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Understanding the People’s Defense Forces in Myanmar

The junta is losing control in the face of a strengthening armed resistance.

Thursday, November 3, 2022 / By: Ye Myo Hein

When the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) first coalesced in Myanmar in 2021, many
viewed them as hastily organized groups of young vigilantes who would be quickly overrun
by the junta’s military force, known as the Sit-Tat. Instead, the PDFs have grown in size,
organization and capability over the last year and half, and now pose a major threat to the
junta’s viability. Though they lack heavy equipment, an advanced command structure and
international support, the proliferating PDFs have demonstrated remarkable tactical ingenuity
and resilience. If they improve their command structure and weaponry, they could help
expand territory under resistance control and hasten the junta’s demise.

Given their fragmented nature and

rapid development, the PDFs remain
a mystery to most analysts and
international policymakers. Benefiting
from strong public support, these
rebel groups, which have become
battle-hardened and more
coordinated, now play a crucial, and
perhaps decisive, role in the future
security landscape of Myanmar.

Rebel militia fighters of the People’s Defense Forces patrol

a front line area near government military positions in the
Kayin State of Myanmar. March 9, 2022. (Adam Dean/The
New York Times)

A New Landscape for Armed Resistance

After tolerating peaceful protests for a few days after its February 2021 coup, the Sit-Tat has
committed horrendous atrocities against the protesters, expecting this would subjugate a
population unwilling to return to military rule. Instead, it unleashed a revolutionary energy that

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soon led to the emergence of the PDFs to protect the people from junta atrocities,
particularly in areas of the country inhabited by the Buddhist Bamar majority from where the
Sit-Tat has historically drawn recruits and political support.

People’s Defense Force is an umbrella term for three types of armed groups that have
emerged since the coup: PDFs, Local Defense Forces (LDFs) and People’s Defense Teams
(PaKhaPha/PDTs). The PDFs are generally larger armed units formed or recognized by the
National Unity Government (NUG), the shadow civilian government formed primarily by
democratically elected lawmakers. The PDFs mainly operate under joint command systems
established by the NUG and several ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), many of which
have been fighting the Sit-Tat for decades.The LDFs are local militias operating
autonomously at the local level, often pursuing their own missions separate from the NUG’s.
The PDTs are localized guerilla units formed for local defense and security purposes. The
PDFs are more regularized military units operating across townships and states/regions,
whereas the LDFs and PDTs are self-defense or community security militias operating at the
community level.

Acronyms

C3C Central Command and Coordination Committee

CDF Chinland Defense Force

CJDC Chinland Joint Defense Committee

EAO Ethnic Armed Organization

J2C Joint Command and Coordination

KA Karenni Army

KIA Kachin Independence Army

KNDF Karenni National Defense Force

KNPP Karenni National Progressive Party

KNU Karen National Union

KPDF Kachin People’s Defense Force

LDF Local Defense Force

MDC Military Division Command

NUG National Unity Government

PDF People’s Defense Force

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PDT/PaKhaPha People’s Defense Teams

People’s Defense Forces

According to interviews undertaken for this piece, there are roughly 65,000 total PDF
troops. Approximately 20 percent of PDF troops are equipped with military-grade
weapons and another 40 percent have homemade weapons.
As of October 2022, there were around 300 PDF battalions with 200 to 500 troops
each. Sixty-three additional battalions are awaiting NUG recognition.
The PDFs operate under the command of the Central Command and Coordination
Committee (C3C) and Joint Command and Coordination (J2C), which were established
by the NUG and its EAO allies. Most PDFs are primarily loyal to or were formed by the
NUG, whereas others, including the powerful Chinland Defense Force (CDF), Karenni
National Defense Force (KNDF) and Kachin People’s Defense Force (KPDF), operate
under the C3C but are not otherwise aligned with the NUG. Regardless of their
national-level affiliation, PDFs work most closely with military division commands
(MDCs), which operate semi-autonomously of the C3C and J2C. Recent PDF
deployment and operations indicate that MDCs are becoming more involved in PDF
operational strategy.
There are currently three MDCs. Some 200 PDF units currently operate under the
command of MDC 1 with responsibility for the Kachin, Anyar(Central Myanmar) and
Chin theaters. Approximately 50 PDFs operate in the areas of MDCs 2 and 3 which
manage operations in the Karen and Karenni theaters, respectively.
The PDFs in ethnic areas are operationally commanded by or affiliated with EAOs. For
example, the KPDF is under the command of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA),
the CDF is under the control of Chinland Joint Defense Committee (CJDC) and the
KNDF is closely affiliated with the Karenni Army (KA) of the Karenni National
Progressive Party (KNPP).
The PDFs are systematically formed, trained and equipped as main combat forces by
the NUG and its allied EAOs. Each PDF unit is structured triangularly with squads,
platoons, companies and battalions of three each. For example, three squads to one
platoon, three platoons in one company and three companies in one battalion.

