21M1 - ENGLISH

CONTEMPORARY
WORLD

Angela Saligumba
Navares Christian Paul
Hamzah Jussein T. Imam

Treaty of Westphalia 1648

The Peace of Westphalia was a series of peace treaties signed between May and October 1648 in
the Westphalian cities of Osnabrück and Münster. The treaties ended the Thirty Years’ War
(1618–1648) in the Holy Roman Empire and the Eighty Years’ War (1568–1648) between Spain
and the Dutch Republic, with Spain formally recognizing the independence of the Dutch
Republic. The peace negotiations involved a total of 109 delegations representing European
powers. The treaties did not restore peace throughout Europe, but they did create a basis for
national self-determination.
Background: Wars In Europe
Two destructive wars were the major triggers behind signing the eventual Peace of
Westphalia: the Thirty Years’ War in the Holy Roman Empire and the Eighty Years’ War between
Spain and the Dutch Republic.
The Thirty Years’ War was a series of wars in Central Europe between 1618 and 1648.
Initially a war between various Protestant and Catholic states in the fragmented Holy Roman
Empire, it gradually developed into a more general conflict involving most of the great powers.
The war began when the newly elected Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand II, tried to impose
religious uniformity on his domains, forcing Roman Catholicism on its peoples. The northern
Protestant states, angered by the violation of their rights to choose granted in the Peace of
Augsburg, banded together to form the Protestant Union.
These events caused widespread fears throughout northern and Central Europe, and
triggered the Protestant Bohemians living in the dominion of Habsburg Austria to revolt against
their nominal ruler, Ferdinand II. They ousted the Habsburgs and instead elected Frederick V,
Elector of Palatinate, as their monarch. Frederick took the offer without the support of the union.
The southern states, mainly Roman Catholic, were angered by this. Led by Bavaria, these states
formed the Catholic League to expel Frederick in support of the emperor.
The war became less about religion and more of a continuation of the France–Habsburg
rivalry for European political preeminence. Sweden, a major military power in the day,
intervened in 1630 under the great general Gustavus Adolphus and started the full-scale great
war on the continent. Spain, wishing to finally crush the Dutch rebels in the Netherlands and the
Dutch Republic, intervened under the pretext of helping their dynastic Habsburg ally, Austria. No
longer able to tolerate the encirclement of two major Habsburg powers on its borders, Catholic
France entered the coalition on the side of the Protestants to counter the Habsburgs.
The Thirty Years’ War devastated entire regions, with famine and disease significantly
decreasing the populations of the German and Italian states, the Crown of Bohemia, and the
Southern Netherlands. The war altered the previous political order of European powers. The rise
of Bourbon France, the curtailing of Habsburg ambition, and the ascendancy of Sweden as a
great power created a new balance of power on the continent, with France emerging from the war
strengthened and increasingly dominant in the latter part of the 17th century.
The Eighty Years’ War or Dutch War of Independence (1568–1648) was a revolt of the
Seventeen Provinces against the political and religious hegemony of Philip II of Spain, the
sovereign of the Habsburg Netherlands. After the initial stages, Philip II deployed his armies and
regained control over most of the rebelling provinces. However, under the leadership of the
exiled William the Silent, the northern provinces continued their resistance. They were
eventually able to oust the Habsburg armies, and in 1581 they established the Republic of the
Seven United Netherlands. The war continued in other areas, although the heartland of the
republic was no longer threatened. After a twelve-year truce, hostilities broke out again around
1619, which coincided with the Thirty Years’ War.

The Peace Of Westphalia

Since Lutheran Sweden preferred Osnabrück as a conference venue, its peace negotiations
with the Holy Roman Empire, including the allies of both sides, took place in Osnabrück. The
empire and its opponent France, including the allies of each, as well as the Republic of the Seven
United Netherlands and its opponent Spain (and their respective allies), negotiated in Münster.
The peace negotiations had no exact beginning and ending, because the participating total of 109
delegations never met in a plenary session, but arrived between 1643 and 1646 and left between
1647 and 1649.

According to the Peace of Westphalia, all parties would recognize the Peace of Augsburg of
1555, in which each prince would have the right to determine the religion of his own state (the
principle of cuius regio, eius religio). Christians living in principalities where their denomination
was not the established church were guaranteed the right to practice their faith in public during
allotted hours and in private at their will. The delegates also recognized the exclusive sovereignty
of each party over its lands, people, and agents abroad, and responsibility for the warlike acts of
any of its citizens or agents.
Multiple territorial adjustments were also decided. Among the most important ones was the
recognition of the independence of Switzerland from the Holy Roman Empire and the expansion
of the territories of France, Sweden, and Brandenburg-Prussia (later Prussia). The independence
of the city of Bremen was clarified. Also, barriers to trade and commerce erected during the war
were abolished, and “a degree” of free navigation was guaranteed on the Rhine.

