Electoral Studies 52 (2018) 26–35

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Electoral Studies
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/electstud

Decentralization and democratic participation: The effect of subnational T

self-rule on voting in Latin America and the Caribbean
Alissandra T. Stoyanb,∗, Sara Niedzwieckia
a
Politics Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, USA
b
Department of Political Science, Kansas State University, 802 Mid Campus Dr. South, 101D Calvin Hall, Manhattan, KS 66506, USA

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Previous literature on the consequences of decentralization has demonstrated a positive effect on voter parti-
Decentralization cipation in subnational elections. However, does this positive effect also extend to national level elections? This
Regional authority paper evaluates the consequences of decentralization-level political participation. Our approach innovates by
Voter turnout disaggregating decentralization to uncover the specific dimensions that matter for voting participation. We argue
Participation
that self-rule (or the authority that subnational units exercise in their own territory) is closely associated with
Democracy
vertical accountability and positively affects voting participation. Moreover, we find that political dimensions of
Latin America
self-rule matter more than fiscal dimensions. Shared-rule (or the authority that subnational units exercise in the
country as a whole) has no significant effect on participation since it is more closely related to horizontal
accountability. We test our theory in 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries using a hierarchical model with
2010 data at the national and individual-level.

1. Introduction to communicate their preferences more effectively and, in turn, elected

Voting is one of the essential acts of citizenship and the main me-
chanism of representation and accountability of political leaders in a
democracy. High levels of participation promote stability and legiti-
macy (Dahl, 1971), while low voter turnout presents serious problems
for democracy, particularly because it is biased against poorer citizens
who, in turn, have less political influence (Lijphart, 1997). Participation
in national-level elections is of particular relevance because there is
more at stake (Reif and Schmitt, 1980) and levels of turnout tend to be
higher than for any other election (Lijphart, 1997). While the vote as a
mechanism of representation and accountability rarely functions per-
fectly in practice, in theory, it is the most necessary and central element
of a functioning democracy. After all, “voters have only one instrument
to reach two goals: to select better policies and politicians, and to in-
duce them to behave well while in office” (Manin et al.,1999, 45). As
citizens have more opportunities to engage with politics, they may also
be more capable of holding their governments accountable.
Decentralization carried the promise of enhancing democratic par-
ticipation through increased proximity between governments and citi-
zens. It was heralded as a strategy for deepening democracy and de-
mocratic participation in Latin America.1 International organizations
argued that devolving power to subnational levels would allow citizens
officials should become more accountable. Partly for these reasons,
previous authors have argued that decentralization increases partici-
pation at the subnational level (Diamond, 1999; Peterson, 1997;
Goldfrank, 2007; Vetter, 2002). Taking this relationship as a given, we
focus here on how territorial structure may affect participation in na-
tional elections, a much less studied topic in spite of its relevance.
The few previous studies that have specifically examined the effect
of decentralization on national voter turnout argued that there is either
no relationship or a negative relationship (Blais et al., 2011; Meguid,
2007; Foweraker and Landman, 2002). The present paper builds from
this literature's disagreement and analyzes the relationship with addi-
tional nuance. We focus on the specific dimensions of decentralization
that matter for democratic participation through voting in national
elections. We find that aggregate decentralization positively affects
participation in national elections; however, this positive relationship
masks the fact that not all dimensions of decentralization matter for
political participation through voting. We go a step further by un-
packing the concept of decentralization to analyze ten dimensions of
the territorial distribution of power in an effort to discover the specific
elements of decentralization that may influence voting participation. In
doing so, we find that certain dimensions of decentralization clearly
underlie this aggregate effect, having their own distinct positive and

