Eminent Domain Cases:
municipal ordinance, resolution or executive order is
1) Filstream International Incorporated v. Court of Appeals
(Facts: City Ordinance declaring Filsteam’s properties
expropriation as part of the City Land use Dev’t. Program. )
ISSUE: Whether or not the right of an LGU to expropriate by
virtue of an ordinance is absolute. (NO)
- Local government units are not given an unbridled
authority when exercising their power of eminent
domain. The basic rules still have to be followed, which are as
follows: “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. 3, Sec. 1,
1987 Constitution); private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation (Art. 3, Section 9,
1987 Constitution)”.
Thus, the exercise by local government units of the power of
eminent domain is not without limitations. Even Section 19 of
the 1991 Local Government Code is very explicit that it must
comply with the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws.
The governing law that deals with the subject of
expropriation for purposes of urban land reform and
housing is REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7279 (Urban Development
and Housing Act of 1992).
Sections 9 of the said Republic Act clearly provides for the
limitations with respect to the order of priority in acquiring
private lands and in resorting to expropriation
proceedings as a means to acquire the same.
Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of
socialized housing. In the same vein, Section 10 of RA 7279
states that expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to
only when the other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted. Compliance with these conditions must be deemed
mandatory.
2) Moday v. Court of Appeals
An ordinance disapproved by Sangguniang
Panlalawigan citing, “expropriation is unnecessary considering
that there are still available lots in Bunawan for
the establishment of the government center.”
ISSUE: whether a municipality may expropriate private
property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was
disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. (YES)
The power of eminent domain inherently possessed by the
national legislature may be validly delegated to local
governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the
taking of private property by the government to be valid, the
taking must be for public use and there must be just
compensation.
Section 153 BP Blg 337
- (2) If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any
beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang
bayan or the mayor, it shall declare such ordinance,
resolution or executive order invalid in whole or in
part, entering its actions upon the minutes and
advising the proper municipal authorities thereof. The
effect of such an action shall be to annul the
ordinance, resolution or executive order in question in
whole or in part. The action of the sangguniang
panlalawigan shall be final.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s disapproval of Municipal
Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render
said resolution null and void. The law grants the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution
invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the
Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. The provincial
(board’s) disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or
order must be premised specifically upon the fact that
such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope
of the legal powers conferred by law. The Sangguniang
Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove for the
Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the
right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the
capacity to promulgate said resolution.
3) Republic v. Mendoza,
(Facts: School was constructed in mendoza’s lot.)
WON the CA erred in holding that the Mendozas were entitled
to evict the Republic from the subject property. (YES)
A decree of registration is conclusive upon all persons,
including the Government of the Republic and all its
branches, whether or not mentioned by name in the
application for registration or its notice. Title to the land,
once registered, is imprescriptible.
The fact that the property was tax-declared under the name of
the government does not defeat the Mendozas’ title.
However, it was evident that the Mendozas intended to cede
the property to the city government permanently.
The Court holds that where the owner agrees voluntarily to
the taking of his property by the government for public
use, he thereby waives his right to the institution of a
formal expropriation proceeding covering such property.
The Mendoza’s remedy is an action for just compensation,
NOT ejectment.
4) Tenorio v. The Manila Railroad
Defendant company took possession of and occupied small
parcel of land without the express consent of
Plaintiff and without having made payment therefore, alleging
that the land is a part of certain lands described in
condemnation proceedings.
- A statute authorizing a railroad company to exercise the
power of eminent domain being in derogation of general right,
and conferring upon it exceptional privileges with regard to the
property of others of which it may have need, should be
construed strictly in favor of land owners whose property
is affected by its terms; and before any right to take
possession of land under such a statute can be lawfully
exercised its provisions must be "fully and fairly" complied
with.
5) Visayan Refining Co v. Camus
(Governor-General directed the Attorney-General to file a
complaint for the condemnation of a piece of
land in Paranaque, Philippines, for military and aviation
purposes. The petitioners, among the defendants, contested
the proceedings, arguing there was no legal authorization for
eminent domain. They also challenged the deposit of
funds. Despite their objections, Judge Camus ruled in favor of
the government. This prompted the petitioners to file a petition
to halt the proceedings.)
