ARTURO M.

TOLENTINO, petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR, and THE DISBURSING
OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, respondents, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, JESUS G.
BARRERA, PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA, LEONARDO
SIGUION REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V. BORRA, Intervenors.

GR. NO. L-34150

OCTOBER 16, 1971

FACTS: A Constitutional Convention was convened to propose revisions to the Philippine Constitution,
and the delegates to the said Convention were all elected according to and by resolutions and the
implementing law, Republic Act 6132. The Convention passed Organic Resolution No. 1, which amends
Section 1 of Article 5 of the Philippine Constitution to decrease the voting age to 18 years old. The
resolution also stated in Section 3 that the partial amendment, which only refers to the age qualification
for exercising suffrage, is without prejudice to any future amendments proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended Section or the entire Constitution.

The petition's major point is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing resolutions later
passed by the Convention have no authority and effect as laws since they violate Section 1 Article XV of
the Constitution. The proposed amendment in question, according to the aforementioned law, cannot
be offered to the people for ratification apart from all of the other changes to be developed and
proposed by the Convention.

ISSUES: Is it within the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to mandate the convening of a
census on the proposed amendment/s.

WON the constitutional resolution agreed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention.

Conclusion: The Court rules that all proposed revisions must be put to the public in a single "election" or
plebiscite. We hold that the plebiscite held on November 8, 1971, to submit the same to the public for
ratification is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, and therefore all acts of the
Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and invalid. It expressly states that
either Congress acting as a constituent assembly or a convention convened for that purpose "may
propose amendments to this Constitution.

The same provision clearly states that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification," leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may
be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of
Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocally states that

The petition is approved. Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, as well as the
Convention's implementing acts and resolutions, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite
on November 8, 1971, and the respondent Comelec's resolution complying therewith RR Resolution
Number. 695, are considered or can be null and voided. The defendants Comelec, Disbursing Officer,
Chief Accountant, and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby restrained from acting in
accordance with the aforementioned organic resolution. Given the unusual circumstances of this case,
the Court deems this judgement to be immediately executable. There are no fees.
G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL

ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA,
in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization
and Action (PIRMA), respondents.

FACTS: Delfin claimed in his petition that….

Connected to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution"[10] with the
proposed revisions, which consist of the repeal of the clauses addressing term limits from the
aforementioned sections, and with the following proposition:

(DO YOU SUPPORT AMENDING SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE
VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION TO LIFT THE
TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS?)

According to Delfin, the aforementioned Petition for Initiative would be presented to the public first,
and it will be legally submitted with the COMELEC if it is signed by at least 12% of the total number
of registered voters in the country.

 The constitutional provision allowing citizens to propose amendments to the Constitution

may only be enacted through legislation ratified by Congress. There has been no legislation
on the current subject at hand.
 It is correct that R.A. No. 6735 establishes three systems of initiative: initiative on the
Constitution, initiative on statutes, and initiative on municipal legislation. However, unlike the
other kinds of initiative, it failed to give any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution. are
particularly provided for in Subtitles II and III, indicating that the issue of people's initiative to
modify the Constitution was left to some future statute.

ISSUES:

 Even if the R.A. No 6735, An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, was meant to contain or cover initiative on constitutional
modifications; and, if so, whether the Act, as written, appropriately covers such initiative.
 Whether raising term limits for elective national and municipal authorities, as proposed in the
drafted "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," constitutes a reform or amendment to
the Constitution.

CONCLUSION:

1. Article 17, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which discusses modifications by People's
Initiatives, is not self-executive. "Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose
 amendments to the Constitution through the initiative system would remain entombed in the
cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provided for its implementation." In other words,
while the Constitution recognizes or grants that right, the people cannot enjoy it if Congress,
for whatever reason, fails to provide for its execution."
2. In terms of initiating constitutional revisions, R.A. No. 6735 is insufficient, inadequate, or
lacking in key terms and circumstances. Its gaps on this point are critical, and they cannot be
filled by "empowering" the COMELEC to "propose such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act."

B. Section 2 is confined to suggestions to AMEND the Constitution rather than REVISE it. This
resolution was based on the constitutional drafters' interpellation and their conversation with
President Cory Aquino.

This petition must therefore be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently barred from
receiving or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on constitutional modifications until a
suitable legislation has been legitimately passed to provide for the system's implementation.
PIRMA v. COMELEC (GR No.129745)
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED

VOTERS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

FACTS:

Lambino, Raul L.

Mr. Erico B. Aumentado. collecting signatures for an initiative petition to amend the 1987
Constitution. ask the COMELEC to convene a plebiscite to approve their initiative petition under
Sections 5(b) and (c)[2] and 7[3] of Republic Act No. 6735. Can be known as the Initiative and
Referendum Act.

