METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER DISTRICT v. J. KING, GR No.

175983, 2009-
04-16

The Metropolitan Cebu Water District attempted to acquire a five-square meter lot in Banilad,
Cebu City, but unsuccessfully negotiated. After depositing P17,500, the trial court granted the
motion. The respondent filed a petition for certiorari, but the Court of Appeals ruled the board
resolution invalid and rejected the petitioner's reconsideration.

Issues:

The issues raised by petitioner can be summarized as follows:

1. Whether there was sufficient authority from the petitioner's board of

directors to institute the expropriation complaint; and
2. Whether the procedure in obtaining a writ of possession was
properly observed.
The Court of Appeals ruled that a board resolution authorizing expropriation was invalid due to
its lack of specificity. The petitioner's charter grants it powers and privileges, but to exercise
eminent domain, it must have a board resolution and be reviewed by the LWUA. The court also
ruled that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function.

Didipio v Gozun (Natural resources)

DIDIPIO v GOZUN
GR No. 157882
March 30, 2006

FACTS:

This petition for prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of
1995, together with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued pursuant thereto,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 96-40,
s. 1996 (DAO 96-40) and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA)
entered into on 20 June 1994 by the Republic of the Philippines and Arimco Mining
Corporation (AMC), a corporation established under the laws of Australia and owned by its
nationals.
ISSUES & RULINGS:

I
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE CAMC FTAA ARE VOID BECAUSE
THEY ALLOW THE UNJUST AND UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT PAYMENT OF
JUST COMPENSATION , IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION.

NO.

The provision of the FTAA in question lays down the ways and means by which the foreign-
owned contractor, disqualified to own land, identifies to the government the specific surface
areas within the FTAA contract area to be acquired for the mine infrastructure. The
government then acquires ownership of the surface land areas on behalf of the contractor,
through a voluntary transaction in order to enable the latter to proceed to fully implement
the FTAA. Eminent domain is not yet called for at this stage since there are still various
avenues by which surface rights can be acquired other than expropriation. The FTAA
provision under attack merely facilitates the implementation of the FTAA given to CAMC and
shields it from violating the Anti-Dummy Law.

MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC v. SECRETARY OF DSWD

711 SCRA 302
G.R. No. 175356
December 3, 2013

TOPIC: Bill of Rights; Eminent Domain v. Police Power

FACTS: RA 7432 was passed into law (amended by RA 9257), granting senior citizens
20% discount on certain establishments.

To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance and the DSWD
issued its own Rules and Regulations.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior citizens but are only
assailing the constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under RA 9257
and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF.

Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the
Constitution, which provides that: "private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation."

Respondents maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a legitimate exercise of the
State’s police power.

ISSUE: Whether the legally mandated 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of
police power or eminent domain.

RULING: The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power.

It may not always be easy to determine whether a challenged governmental act is an
exercise of police power or eminent domain. The judicious approach, therefore, is to
look at the nature and effects of the challenged governmental act and decide on the basis
thereof.

The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age,
are less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities,
and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic commodities. It serves to honor senior
citizens who presumably spent their lives on contributing to the development and
progress of the nation.

In turn, the subject regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a
private establishment.

The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial distinctions
from, price control or rate of return on investment control laws which are traditionally
regarded as police power measures.

Spouses Jesus L. Cabahug and Coronacion M. Cabahug, Petitioners, vs.

National Power Corporation, Respondent
G.R. No. 186069; January 30, 2013

Facts: Spouses Cabahug, being owners of two parcels of land which were subjected to expropriation
proceedings by the National Power Corporation (NPC). NPC electrical cables would be installed in the
portions of the province and would traverse the land owned by the petitioners. Cabahug, in
consideration of the easement fees, granted NPC a continuous easement right of way. Two years
thereafter, Cabahug filed a complaint before RTC for payment of just compensation after having learned
that the compensation given by NPC was very low compared to the appraisal made by the province of
Leyte. RTC rendered decision in favor of Cabahug. However, at the Court of Appeals, it was ruled that
vested right has already accrued in favour of NPC, and to allow spouses Cabahug to pursue the case
would be a violation of the contract and an unjust enrichment in favour of Cabahug.