∗
Corresponding author.
E-mail address: stoyan@ksu.edu (A.T. Stoyan).
1
See Selee (2004) for a summary of this literature.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2017.12.001
Received 5 July 2017; Received in revised form 19 November 2017; Accepted 13 December 2017
Available online 21 December 2017
0261-3794/ © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
A.T. Stoyan, S. Niedzwiecki
significant effects on voting participation in national level elections.
Each disaggregated dimension of decentralization measures a dis-
tinct component of how regions may exert authority.2 These dimensions
can be thought of as indicators of a latent variable, and as such are
strongly associated with each other. Yet, disaggregating allows us to
observe and analyze substantial variation across countries that have
taken very different paths of reform in each dimension. From the con-
cept of federalism, the measure takes the already familiar idea that
subnational authority consists of different forms of rule: the authority
that regions have in their own territory to, for instance, elect their own
representatives or tax their populations (self-rule) as well as in the
country as a whole through participation in national institutions such as
the senate (shared-rule) (Elazar, 1987).
We argue that greater self-rule, which is closely associated with
vertical accountability, or the ability of citizens to hold their leaders
responsible, will increase voter turnout. Shared-rule, conversely, is
more closely related to horizontal accountability, or the control ex-
ercised by other state agencies including subnational agencies, and
therefore we contend that it may not have a direct effect on citizens'
participation. However, self-rule puts the government closer to people
and, by providing them with more points of access, it has the potential
to directly affect levels of participation. As the authority of subnational
governments in their own territory increases, citizens can participate
more in issues they care about such as healthcare, education, and in-
frastructure. This increased civic awareness that comes from the actual
or perceived influence that their actions have on decentralized polities
can amplify the feeling that voting matters more generally. It may also
create opportunities for enhanced participation across the country and
at other levels of government.
Within self-rule, we argue that certain dimensions may be more
relevant than others. Political decentralization should have more in-
fluence on voting participation than fiscal decentralization.
Specifically, while institutional, policy, and representation authority
enhance voter turnout, the authority to tax or to borrow may not di-
rectly affect democratic participation through voting. This is mainly
because political authority over a subnational territory provides more
direct political accountability to the citizens living within that territory.
In the case of representation authority, or the authority of subnational
governments to have an elected executive and/or assembly, it is the
main route for citizens to voice their demands. Similarly, the higher the
autonomy of a subnational government (institutional depth) and the
larger the range of policies for which it is responsible (policy scope), the
larger the sense of empowerment that citizens have. This increased
sense of political relevance will likely increase participation in demo-
cratic politics, particularly through voting (Bandura, 2007; Miller and
Miller, 1975).
On the other hand, the authority to tax and borrow may not directly
affect political participation through voting. At the individual level,
different fiscal arrangements could provide a basis for comparison and
competition; citizens may “vote with their feet” and move to areas with
more advantageous fiscal arrangements (Tiebout, 1956; Litvack et al.,
1998, 27). Yet, this mechanism of accountability is distinct from ac-
tively participating in democratic politics.
We analyze the individual-level decision to participate in elections
for 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries using a hierarchical
model at a single time point (2010). Data from the Latin American
Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) allows us to include a number of in-
dividual-level controls that are important in driving turnout. Latin
America is a particularly relevant context for analyzing the effect of
2
We treat “regional authority” and “decentralization” as synonymous, though they are
not strictly equal. The term decentralization assumes that authority is devolved from the
central government to lower territorial levels of government and government within
countries is conceived in unidimensional terms. Conversely, the term regional authority
allows for the possibility that increased authority follows a bottom-up logic and includes
the region as the unit of analysis (Hooghe et al., 2016).
27
Electoral Studies 52 (2018) 26–35
decentralization on voting mainly because these countries exhibit
marked differences in terms of voter turnout as well as in levels of
decentralization across self-rule and shared-rule dimensions. To assess
the latter, aggregate measures of decentralization are insufficient; we
use an original dataset that shows great variation in levels of decen-
tralization across countries and time. Overall, while subnational gov-
ernments in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have high levels of authority
to decide over policy, institutional design, and taxes, for instance, in
Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala intermediate levels of govern-
ment are deconcentrated or not autonomous (Hooghe et al., 2016).
Additionally, Latin America is an ideal context in which to test this
relationship because voting has now become a regular, institutionalized
practice in the region; yet, while cross-national studies of political
participation in developed countries are numerous, less attention has
been devoted to developing countries.3
We begin by reviewing the literature on the effect of decentraliza-
tion for democracy and voting participation. In this section, we also
hypothesize the specific dimensions of decentralization that matter for
voting participation. Next, we describe our data, particularly the
Regional Authority Index and the AmericasBarometer survey. In the
empirical section, we discuss the results of the hierarchical models for
Latin American and Caribbean countries.
2. Democratic participation and decentralization
2.1. Democracy and decentralization
Latin America has been increasingly decentralized from the early
1980s to the present. The dual process of democratization and neo-
liberal reforms has partly fueled this transformation in the structure of
governance in the region. We understand decentralization as the de-
volution of political, fiscal, and administrative powers to subnational
levels of government (Burki et al., 1999; Montero and Samuels, 2004;
Eaton, 2004; Falleti, 2005). Political decentralization includes the di-
rect election of subnational executives and legislatures. For instance,
Brazilian states have high level of political authority in part because
governors are directly elected. Fiscal decentralization gives subnational
units greater authority over taxation, borrowing, and spending deci-
sion. Until the 1990s, Argentine provinces could finance their deficits
through borrowing with almost no restrictions, thus providing them
with significant room to maneuver (Hooghe et al., 2016, 201). Finally,
administrative decentralization gives subnational governments the au-
thority to set goals and implement policies. Departments in Bolivia
enjoy high levels of administrative authority since 2009, given that they
have exclusive competences over economic development, tourism, job
promotion, and public health, among others. However, these autho-
rities are exclusively concerned with actions of subnational govern-
ments in their own territory. We also incorporate a dimension of de-
centralization that is related to the authority that subnational
governments exercise in the country as a whole, also along the lines of
fiscal, administrative, and political dimensions. For instance, can pro-
vinces decide on constitutional change or on the amount of national
transfers to subnational levels of governments? This authority can be
exercised in a territorially-representative Senate or in meetings with the
national executive (Niedzwiecki et al., 2016).
Previous research has mostly focused on the effect of decentraliza-
tion for local democracy, including both positive as well as negative
outcomes for its development (e.g: Goldfrank, 2007; Bardhan and
Mookherjee, 2006). In particular, while some argue that decentraliza-
tion promotes participation through enhancing political engagement,
knowledge, and sense of community4; others offer reservations to the
3
For exceptions, see: Fornos et al. (2004); Kostadinova and Power (2007); Pérez-Liñán
(2001).
4
See Spina (2014, 451) for a summary of these three perspectives.
A.T. Stoyan, S. Niedzwiecki
celebratory schools of decentralization arguing that it opens up op-
portunities for clientelism, corruption, and even subnational author-
itarian enclaves (Gibson, 2004, 7–8, 2012; Diamond, 1999, 159;
Giraudy, 2014; Gervasoni, 2010). The focus on the effect of decen-
tralization on subnational arenas is understandable given that decen-
tralization initially intended to deepen subnational democracy. How-
ever, we believe that there is value in observing the effect of
decentralization on national elections, a topic that has received very
little attention. This is surprising given that there is typically more at
stake in national elections (considered as “first order”) than in elections
for other territorial levels (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). Partly as a result of
this, turnout tends to be higher in national compared to regional elec-
tions (Lijphart, 1997). In addition, focusing on national level elections
avoids observing endogenous processes: while it would be plausible to
argue that local turnout could increase the pressures for decentraliza-
tion, that is not a likely argument when analyzing national level voting
participation. Therefore, a major contribution of this analysis is the
opportunity to depart from potentially endogenous processes in the
study of decentralization. In particular, we are interested in the ways in
which the formal authority of subnational units matters for the func-
tioning of democracy. Constitutional features “… spell out the attri-
butions of authority, the limitations of power, the policy scope of dif-
ferent governmental bodies and levels of government, etc. They express
a presumptive division of power between actors and institutions at dif-
ferent points in the federal system” (Gibson, 2004, 8). Indeed, we focus
on the legal characteristics of the division of authority between the
central and subnational governments to unpack its effect on the func-
tioning of democracy.5
Previous studies examining how decentralization affects national
voter turnout have found either no relationship or a negative relationship
between these two variables (Blais et al., 2011; Meguid, 2007; Foweraker
and Landman, 2002; Spina, 2014; Nikolenyi, 2010). In particular,
Nikolenyi (2010) finds that decoupling regional and national elections (a
