THE COLD WAR AND THE CONGO CRISIS, 1960-1961

Author(s): Omajuwa Igho Natufe

Source: Africa: Rivista trimestrale di studi e documentazione dell'Istituto italiano per
l'Africa e l'Oriente , SETTEMBRE 1984, Anno 39, No. 3 (SETTEMBRE 1984), pp. 353-374
Published by: Istituto Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente (IsIAO)

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40759745

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 THE COLD WAR AND THE CONGO CRISIS,
1960-1961

by Omajuwa Igho Natuf e ( * )

Cold war as a concept in contemporary international politics is

usually used to define the unfriendly relationship between the conflicting
global ideological centres of socialism and capitalism. These opposing
class centres have gained currency as the East- West ideological conflict
represented by the USSR and the USA respectively. Thus, as a concept,
it means a state of permanent hostility reflected in the (foreign) policy
actions of opposing ideological protagonists for hegemony and influence
in the international system. Viewed in this perspective, cold war
describes a strained relationship between international political actors
as a result of their irreconciliable class, ideological orientations. The
chief protagonists of the cold war, Moscow and Washington, engage
in propaganda warfare to undercut or obliterate the power and/or
influence of their class enemy in global politics by supporting and
promoting dissent and disintegration in the enemy's camp. Very often
socialist and capitalist arms are exported as aid to a target country
or region where the local indigenes are engulfed in an armed conflict
as a progression of the cold war actions of the main opposing ideological
powers.
Though the term cold war is frequently utilized to describe So-
viet-US relations in the immediate post 1945 period, it is, in my view,
conceptually wrong to do so. The cold war phenomenon defines the
relationship between the USSR and the capitalist world since the
October 1917 Russian socialist revolution, particularly after the abor-
tive Western intervention to strangulate the young socialist state. As
a concept in international politics, therefore, the end of the civil war

(*) Department of Political Science, University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria.

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354 OMAJUWA IGHO NATUFE

in Soviet Russia and the failure of the West's military int

subvert socialism should be regarded as the origin of the
While the guns were silenced following this episode, both
and the West engaged in ideological warfare by supportin
trifugal forces in the opposing camp. This state of mutu
acquired a new dimension in post 1945 with the gains o
cialism in Eastern Europe and in Asia. Winston Churchill,
Prime Minister, in his speech at Fulton, Missouri, USA, o
1946, attacked " Eastern imperialism " and coined the " iro
as a derogatory term describing the sovietization of East
He called on the West to halt the spread of communi
policy of " containment " later adopted by the US Gov
President Truman was an expression of the strategic measu
in Churchill's speech as the West sought ways " to hol
and its Communist satellites within their existing bound
The Soviet Union, confident that it had dismantled the
encirclement " that shaped Soviet psychology in the inter
could now talk of a real socialist camp opposed to a cap
- the " two camps " doctrine.
While the West was formulating its strategy of contain
USSR was negotiating a series of bilateral economic and mil
ments with her East European Communist allies to con
socialist commonwealth of nations. Greece, Turkey and B
the initial testing grounds of cold war muscle flexing. As
to the policy of containment, the West established the No
Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 as a politico-milit
system to halt the spread of communism. NATO's military
dotted all over West European member states at strate
distance from Moscow and other key Soviet cities. Th
liberating the citizens of socialist countries from Commun
couraging internal strife within individual communist sta
to curb the spread of Communism by outlawing " Comm
ties " in non-Communist countries gained currency in US
thinking (3). The socialist commonwealth responded w

(1) W.S. Churchill, The Sinews of Peace: Post-war Speeches, ed. by

S. Churchill, London, 1948, p. 100.
(2) Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, E
Cliffs, N.J., 1955, p. 719.
(3) J. Burnham, Containment or Liberation? An Inquiry into the Aim
States Foreign Policy, New York, 1953, pp. 31-34, 130-140. See also th

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 THE COLD WAR AND THE CONGO CRISIS 355

politico-military alliance - the Warsaw Treaty Organization

- in 1955. While both opposing alliances arm themselve
destructive weapons systems, they seem to have a working un
standing to avoid direct inter-alliance military conflict. Wi
understanding, therefore, regions outside the alliances member
became the main ideological battle grounds. The most vulnerab
these were, of course, the colonial and emerging independent co
of Asia, Africa, etc.
Gradually a new strategic alliance system began to crystall
international politics. The question of independence for the co
was championed by the USSR, while the US and her European
thought of how ho either delay the granting of independence a
to involve the newly independent countries in their (the West's)
anti-communist crusade. The immediate post 1945 East- West
gical conflict and the independence of India, Burma and Ind
significantly influenced the tempo of the anti-colonial moveme
Asian and African countries. The " loss " of India, Burma and
nesia weakened the colonial empires of Britain and Holland, wh
defeat of France in Vietnam further discredited imperialism i
global anti-colonial movements which gained momentum in pos
With respect to Africa, North Africa fell within the strategic conc
of NATO. Thus, Africa was viewed by both competing ideo
alliance systems as an important object in the cold war.
Africa then acquired a new dimension in NATO's strateg
the opinion of S. Possony, a leading American sovietologist
correct course for the West is neither to retreat nor to withdr
the formulation of an acceptable decision to remain... " (4)
colonies. The colonial powers banned Communism and comm
activities in their respective African colonies. These colonie
began to play a predetermined role in the cold war for their c
masters. The enslaved peoples' demand for independence wa
strued by the West as a communist inspired movement, thus im
suggesting that the colonized peoples preferred to remain colo
It was from this perspective, that, for example, France viewe

speeches by the then U.S. Secretary of State, D. Acheson, " Total Diplomac
Strengthen U.S. Leadership for Human Freedom ", Department of State Bu
March 20, 1950, pp. 427-430; "Tensions between the United States and the So
Union", ibid., March 27, 1950, pp. 473-478.
(4) E.D. Modrzhinskaia, Ideologia Sovremennogo Kolonializma, Moscow, 1961,