Issue: Whether or not NPC may still be held liable to pay for the full market value of the affected
property despite the fact transfer of title thereto was not required by the easement.

Ruling: Yes. The power of Eminent Domain may be exercised although title is not transferred
to the expropriator in easement of right of way. Just compensation which should be neither more nor less
than the money equivalent of the property is, moreover, due where the nature and effect of the easement
is to impose limitations against the use of the land for an indefinite period and deprive the landowner if
ordinary use.

Petitioner, NATIONAL POWER

CORPORATION, a
government-owned and
controlled corporation,
commenced its 350 KV Leyte-
Luzon HVDC Power
Transmission Project. In order to
carry out this
project, [petitioner’s]
transmission lines have to cross
over certain lands owned by
private individuals
and entities, including a
portion of the land owned by
[respondent] MANUBAY
AGRO-
INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION. Hence,
[petitioner] filed a complaint
for
expropriation before the
Regional Trial Court against
[respondent] in order to acquire
an easement of
right of way over the said land.
For the purpose of determining
the fair and just compensation
due to
[respondent], the court appointed
3 commissioners: one
representative for the petitioner,
one for the
respondent and the other from
the court. Thereafter, the
commissioners submitted their
individual
appraisal/valuation reports.
Commissioner for the
[petitioner] recommended the
price of P115.00 per
square meter, commissioner for
the [respondent], recommended
the price of P550.00 per square
meter
and the court’s Commissioner
adopted the price recommended
by the respondent’s
commissioner. The
RTC approved of the latter’s
recommended amount of P550
per square meter as just
compensation for
the property. Further, the RTC
held that it was not bound by the
provision cited by petitioner —
Section
3-A of Republic Act 6395, as
amended by Presidential
Decree 938, as the
determination of just
compensation in eminent domain
cases is a judicial function. Thus,
valuations made by the executive
branch or the legislature are at
best initial or preliminary only.
National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, G.R. No.

150936

FACTS:

Petitioner, NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, a government-owned and controlled corporation,

commenced its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project. In order to carry out this

project, [petitioner’s] transmission lines have to cross over certain lands owned by private individuals

and entities, including a portion of the land owned by [respondent] MANUBAY AGRO-

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. Hence, [petitioner] filed a complaint for

expropriation before the Regional Trial Court against [respondent] in order to acquire an easement of

right of way over the said land. For the purpose of determining the fair and just compensation due to

[respondent], the court appointed 3 commissioners: one representative for the petitioner, one for the

respondent and the other from the court. Thereafter, the commissioners submitted their
individual

appraisal/valuation reports. Commissioner for the [petitioner] recommended the price of P115.00 per

square meter, commissioner for the [respondent], recommended the price of P550.00 per square meter

and the court’s Commissioner adopted the price recommended by the respondent’s commissioner. The

RTC approved of the latter’s recommended amount of P550 per square meter as just compensation for

the property. Further, the RTC held that it was not bound by the provision cited by petitioner — Section

3-A of Republic Act 6395, as amended by Presidential Decree 938, as the determination of just

compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. Thus, valuations made by the executive

branch or the legislature are at best initial or preliminary only.

ISSUE/S:
I. Should such
compensation be a simple
easement fee or the full value of
the property?
II. How much just
compensation should be paid for
an easement of a right of way
over a parcel
of land that will be traversed by
high-powered transmission
lines?
III. Whether CA erred in
affirming the Decision of the
RTC
ISSUE/S:

I. Should such compensation be a simple easement fee or the full value of the property?

II. How much just compensation should be paid for an easement of a right of way over a parcel

of land that will be traversed by high-powered transmission lines?

III. Whether CA erred in affirming the Decision of the RTC

Ruling

The SC said that it cannot sustain the view of the petitioner that it should pay only an

easement fee, and not the full value of the property. The acquisition of such an easement

falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. As correctly observed by the CA,

considering the nature and the effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the

use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the

property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which

must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land.

