclusively supported.
Yet scientists will spend considerable time developing and testing
some currently marginal models, but spend little or no effort on
astrology, biorhythms, and so on. Why is this?
The answer seems to be that, judging by models scientists
currently deem to be on the right track, some currently marginal
models are promising, while others seem completely implausible.
A modi cation of Giere’s method: We will call astrology, creation
science, etc. “very marginal sciences” because these marginal sciences
are only poor versions of what current consensus counts as science; that
is, such “sciences”:
(i) will only make successful predictions already made by other, much-
better supported, sciences; and
(ii) con ict with the structures of successful, contemporary models
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The idea is that, whenever astrological, crystal therapy, neurolinguistic
programming, Extraterrestrial Visitation models make successful predictions,
there will always be other less “esoteric,” i.e., naturalistic models that make the
same predictions.
For example, astrology will only make predictions about behaviour and the
future that, when successful, can also be explained by scienti c theories such
as genetics and psychology, which are much better supported than astrology.
At which step in our program is the problem with marginal sciences most
often going to show up then?
Big Hint: When doing ch. 4 problems, there will always be, and you should be
able to think of, naturalistic models that explain the data.
Giere’s “criterion” for mainstream or genuine science:
(a) a model is part of mainstream science, if the available data gives the
model good support in the context of other, available and plausible
models.
or, correlatively,
(b) a model is part of marginal science if available data provides that model
only inconclusive support, in the context of other available and plausible
models.
For example, astrology can make predictions about human behaviour or the
future that, when successful, can also be explained by scienti c models
such as genetics and psychology, which are elsewhere much better
supported than astrology.
In addition, the nature of the stars and planets, as well as the causes of
human personality, as described by astrological models doesn’t mesh
with those of modern genetics, biochemistry, physics, etc.
Thus, generally speaking, when scientists consider a new model as
plausible (worth looking at), they are using their currently successful models
of how things work to help them make this judgement.
Of course, scienti c standards do change so that what were once
considered correct standards for plausible models, are dropped in
favour of new standards.
For example, when phlogiston chemists considered available, new models
to be plausible, these models presupposed the basic phlogiston structure:
combustion involves the release of some ery substance (whether sulphur,
carbon or in ammable air).
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In other words, these different phlogiston models (sulphur, carbon, and
in ammable air) were in the family of models comprising the phlogiston theory
—i.e., they t within the phlogiston worldview
By the phlogiston standard, Lavoisier’s oxygen hypothesis wasn’t even
plausible since it approached combustion in a seemingly wrong-headed
way: namely, combustion involves the absorption of something in the air,
and the ery substance is some new thing called caloric.
The standards of plausibility changed here when it became clear that
phlogiston models could not deal coherently with the data (e.g., to explain
mercury combustion, phlogiston must be a substance with a negative
weight).
Incommensurability: Clearly the phlogiston and oxygen theoretical traditions
had different standards about plausible conceptual structures for models
explaining combustion.
The (long) term for describing this sort of disagreement is
incommensurability: having no common standard.
Incommensurability is a problem for scienti c reasoning because it
makes it dif cult to decide whether proposed models are worth pursuing.
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Therefore, the burden of proof lies with these current nonsciences to show
that they can fully compete with modern science.
Criterion to keep in mind: If accepting a model because it can
explain some piece of data forces us to reject or to leave
unexplained — even to leave apparently unexplainable — data
already explained by current models, that model should be rejected
4.1 FREUD: THE CASE OF LITTLE HANS
Freud’s model of the mind: Two sets of structures:
(1) (a) the unconscious mind,
(b) the preconscious mind
(c) the conscious mind; and
(2) (a) the id,
(b) ego, and
(c) superego
We are never directly aware of what goes on in the
unconscious; the conscious mind is the aware mind;
and we can sometimes bring preconscious things
into awareness.
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The Tycho-Galileo dispute was also due to incommensurability.
Though Giere doesn’t say this explicitly, he uses the criterion that we
should only accept as plausible those available models that comprise
currently accepted scienti c theory
Philosophical issue: By assuming the truth of contemporary scienti c
models, aren’t we stacking the cards against the alternatives?
That is, are we not just assuming, by this rule of comparison that other
views are wrong? Are we giving them a fair chance?
Justi cation: Contemporary science embodies a tremendous amount of
data successfully explicated and extricated from the world
I.e., modern science is not just a body of models but also a body of
information explained by those models.
So any very different models also have to prove themselves against
this body of information to be worthy of our acceptance.
Thus, marginal non-sciences are “inconclusively supported” because
anything they can do modern science can do so much better
Further, modern science can do many things that these marginal views
cannot.
id: The primitive, primarily biological part of the mind.
The id includes desires whose ful lment brings pleasure.
