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Zurabishvili 10610154.2004.11068612
Zurabishvili 10610154.2004.11068612
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Today, more than ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Georgia is not able to boast of any significant progress in the
economy, or the quality of life, or the development of the system
of social security. The following are characteristic of the country:
a low level of development of industry and, as a result, an ex-
tremely high percentage of unemployment; huge foreign debt;
dependency on imported sources of energy; and widespread cor-
ruption. Only to a very small degree can the country’s present-day
problems be linked to the ethnic conflicts that paralyzed its
economy in the early 1990s.
As in the case of the majority of the other post–Soviet repub-
lics, there are substantial differences in Georgia between the state
of affairs in the capital city and out in the regions: economic activ-
ity is disproportionately concentrated in Tbilisi, while the regions
are in a position of relative deprivation.
According to numerous expert appraisals, and corroborated by
the local mass media, the population of Georgia is in an extremely
difficult situation. It suffers from serious economic problems, as
well as hardships that disrupt everyday life, such as constant elec-
English translation © 2004 M.E. Sharpe, Inc., from the Russian text © 2003 the
Russian Center for Public Opinion Research (VTsIOM), the Interdisciplinary
Academic Center for the Social Sciences (InterCenter), and the Academy of the
National Economy (ANE). “Gruziia: nepreodolennyi paternalizm,” Monitoring
obshchestvennogo mneniia: Ekonomicheskie i sotsial’nye peremeny, 2003,
no. 4, pp. 39–43. A publication of VTsIOM, InterCenter, and ANE.
87
88 SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH
tricity and gas outages and disrupted water supply. In spite of the
predominance of such appraisals, over the past ten years in Geor-
gia there have be very few focused studies of the social condition
of the population, especially in the regions.
In designing this study,1 we were concerned most of all to ob-
tain reliable information about whether the predominant mood of
the population really is helplessness and hopelessness. In addi-
tion, our questionnaire included a number of items from a VTsIOM
Monitoring that made it possible to study the population’s assess-
ment of the changes that have taken place in the country over the
last ten years. Finally, it was of special concern to us to trace the
character of relations between the state and its citizens, what ex-
pectations are linked to the state, and how reasonable it is to speak
of the prospects of the formation of a civil society in Georgia.
Table 1
Have You and Your Family Adapted to the Changes That Have Taken
Place in Georgia Since 1991? (% of respondents in each age group;
2003; not counting those who found it difficult to answer)
18 to 25 63 12 17
26 to 35 52 16 30
36 to 45 49 21 28
46 to 55 49 13 33
56 to 65 32 — 60
66 and older 28 — 51
Total 47 15 32
Table 2
%
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Unemployment The Delayed The industrial Corruption Narcotics Pankisi Gorge The energy The crime The ecology
economic payment of crisis abuse crisis situation situation
crisis salaries, wages,
and pensions
Table 3
Of inhabitants Of inhabitants
Answer option Of your family of Telavskii Raion of Georgia
Very good 1 0 1
Good 11 5 6
Average 57 50 39
Poor 22 32 35
Very poor 9 8 16
%
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1990
The present time
In ten years
Figure 2. What rung are you on now? Where were you in 1990? Where
will you be in ten years? (% of respondents; 2003).
%
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Will get Nothing will Will get I find it
better change worse difficult to
answer
In a year In ten years
Figure 3. Will the situation get better, get worse, or not change? (% of
respondents; 2003).
The paternalism that was inherent not only to the Soviet era but
also to earlier stages of history of the country persists firmly in
Georgia. This is often viewed as one of the bases of people’s resis-
tance toward democracy and the institutions of a civil society.4
The biggest influence on the lives of the population, in the opinion
of respondents, is exerted by the bodies of ruling authority, the
government, the parliament, and bodies of local government (22
percent, 16 percent, and 15 percent, respectively).
Such an exaggerated notion of the level of influence of the bod-
ies of ruling authority leads to a paralysis of civic life. The popu-
lation delegates to the state the job of solving all urgent problems,
and seeing the state’s inability or lack of desire to solve the prob-
lems, they burst out with embittered and implacable criticism
against the state, considering it to be the source of all their misfor-
tunes. It is the government and, as the respondents very often
specify, President E[duard] Shevardnadze personally, who is to be
blame for the spread of corruption in the country, tension in the
Pankisi Gorge, and the lack of protection for the country’s natural
NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 2004 95
Table 4
Other
Appropriate (the mass
government media, I find it
Population, structures, nongovernment difficult
Age group citizens The state the president organizations) to answer
25 or below 25 28 28 15 4
26 to 35 27 37 22 7 7
36 to 45 17 52 22 7 2
46 to 55 18 40 21 20 1
56 to 65 23 45 27 5 —
66 and older 3 49 37 11 —
Total 20 41 25 11 3
resources. At the same time, however, people are 2.5 times more
likely to expect the government specifically, and in particular the
president, to defend their rights and freedoms, rather than any other
institutions of a civil society; very often they do not see any possi-
bility of themselves taking part in and bearing responsibility for
these things. The most independent portion of the population are
the young people, although even among them the percentage of
those who delegate to the state the job of protecting their rights
exceeds by more than twice the percentage of those who rely only
on their own powers in this regard (see Table 4). On the average
this ratio in the sample stands at 3.3 : 1; among the oldest respon-
dents the ratio is almost 29 : 1.
Among the population there is a very low level of knowledge-
ability about the rights of the individual; there is a very high per-
centage of respondents who had a hard time answering the relevant
questions. The respondents were unable to name not only the or-
ganizations that fight for human rights, which is an indication of
their lack of knowledge of the mechanisms necessary to defend
their rights, but also the actual rights that they do possess and, in
particular, the rights that they consider to be the most important to
themselves. The rights mentioned the most often were the rights
96 SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH
Notes
1. The first phase of this survey was carried out in April of 2002; the second
was carried out in April 2003 by the Center for Sociological Research at Telavi
State University. The number of respondents who were surveyed was 332 and
359, respectively, representing the urban and rural population of Telavskii Raion.
The results were weighted according to sex.
2. The data for Russia were taken for March 2002 (Monitoring
obshchestvennogo mneniia: Ekonomicheskie i sotsial’nye peremeny, 2002, no.
3) and May 2003.
3. In 2001 a survey was carried out in the city of Telavi that was smaller in its
coverage (N = 153 respondents). In contrast to the surveys of 2002 and 2003,
when the corresponding question was given in open form, in 2001 the respon-
dents were given a card with possible answer options.
4. See M. Chitashvili. “Social Changes and Values: Internal Resistance to
Democracy” [Sotsial’nye izmeneniia i tsennosti: Vnutreniaia rezistentnost’
demokratii], in Processes of Post-Soviet Transformation in Georgia [Protsessy
postsovetskoi transformatsii v Gruzii] (Telavi: SER, 2002) (in Georgian).
To order reprints, call 1-800-352-2210; outside the United States, call 717-632-3535.