measure of decentralization) depresses turnout in India. Along similar
lines, Blais et al. (2011) argue that there is a trade-off between national-
level and regional-level participation in decentralized countries. For the
case of Canada, the authors find that there is a small reduction in na-
tional electoral turnout as central governments lose importance. In
contrast, Spina (2014) finds that the effect of decentralization on parti-
cipation in national level elections in Europe is insignificant. Given the
disagreement in the literature, we do not have a strong expectation re-
garding the effect of aggregate measures of decentralization on voter
turnout. In our analysis of Latin America, we find that although ag-
gregate levels of decentralization are positive and significant, they mask
the fact that not all dimensions of decentralization matter for political
participation. Therefore, we argue for the use of more nuanced measures
of this concept to get at the actual effect of decentralization on voting.
In order to study the effect of decentralization on voter turnout,
aggregate measures of decentralization are insufficient. It is paramount
to unpack the concept of decentralization into its different dimensions.
This is because decentralization in Latin American unfolded through a
variety of distinct mechanisms of empowering subnational units.
Looking only at aggregate decentralization ignores this variety, and
fails to capture meaningful reforms that may enhance participation in
national level elections. Through this approach, we build on recent
work in OECD countries that finds specific or differentiated effects of
self-rule and shared rule on corruption (Neudorfer and Neudorfer,
2014), protest (Quaranta, 2013), subnational representation in the
European Union (Donas and Beyers, 2013), and subnational coalition
formation (Bäck et al., 2013).
5
The Regional Authority Index measures formal authority (formal legislation and
routinized application of law) but not the range of informal conditions—party political
structures, clientelism, the effect of individual leaders – that can affect the functioning of
democracy. This distinction is useful given that we wish to evaluate the effect of con-
stitutional and legal structures on voter turnout.
28
Electoral Studies 52 (2018) 26–35
While self-rule actually empowers citizens, thus increasing their
levels of participation, shared-rule should not have any effect on voting
behavior. In regions with higher self-rule, citizens are able to vote for
autonomous subnational representatives who can define their own
policies, borrow, and tax their populations. This is the traditional way
in which we think about decentralization. Self-rule positions the gov-
ernment closer to people, by providing them with more points of access
to government, thus potentially making their leaders at multiple levels
more accountable. As the authority of subnational governments in their
own territory increases, citizens can participate more in issues they care
about such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure. This increased
civic awareness that comes from the actual or perceived influence that
their actions have on decentralized polities can amplify the feeling that
voting matters and create opportunities for enhanced participation
across the country (Diamond, 1999; Peterson, 1997; Goldfrank, 2007;
Vetter, 2002). In this way, self-rule increases voters' feeling that their
vote actually matters for the future of the polity, not only in subnational
elections but also at the national level. As self-rule reduces the ratio of
citizens to representatives, subnational arenas could serve as the
training ground for citizens, a place where voters learn that their par-
ticipation can actually matter for governance outcomes (Hajnal and
Lewis, 2003, 646). This perception, in turn, has a direct effect on the
level of political participation, including voter turnout in national
elections (Bandura, 2007; Miller and Miller 1975, 406–7; Pattie and
Johnston, 1998). In other words, self-rule can enhance vertical ac-
countability, or the ability of citizens to hold their leaders responsible
for policymaking and effectiveness in office. As a consequence, it po-
tentially enhances the sense of relevance of their vote and thus pro-
motes political participation and democracy more broadly.
Shared-rule allows subnational governments to co-determine deci-
sions at the national level through parliaments or executive meetings.
This dimension does not significantly affect voting at the national level
because it is more related to horizontal, rather than vertical, account-
ability (O'Donnell, 1998). It affects elected politicians more than in-
dividual voters and should not factor into the calculus of voters with
respect to turning out to vote.
H1a. Self-rule and voting should have a positive relationship; citizens of
countries with more self-rule should be more likely to vote in national
elections.
H1b. Shared-rule and voting should have no significant relationship;
citizens of countries with more shared-rule should be equally likely to
vote in national elections.
Within self-rule we argue that institutional, policy, and electoral
dimensions matter for voting participation, while fiscal dimensions
(taxing and borrowing authority) may not. The idea that dimensions
related to political authority are driving the effect of shared-rule on
voting participation is supported by previous studies. Brancati (2008)
finds that while political decentralization increases the strength of
European regional parties in national legislatures, the effect of fiscal
decentralization is insignificant. Political decentralization, according to
Brancati, encourages voters to vote for regional parties in part because
of their potential influence in national politics.6 Litvack et al. (1998)
also find that high levels of political authority have been conducive to
developing accountability in the form of participatory budgeting in
Brazil and Mexico, where citizens are invited to discuss budgetary
priorities at the different levels of government. We test these expecta-
tions by disaggregating self-rule into three dimensions of political de-
centralization related to governance: institutional depth, policy scope,
and representation. These are expected to have a direct effect on voting
participation. On the one hand, institutional (or devolution) and policy
authority can facilitate direct participation of voters, interested in
6
To our knowledge, there is no available data on the existence of regional parties in all
the countries included in this study.
A.T. Stoyan, S. Niedzwiecki
ensuring that national policies respond to local needs. On the other
hand, the representation dimension (or whether subnational executives
and assemblies are elected) carries the most straightforward connection
between decentralization and voting participation. The incorporation of
subnational elections is a fundamental tool for legitimizing the re-
levance of the act of voting and thus strengthening subnational de-
mocracy and for enhancing voting participation at all levels of gov-
ernment. In other words, the practice of voting for subnational
executives and legislators generates positive feedback effects that en-
courages voting at the national level also.
H2a. Institutional depth and voting should have a positive relationship;
citizens living in countries with greater institutional depth at the
subnational level should be more likely to vote in national elections.
H2b. Policy scope and voting should have a positive relationship;
citizens living in countries with greater policy scope at the subnational
level should be more likely to participate by voting in national elections.
H2c. Representation and voting should have a positive relationship;
citizens living in countries with greater representation at the
subnational level should be more likely to participate by voting in
national elections.
Conversely, we argue that fiscal dimensions do not directly shape
the decision to turnout in national elections. They may shape other
expressions of democracy outside of voting, such as the opportunity of
voters to “vote with their feet” and move to areas with more beneficial
fiscal arrangements (Litvack et al., 1998, 27; Tiebout, 1956). In addi-
tion, fiscal decentralization could promote the improvement of public
services provided by subnational levels of government; because if citi-
zens pay taxes for the provision of these services, then they will be more
likely to participate in monitoring their implementation. However, this
form of accountability is not expected to have a direct effect on parti-
cipation in national elections. In general, the direct link between fiscal
dimensions of decentralization and voting participation is much less
clear than with political dimensions.
2.2. Voting participation
Our dependent variable is a self-reported measure of whether in-
dividuals have turned out to vote in the previous national-level elections.
In addition to decentralization, a number of sociodemographic, beha-
vioral, economic, and institutional factors may also affect this indicator
of voting participation. While some authors have focused purely on vo-
ters' cost-benefit strategic calculations, more recent work acknowledges
that the decision to vote may be conditional and dependent on the social
context and networks within which voters are embedded (Rolfe, 2012).
First, various political factors at the national level may affect voting
participation. Some elections are considered to be more decisive than
others, and turnout tends to increase with political competition or
electoral "closeness" (Blais, 2000, 2006; Lehoucq and Wall, 2004). Thus,
more democratic contexts should increase voter turnout, and we in-
clude the Unified Democracy Score (Melton et al., 2014) to account for
this. However, the literature on the effect of party competition on voter
turnout presents conflicting findings. Some have claimed that there is a
negative association between the number of parties and turnout (Blais
and Dobrzynska, 1998; Jackman, 1987), implying that fractionalization
suppresses turnout, but this finding does not seem to hold in Latin
America (Pérez-Liñán, 2001; Fornos et al., 2004).7
Institutional factors have been the central focus of the literature on
voter turnout, the extent to which they matter, particularly in newer
7
We exclude party system nationalization from our analysis because: there is no
agreement in the literature regarding its effect on democratic participation, the publicly
available measure has not been updated since 2000 (Jones and Mainwaring 2003;
Stegmueller 2013), and it is highly correlated with the RAI, thus increasing our risk of
multicollinearity.
29
Electoral Studies 52 (2018) 26–35
democracies or less developed contexts, is questionable.8 Mechanisms
like automatic registration and compulsory voting were once con-
sidered the key institutional components driving participation (Powell,
1980; Jackman, 1987). Such institutions may help solve the gap in
voter turnout between social groups, if turnout becomes nearly uni-
versal (Lijphart, 1997; Gallego, 2010). Yet, even where these laws exist,
very few countries effectively enforce participation.9 It is unclear what
type of penalty is sufficient to induce voting (Blais, 2006). In practice,
compulsory voting laws may be less consequential for participation
