Simon Fortier

Proclus on the Climax of the Phaedrus

(247c6–d1)
1 Introduction
It was at the Neoplatonic School of Athens that the Phaedrus received its richest, if
not to say most imaginative treatment in all of Antiquity. The later Neoplatonists’
deep reverence for this dialogue stemmed from their conviction that it, along with
the Symposium, treated of certain ‘theological realities (πράγματα).’1 These reali-
ties, in the case of the Phaedrus, constituted no less than five separate orders of
gods that were all to be found in the first half of Socrates’ palinode (Theol. plat. I
4, 17.25–18.9). These two dialogues were held, however, to teach not only of the
gods, but also of the penultimate step in the soul’s journey towards unification
(ἕνωσις) with them.2 While the Symposium was held to teach of the soul’s contem-
plative ascent to Intelligible Beauty via the scala amoris (Symp. 209e–212a), the
same ascent was understood to be taught in the Phaedrus via a scala pulchri-
tudinis (In Phdr. 14.9–12), beginning with the physical beauty of one’s beloved
and culminating in the soul’s vision of the region beyond heaven (Phdr.
247c3–e8).3 Therefore, like the encomium of the indescribable Beauty in the

1 See Anon. Prol. 26.16–44; Festugière 1969, 290–292.

2 I.e. they describe the contemplation of the intelligibles, and perhaps even, in the case of the
Symposium (see Theol. plat. I 4, 19.1), the unification with Intelligible Beauty, but not yet the
unification with the gods per se (i.e. the divine henads) by means of the ὕπαρξις of the soul. For
Proclus’ conception of the steps of the inner journey towards unification, see, inter alia, Theol.
plat. I 3, 15.6–17.7; II 11, 64.11–65.26.
3 “Intelligible Beauty and the participation extending thence to all beautiful things” is said by
Proclus to be the σκοπός of the Phaedrus (Theol. plat. I 7, 31.3–5). Nevertheless, he seems to con-
sider the Intelligible Beauty to be beyond the divine orders of which the Phaedrus treats and to
be only implicitly treated in the dialogue: “and how then is the unification with the primary in-
telligibles, Plato did not reveal this in words; indeed, the unification with these intelligibles is
ineffable and operates by ineffable means” (Theol. plat. IV 9, 28.24–27). Although we know little
of Proclus’ interpretation of the Symposium, it is likely that he understood this ineffability to
have been made explicit in the apophatic description of Beauty at Symp. 211a (the presence of
this apophatic description would also explain why the Symposium succeeded the Phaedrus in
the Neoplatonic curriculum). Proclus holds that this Intelligible Beauty is located in the third
intelligible triad (see, inter alia, Theol. plat. III 15, 53.9–10; 18, 63.22–24; 22, 80.7–27).

Simon Fortier, FRS-FNRS/Université de Liège – FWO/KU Leuven

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110683936-012
200 Simon Fortier

Symposium, the description of the soul’s vision of the region beyond heaven
was seen as the highpoint of the Phaedrus.
One sentence of this description in particular held the Neoplatonists’
attention:

For the colourless, shapeless, intangible Being that truly is, observable by the soul’s
pilot, intellect, alone, around which is the class of true science, holds this place. (Plato,
Phdr. 247c6–d1)4

Here, in this willfully opaque depiction of the region beyond heaven, Proclus
found not only the Phaedrus’ most profound theological teachings,5 but also a de-
scription of how these teachings may be confirmed by experience. In other words,
he found here a description of the nature of contemplation. This was therefore,
one could argue, the very climax of the Phaedrus for the later Neoplatonists.
Although no formal Proclean commentary on the Phaedrus has survived,6
the passage at 247c6–d1 was of such importance to his thought that we find allu-
sions to his exegesis of it, and even summaries thereof, scattered throughout his
remaining works, most notably in the fourth book of his Platonic Theology. It is
on the basis of these and others passages that I therefore propose to reconstruct,
as far as possible, Proclus’ interpretation of Phaedrus 247c6–d1, proceeding, as
he would himself have in a commentary on the dialogue, lemma by lemma.7

4 ἡ γὰρ ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφὴς οὐσία ὄντως οὖσα, ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ
μόνῳ θεατὴ νῷ, περὶ ἣν τὸ τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἐπιστήμης γένος, τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τόπον. All transla-
tions are my own, unless otherwise indicated. I translate here and throughout Phaedrus 247c6-
d1 according to Proclus’ understanding of it, which we shall examine in detail below.
5 While Proclus technically holds that the assertion that “the divine is beautiful, wise, and
good” (Phdr. 246d8–e1) describes not only three universal divine attributes (Theol. plat. I 22–24),
but the three intelligible triads (Theol. plat. III 22, 78.16–20), he seems to understand this as an
aside rather than part of the dialogue’s principal theological teachings. This, at least, is the im-
pression he gives when he orders the dialogues (other than the Parmenides) hierarchically ac-
cording to the orders of gods of which they treat (Theol. plat. I 5, 25.3–23). Here, as elsewhere
(e.g. Theol. plat. I 4, 17.25–18.12), Proclus states that the highest divine order of which the
Phaedrus teaches are the intelligible-intellective gods.
6 On Proclus’ lost Phaedrus commentary or commentaries, see Luna e.a. 2012, 1573. There may
also have been a commentary specifically on the palinode (Luna e.a. 2012, 1573). Proclus also
mentions certain “researches on the divinely inspired intuitions of Socrates in the Phaedrus”
that he co-authored with Syrianus (In Parm. IV 944.15–16 Steel (= 944.16–18 L–S)). On the hy-
pothesis that Proclus’ commentary (or one of his commentaries) may still have existed during
the Byzantine Middle Ages, see Rashed 2016a.
7 Although it undoubtedly contains certain teachings of Syrianus on Phaedrus 247c6–d1 that
were later adopted by Proclus, I have chosen not to use Hermias’ Scholia to ‘fill in’ the gaps in
our knowledge of Proclus’ exegesis. There is still a great deal of uncertainty regarding what
 Proclus on the Climax of the Phaedrus (247c6–d1) 201

2 “The Colourless, Shapeless, Intangible Being

that Truly Is”
Plato, as many would argue today, is here referring to the immaterial nature
of the Forms, those things which are said to exist, metaphorically, in the
mysterious ‘region beyond heaven.’ Proclus, however, takes this lemma to be
far richer than meets the eye. For him, the myth of the Phaedrus palinode is a
thinly veiled double-allegory for what he describes in the following passage:

