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Mareva Injunction by Ajape Abdulsamad Abiola
Mareva Injunction by Ajape Abdulsamad Abiola
FACULTY OF LAW
Generally, in Nigeria, the root of the court’s statutory, equitable and inherent
jurisdiction would be traced back to the Constitution. The court’s power to grant
mandamus, injunction or appoint a receiver is usually donated by statute
establishing the relevant court pursuant to the 1999 Constitution as amended
and amplified by the relevant court rules. However, in terms of case law in
Nigeria, recognition of Mareva injunction may be first traced to the Supreme
Court case of SOTIMINU V. OCEAN STEAMSHIP (NIG) LTD (1992) 5
NWLR (PT.239) 1 where the Supreme Court acknowledged as a preventive
measure, the power of the court to grant anticipatory and preservative ex parte
injunction to a Plaintiff with a good prima facie case against a “mischievous”
Defendant planning to remove assets outside the jurisdiction of the court before
judgment.
Another notable nigerian case where the court granted a Mareva injunction is
the case of Ojukwu v. Ojukwu (2010) LPELR-3809(SC), where the Supreme
Court granted a Mareva injunction to restrainthe respondent from disposing of
his assets pending the determination of a dispute over the estate of the late
Ikemba of Nnewi, Chief Odumegwu Ojukwu.
1. A strong prima facie case: the applicant must show that there is a good
arguable case that he will succeed at trial.
This was stated in the case of Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Bello (2015)
LPELR-CA/L/1033/2013, where the Court of Appeal held that a Mareva
injunction can be granted to preserve assets, only where the plaintiff has “a
strong prima facie case” and there is a real risk that the defendant may dispose
of the assets.
3. Adequate disclosure: the applicant must make full and frank disclosure
of all material facts, including any facts that are adverse to his case.
4. That he has given full particulars of the assets within the jurisdiction.
In the recent case of Haladu v Access Bank (2021) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1794) 434,
458. the Court of Appeal (Ojo JCA) interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision
(Nnaemeka Agu JSC) in Sotuminu as follows:
“The apex court in the above case has stated clearly the conditions that must be
met for the grant of a Mareva Injunction. In other words, they are pre-
conditions that must be met. To my mind, the conditions are of strict liability. It
follows therefore that an applicant who seeks an order of Mareva Injunction
must place sufficient materials before the court upon which it can exercise its
discretion.”
In the instant case, the applicant’s case failed at the Court of Appeal because it
failed to provide an undertaking as to damages in its application for Mareva
injunction, and did not sufficiently prove that the defendant intends to remove
its asset in Nigerian banks to a foreign country.
The take away of Haladu is that an applicant that wants to obtain a Mareva
injunction in Nigeria has to be thorough, hardworking, and diligent in its case.
All the conditions for the grant of Mareva injunction as stated in Nnaemeka-
Agu JSC’s concurring judgment in Sotuminu must be met. Indeed, this is not an
easy task. As stated by Ojo JCA in Haladu, “solid evidence” must be provided
to succeed in a prayer for Mareva injunction. It is submitted that there is
justice in this approach because if a Mareva injunction is granted without the
right justification, it would cause great hardship to the respondent.
A balance is thus struck between ensuring that a claimant should be able to
reap the fruits of its judgment, and on the other hand the defendant should not
be subjected to great hardship by a wrongful grant of Mareva injunction.
Haladu’s case demonstrates that Nigerian law tilts more towards the side of the
defendant as a matter of evidence and procedure.
Also, taking in cognizance the notable and present case ruled by the court that
granted a Mareva injunction is the case of Ojukwu v. Ojukwu (2010)
LPELR-3809(SC), where the Supreme Court granted a Mareva injunction to
restrain the respondent from disposing of his assets pending the determination
of a dispute over the estate of the late Ikemba of Nnewi, Chief Odumegwu
Ojukwu.