G.R. No. 156684 April 6, 2011 SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY, Respondents. Facts: The petitioners
owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square meters situated between Nueve de Febrero Street
and Fernandez Street in Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they used as their
residence, and the rest they rented out to nine other families. Allegedly, the land was their only
property and only source of income. On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong
City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to
take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of
developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants. The petitioners
became alarmed and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying for the annulment of
Resolution No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force and
effect. The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a mere authorization given to the City Mayor to
initiate the legal steps towards expropriation, which included making a definite offer to purchase the
property of the petitioners; hence, the suit of the petitioners was premature.

Issue: Whether or not the validity of Resolution No. 552 can be assailed before its implementation.

HELD: No. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action. In
view of the absence of the proper expropriation ordinance authorizing and providing for the
expropriation, the petition for certiorari filed in the RTC was dismissible for lack of cause of action. As of
then, it was premature for the petitioners to mount any judicial challenge, for the power of eminent
domain could be exercised by the City only through the filing of a verified complaint in the proper court.
Before the City as the expropriating authority filed such verified complaint, no expropriation proceeding
could be said to exist. Until then, the petitioners as the owners could not also be deprived of their
property under the power of eminent domain. Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code)
requires cities to pass an ordinance, not adopt a resolution, for the purpose of initiating an expropriation
proceedings

MASIKIP vs PASIG G.R. No. 136349 January 23, 2006 Power of Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Genuine
Necessity

FACTS:

Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Pag-Asa,
Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila. The City of Pasig notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a
1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the “sports development and recreational
activities” of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993
enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.

Petitioner replied stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and
oppressive.

Respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner’s property is “to provide
sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents” and subsequently filed with the trial court a
complaint for expropriation,

ISSUE:

Was the City of Pasig able to establish “genuine necessity”?

RULING:

The Court holds that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to
expropriate petitioner’s property. A scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification issued by the
Caniogan Barangay Council, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the
expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners
Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. Petitioner’s lot is the
nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The
necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports
development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all
residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.

SAN ROQUE REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(through the Armed Forces of the Philippines), respondent.G.R. No. 163130, September 7,
2007Facts:The subject parcels of land are located at Lahug, Cebu City. It was originally owned by Ismael
D. Rosales, Pantaleon Cabrera and Francisco Racaza. Subject parcels of land, together with seventeen
(17) others, were the subject of an expropriation proceeding initiated by the then Commonwealth of the
Philippines docketed as Civil Case No. 781. Judge Felix Martinez ordered the initial deposit of P9,500.00
as pre-condition for the entry on the lands sought to be expropriated. On 14 May 1940, a Decision was
rendered condemning the parcels of land. However, the title of the subject parcel of land was not
transferred to the government

Issue:

WON the CA erred in holding that the (a)validity of the expropriation proceedings; (b)

respondent had a better right to the subject properties and (c) respondent is not guilty of laches

Ruling:

The CA disregarded relevant facts and ignored the evidence, noteworthy among which is that

when the Republic filed its complaint with the RTC, it alleged that the CFI Decision in Civil Case

No. 781 had long become final and executory. However, this assertion would compound the

Republic’s predicament, because the Republic could not adequately explain its failure to register

its ownership over the subject property or, at least, annotate its lien on the title. Trying to

extricate itself from this quandary, the Republic belatedly presented a copy of an Exception and

Notice of Intention to Appeal dated July 9, 1940, to show that an appeal filed by the original

owners of Lot No. 933 effectively prevented the Republic from registering its title, or even only

annotating its lien, over the property.

NPC v. HEIRS OF SANGKAY

656 SCRA 60

G.R. No. 165828

August 24, 2011

TOPIC: Eminent Domain; Just Compensation

FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC) undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project
to generate electricity for Mindanao. It included the construction of several underground tunnels to be
used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants.
On 1997, Respondents sued NPC for recovery of damages of the property and a prayer for just
compensation. They alleged that the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial
and residential value of their land; and that their land had also become an unsafe place for habitation,
forcing them and their workers to relocate to safer grounds.

ISSUE: Whether the Heirs of Sangkay have the right to just compensation

RULING: Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. It has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the governmental
defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the
taking agency.