Whenever a particular soul attaches itself to a universal soul, its vehicle also accompanies
the vehicle of the divine soul, and just as the particular soul imitates the intellection of
the divine soul, so does its body imitate the movement of the divine body. (Proclus, In
Tim. III 276.19–22)

On the one hand, the myth is an allegory for a real, physical journey under-
taken by human souls: attached to their luminous vehicles, our souls follow the
movements of the vehicles of the gods, the celestial bodies.8 On the other hand,
the myth is also an allegory for the soul’s imitation of the gods’ intellective life.
According to this allegorical reading, the physical movement and ‘places’ de-
scribed in the myth should be understood as moments in an intellective jour-
ney. For example, Proclus holds that the ‘heavens (οὐρανός)’ through which
the soul charioteers are said to journey in the palinode is not the physical heav-
ens, but the intelligible heavens (Theol. plat. IV 5). Socrates is therefore describ-
ing in the palinode both an outer journey across the heavens and an inner
journey through the intellect.
In keeping with the second of these two allegorical readings of the palinode,
Proclus, following Syrianus (Theol. plat. IV 23, 69.12–15), takes three of the pla-
ces mentioned in the palinode, namely, the vault below heaven (ὑπουράνιον
ἁψῖδα), heaven (οὐρανός), and the region beyond heaven (ὑπερουράνιος τόπος)
to be symbols of three different orders of divine intelligible beings who are at
once intellects, Forms, and gods. While the last of these qualifications may sur-
prise readers unfamiliar with Proclus, they need only keep in mind that as a

teachings from the Scholia belong to Syrianus and what belong to Hermias alone and I am
unconvinced by the arguments (or lack thereof) for treating the Scholia wholesale as a mere
transcript of Syrianus’ lectures (see Fortier 2018b). Rather than use Hermias to clarify Proclus,
it seems far more prudent to establish as far as possible Proclus’ exegesis via his own texts
and then to use this as a basis for clarifying the provenance of the Scholia’s content.
8 On the soul’s journey through the cosmos according to Proclus, see Fortier 2018a.
202 Simon Fortier

Greek polytheist, he is willing to ascribe different degrees of godhead or divinity

to certain beings is the order of procession.9 He therefore calls the more univer-
sal degrees of Forms gods.
These beings are the highest orders of what he calls the ‘intellective (νοεροί)’
gods, specifically the ‘intelligible-intellectives (νοητοί καὶ νοεροί).’ This technical
terminology requires some explaining. Proclus offers multiple ways to look at
the vast procession of gods from One-Being (ἓν ὂν), the reflection of the First
Principle in the world of Being,10 down to the gods who inhabit the sublunary
world alongside us. One way, which he adopts as the backbone of his Platonic
Theology, is to divide the gods into universal gods and particular gods (Theol.
plat. VI 2, 11.9–30). As Proclus writes, “a god is more universal the nearer he is
to the One, more particular the more removed he is” (El. theol. §126, 113.14–15).
Placing the gods along a spectrum relative to their proximity to the First princi-
ple, Proclus divides the spectrum in two at the level of the universal Demiurge of
the Timaeus. The Demiurge is, according to him, the last of the universal gods, or
the lowliest god in the order of procession possessed of truly universal causal
power (Theol. plat. V 13, 43.18–44.17).
In order to describe the internal order of the category of universal gods,
Proclus turns to the Timaeus’ image of the demiurgic Intellect that contem-
plates the Intelligible Model. The most universal of the universal gods are the
objects of contemplation for the less universal gods. The former are therefore
referred to by Proclus as the intelligible gods, while the latter are appropri-
ately referred to as the intellective gods. There are, however, some gods that
are universal enough so as to be the objects of contemplation of some beings,
but not so universal as to be without any object of contemplation beyond
themselves. It is to these gods that Proclus refers when he speaks of the intel-
ligible-intellectives.11

9 We shall examine the relation between intellects and Forms below. On what the appellation
‘god’ means for Proclus, see Fortier 2018c.
10 According to his reading of the Parmenides, Proclus holds that the order of procession
from the first principle may be conceived of as the gradual estrangement of One and Being.
What Proclus calls the ‘primary intelligibles’ (e.g. Theol. plat. IV 6, 23.11) may therefore be de-
scribed as One-Being, while at the level of the intelligible-intellectives, One and Being have
become sufficiently estranged that their distinction becomes actual (Theol. plat. IV 27, 79.
15–80.6). On the difference between the primary intelligibles and the intelligible-intellectives,
see Theol. plat. IV 3, 16.1–17.14.
11 As Proclus writes, “amongst the intellective [gods], some are intelligible and intellective,
i.e. those which while thinking are thought, according to the Oracle, while others are only in-
tellective” (Theol. plat. IV 1, 6.10–12).
 Proclus on the Climax of the Phaedrus (247c6–d1) 203

In sum, the intelligible-intellective gods are simply the most universal or-
ders of intellective gods, and are sufficiently universal so as to be the object of
contemplation for all intellects below the Demiurge. The appellation ‘intelligi-
ble-intellective’ is, of course, especially merited by the very highest orders of
the intelligible-intellective gods, which Proclus takes to be symbolized by the
‘region beyond heaven’ in the Phaedrus, insofar as they are at once the most
universal of the intellective orders of gods, and in a certain way, the most par-
ticular of the intelligible orders:

the region beyond heaven is doubtless intelligible, and it is for this reason that Plato says
that it is a Being that truly is and observable by the intellect of the soul, but at the same
time it is the unique extent and unification of the intellective gods. For it is not intelligible
in the same way as the Living-Being-in-Itself, nor as the very first Eternity, nor as the pri-
mary One-Being itself. For these, being primary intelligibles, transcend all the other intel-
ligibles and pre-exist according to themselves, while the region beyond heaven is
established immediately above the heavenly revolution and is its intelligible, but not an
intelligible pure and simple. (Proclus, Theol. plat. IV 10, 31.23–32.6)

