Lameer, Joep - غير المعلوم يمتنع الحكم عليه) An Exploratory (Ghayr al-maʿlūm yamtaniʿ al-ḥukm ʿalayhi Anthology of a False Paradox in Medieval Islamic Philosophy

An Exploratory (Ghayr al-maʿlūm yamtaniʿ al-ḥukm ʿalayhi) ‫غير المعلوم يمتنع الحكم عليه‬
Anthology of a False Paradox in Medieval Islamic Philosophy

Author(s): Joep Lameer
Source: Oriens , 2014, Vol. 42, No. 3/4 (2014), pp. 397-453
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24801753
REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/24801753?seq=1&cid=pdf-
reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Brill is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Oriens
This content downloaded from

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453 —
ORIENS
BRILL brill.com/orie
‫هيلع نكحا عتمي مولعملا رض‬

(Ghayr aL-maclumyamtanï al-hukm 'atay/ii)
An Exploratory Anthology of a False
Paradox in Medieval Islamic Philosophy
Joep Lameer
Independent Scholar, The Netherlands
joeplameer@yah.oo. com
Abstract
In Islamic philosophy, knowledge is divided into 'conception' (tasawwur) and 'belief'

(tasdïq). While there is no objection to dividing knowledge in this way, problems arose
when belief was described as being 'composed' of conceptions. An early objection to
belief's dependence upon conceptions was based on a self-referential reading of the
principle that 'the unknown cannot be a subject of predication,' which was another way
of saying that 'what is not conceived, cannot be believed.' This objection was answered
in various ways. While Nasïr al-Dïn Tüs! (d. 672/1274) may have been the first to know
how to solve paradoxes of self-reference, it was Siräj al-Dïn Urmawl (d. 682/1283) who
dominated most of the later discussions.
* This article is a much enlarged version of a presentation given at the second workshop of the
Mellon Sawyer Seminar "Rationalist Sciences I: Logic, Physics, Metaphysics, and Theology in
the Post-Classical Period," held on December 3-5,2011 at Washington University in St. Louis,
United States. I should like to thank Asad Ahmed of the University of California at Berkeley,
Tony Street and Riccardo Strobino of Cambridge University, Wilfred Hodges of the Queen
Mary University of London (emer.), and an anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments.
Without the generous practical support and expert advice of Mohammad J. Esmaeili of
the Iranian Institute of Philosophy in Tehran, this article could certainly not have been
written in its present form. I hereby gratefully acknowledge my great indebtedness to him.
Joep Lameer, Independent Scholar, Dennenweg 25, 6891 dl Rozendaal, The Netherlands,
joeplameer@yahoo.com.
© KONINKUJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2014 | DOI: 10.1163/18778372-04203005

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
398 LAMEER
Keywords
Islamic philosophy - paradoxes of self-reference - 'impossible' concepts - ways of

predication
I Introduction
Reading the very first pages of Siräj al-DIn Urmawl's (d. 682/12
compendium the Matäli' al-anwär,11 came across a short passage
completely puzzled. It was about the 'utterly unknown' (al-majh
its incapacity to act as a subject of predication, and the contrad
involved. As I did not understand much of it, I turned to Q
(d. 766/1365) commentary on the Matäli' for some explanation.2
Râzï's commentary confused me even more. But what I did und
the subject was notorious, that it was labelled a 'sophism' (a
and that it had a history. I then decided that the best way for
grip on the problem would be to try and find my way back to t
argument first, and then to see how it had been dealt with amo
and logicians. The present article is a report on my findings, w
in the form of an anthology. Every fragment in the anthology is fi
Arabic, together with an English translation, and then followed
of its major claims and implications. As is clear from the use of
'exploratory' in the title of this article, the anthology presente
means definitive or complete. It merely contains a number
were available to me at the time of research. Nevertheless, I thi
i Siräj al-DIn Urmawl,Matäli'al-anwâr, ed. H.Akkanat, "KadiSiraceddinel-Ü

envâr," vol. 1/3 (PhD diss., Ankara University, 2006). A file of this dissertat
to me by Ihsan Fazlioglu of Istanbul University. The Logic part of the Matä
contained in the margin of Qutb al-Dïn Râzï, Lawämi'al-asrärßsharh Ma
bul: Dar al-tibä'a al-'ämira, 1277/1861), accessed October 20,2013, http://ww
data/arabic/depot/gap.php?file=moi4872.pdf. Although this edition has
here and there, I think its readings are often better than those of Akkanat
2 Qutb al-DIn Räzi is sometimes also referred to as (al-Qutb) al-Tahtäni. T
of the commentary by Qutb al-Dîn Râzî mentioned in the previous note
seen to date. A similar situation obtains for 'All b. Muhammad Juijânï's (al
(d. 816/1413) Glosses on Râzï's Lawämi'al-asrär, of which we possess no mod
The best edition that I have seen so far is al-Sayyid al-Sharif, ai-Hâshiya a
al-Matâli' (Istanbul: Där al-tibä'a al-'ämira, 1277/1861), accessed October 2
-mostafa.info/data/arabic/depot3/gap.php?file=ioo4o86.pdf.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
ghayral-ma'lüm yamtani'al-hukm 'alayhi 399
positions are covered. But as a number of details still need to be investigated, I

shall terminate this article by identifying some areas on which future research
could concentrate.
In this connection and before anything else it is important to refer to two

articles about the paradox, published recently in Iran. The first of these is by
Qarâmalekï and Jâhed, and in English its title can be rendered as "Qutb al-DIn
Râz! on solutions to the majhül mutlaq paradox."3 In the introduction to this
article the authors explain that in the history of Islamic philosophy, the majhül
mutlaq was debated in two different contexts. First, there was the discussion
around Aristotle's Posterior Analytics 1.1 where it is stated that all teaching and
learning is based on things already known, which raised the question of how
one can learn anything one did not already know. Second, there were the more
general introductions to logic, in which the paradox was sometimes mentioned
in a different form in discussions about the conditions for there to be judgments
and predication. The article then continues by focusing on the paradox as
treated in relevant parts of Qutb al-DIn Räzl's commentary on the introductory
part of the Logic of Urmawfs Matäli' al-anwär. The authors conclude that Qutb
al-DIn Räzi does no more than restate and comment upon previous accounts
by earlier thinkers, while the only solution that would seem to be his own is not
much of an improvement on earlier efforts.
The second article is by HojjatI and Sharlfzädeh and in English its title
would be "The paradox of assertions about the majhül mutlaq: an analysis of
'assertion' as a concept."4 This article is much more ambitious than the first
in that it wants to solve the paradox, rather than rest content with an analytic
account of things said about it in the past. As for the past, the authors restrict
themselves to mentioning Sadr al-DIn Shïrâzl (d. 1045/1635) and some of the
later commentators on his work, such as Mollä Hädl Sabzevârî (d. 1289/1873),
'Allämeh Mohammad Hoseyn Tabätabä'I (d. 1360 solar/1981), and Mortadä
Mottaharl (d. 1358 solar/1979). In brief, the authors contend that Sadr al-DIn
Shlräzl's solution, which as they explain is based on a distinction between
two different kinds of predication, does not address the problem, whereupon
they propose a completely new approach to the issue based on a distinction
between (informative) 'assertions' (khabar) and mere 'talk' (sokhan).
3 A.F. Qarâmalekî and M. Jähed, "Qotboddîn Râziva hall-e mo'ammä-ye majhül-e motlaq" Andi
shehä-ye Falsafi 1, no. 2 (1384 solar): 33-46, accessed October 20,2013, http://www.noormags
.com/view/fa/articlepage/92047.
4 Seyyed M.'A. Hojjatï and R. Sharîfeàdeh, "Pârâdoks-e ekhbâr az majhül-e motlaq: tahlil-e maf
hüm-e khabar," Manteq pazhühl 3, no. x (1391 solar): 77-95, accessed October 20,2013, http://
logicalstudy.ihcs.ac.ir/?_action=articleInfo&article=5i4.
0RIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
400 LAMEER
I mention these two articles because someone might ask: "Why do we