Legacy
The Peace of Westphalia established the precedent of peace reached by diplomatic congress
and a new system of political order in Europe based upon the concept of co-existing sovereign
states. Inter-state aggression was to be held in check by a balance of power. A norm was
established against interference in another state’s domestic affairs, known as the principle of
Westphalian sovereignty. This principle of international law presumes that each state has
sovereignty over its territory and domestic affairs, to the exclusion of all external powers, on the
principle of non-interference in another country’s domestic affairs, and that each state (no matter
how large or small) is equal in international law. As European influence spread across the globe,
these Westphalian principles, especially the concept of sovereign states, became central to
international law and to the prevailing world order. However, the European colonization of Asia
and Africa in the 19th century and two global wars in the 20th century dramatically undermined
the principles established in Westphalia.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, power was seen as unipolar with the United States in
absolute control, though nuclear proliferation and the rise of Japan, the European Union, the
Middle East, China, and a resurgent Russia have begun to recreate a multipolar political
environment. Instead of a traditional balance of power, inter-state aggression may now be
checked by the preponderance of power, a sharp contrast to the Westphalian principle.

International Criminal Court (ICC)

The Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was adopted, in Rome on 17 July 1998
as the result of an international diplomatic conference organized under the aegis of the United
Nations (UN). The Rome Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002 following its ratification by
60 States. The Court has its seat in The Hague in the Netherlands and started functioning in
March 2003 when the Prosecutor, judges, and registrar were appointed.
As of October 2023, 124 States have ratified the Rome Statute. However, two countries have
withdrawn from the ICC: Burundi (withdrawal effective on October 2017) and the Philippines
(withdrawal effective on 17 March 2019), while two others had notified of their decision to
withdraw but later revoked it: South Africa (notification made on 19 October 2016 and revoked
on 7 March 2017) and The Gambia (notification made on 10 November 2016 and revoked on 10
February 2017).
The ICC is the first permanent international criminal tribunal having jurisdiction over
individuals accused of the crime of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime
of aggression (art. 5 of the Rome Statute). The ICC should not be confused with the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), which was created by the UN Charter in 1945 to adjudicate on legal
disputes between States and is also based in The Hague.
The idea of establishing a permanent international criminal court was first considered after the
Nuremberg trials held under the International Military Tribunal (IMT) established after the
Second World War in 1945 but States failed to agree until 1998.
The Rome Statute was adopted with the aim of filling the gap left since the Second World War
in the international community’s ability to prosecute and punish the perpetrators of the most
serious crimes. It builds on the experience of the two ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals
established by the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions to prosecute crimes committed in
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (operational from 1993 through 2017) and in Rwanda (ICTR)
(operational from 1994 through 2015).
However, contrary to the ICTY’s and ICTR’s jurisdictions, the ICC does not have primacy over
national criminal jurisdictions but rather is complementary to domestic prosecution. The ICC can
initiate proceedings only if the State in question is “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out
the investigation or prosecution” (art. 17 of the Rome Statute). This means that if a national legal
entity is carrying out such proceedings, the ICC may not act unless it can prove that the
proceedings are not being carried out in good faith (explained further in Section IV). The aim of
this approach is to incentivise States to carry out their own prosecutions whenever possible.
The jurisdiction of the ICC over these crimes remains subordinated to the condition of State
consent through a ratification process and special conditions depending on the nature of crime.
Whether a case involves genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity, the Court can only
investigate the crimes if either the State of nationality of the person accused or the State on
whose territory the crime was committed has accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction (art. 12 of the Rome
Statute). The absence of any reference to the State of nationality of the victim or of the State
where the accused is located has limited the Court’s ability to investigate situations of non-
international armed conflicts since the State of nationality of the accused and the State where the
crime was committed are the same.
With respect to the crime of aggression, the ICC’s theoretical jurisdiction has only been effective
since 17 July 2018, and the entry into force of the relevant amendments to the Rome Statute.
However, the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression remains optional for States Parties
and is subject to restrictive conditions that differ from those applicable to the Court’s jurisdiction
over other international crimes.
The UNSC has a high degree of authority over the jurisdiction of the ICC. It is the only body
that can bypass the requirement of State consent, as it can impose ICC jurisdiction on any State,
provided that none of its five permanent members vetoes the decision. The UNSC can also defer
or prohibit the commencement or continuation of an investigation or prosecution for one year,
which can be extended indefinitely (art. 16 of the Rome Statute). The special privileges granted
by the Rome Statute to the UNSC reflect the hybrid nature of the ICC as an independent judicial
body on the one hand and as an instrument of international conflict management on the other.
This has led to uncomfortable and confusing situations of selective enforcement of international
justice. The politicisation of the initial referral of a case can be exacerbated by the Prosecutor’s
dependence on evidence provided by States. But it can also be mitigated by the judges who
require strict adherence to due process and high standards of evidence in the investigation and
prosecution phases, even if this leads to the acquittal of suspects.
Despite these constraints, the ICC represents a step forward in the consolidation and
implementation of international criminal law. It is an important step towards unifying the
definition of international crimes and bringing together the world’s diverse legal systems and
standards of criminal investigation, fair trial and due process. By promoting complementarity of
jurisdiction between the ICC and national courts over commonly defined international crimes, it
also strengthened the application of the principle of universal jurisdiction, which allows national
courts to prosecute perpetrators of mass crimes committed abroad. The number of countries that
have ratified the Rome Statute has disproved the pessimists’ predictions. It shows that the ICC is
seen as a protective instrument for those numerous countries that cannot rely on their super
military power.
The structure and organization of the ICC reflects its mixed international and judicial nature
and defines the role of the various organs and their respective powers in the concrete exercise of
the ICC’s jurisdiction over the different situations and types of crimes. The relationship between
States and the ICC is reflected and is complemented for the first time by the special status
accorded to victims and witnesses including the recognition of victims’ right to reparation.
Throughout its 20 years of existence, the ICC Prosecutor and Judges have navigated between the
limitations of the Rome Statute and the expectations of victims. This is reflected both in the
number of situations and cases brought before the ICC, but also in the many challenges and
shortcomings associated with their investigation or adjudication by the ICC. Despite the failures
and frustrations, the work of the ICC is contributing to the emergence of international
jurisprudence, consolidating the learning process of international criminal justice in relation to
mass crimes and disseminating common standards at the national level.
The Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was adopted, in Rome on 17 July 1998
as the result of an international diplomatic conference organized under the aegis of the United
Nations (UN). The Rome Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002 following its ratification by
60 States. The Court has its seat in The Hague in the Netherlands and started functioning in
March 2003 when the Prosecutor, judges, and registrar were appointed.