The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents’ use of the property for an indefinite
period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Hence, respondents are clearly entitled to the payment of
just compensation.

MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN v. IAC, GR No. 72126, 1988-01-29

Facts:

a petition for review on certiorari... and dismissing the special civil action
for... expropriation filed by the petitioner.

respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed with the

Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan... the Municipal
Council of Meycauayan... manifesting the intention to expropriate the
respondent's parcel of land

Provincial Board of Bulacan disapprove or annul the resolution in question

because there was no genuine necessity for the Municipality of
Meycauayan to expropriate the respondent's property for use as a
public... road.

On October 21, 1983, however, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, now

headed by Mayor Adriano D. Daez, passed Resolution No. 21, Series of
1983, for the purpose of expropriating anew the respondent's land.
Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the market value of
the land, with the Philippine National Bank, the trial court on March 1,
1984 issued a writ of possession in favor of the petitioner.

Issues:

What is questioned is the existence of a genuine necessity therefor

Ruling:

As early as City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila (40 Phil. 349)

this Court held that the foundation of the right to exercise the power of
eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a
public character. Condemnation of private property is... justified only if it
is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity of a public
character. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the
legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine
whether there is a genuine necessity therefor

(Republic v. La Orden de PP. Benedictos de Filipinas, 1 SCRA 646; J.M.

Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413).

There is absolutely no showing in the petition why the more appropriate

lot for the proposed road which was offered for sale has not been the
subject of the petitioner's attempt to expropriate assuming there is a real
need for another connecting road.

Republic vs. La Orden De PP. Benedictinos De Filipinas, G.R. No. L-12792, February 28, 1961 The Power
of Eminent Domain Facts: To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the
Government drew plans to extend Azcarraga St. (now Recto) from its junction with Mendiola St., up to
the Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila. To carry out this plan it offered to buy a portion of
approximately 6,000 square meters of a bigger parcel belonging to La Orden situated on Mendiola St.
Not having been able to reach an agreement on the matter with the owner, the Government instituted
an expropriation proceeding. On May 27, 1957 the trial court valued the property in question at
P270,000.00 and authorized appellant to take immediate possession upon depositing said amount. The
deposit having been made with the City Treasurer of Manila, the trial court issued the corresponding
order directing the Sheriff of Manila to place appellant in possession of the property aforesaid.

Issue: Whether or not there is a genuine necessity for the exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain.

Held: It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be expropriated for public use and upon
payment of just compensation; that condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the
public good and there is a genuine necessity therefor of a public character. Consequently, the courts
have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to
determine whether or not there is a genuine necessity therefor. It does not need extended argument to
show that whether or not the proposed opening of the Azcarraga extension is a necessity in order to
relieve the daily congestion of traffic on Legarda St., is a question of fact dependent not only upon the
facts of which the trial court very liberally took judicial notice but also up on other factors that do not
appear of record and must, therefore, be established by means of evidence.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY

THE DEPARTMENT OFPUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
V. SORIANO

Facts:

The Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint for expropriation against Soriano, the
landowner, for the construction of the NLEX-Harbor Link Project. The RTC ordered the Republic
to pay consequential damages, including transfer taxes, to Soriano. The Republic argues that
these taxes are liabilities of Soriano, not the Republic.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE transfer taxes in the nature of Capital Gains Tax are liabilities of the property
owner

RULING:

Yes. With respect to the capital gains tax, We find merit in petitioner’s posture that pursuant to Sections
24(D) and 56(A)(3) of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code(NIRC), capital gains tax due on the sale
of real property is a liability for the account of the seller.

APO FRUITS CORPORATION VS. LANDBANK

FACTS:
Petitioners offered to sell their lands under Republic Act 6657, but the government took them
in 1996. Land Bank valued the properties at P165,484.47 per hectare, but AFC-HPI rejected the
offer. Land Bank deposited P26,409,549.86 and P45,481,706.76, respectively, for AFC and HPI.
The total amount paid was P411,769,168.32, an increase of nearly five times. Both petitioners
withdrew the amounts, but their complaints for just compensation were dismissed. The RTC
ruled in favor of the petitioners, and the just compensation was settled in 2008.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the standard of “transcendental importance” cannot justify the negation of the
doctrine of immutability of a final judgment and the abrogation of a vested right in favor of the
Government that respondent LBP represents
RULING:
No. The present case goes beyond the private interests involved; it involves a matter of public
interest – the proper application of a basic constitutionally-guaranteed right, namely, the right
of a landowner to receive just compensation when the government exercises the power of
eminent domain in its agrarian reform program.