any more study of the subject, now that the historical and contemp
counts of the paradox have been dealt with in the two articles afo
tioned?" My answer would be that in spite of its great merit in informin
the existence and some of the contents of many logical texts that remai
far unedited,5 the article on Qutb al-Dïn Räzl shows a complete ignorance
origin of the paradox (which they call 'Type 2', 'Type 1' being connected
totle's Posterior Analytics 1.1, but with roots that go back as far as Plato'
Because of this, the authors, while recognizing that the 'Type 2' paradox
Greek roots and must therefore be an invention by someone from the I
world, see no other way than to imply that 'Type 2' paradoxes must deriv
importance from the relevance that they have for the question whether
have/acquire knowledge at all, because it posits (so they say) the impossi
of propositional knowledge.6 And this brings the reader back to the epi
logical context of the Posterior Analytics and Plato's Meno, even tho
association with Type 1 paradoxes is not made in so many words. Th
association of contexts is, as will be seen, completely mistaken, the o
the paradox being deeply embedded in Islamic philosophy itself without
being any relation to the question of the possibility of having/acquiring
edge at all. I think that the major weakness of this article lies in the fac
the authors expressly state that it is not their intention to give an analysi
paradox as a (logical) problem, their only goal being to investigate Qutb
Râzl's assertions on the subject in relation to the tradition in which he s
Also, their language is not precise and at times clearly mistaken.8 Be
all this, the analyses in this article suffer from distortion and are often
the point, even if the authors are right in contending that Qutb al-DIn
most cases does not much more than rehash information drawn from ea
sources, which seem for the most part to have been correctly identified
The second article being about a new approach to an old problem, one
have expected to find some references to contemporary analyses of para
of self-reference to which the present paradox belongs.9 But we find no
5 Qarämaleki and Jähed, "Qotboddîn Räzi": passim, with the bibliography on pages 4
6 Ibid., 37.
7 Ibid., 34, last paragraph.
8 Cf. e.g. page 38, where in 'Proposition (1)' they replace Urmawfs al-majhül al-mutlaq ('the
utterly unknown') without explanation by har mahküm 'alayhl keh hich tasawwuri az an
nadäshteh bâshlm ('every subject of predication of which we have no conception whatso
ever'), which is absolutely mistaken.
9 Cf. e.g. Thomas Bolander, "Self-Reference," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
GHAYRAL-MA'LÜM YAMTANl'AL-HUKM 'ALAYHI 401
reference whatsoever. Maybe this is because the authors do not know what
the problem really is and that it may be solved quite easily by dealing with it
at the root (see section 11 below, penultimate paragraph). In any case, 1 could
not find any passage in which the problem is formally identified as a paradox
of self-reference. The authors try to find new ways to solve it, while factually
accepting the initial self-referential character of the paradox. And there is no
understanding of the history of the problem. Also, the authors have no direct
knowledge or understanding of Sadr al-Dïn Shlràzî. Their opinions on him are
entirely based on later authors (Sabzevâri, Tabâtabâ'î, Mottaharî).10 This is why
they don't know that for ShlrâzI the majhül mutlaq was an impossible notion,
which had no essence and no referent—it could not even refer to and thus be
predicated of itself—so that their use of the term 'mafliüm' (concept) would
have needed some explanation in this context. There is no proper analysis of
Shlräzl's position. The distinction between two forms of predication in Mollä
Sadrä to deal with the problem that they refer to needs an altogether different
interpretation than the one given by them,11 which is really totally mistaken,
even if they base their assertions on two (!) lines from Mollä Sadrä and some
references to his commentators.
So, even though it is good and most welcome that people take an interest
in the majhül mutlaq paradox and write about it, this does not mean that we
can now put this matter to rest. As we have seen, many issues still need to be
resolved. And it is in an effort towards resolving some of those issues that the
present article was written.12
2013 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta, accessed October 20,2013, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/

fall20i3/entries/self-reference/.
îo Hojjatï and Sharifzàdeh, "Pärädoks-e ekhbär," 82 ff.

11 Also, when they give examples of a) dhàtï / awwali as against b) 'aradi/sinä'l predication,
the predicates of the propositions are not the same: a) ensän heyvân-e nâteq ast, b) Soqräf
ensän ast. In order for there to be a possibility of comparison, the second proposition
should have read: Soqrät heyvân-e nâteq ast. Cf. ibid., 82. The matter seems of no impor
tance, but lies at the basis of a proper distinction between various uses of one and the
same predicate term, which is important for a proper understanding of Mollä Sadrä's use
of the distinction as a way to solve the paradox. See below, section X
12 In view of the fact that this article was written around (and about) a series of quotations
that have for the most part been ordered chronologically, it could hardly be structured
along thematical lines. That is also why it was not practicable to write a preview or a plan of
the article as a kind of vademecum for the reader. Nevertheless, as the account progresses,
it will be noticed that different things 'unfold' in various ways. So, many questions may
find their answer at a later point in the article, even though many others will only be
answered—if at all—after further research.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
402 LAMEER
il Fakhr al-Dïn Räzi (d. 606/1210)
The first mention of the paradox comes in Fakhr al-DIn Räzi. In the
lines of the Introduction to the Logic of the Mulakhkhas, Räzi says the
ing:
‫طملا أكايمب ام قمهو امبدصت عؤمحنا ناكَتاثإ وا يمب هلع ء اذاٍو ارومن لإ‬
‫ثالث هيفف قدصت دغو بكنملاو‬13 ‫ا ةئح ناب يتؤأل\ معلل تاروصت‬-‫هيطو هب موكغاو عذ‬
‫ركخلا كلذ رذعت ةروصتم نك' إ ىم‬
‫ ملا لاقي ال‬-‫ةقداص هتضق كئذ نا ممهرو هتلع عذ ا عنمب هئاي مولعلا رّغ لع مع‬
‫نوك الف مولعم رض هنا هنم مولعم مولعملا رض نإ ملق سلف روصتم رض هيلع موكحناف‬
‫رض هنا هل ضرع يذلا رمألا لزألا نار'بعا هل مولعملا رض لوقتف مولعم رمج هيلع موكحنا‬
‫ف ةمولعماللا يعأ رابمسم اذه يرخ ياخلا مولعم‬1‫يذلا ةتضقلا ق هلع موكغا ناكن‬
‫إزاك ناؤ كشلأ هجوتيف روصتم رض هيلع موكحم هنا ىيح نْ هيلع موكغا ناك لقألا‬
‫ا خصي ال هنا ركلا ناك فاقلا‬-‫ا حُ مولعه دكَ نأل ظذاةَ هلع ملال‬-‫هنوك ولو هيلع متتل‬
‫امولعم‬
‫إيف حيتي ال تألرورضلا ؛ؤ كّكشتلا لوت انأل‬4‫ا‬
"We have a 'conception,'15 and if this conception is subjected to an affir

mative or a negative judgment, then these things together form a 'be
‫ ثالث‬3‫ أ‬instead of ‫ ةثالث‬is a feature of Middle Arabic here.