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356 OMAJUWA IGHO NATUFE

national liberation movements in Algeria, Morocco, and Tu

therefore granted the US the right to build four militar
Morocco in 1950. As the national liberation movements g
mentum in North Africa, France protested that " the Sovi
its agents are seeking to intensify disorder and revolt in
is strategically important to the West ". Furthermore, in
to involve NATO, it was argued that France's interest in N
" is consonant with the interests of the Atlantic Alliance sinc
military control of part of the strategically important M
areas " (5). To emphasize the significance of North Afric
global strategy in the cold war French officials in the reg
" The four big American bases in Morocco, capable of bo
spot in the globe including all of the Soviet Union, are o
value to the free world because they are farther away fr
counterattack than any other spot in Europe or North A
pf them would be a grave blow " (6).
It is obvious from the above that the attainment of in
by African colonies had to be curtailed by the West in or
the former as buffer zones in its anti-communist crusade. Th
of this position was also influenced by economic consi
1954, Richard Nixon, then US Vice-President, had expres
for the fate of imperialism when he claimed that the Co
" have begun to concentrate their forces " in Africa, and
that " as the world's resources move toward depletion,
become decisive " (7).
While the West European colonial powers had banned C
activities and arrested suspected communists in their Afr
as the anti-colonial movements intensified the struggle for in
the USSR failed to exploit these opportunities in the imm
1945 period. The Stalinist " two camps " doctrine was sti
in Soviet strategic thinking: Moscow viewed the world in
(socialist or capitalist) situation and considered the nation
in the forefront of the independence struggle as " lackeys "
imperialism. The Soviets however reversed this positio
with Africa's anti-colonial movements in 1956, three yea

(5) The New York Times, November 12, 1954.

(6) Barrett McGurn, " Reds Aiding Arab Revolt in North Africa
Herald Tribune, December 6, 1954.
(7) Sunday Mail, Rhodesia, January 3, 1954.

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 THE COLD WAR AND THE CONGO CRISIS 357

death of Stalin (8). However, prior to the policy reversal in

the USSR had benefited from the anti-colonial movements in the co
nies. Writing in 1977, Professor K. N. Brutents admitted that:
the postwar period, especially in the early years, the tide of na
liberation revolutions dealt heavy blows at the imperialist poli
aggression, helped substantially to thin out the forces of imper
and to create more favourable international conditions for the effort
to rehabilitate the USSR's economy and build up the emerging socialist
community " (9).
Thus while the imperialist powers were diverted by the anti-
colonial movements, Africa's independence struggle functioned as a
tactical ally of the USSR in the cold war. This alliance became more
concretized in post 1953 as the USSR championed the cause of decolo-
nization at the United Nations Organization (UNO). The resolution
on the Granting of Independence to the colonies adopted at the XV
session (1960) of the UNO was initiated by the USSR.
As the 1950s came to a close, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana and
Guinea gained their independence. In 1960 alone 17 independent
states emerged in Africa. Most of these new independent states had
competing forces allied with the opposing ideological camps of the cold
war in the international system. Besides the problem of grappling with
the complex issues of international politics, these states, at independence,
had also to tackle the question of consolidating their independence.
The former Belgian Congo was one of such states.

The Congo Crisis

The Congo, a former Belgian colony, gained her independence

on June 30, 1960. However, the constitutional arrangements reached
as of June 30, 1960, seemed to have planted the seeds of conflict
for the ensuing disarray that transformed the new independent country
into an ideological battle-ground of the cold war. These arrangements
or compromises (Patrice Lumumba as the Prime Minister - Head of
Government - , Joseph Kasavubu as the President - titular Head
of State - and Moise Tshombe as the President of the province of
Katanga) were based on the Belgian perceptions of the Congo as a

(8) For a detailed discussion of this issue, see my Soviet Policy in Africa: A
Critical Analysis (forthcoming); note Chapter three, " Issues in Soviet African Policy ".
(9) K. N. Brutents, National Liberation Revolutions Today, vol. 1, Moscow,
1977, pp. 65-66.

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358 OMAJUWA IGHO NATUFE

neo-colonial entity, and on the overall West European s

tion in Africa. Belgian perceptions influenced the cho
(Kasavubu and Tshombe) and key government officials B
on Prime Minister Lumumba. The main expectation of
the retainment of Congo as a neo-colonial country whose r
be exploited for the development of Belgian and West
nomies, and the continued underdevelopment of the C
wiching of Lumumba between Kasavubu and Tshombe
guarantee the West European exploitation of the Congo
who served as Congo's Ambassador to the UNO, und
government, summed up the compromise as follow
submission to the will of Belgium and equally Belgium
him as Prime Minister, were both purely tactical steps.
was one of mutual mistrust, misunderstanding, and de
Situated in the heart of Africa, with Africa's " he
already an ally of the USSR, and Africa's " feet ", the
Union) of South Africa, entrenched in the internationa
tegic design, the Congo naturally appealed to the com
ideological blocs for the following reasons. First, t
Katanga has valuable mineral resources essential for the W
and military development with strong Belgian, French
terests. Secondly, Congo shares its southern borders w
northern Rhodesia then Portuguese and British coloni
Thirdly, the Benguela railway system links the mine f
with the Angolan port of Benguela. And finally, Lumu
as the leader of a 3-man delegation of the Movement N
(MNC) at the first All African Peoples Conference (AA
in December 1958 was a matter of grave concern to imper
in the Congo, the neighbouring colonies of Angola, th
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the racist apartheid re
Africa. Delegates from these countries attended the Ac
In February 1959 the Nyasa African Congress (NA
demonstration demanding the independence of Nyasala
Republic) and the disintegration of the colonial federat

(10) Thomas Kanza, The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba:

Congo, London, 1978, p. 98. The Congo referred to is now Zaire,
Leopoldville is now Kinshasha. The province of Katanga is no
However, for historical relevance the name Congo will be used thr
The other Congo with its capital of Brazzaville shall be referred
throughout this paper.