EVERGREEN MANUFACTURING CORPORATION VS. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES
FACTS:

Evergreen, the registered owner of a land parcel, was evicted by Republic-DPWH

in 2004. The RTC issued a Writ of Possession and granted Evergreen a Motion to
Withdraw the Initial Deposit. The RTC fixed the just compensation at P25,000 per
square meter. Both parties filed motions for partial reconsideration, but the CA
denied them.
ISSUE:
In what year should just compensation be reckoned with: 2000 or 2004 or 2008?
RULING:
In 2004, just compensation was determined based on the value of the property at
the time of taking, which was 2004. However, the commissioners failed to rely on
clear factual evidence to determine the value of the property at the time of
taking. The court ruled that a finding based on available records would be most
beneficial to both parties, considering the mean prices of the properties for 2000
and 2008.

TRIDHARMA MARKETING CORPORATION VS. COURT OF TAX APPEALS

FACTS:
The petitioner received a preliminary assessment notice for deficiency income tax
and VAT due to the BIR's disallowance of its purchases from Etheria Trading. The
petitioner paid the assessments and appealed to the CTA. The court granted the
petitioner's motion for suspension of tax collection, but required the petitioner to
deposit a surety bond equivalent to 150% of the assessment or P6, 701, 087,
822.64 within 15 days.
ISSUE:
Did the CTA in Division commit grave abuse of discretion in requiring the
petitioner to file a surety bond despite the supposedly patent illegality of the
assessment that was beyond the petitioner's net worth but equivalent to the
deficiency assessment for IT and VAT?
RULING:
The petition for certiorari is meritorious, as Section 11 of Republic Act No.
1125 allows the Court to suspend tax collection if it may jeopardize the
government's or taxpayer's interest. The petitioner argues that the surety bond
exceeds their net worth, making it legally impossible to procure it from bonding
companies. The Court grants the petition, annuls and sets aside resolutions, and
requests a preliminary hearing.
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. QUEZON CITY, GR No. L-36081,
1989-04-24
FACTS:
Progressive Development Corporation, owner and operator of a public market
known as the "Farmers Market & Shopping Center" filed a Petition for Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction against respondent... on the ground that the
supervision fee or license tax imposed by the above-mentioned ordinances is in
reality a tax on income which respondent may not impose, the same being
expressly prohibited by Republic Act No. 2264, as amended.
Petitioner, insists that the "supervision fee" collected from rentals, being a return
from capital invested in the construction of the Farmers Market, operates as a tax
on income, one of those expressly excepted from respondent's taxing authority,
and beyond the latter's competence.
ISSUE:
Whether the only issue to be resolved here is whether the tax imposed by
respondent on gross receipts of stall rentals is properly characterized as partaking
of the nature of an income tax or, alternatively, of a license fee.
RULING:
The "Farmers' Market and Shopping Center" being a public market in the sense of
a market open to and inviting the, patronage of the general public, even though
privately owned, petitioner's operation thereof required a license issued by the
respondent City, the issuance of which, applying the standards set forth above,
was done principally in the exercise of the respondent's police power.
The operation of a privately owned market is, as correctly noted by the Solicitor
General, equivalent to or quite the same as the operation of a government-
owned market;
The five percent (5%) tax imposed in Ordinance No. 9236 constitutes, not a tax on
income, not a city income tax... but rather a license tax or fee for the regulation of
the business in which the petitioner is engaged.