14 Fakhr al-Dîn Râzî, Mantiq alMulakhkhas, ed. F. Qaramàlekl and A. Asgharinezhad (Teh
ran: Daneshgah-e Sadeq, 1381 solar), 7.5-8.9. In the remainder of this article, lines in
printed editions are separated from page numbers by a dot: e.g. '27.9'; lines in manu
scripts are separated from folio numbers by the word 'Hne(s),' e.g. 'folio 27a, line 9.'
15 This is according to the interpretation given by Najm al-Din Kâtibï Qazwïnï (d. 675/1276)
in his commentary on the Mulakhkhas, entitled al-Munassas fi sharh al-Mulakhkhas. It
may be interesting to note that Kâtibï commented the whole of the Mulakhkhas—logic,
physics, and metaphysics—twice, and that the Munassas is the second, revised 'edition'
of an earlier commentary that seems to have been lost. Regrettable though this is for
our understanding of the development of Kâtibï's thought, the second edition at least
has the merit of being more likely to represent Kâtibï's final positions on key issues in
logic, physics, and metaphysics. In the Munassas, MS Leiden Or. 36 (dated 692/1293),
folio lb, lines 3-14, accessed October 22, 2013, http://www.primarysourcesonline.nl/c55/
do_search.php (subscribers only) Kâtibï tells us about the first and second editions of his
commentary on the Mulakhkhas. On folio lb, lines 20-21 we find his explanation of Ràzï's
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
ghayral-ma'lûm yamtani'al-hukm 'alayhi 403
lief.'16 The difference between the two is like the difference betwee
simple and the composite. In every belief there are three concep
because we know by intuition that, if we have no conception of wha
inna tasawwuran, which Kâtibï interprets as: inna land tasawwuran aw inna fi l-
tasawwuran: 'We have a conception' or 'there is a conception.' Kâtibî's commenta
Râzï's account of the objection may be found on folios lb, penultimate line—2a, line
addition, Kätibi also mentions some other perspectives on the problem which 1 shal
to shortly. On MS Leiden Or. 36 see also J.J. Witkam, Inventory of the Oriental Manus
of the Library of the University of Leiden (16 vols. Leiden: Ter Lugt Press, 2007-2008),
accessed October 20,2013, http://www.islamicmanuscripts.info/inventories/leiden/
.html. Since this publication is still a work in progress, I do not refer to page num
P. Voorhoeve, Handlist of Arabic Manuscripts: In the Library of the University of
and other Collections in The Netherlands. Second Enlarged Edition (The Hague: L
University Press, 1980), 231.
16 'Belief renders the Arabic tasdlq, a term that is usually translated as 'assent,' i.e. t
tional approval of a proposition offered for acceptance. It would seem that tho
translate tasdlq by 'assent' envisage offer and acceptance as taking place, either 1)
the soul of a single individual as in the Stoic theory of 'assent' (sunkatathesis), or
context of instruction or debate. It should however be noted that tasdlq in the p
context is not necessarily intentional or even conscious at all, as is the case of the i
tary and unasserted presence of first principles that are propositional in character.
the same way in which there can be tasdlq without assent (cf. above), there can be
without taçdlq: the contradictory opposite of the proposition to be proven by way
proof per impossibile is taken in as a premise by way of tasHm ('assent,' in the sense
acceptance as a premise in the construction of an argument—from the perspective
student or the opposite party in a debate) or akhdh ('adoption,' here: as a premise—
the perspective of the person constructing the argument), but not on the basis of
(belief). I think that generally speaking the best thing to say is that tasdlq, in its
historical acceptation—next to tasawwur—means 'belief or, given its origin in Aris
Posterior Analytics, also 'conviction' or 'persuasion.' Later, but already as early as Av
tasdlq is also used in the sense of a 'judgment' (syn. 'assertion'), but then always co
to 'belief.' Tasdlq never means 'assent,' even though tasdlq and assent may co-exi
then without being identical. On the origins of tasawwur and tasdiq and the his
their interpretation, see J. Lameer, Conception and Belief in Sadr al-Dln Shiräzu Al-
fi l-tasawwur wa-l-tasdlq (Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy, 2006), esp. chapt
and 2. For a general discussion of the Stoic theory of assent, see D. Baltzly, "Sto
in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta, a
January 5, 2014. http://plato.Stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/stoicism/. On
in logic and philosophy, including a brief discussion of belief vs. 'acceptance' (= ass
see E. Schwitzgebel, "Belief," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 20
tion), ed. E.N. Zalta, accessed January 4,2014, http://plato.stanf0rd.edu/archives/wi
entries/belief/.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
404 LAMEER
judgment, the subject and the predicate represent, then such a

cannot be actualized.17
It makes no sense to say:18
'Did you not predicate the impossibility of being predicated

the unknown [just now], and claim that that is a true propo
But the subject [of this proposition] is something of which
no conception! And if you were to say that the unknown is
to be unknown, so that the subject is not unknown, then w
say: 'the unknown' can be considered in two ways: first, as
that happens to be unknown, and second, the mere consi
viz. 'unknownness.' Now, if the subject in the proposition ju
tioned designates the first, then there is no conception of t
ject in its capacity as a subject, and thus our misgiving stan
the other hand, the subject denotes the second, then the jud
asserting that it cannot be predicated of is false because eve
known can be predicated of, if only to the effect that it is (so
known.'20
Because we say: Doubts raised about things that cannot be other

not even worthy of rebuke."21
17 It seems that in this passage there is an oscillation between hukm as copu

hukm as judgment (assertion). In the remainder of this article, the term
depending on the context—be translated as 'judgment' or as 'predication.'
18 Lâyuqâl, lit. 'It should not be said.'
19 'The impossibility of being predicated-of' (putting the stress on 'predicated
ful here), meaning: 'the impossibility of acting as a subject of predication.'
20 Even though conception of the predicate and the relation is also necessary
be beliefs, I think Räzfs critics focused on the subject term in application of
of parsimony. In other words: the objections involving the subject term mu
considered sufficient for the invalidation of the contested proposition. In th
this article 1 cannot go into the question whether there can in fact be co
the copula or of propositions. The interested reader will find a detailed treat
question in Lameer, Conception and Belief, chapter 2, esp. 25 ff.
21 I understand the pronominal sufrix -hä in Läyuqaahujihä as referring back
Because tashklk is usually treated as masculine, the feminine -hä must then b
as a feature of Middle Arabic, in which a lack of concord of gender is quite
reading fihâ is not a particularity of some manuscript: it is found in all the
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
ghayral-ma'lûm yamtani'al-hukm 'alayhi 405
According to Râzï, every belief is composed of conceptions and identical with a