Here the liminal position of the gods represented by the region beyond heaven
is made abundantly clear. These gods are intelligible, insofar as, like their sym-
bol – the region beyond heaven – they are the objects of an intellect, yet unlike
the Living-Being-in-Itself, the very first Eternity, and the primary One-Being,
the symbols of the three intelligible triads which make up what are called the
‘primary’ intelligibles (i.e. the intelligible gods mentioned above) (Theol. plat.
III 8–27, 30.15–102.6), Proclus considers these intelligible-intellective gods to
be only a ‘secondary’ or ‘derivative (δεύτερος)’ intelligibles (Theol. plat. IV 10,
32.27).
There is, however, no sharp separation between the intelligible and the
intellective gods, for the gods as a whole form a unique and unbroken series
characterised by both continuity (συνέχεια) and community (κοινωνία) (Theol.
plat. IV 11, 35.20–36.13). There is therefore a necessary ‘overlap’ of the intelli-
gible and the intellective gods. The highest triad of the intelligible-intellective
gods thus overlaps with the lowest order of the intelligible gods and shares in
some of its properties. It is, for example, like the intelligible gods, “unknowable
and ineffable according to its specific character (ἰδιότητα), and known only
through intelligible symbols (συνθήματα)” (Theol. plat. IV 11, 35.17–20). These
symbols are evidently those, both apophatic and cataphatic, revealed by Plato in
the Phaedrus. Plato describes the highest triad of the intelligible-intellective gods
apophatically as ‘colourless, shapeless, and intangible.’ He also uses three differ-
ent sets of cataphatic symbols, including the triad which we find at Phaedrus
204 Simon Fortier

247c6–d1, namely, the 1) ‘Being that truly is,’ which is 2) ‘observable only by the
soul’s pilot’ and 3) ‘around which is the class of true science.’12
Insofar as the first intelligible-intellective triad has a “transcendent su-
premacy over subsequent beings” (Theol. plat. IV 11, 37.25–26), “extends be-
yond the intellective gods” and is “the highest and most unitary [of them]”
(Theol. plat. IV 11, 38.25–26), it is revealed apophatically. Just as the First
Principle may be known through the negations of all the orders of reality that
proceed from it, the first intelligible-intellective triad may be known through
the negations of the attributes of the three divine orders immediately succeed-
ing the region beyond heaven (Theol. plat. IV 12, 39.4–19). ‘Colourless’ therefore
refers to the second intelligible-intellective triad, the ‘heaven’ of the Phaedrus,
which is filled with intelligible light just as the sensible heaven is filled with
sensible colour (Theol. plat. IV 12, 39.22–40.12). ‘Shapeless’ refers to the third
intelligible-intellective triad, since the ‘vault below heaven,’ as a vault, is a
shape (Theol. plat. IV 12, 40.13–17).13 ‘Intangible,’ finally, refers to the first triad
of strictly intellective gods, whose attribute, according to the second hypothesis
of the Parmenides, is ‘tangibility’ (Theol. plat. IV 12, 39.2–42.12).
By contrast, insofar as it “participates those things that precede it” (Theol.
plat. IV 11, 37.26-7) and “is filled by the first causes” (Theol. plat. IV 11, 38.22), the
first intelligible-intellective triad is revealed cataphatically. In the cataphatic triad
of Phaedrus 247c6–d1, for example, Plato reveals the general nature of this order
and how it is known (as opposed to the other cataphatic descriptions, which reveal
its triadic nature). Regarding its nature, the first intelligible-intellective order is de-
scribed by Plato as the ‘Being that truly is.’ Proclus describes why it is so called in
the following two passages, which are as close to a Proclean gloss on Phaedrus
247c6–7 as has come down to us:

He (sc. Plato) therefore calls [the region beyond heaven] the ‘Being that truly is,’ because
it participates primary Being. Indeed, in all beings, what is (τὸ εἶναι) and what truly is (τὸ
ὄντως εἶναι) are the offspring of intelligible being (τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας). For just as unity
(τὸ ἕν) [draws its existence] from the very first principle, that prior to the intelligible, so
too does the nature of being [draw its existence] from the intelligible, since it is there that
One-Being [is to be found]. (Proclus, Theol. plat. IV 13, 42.18–22)

12 The other two sets of cataphatic symbols are ‘Knowledge Itself,’ ‘Temperance Itself,’ and
‘Justice Itself’ (see Theol. plat. IV 14, 43–45), and ‘the Plain of Truth,’ ‘the Prairie’ and ‘the
Nourishment of the Gods’ (Theol. plat. IV 15, 45–48). The name ‘region beyond heaven’ is, of
course, also a cataphatic symbol of this order.
13 See also In Parm. VI 1127.29–1128.28 Steel (= 1127.30–1128.36 L.–S.).
 Proclus on the Climax of the Phaedrus (247c6–d1) 205

Proclus explains here that the highest intelligible-intellective triad is called the
‘Being that truly is’ because it participates the ‘primary Being,’ i.e. the primary
intelligibles. Elsewhere, he even goes so far as to say that this participation in
the intelligibles is reflected in the very expression ‘Being that truly is,’ as
‘Being’ signifies that it is intelligible, while ‘truly is’ signifies that it participates
intelligible Being (Theol. plat. IV 6, 23.16–20). The appellation ‘Being that truly
is,’ however, is not specific to the highest intelligible-intellective triad. All
being that participates the primary intelligibles, or, in other words, the entire
‘intelligible plane’ (In Tim. I 233.2-3),14 from the Living-Being-in-Itself to the par-
ticular intellects,15 is composed of Being that truly is.
Continuing with his discussion of Phaedrus 247c6–7, Proclus then goes on
to explain that

[Plato writes] ‘observable by the soul’s pilot,’ because [this order] has received an intelli-
gible superiority with regard to the other intellective gods. He therefore clearly distin-
guishes the intelligible good of this [order] from the intellect that knows it. And thus, this
intelligible, like the Being that truly is, reaches this [order] from the unitary gods. For
those are intelligibles in a primary and unparticipated way and the primordial causes of
all the intelligibles; and the Being that truly is and the intelligible coincide with one an-
other. For indeed all the intelligible is truly Being and all the Being that truly is, is intelli-
gible. For indeed the intellect is intelligible by the being that is in it, and is an intellect
according to its faculty of knowing. For this reason, all intellect is a dispenser of knowl-
edge, while all intelligible is a dispenser of being; for that is what each one has primarily,
and what it irradiates onto the lower strata of reality. (Proclus, Theol. plat. IV 13, 42.
23–43.13)

That the summit of the intellective gods is an intelligible is, according to

Proclus, made evident by Plato when he makes it the ultimate intelligible object
of a certain type of intellect, whose nature we shall examine in a moment. Yet if
they are intelligibles, these gods are only ‘secondary’ or ‘derivative (δεύτερος)’
intelligibles (Theol. plat. IV 10, 32.27) and, like all of the intelligible plane, are
Being that truly is only through their participation in the primary intelligibles
(Theol. plat. IV 3, 16.1–17).
In sum, where contemporary readers of Plato may find a general description
of the immaterial nature of the intelligible Forms, as far as Proclus is concerned,

14 The ‘planes (πλάτα)’ of reality seem to be one of the broadest divisions employed by Proclus
for describing the procession from the First Principle. These planes correspond roughly to the
Plotinian hypostases, and the intelligible plane therefore contains all genuine intellects.
15 It is important to note that, despite their name, the triads of intelligible gods beyond the
Living-Being-in-Itself (i.e. One-Being and the very first Eternity mentioned above), are beyond
the intelligible plane, as they are beyond the scope of any form of intellection (Theol. plat. III
28, 100.1–9).
206 Simon Fortier

this first assertion in Phaedrus 247c6–d1 is a description of specific class of

Forms both universal in scope and divine in character.