ALTA VISTA GOLF v. CITY OF CEBU, GR No. 180235, 2016-01-20

FACTS:

The petitioner, a non-stock and non-profit corporation operating a golf course in

Cebu City, is challenging the amusement tax imposed on theaters, cinemas,
concert halls, and other entertainment venues. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cebu City enacted the Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance No. LXIX in 1993, which
amended Section 42 to include movie premieres or gala shows for charitable
institutions or government institutions with higher admission fees. The petitioner
argues that the Local Government Code only applies to theaters, cinemas, concert
halls, or places where one seeks to entertain themselves by seeing or viewing a
show or performance. The petitioner also cites the ruling in the Philippine
Basketball Association (PBA) v. Court of Appeals, which stated that under the
Local Tax Code of 1973, the province could only impose amusement tax on
admission from proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinematographs,
concert halls, circuses, and other places of amusement, but not professional
basketball games.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CITY OF CEBU OR ANY LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAN VALIDLY
IMPOSE AMUSEMENT TAX TO THE ACT OF PLAYING GOLF
RULING:
Section 42 of the Revised Omnibus
Tax Ordinance, as amended, imposing is an amusement tax on golf courses is
null... and void as it is beyond the authority of the respondent Cebu City to enact
under the Local Government Code.

RUFINO R. TAN v. RAMON R. DEL ROSARIO

FACTS:
The consolidated cases questions the constitutionality of RA 7496 or the
Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme. Petitioners claim to be taxpayers
adversely affected by the continued implementation of the amendatory
legislation. Petitioners also assailed Section 6 of Revenue Regulations No. 2-93:
that public respondents have exceeded their rule-making authority in applying
SNIT to general professional partnerships.
The Solicitor General agrees with the public respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether RA 7496 and RR Nos. 2-93 are unconstitutional.

RULING:

No. RA 7496 does not impose tax on single proprietorships and professionals
differently from the manner it imposes the tax on corporations and partnerships.
Such system of income taxation has long been the prevailing rule even prior to RA
7496. Uniformity of taxation merely requires that all subjects or objects of
taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities.

PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE PHILS., INC. vs. CITY OF BUTUAN

24 SCRA 789
GR No. L-22814, August 28, 1968

FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant Pepsi-Cola sought to recover the sums paid by it under

protest, to the City of Butuan, and collected by the latter, pursuant to its
Municipal Ordinance No. 110 which plaintiff assails as null and void because it
partakes of the nature of an import tax, amounts to double taxation, highly unjust
and discriminatory, excessive, oppressive and confiscatory, and constitutes an
invlaid delegation of the power to tax. The ordinance imposes taxes for every case
of softdrinks, liquors and other carbonated beverages, regardless of the volume
of sales, shipped to the agents and/or consignees by outside dealers or any
person or company having its actual business outside the City.

ISSUE: Does the tax ordinance violate the uniformity requirement of taxation?
RULING:
Yes. The tax levied is discriminatory. Even if the burden in question were regarded
as a tax on the sale of said beverages, it would still be invalid, as discriminatory,
and hence, violative of the uniformity required by the Constitution and the law
therefor, since only sales by "agents or consignees" of outside dealers would be
subject to the tax. Sales by local dealers, not acting for or on behalf of other
merchants, regardless of the volume of their sales, and even if the same exceeded
those made by said agents or consignees of producers or merchants established
outside the City of Butuan, would be exempt from the disputed tax.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,

petitioners, vs. HON. APOLINARIO B. SANTOS,
Facts:
Petitioner in this case, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the
Commissioner of Customs jointly seek the reversal of the Decision of herein public
respondent, Hon. Apolinario B. Santos, Presiding Judge of RTC Pasig City, declaring
Section 150(a) of Executive Order No. 273 inoperative and without force and
effect insofar as petitioners are concerned. This EO subjected jewelry to a 20%
excise tax in addition to a 10% value-added tax under the old law.
Private respondent Guild of Philippine Jewelers, Inc., is an association of Filipino
jewelers engaged in the manufacture of jewelries and allied undertakings, with
private respondent Antonio M. Marco is the President of the Guild.
Issue:
Can the Regional Trial Courts declare a law inoperative and without force and
effect or otherwise unconstitutional?
RULING
No. This is a matter on which the RTC is not competent to rule. As Cooley
observed: “Debatable questions are for the legislature to decide. The courts do
not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting issues.” In Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, Justice Laurel made it clear that “the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.” And fittingly so, for in
the exercise of judicial power, we are allowed only “to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,” and may not
annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or
impractical. This is not to say that Regional Trial Courts have no power
whatsoever to declare a law unconstitutional.