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting
at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by
at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The
Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the
6.3 million individuals.
Petitioners (Lambino group) began collecting signatures for an initiative petition to amend the 1987
constitution, and they petitioned the COMELEC to convene a referendum to validate their initiative
petition under RA 6735. The Lambino group claimed that the petition received the backing of 6
million people, as required under Article 17 of the Constitution. Their petition amends the 1987
constitution by altering parts 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7, as well as introducing Art 18. The
proposed amendments will convert the current bicameral-presidential system of government to a
unicameral-parliamentary form of government.

ISSUES:

Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition conforms with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on constitutional amendments by popular initiative;

Whether this Court should reconsider its decision in Santiago, which declared RA 6735 "incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions" for implementing the initiative provision on
proposals to modify the Constitution; and whether the COMELEC abused its discretion by denying
the Lambino Group's petition due process.

CONCLUSION:

The court ruled that the Lambino Group initiative is invalid and unconstitutional because it fails to
meet the criterion of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, which states that the initiative must be
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition."
The core of revisions "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the
whole proposal is a petition by the people on its face. This implies that two key components must be
present. The people must first author and thereby sign the complete proposal. No agent or
representative has the authority to sign on his or her behalf. Second, the plan must be represented
in a petition as an initiative based on a petition.

The core of revisions "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the
whole proposal is a petition by the people on its face. This implies that two key components must be
present. The people must first author and thereby sign the complete proposal. No agent or
representative has the authority to sign on his or her behalf. Second, the plan must be represented
in a petition as an initiative based on a petition.

The whole language of the proposed modifications may be written on the petition's front or attached
to it. If such an attachment is made, the petition must indicate that fact. This ensures that everyone
of the petition's millions of signatories see the entire content of the proposed revisions before
signing. Otherwise, given the time constraints, it is physically impossible to demonstrate that
every.one of the millions of signatures had reviewed the full text of the proposed revisions before
signing.
G.R. No. L-28196 November 9, 1967

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and AUDITOR
GENERAL, respondents.

FACTS:

The Senate and House of Representatives passed Resolutions Nos. 1, 2, and 3 on March 16, 1967.
to increase the Lower House seats from 120 to 180; to convene a Constitutional Convention of 1971;
and to amend the Constitution (Section 16, Article VI) so they can become delegates themselves to
the Convention. Then Congress passed a bill, after being approved by the President became
Republic Act No. 4913 on June 17, 1967, providing that the amendments to the Constitution
proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted for approval.

Ramon A. Gonzales, a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter, filed an original action for prohibition,
with preliminary injunction, in L-28196Then Congress passed a bill, after being approved by the
President, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated. Another is by PHILCONSA, in L-28224, a
corporation duly organised and existing under Philippine laws, and a civic, non-profit, and non-
partisan organisation whose goal is to uphold the rule of law in the Philippines and defend its
Constitution against erosions or onslaughts from whatever source.

ISSUES:

Whether or not a Congressional Resolution operating in the capacity of a constituent assembly is it a

violation of the Constitution? Can Constitutional Amendments Be Put Up for Vote in a General
Election?

Constitutional Amendments in May be submitted for approval... in a Presidential Election?

CONCLUSION:

The question of whether or not a Congressional Resolution operating in the capacity of a constituent
assembly violates the Constitution in a way that is basically justiciable, not political, and hence
amenable to judicial review. In the instances at hand, notwithstanding the fact that the R. B. H. Nos.
1 and 3 were adopted by a vote of three-fourths of all members of the Senate and House of
Representatives voting separately, but they are null and invalid since Members of Congress who
supported the proposed changes are no longer in office.

Both the resolution calling for a convention to submit revisions and the resolution itself are, at best,
ineffective.

Congressmen (based on Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, no apportionment has been made
by Congress within three (3) years since 1960. Subsequently, the Congress of the Philippines and/or
the election of its members became unlawful; that Congress and its Members, likewise, became a
criminal offence.The Congress (and/or congressmen);however, as a result of this, the title of a
Officer cannot be attacked indirectly.
G.R. No. 104768 July 21, 2003

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and ELIZABETH
DIMAANO, Respondents

FACTS:

The first Resolution refused petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and ordered the restoration of
the confiscated property to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution disallowed
petitioner's Amended Complaint.

Pres, Corazon C. Aquino established the Presidential Commission on Good Governance "PCGG" by
Executive Order No. 1 -EO No. 1. The PCGG was principally charged under EO No. 1 to retrieve
all... ill-gotten riches of former Pres Ferdinand Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates
and close acquaintances. According to EO No. 1, the PCGG has the authority "(a) to conduct such
investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this... order"
as well as the authority "(h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the purpose of this order. the PCGG, led by then-Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, established the
AFP Anti-Graft Board ("AFP Board") to investigate claims of... unexplained wealth and unscrupulous
practices by AFP members, both current and retired, the AFP Board looked into different claims
about respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas ("Ramas")' alleged unexplained riches, the
owner of a home and property in 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. In addition, he has a house
and land in Cebu City. The lot is 3,327 square meters in size. Aside from military weapons/items and
communications equipment, the raiding squad was also able to seize money totaling P2,870,000.00
and $50,000 USD at Elizabeth Dimaano's home on March 3, 1986.Respondent's mistress is
Elizabeth Dimaano.