judgment.22 Now, since conception and belief in Islamic philosophy tradition
ally divide the sphere of knowledge,23 Räzl's opponents must have regarded
it as inadmissible that one member of the division should be dependent on
or defined through the other. And one way for them to attack beliefs depen
dence on conceptions would be to criticize the major implication of Râzï's
assertion—at the end of the first paragraph in the above quotation—that
there can be no judgment (= belief) without conception, embodied in the
statement—contested by them—that 'the unknown cannot be predicated
of.'24 In order to overthrow this rule, they needed to falsify it, and in order to
falsify it, they had to prove its contradictory. But faced with the impossibility
of bringing in some unknown(s) of which something could be asserted, they
focused on the subject term of the principle itself (viz. 'the unknown'), saying
that if: a) it is itself an unknown, then something can be predicated of some
unknown, as in this particular proposition, and if b) the subject of this propo
sition should be known to be unknown, then it is not true that it cannot be
predicated of, since in this capacity the unknown is something known, and
all that is known can be predicated of, if only to the effect that it is (some
thing) known. In the first case there would be a contradiction, allowing for the
inference that the original proposition is false, while in the second case the
proposition would be false. Schematically, the matter can be represented as
follows ('s' = subject, 'P' = predicate):
Mulakhkhas and also in the Kâtibï's Munassas, for which cf. e.g. MS Leiden Or. 36, folio 2a,
line 13.1 find a reading that relates -hä in fihà to al-darüriyyät not satisfactory, also but not
merely because one would have to assume a missing aUatl
22 On belief's being sometimes identified with the judgment, at the latest from Avicenna
onward, see my earlier remarks on belief, six notes back.
23 This is so at least from Fârâbï (d. 339/950-51) onwards, on which cf. Lameer, Conception
and Belief, chapter 2.
24 It might be argued that ghayr al-ma'lüm in the proposition ghayr al-ma'tüm yamtani'
al-hukm 'alayhi is an indefinite name (cp. Aristotle's 'not-man' of de Interpretatione x)
so that the discussion is maybe about indefinite names rather than about the division of
knowledge. This is a valid objection; only, it finds no support in any logical work in Arabic
that I know of.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
4o6 LAMEER
ghayr al-ma'lüm yamtani'al-hukm 'alayhi
s in this sentence is either of 1 or 2 below:
/ \
1 2
ghayr ma'lüm ma'lüm bi-l-lä-ma'lümiyya
Predication said to be impossible, but Predication said to be impossible, but it is

the impossibility of being predicated generally possible for what is ma'lüm to be
of is predicated of s predicated of, if only to the effect
that it is (something) ma'lüm
I 4
Contradiction Falsehood
It may be useful to spell out the reason

falsehood. In case of the contradiction
unknown represented by the subject of t
of, since it is predicated of the impossibi
unknown can be predicated of, while the
predicated of. And these are contradictor
the contested proposition must be und
a universal statement at one and the sa
of the resulting contradiction is claimed
proposition (the contested proposition) m
The falsehood (case 2) comes about wh
of the subject of the contested proposi
assertion that some known (i.e. S in th
known, but under consideration of its be
predicated of, which is false because in f
of, if only to the effect that it is (somet
hood and contradiction. The suggestion
proposition must be false as well. But i
ORIENS 42 (2014) 3

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
GHAYR AL-MA'LÜM YAMTANl'AL-HUKM 'ALAYHI 407
hood of'Some known cannot be predicated of' could allow for the conclusion
that the original, contested proposition 'The unknown cannot be predicated of
is false because their subjects are not the same. For this second objection, the
contested proposition need only be read as an individual (singular) statement.
Interestingly, Râzï does not answer the criticism, saying only that he is not
going to quarrel about things that cannot be otherwise. But he could have
answered it. This is because the opponents built their case on a paradox of
self-reference. They did this by giving an individual, self-referential reading
to the subject of the statement 'The unknown cannot be predicated of.' This
was possible because the proposition—which in ordinary, informal Arabic
can certainly be understood as a universal statement25—has no universal
quantifier so that the subject's scope of reference is open to interpretation.
And on an individual reading, 'The unknown cannot be predicated of' provided
the opponents exactly with what they needed, although the contradiction that
they allude to26 implies that they read this very same proposition also as a
universal statement. This is also why I call the ensuing paradox a 'false' paradox:
it is based on a double (individual & universal) reading of the definite article in
the contested proposition and also, it was forced upon Räzl, who certainly did
not understand the proposition in terms of an individual statement. The way
out of a paradox of this kind consists in a complete refusal of any self-reference
by introducing hierarchies of discourse.27 In the present case, this would mean
that 'the unknown' would not be allowed to be itself a member of the set
of individual unknowns of which the impossibility of being predicated-of is

asserted. In other words: the subject term of the contested proposition would
not be allowed to be understood as an individual unknown, effectively barring
the opponents from generating the contradictions that they were after.28
25 Abü Nasr Fârâbi discusses a similar use of the definite article in the context of rhetoric
in his Kitäb al-Qiyäs ai-saghlr, ed. M. Türker, "Färäbl'nin bazi mantik eserleri," Revue
de la Faculté de Langues, d'Histoire et de Géographie de l'Université d'Ankara 16 (1958):
274.4-275.9, a passage that may also be found in R. Al-'Ajam, al-Mantiq 'inda l-Fârâbï (3
vols. Beirut: Dar al-mashriq, 1985-86), vol. 2,52.16-54.1, where it is included in Färäbi's later
version of the Kitäb al-Qiyäs al-saghlr, entitled the Kitäb al-Mudkhal ilä l-qiyâs. See also
J. Lameer, Al-Färäbl & Aristotelian Syllogistics: Greek Theory & Islamic Practice (Leiden:
Brill, 1994), 186-88 (with pages 13-19 on the relation between the two treatises).
26 The allusion can be distilled from the phrase "... then there is no conception of this subject
in its capacity as a subject, and thus our misgiving stands..."
27 On hierarchies of discourse as a way to preclude vicious self-reference, see Bolander,
"Self-Reference."
28 Someone may think that it would have been useful to bring in the distinction between
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
4o8 LAMEER
The oblique objection against belief's dependence upon conception

we find in Räzl's Mulakhkhas was picked up by a number of later w
who included it in their discussions on the subject matter of logic. Now
though this would appear to confirm recent accounts on the influence of
Mulakhkhas in Islamic philosophy,29 there is also an important differenc
where Räzl rejected the objection out of hand as irrelevant, we shall s
all later writers tried to deal with it in some way. In the pages to follow
quote, translate, and discuss a number of passages from their works in an
to reconstruct a discussion that appears to have had a special relevance du
the 7th/i3th century, but which kept on being commented upon well in
nth/ 17th century.30
111 Athîr al-Dïn Abhari (d. 663/1264)
The first text from the time after Fakhr al-DIn Räzi that I should like to
is from Athîr al-Dïn Abhari's Tanzll al-afkärfi ta'dll al-asrär, in which w