ISSUE: W/N Ph Govt. can initiate expropriation proceedings in
the absence of a statute authorizing the exercise of the power
of eminent domain? YES
SECTION 63 of the PHILIPPINE BILL (Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902) - Philippine Government is authorized to
acquire, receive, hold, maintain, and convey title to real
and personal property, and may acquire real estate for
public uses by the exercise of the right to eminent domain The
same is subject to the limitation of due process of law.
In consonance with this, SECTION 64 of the
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE of the Philippine Islands (Act No.
2711) expressly confers on the Government General the power
to determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise
the right of eminent domain in behalf of the Government of the
Philippine Island; and to direct the Attorney-General, where
such at is deemed advisable, to cause the condemnation
proceedings to be begun in the court having proper jurisdiction.
There is no question as to the Governor General's authority to
exercise this power. However, this authority is NOT
ABSOLUTE. It is subject to two limitations, namely, that
the taking shall be for public purpose and there must
be just compensation. Apparently, the reason behind the
taking of the subject land was for military and aviation
purposes. This considered a public purpose given the
importance of the military and aviation in the operation of
the State.
As to the second requirement, it must be remembered that at
that time there was no law requiring that compensation
shall actually be paid prior to the judgment of
condemnation. The deposit was made, despite the absence
of said law, to afford absolute assurance that no piece of
land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling
owner until compensation is paid. This is in conformity with
the just compensation requirement.
6) Beluso v. City of Panay
The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Panay issued a
resolution which authorized the initiation of expropriation
proceedings for a piece of land. The Municipality filed a petition for
expropriation in 1997, which was contested by the
petitioners. They argued that the TAKING WAS NOT FOR PUBLIC
USE but for the benefit of specific individuals, and politically
motivated due to their opposition to the incumbent mayor and vice-
mayor. They also claimed that some supposed beneficiaries DID
NOT actually support the expropriation.
Issue: Whether the Municipal Government of Panay exercise
the power of Eminent Domain in virtue of a resolution. (NO)
A resolution will not suffice for an LGU to be able to expropriate
private property; and the reason for this is settled:
A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ORDINANCE is a law, but a RESOLUTION is merely a
declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on
a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general
and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in
nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third
reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution,
unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian
members.
Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power
of eminent domain expressly provides:
It is clear therefore that several requisites must concur
before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain,
to wit:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council
authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local
government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or
pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,
purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under
Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent
laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer
was not accepted.
7) Republic v. Vda de Castellvi
The owner maintains that the disputed land WAS NOT TAKEN when
the government commenced to occupy the said land as
lessee because the
Essential elements of the “TAKING” of property under the power of
eminent domain are not present, namely :
(1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private
property for more than a momentary period, and
(2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Whether the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or
1959.
Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore,
that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes of
eminent domain CANNOT BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE
TAKEN PLACE in 1947 when the republic commenced to
occupy the property as lessee thereof.
Requisite number 2 IS NOT PRESENT according to the
Supreme Court, “momentary” when applied to possession or
occupancy of real property should be construed to mean “a
limited period” — not indefinite or permanent. The
aforecited lease contract was for a period of one
year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the
property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered
transitory. The fact that the Republic, through AFP,
CONSTRUCTED some installations of a PERMANENT
NATURE "DOES NOT ALTER" THE FACT that the entry into
the land was TRANSITORY, or intended to last A YEAR,
although renewable from year to year by consent of the owner
of the land.
Note: But this “intention” cannot prevail over the clear and
express terms of the lease contract.
The 5th requirement is also lacking. In the instant case the
entry of the Republic into the property and its utilization of the
same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as
owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the
Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease contract
from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract
whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to
Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi
deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property,
because the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying,
Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed
the complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.
8) Amigable v. Cuenca
A portion of her land was used for road
construction WITHOUT PROPER AUTHORIZATION. In 1958,
Amigable requested payment for the land, but her claim was
denied by the Auditor General.
Can Amigable properly sue the government? (YES)
Where the government takes away property from a private
landowner for public use without going through the legal
process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party
may properly maintain a suit against the government without
thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from
suit without its consent.