ISSUES:

To what extent the PCGG has the power to conduct an investigation into Ramas and Dimaano the
confiscated possessions and other items in Dimaano's residence were illegally seized, making it
inadmissible.

Amended Complaint citing the Republic of the Philippines ("the petitioner") as plaintiff and Ramas as
defendant, as represented by the PCGG. Elizabeth was also named in the Amended Complaint and
Dimaano was named as a co-defendant.

The respondent court made a significant error in determining that petitioner’s evidence could not be
used to make a case for forfeiture and that there was no showing of conspiracy, collusion, or
relationship by consanguinity or affinity by and between respondent Ramas AND RESPONDENT
Dimaano.

Even Though such conclusions were clearly unfounded and premature, having been rendered prior
to the completion of the petitioner’s evidence presentation. The respondent court made a significant
error in determining that the petitioner’s actions, including the fling of the original complaint and the
amended complaint, should be struck out in accordance with the supreme court’s rulings in Cruz,
JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA Despite the fact that: REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO, 189 SCRA
289,

The decisions in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, the supra, and Republic v. Migrino, supra, obviously do
not apply to this case. The respondents rectified and/or waived any procedural flaw in the
establishment of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0037 by submitting their separate responses with
counterclaim; and the two petitions to dismiss were clearly unlawful since they were made after the
petitioner's evidence was presented and even before the latter was permitted to properly provide its
evidence and rest its case.

RESPONDENT COURT MADE A SIGNIFICANT ERROR IN DETERMINING THAT ARTICLES AND

THINGS LIKE MONEY, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELLERY, AND LAND TITLES
CONFISCATED FROM RESPONDENT DIMAANO'S HOUSE WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND
THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE.

RESPONDENT COURT MADE A SIGNIFICANT ERROR IN DETERMINING THAT PETITIONER'S

EVIDENCE COULD NOT BE USED TO MAKE A CASE FOR FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE
WAS NO SHOWING OF CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION, OR RELATIONSHIP BY CONSANGUINITY
OR AFFINITY BY AND BETWEEN RESPONDENT RAMAS AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO.EVEN
THOUGH SUCH CONCLUSIONS WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE, HAVING
BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THE PETITIONER'S EVIDENCE
PRESENTATION.

CONCLUSION:

We conclude that the PCGG lacks such jurisdiction.

However, the petitioner does not argue that the President referred Ramas' matter to the PCGG. As a
result, before the PCGG may exercise jurisdiction over Ramas, his case must fall within the first
category of AFP employees. The petitioner contends that Ramas was unquestionably a... Former
President Marcos' subordinate due to his position as Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
Petitioner believes Ramas' position allowed him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-
chief, making him unquestionably a subordinate of former President Marcos.

They hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President Marcos in the sense that EO No.
1 and its revisions intended. A military officer's post does not automatically render him a
"subordinate," as that term is defined in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, unless there is evidence that he
had a close relationship with former President Marcos.

In EO Nos. 1 and 2, the term "subordinate" refers to someone who has a close relationship with
former President Marcos and/or his wife, comparable to the direct family member, relative, and close
associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business colleague, In EO No. 2, a dummy, agent, or
nominee is used.

Ramas' position as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the title of Major Genera l[19]
is insufficient to qualify him as a "subordinate" of previous President Marcos. PCGG must supply the
prima. Ramas was a close associate of former President Marcos, according to evidence failed to do.
the AFP Board resolution, as well as the Amended Complaint, do not indicate that the assets Ramas
allegedly held were acquired in his role as a "subordinate" of his commander-in-chief. The petitioner
simply listed the properties Ramas purportedly owned... It implied that these assets were
disproportionate to his salary and other lawful revenue without demonstrating that Ramas acquired
them as a result of his close contact with previous President Marcos. In reality, the petitioner agrees
that the AFP Board resolution does... not include a judgement that Ramas amassed his money as a
result of his close affiliation with previous President Marcos,
G.R. No. L-25843 July 25, 1974

MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant.

Seno, Mendoza & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.

Emilio Benitez, Jr. for defendant-appellant

FACTS:

The lower court ruled in favour of the mother, the plaintiff in this instance, by applying the relevant
Civil Code provisions. The defendant's uncle filed an appeal. Florentino Pilapil, the insured, had a
kid, Millian Pilapil, with a married lady, Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years old when the lawsuit
was filed... On October 10, 1964, a petition was filed.

Francisco Pilapil, the accused person, is the deceased's brother. The dead insured himself and
named his kid as beneficiary, with his brother acting as trustee during her minority. Following his
death, the funds were distributed to... him. As a result, the mother, with whom the child lives, has
filed a complaint requesting payment of the cash in question.

The parties in this appeal from a lower court ruling on a matter of law are the mother and uncle of a
minor beneficiary of the profits of an insurance policy issued on the life of her dead father. The
disagreement is on which of them should be permitted to act as trustee.