Local Defense Forces

The NUG estimates that there were 401 LDFs as of April 2022. The LDFs operate
more autonomously than the PDTs and PDFs and do not directly interact with the C3C
or J2C, but 354 are now informally linked with the NUG. This enhanced coordination is
a first step toward integrating the LDFs into the broader command system. One
hundred LDFs have been converted to PDFs and dozens have been converted to
PDTs.

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 Recent analysis estimates that there are at least 30,000 LDF personnel. The LDFs
range in size from a dozen to a few thousand personnel. This estimate is highly fluid
given that roughly 25 percent of LDF fighters have been converted to PDFs or PDTs
over the past six months.
Mostly formed in mid-March 2021 to protect protesters, the LDFs continue to operate
as township-based militias, often led by activists.
The LDFs are self-funded, primarily through community and diaspora donations. They
rely mostly on homemade weapons, though some LDFs are connected with large
EAOs which provide training and equipment.
Operationally, the LDFs engage in irregular warfare through landmines, skirmishes,
sabotage and targeted killings. Their primary aim is to deny the junta administrative
control over rural areas.

People’s Defense Team

The PDTs, also known as PaKaPha, are formed by the NUG, and specialize in urban
guerilla warfare, basic training for new resistance fighters, logistics, public mobilization
and PDF support.
According to the NUG, the PDTs have been formed in 250 out of 330 townships. Over
the past six months, they have significantly expanded formation at the village level. The
PDTs are most active in central Myanmar, particularly Sagaing and Magwe regions.
Although PDTs operate at the village level, many coordinate at the township level. A
single township can, therefore, have as many as 2,000 PDT members coordinating.
Most PDTs are primarily equipped with homemade small arms.
The PDTs are the foundational resistance force, linking communities with the broader
resistance movement.

The Continued Development of the PDFs

As nonviolent resistance methods have become prohibitively dangerous for many because of
the Sit-Tat’s crackdown, the PDFs, LDFs and PDTs have become the center of the resistance
movement. With strong public support and increasingly close coordination with EAOs, they
have expanded rapidly despite facing a genocidal Russian-armed and Chinese-backed junta
with decades of fighting experience that has no qualms about committing atrocities.

Eighteen months since the coup, the PDFs, LDFs and PDTs are undergoing a transformation
from fractious, decentralized and localized resistance forces to a more organized and better
equipped military force.

Command Systems

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Resistance forces established themselves in the form of a cellular, horizontally networked
guerilla force. Faced with the junta’s more aggressive and brutal offensive campaigns, the
NUG sought to integrate the disparate civil resistance forces, and to coordinate military
operations with allied EAOs under a centralized command system.

In October 2021, the NUG announced the formation of a C3C, a centralized military
command structure jointly led by the NUG and its EAOs allies. The C3C includes the NUG,
KIA, the KNPP, Chin National Front and the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front. The NUG
also negotiated with Karen National Union (KNU), which is not a member of the C3C, to form
the J2C to oversee operations of all troops in the KNU area. Although the C3C and J2C are
separate commands, the NUG is a key link between these two structures.

Even as the command systems are still developing, overall command is becoming a more
cohesive and coordinated command unit, which could help shift the military balance further in
favor of the resistance. Importantly, the operation of the C3C and J2C is improving as more
PDFs, LDFs and PDTs come under their command. The NUG is now in the process of
establishing a war office, which has three departments: general staff, adjutant affairs and
quartermaster. The general staff branch oversees military operations whereas adjutant affairs
and the quartermaster oversee joint command administration. The key challenge now will be
to merge the C3C, J2C and LDFs into a single system.

