EX PARTE THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE: In re S v JOHN CAVE 1970 (2) SA 355 (A)

1970 (2) SA p355

Citation

1970 (2) SA 355 (A)

Court

Appellate Division

Judge

Steyn HR, Ogilvie Thompson AR, AR Rumpff, Jansen AR and AR Rabie wn

Heard

November 13, 1969

Judgment

February 20, 1970

Annotations
Link to Case Annotations

Flynote: Keywords

Criminal Law - Suicide or attempted suicide - not a crime - person who encourages another, help or
enable to commit suicide - When a crime - Nature of such crime, if it is one - depends on the particular
circumstances.

Headnote: Kopnota

Neither suicide nor attempted suicide is a crime.

Or a person who encourages another, help or enable to commit suicide, a crime committed, will depend
on the facts of the particular case. The mere fact that the last act of the suicide's own voluntary non-
criminal act, bring not merely means that that person is guilty of no crime may be. Depending on the
factual circumstances, the crime murder, attempted murder or manslaughter be.

Flynote: Keywords

Criminal law - Attempted Suicide or suicide - Not an offence - Person instigating, assisting or Placing
another in a position to commit suicide - When an offence - Nature of industry leaders offence, if any -
depends on the circumstances IHB.

Headnote: Kopnota

Neither suicide nor Attempted suicide constitutes an offence.

Whether a person who instigates, ASSISTS or another well in a position to commit suicide offence
commits an depends on the facts of the case mn. The lakes fact dat the last act of the person
committing suicide is such person's own, voluntary, non-criminal act does Not necessarily mean dat the
other person Can not be guilty or Any offence. Depending upon the factual circumstances the offence
Can Be Murder, Attempted Murder or culpable Homicide.

Case Information

Determination of questions proposed by the Minister of Justice in terms of art. 385 of Act 56 of 1955
The nature of the questions appear from the judgment of STEYN, HR

F P. Yutar, SC, Attorney General of the Orange Free State (assisted by AJ de Klerk), on behalf of the
State: Suicide has leg held not to be a crime - presumably Because punishment Can not Operate Against
the felo's the Personally. Gardiner & Lansdown, 6th ed., Vol. 2, p. 1540; S v Gordon, 1962 (4) SA 727 at p.
729 See also R v Nbakwa, 1956 (2) G SA 557 at p. 560 Min-following it has Assumed leg and held therein
Attempted suicide is not a crime died. See South African Law Journal (1908) vol. 25, p. 417 In Rex v
Peverett, 1940 AD 213 at p. 218, this question was left open. Consequently, it has leg hero aiding and
abetting therein a person to commit suicide is likewise not a

1970 (2) SA P356

crime. Gordon's case, supra, at p. 731; Nbakwa's case, supra, at p. 560 produced according to Roman-
Dutch authority, however, no man has an unlimited right over His own life. Grotius, 01/02/44 (Maas
Town's translation); A Moorman, Papers on the crimes, 2.11.4 and 'suicide is undoubtedly an Unlawful
Act. Van der Linden, Institutes, 2.5.14, (Juta's translation); see also S v Robinson and Others, 1968 (1) SA
666 at p. 678; Gardiner & Lansdown, 6th ed., Vol. 1, p. 118; Foot, 9.2.11 (Gane's translation). If the
Offender is, by the act Itself Guilty, Placed beyond the reach of the law, "South African Law Journal, B
supra at p. 418, it is manifest why have Can not Be 'Accused of Any crime', Grotius, supra, and why
suicide 'can not be classed under Which crimes are punished publicly. Van der Linden, supra; see also
van Leeuwen, Roman-Dutch Law, Vol. 2, 4:34:11. But persons who have committed suicide have always-
been punished 'in the treatment accorded to Their corpses and by way of confiscation of property hun.
Grotius C and van der Linden, supra; Huber, Jurisprudence, 13/6/27 (Gane's translation); Schorer, Note
LX ad Grotius, 01/02/44; see also De Wet Swanepoel &, 2nd ed., p. There were 206 killed Roman-Dutch
authority for the view therein Attempted suicide is a crime. Damhouder, Practijck Criminal, 88.9; Foot,
48.21.2 (Gane's translation); South African Law Journal, D supra, p. 417-8; Carpzovius, Lijfstraffelyke
Crimes, Chap. 2 sec. 22 If, Charmain Horn Please note, the aforegoing submissions are well founded,
then, under the general principles of criminal law, to aid and abet a person to commit suicide Would
consitute a crime. Gardiner & Lansdown, 6th ed., Vol. 1, p. 128 et seq; Mommsen, Römisches Criminal
Law, p. 1043, para. E 11 'any event, the Above-Mentioned Concerning suicide Aggs approach the
question in the present case and is Quite irrelevant, Because one is not here Concerned with the mind of
the person who has committed suicide, but Rather with the mind of the Accused aided and abetted who
dat person to commit suicide. See Robinson's case, supra, at p. 678; The Law & F Swanepoel, supra at p.
82; Journal of H.R.H. Law, (1963) vol. 26, pp. 58-59; full. 32, pp. 188, 191-192. The Accused's purpose in
handing a loaded rifle to His wife was enable to have to pull the trigger, and the pulling of the trigger
was in turn activates the Means whereby death was to be caused. Rex v Peverett, supra at p. 218 See R v
too Loubser, 1953 (2) P. H. H190; R v Du Plessis, 1960 (2) SA 642; R. G v Motomane, 1961 (4) SA 569;
Journal of H.R.H. Law, vol. 26, pp. 58-59; full. 32, pp. 188, 191-192. This view is in accordance with
English Law. Russell on Crime, 12th ed., Vol. 1, p. 146; Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law, 18th ed., P. 174-
5. It is killed in accordance with American Law. Commonwealth v Bowen, (1816) 13 Massachusetts 356.

