CONFLICT AND COOPERATION

BETWEEN INDIA AND US OVER

NUCLEAR ISSUE
-BY: ARKAJA (508)
AND
SWEKSHA SINGH (1016)
- B.A. (HONS.) POLITICAL SCIENCE
ABSTRACT
The indo-US relationship has undergone a significant transformation. It is all because of
shift in the US nuclear policy towards India. The nuclear issue has always been a source
of tension between the two countries. The US move to conclude a civil nuclear agreement
with a non- nuclear state, was a surprise for many states. A change in the US nuclear
policy is seen as an opportunity for India to have access to advanced nuclear technology.
Our paper tries to analyze this journey of evolution of India-US relations over nuclear
issue. In this paper we have tried to analyze the background of indian nuclear program ,
how it started with the objective of peaceful use to its shift to weaponisation in the context
of growing regional threats faced by it. It highlights the tussle between India and US over
the nuclear issue, how despite being a proponent of nuclear disarmament, India refused
to sign NPT and CTBT and was pressurized by the US for the same. In post Pokhran- 1
and especially Pokhran-2 scenario, several sanctions in technological and economic field
were imposed on India by US and the tussle went on till 2005, which heralded a new era
in the Indo- US relationship in the wake of Indo- US civil nuclear deal.

BACKGROUND
From the early days of independence India took a stand against nuclear weapons and led
the front lines of the movement against nuclear disarmament. Indian leaders such as M.
K. Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru advocated for the promotion of world peace."But
Homie J Bhabha convinced India's first Prime Minister Nehru of the signal importance of
atomic energy research in enabling India to build an industrial base and to tackle the
overwhelming problems of entrenched poverty "(Beaton and Maddox 1962 as quoted in
Ganguly1999: 150). Nehru, a person of scientific temper was also convinced that nuclear
technology had a role to play in India's development. Initially, India's interest in nuclear
technology was restricted solely to its peaceful uses, such as the production of
inexpensive electricity." India's nuclear program, started at the Bhabha atomic research
centre in Trombay was based on the countries abundant natural thorium reserves"
(Creasman 2008 as quoted in Charnysh 2009: 1). Its foundation was laid by the US
Atoms for Peace Program, which aimed to encourage the civil use of nuclear
technologies in exchange for assurances that they would not be used for military
purposes. India's first reactor, the 1 Megawatt Apsara Research Reactor was built with
the help of Britain in 1955. In 1956, India acquired a CIRUS 40 MWt heavy-water
reactor from Canada. The United States agreed to supply heavy water for the project and
also assisted India in building and fueling the Tarapur reactors.

While India pursued a "peaceful nuclear program" in the 1950's , it revised its nuclear
policy in the phase of increasing regional threats in the form of 1962 border war with
china , the 1964 Chinese, nuclear explosion, and 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan. Thus
India's nuclear policy shifted from "peaceful" purposes to political and defense purposes
in the wake of Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, Chinese nuclear superiority and the latter's
support to Islamabad's nuclear development program. India conducted its first nuclear
test on May 18, 1974 in Pokhran, Rajasthan which Indian government described as a
"peaceful nuclear explosion". The international reaction to this test was mixed. The Non-
Aligned Movement member countries congratulated India for its technological
breakthrough, the United States, however, imposed sanctions to limit India's access to
nuclear material and technology. Upset over the use of Canada aided reactor in producing
plutonium for the explosion, Canada cut-off its aid to the Indian Nuclear program.

India- US tussles over NPT and CTBT

"It may be noted that India was one of the first countries to make a proposal for a nuclear
test ban treaty" (government of India 1988: as quoted by Seethi 2005: 107). "The
proposal at that time was quiet genuine and reflected the mood and sentiments of national
leadership on this question"(Seethi 2005:107). India even signed the Partial Test Ban
Treaty (PTBT) in 1963, which prohibited nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere, outer
space or under water but continued to permit them underground.