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 THE COLD WAR AND THE CONGO CRISIS 359

and Nyasaland. Many demonstrators were killed in a combat with th

police. Roy Welensky, the Prime Minister of the Federation, blame
the Accra conference: " I want to go on record as saying that th
Accra Conference was attended by a number of African leaders from
the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. The public ought to know that at the
Accra Conference the Russians had a strong team... We have it from
factual evidence that direct contact was made between Russian represen-
tatives and certain of the African leaders from the Federation " (u
Thus, Lumumba's contact with Kwame Nkrumah at the AAPC an
his (Lumumba's) independent posture vis-à-vis Belgian design in the
Congo qualified him to be viewed by the West as an ally of the Eas
even before June 30, 1960.
Prior to independence it could be said that political discourse b
Congolese nationalists was almost nonexistent. The only nationa
independence movement, the MNC, was founded in Leopoldville
1958 with Lumumba as its President. Also in 1958 Tshombe founded
his Confederation of Tribal Association of Katanga (CONAKAT) wit
Belgian support. In 1950, a cultural organization, the Association pou
la Sauvagarde de la Culture et des Intérêts des Bakongo (ABAK
was founded with Kasavubu as its leader. In 1956 ABAKO trans-
formed itself into a political movement agitating for the unification of
the Bakongo ethnic group in the two Congos (Belgian and French)
and Angola for the creation of a Kongo Kingdom, a reincarnation of
the ancient Kongo Kingdom. Of the above political groups the MNC
was considered a threat to Belgian interests. In July 1959 Albert
Kalonji, with Belgian support, engineered a split in the MNC and
began to promote Baluba ethnicism as opposed to MNC's nationalist
policies and conspired to oust Lumumba from the Presidency (12). This
led to the emergence of two MNCs: MNC(L) and MNC(K), with L
and K representing Lumumba and Kalonji respectively. The anti-
Lumumbist elements from the above political organizations decided to
establish another movement known as the Parti solidaire africain (PSA)
which was a " federation... of political groups whose bases were tribalist
but whose declared sympathies were for Christianity, federalism, and
anti-communism " (13). Antoine Gizenga, who in 1960 became Lu-
mumba's deputy prime minister, was elected president of PSA with

(11) Manchester Guardian, March 11, 1959.

(12) Kanza, op. cit., p. 35.
(13) Ibid., p. 37.

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360 OMAJUWA IGHO NATUFE

Pierre Mulele as the secretary-general. It is imperative t

of the Congo crisis should be based on an understandi
lectics of political relations, internal and external, repr
above alliance system prior to June 30, 1960.
Lumumba was aware of the membership and str
competing alliance system. He accepted Kasavubu, a Be
as President perhaps hoping that after independence
trenched as head of government he would be in a bet
ostracize Kasavubu. He understimated his enemies a
Kasavubu and the Belgian-Tshombe forces began the p
miliating Lumumba on independence day. For example
government, Lumumba, was ignored by Belgium in mat
relating to the independence celebrations. As the p
Lumumba ought to have known in advance, or in f
participated in writing, the speech of Kasavubu. Th
case and the showdown took place at the independence
After the Belgian King and Kasavubu had read their respec
which were paternalist in tune, Lumumba, in his s
Belgian colonialism which was a catalogue of " deprivation,
he declared that Congolese " independence has only been
gle... " and that the battle for independence "was a
struggle, which was needed to bring to an end the hum
imposed on us by force. Such was our lot for eighty
colonialist regime... " (14). While it is conceded that
not diplomatic, we must recognize, however, that his s
the aspirations of millions of Congolese and Africans who
under the pillage of colonialism and imperialist exploita
crisis would still have occured in 1960 had Lumumba b
and the fact that it did occur unquestionably confirmed t
tions and the anti-colonialist pronouncements of Lumu
The continued exploitation of the Congo was consid
the economic well-being of Belgium and, to a certain
France and Britain. Before the proclamation of ind
government officials met with Kasavabu, Tshombe, Ka
leading anti Lumumbists emphasising the need to prot
capitalist interests " in the Congo after independence (1

(14) Ibid., p. 161; for the texts of the speeches of King Baudo
and President Kasavubu see ibid., pp. 155-157 and pp. 157-160 resp
(15) Ibid., pp. 139-140.

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 THE COLD WAR AND THE CONGO CRISIS 361