H JJF Hefer, on behalf of the accused: R v Gordon, 1962 (4) SA 729, was on the basis (i) that the accused
was guilty as an accomplice because suicide is a crime, and (ii) that the accused as common perpetrator
not guilty because it was not his act, but the voluntary and independent actions of the deceased, which
caused her death. First base, viz. the potential liability based on complicity, is a question of law that is
currently in accordance with art. 385 of Act 56

1970 (2) SA p357

1955 may be decided and it is argued that both decisions in this regard is correct. (A) Romeinsregtelik
suicide was not regarded as a crime. Dig. XV. 1.9.7; Com foot. ad. Pan, IX. 2:11; XLVIII. 21.1; Moorman:
2.11.1. (B) In the Netherlands it initially as A crime and punishment, the body, mainly on the grounds
that suicide is contrary to the divine law, and that no man master of his own body is not. Moorman,
supra; Matthaeus, Prol. 3.3. and 4; 48.5.1.9. and 10; Huber, Hed. Rechtsgel, VI. XIII, 47; Foot, XLVIII, 21.2;
The Great Introduction 2.1.4; Damhouder, LXXXI; Van der Linden, B Institutes, 2.5.14; Carpzovius,
14:17:18 I., 22, 23, 24 These penalties, however, expire and van Leeuwen, Roman-Hedendaegse Law, IV.
XXIV.2, as the crime only when committed to evade the consequences of a crime (and other less
relevant circumstances), and in practice it in this way. (C) In the current South African law can not be
regarded as a crime not C because: (i) one of the fundamental requirements of a crime, ie.
strafbedreiging (cf. S v Johnson, 1969 (1) SA on p. 204: The Law & Swanepoel, 2nd edition, p. 15th and
authors cited in note 104) missing. (Ii) Even if suicide, sg. if crime is not punishable publiekregtelik was
not (cf.. van der Linden, tap) it D by disuse as attempted suicide in this country not punishable not.
(1908 SALJ 413; report submitted in R v Peverett, 1940 AA on p. 214). (D) The position in England,
Germany and Holland are not comparable as suicide and inciting and assisting in suicide in those
systems statutorily regulated. (Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law, 18th ed., P. 174-5; von Liszt, E 25th ed.,
P. 205, n.13; Wolzol, 6th ed., P. 234; Woods, 4th ed. , p. 260, of Bemmelen and Hattum, Vol II, p. 200 (e)
A person is as instigator or accomplice guilty only when the act of 'trunk' is a crime. Bettbarn R v. OPA
1930 on p. 191, R v Rassool, 1924 AA on p. 48-9, R v Milne & F Erleigh, 1951 (1) SA on p. 822. The only
two possible crimes are murder and manslaughter. Suppose both crimes relating to causing the death of
a person, cf. & De Wet Swanepoel, 2nd ed., p. 46-7; van Leeuwen, supra. IV. XXXIV. 1; Moorman,
2:11:16, is the pertinent question in both decisions came up for discussion, or G in each case found was
that it was the accused's conduct was the death of the deceased caused owing to the fact that in each
case she herself was the final death action that has . Either it was found that her own free and
independent action was that caused her death. At the question of causation in a particular case in the
first part of the investigation found that the bweerde result indeed a consequence of the H act in
question must as second question is whether the intended result a foreseeable one. Cf. Kruger v Van der
Merwe and Another 1966 (2) SA on p. 272D-E. However, it is found that the alleged result not a result or
to a finding in this regard is not made, comes the second part of the investigation not even mentioned.
(Cf. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corporation Ltd v Koch., 1963 (4) SA on p. 151E-G;