Arturo Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance and Commissioner of Internal Revenue

G.R. No. 115455; October 30, 1995
FACTS:
These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the
petitions filed in these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No.
7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. Now it is
contended by the Philippine Press Institute (PPI) that by removing the exemption
of the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law
discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, “even nondiscriminatory
taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional.”
ISSUE:
Does sales tax on bible sales violative of religious and press freedom?

RULING:
No. The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary
tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional
because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. Hence, although its
application to others, such those selling goods, is valid, its application to the press
or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, in connection with the
latter’s sale of religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S.
Supreme Court put it, “it is one thing to impose a tax on income or property of a
preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon.”

BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO v. JOSE ISIDRO N. CAMACHO, GR No. 163583

FACTS:
The Court declared Section 145 of the NIRC constitutional and Revenue
Regulations No. 1-97 and Order No. 6-2003 invalid for reclassifying new brands.
The petitioner argues that the classification freeze provision violates equal
protection and uniformity of taxation, as Annex "D" brands are taxed based on
1996 net retail prices, while new brands are taxed based on present-day net retail
prices.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the assailed law does not violate the equal protection and
uniformity of taxation clauses.
RULING:
The rational basis test was applied to determine the constitutionality of a law in
the face of an equal protection challenge. A statutory classification that does not
violate constitutional rights must be upheld if there is a rational basis for it.
Legislative classifications are considered valid and reasonable if they are rationally
related to achieving a legitimate state interest. The classification freeze provision
was inserted for practicality and expediency, as Congress needed a uniform
mechanism to fix the tax bracket of a new brand. The classification freeze
provision could not be considered arbitrary or motivated by a hostile or
oppressive attitude to favor older brands over newer ones. Congress doubted the
constitutionality and ethical implications of delegating power to the Department
of Finance and the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

Swedish Match Philippines, Inc. v. The Treasurer of City of Manila G.R. No.
181277, July 3, 2013
FACTS:

This is a case filed by the petitioner for Refund of Taxes. In its letter to the City of
Manila Treasurer, the petitioner claimed double taxation when it paid business
taxes under Sections 14 and 21 of Ordinance No. 7794 which is the Manila
Revenue Code. The respondent contends that both sections refer to two distinct
objects of tax, hence they are not the same in character and kind that will result
in double taxation. The RTC, CTA division and CTA en banc denied the petition for
a tax refund filed by the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not both sections of the Manila Revenue Code constitute double
taxation

RULING:

Yes, there is double taxation.While the petitioner is liable for the payment of
business taxes to the City of Manila, the fact that it already paid under section 14
of the Manila Revenue Code, it is already precluded from paying the tax imposed
under section 21 of the same code. Considering these nature of taxes paid by the
petitioner under both sections of the Code, the court held that the petitioner is
entitled to a tax refund for the tax it paid under Section 21.

CITY OF MANILA V. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC

FACTS: Petitioner City of Manila is a public corporation empowered to collect and
assess business taxes, revenue fees, and permit fees, through its officers,
petitioners Toledo and Santiago, in their capacities as City Treasurer and Chief of
the Licensing Division, respectively. On the other hand, respondent Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc. is a corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing and selling beverages, and which maintains a sales office in the
City of Manila.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS DOUBLE TAXATION.
RULING:
YES. Contrary to the assertions of petitioners, the Coca-Cola case is indeed
applicable to the instant case. The pivotal issue raised therein was whether Tax
Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011 were null and void, which this
Court resolved in the affirmative. Tax Ordinance No. 7988 was declared by the
Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) as null and void and without legal
effect due to the failure of herein petitioner City of Manila to satisfy the
requirement under the law that said ordinance be published for three consecutive
days.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. v. EDU