In 1968, the NPT (nuclear non- proliferation treaty) was introduced to further the cause
of nuclear proliferation. The treaty creates a distinction between the five nuclear weapon
states (P5- USA, France, Russia, United Kingdom, China) and the rest by restricting the
legal possession of nuclear weapons to those states that tested them before 1967. The
treaty has been signed by 189 countries, including the five legitimate nuclear weapon
states. Countries like Israel, India, and Pakistan have not signed the treaty. India found
NPT discriminatory and has argued that it creates a club of nuclear 'haves' and a large
group of nuclear 'have-nots'. Nuclear weapon states want to retain their weapons; they do
not want to stop their own production and testing but at the same time do not want to give
the same right to others. The United States justified this and argued that nuclear weapons
in the hands of 'rouge' states is greatest danger to the world. It should be retained in the
hands of 'responsible ' power to avoid a massive warfare. India did not accept this view.
M.C Chagla, then external affair minister said in Lok Sabha on may 31, 1967 that," the
big powers had the monopoly on nuclear weapons, under NPT they sought to retain their
monopoly on nuclear technology as well"(Shodhganga , US NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION POLICY AND POKHRAN-I:57 ). At the 18th national disarmament
committee ENDC held in February 1968, Indian representative Azim Husain detailed
how India treasured its autonomy and would not give that up under the provisions of any
treaty. Thenceforth for these reasons India remained outside the treaty and conducted its
first nuclear test in 1974. India's justification for the test was that it was for peaceful
purposes, as allowed by the NPT. However, the world established the nuclear suppliers
group NSG to regulate and restrict the export of nuclear materials and technology to NPT
signatories only.

In the backdrop of the disintegration of Soviet Union and other east European countries
the proposal for the test ban treaty was revived. "The nuclear weapon powers then began
negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty, which they had opposed for more than
four decades. It was in this context that India and the US co-sponsored a resolution to this
effect in the UN during 1993-94"( Seethi 2005 :108). However India had apparently
made it clear to the US officials that it will not compromise with its national security
interest neither would succumb to any external pressure. Despite promoting a test ban
treaty for decades, in September 1996 India voted against the UN general assembly
resolution endorsing the CTBT. India argued that the CTBT was discriminatory and
unequal as it would prohibit countries like India to develop the technological capabilities
which the advanced nuclear weapon powers already possessed. "The arguments relating
to the 'discriminatory' clauses of the CTBT further stressed that the treaty was not
'comprehensive' enough to prohibit subcritical or zero yield test and computer stimulation
processes which would lead to fourth generation nuclear weapons"(Government of India
1996 as quoted by Seethi 2005:111). Another major argument against the CTBT was that
it would seriously interfere with the sovereignty of the Indian state.

On May 11, 1998, India exploded three nuclear devices in Pokhran. Two days later on 13
may 1998, India tested two more nuclear weapons. In this context, Vajpayee cited" a
hypocritical international community that itself possessed nuclear weapons but which
was pushing regimes such as the permanent extension of the NPT and CTBT to
prevent India from acquiring it"( Vajpayee 1998 as cited by Narang 2015). India was the
first new state to openly test nuclear weapons in 34 years. Indian nuclear tests seem as a
major setback to the nuclear non proliferation policy. These nuclear tests resulted in a
variety of sanctions against India by a number of major states, including Japan and the
United States. Although France and Russia were little sympathetic towards India, they
could not stand in the way of the United States creation of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1172 on 11 June, 1998. Between1998-2000, Strobe Talbott and
Jaswant Singh went for more than a dozen rounds of talks. "Strobe Talbott then US
deputy secretary of state said US was looking for indian compliance with 5 benchmarks
derived from the UNSC resolution 1172; these were signing on to the CTBT, joining the
negotiations on the FMCT, tightening indian controls over the export of sensitive
technologies and commodities, adopting non- threatening nuclear weapons posture and
lessening indo-Pakistan tensions through dialogues" (Rajamohan 2003: 91-92). In
compliance with the non proliferation law, the United States imposed economic sanctions
on India. "The sanctions on India consisted of cutting off all assistance to India except
humanitarian aid, barring the export of certain defense and technology material, ending
American credit and credit guarantees to India, and requiring the US to oppose lending
by international financial institutions to India"(CNN, 1998
http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/13/india.us/ ). Nuclear dual use technology
already stood suspended since 1974.

It was a setback for president Bill Clinton, who worked very hard for non proliferation of
nuclear weapons and missile development. He criticized India's decision to conduct
nuclear tests and emphasized that Indian government put itself at odds with the
international community over the nuclear issue. "The Clinton's administration mantra was
to 'cap, rollback and eliminate' India's nuclear weapons program" (Sikri 2009: 174). He
urged India to refrain from its nuclear program. The United States made an unsuccessful
attempt of holding talks regarding the rollback of India's nuclear program. Washington
was willing to ease its sanctions in return for India's acceptance of limits on its nuclear
program. India on the other hand declared that" it was interested only in a minimum
credible deterrent that would be guided by a no-first-use policy"(Rajamohan 2003:92) .