the following:
‫ ال‬.‫قلطم لوهجلا نم ءيق ال نأكأ راتعاب موطم هيلع موكحم يكذا ايوق قدص ول لاقب‬
‫اقلطم ألوهحم نأةَنإ ةتضقئا هذه ق هيلع موكحماف قدص وئ هنأل بذاكءوهو هيلع موكب‬
‫مولعم لكَنأل هتضقلا بذك منل رابتعاب امولعم نأكناٍو قدصلا لع نيصشلا أّامجا منل‬
‫رابتعاب امولعم هنوك هيلع موكحم وهف رابتعاب امولعم هنوك هيلع موكحم وهف رابتعاب‬
de re and de dicto modalities here as there is question of necessity (in the form of an
impossibility) and a confusion about scope. However, the confusion is not about the scope
of a necessity operator while a self-referential interpretation of the subject term cannot
be equated with a de re reading of the contested proposition. 1 think we can only guess as
to how Râzï's opponents would have construed their objection in case they should have
wanted it to reflect the de re and de dicto distinction.
2g See for instance H. Eichner, "Dissolving the Unity of Metaphysics: from Fakhr al-Dln
al-Râzî to Mullâ Sadrä a\-Shitàz\" Medioevo 32 (2007): 139-197.
30 While Sabzeväri's statements on the paradox may still be believed to have been made
on the basis of the worldview that they profess to represent, he was a commentator of
Sadr al-Dïn Shîrâzî who did not develop any personal opinion on the matter. And I think
that this may in fact apply to all of Sadrâ's successors from before Mollä Had! Sabzeväri's
time. On the other hand, recent scholars like Ällämeh Tabâtabâ'î and Mortadä Mottahari
mentioned in the Introduction also commented upon Mollä Sadrä, but they did not have
the corresponding worldview any more.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
GHAYRAL-MA'LÜM YAMTANÏAL-HUKM 'ALAYH1 409
‫مَلاأ هلوق امأو ةنضتلا بذك مزل رابتعاب امولعم ناةَول هنا رثم ال لومن أئأل‬
‫لا نم انرد ام بذك هنم مزلي هئاب ملق ريف طلق راتعاب انولمْ هتوك؛ هيط موكحم‬
‫حم وهف رابتعاب مولعم لذو راتعاب مولعم ةيضقلا هذه ق هيلع موكحمأ كثِوق نأل‬
‫رابتعاب امولعم هنوك هيلع موكي ةتضقلا هذه ق هيلع موكغا نأ جني راتعاب احمولعم هنوك‬
‫وجل ال كلذو‬-‫عوصولا ي اهفالخإل هيط موكومب ظطم لوهحنا س ءيق ال اتلم بذكبح‬31
"It makes no sense to say:
'If it were true to say that everything predicated of is known in

some sort of manner, then none of the things utterly unknown
can be32 predicated of, which is false. This is because, if this were
to be true, and then, if the subject33 of this proposition were to
be (something) utterly unknown, then it would follow that two
contradictory statements are true at one and the same time. And if
the subject were to be known in some sort of manner, then it would
follow that the proposition is false because its being known in some
sort of manner is predicable34 of everything known in some sort of
manner, so that its being known in some sort of manner would be
predicable of it (i.e. the subject).'
This is because we say that we do not concede that the proposition would
be false if its subject were to be known in some sort of manner. And as for
his contention that its being known in some sort of manner is predicable
of everything known, we ask:35 why do you say that the proposition that
we have mentioned implies a falsehood? This is because your statement
that (a) the subject in this proposition is known in some sort of manner,
and that (b) its being known in some sort of manner is predicable of
everything known in some sort of manner, brings on the conclusion that
31 This fragment is included in Naçïr al-Dïn Tüsi's (d. 672/1274) Ta'dll al-miyârfinaqd tanzll
al-afkâr, ed. 'A. Nüräni in Manteq va mabàheth-e alfäz, ed. M. Mohaghegh and T. Izutsu
(Tehran: McGill University, Institute of Islamic Studies, Tehran Branch 1353 solar/1974),
143.2-12.
32 'Can be predicated of renders the Arabic ... mahküm 'alayhi, lit. 'are predicated of.' But I
think the context requires the proposed reading.
33 'Subject' is another rendering of mahküm 'alayhi.
34 'Predicable' renders mahküm, lit. 'predicated.' In this case, too, the context seems to
impose this modification.
35 'qulna', lit. 'we say.'
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
410 LAMEER
(c) its being known in some sort of manner is predicable of the subj
this proposition. But this is not a falsification of our statement that
of the things utterly unknown can be predicated of because their su
are not the same."
The above quotation begins with the words "It makes no sense to say
lowed by an account the first part of which is incontestably inspired
account as we find it in Fakhr al-DIn RäzI. However, there is also a diffe
which is the fact that the contested proposition now has universal quant
tion.36 This is not an insignificant detail because the subject of a proposi
thus formulated is not usually understood as being (potentially) self-refe
at all. After all, the subject now is: la shay'min al-majhülmutlaqan, i.e. 'n
the things that are utterly unknown.' In fact, were it not for Râzï's acco
the Mulakhkhas, it would have been very difficult if not impossible for
understand how the opponent could have come forward with his obje
It thus seems that at some point, someone replaced the article as we find
Râzï by a universal quantifier, without noticing that by changing—or m
'correcting'—the wording at this point, the whole objection loses its
We find a similar 'unwarranted' introduction of a universal quantifier in
Munassas by Abhan's contemporary Najm al-DIn Kätibl, who changes
ghayr al-ma'lümyamtani' al-hukm 'alayhi into kullu mä laysa bi-ma'lü
tani' al-hukm 'alayhi.37 Apparently Kätibl, too, was not aware of any adv
consequence that this change of wording might have for the objection ag
RäzI
In his answer, Abhari only addresses the second objection, which is the
case in which the being unknown of the subject of the contested proposition
is assumed to be known. Now even though Abhari is right in pointing out
that the second objection (in its original phrasing) does not apply because of
a difference in subject terms (see my analysis in the previous section), it is
also true that this objection loses its sense in case the contested proposition
is given a universal quantifier. One gains the impression that Abhari was not
aware of the context in which the discussion around conception, predication
and 'the unknown' had first arisen, or of the importance of the use of the
definite article in that regard. It is even possible that his observation on the
distinction between the 'absolute unknown' and what is 'known in some sort
36 Another difference is the absence of any explicit reference to necessity, which is however
clearly understood.
37 Kätibl, al-Munaçsas, MS Leiden Or. 36, folio lb, last line.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
of manner' was not his own, but rather a trace from an unidentified source
in which the contested proposition still had no universal quantifier, and in
which a counterargument pointing out this distinction had some real logical
significance.
iv Nasïr al-DIn Tüsl (d. 672/1274)
In his commentary on the TanzU al-afkär, Naslr al-DIn Tüsl has the following
comment on the above passage by Abharl:
‫هدحو ةظفللا ْذه لولدم لقألا نمو لع دجوي اقلطم لوهجلا لا كلذ ى ققحتلا لولا‬
‫ ال يأنلا هجولاو اقلط ألوهحم هنوك هقاحم عم هلولدم قاثلاو‬.‫نأل ائلطم الوهجم نوك‬
‫فصولا كلذ ثيح نم امولعم نوك مولعم رمأب فوصولاو مولعم رما ةتلوهتئاب فاحتالا‬
‫ اصِ نص هيلع موكحين اقلطم لوهحنا نه ء يحم ال انلوق ق هيلع موكحناف‬١ ‫هيلع إكل؛ا| عإنتّه‬
‫ا ثح نمو لزألا هجولاب ذوحاملا وه‬-‫قائلا هجولاب ذؤخاملا م هلع ملا عاسءاب هيط ملتل‬
‫ئصولل ي اهفالتخا نْ دارملا م كلذو‬38
"The fact of the matter is that 'the utterly unknown' exists in two ways:
firstly, as the mere referent of this term, and secondly, as the referent, plus
its qualification as an 'utterly unknown.' And in the second sense, it is not
an 'utterly unknown' because its qualification as something unknown is
something known, while a thing qualified by something known will be
known under that aspect. Therefore, insofar as it cannot be predicated
of, the subject in the statement that 'none of the things utterly unknown
can be predicated of' is taken in the first sense, while insofar as the
impossibility of anything being predicated of it is predicated of it, it is
taken in the second sense. And this is what is meant by their subjects not
being the same."
In the above fragment, we see that Tüsl displays the same sort of lack of con
textual awareness as Abhari, the only difference being that he understands
Abharl's words in his own, special way. For instead of talking of two different
subjects in two different propositions, Tüsl wants us to regard the subject of
one and the same proposition under two different aspects at one and the same
time: under one aspect the subject term is a particular utterly unknown which
38 Nasïr al-Dïn Tûsî, Ta'dä al-mi'yâr, 143.13-18.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
412 LAMEER
cannot be predicated of, while under the other aspect it is this same
lar, but now 'known to be unknown' (please note that he does not say 'k
to be utterly unknown') which according to him allows for the impossib
of its being predicated-of to be predicated of it. Passing over the unwar
individual reading of the subject term of the contested proposition in it
scription by Abharl, I think we cannot but reject this analysis by Tüsi.
because it treats the utterly unknown as an individual that is both an ut
unknown and a known at one and the same time, resulting in the implic
tion that:
- The impossibility of its being predicated-of, qua utterly unknown,