FACTS:
Philippine Airlines (PAL) was exempt from taxes under Act No. 42739. However, in
1971, Land Transportation Commissioner Elevate required PAL to pay motor
vehicle registration fees. PAL protested, paying the fees under protest. PAL
demanded a refund from Land Transportation Commissioner Romeo Edu, but Edu
denied. PAL filed a complaint against Edu and National Treasurer Carbonell, which
was dismissed by the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not motor vehicle registration fees are considered as taxes.
RULING:
Yes. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real
and substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax. Such is the
case of motor vehicle registration fees. The motor vehicle registration fees are
actually taxes intended for additional revenues of the government even if one
fifth or less of the amount collected is set aside for the operating expenses of the
agency administering the program.

JOSE J. FERRER v. CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, GR No. 210551, 2015-06-30

FACTS:
The petition seeks to declare the Socialized Housing Tax and Garbage Fee
imposed by the respondents unconstitutional and illegal. The petitioner claims
that the annual property tax is an ad valorem tax, subject to revision every three
years, and that the SHT and garbage fee are increases in property tax not based
on assessed value. Respondents argue that the SHT is a social justice principle and
not oppressive, but the petitioner claims it is a penalty for real property owners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Socialized Housing Tax is valid.
RULING:
Taxation is a crucial tool for local government units (LGUs) to generate revenue
and support their activities. The 1987 Constitution emphasizes property use and
contributing to the common good. Police power is vested in the legislature to
create statutes and ordinances. Ordinance No. SP-2095 is constitutionally and
legally valid, and respondents are directed to refund collected amounts.

COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS v. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL

REVENUE.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed an action in the CFI Manila to recover from City of
Manila(City ) the sum of P15,280.00 allegedly overpaid by it as taxes on
its wholesale and retail sales of liquor for the period from the third quarter
of 1954 to the second quarter of 1957, inclusive, under Ordinances Nos.
3634, 3301, and 3816.

Tabacalera's action for refund is based on the theory that, in connection

with its liquor sales, it should pay the license fees but not the municipal
sales taxes; and since it already paid the license fees aforesaid, the sales
taxes paid by it 4 amounting to the sum of P15, 208.00 4 under the three
ordinances is an overpayment made by mistake, and therefore refundable.

The City contends that for the permit issued to it Tabacalera is subject to
pay the license fees prescribed by Ordinance No. 3358, aside from the
sales taxes imposed by Ordinances Nos. 3634, 3301, and 3816.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the taxes imposed are valid

RULING:
Ordinance No. 3358 is clearly one that prescribes municipal license fees
for the privilege to engage in the business of selling liquor or alcoholic
beverage. On the other hand, it is clear that Ordinances Nos. 3634, 3301,
and 3816 impose taxes on the sales of general merchandise, wholesale or
retail, and are revenue measures enacted by the Municipal Board of
Manila by virtue of its power to tax dealers for the sale of such
Merchandise.

ANGELES UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION vs. CITY OF ANGELES et. al

Facts:
Petitioner is an educational institution and was converted into a non-stock,
non-profit education foundation under the provisions of R.A. 6055. Sometime in
August 2005, petitioner filed with the Office of the City Building Official an
application for a building permit for the construction of an 11-storey building.
Said office issued a Building Permit Fee Assessment in the amount of P126,839.20
and P238,741.64 as Locational Clearance Fee. Petitioner claimed that it is exempt
from the payment of the building permit and locational clearance fees, citing legal
opinions rendered by the DOJ.

Issues:
1. Whether petitioner is exempt from the payment of building permit and
related fees imposed under the National Building Code
Ruling:
R.A. No. 6055 granted tax exemptions to educational institutions like petitioner
which converted to non-stock, non-profit educational foundations.
On February 19, 1977, P.D 1096 was issued adopting the National Building Code
of the Philippines. The said Code requires every person, firm or corporation,
including any agency or instrumentality of the government to obtain a building
permit for any construction, alteration or repair of any building or structure. Not
being expressly included in the enumeration of structures to which the building
permit fees do not apply, petitioner’s claim for exemption rests solely on its
interpretation of the term “other charges imposed by the National
Government” in the tax exemption clause of R.A. No. 6055.