ISSUES:

The parties in this appeal from a lower court ruling on a matter of law are the mother and uncle of a
minor beneficiary of the profits of an insurance policy issued on the life of her dead father. The
disagreement is on which of them should be permitted to act as trustee.

CONCLUSION:

If, as the Constitution rightly states, the family as a unit must be reinforced, it does not... concede
that even if the uncle had a better case, adherence to a constitutional duty would have led the lower
court to rule as it did.

As a result, the judgement of May 10, 1965 is upheld. Costs are levied against the defendant-
appellant.

This is especially plausible given that the youngster is with the mother. Even though the wording of
the law... there are no conditions that militate against what corresponds to the natural order of
things. Were not as obvious. It should not be forgotten, though, that the court, in its function as a
parens patriae organ of the State, with an even greater emphasis on family unity under the current
Constitution, did weigh in the balance the opposing... allegations and did come to the decision that
the child's wellbeing demanded that the mother be entrusted with such duty

G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by the Treasurer of the

Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA, defendant-appellant.

William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for appellant.

Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.

FACTS:

The citizens of the Spanish Dominions contributed around $400,000 to the Philippine Islands'
treasury for the assistance of individuals affected by the June 3, 1863 earthquake in the Philippine
Islands. Following that, a central relief board was formed to distribute the funds that had been freely
provided, and it allocated $365,703.50 to the numerous suffering specified in its resolution. A list of
these allotments, along with the names of people entitled to them, was published in the Official
Gazette of Manila by order of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. These were eventually
dispersed up to the amount of 30,299.65 dollars. then leaving a balance of 365,403.85 Dollars.

The Philippine Government directed its treasurer to turn over to the former the sum of $80,000 from
the relief fund in installments of $20,000 each and were received on the following dates: February
15, March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883, and are still in the possession of the Monte de Piedad. On
the basis of various petitions from the persons and heirs of others to whom the aforementioned
allotments were made, the Philippine Islands filed a suit against the Monte de Piedad to recover,
"through the Attorney-General and in representation of the Government of the Philippine Islands,"
the $80.000, plus interest. Following a fair trial, the plaintiff received a favourable judgement.
Defendant filed an appeal and stated the following claims.

ISSUES:

Monte de Piedad got the $80,000 cash, to form of a distribution or contribution.

WON the Monte de Piedad's commitment to refund the $80,000 to the Government, even if it was a
loan, was voided with the transition of sovereignty.

Under the theory of parens patriae, the government is a legitimate party to the lawsuit.

CONCLUSION:

No.Documentary evidence shows that Monte de Piedad, after describing its financial situation and
the absolute need for more working capital in its petition to the Governor-General, requested that
$80,000 be transferred to it from the Treasury of the Philippine Islands. The Monte de Piedad agreed
that if the transfer of these monies was not permitted by the Spanish government, they would be
returned immediately. It did not request that the $80,000 be handed to it as a gift.

The Department of Finance, acting on the Governor-General's orders, understood that the $80,000
was transferred to the Monte de Piedad well knew that it received this sum as a loan interest." In
addition, the Monte de Piedad acknowledged and also considered on receiving the $80,000 "as a
loan that is returnable, and also without interest" as late as March 31, 1902.

No. If legal provisions are in conflict with the new sovereign's political character, constitution, or
institutions, they become inoperative or lose their force upon cession of the Philippine Islands to the
United States; however, if they are among "that great body of municipal law which regulates private
and domestic rights," they continue in force and are still in force unless repealed by the current
Government.
G.R. No. 173034 October 9, 2007

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III; HEALTH UNDER SECRETARIES DR.
ETHELYN P. NIETO, DR. MARGARITA M. GALON, ATTY. ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, & DR.
JADE F. DEL MUNDO; and ASSISTANT SECRETARIES DR. MARIO C. VILLAVERDE, DR.
DAVID J. LOZADA, AND DR. NEMESIO T. GAKO, respondents.

FACTS:

The Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines filed a petition to overturn
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0012, titled "Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Executive Order No. 51, Otherwise Known as The "Milk Code," Relevant International Agreements,
Penalising Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes," which it claims is invalid because it contains
provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond the law it is supposed to implement.

President Corazon Aquinoon issued Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) on October 28, 1986.
According to one of the Milk Code's preambular provisions, the legislation intends to give effect to
Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), which was
enacted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 until 2006, the World Health
Organisation approved many Resolutions stating that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted,
and protected, and that nutrition and health claims for breastmilk substitutes should be prohibited.
The DOH published the RIRR for the Milk Code, which was scheduled to go into effect on July 7,
2006.

ISSUES:

Whether or if relevant international agreements entered into by the Philippines are part of the law of
the country and may be implemented by the DOH through the RIRR; if so, whether or not the RIRR
is in accordance with the international agreements; and, if so, whether or not the RIRR is in
accordance with the international agreements.

CONCLUSION:

Yes, in terms of the ICBMS.