hand the Communist bloc used the Belgian Communist party as

between itself and Congolese nationalists considered hostile to cap
interests. However, in Kanza's views, the use of the Belgian
munist party in this operation was " a grave mistake... for the B
Communist Party was larded with double agents... Some of its le
differed from the leaders of other Belgian parties only in the rh
with which they denounced Belgian colonialism " (16). Thus in
of class solidarity the forces of anti imperialism in the Congo
at a serious disadvantage since their " comrades ", Belgian Comm
had allied themselves with Belgian capitalist interests. The B
government knew this, while the Lumumbists knew it after the bet
The above competing alliances represented the correlation of for
in the Congo at independence.
The events scholars refer to as the Congo crisis or, in C
Legum's words, Congo Disaster, occured between July 5 and Sept
4, 1960. On July 5 Congolese nationals in the Armée Nationale
golaise (ANC) mutinied against their Belgian " colonialist maste
On July 10 at the invitation of Tshombe Belgian troops lan
Katanga and systematically disarmed Congolese troops. On July
Tshombe declared the " independence " of Katanga, thus seceding
the Republic of Congo. On September 4 Kasavubu dismisse
mumba as Prime Minister. What was Lumumba's governme
sponse to these developments? What was the nature of the com
domestic power blocs vis-à-vis these incidents? How did the op
ideological power centres - Moscow and Washington - react
crisis? Because of their strong linkages an answer to one of
questions invariably has to deal with the others.
Mr. Robert Murphy led U.S. delegation to the independence
bration on June 30, 1960. One of those in the delegation w
Clarke Timberlake, U.S. Ambassador-designate to the Congo. A 1
Soviet delegation to the independence celebration was led b
Mirzo Rakhmatov, a Vice-President of the USSR Supreme Sovie
inclusion of an Ambassador-designate (USA) and a Vice-Pres
(USSR) in the respective delegations of the two major powers ind
the significance of the Congo in the strategic planning of Wash
and Moscow. We have already mentioned U.S. contacts with prom
anti Lumumbists with the view of constructing an alliance ho
communists interest in the Congo. Forty-eight hours before the pr

(16) Ibid., p. 141.

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362 OMAJUWA IGHO NATUFE

mation of independence it was reported that the Soviet

an offer of economic and technical aid to the Congo am
that Lumumba was contemplating establishing diplomat
Moscow, Peking (now Beijing) and other socialist states
to be a stooge of the Western powers " (17). The subse
tov-Lumumba meeting resulted in the establishment of
tions between the USSR and the Congo on July 8,
Soviet delegation returned to Moscow on July 9.
However, prior to the departure of the Soviet d
Congo was thrown into political disarray as the AN
July 5 against its Belgian officers demanding the indig
ANC. This was a natural reaction of a people who p
pendence to mean an era of total self government in all as
the armed forces. Belgium immediately exploited the mut
that Lumumba had brought in Soviet soldiers. Soviet
independence celebrations were humiliated at the airport a
was suspected of carrying arms and soldiers to aid Lu
ANC against Belgians. The effect of Belgian propagan
marized as follows: 1) to set impressionable Congol
mumba; 2) to create favourable crisis situation to faci
and the West continued dominance; 3) to seek an altern
in the Congo to realize 2 (above).
The Council of Ministers, with Kasavubu in the
July 8 to discuss the ANC mutiny. The decision to
ANC was unanimous and Joseph Mobutu, Lumumba's pr
was appointed Chief of Staff of the Army and immedi
to the rank of Colonel. It was thus declared in the
the Council of Ministers: " After some discussion, the
and members of the government have decided to g
command to Congolese soldiers, so as to create a nationa
and commanded by its own people... The Council of M
to make it clear that these reforms do not involve the
Belgian commanders and officers prepared to serve th
The government guarantees them their income and sec
safety of their families and goods. All that is asked
work with the new regime which is part of the natu
of Congolese independence " (18).

(17) Daily Telegraph, June 28, 1960.

(18) Kanza, op. cit., p. 194.

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 THE COLD WAR AND THE CONGO CRISIS 363

The communiqué was both moderate and conciliatory in tune,

but it did not seem to satisfy the Belgian government which had decided
to exploit the ANC mutiny to undermine the independence of th
Congo. Meanwhile, Belgium was consolidating her stronghold in the
province of Katanga. Declining to withdraw her forces from the Cong
after June 30, the Belgian government systematically started to posi
tion itself in the Congo. On Tshombe's invitation Belgian troop
landed in Katanga on July 10 and began to disarm Congolese troops
loyal to the central government of Lumumba. The central government
sent a request for aid to the UNO on July 10, while Tshombe declared
the " independence " of Katanga on July 11. Belgian and Western
support for Tshombe, who had refused to place Katanga under th
Central Government of Lumumba, systematically led to a series of
riots and disorders in the Congo as Belgian and Congolese troops were
engaged in a military showdown. In a move to assess the crisis an
assure Congolese of the central government's determination to restor
law and order and safeguard the territorial integrity of the Congo,
Lumumba and Kasavubu toured the country and met with both politica
and military leaders. The Council of Ministers meetings on July 11
and 12 were chaired by Gizenga with Belgian Ministers and U.S. Am-
bassador Timberlake in attendance (19). The participation of Belgian
Ministers and the U.S. ambassador in the deliberations of the Congoles
council of Ministers' meeting seemed normal and acceptable to both
Brussels and Washington. It also demonstrated the extent to which
the West had succeeded in penetrating into, and manipulating th
government of the Congo.
Kasavubu and Lumumba sent a second telegram to the UN
requesting its intervention to convince Belgium to withdraw her troop
from the Congo. They also sought military aid from Ghana on July 13
Ghana accepted, but informed Belgium, and outlined its desire to work
within the framework of an international body. The Congolese govern
ment also appealed to both Moscow and Washington for assistance in
persuading Belgium to withdraw from the Congo. The imperialis
machinations in the young state provoked Soviet condemnation of th
Western powers and the Soviet Government quickly took diplomatic
move to display its support for Lumumba. Andrei Gromyko, the Sovie
Foreign Minister, summoned the Belgian Ambassador, J. Cools, and
the U.S. Charge d'Affaires, E. L. Freers, to the Soviet Foreign Ministry

(19) Ibid., p. 201.