1970 (2) SA P358

STEYN HR

p. 152-3; p. 157D-E; 158F ff and 159H). In the criminal law is the same approach. If on a charge of
murder or manslaughter is found that the death was the result of the accused's actions, A is the further
question whether it is a foreseeable result and, if so, the accused is liable. Cf. S v Bernard, 1965 (3) SA
287, especially at p. 302H to p. 303 Can not beyond doubt found that the accused's conduct was the
cause of death was, he already not to murder or manslaughter convicted and the question arises as to
foreseeability disagree. Cf. S Mbambo v B and Another 1965 (2) SA on p. 857-8; S v Thomo and Others,
1969 (1) SA on p. 308-400. If it is assumed that the actions of the accused co-cause of death, there is the
question of law or exempt them from liability by the actions of the deceased as a final and decisive step.
It is assumed that if C finds that the conduct of the accused with the cooperative actions of the deceased
to death resulted, the defendants were liable. Cf. S v Thomo and Others, supra, at p. 397H. But it must
be established beyond doubt that their actions actually co-caused, ie that their actions also cause. The
State had the causality beyond doubt. S v Van As and Others, D 1967 (A) SA on p. 602 If the submission is
incorrect, argued that they act as (co)-source can be described only if found to be among the dead
would have followed it (sine qua non); Woods, p. 194; of tinkering & van Hattum, p. 173 About the
conditio sine qua non veroorsakings theory; see R v Makali, 1950 (1) SA on p. 343-4.

E Yutar, S. C., in reply.

Cur. adv. fills

Postea (February 20).

Judgment

F STEYN, HR: In the Witwatersrand Local Division is John Cave was acquitted on a charge of murdering
his wife. The record of the evidence is not presented this Court, but according to the verdict must be
accepted that the deceased committed suicide. The G conditions were summarized below: The
deceased was partially paralyzed and a manic depressive person. Her marriage to John Cave has a very
unhappy and tense stage and was close to breaking point. She gave him conjugal rights withheld, and
shortly before the incident he had an intimate relationship started with a widow with whom he also H to
the deceased's death married. On that particular day, his gun, the butt just behind the trigger were
pulled down by a friend, and at the insistence of the deceased, that he sent. In her presence, he
disassembled the gun to determine whether the two pieces glued together could be. To do this, he had
to remove the triggerguard. As a result, the trigger outside uncovered. The deceased have blamed him
for the fact that the gun was broken and wanted to know whether in that state could still shoot. In order
to show her that it was okay, he from a balcony, a shot was fired into the ground. Then an argument
about the

1970 (2) SA p359

STEYN HR

widow arise in the course of which the deceased furious angry and said that she herself shooting. John
Cave when a pattern elsewhere in the apartment to fetch the gun in her presence uploaded while on a
low couch sitting, and handed it to her with the words:

A 'kill yourself then if you want because you're a liability. "

She took the gun with one hand, between her feet placed on the floor, saying, "I will," her face turned so
that walking to her right eye showed, and the foot on the exposed trigger underfoot. She was almost
immediately killed.
 B. The trial court did S v Gordon, 1962 (4) SA 727 (N), and followed John Cave acquitted. The
motivation is evident from the following observations:

"The accused is normally only liable for his own actions and not the actions of someone else. In the
present case it was not his act to the loaded gun at the deceased handed that caused her death, but her
own C independent and voluntary act for the gun to fire. . . Where besides suicide is not a crime in our
law, can accretion or encouragement of suicide is not a crime because the wederregtelikheidselement
missing.