Towards India- US nuclear Cooperation

A drastic change was visible in the US foreign policy towards India during the Bush
Administration which desired to transform US- India relations and develop a strong
strategic partnership with India. The post Pokhran -2 sanctions, preceded by a long -
standing US denial of dual use nuclear and space technology to India were the major
irritant in the US-India relations in India's view. While India pressed for the removal of
these sanctions, "there was fierce resistance from the non-proliferation 'ayatollahs' on the
American side who perceived India's demands as a threat to the global non-proliferation
regime"(Mansingh 2009). Most of the critics reflected the biases and prejudices which
prevailed within America towards India during the Cold War. Sumit Ganguly, described
them as the 'ghosts from the past (who) still lurk in the dark corridors in
Washington'(Ganguly as cited by Mansingh 2009). The post 1998 sanctions on India
were lifted after September 11 2001, when they were simultaneously "lifted on Pakistan
as well because of changed geo-political concerns. At the end of the first administration
of bush very little progress was achieved"(Mistry 2006:681). A joint statement was
issued by Vajpayee and Bush in January 2004 under the title 'Next Steps In the Strategic
Partnership' (NSSP) which was intended to increase cooperation in civil nuclear activities
civilian space programs, high technology trade and missile defense. "The united states
removed the indian space research organization (ISRO) from its entity list (a list of
organizations to whom technology transfer was restricted ), and subsequently cased
licensing requirements for exporting low level, dual use items to ISRO
subordinates"( Mistry 2006: 681-682). However little progress was made and talks were
carried on to the next stage.

2005 India-US Nuclear Deal

"India and US engaged in serious nuclear diplomacy only in early 2005, after George
bush started his second term as president, with a new team in the state department,
headed by Condoleezza Rice"(Mansingh 2009). He was as determined as before to secure
a strategic partnership with India. Unlike his predecessors, Bush demonstrated a strong
desire to transform relations with India to counter geo-political challenges in 21st
century. The US strategic interest was to be achieved with a militarily and economically
strong India. The US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice visited India in March 2005 to
start a new era in the Indo-US relationship. The Bush administration saw India as an
emerging global power which could be trusted with the nuclear technology. It was
asserted that the United States will support India in its rise as a global power.

"Intense negotiations since then produced three major bilateral nuclear agreements -
the Joint Statement of July 18 2005, the announcement of a separation plan on march 2
2006 and the 123 agreement which was concluded in the summer of 2007"( Mansingh
2009). In the July 2005 agreement, the United States took two important steps, according
to Dinshaw Mistry (2006):

 First, without giving India formal status as a nuclear weapons state,

Washington nonetheless acknowledged that "[a]s a responsible state with
advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and
advantages as other such states"(Kessler 2006 as cited in Mistry 2006:
683).
  Second, and more substantively, the Bush administration agreed to assist
India in obtaining civil nuclear technology by, impart, seeking "agreement
from congress to adjust US laws and policies "(Joint Statement between
president George W. Bush and prime minister Manmohan Singh as cited
in Mistry 2006: 683) to help facilitate technology transfers and
cooperation.
 In addition, the Bush Administration stated that the " United States will
work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full
civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India"(Joint Statement
between president George W. Bush and prime minister Manmohan Singh
as cited in Mistry 2006: 683).

"In return, India undertook to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and place
the civilian component under international safeguards. It also agreed to maintain a
moratorium on nuclear testing that thwarted it from testing powerful thermonuclear
devices. It further agreed to support talks on the Fissile Material Treaty- a treaty that
would effectively cap the growth of India's nuclear arsenal. Finally, India agreed to
adhere to international guidelines controlling the export of nuclear and missile
technology"(Mistry 2006 : 683-684).

The July 2005 agreement was a watershed in the history of indo-US relation as US set
aside its longstanding nuclear policy and abandoned more than 30 years long ban on
nuclear trade with India. This agreement is unique in its type because India is a non
signatory of NPT and the US law prohibits agreement with any country that does not
follow IAEA (International atomic energy agency) guidelines. India became the first
country with which US signed such kind of agreement. President Bush went far ahead
despite criticisms within its country.