"the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve
as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen."
Since restoration of possession of said portion by the
government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time
because it is now and has been used for road
purposes, the only relief available is for the government to
make due compensation which it could and should have
done years ago.
To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis
should be the price or value thereof at the time of the
taking.
9) NAPOCOR v. CA
-National Power Corporation (NPC) MISTAKENLY TOOK
POSSESSION of a lot in Marawi City owned by Mangondatu, thinking
it was public property. Over a decade later, NPC
acknowledged the property's private ownership and entered a sale
agreement with Mangondatu. DISAGREEMENT AROSE over the fair
market value.
-contention was when to calculate the fair market value - from the
time of taking in 1978 or from the filing of the expropriation case in
1992.
ISSUE: Whether the value of just compensation for the
property was to be computed in 1992 when the complaint was
filed instead of in 1978 when the “taking of the property” was
done. YES.
GENERAL RULE in determining just compensation in eminent
domain proceedings is found in Section 4, Rule 67 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which states that in an Order of Condemnation, the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property “…upon payment of
just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of
the complaint.”
Normally, the time of the taking coincides with the filing of the
complaint for expropriation.
The EXCEPTION to this general rule is where the owner would be
given undue incremental advantages from the use of the
expropriated property.
Petitioner NPC HAS NOT ESTABLISHED ANY PROOF that the increase
of P1000 was due to increments caused by petitioner’s use of the
land.
The present price can be attributed to ordinary inflation and
increase in land values from 1978 to 1992.Therefore, petitioner
CANNOT INVOKE THE EXCEPTION to Section 4 of Rule 67.The TAKING
DID NOT TAKE PLACE IN 1978, because petitioner’s entrance in 1978
WAS NOT LEGAL.
It was without intent to expropriate nor was it made under a
“warrant or color of legal authority.”
10) Municipality of La Carlota v. NAWASA
The municipality of La Carlota (La Carlota) owned the
WATERWORK SYSTEM serving its inhabitants until the
enactment of R.A. No. 1383 on June 28, 1955.By virtue of RA
1383, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authorify
(NAWASA) ASSUMED OWNERSHIP andtook over the
supervision, administration and control of the said system,
including the collection of water rentals from the consumers.
ISSUE: Where the owner is deprived of the ordinary and
beneficial use of his property or of its value by its being
diverted to public use, there is taking within the constitutional
sense. Such deprivation would be the certain consequence if,
as prayed for by NAWASA, it should be allowed to assume
jurisdiction supervision and control over the waterworks system
of La Carlota. That would be little less than all assumption of
ownership itself and not of mere administration.
11) Republic v. PLDT
DISPUTE AROSE when the Bureau also provided services to
the general public, leading to PLDT severing the lines.
ISSUE: w/n the trunk lines of PLDT can be validly
expropriated.(YES)
The Republic may, IN THE EXERCISE OF THE SOVEREIGN
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN, require the telephone
company to permit interconnection of the government
telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the
government service may require, subject to the payment of just
compensation to be determined by the court.
12) Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines v. Comelec
Section 92, which mandated that radio and television stations
provide free airtime, known as "COMELEC TIME," during
elections. They argued this unfairly targeted their industry, as
print media was paid for similar services.
All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is
licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast
that there are frequencies to assign.
Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are
given franchises, DO NOT OWN the airwaves and
frequencies through which they transmit broadcast
signals and images. They are merely given the temporary
privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege
may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the
grantee of some form of public service.
13) NAPOCOR v. Maruhom
a land in Saduc, Marawi City owned by Lucman G. Ibrahim and
co-heirs. In 1978, the National Power Corporation (NPC) took a
portion of the land for water projects WITHOUT OWNER'S
KNOWLEDGE.The owners discovered this in 1992 and
demanded damages and repossession from NPC. When not
met, they filed a lawsuit in 1994.
Payment of just compensation does not automatically
grant ownership of the property to the National Power
Corporation (NPC). The respondents, who are the
landowners, are entitled to receive just compensation for
the taking of their property. However, this entitlement does
not entail a mandatory transfer of title to NPC.
Considering the nature and effect of the installation power
lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite
period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use.