than they seem, particularly in less established democracies and parti-
cularly in terms of political participation and engagement more broadly
(Carreras, 2016; Norris, 2004; Maldonado, 2011).
Along the lines of institutional factors, concurrent elections national
executive-legislative and/or national-subnational (Norris, 2004;
Nikolenyi, 2010) may increase turnout. For similar reasons, parlia-
mentary systems typically have higher levels of voter turnout. Uni-
cameral systems typically increase voter turnout because legislative
elections in such systems are perceived as more decisive and efficient
(Jackman, 1987). Additionally, empirical studies of voting participation
have also identified a positive link with the proportionality of the
voting system (Geys, 2006).10
Though it is often overlooked, the national economic context may
affect voter turnout. In general, economically developed democracies
have higher levels of turnout than their lesser developed counterparts.
Likewise, economic downturns may affect voter turnout, but previous
studies have generally failed to find conclusive results on this point
(Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998; Blais, 2006). We include real GDP per
capita as a control.11
Additionally, individual-level factors also affect voting participa-
tion.12 Resource-based models of voter turnout stress that voters need
the time, money, and skills in order to vote (Smets and van Ham, 2013,
348). Hence, sociodemographic factors, such as education and wealth
are likely to increase voter turnout both in developed and in developing
countries (Lijphart, 1997; Blais, 2000; Smets and van Ham, 2013). The
costs associated with voting are much less consequential for wealthy
individuals. Likewise, education gives voters the necessary skills to
register and properly cast a vote. It also may convince them of the
importance of participation through voting. In general, older in-
dividuals are more inclined toward voting participation (Blais, 2000),
but some studies also find a curvilinear effect of age. That is, partici-
pation in elections declines again as people become elderly, finding it
more difficult to vote (Smets and van Ham, 2013). The degree of ur-
banization may also condition voting participation (Lehoucq and Wall,
2004; Fornos et al., 2004; Power and Roberts, 1995). Notably, turnout
is typically higher in rural areas because these communities tend to
have a greater degree of civic associational life, stronger social ties, and
higher levels of trust in politicians and fellow citizens (Carreras and
Bowler, 2017; Geys, 2006; Smets and van Ham, 2013).
Finally, models of turnout focusing on mobilization and
8
See Blais (2006) and Smets and van Ham (2013).
9
Measures of enforcement are contradictory among sources (e.g.: IDEA (2017), Birch
(2008)), reflecting the difficulty of measuring actual implementation. Non-voters may
escape penalties through loopholes or the enforced penalty itself may be weak or unequal
across all sectors of society. In a cross-national study, Blais (2006) acknowledges that we
know very little about how compulsory voting laws are enforced in individual cases. He
opts for a dichotomous, de jure measure. We make the same decision in this paper, by
using a measure of compulsory voting law from IDEA (2017).
10
To measure proportionality, we employ a dichotomous measure of the voting system
from the Database of Political Institutions, but also use the Gallagher Least Squares Index
as a robustness check in the online appendix. This does not change our main substantive
findings.
11
Population may also affect voter turnout (see Geys, 2006, 642). We do not include
population size, however, because it is highly collinear with the RAI and its component
parts. Having a larger population puts pressure on the development of a multilevel
structure that can provide public goods at appropriate population scales (Hooghe and
Marks, 2016).
12
See Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita (2014).
A.T. Stoyan, S. Niedzwiecki
socialization acknowledge that certain behavioral factors, like political
interest or civic engagement, may increase voting participation (Smets
and van Ham, 2013). Those who pay greater attention to politics should
also be more informed about elections and candidates, and likely feel
more invested in the outcome. Some authors have claimed that this is
potentially a more proximate explanation for the effect of education on
turnout (Sondheimer and Green, 2010). In addition, people who par-
ticipate more in civic associational life are likely not only to have
broader networks, but also more politically active and engaged net-
works (Putnam, 1993).
We rely upon the LAPOP dataset for individual level control vari-
ables: age and age squared, socio-economic status (SES), education, and
size of town in which respondents live, as well as measures of political
interest and civic engagement.
3. Data and measurement
The analysis presented below uses a hierarchical model to analyze
national and individual levels variables at a single time point (2010) in
20 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Table 1 below displays
basic summary information about all countries included in this analysis.
We make innovative use of existing data by combining two datasets for
the first time. Data on decentralization is drawn from the Regional
Authority Index (RAI) (Hooghe et al., 2016). Public opinion data is drawn
from the Americas Barometer from the Latin American Public Opinion
Project (LAPOP). Table A.1 in the online appendix details the descriptive
statistics for all variables employed here and in the online appendix.
3.1. Dependent variable: voting participation
We measure self-reported voting participation in national elections
through a question from LAPOP: whether respondents voted in the last
presidential elections (responses: "voted" or "did not vote").
In general, self-reported voting participation is relatively high
among respondents in Latin America. The y-axis in Fig. 1 shows mean
levels of voting participation across the countries in our sample. Mean
levels are quite high overall, although there is variation within our
sample. Countries such as Ecuador and Uruguay have the highest mean
levels of voting participation while Colombia and Jamaica have the
lowest mean levels. Table 1, above, also presents a comparison of self-
reported turnout within the LAPOP data and aggregate measures of
voter turnout from International IDEA (2017).
3.2. The regional authority index in Latin America
Our primary independent variable is a country-level indicator of the
extent of decentralization, the Regional Authority Index (RAI).13 This
index was developed and widely used for OECD countries (Hooghe
et al., 2010). It is regarded as “the most nuanced and comprehensive
measurement of subnational powers,” which may assist in reducing
“the trade-off between detail and generalisability common in large-N
studies” (Spina, 2014, 449). The index has now been expanded to Latin
America and Caribbean countries, measuring the degree of subnational
authority in the region across ten different dimensions on an annual
basis from 1950 to 2010.
While previous research has measured decentralization mostly
through financial data provided by International Financial Institutions
(Daughters and Harper, 2007; Escobar-Lemmon, 2001), one of the main
contributions of this paper is to use a measure that taps into regional
authority directly. Fiscal data can tell us how much subnational gov-
ernments collect in taxes or spend, while the RAI informs us about the
authority that these governments have to set the rate and/or base of
13
For a thorough description of the Regional Authority Index see Hooghe et al. (2016)
and Niedzwiecki et al. (2016).
30
Electoral Studies 52 (2018) 26–35
Fig. 1. Self-rule and voting participation across Latin America and the Caribbean.
Source: The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP (2010).
taxes and determine spending priorities. This is important because a
given government can show high levels of spending (such as Depart-
ments in Uruguay), while not having authority over how to spend that
money. The measurement instrument taps de jure authority, that is,
explicit rules or routinized institutional practices governing the exercise
of formal power. It does not measure de facto use of that authority or
exogenous influences, such as the charisma of a political leader or many
factors that can affect the ability of a government to achieve its goals.14
The RAI groups indicators into two dimensions: self-rule and shared-
rule. Self-rule builds on and extends the distinction between fiscal,
administrative, and political decentralization (Montero and Samuels,
2004; Falleti, 2010). The index includes five variables to measure the
authority that governments enjoy in their own territory: institutional
depth (which distinguishes decentralization from deconcentration),
policy scope (measures the breadth of regional policy competencies),
representation (looks at whether the subnational government has a
regionally elected legislature and executive), fiscal autonomy (the au-
thority to set the base and rate of minor and major taxes) and bor-
rowing autonomy (the extent to which regional governments can
borrow; and, if they do, whether they can borrow without prior au-
thorization and restrictions by central government). At the same time,
the index includes the authority of subnational governments to shape
the rules of the game in the country as a whole. Shared-rule includes
five additional variables across whether the region is related to the
central government bilaterally or multilaterally with other regions.
The unit of analysis is the year and subnational government,15
which is defined as government between the local and the national
levels (such as provinces, departments, or regions) having an average
population greater than 150,000.16 In addition, the index includes re-
gions with special autonomy, such as capital cities or indigenous ter-
ritories in many of these countries. The raw value of each region is
weighted by population and then added to construct the country score.
The regional authority index detects considerable variation across
countries, with a standard deviation of 7.2, a minimum of 0 in Costa
Rica, Guyana, and Jamaica, and a maximum of 23.5 in Argentina (see
Table 1).
14
Estimating the RAI in Latin America faces a particular challenge: the issue of dis-
crepancies between informal and formal authority. The measurement instrument does not
engage the range of informal conditions, such as clientelism or the effect of individual
leaders, because it is conceptually useful to keep these separate (see Hooghe et al. 2016
and Niedzwiecki et al. 2016).
15
The RAI varies annually.
16
This means that the RAI does not measure decentralization at the local level, thus
probably underestimating the score of countries that have skipped the intermediate level
and have decentralized towards the local level. That said, the RAI does incorporate local
level variation in units with asymmetric authority, such as capital cities (such as the City
of Buenos Aires or Mexico City), indigenous communities (in Bolivia and Nicaragua, for
instance), internal colonies (in Brazil and Colombia, for instance), and protected geo-
graphical territories (such as Galápagos in Ecuador).
A.T. Stoyan, S. Niedzwiecki Electoral Studies 52 (2018) 26–35