Following this ruling, and the Gordon case, the Minister in terms of art. 385 of the Criminal Procedure
Act 56 of 1955, the following questions to this Court for a ruling submitted:

D 1. Committing a person who encourages another, help or enable himself or herself to kill him, a
crime?

2 If so, what crime? "

To these questions can be answered, it is necessary first to determine whether suicide is a crime. In
Roman law it seems as such E punishable been. With reference even to a slave who himself was
wounded or killed, in Dig., 15.1.9.7, said that he may make his own body to do violence. A slave
according Dig., 29.5.1.22, as he punished, as he is able to do it, not prevent his master commit suicide,
but it is not F heads of complicity in his master's crime but from other considerations. He viz. also liable
if he did not someone else hinders his master to kill him not. Suicide was not without legal
consequences. Someone who, while he stands accused of a crime in which the death penalty or
deportation would follow, for fear of the charge committed suicide, has no heir. Its good to be
confiscated, not G because the act is not criminal, but because such a case is if the offender by his act of
guilt on the charge guilty. Confiscation is also limited to the case where the perpetrator to a crime of
such a nature that he was concerned his stuff on conviction would lose. Someone commit suicide in
fatigue life, because his suffering can not wear H out of shame for his debt or any other cause, he does
have an heir. However, he strikes without such a reason his hand to his life without the deed executed,
then he is liable because, as is said, he himself not spared, will be another much less reverence.
Whether it also applies to a defendant acting out of fear the aforementioned circumstances, is not clear.
(Dig., 21.1.43.4, 29.5.1.23, 48.21.3; 49.14.45.2). For a soldier apply a special arrangement. If he himself is
wounded or otherwise, death to the neck trying to catch up, then he, for the case that he was out

1970 (2) SA p360

STEYN HR

unbearable pain or distress, fatigue life, grief, rage or shame death chosen, not punished but shame
dismissed. In the absence of such an excuse, he is punished with death. (Dig., A 49.16.6.7). From the
case of incomplete suicide, or fails to suicide to prevent, among strafbedreiging stood, it seems, also
with a view to dealing with other cases said, that the punishment by declaring that suicide such as a
crime is not. The underlying motivation or reason shows no clear relationship with such a crime.
 B. The provisions of the Roman law in some respects to our old writers echo found, but suicide is a
much more serious light. Matthaeus, The Criminibus, 48.5.1.10 and 11, stressing that the Roman
approach under the influence of Stoic philosophy and stood in conflict with the Christian worldview. C
he rejected all excuses for suicide. Whoever, whether from awareness of an atrocity, insubordination
against the Creator or similar cause, with bedagte wickedness and deliberately put his hand to save
himself, he must think so Matthaeus, with the sword punished. However, he was by sudden grief or pain
or shame without forethought to the folly D driven, he must be punished softer. He came to die before
he can be punished, he must be a horde dragged his body or some other reproach done, so that others
in the shame of his bones of such an evil deed deterred. He praises the custom of his time to look at a
crotch hanging and later under the gallows to be buried. Not to punish or light punishment, would seem
to call for suicide.

E Damhouder, Practycke in Criminal Saken, Cap. 88, also refers to the habit of the body to shame, to do
whatever reason the suicide, and call in the same context the forfeiture of the deceased's property. He
continued:

"So who is it selven quetst with quaden sake, plug east, or too out disperatie which is punieren, as oft
he eenen others must be wounded hadde: F For naer straight Niemandt master and of being even
members force lichaem: For him selven not and able to conserve appropriate to wait many minutes he
soude eenen others können save, the force it selven quaedt hinderlyck is appropriate, he will be a
different quader much worse, force hinderlycker zyn.

The penalty incomplete suicide, he says that some say G that the death penalty should be, while others
have a lesser penalty advocates. The will of a suicide is null and void.

Van Leeuwen, Roman-Dutch Regt, 4:34:12, set the limits of criminality is much narrower. He is suicide
punishable H unless it appears that it intentionally, of evil committed, a crime ground, from grief and the
punishment to escape. The nature of the crime give ground he has no restrictive definition as in Roman
law occurs. The penalty is forfeiture of the deceased's property and the humiliation of his body. Those
who consider themselves 'short?' Without previous crime, only of grief and despair, is not punishable.
Of attempted suicide says he is not out.