What the text leaves out is the large importance Freud gives to sexual
desire.
super-ego: Sometimes called the conscience; the rules of correct social
behaviour imposed on us by parents, society, etc.
ego: that part of the mind that seeks to balance the forces of the id and
superego
Development: Young children are primarily ruled by the id.
Ego development and the Oedipus-Electra complexes: Freud says a
young child’s rst sexual feelings are directed towards their opposite-sex
parent.
Little boys desire their mothers and are jealous of their fathers, but do not
challenge them for fear of castration. As well, the boys learn that society
expects them to love their fathers, and not to have sexual feelings for their
mothers.
Some Freudians have also argued that there is a parallel Electra complex in
young girls.
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Successful ego development: occurs when the child accepts its parents’
authority and transfers its sexual desires to a more socially appropriate object.
Successful ego development requires adapting the needs of the id to the
demands of the super-ego.
We sometimes cope with the con ict by pushing the demands of the id
into unconsciousness.
Projection of super-ego rejected desires onto other objects is a way of coping
with the demands of desires and the super-ego.
For example, a person could project forbidden sexual desires onto a more
acceptable hobby, such as stamp collecting.
“Psychosis”: losing touch with reality because of psychic energy involved.
Little Hans and horses: Hans was the son of a Viennese physician and
friend/disciple of Freud.
In the fall of 1907, four-year-old Hans developed an extreme fear of horses so
that he refused to go outside.
Among many things, Hans said he was afraid a horse would come into his
bedroom and bite him.
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Freud asked Hans if his father’s glasses and beard didn’t resemble the horses
blinders and muzzle
• Freud suggested to Hans that he was really afraid of his father’s reaction
to wishing to spend more time with his mum
• Freud asked the father to reassure Hans about his mother; and he got
Hans to symbolically defy his father (biting him).
The father claimed the extreme fear of horses started to abate right away; but
it took several months for them completely to disappear.
Evaluation in text: pp. 95–96.
Filling in Step 6: It seems relatively easy to nd other models that predict the
end of Little Hans fear of horses.
On a “desire-for-attention” model, children will do many strange things to
get the attention or affection they desire.
As an auxiliary model, children are very changeable and quickly
“outgrow” their obsessions.
This alternative model predicts that children, such as Hans, with little
or no therapy — perhaps especially with no therapy — will persist for
a while in behaviour that gets their parents’ attention, but that they will
quickly outgrow this behaviour.
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Freud’s treatment: Hans had spent the summer at a resort far from Vienna
where he had many playmates.
Because his father was often away to Vienna to tend his practice, Hans
spent much time with his mother, sometimes sleeping in her bed when he
was nervous at night.
Hans was also frightened when he heard that horses might bite, if one
got too close.
When they returned to Vienna, Hans’s parents bought a larger apartment,
where he had his own room; his father refused to let him come into his
parent’s bedroom in the morning; his mother spent less time with him now
that he had a nursemaid.
On one walk in the park with the maid, a horse fell down, frightening
Hans; shortly after, he developed his extreme fear of horses, especially
their blinders and muzzles.
Freud’s model of the data: Hans is undergoing an Oedipal crisis—his id
desires his mum, but his ego is unconsciously afraid of his father’s jealousy.
Because his superego tells him he must nevertheless love his father,
Hans transferred his anxiety to another object he feared and who in
some way resembled his father: horses.
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Philosophical Aside: One of the many criticisms of Freud (by Popper
and others) is that Freud’s theory is too dif cult to falsify.
The idea behind this critique is that, for any psychological issue, it is
possible to generate (at least) one Freudian model of that issue.
However, as we’ve seen this simply means that Freudian analysis is a
theoretical tradition, as was phlogiston theory, oxygen theory, and so
on.
A more telling objection is that Freud’s predictions are so vague that it is
easy for any data to t them.
How soon will Hans become better?
How much better?
What does “better” here mean?
The above, alternative model exploits this vagueness in Freud, since
neither Freud’s model nor the attention-seeking model is required to
make very speci c predictions about Hans’s future mental health.
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For example, if you read a horoscope that tells you that your love life will
meet some challenges today, you might easily take as support:
(i) a small argument with your love
(ii) meeting someone else who is even minimally attractive
(iii) the fact that you have no love life; and so on.
Though the original description was very vague about the sort of challenges
you will face, you naturally interpreted the speci c sort of events which
actually occurred in your love life as these “challenges”
(iii) Multiple predictions: If enough, even contradictory, predictions are
made, occasional successes are likely (e.g., Make six different
predictions about how a die will come up).
Multiple predictions are often combined with another common
error often called selective thinking: a preference for
remembering data which supports one’s belief but forgetting that
which undermines it (also called con rmation bias).
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Common characteristics of (very) marginal sciences:
(i) No new predictions: Many very marginal sciences do not make any new
predictions; that is, they propose a model to explain some known
phenomenon, but make no further predictions about as yet unknown
data.