3 “Observable by the Soul’s Pilot, Intellect,

Alone”
For a modern commentator such as C. J. Rowe, the second assertion of
Phaedrus 247c6-d1 is fairly clear: the Forms ‘are graspable only by the mind’ or
intellect, which Plato here calls the ‘soul’s pilot’ and elsewhere its charioteer.16
Proclus would agree but not without certain qualifications. According to him,
the ‘soul’s pilot’ is not our human intellect but a ‘particular intellect (μερικὸς
νοῦς).’17 Proclus tells that he was not the first to so identify it, writing that “in
the Phaedrus, Socrates says that it is the particular intellect which contemplates
the region beyond heaven, for this is the ‘soul’s pilot,’ as it is rightly said by our
predecessors” (Theol. plat. IV 6, 22.21–22). As neither Iamblichus nor Theodore
of Asine made this claim,18 by ‘predecessors,’ Proclus must be referring to his
teachers at the School of Athens, perhaps to Plutarch, and most certainly to
Syrianus.19
There are passing references to the particular intellect scattered throughout
Proclus’ works.20 In the Elements of Theology, the particular intellect is men-
tioned as the particular (i.e. the least universal) member of the intellective
order, which, according to the mechanics of participation (El. theol. §108, 96.
9–22), “participates the first henad, which is beyond intellect, both through the
universal Intellect and through the particular henad coordinate with it” (El.
theol. §109, 96.23–25). In the Commentary on Plato’s First Alcibiades, on the
other hand, Proclus tells us that the particular intellect is not to be confused
with the soul’s guardian daemon, for

souls enjoy intellect only when they revert upon it, receive the light therefrom, and unite
their own activity with it, while we receive the care of the daemon throughout our entire

16 Rowe 1986, 179.

17 See Theol. plat. IV 6, 22.24–23.4; 10, 31.23–25; 13, 43.14–22; In Alc. 77.10–11; In Tim. I 245.
26–27.
18 On Iamblichus, see In Phdr. 157.6–11. As for Theodore, Proclus tells us that his interpreta-
tion of the palinode ignored the entire section on the region beyond heaven (Theol. plat. IV 23,
69.16–25).
19 Of the two, Syrianus is the only one known to have taught the Phaedrus to Proclus.
20 For an earlier, much condensed version of this reconstruction, see Fortier 2018b, 455–457.
 Proclus on the Climax of the Phaedrus (247c6–d1) 207

existence and for our whole life, in all that we receive from fate and from universal provi-
dence. (Proclus, In Alc. 76.26–77.4, tr. O’Neill modified)

Even the amplest Proclean definition of the term ‘particular intellect’ to have
come down to us is little more than a reference to another discussion of the
subject in one of Proclus’ lost works, perhaps in a commentary directly on the
palinode itself:

the particular intellect is established directly above our essence, guiding it and perfecting
it, being that to which we turn when we have been purified through philosophy and have
connected our own intellective power to the intellection of this intellect (. . .). What this
particular intellect is and how it is not unique for a single particular soul and how it is
not participated in directly by particular souls, but through the mediation of angelic and
daemonic souls who are always active in accordance with that intellect and through
whom particular souls too sometimes share in the intellective light, these questions have
been thoroughly examined at considerable length elsewhere. For the present let it be un-
derstood to this extent, namely, that the entire particular intellect is directly participated
by other, daemonic souls, but it also illumines our souls, whenever we turn towards it
and we make the λόγος in us intellective. (Proclus, In Tim. I 245.13–25, tr. Runia & Share
modified)

André-Jean Festugière, on the strength of this passage and those previously

cited, concluded that the particular intellect is synonymous with what might be
called the ‘intellective intellect’ described in the Elements of Theology.21 In the
Elements, Proclus initially distinguishes between two different types of intellects:
those that are ‘self-perfecting beings (οὐσίαι αὐτοτελεῖς)’ and those that are only
‘intellective perfections (νοεραί τελειότητες)’ (El. theol. §64, 62.6–7). The former,
as the name suggests, are genuine independent beings, while the latter are only
‘irradiations’ or ‘illuminations’ (ἐλλάμψεις) generated by these beings. When
Proclus speaks of human souls as possessing an ‘intellect,’ it is, as we shall see,
to our participation in just such an illumination that he is referring, since we can-
not directly participate a genuine intellect (El. theol. §175, 154.1–2).
In the latter parts of the Elements, the genuine intellects are divided accord-
ing to Proclus’ triadic model of participation. There is therefore an unparticipated
Intellect and two types of participated intellects, namely, divine intellects and
purely intellective intellects (El. theol. §166, 144.11–21; §181, 158.29–33).22 Each of
these two types of participated intellects is participated by a different type of
soul (El. theol. §166, 144.9–21). The divine intellects, for example, are perpetually
participated by divine souls, while the intellective intellects are perpetually

21 Festugière 1966–1968, vol. 2, p. 81–82n5.

22 See also Dodds 1963, 294.
208 Simon Fortier

participated by certain souls that are “neither divine, nor yet subject to a change
from intellect to non-intellection” (El. theol. §183, 160.13–15), a description which
undoubtedly applies to certain daemonic souls (El. theol. §§183–185).23
This three-fold classification of the genuine or substantial intellects is by
no means the only scheme that Proclus presents. He sometimes offers a simpler
model that does not distinguish between the various types of participated intel-
lects (e.g. In Alc. 65.15-19), and, at least once, offers a more complex classifica-
tion of these intellects than that found in the Elements:

If one wishes to contemplate the intellective orders (νοερὰς διακoσμήσεις), some of these
impose order upon the universal souls and the more divine beings in the cosmos. . . others
upon the souls of the superior genera, and are participated directly (προσεχῶς) by those
who command amongst these genera, and in a derivative manner (δευτέρως) by the more
particular beings; and thirdly there are those set over particular souls, and their power is
diminished insofar as their participation is more diversified and composite than that of
the intellects which precede them. (Proclus, Theol. plat. III 5, 19.16–24)