For these reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to payment of just
compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the
money equivalent of the property.
It is, therefore, clear that NPC’s acquisition of an easement of
right-of-way on the lands of respondents amounted to
expropriation of the portions of the latter’s property for which
they are entitled to a reasonable and just compensation.
14) Sululong v. Guerrero
National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint to
expropriate parcels of land, including those owned by
petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing,
totaling approximately 25 hectares in Antipolo, Rizal. in
accordance with Pres. 1224 (which was intended for socialized
housing specifically, expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing
Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government
employees.)
Public use -Yes
Just compensation -declared unconstitutional
The provision on just compensation found in Presidential
Decree No. 1224 is the same provision found in the
Presidential Decrees discussed in the case of Export
Processing Zone All thirty vs. Dulay which are declred
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Reason: The method of ascertaining just compensation under
the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment
on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a
matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final
determination.
Due process - Unconstitutional
Before a writ of possession is issued by the court, the ff
requisites must be met:
1) There must be a Complaint for expropriation sufficient in
form and in substance;
(2) A provisional determination of just compensation for the
properties sought to be expropriated must be made by the trial
court on the basis of judicial (not legislative or executive)
discretion; and
(3) The deposit requirement under Section 2, Rule 67 must be
complied with.
Reason: Court finds that the Orders issued pursuant to the
corollary provisions of those decrees authorizing immediate
taking without notice and hearing are violative of due process.
15) Manosca v. Court of Appeals
National historical landmark by the National Historical Institute
due to its association with Felix Y. Manalo,
The petitioners argued that the intended expropriation DID
NOT serve a public purpose and would indirectly benefit Iglesia
ni Cristo, violating constitutional provisions.
Issue: Whether or not the “public use” requirement of Eminent
Domain exists in this case? (YES)
For condemnation purposes, ‘public use’ is one which confers
some benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to
actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public to
use proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought and,
as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by one or
many members of public, a ‘public advantage’ or ‘public
benefit’ accrues sufficient to constitute a public use. Montana
Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457 P.2d 769, 772, 773.”
‘whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a
public use.’ ”
The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize
the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the
culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his
founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo.
16) Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Lozada
Sr.,
Lozada opted not to appeal and the lot was transferred to the
Republic based on the premise thatw if the project will not
happen, they can repurchase it. The planned airport expansion
DID NOT OCCUR and Lozada's attempts to reacquire the lot
were denied due to potential emergency airport needs.
Transfer of operations to Mactan Airport, effectively closing
Lahug Airport. The old airport was repurposed into a
commercial complex, and Lot No. 88 housed a jail and squatter
settlements. Lozada filed a complaint to recover the lot.
Issue: W/N the rights of the respondents to repurchase may be
enforced based on a constructive trust?
On the matter of the repurchase price, while petitioners are
obliged to reconvey Lot No. 88 to respondents, the latter must
return to the former what they received as just compensation
for the expropriation of the property, plus legal interest to be
computed from default, which in this case runs from the time
petitioners comply with their obligation to respondents.
Respondents must likewise pay petitioners the necessary
expenses they may have incurred in maintaining Lot No. 88, as
well as the monetary value of their services in managing it to
the extent that respondents were benefited thereby.
17) EPZA v Dulay
Issue: Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of
determining just compensation in P.D. No. 1533 is
constitutional and valid?
No, the method of ascertaining just compensation under the
aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on
judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the Court inutile in a
matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final
determination. Although in an expropriation proceeding the
court technically would still have the power to determine the
just compensation for the property, following the applicable
decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower
value of the property as declared either by the owner or the
assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless
for the court to appoint commissioners under the Rules of
Court.
The determination of “just compensation” in eminent
domain cases is a judicial function.
18) De Knecht v. Court of Appeals
The Knechts insist that although they were no longer the
registered owners of the property at the time Civil Case No.
7327 was filed, they still occupied the property and therefore
should have been joined as defendants in the expropriation
proceedings. They claim that they still occupied the land when
it was expropriated and therefore had a share.
Four months earlier, in January 1990, Civil Case No. 2961-P
for reconveyance was dismissed with finality by this Court and
judgment was entered in February 1990. The Knechts lost
whatever right or colorable title they had to the property after
we affirmed the order of the trial court dismissing the
reconveyance case.