Table 1
Summary information for 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries.

Country Executive Form Federalism RAI Election Year Election Type Aggregate Electoral Turnout

LAPOP IDEA IDEA - VAP

Argentina Presidential Federal 23.50 2009 Legislative 75.23% 72.39% 70.89%

Belize Parliamentary Unitary 0.00 2008 Parliamentary 76.44% 77.18% 76.54%
Bolivia Presidential Unitary 13.55 2009 Concurrent 89.19% 94.55% 85.55%
Brazil Presidential Federal 19.50 2006 Concurrent 83.44% 81.01% 81.32%
Colombia Presidential Unitary 12.29 2006 Concurrent 60.23% 45.11% 44.15%
Costa Rica Presidential Unitary 0.00 2006 Concurrent 58.04% 65.21% 63.96%
Dominican Republic Presidential Unitary 3.67 2008 Presidential 76.13% 71.36% 71.63%
Ecuador Presidential Unitary 8.00 2009 Concurrent 92.70% 75.28% 90.47%
El Salvador Presidential Unitary 1.00 2009 Concurrent 79.34% 61.91% 72.39%
Guatemala Presidential Unitary 1.00 2007 Concurrent 69.00% 48.15% 45.54%
Guyana Parliamentary Unitary 0.00 2006 Parliamentary 71.22% 68.82% 66.44%
Haiti Presidential Unitary 5.50 2006 Concurrent 59.38% 59.26% 47.77%
Honduras Presidential Unitary 1.00 2009 Concurrent 60.92% 49.88% 53.17%
Jamaica Parliamentary Unitary 0.00 2007 Parliamentary 57.20% 60.40% 49.56%
Mexico Presidential Federal 20.03 2006 Concurrent 71.03% 58.55% 63.26%
Nicaragua Presidential Unitary 4.69 2006 Concurrent 69.36% 61.23% 74.16%
Panama Presidential Unitary 2.55 2009 Concurrent 81.83% 68.57% 69.04%
Paraguay Presidential Unitary 8.30 2008 Concurrent 66.85% 60.34% 45.94%
Uruguay Presidential Unitary 12.00 2009 Concurrent 93.46% 89.18% 96.10%
Venezuela Presidential Federal 6.52 2006 Presidential 68.65% 74.69% 76.41%

Note: We calculate aggregate self-reported electoral turnout from LAPOP and report aggregate turnout data for the same election from International IDEA for comparison. IDEA measures
turnout as the total number of votes cast divided by the number of names on the voters' register, expressed as a percentage. In contrast, IDEA-VAP measures Voting Age Population (VAP)
turnout as total number of votes cast divided by census estimates of the voting age population, expressed as a percentage. Discrepancies between these two measures may indicate issues
with voter registration, but voter rolls are also updated more regularly than census data, so this can also explain differences.

4. Findings and analysis
The statistical analysis presented in this section begins very gen-
erally to assess the effect of decentralization on voting participation.17
Ultimately, however, our goal is to move toward an analysis of the
specific components of decentralization to determine which of these
exerts a significant influence on voting participation. Given the existent
disagreement in the literature on the effect of decentralization on
voting participation, we do not have a strong expectation about this
aggregate relationship. With that caveat in mind, we find that aggregate
measures of decentralization increase national voter turnout. However,
we do have theoretical expectations of the effect of particular dimen-
sions of decentralization on national voting turnout. In line with our
expectations, we find that self-rule determines voting participation
more than shared-rule. Lastly, among the specific components of self-
rule, those related to political authority – institutional depth, policy
scope, and representation – affect voting participation to a greater ex-
tent than those components related to fiscal authority. Self-rule political
authority puts the government closer to voters and thus provides them
with a direct avenue for voicing their demands. This takes place in a
context of (perceived) empowerment given the high level of subna-
tional institutional, political, and policy autonomy.
We estimate hierarchical logit models given that our data has a
binary outcome variable and survey respondents (level one) are nested
within countries (level two). While variables from the LAPOP dataset
are measured at level one, all of our measures of decentralization from
the RAI dataset are level two variables and so are our controls for
compulsory voting, concurrent elections, proportionality, parlia-
mentarism, democracy, and GDP per capita. The hierarchical model
with varying intercepts and varying slopes allows us to formulate ac-
curate estimates and standard errors that take into account the N at
level two. Random coefficients yield better predictions (or slopes) for
the level two variable of interest (i.e. decentralization).
We begin our analysis by examining the effect of decentralization on
voting participation in Latin America in general. Model 1 in Table 2
includes the aggregate RAI measure of decentralization alongside a
number of control variables. In this model, the degree of decen-
tralization exerts positive and significant effect, when controlling for
individual characteristics and national-level factors known to affect
voter turnout. We did not have a strong expectation regarding the effect
of aggregate levels of decentralization on voting, given the existent
disagreement in the literature.
We expect that the two distinct dimensions of the RAI operate dif-
ferently with respect to voting participation, so we disaggregate the RAI
measure. In doing so, we find clear evidence of the dynamics under-
lying the positive result for the aggregate measure. Models 2 and 3
examine the individual effects of the self-rule and shared-rule dimen-
sions. Taken together, the results of these two models demonstrate that
self-rule is the more relevant dimension, as we previously anticipated.
Self-rule has a positive and significant effect on voting participation
because it puts the government closer to people and provides them with
more points of access to participation in government. If the self-rule
index were to increase by one, this would lead to a positive difference of
2.9% in the probability of voting, holding all other variables constant.
This effect may appear to be small. Yet, recall that self-rule ranges from
0 to 14.84 in our sample (see Table A.1 in the online appendix). Thus,
an increase of 1 on this index is itself a very small change (e.g. ap-
proximately a move from Costa Rica to Haiti). More concretely, a one
standard deviation increase in self-rule would produce a positive dif-
ference of 15.1% in the probability of voting. This change is roughly
equivalent to moving from Paraguay to Brazil. In contrast, shared-rule
has no significant effect on voting participation.
Lastly, an even more fine-grained analysis demonstrates that poli-
tical dimensions of self-rule effect voting more than fiscal dimensions.
To unpack this, we disaggregate the self-rule dimension into its five
component parts, running a separate model for each.18 In Table 3
above, Models 4–6 test political components of self-rule. In Table 4

17
The results of all the models presented here are robust to model specification. A set
18
of robustness checks mentioned throughout this manuscript are available in the online We do not include these components in the same model because of high-levels of
appendix. multicollinearity. Most correlate around 0.8 and all correlate above 0.5.

31
A.T. Stoyan, S. Niedzwiecki Electoral Studies 52 (2018) 26–35

Table 2
Hierarchical models of voting participation: RAI, self-rule, and shared-rule.

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Fixed Effects Political Interest 0.312 *** 0.312 *** 0.312 ***
(Level 1) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Civic Engagement 0.313 *** 0.313 *** 0.313 ***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Socioeconomic Status 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age 0.207 *** 0.207 *** 0.207 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age2 −0.002 *** −0.002 *** −0.002 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rural 0.041 *** 0.041 *** 0.041 ***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Education 0.133 *** 0.133 *** 0.133 ***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Constant −5.212 *** −5.064 *** −5.665 ***
(0.789) (0.755) (1.120)
Fixed Effects Regional Authority Index 0.094 *
(Level 2) (0.048)
Self-Rule 0.116 **
(0.048)
Shared-Rule 0.299
(0.209)
Compulsory Voting 0.307 0.257 0.694
(0.453) (0.439) (0.473)
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Proportional −0.357 −0.212 −0.507
(0.355) (0.359) (0.362)
Democracy 0.653 0.625 −0.313
(0.603) (0.599) (0.615)
Parliamentary 0.321 0.275 0.405
(0.657) (0.573) (0.608)
Unicameral 0.695 * 0.497 0.544 *
(0.404) (0.350) (0.321)
Concurrent −0.288 −0.295 0.389
(0.617) (0.571) (0.706)
Random Effects Level 1 Variance 0.251 0.233 0.252
(Standard Deviation) (0.119) (0.109) (0.082)
Level 2 Variance 0.001 0.003 0.197
(Standard Deviation) (0.002) (0.003) (0.100)