Here we find a list of not two, but three different types of participated intellects:
1) the participated intellects of universal souls, 2) the participated intellects of
certain souls which “command” amongst the “superior genera” (a Proclean
metonym for certain types of daemonic souls)24, in which other more particular
beings of these genera also participate in a secondary manner, and finally 3)
the participated intellect set over particular, human souls. There therefore seem
to be two different types of non-divine participated intellects.
Although it is more elaborate than the list of intellects in the Elements,
there is no reason to believe that this classification of the participated intellects
from the Platonic Theology represents some sort of doctrinal shift. Proclus has
likely offered us just a closer look at the somewhat ambiguous genus of intellec-
tive intellects and shown that it in fact contains two separate species. It also
takes no great stretch of the imagination to fit the particular intellect described
in the Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus into this new model of two participated
non-divine intellects.
If the participated intellect described as being set over human souls (no. 3
above) is a genuine intellect, as its place alongside the intellects of gods and the
‘commanding’ daemons would seem to suggest, then, like the particular intellect
described in the Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, it is not directly participated by

23 I say ‘certain’ daemonic souls (a category which itself embraces angelic, daemonic, and he-
roic souls) as Proclus distinguishes between divine daemonic souls and purely intellective
daemonic souls (In Alc. 71.3–15).
24 See, inter alia, Theol. plat. III 27, 98.22–99.9.
 Proclus on the Climax of the Phaedrus (247c6–d1) 209

the human souls over which it presides. Its primary participants must instead be
certain non-divine yet perpetually intellective souls. The ideal candidates would
be those ‘more particular beings’ that are said to only indirectly participate intel-
lect (no. 2 above), for as they appear to be lesser daemonic souls, they must still
perpetually participate an intellect. This once again reminds us of the above-
cited description of the particular intellect, which, as we saw, is directly partic-
ipated by daemonic souls. There is therefore no reason to suppose that Proclus
changed his mind on the number or nature of participated intellects over the
course of his writings. He simply offered more or less detailed overviews of his
theory as the circumstances dictated.
The particular intellect is therefore particular insofar as it is the least uni-
versal of the substantial intellects. This particularity, as the following passage
makes clear, colours every aspect of its being:

The fourth rank is held by intellection of the particular intellects, since each of these as
well has both a certain intelligible which is coupled with it above all and also an intellec-
tion, or rather each of them possesses all these things particularly – intellect, intellection,
intelligible – by means of which each of these intellects is not only connected with the
universals but also intellects the entire intelligible cosmos. (. . .) It is the object of cogni-
tion in a particular way and indeed sees the universals through the particular. (Proclus,
In Tim. I 244.11–29, tr. Runia & Share modified)

Like the unparticipated ‘divine Intellect itself’ (In Tim. I 244.6), a particular in-
tellect is its own intelligible content and its intellection is ἀθρόος, ‘holistic,’ i.e.
it intelligize the entire intelligible cosmos at once (In Tim. I 244.26–30).25 It is
also, in itself, coordinate (σύστοιχος) with the eternal (In Tim. I 245.6–7).
However, unlike the unparticipated Intellect, both its intelligible content and
its manner of intelligizing this content are particular rather than universal.
“Every intellect,” Proclus writes, “is a plenitude of Forms, yet some of them
embrace more universal Forms and others more particular” (El. theol. §177, 156.
1–2). The Forms, like all other things in the order of procession, become more
particular, more numerous, and more diverse the farther removed they are from
the First principle. Different degrees of intellect are therefore composed of dif-
ferent degrees of Forms:26 for example, a particular intellect is therefore com-
posed of more particular, numerous, and diverse instantiations of the Forms
than those that make up the more universal intellects.

25 See also, inter alia, Theol. plat. III 27, 94.5–10.

26 On this, see d’Hoine 2017b, 109.
210 Simon Fortier

Nevertheless, despite the particularity and diversity of its contents, the par-
ticular intellect is still able to grasp the more universal intelligibles,27 such as
the highest of the intelligible-intellective Forms, which are, as Proclus tells us,
its intelligible object:

If therefore one must, from this analogy, hunt for the distinction between objects of intel-
lection, I would say that just as the demiurgic Intellect is unparticipated, while the partic-
ular intellect is participated, so too with regard to the intelligible, that of the demiurge,
which is the very first paradigm, is one of the primary intelligibles, while that of a partic-
ular intellect is one of the secondary intelligibles, which are undoubtedly intelligibles,
but which have received an intelligible superiority only with regard to the intellectives.
(Proclus, Theol. plat. IV 6, 22.22–23.4)

How a particular intellect should have so exalted an intelligible object is ex-

plained by Proclus in the Elements of Theology:

Every intellect intelligizes itself. But the very first intellect only intelligizes itself and in
it intellect and intelligible object are numerically one. On the other hand, each of the
subsequent intellects intelligizes at once itself and its priors, and what is intelligible for
it is in part what it itself is and in part that from which it comes. (Proclus, El. theol. §167,
144.22–25)

Intellection, according to Proclus, is always an intellect’s intellection of itself,

i.e. of its own intelligible contents. It is by intelligizing these contents that an
intellect may know more universal intelligible objects. In other words, as we
saw above, a particular intellect “is the object of knowledge in a particular way
and indeed sees the universals through the particular” (In Tim. I 245.29). A par-
ticular intellect therefore knows of the intelligible-intellective Forms indirectly
by intelligizing its own particular intelligibles.
Although we now know something of the identity of the ‘soul’s pilot,’ there
remains the question of how Proclus took Plato’s qualification that it ‘alone’
contemplates the Being that truly is. The answer seems to lie in the following
passage:

Plato says that ‘the class of true science’ is established around this [i.e. the Being that
truly is]. Indeed, these two things ascend to the contemplation of this Being: the intel-
lect, which is the ‘soul’s pilot’ (i.e. the particular intellect established above the souls,
leading them towards the paternal harbour), and the ‘true science,’ which is the perfec-
tion of the soul. This ‘true science’ therefore operates around this [i.e. the Being that
truly is], since it dances around Being transitively (περιχορεύουσα τὸ ὂν μεταβατικῶς),
while the intellect contemplates it, since it uses a simple intellection. (Proclus, Theol.
plat. IV 13, 43.14–23)

27 On this idea, see El. theol. §167, 144.22–146.15 and infra.

 Proclus on the Climax of the Phaedrus (247c6–d1) 211

Here we see that of the two things that Proclus holds to ascend to the contem-
plation of the Being that truly is, i.e. the soul’s pilot and the class of true sci-
ence, the latter ‘dances around’ this Being, while the former, the pilot, alone
contemplates it, since it uses a simple intellection. The intellect, after all, as
Proclus writes, “is what, properly speaking, contemplates the Forms (. . .) since
the Forms are also intellective by nature and everywhere like is known by like”
(In Parm. IV 924.26-28 Steel = 924.32–34 L–S). This answer, of course, leads to a
further question, namely, what does the ‘class of true science’ represent for
Proclus?