Recall: Mendel rst proposed his factor model of pea-plant inheritance to
explain the known 3:1 ratio for self-fertilized hybrid tall plants.
However, what made his model worth accepting were its predictions
about the as-yet-unknown data for the backcross test.
(ii) Vague predictions: For many very marginal sciences, the predictions
are so broad that very little data could ever disagree with them, and it
would be very dif cult to show that the models don’t t
This might seem to make such models powerful but it actually makes
them very weak since it will also be very easy to generate alternative
models that also t such broad data
Vagueness is often combined with a common error in reasoning
known as the Forer effect: the tendency of people to attribute
speci c, personal meanings to vague descriptions.
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(iv) Incompatibility with established science: As already noted, the reason
that scientists typically don’t spend much time on such marginal
sciences as astrology, divination or crystal therapy is that these models
give a very different structure to the world than that described by
currently successful models.
Case I: Astrology
I’ve abstracted the following description of one of the astrological signs (by
removing some of the speci c indicators).
“Ruled by the planet _______, _______is quick, verbal and
intellectual. Its element is _______, its quality mutable. People born
under _______ are like the restless wind. They are ethereal and
hard to pin down. They are also changeable and inconstant.
_______energy is bright and breezy but also super cial and
inconsiderate - _______ never let anyone's feelings stop him telling
a good joke. A subtle but ighty energy.”
I have had previous classes read “incorrect” horoscopes to their friends,
families and the general public. What they found was that, even though
people were read the wrong astrological signs, they almost always
described them as very accurate.
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History: The original creators of astrological theory, the Babylonians, noted
that the sun and moon affected things on earth and hypothesized that
these were the actions of their gods
Jupiter = Marduk
Venus = Ishtar
Saturn = Ninib
Mercury = Nebo
Ninib
Mars = Nergal

Their motion in the heavens was thought to be a sign of these gods’

Ishtar
activities.
Clearly, very few, if any people still believe that ancient Babylonian gods Marduk
control or in uence their destinies.
Some astrologers have attempted to provide new models to explain how
the positions of the stars and planets can in uence human destiny and
character.
For example, Newton thought that gravity might play such a role; others
have suggested that electromagnetic elds are responsible, and so on.
Nergal

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Note, however, that these attempts to modernize astrology presuppose that the
planets and stars really do in uence human destiny and character.
Further, no serious attempts have been made to show how these forces
might affect human beings, nor why the particular alignment of stars and
planets leads to these speci c effects.
Though contemporary believers are not usually aware of the original models
underlying astrology, they often defend their belief by noting the astrology
“works.”
In other words, they say that they have no model of why astrology works,
they just claim that it does
Suppose we grant that astrological models of people make predictions that are
accepted by them as accurate
Is there any other way to explain this “accuracy”?
Astrology’s ability to “predict” human character traits can be explained by
the “vague description” (and “multiple-prediction”) models
The predictions of astrology are often vague, but even when they are fairly
precise, astrologers usually undercut this by making exceptions — as a Leo,
you are a very strong character, but, if necessary, you can also be a real
“pussycat”
Vagueness (Forer effect): People are likely to agree to self-descriptions
expressed with words that are open to interpretation.
Multiple predictions (selective thinking): If enough, even contradictory
predictions are made, occasional successes are likely.
People who believe in astrology or who are startled by a strikingly accurate
statement, will remember the few, exciting “successes,” but forget the
many, boring failures.
So the Forer-effect model that people interpret speci cally vague
personal predictions and the selective thinking model also predict that
people will typically nd astrological predictions accurate.
Thus the “successes” of astrological model predictions are inconclusive
for the truth of astrology—that the positions of the stars and planets at
one’s birth affect one’s character.
Stronger criticism: Incompatibility with established science: Astrology
claims that the stars and planets somehow in uence our characters,
presumably more strongly than do the genes we inherit from our parents,
or our social environment.

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But current science has no place for an in uence from the stars or
planets (gravity? radiation?) that could have any measurable effect on
us, let alone a consistent, predictable effect on our character.
So astrology is both inconclusively supported and inconsistent
with strongly supported models in mainstream science; we have
good reason to reject it as not worth pursuing.
Yet another approach: Doesn’t the truth of astrology depend on its
being relatively precise?
That is, shouldn’t any astrologer worth their salt, claim that
astrological predictions are speci c and accurate?
If so, the fact that astrological predictions seem to be accepted
even when they are for the wrong signs also provides direct
good evidence that astrology doesn’t t the real world.
If we take this line, we would have to include in the prediction that
people will not accept descriptions of wrong horoscopes as
accurate.
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Step 4. Data. John F. Kennedy was elected president in 1960, and
assassinated in November 1963.
Step 5. Negative Evidence? No. The data and prediction agree very well.