As of October 2023, 124 States have ratified the Rome Statute. However, two countries have
withdrawn from the ICC: Burundi (withdrawal effective on October 2017) and the Philippines
(withdrawal effective on 17 March 2019), while two others had notified of their decision to
withdraw but later revoked it: South Africa (notification made on 19 October 2016 and revoked
on 7 March 2017) and The Gambia (notification made on 10 November 2016 and revoked on 10
February 2017).
The ICC is the first permanent international criminal tribunal having jurisdiction over
individuals accused of the crime of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime
of aggression (art. 5 of the Rome Statute). The ICC should not be confused with the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), which was created by the UN Charter in 1945 to adjudicate on legal
disputes between States and is also based in The Hague.
The idea of establishing a permanent international criminal court was first considered after the
Nuremberg trials held under the International Military Tribunal (IMT) established after the
Second World War in 1945 but States failed to agree until 1998.
The Rome Statute was adopted with the aim of filling the gap left since the Second World War
in the international community’s ability to prosecute and punish the perpetrators of the most
serious crimes. It builds on the experience of the two ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals
established by the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions to prosecute crimes committed in
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (operational from 1993 through 2017) and in Rwanda (ICTR)
(operational from 1994 through 2015).
However, contrary to the ICTY’s and ICTR’s jurisdictions, the ICC does not have primacy over
national criminal jurisdictions but rather is complementary to domestic prosecution. The ICC can
initiate proceedings only if the State in question is “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out
the investigation or prosecution” (art. 17 of the Rome Statute). This means that if a national legal
entity is carrying out such proceedings, the ICC may not act unless it can prove that the
proceedings are not being carried out in good faith (explained further in Section IV). The aim of
this approach is to incentivise States to carry out their own prosecutions whenever possible.
The jurisdiction of the ICC over these crimes remains subordinated to the condition of State
consent through a ratification process and special conditions depending on the nature of crime.

Whether a case involves genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity, the Court can only
investigate the crimes if either the State of nationality of the person accused or the State on
whose territory the crime was committed has accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction (art. 12 of the Rome
Statute). The absence of any reference to the State of nationality of the victim or of the State
where the accused is located has limited the Court’s ability to investigate situations of non-
international armed conflicts since the State of nationality of the accused and the State where the
crime was committed are the same.
With respect to the crime of aggression, the ICC’s theoretical jurisdiction has only been effective
since 17 July 2018, and the entry into force of the relevant amendments to the Rome Statute.
However, the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression remains optional for States Parties
and is subject to restrictive conditions that differ from those applicable to the Court’s jurisdiction
over other international crimes.