4 “Around which is the Class of True Science”

While we might literally translate the final part of Phaedrus 247c6–d1 as
“around which is the class of true science,” it has often been understood by
contemporary commentators to mean “which is the object of the class of true
science,” i.e. that the Beings that truly are, are the object of this class of true
science.28 As for Proclus’ interpretation of this lemma, the passage cited imme-
diately above from the Platonic Theology offers three pieces of information: 1)
the class of true science ascends to the Being that truly is with the soul’s pilot,
2) it is the perfection of the soul, and, 3) unlike the soul’s pilot, which contem-
plates the Being that truly is, the class of true science is said to ‘dance around’
this Being transitively.29 As we shall see, Proclus holds the class of true science
to be synonymous with the λόγος of the ‘intellection together with λόγος’ men-
tioned in the Timaeus.
The expression ‘intellection together with λόγος’ is drawn from the follow-
ing passage in the Timaeus:

What is the Being that always is (τὸ ὂν ἀεί), and has no part in becoming, and what is it
that becomes, but never is? That which is grasped by intellection together with λόγος
(νοήσει μετὰ λόγου) is the Being which is always self-identical, while on the other hand
the object of opinion together with irrational sensation is that which becomes and passes
away but never truly is. (Plato, Tim. 27d6–28a4)30

28 E.g. Yunis 2011, 141.

29 I earlier discussed Proclus’ interpretation of this lemma at Fortier 2018b, 457–461. What
follows contains many important nuances.
30 While keeping the pagination of Rivaud, I here translate the text as transmitted in the In
Tim. (see In Tim. I 227.4–5; 240.13–16) and as understood by Proclus. On Proclus’ understand-
ing, see In Tim. I 227.6–234.3; 240.28–241.30; Festugière 1966–1968, vol. 2, 73n1.
212 Simon Fortier

According to Proclus, ‘the Being that always is’ is synonymous with the Being
that truly is31 and refers to “all that eternally is, beginning from the nature of
Living-Being-in-Itself – for this is eternity in a primary sense – and ending with
the particular intellects” (In Tim. I 231.20–23).32 This Being is grasped by ‘intellec-
tion together with λόγος,’ an expression which Proclus takes, in his Commentary
on Plato’s Timaeus, to refer to the intellection of a particular intellect joined to-
gether with the intellection of our intellective λόγος, i.e. when the intellect ‘illu-
mines our souls’ (In Tim. I 245.24) through the intermediary of angelic and
daemonic souls.33
Our λόγος is, for Proclus, ‘the summit of the soul’ (In Tim. I 246.28–31), or,
more precisely, the summit of the soul’s faculty of διάνοια (In Tim. I 246.26–28).
It is our master cognitive faculty, which sits at the core of our cognitive pro-
cesses, manifesting itself as the other faculties, both higher and lower.34 The
above-mentioned illumination occurs, as Proclus writes, “whenever we turn to-
wards [the particular intellect] and we make the λόγος in us completely intellec-
tive” (In Tim. I 245.24–25) and when the soul begins “to move itself around the
intelligible” (In Tim. I 247.4–5). In other words, when we make our λόγος intel-
lective by turning the soul away from imagination, opinion, and ‘variegated
and indeterminate knowledge’ (In Tim. I 247.11–12), towards the particular intel-
lect directly above us, we can receive an illumination from this particular intel-
lect. This illumination, as Proclus describes elsewhere, functions as an intellect
that we can directly participate:

For scientific knowledge is not the highest of the forms of knowing, but rather the intel-
lect that precedes it — I do not mean the intellect that transcends the soul [i.e. the partic-
ular intellect], but the actual illumination therefrom that reaches the soul. (Proclus, In
Alc. 246.18–247.2, tr. MacIsaac)35

31 See, inter alia, In Tim. I 233.2–3; I 236.20–21.

32 The Neoplatonists refer to the ‘complete Living Being’ of Tim. 31b1 as the ‘Living-Being-in-
Itself (αὐτόζῷον).’ See also In Tim. I 234.13–235.1.
33 On the intermediary role of daemonic souls in this illumination, see, inter alia, In Tim. I
245.19–20; III 269.15–270.16; In Alc. 76.20–78.6; MacIsaac 2011.
34 Its ‘use’ of intellection, however, is nuanced by Proclus: “This [λόγος], restricting itself to
the contemplation of intelligibles, uses both itself and intellection, not that intellection is its
instrument, and [λόγος] what uses it, (. . .) but that intellection is the light of λόγος, perfecting
it and leading it upwards and illuminating the cognitive power in it. Proceeding toward judg-
ment of the intermediary λόγοι, it uses διάνοια and not itself alone, and it reverts toward itself
through this, but when judging objects of opinion it moves opinion, and likewise for imagina-
tion and sense-perception” (In Tim. I 254.29–255.3).
35 On an illumination of the particular intellect functioning as an intellect for us, see also In
Alc. 65.11–15; 65.20–66.6; Segonds 1985–1986, vol. 2, 294n5; MacIsaac 2011, 45–51.
 Proclus on the Climax of the Phaedrus (247c6–d1) 213

By participating this illumination, our intellective λόγος is able to exercise in-

tellection. This initial form of intellection, however, also opens the way for an-
other, even more powerful form. For the soul can “join [its intellective] activity
to the intellection of this [particular] intellect” (In Tim. I 247.13–14) and “intellect
with it the Being that always is” (In Tim. I 247.14–15). “In fact,” Proclus tells us,

it is precisely [when we join our intellective activity to that of the particular intellect] that
the intellection of the soul becomes more holistic (ἀθροωτέρα), and comes closer to the
eternal realities, so that it too grasps the intelligible together with the [particular] intellect
and acts like a lesser light together with a greater one, since the λόγος in us insinuates
itself into the intellection of the [particular] intellect, the intelligible is grasped by intel-
lection together with λόγος. For our λόγος grasps the intelligible together with intellec-
tion, whereas the intellection of the [particular] intellect always both is and sees the
intelligible, but it connects the λόγος to the intelligible, when the λόγος has taken on the
form of an intellect (νοοειδής). (Proclus, In Tim. I 247.17–25, tr. Runia & Share modified)