Arming the Resistance

The armed resistance began with makeshift weapons, such as traditional guns, gas rifles
and handmade firearms, and junta leaders mistakenly expected that these ragtag armed
rebels could be easily defeated. Unlike in Ukraine, Myanmar’s armed rebellion has received
no lethal support from the international community, relying instead on arms being supplied by
sympathetic EAOs and purchased on the black market.

Resistance forces have used their own money and public donations to finance arms
purchases from EAOs and others. Through its innovative fundraising tactics, the resistance
has raised over $55 million, according to interviews with an official of the NUG’s Ministry of
Defense undertaken for this article, most of which has been used to fund armed resistance
forces. Although this is only a fraction of what is needed, it has far exceeded initial
expectations and helped sustain the armed resistance.

In central Myanmar, far from EAOs and the weapons black markets along the border with
China, the price of weapons is particularly high, which constrains the PDFs, LDFs and PDTs
in that area. In response, resistance forces have produced their own weapons during active
war, which is unprecedented in Myanmar’s modern history. According to the author’s
research in April 2022, there are over 70 workshops across the country that manufacture
rudimentary weapons which serve about 30 percent of localized arms requirements.

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Although 60 percent of the PDFs are armed, a smaller proportion — only about 50 percent
— of all resistance troops are armed, mostly with locally produced low-quality arms. Strategic
armaments such as artillery, anti-air and anti-armored weapons are unavailable to most
resistance troops. Without more advanced arms, particularly air-defense weapons, the
resistance forces will only be able to engage in limited warfare. Furthermore, despite some
success in rural guerilla tactics, it is still difficult to contest junta security control of major
urban areas. When the Sit-Tat’s infantry comes under serious assault from the PDFs, they
often call in air strikes, artillery and armored units, and the poorly equipped pro-democracy
forces retreat.

Public Support

Widespread public support for the resistance forces provides a major advantage over the Sit-
Tat’s light infantry force which is now spread thinly across the country. So far, resistance
forces have had no trouble recruiting to replace losses and expand their strength, while the
Sit-Tat is experiencing defections and recruitment difficulties. However, without meaningful
international support, resistance forces remain entirely dependent on local support to sustain
themselves and may find it difficult to maintain public goodwill if the Sit-Tat manages to drive
a wedge between the resistance movement and the public by killing its supporters and
funders and burning down villages perceived to support the resistance.

What’s Next for Resistance Forces?

The PDFs, LDFs and PDTs have demonstrated the ability to inflict heavy causalities on the
low-morale and over-stretched Sit-Tat. As a result, the junta is losing control of a wide swath
of territory, particularly in rural areas. Moreover, resistance forces are making progress
toward overcoming their weaknesses in command and control and weapons.

Mao Zedong once said that, “there is very little hope of destroying a revolutionary guerilla
movement after it has survived the first phase and has acquired the sympathetic support of a
significant segment (between 15 and 25 percent) of the population.”

Despite facing serious and ferocious crackdowns, Myanmar’s revolutionary guerilla

movement has survived the first phase and built widespread public support. Through tactical
ingenuity, it is now developing from its rudimentary beginnings into a force that operates at a
strategic scale.

The junta has garnered support from regional actors, including China, by claiming to be the
only entity that can stabilize the country and provide protection for these actors’ strategic
assets and investment. This assertion has become less credible in recent months as the Sit-
Tat has not only lost control of most of the country, but has also shown itself to be the primary
agent of instability domestically and regionally — launching heavy weapons into Thailand
and Bangladesh, actively inciting interreligious violence and committing horrendous atrocities

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that spur large outflows of refugees. As the junta desperately attempts to regain some
degree of control ahead of its sham elections proposed for next summer, it will face a more
sophisticated and coordinated resistance force than it has to date.

Ye Myo Hein is a visiting scholar at the U.S. Institute of Peace and a global fellow at the
Wilson Center.

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