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364 OMAJUWA IGHO NATUFE

and handed them a strong protest of the Soviet Governme

was accused of " committing a flagrant violation both of th
integrity and of the political independence " of the Cong
U.S., through its NATO connection, was accused of support
According to the Soviet note, Belgian troops under NATO
stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany were deplo
Congo. Moscow appealed to the UN to halt Western ag
the " interest of peace " and to " restore the sovereign r
independent Republic " of the Congo i20). The Belgian Go
argued it was intervening to fulfil " its sacred duties, imp
and morals, to protect its compatriots in extreme danger
its opinion, Lumumba was unable " to stop or control " th
while Bonn refuted Soviet allegation and accused Moscow
" ideological aggression " with the explicit purpose of making
" one of its colonial satellites " (21). The " legal " argumen
by Belgium to justify her aggression in the Congo were in
Belgian disinclination to forfeit its imperial grip in the count
refused to accept responsibility for the crisis. If Belgium'
intervene was purely to " protect its compatriots " it is in
note that the Belgian Government did not seek to evacuat
patriots " from the Congo.
The Katanga-Belgian alliance supported by Western ca
terests paralyzed the efforts of Lumumba to govern the co
compelled the Congolese government to seek the assistan
Western forces in combating the aggression. Kasavubu and
joint appeal to the Soviet Government for aid to stop the
was accepted by Moscow conditionally, should the aggressor
their criminal actions" in the Congo i22). This was afte
was " rebuffed by the Eisenhower administration " of th
The UN Security Council resolution of July 14, 1960, req
gium to withdraw its forces from the Congo and authorized th
General, Dag Hammarskjoeld, " in consultation with the gov
the Republic of the Congo to provide that government wit
tary assistance as may be necessary, with the technical assista
United Nations, until the national security forces are able, in

(20) Soviet News, Embassy of the USSR, London, July 14, 1960. S
New York Times, Tuly 14, 1960.
(21) The New York Times, July 16, 1960.
(22) Soviet News, Embassy of the USSR, London, July 18, 1960.
(23) D. N. Chatterjee, Storm Over the Congo, New Delhi, 1980, p. 13.

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 THE COLD WAR AND THE CONGO CRISIS 365

of the government, to meet fully their tasks " i24). The Security Council
resolution of July 14 made it explicitly clear that the intensity or level
of UN involvement in the Congo was to be determined by the legitimate
government of Lumumba that sought for UN military intervention. A
part of the UN contingents General H. T. Alexander, a British citizen
and head of Ghana's troops, arrived in the Congo on July 14. However
the UN involvement only intensified the crisis and facilitated the down-
fall and assassination of Lumumba. It is ironical that Kwame Nkrumah
the leading African anti-colonial crusader should, in 1960, three years
after Ghana's independence still have a Briton as head of his armed
forces, a Briton who did not conceal his hostility toward African inde
pendence and the anti colonial movement.
This same Briton - General Alexander - acting in the service
of Ghana, contributed to the overthrow and assassination of Lumumba
Nkrumah's ally Í25).
Kasavubu and Lumumba returned to Leopoldville from their cross-
country tour on July 15. Meanwhile, Ghana's General Alexander, who
was " de facto commander " of the UN contigent, had ordered th
disarming of the mutinous ANC soldiers. The Congolese parliament
was divided on its support for Lumumba. The Chamber of Representa
tive under Joseph Kasongo was pro Lumumba while the Senate unde
Joseph Ileo was against Lumumba as the internal forces began to posi
tion themselves in the ensuing alliance buildup.
On July 20 Lumumba flew to New York for personal appeal
before the UN Security Council for Belgian troops to be withdrawn
from his troubled country. He seemed to have had some faith in th
UN peace keeping effort, but stipulated that the Secretary-General must
evacuate the UN troops when his government was convinced that the
situation was under control. The withdrawal of Belgian troops wa
the main priority of Lumumba's government. But the UN did no
possess any power to compel Belgium to adhere to the Security Counci
Resolution requesting Belgium to withdraw, neither was the Wes
interested in Belgian withdrawal from the Congo. Lumumba's appeal
to the U.S. Government was also a failure; Washington argued that
her peace efforts were channelled through the UN. However, the U.S.

(24) As quoted in Kanza, op. cit., p. 208 (italics mine).

(25) See Lumumba s letter to Nkrumah on this subject in Kwame Nkrumah,
Challenge of the Congo, London, 1967, p. 39. See also W. Scott Thompson, Ghana's
Foreign Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State, Princeton, New
Jersey, 1969, pp. 125-128, & 139.

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366 OMAJUWA IGHO NATUFE

promised Lumumba economic aid and adopted a wait-a

by refusing to condemn Tshombe's secession or Belgia
the Soviet Government opposed the presence of U.S. tr
operation, Lumumba remained pragmatic and hoped for
of peace to the Congo. In a Washington press conferen
his government's decision to welcome " American troo
in his view, was to compel Belgium to withdraw imm
By the end of July 1960, it became evident that t
were determined to defy Lumumba's government. Whi
ington, Lumumba received a cable from his deputy, An
informing him that the " United Nations troops were
golese and leaving the Belgians their arms ", while th
declined to crush Tshombe's rebellion C6). Hammar
West were condemned by Moscow and radical African
Guinea, Mali, and Egypt. In August 1960, the Sovie
despatched a plane to airlift Ghanaian troops to t
operation almost coincided with the arrival of Soviet A
Yakovlev in Leopoldville.
Lumumba's discussion with Hammarskjoeld at th
York was acrimonious as it was clear that both differe
on the role of UN troops and the West in the Con
from New York in August 1960, Lumumba visited Tu
Liberia, Guinea, Ghana and Togoland in a diplomatic e
the support of these states. Sekou Toure promised him
UN troops would be placed under the complete jur
government. This was an encouragement the Congoles
had expected from other states. The Lumumba - Nkru
of August 8 seemed to confirm Lumumba's politica
defeat the Hammarskjoeld-Belgium-Tshombe triple alli
8, Nkrumah called for the formation of an African H
outside the UN to assist Lumumba. This was followed
by the declaration of the Ghanaian Government to with
from the UN command and place them in readiness to
The gesture of Toure and Nkrumah appeared progressi
the power of implementation, while pro Western Afric
it as a hyprocritical act by Guinea and Ghana to public
gical stance in African politics. The conference of Indep
States convened in Leopoldville to discuss the crisis had