Wald Chi2 (Prob > Chi2) 3737.77 (0.000) 3737.33 (0.000) 3744.27 (0.000)
N (n) 20 (32797) 20 (32797) 20 (32797)

Note: ***p ≤ .01; **p ≤ .05; *p ≤ .1; Standard errors in brackets.

below, Models 7 and 8 test fiscal components of self-rule. These models
allow us to further assess which specific aspects of self-rule – either
those related to political or to fiscal authority – might affect voting
participation.
In Model 4, we include a measure of institutional depth. This vari-
able has a positive and significant effect on voting in our sample. As the
regional government becomes more autonomous, rather than decon-
centrated, citizens are more likely to participate through voting. More
precisely, a one-unit increase in institutional depth leads to a positive
difference of 17.1% in the probability of voting, holding all other
variables constant. For example, this is roughly equivalent to moving
from a region where the central government can veto subnational de-
cisions to a region where the central government cannot veto.
In Model 5, we include a measure of policy scope, the range of
policies for which regional governments are responsible. Policy scope
has a positive and significant effect on voting. As the regional govern-
ment's responsibility extends to a broader range of policies, voting
participation tends to increase. Specifically, holding all other variables
constant, a one-unit increase in policy scope leads to an increase of 10%
in the probability of voting. For instance, this change reflects the dif-
ference between a country with very weak subnational competencies on
policies (Chilean regiones) to a country where subnational government
has authority over either economic, cultural, or welfare policies
(Venezuelan estados).
Model 6 includes a measure of representation or the presence of an
independent and elected regional legislature and/or executive.
Representation has a positive and significant effect on voting partici-
pation. That is, as regions are endowed with an independent legislature
and executive, voting participation tends to increase on average in our
sample. For a one-unit increase in representation, there is a 7.9% in-
crease in the probability of voting, holding all other variables constant.
One unit increase means, for instance, the difference between having no
elected assembly or executive (e.g. Costa Rica) to indirectly elected
assembly (e.g. Consejos Regionales in Chile).
In Table 4, we test fiscal dimensions of self-rule. Model 7 includes a
measure of fiscal autonomy, or the extent to which regional govern-
ments can independently tax their population, while Model 8 includes
borrowing autonomy, or the extent to which regional governments can
borrow. Neither of these fiscal dimensions of self-rule have a statisti-
cally significant effect on voting.
Taken as a whole, the models in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that com-
ponents of self-rule related to political governance have a significant

32
A.T. Stoyan, S. Niedzwiecki Electoral Studies 52 (2018) 26–35

Table 3
Hierarchical models of voting participation: Political components of self-rule.

Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

Fixed Effects Political Interest 0.312 *** 0.312 *** 0.312 ***
(Level 1) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Civic Engagement 0.313 *** 0.313 *** 0.313 ***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Socioeconomic Status 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age 0.207 *** 0.207 *** 0.207 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age2 −0.002 *** −0.002 *** −0.002 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rural 0.040 *** 0.040 *** 0.040 ***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Education 0.133 *** 0.133 *** 0.133 ***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Constant −4.765 *** −2.21 *** −2.534 ***
(0.756) (0.718) (0.646)
Fixed Effects Institutional Depth 0.682 ***
(Level 2) (0.223)
Policy Scope 0.407 *
(0.222)
Representation 0.316 ***
(0.119)
Compulsory Voting 0.010 −0.015 0.387
(0.160) (0.403) (0.363)
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Proportional −0.215 −0.313 −0.135
(0.369) (0.324) (0.354)
Democracy 0.837 *** 0.728 0.616
(0.260) (0.478) (0.541)
Parliamentary 0.417 0.086 0.292
(0.543) (0.551) (0.531)
Unicameral 0.413 0.686 ** 0.479
(0.190) (0.279) (0.302)
Concurrent −0.284 −0.503 −0.225
(0.294) (0.550) (0.519)
Random Effects Level 1 Variance 0.247 0.209 0.226
(Standard Deviation) (0.088) (0.070) (0.094)
Random Effects Level 2 Variance 0.103 0.176 0.021
(Standard Deviation) (0.064) (0.072) (0.021)

Wald Chi2 (Prob > Chi2) 3747.92 (0.000) 3733.25 (0.000) 3737.31 (0.000)
N (n) 20 (32797) 20 (32797) 20 (32797)

Note: ***p ≤ .01; **p ≤ .05; *p ≤ .1; Standard errors in brackets.

and positive effect on voting participation. These components are 5. Conclusion

driving the positive association of self-rule and, in turn, of aggregate
decentralization. We hypothesized in the theory section that the poli-
tical components of self-rule matter for voting participation because
subnational elections strengthen the perception that voting matters and
thus enhance voting participation at all levels of government. In addi-
tion, institutional and policy authority enhances participation in elec-
tions because voters may want to make sure that national policies re-
spond to local needs.
Finally, in all models presented above, we find that the effects of
control variables, particularly at the individual level, are relatively
strong and consistent with previous findings. As expected, we find a
curvilinear effect of age; until it becomes difficult for individuals to get
out to vote, older individuals are more likely to vote than younger in-
dividuals. Education, living in rural areas, political interest and parti-
cipation in civic associational life all have positive effects on voting
participation. National level control variables are more inconsistent
across models. However, when these factors are significant, they are in
line with our expectations; we find that voters are more likely to
turnout in countries with unicameral legislatures and higher levels of
democracy.
Democracy requires government accountability and responsiveness,
both of which rely in large part on citizens' ability and willingness to
participate in the political system. Robert A. Dahl (1971) recognized
two fundamental dimensions of democracy: contestation and partici-
pation. The latter may take many forms, including either formal par-
ticipation (e.g. voting in elections) or informal participation (e.g. pro-
testing). The idea of free and fair elections still lies at the core of our
understanding of democracy because elections are often the primary
formal mechanism of accountability and allow citizens to express their
preferences to elected representatives at routine, regular intervals. It is
important to understand the factors that influence voting participation
because it is essential to the functioning of democracy.
This paper advances our understanding of the factors that drive
voting participation in national level elections. It does so by under-
scoring the need to disaggregate decentralization to study voting par-
ticipation. Incorporating different dimensions of decentralization, en-
riches our understanding because decentralization in Latin American
unfolded through a variety of distinct mechanisms, and looking only at
aggregate decentralization fails to capture meaningful reforms.
We use a nuanced measure of decentralization –the Regional
Authority Index—to capture the underlying dynamics that matter for