- is predicable of the individual utterly unknown,
- qua known to be unknown.39
I think that Tùsî's interpretation originates in an undue conflation of two

things: 1) the 'utterly unknown' in the strict sense, in which case it can nei
ther be circumscribed nor designated because it is completely outside of our
consciousness and/or range of perception, and 2) the 'utterly unknown' in the
everyday usage of this term, where we can say that so-and-so is utterly unknown
to us and that we cannot possibly say anything more about it than that we just
don't know. But in all fairness to Tüsi it must also be said that the combined
self-referential and universal reading of the subject term and the amalgama
tion of known and unknown unknowns is already present in the objections
raised against Râzî with which the whole discussion begins.40
39 This criticism of a solution along the lines suggested by Tüsi is also found (in different
words) in Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hillî's (d. 726/1326) al-Asräral-khaftyyafiL-hilüm al-'aqliyya
(Qom: Markaz al-'ulüm wa-l-thaqäfa al-islämiyya—Markaz ihyä' al-turäth al-islâmî, 1387
solar/1430. Second printing), 13.9-11.
40 iusis solution is also tound in Qutb al-Uin ishirazis (d. 710/1310) Uurratal-laj (without
source reference), where it is even described as an 'elegant solution' (hall-e nîkù) and
'extremely beautiful' (fighäyatal-husn). Qutb al-Dïn Shïrâzi calls the problem a 'sophism'
(moghälateh), which we might, with some leniency, translate as 'paradox.' But he uses
no universal quantification like Abhari or Tûsï but the 'correct' proposition: at-majhül
mutlaqan yamtani' al-hukm 'alayhi. Even though one might be tempted to read Qutb
al-Dîn Shïrâzi as if he separates universal concepts from the individuals to which these
concepts refer [which would make him the first Muslim writer on record to actually
envisage a solution to the paradox according to modern insights], in fact he follows Tüsl in
emphasizing two different aspects of one and the same individual thing. Cf. Qutb al-Din
Shîrâzî, Durrat al-Täj li-'Izzat al-Dabbäj, ed. Seyyed M. Meshkät and H. Meshkän Tabasï
(5 parts in 2 vols. Tehran: Vezärat-e Farhang, 1317-1324 solar), vol. 1, part 2, 13.15-14.4.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
GHAYRAL-MA'LÜM yamtanïal-hukm 'alayhi 413
In spite of its shortcomings, Tüsl's explanation of Abharl is important in

that he makes a distinction between names and their referents, which as we
have seen is key to the solution of paradoxes involving the self-reference of
terms. But because the distinction is presented in the form of two regards on
one and the same individual, the paradox is not (yet) solved.41 Interestingly,
in his critical commentary on Fakhr al-DIn Räzfs Kitäb al-Muhassal called
the Talkhls al-Muhassal, Tùsl also distinguishes between universals and their
referents, this in a similar discussion on the impossibility of something's being
predicated-of. He does this in a passage in which he takes issue with Fakhr
al-DIn Räzl in the matter of the absolute nonexistent, and of which Räzl says
that we can have no conception of it, which means that there can be no belief
or judgment regarding it. Briefly, Tùsl effectively claims against Räzl that 1) we
can have a conception of the absolute nonexistent42 and also, that 2) when
we say that the absolute nonexistent cannot be predicated of, the predication
of the impossibility regards the conception, while the impossibility of the
According to Modarres Radavi, there is a manuscript containing a small set of five fawä'id
or 'useful sayings' (i.e. 'quotes' or 'citations') ascribed to Tüsl, the fourth of which concerns
a report by Najm al-Dïn Abü Bakr Muhammad Nakhjawânî (d. after 626/1229), saying
that Tüsi had written something on the majhüt mutlaq paradox (Nakhjawânî calls it a
'sophism,' mughälata) and in which he condoned the use of the proposition embodying
it. I have not yet seen the fä'ida in question, so that I do not know any further details
about the account that it contains. But it would seem that this account cannot be much
different from what was stated in the Ta'dll al-mi'yâr and may even be identical with
it. Cf. M.T. Modarres Radavi, Ahwäl-o äthär-e ... Mohammad b. ... al-fûsl molaqqab beh
Khwâjeh Naslroddln (Tehran: Däneshgäh-e Tehran, 1334 solar), 305.1 owe this reference
to a personal communication by Reza Pouijavady of Berlin.
4i And the same goes for Tüsi's handling of the Liar paradox elsewhere in the Ta'dll al-mi'yâr.
instead of dismissing self-reference—which he in this case even explicitly mentions as the
Liar paradox's main characteristic—he fully accepts it, focusing instead on the idea that
self-referent propositions could be true or false, which is something that he emphatically
denies. Cf. Nasîr al-Dîn Tüsl, Ta'dil al-mi'yâr, 235.15-237.19; A. Alwishah and D. Sanson,
"The Early Arabic Liar: The Liar Paradox in the Islamic World from the Mid-Ninth to
the Mid-Thirteenth Centuries CE," Vivarium 47 (2009): 97-127, esp. U3ff. It seems that
Alwishah and Sanson did not realize that Tüsi did not deal with the paradox at the root.
For an exposition of various solutions to the Liar paradox in the Latin Middle Ages roughly
around Tûsï's time, see R. Strobino, "Truth and Paradox in Late xivth Century Logic: Peter
of Mantua's Treatise on Insoluble Propositions,'"Documenti e studi sulla tradizionefilosofica
medievale 23 (2012): 475-519.
42 This is of course open to debate. As we shall see later in Section x on Sadr al-Dïn Shîràzi,
the latter regarded the absolute nonexistent and the absolute unknown as empty labels
that (can) have no definition and no referent.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
414 LAMEER
predication concerns the absolute nonexistent itself.43 However, beca