Huber, Heedendaegse Right-Geleertheyt, 3/13/47, says only:

1970 (2) SA p361

STEYN HR

"Those involved Haer themselves to be neck are placed as not beyond his sentence has been zyn hair,
gemeinelyk be buried under the gallows, or reason praised, heimelyk put under."

Foot, 9.2.11, refer to the aforementioned comment in Dig., 15.1.9.7, A and adds that this does not prove
ownership of all his limbs did not. In 48.21 he deals specifically with suicide. Like Matthaeus rejects the
Roman consequences of the stoic philosophy, and also agree with him that someone put his hand to
save himself because of a guilty conscience, with the sword must be punished or at least an
extraordinary strict punishment. Motivating call B the reason he Dig., 48.21.3, above, viz. that if he
spared himself, he is another much less will walker. Someone, however, who took his own life trying to
bring life from fatigue, shame or inability to endure pain, not the usual punishment imposed. At a
completed suicide finding forfeiture of the deceased's good C not happen unless the act was committed
from guilty conscience for causes of a charge brought crime forfeiture would result. However, if the
heirs innocence of the crime proved, they may well retain. Although he dishonouring of the body,
except where the suicide to geesteskrankheid due, not reject it, he stated that the deceased in Holland
and Zeeland not an honorable burial is denied.

D Carpzovius, Practica Rerum Criminalium, 2:13 ET seq., Consider the reduction of their lives, from any
cause, except a heinous crime. What punishment is concerned, he distinguished between completed
and uncompleted suicide. As the former is concerned, the deceased, unless he says of fury, melancholy
or spiritual weakness acted, the ordinary earth order refused to get the look just to others recoil, a
treatment that a Funeral dogs called. Of forfeiture of property he makes no mention. As regards the
latter, the perpetrators not punished as he lives out F grief intolerable pain, despair, rage or similar
cause acted. In other cases, according to some he punished with death, according to others, with whom
the author rallies, with a lighter punishment.

According to Moorman, Papers on Crimes, 2.11.2, the earlier use of dishonoring the look and
confiscation of the property of a G suicide in his time mostly not followed. (Cf. Schorer, On the Great, I.
F. 01/02/44 n.33). All forfeitures of property under crime is in fact in 1732 by the State of Holland
abolished. (Schorer, cit 3:32:14 n.34). Moorman points out (2.11.4 and 5) that no master of his life or
even the limbs of his body is not H, and cites an instance where someone his sore toe cut off, a fine was
incurred. From this we can conclude that he is an injury to an unfinished suicide note as punishable
considered.

Van der Linden, in his Supplementum on foot, 9.2.11. Rejected as Foot in the later passage (48.21.) The
stoic approach to Roman law. He makes the statement that suicide is unlawful (illicita) and only in some
cases can be excused. For this he introduced a number of reasons of religious and moral nature, and
provide a range of exceptional cases, some of which, like those of

1970 (2) SA p362

STEYN HR

soldiers and others who in the course of their service life compromises, hardly a suicide could be
considered. Certain other cases he describes as doubtful. The obvious exceptions fall into a limited
scope: those with a definite expectation of death as A result of unbearable torture; persons their ship
and themselves along with the enemy to save the homeland destroyed; and lunatics. He mentions no
punishment and refers to the dishonoring of the body and the denial of heirs, ie confiscation of
property, as if it belongs to the past. In his later Koopmans Handbook, 2.5.14, he said the following:

B Clean the zelfsmoord ongetwyffeld eene unlawful act, however, should not zy under misdaaden, the
public be avenged penalty. According to the most ancient customs of this country were lyken of
zelfsmoorders on demanding a horde dragged suspended in an aim, and theirs goods forfeited; but
deeze habit is already very long obsolete. Alleenlyk be zy in silence, without Station to the earth
ordering.

C Van der Keessel, Praelectiones De Groot, 02.01.44, referring to the former customary Holland which
suicide premeditated, a delictum was punished with confiscation of property and by the looks of scorn
to do. In his time, he says, find it scarcely more general application. Forfeiture is viz. Holland D
completely abolished and all of the confusion that seems to be doing without it established that the
suicide awareness of an atrocity committed, is in Holland no examples. He adds, however, that it can not
be denied is that the public interest at all yet that such a great folly not totally committed with impunity
should be. This last comment seems nothing to the existing law to add, E, and the author also do not
seem any form of punishment in place should come from those who lapsed.