US helped India in getting India specific waiver from IAEA and NSG. Wih the help of
US, India specific safeguards was negotiated with the IAEA." Under these safeguards, of
the listed 22 reactors India has (existing or under construction), 14 are to be under
international safeguards and the other 8 are off limits (this includes the
breeders)"(Ghoshroy 2006 as cited by Nayudu 2009). The US had to persuade the NSG
to amend its guidelines and this made India an exception to it. US drafted the proposal for
amending NSG guidelines and placed before it in august 2008. Six member countries
Austria, Ireland, New Zealand, Netherland, Norway and Switzerland stated their
dissatisfaction over this proposal. The US then presented a revised proposal and Mr.
Bush personally urged the leader of dissenting countries to drop their objection. On 5
September, 2008 the NSG lifted its ban on the nuclear commerce with India. This move
will allow India to resume civil nuclear cooperation with the world (despite being a non
signatory of NPT and CTBT), something the NSG guidelines have barred since 1992.

Following the July 2005 indo-US Joint Statement in Washington, then Indian
prime minister Dr. Manmohan Singh was severely criticized back, at home. In India the
nuclear deal faced scathing attacks from the opposition BJP and the NDA government's
coalition partners- the communists. His government was at stake and Manmohan Singh
had to seek a vote of confidence in parliament which he won with a small margin .On the
American side, president Bush did not have an easy time either. Facing domestic
problems and globally criticized for waging war in Iraq, his popularity was dropping to
historic lows. "And yet he stubbornly pushed for the nuclear deal with India, piloting the
Hyde Act and the congressional approval of the 123 Agreement with an impressive
bipartisan majority"(Mansingh 2009). The US congress on 1 September 2008 gave final
approval to an agreement facilitating nuclear cooperation between the India and the US.

Apart from India's access to global nuclear trade, there are several significant
achievements, which were eventually agreed to the NSG. According to Mansingh(2009):

 First, although India offered to keep its civilian nuclear facilities under safeguards
but its military nuclear assets remained fully secured against any kind of
interference.
 India put forward its right to receive uninterrupted nuclear fuel supplies.
 India has the right to acquire advanced nuclear technologies and enter into
negotiations bilaterally with the US and other suppliers.
 India still has the right to test a nuclear device both domestically and abroad.

2015: the culmination of indo-us civil nuclear

deal

The India -US civil nuclear cooperation starting with the July 18, 2005 nuclear
agreement and culminating in the formal 123 agreement bill approved by the US
congress on September 28 2008, failed to be materialized till 2015. Prime
Minister Narendra Modi discussed this deadlock during his visit to Washington in
September 2014. "Under direct guidance from the top leadership, the Contact
Group, consisting of US and Indian government officials and nuclear industry
representatives met thrice and hammered out an agreement before Obama's
republic day visit to clear two key hurdles preventing the building of US Nuclear
power plants in India."(Sidhu, The Indian Express, January 29, 2015). Along
with the nuclear cooperation with India, the US was also expecting huge
economic opportunities. This was an opportunity which could open new business
for US nuclear companies.
There were basically two major points of this nuclear deal- administration
tracking, which means tracking and accounting for all the nuclear materials that
are supplied by the US and the requirement that India was reluctant to accept as it
went beyond the IAEA and certain other norms of India's nuclear liability law.
"India's Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (CLND) Act of 2010 appears to allow
lawsuits to be brought against suppliers for nuclear reactor accidents, which the
US government and US private companies regard as inconsistent with existing
international norms- particularly the Convention for Supplementary
Compensation for Nuclear Damage- that channel liability to nuclear plant
operators." (Sidhu, The Indian Express; January 29, 2015).
"It now appears that the US has moderated its demand and will be satisfied with
IAEA safeguards, in turn the indian side has explained its plan to set up an
insurance pool amounting to Rs. 1500 crore, half of which will be contributed by
the suppliers and the operator and the balance, by the general insurance
cooperation of India (GIC) and four other insurance companies." (Sood, The
Hindu: 27 January, 2015).
An assurance has been made from the Indian side that they would provide a legal
memorandum - a clarification of key provisions of the liability law, which the
Indian government interprets will not place the suppliers in jeopardy.