33
A.T. Stoyan, S. Niedzwiecki Electoral Studies 52 (2018) 26–35

Table 4 also enhance the key mechanism of government accountability and re-
Hierarchical models of voting participation: Fiscal components of self-rule. sponsiveness at the national level. In other words, regional processes may
generate effects on political behavior at the national level as well.
Model 7 Model 8
Moreover, the substantive size of the effects of decentralization on the
Fixed Effects Political Interest 0.312 *** 0.312 *** probability of voting are not trivial. Living in a context with one standard
(Level 1) (0.016) (0.016) deviation more political decentralization - in terms of self-rule, institu-
Civic Engagement 0.313 *** 0.313 ***
tional depth, policy scope, or representation - has arguably more of a
(0.031) (0.031)
Socioeconomic Status 0.002 0.002 substantive impact on voting participation than a one standard deviation
(0.003) (0.003) increase in civic associational life or years of education.
Age 0.207 *** 0.207 *** Another contribution of the present analysis is our combination of
(0.001) (0.001) micro-level and macro-level predictors of political behavior into a
Age2 −0.002 *** −0.002 ***
single model. Aggregate trends in political participation are explained
(0.000) (0.000)
Rural 0.041 *** 0.041 *** by a conscious decision that citizens make about whether or not to
(0.010) (0.010) turnout to vote on election day. A variety of influences affects each
Education 0.133 *** 0.133 *** person's decision-making calculus, including individual socio-demo-
(0.011) (0.011)
graphic and behavioral factors, as well as other national-level economic
Constant −5.162 *** −5.196 ***
(0.930) (0.848) and institutional factors. However, even controlling for these influ-
Fixed Effects Fiscal Autonomy −0.045 ences, we find that self-rule persists in positively influencing voting
(Level 2) (0.233) participation. Devolving power to the subnational level brings the
Borrowing Autonomy 0.523 government closer to the people and allows citizens to view more
(0.442)
clearly the impact of their vote. Overall, our analysis demonstrates that
Compulsory Voting 0.534 0.717
(0.524) (0.451) these dynamics lie at the heart of decentralization's effect on voter
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 turnout and, ultimately, democratic participation.
(0.000) (0.000) Voters in places with a higher degree of self-rule may feel that their
Proportional −0.339 −0.243
vote matters more. In general, higher levels of self-rule correlate sig-
(0.410) (0.404)
Democracy 0.178 0.373
nificantly with higher perceived importance of voting.19 For example,
(0.658) (0.643) in the highly decentralized country of Argentina, more than 70% of
Parliamentary −0.190 0.407 respondents considered that “the way you vote can change the way
(0.689) (0.604) things will be in the future.” In contrast, in highly centralized Costa
Unicameral 0.009 0.397
Rica, a majority of the population considered that “no matter how you
(0.376) (0.344)
Concurrent 0.291 −0.238 vote, things will not improve in the future.” A possible implication of
(0.633) (0.577) this finding is that as citizens are more involved in politics, their gov-
Random Level 1 Variance 0.420 0.314 ernments are more subject to accountability.
Effects (Standard Deviation) (0.134) (0.105)
Yet, this data is preliminary and incomplete; future research should
Level 2 Variance 0.000 0.345
(Standard Deviation) (0.000) (0.125)
focus on uncovering the micro-level mechanism at work behind the
trends elucidated here. More generally, there is a need for research that
Wald Chi2 3735.04 (0.000) 3750.55 (0.000) evaluates the effect of disaggregated dimensions of decentralization on
(Prob > Chi2) other governance outcomes, both at the national and subnational levels,
N (n) 20 (32797) 20 (32797)
such as fiscal capacity and transparency. Finally, another limitation of
Note: ***p ≤ .01; **p ≤ .05; *p ≤ .1; Standard errors in brackets. this paper is that the Regional Authority Index only takes into account
formal rules. In this way, it cannot inform our understanding of in-
formal practices, such as, clientelism, corruption, patronage politics,
explaining national voting. The combination of a relatively new dataset, political coalitions, and illicit non-state actors. Future research that
the Regional Authority Index, with one of the best sources of public develops systematic measures of these concepts should analyze their
opinion data in the region allows us to reevaluate a long-standing dis- relationship with national voting participation.
puted finding in the literature. The present analysis focused on Latin
American and Caribbean countries, which remain relatively under-
Funding
studied with respect to the effects of decentralization and political be-
havior. However, the experience of countries within this region has
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding
implications for other established democratic regimes and transitional
agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
democracies as well.
We find that increased regional authority through self-rule posi-
tively affects voting participation in Latin America, and the political Acknowledgements
dimensions of self-rule primarily drive this relationship. In showing the
specific dimensions of decentralization that matter for increasing voting We thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and
participation, a main contribution of the present analysis is to demon- its major supporters (the United States Agency for International
strate that aggregate measures of decentralization are insufficient. We Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, and Vanderbilt
unpack decentralization by illustrating how devolving institutional, University) for making the AmericasBarometer data available. The
policy, and representation authority to subnational levels may increase authors would also like to acknowledge the research assistance of
voter turnout. By increasing citizens' sense that their vote matters, self- Nicole Gayer and excellent comments from Mariana Borges, Miguel
rule may increase political participation at all levels of government, Carreras, Wendy Hansen, Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Eduardo
including voting in national-level elections. Moncada, Jana Morgan, Heidi Smith, and the anonymous reviewers.
Overall, individuals living in countries with higher levels of authority,
particularly political authority, in their own territory are more likely to 19
See Table A.5 and Figure A.2 in the supplemental analysis in the online appendix.
turnout to vote. Thus, a key contribution of our analysis is the idea that, Unfortunately, this indicator is not available from LAPOP in 2010, so we rely on data
while decentralization devolves authority to subnational regions, it may from 2003.