It is pertinent to restate the reasoning behind the Courts granting the order of
Mareva injunction. As stated by Lord Denning, in the MAREVA COMPANIA
NAVIERIA S.A. case: “If it appearsthat the debt is due and owing and there is
a danger that the debtor may dispose of his assets so as to defeat it before
judgment, the Court has jurisdiction in a proper case to grant an interlocutory
injunction so as to prevent him disposing of those assets.”
Sacrosanct in the above dictum is the danger of the debtor disposing of his
assets in order to defeat and be relieved of the judgment. This is the second
precondition in the SOTUMINU Case (supra), that: “There is a real and
imminent risk of the defendant removing his assets from jurisdiction and
thereby rendering nugatory any judgment which the Plaintiff may obtain.”
A Mareva injunction takes effect as soon as it is made and served. It does not
operate as an attachment to the asset. It merely restrains the owner of the asset
from dealing with the assets in a specified manner.
According to Buckley, L. J., in CRETANOR MARITIME CO. LTD. VS.
IRISH MARINE MANAGEMENT LTD W.L.R. 966 AT 974, made this
point very clearly when he stated as follows:
“…..It is, I think, manifest that a Mareva injunction cannot operate as an
attachment. Attachment ’ must, I apprehend, mean a seizure of assets under
some writ or like command or order of a competent authority, normally with a
view to their being realized to meet established claim or held as a pledge or
security for the discharge of some claim either already established or yet to be
established. An attachment must fasten on particular assets…… A Mareva
injunction , however, even if it relates to a particular asset…… is relief in
personam…… All that the injunction achieves is in truth to prohibit the owner
from doing certain things in relation to the asset…..”
A third party that has been given notice of the injunction, if he knowingly assists
in a breach of the order, will be guilty of contempt of court, irrespective of the
defendant’s knowledge of the injunction. A bank must, therefore, dishonour any
cheque or refuse any transfer of money once it has received notice of the
injunction.
If a bank is under an obligation to another party to make payments on behalf of
the defendant, for instance under a bank guarantee, the bank may violate the
injunction and debit the defendant’s account irrespective of notice. The bank
must, however, as far as possible, consider withdrawal of such facilities from
the defendant.
The plaintiff must indemnify any reasonable expense incurred by a third party in
complying with the injunction, and is required to give the court an undertaking
to this effect. These costs can, however, be recovered from the defendant at trial,
if the plaintiff is successful.
It is the duty of the plaintiff to give the third party such information as is needed
to allow it to comply with the injunction. If the plaintiff does not have sufficient
information and is unable to identify the assets of the defendant, he may request
the third party to conduct a search. The cost for this, however, is to be borne by
the plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
The Nigerian landscape shows that the English procedure for grant of Mareva
injunction has been fully adopted and in some areas expanded by statute and
case law. Mareva over the years has simply become a tool of predilection in
debt recovery in Nigeria and seems to have grown from being exceptionally
granted to being liberally granted by the court at the instance of
counsel/recovery agent in proceedings in court. It also nowadays, serves as a
critical means for a creditor to trace assets and gauge the magnitude and nature
of assets available as well as the level of indebtedness to other creditors and the
risk of the defendant not having substantial assets to satisfy the judgment.
However, despite its numerous appeals as a debt recovery instrument, it is also
often abused by creditors and sought to be converted from a preservative order
to one that would help a creditor change his status as a creditor in terms of
priority of interest.
THE ANTON PILLER INJUNCTION
The Anton Piller injunction, just like the Mareva injunction, is an order in
personam. It is addressed to the respondent ordering him to permit the persons
serving the order to enter his premises and do therein all the things which the
order authorizes them to do. Generally applicable in intellectual property cases
(copyright, patent, and passing off), it was established in the oft-cited case of
Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd. [1976] Ch. 65. where it
was first accepted by the English Court of Appeal. It permits a plaintiff to enter
the defendant’s premises to inspect, remove, or make copies of the plaintiff’s
documents necessary for the prosecution of his case.