referent is in this case the absolute nonexistent, there is in fact nothing o
nothing can be predicated, a circumstance that given the logical pers
from which TusI develops his argument, is not sufficiently explained. B
case we apply the approach of the Talkhls al-Muhassal to the paradox
ing the utterly unknown whose objective existence is countenanced by T
would—on condition that it be phrased in a way that it can be read as an
vidual statement—effectively have disarmed it by applying a kind of hie
of discourse as is now customary in logico-philosophical discussions
paradoxes of self-reference. But I am not sure if Tüsl had already writte
Talkhls al-Muhassal when he wrote his commentary on Abhari. This is be
if this had been the case, one would have expected him to make a clearer
aration between the majhül mutlaqan as a mere concept and the ind
utterly unknowns to which this concept refers. So, even though Tüsl see
have had the right intuition, comparable to the modern approach to
paradoxes of self-reference, he may never have gotten round to writing
the real solution to 'Räzl's paradox', which he certainly must have been a
as is shown by his account in the Talkhls al-Muhassal.
v Siräj al-Dïn Urmawi (d. 68a /1283)
In his philosophical compendium the Matäli' al-anwär, Tüsfs contem

Siräj al-Dîn Urmawi proposes to take an entirely different angle on t
ject:44
43 Nasïr al-Dîn Tûsï, Talkhïs al-Muha?sal: With Thirty Philosophical and Theological Treatises,
ed. A. Nürärn (Tehran: McGill University, Institute of Islamic Studies, Tehran Branch, in
Collaboration with Tehran University, 135g solar/1980), 29.6-30.9, with 391.14-17.
44 An account similar to Urmawi s is also round in Aidai al-L)in Khunaji s (d. 040/1240) Kashj
al-asrär 'an ghawâmid al-ajkâr, ed. Kh. El-Rouayheb (Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philos
ophy & Institute of Islamic Studies—Free University of Berlin, 1389 solar), 9.10-10.5. If I
quote from Urmawi rather than from Khünaji, this is because contrary to El-Rouayheb,
I do not believe that Urmawï's Matäli' is "... clearly indebted to Khünaji's Kashf" (ibid.,
English Introduction, xxiv). It seems that El-Rouayheb infers this from Veliyüddin Cärul
läh Efendï's (d. 1151/1739) remark that the Matäli' is an epitome of Khünaji's Kashf, a matter
referred to on page vi of the English Introduction, with note 10. Comparing the two texts,
it is incontestably true that many passages from the Matäli' can be found—sometimes
almost literally—in Khünaji's Kashf. But given that in the Kashf passages identical with
or similar to the Matäli' are surrounded by text that can been seen as supplements to and
amplifications of the passages that the two texts have in common, I deem it much more
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
ghayral-ma'lümyamtani'al-hukm 'alayhi 415
‫ا ليق نإف‬-‫هجلا قدص ام هجو هنوص ضدسلا ول ءيثلا لع متل‬

‫و صقانت ةلطم ألوهحم مَنإ هتف هلع موكغا لأل بذاةَوهو هلع‬
ْ‫تف هلع مخلا نك؛هحو نم مولعم دكو هحو ن‬
‫انتمال ةتجناح اهقدص عنمب ةتضقلا هذه اتلق‬۶ ‫ؤاخلا ق اموصوم‬
‫ك« ةقيقح اهقدصو احمدقل احمونل هُآعتمبذ هحو نم مولعم‬
"And if it should be said:
'If for something to be predicated-of were to cal

conceived in some sort of manner, then it would [al
say] that 'the utterly unknown cannot be predica
false. This is because if the subject in the latter [pro
likely that the Kashf is an extensive adaptation of the text of the

that must have involved more sources than just the Matâli'—tha
so sparingly (but then still most coherently) have borrowed from a
the Kashf. Future research will have to determine whether my hy
that it is more likely that both drew upon some common source. E
only modern author to believe that Urmawi drew upon Khunajî: a
in Qaràmalekï and Jähed, "Qotboddin Real" 40, while L. Marlow, "A
Scholar in the Eastern Mediterranean: Siräj al-Dîn Urmavï, Juris
Al-Masäq 22, no. 3 (2010): 283-289 presents Urmawi more genera
lower of Khünaji, who is even described as Urmawi's older 'relati
and 'relative.' Likewise, Veliyüddin Cärulläh Efendi may not hav
cal author to have believed that Urmawi copied Khunajî. This is
Samarqandi (fl. second half 7th/i3th cent.) connects what I con
account of the paradox with Khünaji, whom he refers to as Sâhi
of the Kashf). Cf. Shams al-Dïn Samarqandi, Sharh al-Qistâs, MS
(ca. 800/1397), folio 9a, lines 37ff., accessed 20 October, 2013, http
.mpg.de/MPIWG:YWNFHB9H. On this manuscript, cf. W. Ahlwardt
bischen Handschriften der Königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin (10 vols
1887-1899), vol. 4,468. The catalogue says that the name of the auth
clear from the Preface on folio lb, lines 8-26, this is the commenta
self. To date, there exists no edition of this work. For manuscripts of
Iran, cf. M. Derâyatï, Fehrestväre-ye dastneveshthä-ye Iran (12 vols
müzeh va markaz-e asnäd-e majles-e shürä-ye eslämi, 1389 solar), v
45 Urmawï, Matäli'al-anwär, 4.17: mutlaqan.
46 Ibid., 4.18: fa-kadhaba.
47 Ibid., 5.2: fa-namna'.
48 Ibid., 4.16-5.3 = Qutb al-Dïn Râzî, Lawâmï at-asrär, 18, margin.
49 'To call for' (istad'ä), i.e. 'to require.'
0RIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
4i6 LAMEER
be utterly unknown, it [i.e. this proposition] would be contradic

and false; and in case it [i.e. the subject of that proposition] shou
be known in some sort of manner, and given that everything kno
in some sort of manner can be predicated of, it [i.e. the proposit
would be false too,'
we would say:
This proposition cannot be true on an externalist reading sinc

subject can have no external existence. This is because everyt
having external existence is known in some sort of manner. The
fore, the proposition cannot be [validly] entailed by [what is
sented as] its antecedent. On an essentialist reading its truth is h
ever possible without there being any kind of contradiction."
The above account by Urmawi needs some discussion. First of all, it