Step 6. Positive Evidence? Are there other plausible explanations of how
Jeane Dixon managed to predict Kennedy’s assassination?
In fact, as noted, Jeane Dixon made thousands of predictions, the vast
majority of which were false. It is easy to “cherry pick” one’s successes
afterwards, and ignore the failures.
This form of “selective thinking” can make predictions look more
impressive than they are.
If we combine this with the known facts that four American presidents have
been assassinated, four have died in of ce, and that there were eight
unsuccessful assassination attempts, the prediction also seems much less
daring than it looks.
Thus, the ability of putative “psychics” such as Jeane Dixon to say in
advance that some event will occur is also explainable on the “educated
guess/multiple prediction/selective thinking” model:
anyone with a little knowledge about the world and the willingness to
guess about the future will be right as often as Jeanne Dixon is.
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Case II: Psychics: vague & multiple predictions again
The American “psychic,” Jeane Dixon apparently
predicted Kennedy’s assassination, etc.
In the May 13, 1956, issue of Parade Magazine she
wrote that the 1960 presidential election would be
"dominated by labor and won by a Democrat" who
would then go on to "[B]e assassinated or die in of ce
though not necessarily in his rst term."
Even so, Jeane Dixon made thousands of predictions, and the vast
majority of them were mistaken. And many of those she got right were
easy enough for a nonpsychic with some historical knowledge to make,
Analysis:
Step 1. Real World: The subject matter involves future events.
Step 2. Models: The model is that Jeane Dixon has the God-given ability to
see future events before they occur.
Step 3. Predictions. The prediction is that “the 1960 presidential election
would be ”dominated by labor and won by a Democrat“ who would then go on
to ”[B]e assassinated or die in of ce though not necessarily in his rst term.”
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Stronger criticism: Contemporary scienti c models predict that human
beings should not be able to predict the future in any signi cant way.
Extremely numerous “failed predictions” also count against the Jeane-Dixon
psychic model.
So we have good reason to take the Jeane Dixon model as not worth
pursuing.
Case III: Extra Terrestrial Visitation (Chariots of the Gods): No new
predictions/fraud
Erich von Däniken is famous for trying to show that
peculiar, ancient archaeological remains are evidence that
earth has been visited by extra-terrestrial beings (aliens).
Von Däniken’s primary argument is that ancient human
beings lacked the knowledge and technology to create
these unusual objects.
Importantly, von Däniken’s models are never tested by new predictions.
So it’s not surprising that his explanations of odd anthropological data such
as the Easter Island Statues are matched by any number of alien spacecraft,
ancient super-civilization models one could dream up in one’s armchair (text,
p.100).
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Further, despite von Däniken’s often fraudulent claims, naturalistic,
terrestrial models exist for these odd facts.
Indeed, von Däniken claimed to learn about the Easter Island Statues
from Thor Heyerdahl’s book Aku-Aku, which has pictures of
contemporary Easter Islanders constructing and erecting stone
statues, without any alien or modern help.
I’ve found that, often the reason ordinary people are prone to believe von
Däniken’s views is that they rst learn about Easter Island statues, etc.
from reading his books.
As a result, they learn to view these phenomena through von
Däniken’s models.
More generally, people nd it dif cult to distinguish the phenomena to be
explained (real world) from familiar explanations (models) of that
phenomena.
So, after having learned about weird statues, etc., from von Däniken,
people have simultaneously learned about them as “alien-constructed”
artefacts.
Summary of Marginal Science: As discussed, what your text’s
approach leaves unanalysed is why we might consider some
models or types of models “inconclusively supported,” yet worth
pursuing, while we consider others as perhaps not completely
disproved, but certainly not worth pursuing.
We can re ne our evaluations at Step 6, when there is more than
one available (plausible?) model, or when the model merely
explains already known data as follows:
(a) The data provide (as yet) inconclusive support for the model,
but
(i) the model is largely consistent with the scienti c
mainstream in this area; and
(ii)the evidence seems to be accumulating in favour of it; so
this model is very promising, and strongly worth further
testing.

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(b) The data provide inconclusive support for the model, but
(i) the model is largely consistent with the scienti c mainstream in
this area; though so far,
(ii)the model hasn’t been tested much; so this model is fairly
promising, and worth further testing.
(c) The data provide inconclusive support for the model,
(i) the model is largely consistent with the scienti c mainstream in
this area; though
(ii)the model makes no clear new predictions; so this model is
plausible, and worth further testing.
(d) The data provide inconclusive support for the model, but
(i) the model is strongly inconsistent with the scienti c mainstream in this
area; and/or
(ii)the model can’t predict other data explained by competing scienti c
models; so this model is very implausible, and not worth further testing.
We could, of course, add further evaluative re nements.
In class: 3.3, 4.6, 4.10

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