The Knechts’ possession of the land and buildings WAS
BASED ON THEIR CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP not on any
juridical title such as a lessee, mortgagee, or vendee.
19) MIAA v. Rodriguez
as pointed out in Republic v. Lara, is that -
"... WHERE PROPERTY IS TAKEN AHEAD OF THE FILING
of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be
enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry
by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its
value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in
the value of the property from the time the complaint is filed,
due to general economic conditions. The owner of private
property should be compensated only for what he actually
loses.
The subject lot was occupied as a runway of the MIAA starting
in 1972. Thus, the value of the lot in 1972 should serve as the
basis for the award of compensation to the owner.
20) Republic v. Lim
Issue: Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot
932 despite its failure to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-
interest the just compensation
There is a recognized rule that title to the property expropriated
shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full
payment of the just compensation. Clearly, without full payment
of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the
landowner to the expropriator.
SC ruled in earlier cases that expropriation of lands consists of
two stages. First is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise. The second is
concerned with the determination by the court of "the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken. It is only
upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is
said to have been completed.
Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and
his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered
the expropriation process incomplete.
Thus, SC ruled that the special circumstances prevailing in this
case entitled respondent to recover possession of the
expropriated lot from the Republic.
While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of
just compensation does not entitle the private landowner
to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however,
in cases where the government failed to pay just
compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the
judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners
concerned shall have the right to recover possession of
their property.
22) Eusebio v. Luis
Whether or not the respondents’ claim for just compensation
has already prescribed. NO
In Republic v. CA, the Court emphasized "that where private
property is taken by the Government for public use without first
acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or negotiated
sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or the value thereof
does not prescribe."
Government agencies should not exercise the power of
eminent domain with wanton disregard for property rights as
Section 9, Art III of the Constitution provides that "private
property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation."
Recovery of possession of the property by the landowner can
no longer be allowed on the grounds of estoppel and, more
importantly, of public policy which imposes upon the public
utility the obligation to continue its services to the public.
The NON-FILING OF THE CASE for expropriation WILL
NOT necessarily lead to the return of the property to the
landowner.
23) Apo Fruits Corporation v. LBP
DAR was given a chance to support its ruling on why the
purchase price should be at a lower amount but DAR failed to
present such evidence. To allow the taking of landowners’
properties,and to leave them empty-handed while
government withholds compensation IS UNDOUBTEDLY
OPRRESIVE.
The CONCEPT OF JUST COMPENSATION embraces not
only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to
the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land
WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME from its taking. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just”
inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the
consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while
being made to wait for a decade or more before actually
receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
Note: Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator.
24) LBP v. Rivera
The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is
considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in
open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action
and competition or the fair value of the property as between
one who receives, and one who desires to sell, if fixed at the
time of the actual taking by the government.
Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is
deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the
final compensation must include interest on its just value to be
computed from the time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court.
25) EPZA v. Pulido
"when the parties signed the compromise agreement and the
same was approved, they had in fact settled between
themselves the question of what is just compensation and that
both of them had intended that defendant would be
compensated on the basis of prevailing values at the time of
the agreement."
Furthermore, the P6,200/square meter is the correct just
compensation for Lot 1406-B. This assortment by the lower
courts are a uniform findings of fact upon the question of just
compensation reached by the CA and the RTC are entitled to
the greatest respect. They are conclusive on the Court in the
absence of a strong showing by the petitioner that the CA and
the RTC erred in appreciating the established facts and in
drawing inferences from such facts.
Lastly, the court contends that the estate of Salud Jimenez is
entitled to an interest of 12% per annum. This is because of the
fact that just compensation was not promptly made to the
Estate of Salud Jimenez for the taking of Lot 1406-B by the
petitioner. The move to compensate through the swap
arrangement under the Compromise Agreement was aborted
or amounted to nothing through no fault of the Estate of Salud
Jimenez. The petitioner, which should have known about the
inefficacy of the swapping of Lot 434 for Lot 1406- B, could
even be said to have resorted to the swapping for the purpose
of delaying the payment.