34
A.T. Stoyan, S. Niedzwiecki
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data related to this article can be found at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2017.12.001.
References
Bäck, H., Debus, M., Müller, J., Bäck, H., 2013. Regional government formation in
varying multilevel contexts: a comparison of eight European countries. Reg. Stud. 47
(3), 368–387.
Bandura, A., 2007. Self-efficacy: the Exercise of Control. W.H. Freeman, Princeton, N.J.
Bardhan, P., Mookherjee, D. (Eds.), 2006. Decentralization and Local Governance in
Developing Countries: a Comparative Perspective. Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Cambridge, MA.
Birch, S., 2008. Full Participation: a Comparative Study of Compulsory Voting.
Manchester University Press, Oxford.
Blais, A., 2000. To Vote or Not to Vote? the Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory.
University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA.
Blais, A., 2006. What affects voter turnout? Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 9 (1), 111–125.
Blais, A., Dobrzynska, A., 1998. Turnout in electoral democracies. Eur. J. Polit. Res. 33
(2), 239–261.
Blais, A., Anduiza, E., Gallego, A., 2011. Decentralization and voter turnout. Environ.
Plann. C Govern. Pol. 29 (2), 297–320.
Brancati, D., 2008. The origins and strengths of regional parties. Br. J. Polit. Sci. 38 (01).
Burki, S., Perry, G., Dillinger, W., 1999. Beyond the center. Decentralizing the State.
World Bank, Washington D.C.
Carreras, M., 2016. Compulsory voting and political engagement (beyond the ballot box):
a multilevel analysis. Elect. Stud. 43 (Sept 2016), 158–168.
Carreras, M., Bowler, S., 2017. Social capital and the geography of political participation
in Latin America. In: For Presentation at the Latin American Studies Association
International Congress, Lima, Peru, April 2017.
Carreras, M., Castañeda-Angarita, N., 2014. Who votes in Latin America? A test of three
theoretical perspectives. Comp. Polit. Stud. 47 (8), 1079–1104.
Dahl, R.A., 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Yale University Press, New
Haven, CT.
Daughters, R., Harper, L., 2007. Fiscal and political decentralization reforms. In: Lora, E.
(Ed.), The State of State Reform in Latin America. Stanford University Press,
Stanford, CA.
Diamond, L.J., 1999. Developing Democracy: toward Consolidation. The Johns Hopkins
University Press, Baltimore.
Donas, T., Beyers, J., 2013. How regions assemble in Brussels: the organizational form of
territorial representation in the European Union. Publius 43 (4), 527–550.
Eaton, K., 2004. Politics beyond the Capital: the Design of Subnational Institutions in
South America. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA.
Elazar, D.J., 1987. Exploring Federalism. University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa, AL.
Escobar-Lemmon, M.C., 2001. Fiscal decentralization and federalism in Latin America.
Publius 31 (4), 23–41.
Falleti, T.G., 2010. Decentralization and Subnational Politics in Latin America. Cambridge
University Press, Leiden.
Falleti, T.G., 2005. A sequential theory of decentralization: Latin American cases in
comparative perspective. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 99 (3), 327–346.
Fornos, C., Power, T.J., Garand, J.C., 2004. Explaining voter turnout in Latin America,
1980 to 2000. Comp. Polit. Stud. 37 (8), 909–940.
Foweraker, J., Landman, T., 2002. Constitutional design and democratic performance.
Democratization 9 (2), 43–66.
Gallego, A., 2010. Understanding unequal turnout: education and voting in comparative
perspective. Elect. Stud. 29, 239–248.
Gervasoni, C., 2010. Measuring variance in subnational regimes: results from an expert-
based operationalization of democracy in the Argentine provinces. J. Polit. Lat Am. 2
(2), 13–52.
Geys, B., 2006. Explaining voter turnout: a review of aggregate-level research. Elect. Stud.
25, 637–663.
Gibson, E.L., 2004. Federalism and democracy: theoretical connections and cautionary
insights. In: Gibson, E.L. (Ed.), Federalism and Democracy in Latin America. The John
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp. 1–28.
Gibson, E.L., 2012. Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Federal
Democracies. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Giraudy, A., 2014. Democrats and Autocrats: Pathways of Subnational Undemocratic
Regime Continuity within Democratic Countries. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Goldfrank, B., 2007. The politics of deepening local democracy: decentralization, party
institutionalization, and participation. Comp. Polit. 39 (1), 147–168.
Hajnal, Z.L., Lewis, P.G., 2003. Municipal institutions and voter turnout in local elections.
Urban Aff. Rev. 38 (5), 645–668.
Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Schakel, A., 2010. The Rise of Regional Authority: a Comparative
Study of 42 Democracies. Routledge, New York.
Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Schakel, A., Niedzwiecki, S., Chapman Osterkatz, S., Shair-
Rosenfield, S., 2016. Measuring Regional Authority: a Postfunctionalist Theory of
Governance, vol. I Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Community, Scale, and Regional Governance, 2016. A
35
Electoral Studies 52 (2018) 26–35
Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance. Volume II. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
International IDEA, 2017. Compulsory Voting. https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/
voter-turnout/compulsory-voting, Accessed date: 19 October 2017.
Jackman, R.M., 1987. Political institutions and voter turnout in industrial democracies.
Am. Polit. Sci. Assoc. 81, 405–424.
Jones, M.P., Mainwaring, S., 2003. The nationalization of parties and party systems: an
empirical measure and an application to the Americas. Party Polit. 9 (2), 139–166.
Kostadinova, T., Power, T.J., 2007. Does democratization depress participation? Voter
turnout in the Latin American and Eastern European transitional democracies. Polit.
Res. Q. 60 (3), 363–377.
The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2010.
www.LapopSurveys.org.
Lehoucq, F., Wall, D.L., 2004. Explaining voter turnout rates in new democracies:
Guatemala. Elect. Stud. 23 (3), 485–500.
Lijphart, A., 1997. Unequal participation: democracy's unresolved dilemma. Am. Polit.
Sci. Rev. 91 (1), 1–14.
Litvack, J.I., Ahmad, J., Bird, R.M., 1998. Rethinking Decentralization in Developing
Countries. World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Maldonado, A., 2011. Compulsory voting and the decision to vote. Am. Barom. Insights
63, 1–9.
Manin, B., Przeworski, A., Stokes, S.C., 1999. Elections and representation. In:
Przeworski, A., Stokes, S.C., Manin, B. (Eds.), Democracy, Accountability, and
Representation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Meguid, B.M., 2007. Bringing government back to the people? the impact of political
decentralization on voter engagement in Western Europe. For presentation at the
19th Biennial Meeting of the European Union Studies Association, Montreal, Canada
May 2007.
Melton, J., Meserve, S., Pemstein, D., 2014. Unified Democracy Score. http://www.
unified-democracy-scores.org, Accessed date: 10 November 2017.
Miller, A.H., Miller, W.E., 1975. Issues, candidates and partisan divisions in the 1972
American presidential election. Br. J. Polit. Sci. 5 (4), 393–434.
Montero, A.P., Samuels, D. (Eds.), 2004. Decentralization and Democracy in Latin
America. University of Notre Dame Press, South Bend, IN.
Neudorfer, B., Neudorfer, N.S., 2014. Decentralization and political corruption: dis-
aggregating regional authority. Publius 45 (1), 24–50.
Niedzwiecki, S., Chapman Osterkatz, S., Marks, G., Hooghe, L., 2016. The RAI travels to
Latin America. measuring regional authority under regime change. In: For pre-
sentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association;
Philadelphia, PA, August 2016.
Nikolenyi, C., 2010. Concurrent elections and voter turnout: the effect of the de-linking of
state elections on electoral participation in India's parliamentary polls, 1971-2004.
Polit. Stud. 58 (1), 214–233.
Norris, P., 2004. Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
O'Donnell, G.A., 1998. Horizontal accountability in new democracies. J. Democr. 9 (3),
112–126.
Pattie, C., Johnston, R., 1998. Voter turnout at the British general election of 1992: ra-
tional choice, social standing or political efficacy? Eur. J. Polit. Res. 33 (2), 263–283.
Pérez-Liñán, A., 2001. Neoinstitutional accounts of voter turnout: moving beyond in-
dustrial democracies. Elect. Stud. 20 (2), 281–297.
Peterson, G.E., 1997. Decentralization in Latin America: Learning through Experience.
World Bank Latin American and Caribbean Studies. D.C. World Bank, Washington.
Powell, B., 1980. Voting participation in thirty democracies: effects of socio economic,
legal and partisan environments. In: Rose, R. (Ed.), Electoral Participation: a
Comparative Perspective. SAGE Publications, London, pp. 5–34.
Power, T., Roberts, K.M., 1995. Compulsory voting, invalid ballots, and abstention in
Brazil. Polit. Res. Q. 48 (4), 795–826.
Putnam, R.D., 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.
Quaranta, M., 2013. The impact of institutional decentralization on protest in Western
Europe. Int. Polit. Sci. Rev. 34 (5), 502–518.
Reif, K., Schmitt, H., 1980. Nine second-order elections. A conceptual framework for the
analysis of European election results. Eur. J. Polit. Res. 8, 3–44.
Rolfe, M., 2012. Voter Turnout: A Social Theory of Political Participation. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/46275/.
Selee, A., 2004. Exploring the link between decentralization and democratic governance.
In: Tulchin, J.S., Selee, A. (Eds.), Decentralization and Democratic Governance in
Latin America. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Latin American
Program, Washington, D.C, pp. 3–36.
Smets, K., van Ham, C., 2013. The embarrassment of riches? A meta-analysis of in-
dividual-level research on voter turnout. Elect. Stud. 32 (2), 344–359.
Sondheimer, R.M., Green, D.P., 2010. Using experiments to estimate the effects of edu-
cation on voter turnout. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 54 (1), 174–189.
Spina, N., 2014. Decentralisation and political participation: an empirical analysis in
Western and Eastern Europe. Int. Polit. Sci. Rev. 35 (4), 448–462.
Stegmueller, D., 2013. How many countries for multilevel modeling? A comparison of
frequentist and bayesian approaches,. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 57 (3), 748–761.
Tiebout, C.M., 1956. A pure theory of local expenditures. J. Polit. Econ. 64 (5), 416–424.
Vetter, A., 2002. Local political competence in Europe: a resource of legitimacy for higher
levels of government? Int. J. Publ. Opin. Res. 14 (1), 3–18.