The UNSC has a high degree of authority over the jurisdiction of the ICC. It is the only body
that can bypass the requirement of State consent, as it can impose ICC jurisdiction on any State,
provided that none of its five permanent members vetoes the decision. The UNSC can also defer
or prohibit the commencement or continuation of an investigation or prosecution for one year,
which can be extended indefinitely (art. 16 of the Rome Statute). The special privileges granted
by the Rome Statute to the UNSC reflect the hybrid nature of the ICC as an independent judicial
body on the one hand and as an instrument of international conflict management on the other.
This has led to uncomfortable and confusing situations of selective enforcement of international
justice. The politicisation of the initial referral of a case can be exacerbated by the Prosecutor’s
dependence on evidence provided by States. But it can also be mitigated by the judges who
require strict adherence to due process and high standards of evidence in the investigation and
prosecution phases, even if this leads to the acquittal of suspects.

Amnesty International
 Despite these constraints, the ICC represents a step forward in the consolidation and
implementation of international criminal law. It is an important step towards unifying the
definition of international crimes and bringing together the world’s diverse legal systems and
standards of criminal investigation, fair trial and due process. By promoting complementarity of
jurisdiction between the ICC and national courts over commonly defined international crimes, it
also strengthened the application of the principle of universal jurisdiction, which allows national
courts to prosecute perpetrators of mass crimes committed abroad. The number of countries that
have ratified the Rome Statute has disproved the pessimists’ predictions. It shows that the ICC is
seen as a protective instrument for those numerous countries that cannot rely on their super
military power.

The structure and organisation of the ICC reflects its mixed international and judicial nature
and defines the role of the various organs and their respective powers in the concrete exercise of
the ICC’s jurisdiction over the different situations and types of crimes. The relationship between
States and the ICC is reflected and is complemented for the first time by the special status
accorded to victims and witnesses including the recognition of victims’ right to reparation.
Throughout its 20 years of existence, the ICC Prosecutor and Judges have navigated between the
limitations of the Rome Statute and the expectations of victims. This is reflected both in the
number of situations and cases brought before the ICC, but also in the many challenges and
shortcomings associated with their investigation or adjudication by the ICC. Despite the failures
and frustrations, the work of the ICC is contributing to the emergence of international
jurisprudence, consolidating the learning process of international criminal justice in relation to
mass crimes and disseminating common standards at the national level.
In addition to its work for the prisoners of conscience – ‘the forgotten prisoners’ – Amnesty
International has also carried on campaigns against torture and ill-treatment as well as in recent
years against capital punishment. In the statutes adopted by he organization in 1974 these three
tasks are named as the most important ones for Amnesty International.

ISIS
The Islamic State – also known as ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh – emerged from the remnants of al Qaeda
in Iraq (AQI), a local offshoot of al Qaeda founded by Abu Musab al Zarqawi in 2004. It faded
into obscurity for several years after the surge of U.S. troops to Iraq in 2007. But it began to
reemerge in 2011. Over the next few years, it took advantage of growing instability in Iraq and
Syria to carry out attacks and bolster its ranks.
The group changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2013. ISIS launched
an offensive on Mosul and Tikrit in June 2014. On June 29, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi
announced the formation of a caliphate stretching from Aleppo in Syria to Diyala in Iraq, and
renamed the group the Islamic State.
A U.S.-led coalition began airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq on August 7, 2014, and expanded the
campaign to Syria the following month. On October 15, the United States named the campaign
“Operation Inherent Resolve.” Over the next year, the United States conducted more than 8,000
airstrikes in Iraq and Syria. ISIS suffered key losses along Syria’s border with Turkey, and by the
end of 2015, Iraqi forces had made progress in recapturing Ramadi. But in Syria, ISIS made
gains near Aleppo, and still firmly held Raqqa and other strongholds.
In 2015, ISIS expanded into a network of affiliates in at least eight other countries. Its branches,
supporters, and affiliates increasingly carried out attacks beyond the borders of its so-called
caliphate. In October, ISIS’s Egypt affiliate bombed a Russian airplane, killing 224 people. On
November 13, 130 people were killed and more than 300 injured in a series of coordinated
attacks in Paris. And in June 2016, a gunman who pledged support to ISIS killed at least four
dozen people at a nightclub in Orlando, Florida. of coordinated attacks in Paris. And in June
2016, a gunman who pledged support to ISIS killed at least four dozen people at a nightclub in
Orlando, Florida.
By December 2017, the ISIS caliphate had lost 95 percent of its territory, including its two
biggest properties, Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, and the northern Syrian city of Raqqa, its
nominal capital. The Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi declared victory over the Islamic State
in Iraq on December 9, 2017. But ISIS was still inspiring and carrying out attacks all over the
world, including New York City.
In 2018, the focus of the campaign against ISIS shifted to eastern Syria, where a U.S.-backed
coalition of Syrian Kurds and Arabs known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) gradually
captured key ISIS positions. The SDF briefly suspended its offensive in November 2018 after
Turkish attacks on Kurdish positions diverted its attention. On December 14, the SDF captured
the town of Hajin. Hajin’s fall reduced ISIS territory to a few villages along the Euphrates River
near the Iraqi border.
On December 19, 2018, President Donald Trump declared that ISIS was defeated and signaled
his intention to withdraw all 2,000 U.S. troops supporting the SDF in Syria. But the SDF
continued its offensive and in February 2019 launched the final siege on ISIS forces in Baghouz,
the last holdout. Baghouz fell on March 23, 2019, formally ending the caliphate’s claim to any
territory. The mass surrender of ISIS fighters and their families illustrated the lingering
challenge: how to deal with jihadists to forestall its transformation into an insurgency in Iraq and
Syria. The Baghdadi era of ISIS ended on October 26, 2019, when the leader was killed in a U.S.
raid in northern Syria.