According to the Court, under the 1987 Constitution,

foreign law can be incorporated into domestic law through transformation (through constitutional
mechanisms such as local legislation) or incorporation (by a simple constitutional proclamation in
which foreign law is held to have the force of domestic law).

In this case, the ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties because they have not been
approved by at least two-thirds of all Senate members, as required by Section 21, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution; however, the ICMBS, which was adopted by the WHA in 1981, was transformed
into domestic law through local legislation, the Milk Code. The Milk Code is nearly a carbon copy of
the ICMBS.

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO , all surnamed OPOSA,

vs.

THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR

FACTS:

Minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and
represented by their parents, filed a taxpayer's class action lawsuit against Fulgencio Factoran Jr.,
Secretary of DENR. They asked for a judgement requiring the defendant, his agents,
representatives, and those operating on his behalf to, cancel all current Timber Licensing
Agreements (TLA) across the nation, stop receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or evaluating
new TLAs.

They claimed they had an egregious and indigenous right to a balanced and healthy ecological and are entitled
to protection by the State in its position as parens patriae. likewise, they claim that the defendant's action in
allowing TLA holders to cut and shuck the remaining timbers constitutes a misappropriation and/ or
impairment of the natural coffers property he holds in trust for the benefit of the complainant minors and
succeeding generations.

1. Plaintiffs have no legal recourse against him.

2. The problems highlighted by the plaintiffs are political in nature and should be addressed by the
legislative or executive branches of government.

ISSUES:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine
rainforests" by initiating a class action?"

CONCLUSION:

Petitioner-minors claim to represent their generation as well as future generations. The Supreme Court
determined that individuals can launch a class action complaint on behalf of themselves, others of their
generation, and future generations. Insofar as the right to a balanced and healthy ecosystem is concerned, their
personality to sue on behalf of following generations is founded on the idea of intergenerational responsibility.
Such a right considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature," which indispensably include, among other things,
the prudent disposition, utilization, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral,
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas, and other natural resources so that their exploration,
development, and utilization are equally accessible to present and future generations.

Needless to say, each generation owes it to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony in order to fully
enjoy the benefits of a balanced and healthy ecological. To put it another way, the minor's declaration of their
right to a healthy environment is the fulfilment of their commitment to maintain that right for future
generations.
[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]

MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.

Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.

Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Amparo for

respondents Williams, Fragante and Bayan

City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.

FACTS:

The Director of Public Works established rules and regulations related to the restriction of Rosario Street and
Rizal Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic, as authorised by the Legislature.

Among others, petitioner Calalang, a concerned citizen, claims that the laws and regulations in question.

Infringe on the constitutional precept of promoting social justice in order to ensure the well-being and
economic security of all people, and that it represents unlawful interference with legitimate commerce or trade,
as well as abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of movement.

ISSUES:

Whether the respondents' rules and regulations established in accordance with the terms of Commonwealth Act
NO. 548 constitute an illegal interference with legitimate commerce or trade and infringed on the right to
personal liberty and freedom of movement.

Whether the complained-of laws and regulations violate the constitutional principle of promoting social justice
in order to ensure the well-being and economic security of all individuals.

CONCLUSIONS:

The National Assembly was motivated to pass the aforementioned statute by considerations of public
convenience and welfare.

The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered to not through erroneous compassion for any one group (e.g.,
the poor - because social justice is about providing the greatest good to the largest number, not necessarily
simply the poor, as the drivers of the animal-drawn vehicles).
Promotion of the general welfare, through the adoption by the government of measures calculated to ensure the
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of legally justifiable measures, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers behind the
existence of governments in general on the basis of the constitution or salus populi est suprema lex.
G.R. Nos. L-20589-90 March 21, 1968

ERNESTO DEL ROSARIO, petitioner,

vs.
VICTORIANO DE LOS SANTOS, TOMAS DE LOS SANTOS and THE COURT OF AGRARIAN
RELATIONS, respondents.

FACTS:

Victorino and Tomas de los Santos represented two peons before the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) on
their desire, as tenants of DelRosario, to employ Section 14 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and accept the
leasehold system given, which would modify their status as tenants.

Del Rosario, on the other hand, questioned the legitimacy of the referenced section in his response; as a result,
CAR issued a judgement rejecting Del Rosario's claim and determining the relationship between him and delos
Santos to be one of leasehold tenancy.

ISSUE:

It is said within the case that Section. 14 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act is unconstitutional. I believe it is not.

CONCLUSION:

The writers of the Constitution, aware of the rising dissatisfaction with the government's capacity to deal with
the poverty and misery of the great majority of our people, added the protection of labour and social justice.

Agricultural Tenancy Act law left little dispute regarding the legality of the solution sought by Congress to
alleviate the harsh conditions connected with agricultural labour. In terms of the social justice concept,
President Magsaysay defined it as "he who has less in life should have more in law.