(26) The Times, London, and The New York Times, July 29, 1

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 THE COLD WAR AND THE CONGO CRISIS 367

unanimity as most African states for obvious ideological reasons reaf-

firmed their confidence in the UN command.
Towards the end of July 1960 it was clear to most perceptive
analysts that the UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjoeld, was pilot-
ing the UN Operation in the Congo to favour the U.S. and Western
capitalist interests. Unfortunately, Thomas Kanza, Lumumba's Ambas-
sador in the UN, failed to observe this, even though he had had several
discussion on the Congo with Hammarskjoeld. He seemed to believe
in Hammarskjoeld's goodwill in resolving the crisis. He accompanied
Hammarskjoeld form New York to the Congo in late July 1960. He
reported Hammarskjoeld's statement to him: " I don't know what you
think about the United States, but it seems to me right now that
America is the only ally the central Congolese government can count
on, the only one that sincerely supports what the UN is doing in the
Congo " H.
Why did Hammarskjoeld tell Kanza the above? What about
France and Britain in the Security Council? What about the USSR?
Was it not that Moscow had condemned the UN operation as a neo-
colonial plot conceived by the U.S. hence the Soviet Government refused
to contribute its financial quota to maintain the operation? Was there
no intra capitalist rivalry that compelled both Paris and London to
suspect Washington's calculations in the Congo? These are vital
questions which Ambassador Kanza failed to answer, but to which
Indian Ambassador in Washington (later in Leopoldville in 1962)
D. N. Chatterjee addressed himself i28).
Frustrated by the U.S. and Hammarskjoeld's U.N. command, Lu-
mumba became dependent on Soviet support. On August 15 the
Soviet Government sent him an IL-4 plane as a gift. On August
16 he declared he was assuming complete power to resolve the conflict
without the UN troops. However, on August 18 the UN command
decided to put under its control all radio stations and deprived Lu-
mumba the use of these facilities to consolidate his forces.
The conflict was no longer a conflict between Lumumba and
Tshombe, but a conflict which Lumumba must grapple with on two
fronts: against the UN command and against Tshombe-Belgium. Ham-
marskjoeld's interpretation of the UN's role only " confirmed " his
complicity in a plot to overthrow Lumumba. For example, when

(27) As quoted in Kanza, op. cit., p. 244.

(28) Chatterjee, op. cit., pp. 20-21 & 26.

25
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368 OMAJUWA IGHO NATUFE

P. D. Morozov, the Soviet deputy permanent representative

confronted Hammarskjoeld on the presence of Belgian tro
Congo, Hammarskjoeld stated that the UN had taken over t
bases in Kamina and Kitona but had asked the Belgians
occupying the bases " to remain as part of the UN organiza
This act of Hammarskjoeld clearly violated the Security Coun
tion of July 14 that called for the withdrawal of Belgian t
the Congo. Hammarskjoeld's " assimilation " of Belgium in
military command gave credence to the allegation of UN-Belgia
to overthrow Lumumba.
Meanwhile, Kasavubu and Lumumba were involved
stitutional crisis that further aggravated the conflict. On Se
Kasavubu announced he had dismissed Lumumba even t
former only had the required constitutional two signatori
tember 6. Lumumba in his speech before parliament on Se
accused both Hammarskjoeld and Kasavubu of conspiracy to
Congo's legal government. The parliamentary initiative to
Kasavubu and Lumumba was condemned by the "western
groups ", while U.S. President Eisenhower accused " the So
rather than Belgium of causing anarchy in the Congo " i30
Cordier, a U.S. citizen and Hammarskjoeld's assistant in
was in effective control of the Congolese government (31).
Hammarskjoeld's decision to place Belgium in command
bases in the secessionist province of Katanga raised the
Tshombe and encouraged him to further defy the Central G
of Lumumba. Barely a week after this decision the Sovie
ment sent 15 IL-14 planes to Lumumba. The UN was re
crush Tshombe's secession, while the arrival of Soviet planes, al
" Republique du Congo ", underlined Lumumba's determinat
tirpate Tshombe's secessionist regime in Katanga. To foil L
plan, Hammarskjoeld banned all non-UN planes, including th
ing to the Congolese Government, from UN controlled air
bases, not excluding the important Kamina base in Kata
Hammarskjoeld's decision strongly restricted the movement
of the legitimate government, and was a de facto recognit
Tshombe regime in Katanga. Kasavubu appointed Josep
replace Lumumba as Premier on September 10.

(29) New York Herald Tribune (European Edition), September 2, 19

(30) Kanza, op. cit., p. 301.
(31) Ibid.

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 THE COLD WAR AND THE CONGO CRISIS 369