CONCLUSION
To sum up, it can be concluded that both nations have come up a long way from
chill to warmth in their relations particularly in the context of nuclear issue. The
US stand towards India has changed from staunch defiance towards India's
nuclear policy to extending the hands for friendship in the form of Civil Nuclear
Agreement and helping India in developing its civil nuclear capabilities. The 2005
India-us nuclear deal has heralded a new era in the indo-us relations. "There is a
need to develop an innovative agenda in certain prospects like energy, space and
science. For both India and US diversification is the major instrument for energy
security. So in addition to civil nuclear co-operation, both the countries are
working together across a portfolio of energy options like clean solutions"(Blake
Jr 2011 http://m.state.gov/md163312.htm). There is also a need for both the
countries to work together to ensure regional stability and world peace. Both the
countries are engaged in extensive bilateral talks and there is much to be done at
the planning level. The US is interested in working with India and the members of
the South-east Asia to discuss the concerning security and strategic issues and
better Asia-Pacific cooperation.
Both India and US have done a lot together, but the relationship is still
developing. We will have to continue to work for better cooperation in the future.

REFERENCES:
 Beaton, Leonard and John Maddox, "The spread of nuclear
weapon", 1962 as quoted in Sumit Ganguly, India's Pathway to
Pokhran II: The prospects and sources of New Delhi's nuclear
weapons program(1999), p.150

 Creasman, David "the evolution of India's nuclear program:

implications for the US, "monograph, may 2008, school of
advanced military studies, in India's Nuclear Program by Volha
Charnysh,(2009), p.1

 Mistry, Dinshaw(2006) Diplomacy, Domestic Politics, and the

U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement, p.681-684

 Narang, Vipin "India's nuclear weapons' policy" in Sumit

Ganguly(eds.), Engaging the World: India's Foreign Policy since
1947(2015)

 Rajamohan, C (2003) Crossing the Rubicon, The shaping of India's

New Foreign Policy, p.91-92

 Seethi, K M(2005), India's CTBT Policy : from 'text' to ' testing

times' in Rajen Harshe and K M Seethi(eds.), Engaging with the
World: Critical Reflections on India's Foreign Policy, New Delhi:
Orient Longman, p.107-108, 111

 Sidhu, W.P.S., "The big deal" in The Indian Express; January 29,
2015

 Sikri, Rajiv (2009) challenge and strategy: Rethinking India's

foreign policy, p. 174

 Sood, Rakesh, " A visit and outcomes in superlatives" in The

Hindu, 27 January, 2015
 Online resources
 Blake Jr, Robert O; May 13, 2011 "the current state of US India
cooperation and prospects for the future in
http://m.state.gov/md163312.htm accessed on March 7, 2016

 Chagla, M.C cited in Shodhganga, chapter 2 "US NUCLEAR

NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY AND POKHRAN-I", p.57

 CNN, "U.S. imposes sanctions on India"(1998)

http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/13/india.us/ accessed
on March 7, 2016

 Mansingh, Lalit in Indo-US Nuclear Dual: Seeking Synergy in

Bilateralism, edited by P.R. Chari(2009)
https://books.google.co.in/books?
id=Yox7AwAAQBAJ&pg=PT145&lpg=PT145&dq=the+indo-
us+nuclear+deal+in+the+context+of+indian+foreign+policy+lalit+
mansingh&source=bl&ots=Irt-
R4JzkW&sig=pCBCEfrAo9pykivY3M-
9tQDRca0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiE2J6WssDLAhVTA44
KHe8kDGoQ6AEILzAE#v=onepage&q=the%20indo-us
%20nuclear%20deal%20in%20the%20context%20of%20indian
%20foreign%20policy%20lalit%20mansingh&f=false , accessed
on March 15, 2016

 Nayudu, Swapna Kona in Indo-US Nuclear Dual: Seeking Synergy

in Bilateralism, edited by P.R. Chari(2009)
https://books.google.co.in/books?
id=Yox7AwAAQBAJ&pg=PT134&lpg=PT134&dq=the+indo-
US+nuclear+deal+and+the+non-
proliferation+debate&source=bl&ots=Irt-
K5IuiR&sig=Y2dHNzom8thnxe_btsR3SwcGbJk&hl=en&sa=X&
ved=0ahUKEwiDuMiFoqzLAhVTBY4KHTnWBPsQ6AEIIzAH#
v=onepage&q=the%20indo-US%20nuclear%20deal%20and
%20the%20non-proliferation%20debate&f=false accessed on
March 15, 2016