Consequently, more often than not, upon the enforcement of the order, several
pieces of compromising and incriminating evidence are discovered. The seizure
of that evidence makes the defendant’s job particularly difficult because he is
placed in a position that will be difficult to defend within the scope of imminent
proceedings, thereby making it easier to provide a remedy for the wrongs
suffered.
However, it should be understood that the Anton Piller injunction does not
give the applicant the right to enter upon the premises without the defendant‘s
approval.
As the courts have stated time and again, the order is an injunction requiring the
person in question to allow himself to be subjected to a seizure of some relevant
documents or other evidence in his possession. Therefore, the defendant‘s
refusal to comply with the order and allow the plaintiff and/or his
representatives to enter upon the premises referred to in the order may result in
the defendant being found to be in contempt of court. Lord Denning in his
judgment in the Anton Piller case itself emphasized the
fact that the order is not a search warrant like in criminal cases which would
empower entry into the respondent’s premises without his consent. He stated
that the court has no authority to issue a search warrant in support of a civil
action.
Describing the nature and scope of the Anton Piller relief, he (Lord Denning)
said:
“Let me say at once that no court in this land has any power to issue a search
warrant to enter a man‘s premise in search of documents which are of an
incriminating nature, whether libels or infringements of copyright or anything
else of the kind. No constable or bailiff can knock at the door and demand entry
so as to inspect papers or documents.The householder can shut the door in his
face and say, ’Get out.’ That was established in the leading case of Entick v.
Carrington. None of us would wish to whittle down that principle in the
slightest. But the Order sought in this case is not a search warrant.
It does not authorize the Plaintiffs’ Solicitors or anyone else to enter the
Defendant’s premises against his will. It does not authorize the breaking down
of any doors, nor the slipping in by a back door, nor getting in by an open door
or window. It only authorizes entry and inspection by the permission of the
Defendants. The Plaintiff must get the Defendant‘s permission. But it does do
this: It brings pressure on the Defendants to give permission. It does more. It
actually orders him to give permission with, I suppose, the result that if he does
not give permission, he is guilty of contempt of Court”.
1. Strong prima facie case: The claimant must demonstrate a strong prima
facie case on the merits of their claim. This means that the claimant must
show that there is a high likelihood of success in their case if it proceeds to
trial. The courts will carefully scrutinize the evidence presented by the
claimant to ensure that there is a strong basis for the claim
Similarly, in the case of A.G. Lagos State v. A.G. Federation (2013) LPELR-
CA/L/214/2012, the Court of Appeal held that an Anton Piller injunction can
be granted to preserve evidence, but only in exceptional circumstances where
there is a real risk that the evidence may be destroyed or tampered with.
One notable case where the court granted an Anton Piller injunction is the case
of Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Ibrahim (2016) LPELR-40013(CA), where
the Court of Appeal granted an Anton Piller injunction to search the
defendant's premises for evidence of corruption and money laundering.
4. Potential for serious damage: The claimant must establish that they will
suffer serious damage if the Anton Piller injunction is not granted. This
damage may be in the form of irreparable harm to the claimant's business,
reputation, or financial interests. The courts will weigh the potential harm to
the claimant against the potential harm to the defendant if the injunction is
granted.
CONCLUSION
In the Nigerian context, the courts have also recognized and granted Anton
Piller injunctions, applying similar conditions as those established in English
law. For example, in the case of Nigerian Breweries Plc v. Dumuje (1997) 4
NWLR (Pt. 498) 124, the Nigerian Court of Appeal granted an Anton Piller
injunction to protect the claimant's intellectual property rights, emphasizing the
need for a strong prima facie case and the potential for serious damage.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Mareva injunction and Anton Piller injunction are two types
of interim injunctions that are used in civil litigation to preserve the status quo
and prevent the dissipation of assets or destruction of evidence pending the
determination of a dispute. The conditions for the grant of these injunctions
include a good arguable case.