As a result, the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1955 was enacted, granting renters" the right to change the
occupancy contract from one of share occupancy to leasehold occupancy and vice versa, and from one- crop-
sharing agreement to another of share occupancy." The purpose of this act, according toSec. 2, is" to establish
agricultural occupancy connections between tenants and tenants upon the principle of social justice; to give
respectable protection to the rights of both tenants and landlords, to insure an indifferent division of the yield
and income derived from the land; to give tenant- farmers with impulses to lower and further effective
agricultural product to ameliorate their profitable standing and encourage their participation in the
establishment of peaceful, vibrant, and popular pastoral communities.

G.R. No. 86186 May 8, 1992

RAFAEL GELOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO ALZONA, respondents.

FACTS:

The relevant property is a 25,000 square cadence farmland in Cabuyao, Laguna, owned in equal
portions by private representative Ernesto Alzona and his parents. On July 5, 1970, they signed a
contractual agreement with petitioner Rafael Gelos to hire him as. (1) On September 4, 1973, after
Alzona had purchased his parents' portion and gained complete control over the farm, he contacted
Gelos to advise him of the termination of his. services and to have him leave the premises. Gelos
rejected and went back to work on the property.
Gelos went to the Court of Agrarian Relations on October 1, 1973, and requested that the agricultural lease
rental on the land be fixed. He then dropped the complaint and petitioned the Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
which approved his request. Alzona, for his part, filed a... complaint for unlawful detainer against Gelos in
Cabuyao Municipal Court, but this action was pronounced "not proper for trial" by the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform due to the parties' tenancy relationship. Alzona was turned down for the same reason. When he sought
help from the Ministry of Labour, and then when he filed a lawsuit with the Court of Agrarian Relations
seeking a declaration of non-tenancy and damages from Gelos. However, on appeal to the President's Office,
the complaint was deemed legitimate because. As a result, the trial was de-archived and restored.

ISSUES:

The petitioner's true position as a tenant of the private respondent, entitled to the advantages of tenancy
legislation. The private respondent objects, claiming that the petitioner is nothing more than a hired labourer
with no right to possess... The subject land was terminated after their job contract expired.

CONCLUSION:

According to the contract, the petitioner was not supposed to be a tenant, but rather a mere employee of the
private respondent. The petitioner was compensated for a certain type of work. In numerous decisions, the
court emphasised that tenancy is not a merely factual relationship based on what the claimed tenant performs
on the land. It is also a legally binding connection. The parties' aim, the understanding when the equipment is
placed, and, in this situation, their written agreements, provided they are followed and do not violate the law,
are much more significant.

G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO,

vs.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF were due to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiation panels.

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF did not take place, however, because this Court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same on the request of petitioners,
notably those who filed their petitions before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD.

The MILF invaded a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao from the end of 1999 to early 2000, and in
March 2000, it gained possession of the town hall of that response, then-President Joseph Estrada announced
and carried out a "all-out-war" against the MILF at Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

The parties undertook formal peace negotiations in Tripoli, Libya, from June 20-22, 2001, the result of which
was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001), which contained the main
principles and agenda for the following components of the negotiation:

The security aspect, the rehabilitation aspect, and the ancestral domain aspect are all important. In terms of the
Ancestral Domain Aspect, in the Tripoli Agreement of 2001, the parties simply agreed "that the same be
discussed further by the Parties at their next meeting.

ISSUES:

The MOA's constitutionality and legality are ready for review.

Violation of the right of the people to information on matters of public concern (Article 3 Sec. 7) as a result of
a state policy of full disclosure of all transactions affecting public interest (Article 2, Sec 28), including public
consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).

The signing of the Memorandum of Agreement would bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

1. to establish and recognise the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as an independent state or a legal,
geographical, or political entity;

2. to update or amend the Constitution and existing legislation in order to comply with the MOA

3. to grant or recognise the Moro Islamic Liberation Front's claim to ancestral domain in contravention of
Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), namely Section 3(g) and
Chapter VII (DELINEATION AND RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS).

CONCLUSIONS:
To summarise, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace procedure abused his authority by failing to carry out the
relevant consultation procedure, as prescribed by E.O. Republic Acts No. 3 and 7160, as well as Republic Act
No. 8371. The covert procedure by which the MOA-AD was created and produced violates and exceeds legal
power, and amounts to a capricious, capricious, repressive, arbitrary, and tyrannical exercise of it. It
exemplifies a flagrant breach of affirmative obligation and a virtual reluctance to discharge the prohibited duty.

The MOA-AD is incompatible with the current Constitution and legislation. Not only are its particular
provisions unconstitutional, but so is the concept behind them, namely, the associative connection envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, because the notion assumes that the associated entity is a state and indicates
that it is on its road to independence.

G.R. No. 219581

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
MAXIMO DELA PEÑA, Accused-Appellant

FACTS:
Maximo was charged with piracy under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 532, and an information was filed
against him. It basically said that on the 24th

Maximo and his associates seized and carried away the stated goods, boat equipment, and personal things, to
the detriment of the owners, near the riverside of Barangay San Roque, Municipality of Villareal, Province of
Samar, Philippines, using force and intimidation. As it happened, Maximo and his accomplices entered the
pump boat and pointed their rifles at Julita's family who were inside. Following that, the trial court judged
Maximo guilty as accused and condemned him to reclusion perpetua without the possibility of release.