From the foregoing review it is limited enough that our common law gradually a more lenient attitude
toward suicide ingested. While suicide, initially at least, as crime in and always regarded as irregular, had
the F obvious impossibility of sentencing the offender to a completed act, inevitably over time impacted.
Confiscation of goods or denial of heirs, by its nature, innocent hit and is first abolished after it became
restricted G, as in the Roman law, suicide of remorse over a charge brought crime that would result in
forfeiture with the proviso, however, that heirs forfeiture was hindered by evidence that the deceased
was not guilty of the crime. Also dishonouring of the body, which is done as a deterrent to serve, fell
into disuse in H and van der Keessel time in Holland has only occasionally occurred at suicide awareness
guilty of a serious crime. It can be assumed, I think, that the development culminated that suicide, like
van der Linden argues, no longer under criminal offenses are not counted. What unfinished suicide is
concerned, it was claimed Matthaeus, Damhouder, Foot and Carpzovius be liable. From what
Damhouder said it is not clear whether it should be limited to injury or mutilation of the body. According
Carpzovius the kind of efforts that do most occur, viz. the sorrow of life, intolerable pain, despair, fury
and such

1970 (2) SA p363

STEYN HR

cause, excluded here. Decker, in his note on van Leeuwen, spigot, although he admits that it is not a
foregone conclusion is not that attempted suicide to the consequences of a crime to avoid, itself a
punishable crime, believes that it is one should therefore, for completed suicide one. He mentions only
this one category. A sample of the severed show Moorman repeats with suicide nothing to do. The
reason for any punishment that often mentioned, viz. that no master of his body and body part is not,
would be consistent with a common offense committed would also be where the injury or violation
suicide not been made. Van Leeuwen, van der Linden and van der Keessel makes no mention of B
attempt to suicide.

This development in this country that the outcome had been expected. Neither confiscation of property
nor dishonoring the looks here survived, and it is common cause that, apart from the single C case in
1781 stated in R v Peverett, 1940 AD 213 at p. 214, if, as far as is known, never a prosecution for
attempted suicide is not set. If such an effort by the Roman-Dutch law was in certain circumstances a
crime, then this is completely into disuse. It therefore appears that, although the question in the case D
Peverett left, at right in the Gordon case, supra, and in the instant case found that suicide is not a crime.

From the fact that neither suicide nor attempted suicide is a crime, it does not follow that the answer to
the first question asked should be negative. The person who encourages another, help or enable himself
to kill him, is busy with his own life or E body, but with those of another, and if he commits a crime,
must be judged according to the relevant principles of our criminal law. In the Gordon case and in the
present, the accused was acquitted on the grounds that the various acts that caused death, the
deceased's voluntary and independent 'F acts were. In each of these cases, the actions of the accused -
in one case the conclusion of a suicide agreement and the acquisition and delivery of the tablets, and in
the other case the loading of the gun and handed over to the attendant comment - have a place in the
events of the death of the deceased ended. The Court apparently however G assumed that the last act
of the deceased was a voluntary and independent 'act was as later acceding cause the causality of the
preceding events, so far as the accused's actions were involved could be decisive interrupted. The
accuracy of the findings in the particular circumstances of this case H, I do not have to go. It is not within
the scope of the questions that were submitted, and the records are in any case not before this Court. I
would not make a general statement that the last "free and independent" act of suicide always acquittal
of the accused must lead without reservation in respect of the autonomy of the act would endorse.

This fall viz. no doubt that another's act that the immediate cause of a result is not necessarily causation

1970 (2) SA p364

STEYN HR

of a perpetrator's actions or conduct interrupt or minimize. To such effect, that would be a completely
independent action must be in the sense of one who is totally unconnected and have no connection
with A not the act of the perpetrator; and it would not be the case where the act precisely the
contributory cause of the act, though the act in itself an innocent. Matthaeus, The Criminibus, 48.5.1,
name, eg., As sicarii including someone dolo malo false evidence that the accused of a capital crime B be
judged, and a magistrate who knowingly an innocent to death condemned. From these examples we can
conclude that the fact that the executioner's legal act is the immediate cause of death, did not affect the
causality or unlawfulness of the witness or the magistrate's actions.