The UN decision to ban Lumumba's government from all radio

stations and airports had two fundamentally pathetic consequences.
First the ban permitted Belgium under UN cover to operate in the
Congo, particularly in the province of Katanga. Secondly, the UN ban
against Lumumba was implemented by Ghana's UN troops. Lumumba
in his letter of September 11 to Nkrumah complained bitterly about
the hostility of the Ghanaian troops headed by General Alexander
that prevented him (Lumumba) and his loyal soldiers from taking con
trol of the radio stations. Lumumba declared: " In the circumstances
I feel obliged to renounce the help of your troops in view of the fact
that they are in a state of war against our Republic. Instead of helping
us in our difficulties, your soldiers are openly siding with the enemy
to fight us " (32).
In his reply to Lumumba, Nkrumah regretted the use of Ghanaian
troops by the UN to " tie " down Lumumba and proposed to Lumumba:
" If Ghana troops are to be placed completely at your disposal, then
you and your Government must find some way to declare that in thi
struggle Ghana and the Congo are one " (33).
This proposal by Nkrumah conflicts with the August 10 Declara-
tion of the Ghanaian Government, following the Nkrumah-Lumumba
meeting of August 8 in Accra, in which Ghana committed her troops
to assist Lumumba. In another note to Lumumba (September 12),
Nkrumah advised him to be tactful and less harsh in dealing with
his opponents - Kasavubu, Tshombe, Belgium, UN, etc. He advised
Lumumba to be " as cool as a cucumber " and adopt " tactical action ",
in his struggle to consolidate his forces to a position of strength before
pushing out the enemies (M). In hindsight one can conclude tha
Nkrumah's advice to Lumumba in the critical days of July and August
was perhaps misguided, particularly since it must have been obvious
to Nkrumah that the framework for implementing an anti-colonial
strategem he had in view had not been mapped out. Perhaps the
" tactical action " Nkrumah was now (in September) advising Lumumba
to adopt could have yielded tangible results in early July. Nkrumah
should know since he himself had to adopt a similar strategy in the
1951-1957 period of the anti colonial struggle in the then Gold Coas
(now Ghana).

(32) Nkrumah, op. cit., p. 39.

(33) Ibid., p. 42.
(34) Ibid. p. 43.

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370 OMAJUWA IGHO NATUFE

On September 13 the Congolese parliament declared its

in Lumumba. Unfortunately this declaration lacked the mi
it required to keep Lumumba in power. The UN militar
in the Congo was implicated in corrupt practices by fi
Mobutu led military coup that toppled Lumumba's gov
September 14. Ambassador Chatter jee had this to say abo
and politics: " In international affairs, it is no secret, mone
lubricant and widely employed by the cynic and the virt
pending on the stakes and the quality of services rendere
is either " bought " or " rented " (35); in September 1960 M
" rented " by the West. Moscow condemned Kasavubu for
Lumumba on September 5, but when Mobutu ordered the
Czechoslovakia to close their embassies within 48 hours
Government reversed its position arguing that its Ambas
accredited to Kasavubu and not to Mobutu. On Septemb
vubu formally signed a statement dismissing all commun
dors and journalists from the Congo, and also authorized
of their missions. From the Soviet perspective, the expulsi
diplomats and the closure of its mission did not signify a
of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Co
official statement explaining the crisis, the Soviet Govern
tained that it had " decided to recall temporarily the staff of
Embassy " as a result of the political unrest and the " imp
noeuvre " which had made it " impossible for the Emb
USSR... to function normally ". Secondly, that the decision
draw temporarily " did not affect Soviet-Congolese relati
Soviet Union's attitude to the young African Republic... r
of invariable friendship " i26).
The Soviet Government was cautious in its appraisal of
tion. It blamed the West for the closure of its embassy a
growing anarchy in the Congo. In the Soviet view, a firm
tion to remain loyal to Lumumba and the Congolese an
sentiments would enhance Moscow's prestige in the cou
difficult to establish whether the Soviet leaders were convinced of
Lumumba's success at this stage of the crisis. However what seemed
vital to Moscow was to identify its course with the policies of Ghana,
Guinea, Mali and Egypt, and the general wave of African anti impe-

dì Chatterjee, op. cit., p. 9.

(36) Soviet News, Embassy of the USSR, London, September 20, 1960.

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 THE COLD WAR AND THE CONGO CRISIS 371

rialism that was sweeping through the continent. Thus a solid basis
for a future ideological alliance emerged from the Congo crisis.
Viewed from the context of the East-West ideological struggle,
the anti-Lumumba military coup and the expulsion of Soviet and Com-
munist states' diplomats signified a victory for the West in the Congo.
Mr. Clarke Timberlake, the U.S. ambassador, was alleged to have urged
Mobutu to expel the Soviet diplomats and those of ofther Communist
countries. It was recognized that a complete U.S. " victory " over the
USSR would be meaningful only when " the Lumumba question is
settled once and for all ". This was the rationalization for U.S. involve-
ment in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba (37). Timberlake's " vic-
tory " was regarded as U.S. " amends for the American fiasco of the
U-2 flight " and a <f breathing space " for the West in the Congo. The
arrest of Lumumba and his colleagues, Okito and M'polo, their torture
and subsequent airlifting as "three packages " to Tshombe's Katanga,
where they were finally murdered and their bodies quickly disposed
off, portrayed the complicity of the UN " peace-keeping force " as a
tool of Western imperial design. This prompted the Soviet Govern-
ment to demand the replacement of Hammarskjoeld as UN Secretary-
General. In his place Moscow proposed a troika system of a Secretary
generalship: one each from the East, West and the non-aligned bloc.
Moscow also proposed that an African military command be commis-
sioned to replace the UN in the Congo i38). To immortalize the name
of Lumumba the Soviet Government named the People's Friendship
University, established in 1960, after Patrice Lumumba.
Meanwhile political development in the Congo was heading to-
ward a balkanization: Lumumba's deputy, Gizenga had established
Lumumbist government in Stanleyville; Tshombe was still in control
in Katanga; Cyrille Adoula had replaced Ileo in Leopoldville, while
Kalonji had established a power base in Kasai province. And in Wash-
ington John F. Kennedy had just been sworn in as U.S. President.
The USSR, China, Poland, Czechoslavakia, Yugoslavia, Ghana, and
Guinea were represented by their respective chargés d'affaires in Stan-
leyville while Mali and Egypt had ambassadors also in Stanleyville
Belgium had firmly established herself in Tshombe's Katanga with
strong Anglo-French capital investment in the mines. Kalonji's regime

(37) Donald Seaman, " This was the invisible victory ", Daily Express, September
21, 1960.
(38) Soviet News, Embassy of the USSR, London January 21, and February 16, 1961.