ISSUES:

Whether or if the Information correctly asserted that the event occurred in the river of Barangay San Roque,
Municipality of Villareal, Province of Samar, Philippines, and that the vessel in issue was in Philippine waters
sufficient to constitute piracy under P.D. 532.

If the appellant is guilty of piracy in the act.

due to Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the Court thus finds that the
penalty imposed by the RTC, which was reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, was correct since the
seizure of the vessel and its cargo was accomplished by boarding the vessel.

CONCLUSION:

The appeal is without merit.

The event occurred on the Brgy riverbank. San Roque is located in Villareal, Samar Province. the Information
also explicitly stated that the appellant and his armed associates stole the vessel's cargo, equipment, and
passengers' personal things. It stated unequivocally that the appellant took 13 bags of copra using force and
intimidation.

When the appellant and his armed colleagues entered the victims' pump boat and took possession of it, they
were able to steal these things.

The Court rejects the appellant's claim that the prosecution's witnesses failed to positively identify him, the
Court has no cause to reject Julita's evidence identifying appellant as one of the assailants who boarded their
vessel and confiscated the cargo, equipment, and personal items of the passengers. Julita testified that she
recognized appellant because to the moonlight that illuminated the location.

Because both the RTC and the CA deemed Julita's evidence to be trustworthy and simple, the Court sees no
basis to overturn it. as a result of the preceding clause, the appropriate imposable sentence should be death.
G.R No. 187167 August 16, 2011

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA,

vs.

HON. EDUARDO ERMITA,

FACTS:

Congress enacted R.A. in 1961. 3046 delineating the marine baselines of the Philippines as an
Archepelagic State in accordance with UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying State parties' sovereignty over
their territorial sea. It was then revised in 1968 by R.A. 5446, which corrects certain inaccuracies in
R.A. 3046 is retaining the right to draw baselines around Sabah.

R.A. revised it once again in 2009. 9522, in order to comply with UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements were met by shortening one baseline, optimising the placement of several basepoints,
and classifying KIG and Scarborough Shoal as'regime of islands.

R.A. 3046 was approved, delineating the Philippines' marine baselines. After more than five
decades, RA 9552 was approved, modifying RA 3046 to conform to the conditions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The revised legislation reduced one baseline,
optimised the position of certain basepoints around the Philippine archipelago, and categorised
nearby areas, especially the Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of
islands, with their own applicable maritime zones.

ISSUES:

The petitioners had locus standi to file the claim, and they prevailed. The Republic Act (9522) is
unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court found that the complaint is a citizen suit, not a taxpayer or lawmaker suit,
because it is the people who would be directly affected and benefited if the remedy sought is
granted. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522. First, RA 9522 does not
delineate the territory of the Philippines but is merely a statutory tool to demarcate the country's
maritime zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS III. The Supreme Court emphasised that
UNCLOS III is not a method of acquiring or losing a territory as provided by national laws. UNCLOS
III is a multilateral treaty that established uniform sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., territorial
waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines],
and exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]).

CONCLUSION:

The UNCLOS III Convention on the Law of the Sea, Third Edition, has nothing to do with territory
acquisition disputes or losses. It is just a defined standard that governs state behaviour. RA 9522, on
the other hand, is a baseline statute that establishes basepoints along coasts to serve as geographic
beginning points for measuring. It just informs the international world about the extent of our marine
area.

Domestically, if passages are a concern, the legislature can adopt laws defining routes within
archipelagic seas to manage innocent and marine lanes crossings. In the absence of such
circumstances, however, international law standards will prevail.
The fact that archipelagic nations' waters are vulnerable to both passes does not put them on a
lower footing in comparison to continental coastal states. Furthermore, because RIOP is a
customary international rule, no modern state may use its sovereignty to prevent its passage.

Philippines v. China (PCA Case No. 2013-19)

FACTS:

The Philippines initiated arbitration proceedings against China on 22 January 2013 in a

disagreement about their respective "maritime entitlements" and the legality of Chinese actions in
the South China Sea. In response, China rejected the arbitration in a diplomatic message issued to
the Philippines on February 19, 2013. The Arbitral Tribunal lacked jurisdiction in the case, according
to China, because China's acceptance of dispute settlement under the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS] - the basis advanced by the Philippines - was limited and excluded
sea boundary delimitation and the determination of historic titles.

The People's Republic of China has consistently refused to recognize and participate in the
Philippines' arbitral processes that have occurred in the last few trials. The tribunal, on the other
hand, did not regard this as a barrier: on 29 October 2015, it issued its first decision establishing
jurisdiction, and on 12 July 2016, it issued its award resolving on the merits of the matter.

ISSUES:

The tribunal did not rule who controlled the South China Sea's marine features, such as the Spratly
Islands, which are claimed by both China and the Philippines, or any other coastal state in the
region. Similarly, the tribunal did not establish any maritime limits in the South China Sea between
the Philippines and China.