The intellection together with λόγος that grasps ‘the Being that always is’ there-
fore refers to “an activity that is at once single and double, as there is both
sameness and differentiation in the intellections” (In Tim. I 247.15–17). In other
words, it refers to the combined activity of two simultaneous intellections, each
of a different nature: 1) the intellection of the particular intellect, which, as we
have seen, “is the object of cognition particularly, but also sees the universals
through the particular” (In Tim. I 244.28–29), and 2) that of our intellective
λόγος, which is ‘transitive (μεταβατική)’ (In Tim. I 244.17), i.e. it “moves from
one thing to another (μεταβαίνων ἀπ’ ἄλλων ἐπ’ ἄλλα)” (In Tim. I 246.8),36 and
sees the wholes “but only in parts together and not all at the one time (μερικῶς
ἅμα καὶ οὐκ ἀθρόως)” (In Tim. I 244.29–30, tr. Runia & Share). When these two
intellections act together, it is, as Proclus says, “like a lesser light together with
a greater one.” In other words, we see the intelligibles more holistically when
we see them together with the particular intellect.
Having established the nature of intellection together with λόγος, we may
now see what role this concept plays in Proclus’ interpretation of Phaedrus
247c6–d1. The transitive intellection of our λόγος is described by Proclus as a
‘dance’37 around the intelligible:

Perhaps he [sc. Plato] also wishes to indicate that the λόγος, circling round the intelligible,
exercising its activity and movement just as around a central point, thus contemplates

36 It is interesting to note that Proclus’ ultimate textual support for this description of psychic
intellection as transitive is the Phaedrus, specifically 246b8–c1 (see Theol. plat. I 19, 93.9–12).
37 On the recurrent metaphor of the choral dance of the souls in Proclus, see Moutsopoulos
2004 and Trouillard 1977a.
214 Simon Fortier

it, since intellection knows the intelligible intransitively (ἀμεταβάτως) and indivisibly,
whereas the λόγος dances around (περιχορεύοντος) the essence of the intelligible in a circle
and unravels the substantial unity of all things in the intelligible. (Proclus, In Tim. I 248.
1–6)

This description of intellective λόγος is identical with that of the class of true
science in Proclus’ above-cited passage, where he says that this class “dances
around Being transitively.” It also resembles Proclus’ description of the powers
of the divine souls, which

According to their intellective powers (. . .) are attached to an intellect and dance

around it, while according to their dianoetic powers (. . .) know themselves and their
own being purely and develop their own λόγοι. (Proclus, In Parm. VI 1080.14–17 Steel =
1080.17–20 L–S)38

All the souls depicted in the Phaedrus, in fact, seem to partake in this dance
around the intelligible:

The universal souls always form a dancing chorus around the intelligible, the superior
genera [i.e. daemonic souls] follow in the trains of the gods, and amongst our souls, those
which have the happiness to be delivered from the wandering in the world of generation
reach upwards towards their proper source. (Proclus, Theol. plat. VI 3, 16.24–27)

This image of the psychic dance around the intelligible evidently represents not
just the nature of human intellection, but the nature of psychic intellection in
general, which for all souls “occurs in time and comes to exist in a more partic-
ular manner [i.e. than the intellection of an intellect] and is not holistic grasp of
the intelligibles” (Theol. plat. IV 20, 59.11–12) and functions “transitively (. . .)
for it is in this that soul differs from intellect” (In Tim. II 289.30–290.1). The
dance of our λόγος around the intelligible therefore follows in the steps of the
λόγοι of our superiors, daemonic and divine.39
Thus, we see that the threefold description of the class of true science in
the Platonic Theology corresponds exactly to that given of our intellective λόγος
in the exegesis of “intellection together with λόγος” in the Commentary on
Plato’s Timaeus. Just as the class of true science is said to ascend to contem-
plate Being with the “soul’s pilot”, so too does our intellective λόγος intellect
this Being together with the particular intellect. Moreover, the soul is said by

38 See also Theol. plat. I 19, 90.23–26, where Proclus states that the divine souls do not always
have their intellections turned towards the same intelligibles, but move from one intelligible
to another, acting in time.
39 On our souls imitating the ‘revolution’ of the divine souls and thereby intellecting the intel-
ligibles, see, inter alia, Theol. plat. V 6, 26.12–15.
 Proclus on the Climax of the Phaedrus (247c6–d1) 215

Proclus to be perfected through its participation in intellect,40 and the transi-

tive dance of the class of true science around Being described in the Platonic
Theology corresponds to that of our soul’s intellective λόγος around “the essence
of the intelligible”. And were these parallels not proof enough, Proclus elsewhere
openly assimilates the intellection together with λόγος of the Timaeus to the vi-
sion of the Being that truly is of the particular intellect and our soul described in
the Phaedrus:

And just as in the Phaedrus he (scil. Plato) called this [particular] intellect ‘the soul’s
pilot’ and declared that it alone intellects the Being [that truly is], but [said] that the soul
intellects together with this [particular] intellect when it is ‘nourished with intellect and
knowledge’ (Phdr. 247d2), in the same way here (Tim. 28a1-4) too he states that intellec-
tion is prior to the soul and that this is the only real intellection, but that this intellection
is participated in by the soul when its λόγος acts intellectively (νοερῶς). (Proclus, In Tim.
I 245.25–31)

It is therefore clear that Proclus takes the class of true science to be our intellec-
tive λόγος, which joins together with the soul’s pilot to exercise intellection to-
gether with λόγος and contemplate the Being that truly is.
There remains, however, an important caveat in this explanation: while
both the particular intellect and the human soul may be said to contemplate
the Being that truly is together, their contemplations of this Being are of two
different orders. As we have seen, the intelligible-intellective Forms are the in-
telligible objects of a particular intellect. They are the most universal objects a
particular intellect can grasp through its own particular Forms. However, while
these Forms may be the intelligible objects of the particular intellect that pre-
sides over us, they are, as Proclus tells us, totally beyond our intellective grasp:

The intelligible-intellectives are superior to the partial cognition proper to immanent

beings such as us, whence comes their specific character of being unknowable because of
their transcendent superiority; indeed, we cannot now produce the cognition proper to
them (. . .) for these beings are absolutely beyond to our cognition. (Proclus, In Parm. IV
925.17–25 Steel = 925.19–28 L–S)

And again:

The transcendent Forms are unknowable to our science. And justly so, for they are con-
templated by the divine Intellect alone; and [it is thus] for all the Forms, but particularly
for those that are beyond the intellective gods; for neither sensation, nor opinionative
cognition, nor pure λόγος, nor our intellective cognition can connect our soul to these

40 See, inter alia, Theol. plat. III 6, 21.26–27; In Parm. IV 853.19–20 Steel (= 853.23–24 L–S); In
Alc. 65.17–21.
216 Simon Fortier

Forms, but only an illumination shining forth from the intellective gods can connect us to
these intelligible-intellective Forms, as it is perhaps said that a certain someone says [as
much] in a divinely inspired way; therefore, the nature of these Forms is unknowable for
us, insofar as they are superior to our intellection and the particular intuitions (ἐπιβολῶν) of
our soul. And this is why, in the Phaedrus, Socrates, as we said before, compares the contem-
plation of them to initiations (τελεταῖς), mysteries (μυήσεις), and epopteias (ἐποπτείαις).
(Proclus, In Parm. IV 949.15–27 Steel = 949.18–33 L–S)41

In these passages Proclus is clear: the intelligible-intellective Forms of the

Phaedrus are beyond the scope our intellection. Yet, in the same breath, he
writes that

one must say that it is by remaining in our proper order and possessing essential images
of the totality of beings, that, through them we turn ourselves to them [i.e. the intelligi-
ble-intellectives] and from the symbols we possess we intellect the beings not in a coordi-
nate manner (συστοίχως), but in a derivative manner (δευτέρως) and according to our
proper dignity, while the things native to us, [we intellect them] in a coordinate manner,
because we have grasped in unity both the things known and the knowledge. (Proclus, In
Parm. IV 948.26–30 Steel = 948.31–36 L–S)

A claim that appears to be echoed in the Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus:

But how is the Being that truly is grasped by the particular intellect or by the λόγος? For
this is something that is even more remarkable. For surely, even if the intelligible itself
cannot be grasped by the intellect and the λόγος, because it is superior to all comprehen-
sion (περιοχῆς) and has grasped all things transcendently, nevertheless, the intellect,
having its own intelligible, is said to grasp through this the whole as well, while, by
means of the intellect, the λόγος obtains in a coordinate manner (συστοίχως) conceptions
(ἐννοίας) of the beings in itself and thus by means of these is said to grasp Being.
(Proclus, In Tim. I 247.27–248.1)

41 The mention here of the divine Intellect that alone contemplates the intelligible-intellective
Forms and of an “illumination shining forth from the intellective gods” has led some (e.g. Van
den Berg 2000 and 2001, 48–61) to argue that this passage alludes to the soul’s “unification
with the demiurgic Intellect” (In Tim. I 302.14), of which Proclus briefly speaks elsewhere
(In Tim. I 301.22–302.25). In other words, “the human soul can contemplate the Forms if it
manages to return to the Demiurge” (Van den Berg 2000, 436). This thesis is entirely plausible if
we take Proclus’ talk of ‘unification’ and of the soul “establishing [itself] immaculately in the
demiurgic intellections” (In Tim. I 302.20–21) to refer to the soul’s contemplation of the intellec-
tive Forms, which constitute the demiurgic Intellect. Were, however, Proclus to be implying in
these passages that we can intelligize the Intelligible Intellect together with the divine Intellect
itself as we do the intelligible-intellectives together with the particular intellect, he would be
contradicting, inter alia, his earlier assertion that the intellection of the divine Intellect tran-
scends our knowledge (In Tim. I 245.8–9).
 Proclus on the Climax of the Phaedrus (247c6–d1) 217

While these passages may at first appear to contradict Proclus’ statements about
the transcendence of the intelligible-intellective Forms with regard to our intel-
lection,42 the contradiction is only apparent. Proclus indeed draws a firm distinc-
tion between two types of Forms: transcendent Forms and what we might call
‘non-transcendent’ Forms. The transcendent Forms, of which the intelligible-
intellective Forms are the lowest manifestations, are superior to our intellective
knowledge (i.e. intellection together with λόγος) and can only be directly con-
templated by the divine Intellect itself. Those Forms more particular than the in-
telligible-intellectives, on the other hand, beginning with the degree immediately
inferior, the purely intellective Forms,

even if they are transcendent in relation to us, nevertheless, since we have come into ex-
istence immediately from them, are in some way in us, and there is for us a cognition of
these [Forms] and, through them, also, [a cognition] of the unknowable superiority of the
more divine [Forms]. (Proclus, In Parm. IV 945.3–6 Steel = 945.4–8 L–S)

The intellective Forms transcend us, yet by intelligizing our own intelligible
contents, we can know them indirectly or derivatively, as Proclus puts it, just
as the particular intellect can know the intelligible-intellective Forms through
its own Forms. What is more, Proclus tells us here that through our derivative
knowledge of the intellective Forms, we can know something of the ‘unknow-
able superiority’ of the more divine Forms. In other words, Proclus seems to
imply here that we can know the intelligible-intellective Forms in what we
might call a ‘doubly-derivative’ or ‘third-hand’ way: we can know them through
our derivative knowledge of the intellective Forms.

5 Conclusion
While Phaedrus 247c6–d1 may have originally meant simply that the immate-
rial Forms are contemplated by the soul’s mind or intellect and that it is from
them that we derive true knowledge, Proclus, with his allegorical reading of
the palinode, found there a great deal more. According to him, Phaedrus
247c6–d1 reveals, firstly, the nature of not just the Forms in general, but of a spe-
cific class of universal and divine intelligible beings, the highest of the intelligi-
ble-intellective Forms. These intelligible-intellective gods are, like those which
succeed them, Beings that truly are, yet, as they stand on the threshold of the
primary intelligible gods, they are also, like the divinities that precede them,

42 E.g. Luna & Segonds 2007–2017, vol. 4, 137n6; 168n3; vol. 5, 30n1.
218 Simon Fortier

intrinsically unknowable to us. Secondly, this sentence reveals how, despite

their transcendence, we can still contemplate these gods, albeit in a doubly-
derivative manner. This contemplation occurs by means of intellection together
with λόγος, which Proclus transposes from his reading of the Timaeus onto
Phaedrus 247c6–d1, taking the soul’s pilot to be a particular intellect and the
class of true science to be our intellective λόγος. According to Proclus’ reading,
this single sentence therefore reveals the Phaedrus to be a dialogue of the highest
theological importance, describing both one of the most universal orders of
gods and the means by which we may come to know them. It is thus not difficult
to see how this was, for him, the climax of the entire dialogue.