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372 OMAJUWA IGHO NATUFE

could be dismissed as a mere protest symbol withou

encouragement, while Adoula was having difficulty m
poldville.
The above indicated the relative strength of the respective al-
liance building in the Congolese political chessboard. Through a
Sudanese corridor security support systems materials were shipped to
Gizenga's government in Stanleyville. However this was not enough
to confront the combined forces of the West and Hammarskjoeld's
UN command that had long allied with Leopoldville (read Mobutu)
and Tshombe. Moreover it was clear the U.S. strategic concern was
to obliterate communist influence in the Congo as a prelude to a war
against communism in Africa. Kennedy, as U.S. President, had to
pursue this objective. An overt U.S. support for Tshombe would
strengthen the pro Lumumbist forces in Stanleyville, neither was it
considered viable to control Katanga and Kisai without Leopoldville
and Stanleyville. While U.S. policy was opposed to Tshombe in Ka-
tanga, it did not exclude Tshombe in a united Congo with zero com-
munist influence and a controlled influence of Belgian, French, and
British capitalists dependent on Washington. Thus, in U.S. calcula-
tion, Lumumbists had to go, so also was secession. To achieve this
implied U.S. continued support for Mobutu and Kasavubu. Washing-
ton did not want a Congo without Katanga. Ambassador Chatterjee
pointedly stated: " America wanted a strong, not necessarily a demo-
cratic, government in Leopoldville. America did not want fabulously
rich Katanga to secede under Tshombe who was being financed, guided,
and encouraged in his treasonable enterprise not merely by necessary
adventurers but by respectable ' western ' allies of America " (39).
In August 1961, a coalition government was formed with Adoula
as Premier, and Gizenga as deputy Premier. The Soviet Government
hailed this as a progressive development in Congolese troubled post
independent history. On August 31, 1961, a Soviet Government State-
ment argued that since Adoula was the successor of the " great patriot
Lumumba ", Moscow was prepared to maintain cordial relations with
the new regime. In Moscow's view, the normalization of relations
between Adoula and Gizenga meant the restoration of political stability
in the Congo. As a result of this development all the pro Lumumba
countries, excluding China, decided to " move " their embassies from
Stanleyville to Leopoldville. The Chinese maintained that the murder

(39) Chatterjee, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

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 THE COLD WAR AND THE CONGO CRISIS 373

of Lumumba and the collapse of Gizenga's regime had negated th

concept of Beijing's diplomatic representation in the country, accusing
the USSR of betraying the cause of national liberation. The Congolese
crisis further intensified the Sino-Soviet schism as both communist
states found themselves engaged in bitter rivalry to win support in
Africa.
In drawing a lesson from the above analysis it would be an over
simplification to blame Lumumba for lack of tact in dealing with Bel-
gium and her allies. He displayed tact and willingness to cooperate
hence his acceptance of a Belgian candidate, Kasavubu, as President
of the Congo. As it turned out, again in hindsight, this was his
Waterloo. His belief in the UN was genuine, but the UN demonstrated
itself as a tool of neo-colonialism by its subsequent actions in the
Congo. It is thus imperative for African, Asian, Carribean and Latin
American countries to be extremely cautious and suspicious of any
UN " peace-keeping " force.
A viable alternative is for respective African states to enter into
a regional military alliance to protect themselves from external aggres-
sion as witnessed in the Congo. Naturally, a basis for such a military
alliance bust be ideological without which any such military alliance
would crumble like a pack of cards. This obviously explains the
problems confronting the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) as it continously grapples with the question of establishing
a West African Defence Pact. Would it be proper for such an African
(regional) Military Pact to ally with either NATO of the WTO? This
will be determined by the correlation of forces in the international
political scene. It would be naive to assume that the super powers
do not nurse such plans.

Omajuwa Igho Natufe

RIASSUNTO

L'autore di questo studio esamina le varie fasi della crisi congolese (1960-1961),
nella cornice della « guerra fredda » ossia dei rapporti fra i due gruppi di potenze guidati
rispettivamente da Washington e da Mosca. A suo parere, l'ONU, col suo intervento,
si comportò allora come uno strumento del neocolonialismo. Da questa esperienza egli

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374 OMAJUWA IGHO NATUFE

ritiene di poter dedurre che gli Stati del Terzo Mondo debbono sem
atteggiamento assai cauto a riguardo di qualsiasi forza militare d'in
nei conflitti in corso. Egli si dichiara inoltre favorevole all'ingresso
in alleanze militari regionali atte a proteggerli dalle aggressioni estern

RÉSUMÉ

L'auteur de cette étude analyse les diverses phases de la crise du Congo (1960-
1961), dans le cadre de la «guerre froide» c'est-à-dire des rapports entre les deux
groupes de puissances guidés respectivement par Washington et par Moscou. D'après
lui, l'ONU, par son intervention, se comporta alors comme un instrument du néocolo-
nialisme. De cette expérience il estime de pouvoir conclure que les états du Tiers Monde
doivent toujours suivre une attitude extrêmement méfiante à l'égard de toute force mi-
litaire d'intervention de l'ONU dans les conflit en cours. Il se déclare en outre favorable
à l'entrée des états africains dans des alliances militaires régionales pouvant les pro-
téger des aggressions extérieures.

1 11 FONDATO nel 1901

Jhco della 1 11 sta
UFFICIO di RITAGLI da GIORNALI e RIVISTE
Casella Postale 3549 - 20100 MILANO Direttore:
Via G. Compagnoni, 28 - Tei. (02) 723.333 ignazio FRUGIUELE

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