The prize addresses three important substantive issues:

1. the so-called "Nine-dash line," and China's claim to ancient rights in the South China Sea.

2.the legitimacy of various South China Sea marine features; and .

3.China's operations in the South China Sea are legitimate. The Arbitral Tribunal, however, did not
resolve concerns of territorial sovereignty over the parties' disputed sea features due to jurisdictional
restrictions.

CONCLUSION:

The tribunal considered whether the People's Republic of China claims the said historic rights inside
the said "nine-dash line" were in accordance with UNCLOS law. It first observed that this area - in
which China claimed rights to living and non-living resources (i.e. fisheries and petroleum resources)
"formed in the long historical course" - partially overlaps with areas that would otherwise comprise
the Philippines' exclusive economic zone [EEZ] or continental shelf (CS). The tribunal believes that
UNCLOS establishes a comprehensive maritime area regime and assigns rights in these areas to
the coastal state and other states: in the EEZ and the CS, the coastal state has exclusive sovereign
rights to the exploitation of living and non-living natural resources.

G.R. No. 170867, December 04, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF PALAWAN

FACTS:

The Camago-Malampaya Natural Gas ProjectOn December 11, 1990, the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic or National Government) signed into Service Contract No. 38 with Shell
Philippines Exploration B.V. through the Department of Energy (DOE). and Occidental Philippines,
Inc. (together SPEX/OXY) as Contractor for the exclusive conduct of petroleum activities in the
"Camago-Malampaya" region located offshore northwest of Palawan. Exploration of the area
resulted in the drilling of the Camago-Malampaya natural gas reservoir about 80 kilometres from the
main island of Palawan and 30 kilometres from the platform. The nearest point of the Camago-
Malampaya production area is 93.264 kilometres or 50.3585 nautical miles to the Kalayaan Island
Group (Kalayaan); 55.476 kilometres or 29.9546 nautical miles to mainland Palawan (Nacpan Point,
south of Patu).

The volume of natural gas contained in the Camago- Malampaya was estimated to be sufficient to justify the
pursuit of gas- to- power systems with an aggregate power- generating capacity of roughly 3,000 megawatts
operating at baseload for 20 to 25 times. Service ContractNo. 38, as clarified by the Memorandum of
Clarificaton, was48.843 kms or26.9546 nm to the Province of Palawan (northwest of Tapiutan was entitled to a
payment fellow to forty percent (40) of the net earnings.

ISSUES:

Palawan was not entitled to the 40% share since the Camago-Malampaya reservoir is located
outside of its jurisdiction.

CONCLSUION:

The Court concludes that the Province of Palawan's remedy is legislation that explicitly entitles it to a portion
of the income from the use of the Camago-Malampaya reservoir, rather than judicial adjudication based on
equity. Mariano instructs that the territorial boundaries must be clearly defined "with precise strokes," as
defining those boundaries is a legislative, not a judicial function.[321] The Court cannot engage in judicial
legislation and change the boundaries of the Province of Palawan to include the continental shelf where the
subject natural resource lies on the basis of equity. According to Dean Pangalangan, territorial jurisdiction is
determined by a legislation or a charter that strictly specifies Palawan's area, it is something that can only be
changed in line with [the] correct method, which concludes with a plebiscite.

G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES

FACTS:
Claiming that some portions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371) are unconstitutional,... Petitioners
Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed this prohibition and mandamus action as citizens and
taxpayers, challenging the validity of certain sections of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), also
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA),... as well as its accompanying rules
and regulations (Implementing Rules).

The Solicitor General believes that the IPRA is partially unlawful since it offers indigenous peoples
control of natural resources, and the petition requests that it be given in part they join the NCIP in
supporting the constitutionality of IPRA and requesting that the petition be dismissed.

According to the CHR, IPRA is an embodiment of the concept of parens patriae, and the State is
responsible for protecting and guaranteeing... Indigenous peoples' rights, for example, are severely
disadvantaged. As a result, it requests that the petition be rejected.

Petitioners challenge the legality of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the grounds that they
amount to an unconstitutional deprivation of the State's ownership over public domain lands,
minerals, and other natural resources, in contravention of the regalian philosophy enshrined in
Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution in contravention of the regalian theory enshrined in Section
2, Article XII of the Constitution, domains, ancestors, ancestral homelands, and ancestral domains,
which include inalienable public lands, bodies of water, minerals, and other resources, are private
yet community property of indigenous peoples Sections 3(a) and 3(b) infringe the rights of private
landowners by include private lands situated within stated regions.

ISSUES:

Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65, and 66 of the R.A. 8371 are unlawful and
unenforceable.

CONCLUSION:

The petition was dismissed by seven (7) votes. The Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and
Santiago joined Justice Kapunan's decision, which upheld the constitutionality of the disputed portions of R.A.
8371.

The petition was granted by seven (7) additional members of the Court.
Republic v. Villasor (G.R. No. L-30671