Al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda began as a logistical network to support Muslims fighting against the Soviet Union
during the Afghan War; members were recruited throughout the Islamic world. When the Soviets
withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the organization dispersed but continued to oppose what its
leaders considered corrupt Islamic regimes and foreign (i.e., U.S.) presence in Islamic lands.
Based in Sudan for a period in the early 1990s, the group eventually reestablished its
headquarters in Afghanistan (c. 1996) under the patronage of the Taliban militia.
Al-Qaeda merged with a number of other militant Islamist organizations, including Egypt’s
Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group, and on several occasions its leaders declared holy war
against the United States. The organization established camps for Muslim militants from
throughout the world, training tens of thousands in paramilitary skills, and its agents engaged in
numerous terrorist attacks, including the destruction of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya,
and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (1998), and a suicide bomb attack against the U.S. warship Cole in
Aden, Yemen (2000; see USS Cole attack). In 2001, 19 militants associated with al-Qaeda staged
the September 11 attacks against the United States. Within weeks the U.S. government
responded by attacking Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan. Thousands of militants were
killed or captured, among them several key members (including the militant who allegedly
planned and organized the September 11 attacks), and the remainder and their leaders were
driven into hiding.
The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 challenged that country’s viability as an al-Qaeda sanctuary
and training ground and compromised communication, operational, and financial linkages
between al-Qaeda leadership and its militants. Rather than significantly weakening al-Qaeda,
however, these realities prompted a structural evolution and the growth of “franchising.”
Increasingly, attacks were orchestrated not only from above by the centralized leadership (after
the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, based in the Afghan-Pakistani border regions) but also by the
localized, relatively autonomous cells it encouraged. Such grassroots independent groups—
coalesced locally around a common agenda but subscribing to the al-Qaeda name and its broader
ideology—thus meant a diffuse form of militancy, and one far more difficult to confront.
With this organizational shift, al-Qaeda was linked—whether directly or indirectly—to more
attacks in the six years following September 11 than it had been in the six years prior, including
attacks in Jordan, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Israel, Algeria,
and elsewhere. At the same time, al-Qaeda increasingly utilized the Internet as an expansive
venue for communication and recruitment and as a mouthpiece for video messages, broadcasts,
and propaganda. Meanwhile, some observers expressed concern that U.S. strategy—centred
primarily on attempts to overwhelm al-Qaeda militarily—was ineffectual, and at the end of the
first decade of the 21st century, al-Qaeda was thought to have reached its greatest strength since
the attacks of September 2001.
On May 2, 2011, bin Laden was killed by U.S. military forces after U.S. intelligence located him
residing in a secure compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, 31 miles (50 km) from Islamabad. The
operation was carried out by a small team that reached the compound in Abbottabad by
helicopter. After bin Laden’s death was confirmed, it was announced by U.S. Pres. Barack
Obama, who hailed the operation as a major success in the fight against al-Qaeda. On June 16,
2011, al-Qaeda released a statement announcing that Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s long-
serving deputy, had been appointed to replace bin Laden as the organization’s leader.