26) Mun. of Biñan
In actions of eminent domain, as in actions for partition, since
no less than two (2) appeals are allowed by law, the period for
appeal from an order of condemnation is thirty (30) days
counted from notice of order and not the ordinary period of
fifteen (15) days prescribed for actions in general, conformably
with the provision of Section 39 of BP129 to the effect that in
"appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of
the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals
are allowed, the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a
record of appeal being required.
The municipality's MR was therefore timely presented, well
within the thirty-day period laid down by law therefor; and it
was error for the Trial Court to have ruled otherwise and to
have declared that the order sought to be considered had
become final and executory.
It is claimed by the Municipality that the issuance of such a
separate, final order or judgment had given rise "ipso facto to a
situation where multiple appeals became available." The
Municipality is right. In an action against several defendants,
the court may, when a several judgment is proper, render
judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to
proceed against the others." In lieu of the original record, a
record on appeal will per force have to be prepared and
transmitted to the appellate court. More than one appeal being
permitted in this case, therefore, "the period of appeal shall be
thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being required as provided
by the Implementing Rules in relation to Section 39 of B.P. Blg.
129.
27) Agan v. PIATCO
Facts: The case revolves around the development of the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Terminal III. In the late
1990s, the government entertained proposals for its
construction. Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp (AEDC), a
consortium of Filipino-Chinese business leaders, submitted an
unsolicited proposal. After a series of proceedings, Philippine
International Airport Terminals Co Inc (PIATCO) emerged as
the winning bidder.
28) US v. Toribio,
Appellant Toribio was convicted for slaughtering his carabao
without the required permit from the municipal treasurer, a
violation of Act No. 1147.
NO. Act no. 1147 is not a taking of the property for public use,
within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and
legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate
and restrain such particular use of the property as would be
inconsistent with the rights of the publics. All property is
acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be
so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair
the public rights and interests of the community.
The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines
like an epidemic that wiped 70-100% of the population of
carabaos.. The Supreme Court also said that these animals
are vested with public interest for they are fundamental use for
the production of crops. These reasons satisfy the requisites of
a valid exercise of police power
Finally, SC said that article 1147 is not an exercise of the
inherent power of eminent domain. The said law does not
constitute the taking of caraboes for public purpose; it just
serve as a mere regulation for the consumption of these private
properties for the protection of general welfare and public
interest.
29) People v. Fajardo
Mayor Fajardo of Camarines Sur passed Ordjnance No 7
requiring permit for building/repairing buildings and penalizes if
building destroys the view of the public plaza. Four years after
his term ended and requested permit to build on their property
located /separated from the plaza by a creek. The request was
denied on the ground of destroying the view of public plaza. of
peace.
Whether or not Fajardo was deprived to use his property?
(YES)
The mayor has absolute discretion to issue or deny a permit.
The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any
standard to guide or limit the mayor’s action. It permanently
deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence,
it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a
taking of appellants property without just compensation.
Every structure that may be erected on appellants’ land,
regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the
ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view
of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in
effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused
for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban
in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality
must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to
be heard.
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of
property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose
goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as
a taking of the property.
30) Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College
The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the
setback requirement was to make the parking space free for
use by the public, considering that it would no longer be for the
exclusive use of the respondents as it would also be available
for use by the general public. Section 9 of Article III of the
1987 Constitution, a provision on eminent domain, provides
that private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation.
The petitioners cannot justify the setback by arguing that the
ownership of the property will continue to remain with the
respondents. It is a settled rule that neither the acquisition
of title nor the total destruction of value is essential to
taking. In fact, it is usually in cases where the title remains
with the private owner that inquiry should be made to
determine whether the impairment of a property is merely
regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. The Court
is of the view that the implementation of the setback
requirement would be tantamount to a taking of a total of
3,762.36 square meters of the respondents’ private property for
public use without just compensation, in contravention to the
Constitution.
Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful
acts and "un-neighborliness," it is obvious that providing for a
parking area has no logical connection to, and is not
reasonably necessary for, the accomplishment of these goals.
Regarding the beautification purpose of the setback
requirement, it has long been settled that the State may not,
under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of
the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or
enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community.