that the first part of the account, from "And if it should be said ..." until
would be false too", reproduces the account of Fakhr al-DIn Râzï discussed
lier. Urmawi's use of the expression istad'ä ('to call for', i.e. 'to require') i
opening sentence expresses a necessity-relation between a subject and its
icate and not between the antecedent of an implication and its conse
the phrase tasawwurahu bi-wajhin mä (('... its being) conceived in som
of manner') is a complex term, and not a proposition, which is also
from the fact that after transposition of the sentence parts, the opposite
ceived in some sort of manner' is represented by the (complex) term 'the u
unknown' (al-majkül al-mutlaq) and not by some proposition.
In his answer, Urmawi intimates that the opponents present the conte
proposition as the consequent of some antecedent, using the terms
(entailment) and muqaddam (antecedent). What is meant are the prop
(I rephrase for the sake of clarity and simplicity): 'The thing predic
must be conceived in some sort of manner' ('antecedent') and 'The
unknown cannot be predicated of ('consequent'). These propositions ar
antecedent and consequent insofar as the opponents say 'If it is true
(antecedent), then it is (should) also (be) true to say (consequent).' Th
then..." construction rests on a logical operation called 'contraposition', w
is an operation in which s and P change places and are negated: 'All s
-*■ 'All non-p are non-s.' Roughly speaking, this is the background of U
account.50
50 In this connection it is interesting to note that Katibî in his Munassas also d
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
ghayral-ma'lûm yamtani' al-hukm 'alayhi 417
Urmawl's answer to the paradox turns on a distinction betw

(khärifi) and 'essentialist' (haqlql) propositions.51 Further on
distinction is explained as follows:
‫ انلوقو‬٢ ‫ب ج‬... ‫ةميقلا بسحب ةرات معي دق‬52 ‫يحب وه احم دةَيأ‬
‫اكل جؤاخلا ي دجو ول اٍجب وهف ج ناكأ‬1‫ولأ بسحب ةراتو ب ن‬

‫لئاه قرف اميو جاحلا ي ب هيلع قدص ج هلع ةلاص جياخلا ي دحو‬
١^١^ ‫نود ضملا اذه كئم كلشدكَقدص كنا‬
"Our statement 'Every j is a b' ... is sometimes understood

essence, that is to say: 'Everything which, were it to exist
be a j, would be, insofar as it were to exist externally, a b';
the above argument from the Matäli', even though he does not m
its author by name (cf. Kätibi, at-Munassas, MS Leiden Or. 36, folio 2
where Urmawi does not challenge the validity of the contraposition it
because he interprets the contested proposition as an affirmation rat
(ibid., lines 26-28). Nevertheless he also gives his own interpretation
involved in case one would accept the contraposition and adopt an
(ibid., lines 28-30). I shall refer to this latter point shortly in the sect
Samarqandi. It is further important to note that in his commentar
al-asrär, Kätibi spends more than 2000 words (against ca. 500 wor
on Urmawi's account and solution, Khûnajî's observations, and his
matter. Even though more refined and elaborate, it does not seem to
in the finality of its judgments. There are some similarities betwe
of the Munassas and the commentary on the Kashf al-asrär that
the latter may have been written after the former, since some of th
appear to have been 'copy-pasted' into the text of the latter. Furth
Munassas and the commentary on the Kashf al-asrär and their interr
needed, and editions would be much welcomed. Cf. Najm al-Din
al-asrär, MS Tehran, Majles 1505, folios 9b, line 3-i2b, line 20. This ma
only contains the commentary on the first seven chapters, with cha
syllogistic missing. See also A.H. Hä'erl, Fehrest-e ketäbkhäne-ye majl
vol. 4 (Tehran: Chäpkhäne-ye Majles-e Shürä-ye Mellî, 1335 solar), 2
of this work in Iran, cf. Deräyati, Fehrestväreh, vol. 10,222-23.
5i On the 'externalist' and 'essentialist' readings of propositions, see a

and Islamic Philosophy of Language and Logic," in The Stanford Encycl
(Winter 2013 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta, accessed May 14, 2014, http://
archives/win2oi3/entries/arabic-islamic-language/.
52 Urmawî, Matâlï al-anwär, 30.14: al-haqlqiyya.
53 Ibid., 30.13-18 = Qutb al-Dïn Eâzï, Lawämi'al-asrâr 8g, margin.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
4i8 LAMEER
is understood according to external existence, that is to say: 'Of every

of which j is true externally, B is true externally.' And there is a diffe
between the two inasmuch as, if the only figure to exist were to be
triangle, then 'All figures are triangles' would be true in the latter s
and not in the former."
So, while externalist propositions make assertions about things that have
existence (in the past, present, or future), essentialist propositions make
tions about things concerning which the mere positing of the existence
subject suffices to assert the relation with the predicate. In this connectio
further important to emphasize that the subject terms in externalist an
tialist propositions for Urmawl—who follows Avicenna in this regard—r
something having/receiving actual, external existence, at some point in t
Thus, impossible notions are not part of the universe covered by externa
essentialist propositions. Indeed, according to Urmawï, the only thing on
say about impossible notions such as the void is that the void as existent
mind cannot possibly exist in the outside world.55
54 Urmawï, Matäli' al-amvär, 30.7-9 = Qutb al-Dîn Râzî, Lawämi' al-asrär, 87, margin,
to 22.
55 Urmawi, Matali' alamvar, 114.913. Because the philosophical part of the Mat
to the best of my knowledge never been published before (covering pages 113
Akkanat's edition) it may be helpful to quote the passage in question, which was
from the section on'existence' (•wujud ١ as a separate subject among the 'General Pri
of Philosophy' {umiir ‫أ‬dmma) (I am not sure if the Arabic is entirely grammat
would prefer to read huwa alkhala' instead of wa-huwa aikhala' as in the edition
here):
... ‫عتمم هئاي فوصوملا ناي هنع بجوي ئقو متتحم ءالخلا لوقت اكزثاج مودعملا مودعملا فصوو‬
‫جباخلا ي ءالخ ال هئاف جباخلا ق ختمث هناي هيلع موكغا نهذلا ي دوجولا ءالخلا وهو جتأخلا ي‬
‫يهذلا دوجوملا لع مم وهو هيف عتمث هلاب فصوي فيكف‬...
It is permissible to predicate the nonexistent of the nonexistent, as when you

say 'The void is impossible,' of which it might be said that what is qualified as
impossible—externally—is the void existent in the mind, which is said to be
impossible externally. But there is no void in the outside world. So how can one
qualify it as being impossible in it? This, now, is something in which recourse is
had to mental existence."
At the end of the quotation, the Arabic has al-mawjùâ aidhihm, i.e. 'the mental(ly)
existent,' which I thought was better to translate as 'mental existence.'
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
Now if we look at Urmawl's answer we see that he says that, because

unknowns cannot possibly have external existence, the contested propo
('the utterly unknown cannot be predicated of) cannot be true on an ex
ist reading.56 But on an essentialist reading, he believes its truth to be
without there being any contradiction. The question then is of course
'utterly unknown' actually stands for. While Urmawl does not address
others did, as will become clear in section x below.
Urmawl's reasoning must have been that, since the adversary interpr
subject of the contested proposition two times as an individual, ac
of the 'utterly unknown', the best way to deal with him is to say that
unknowns can have no actuality because everything that exists is k
some sort of manner. This seems like an extravagant claim to make. On
rather think that some things are known to some and utterly unknow
ers, some of the time, or all of the time; that some things are known
and some utterly unknown to all, some or all of the time. And then th
of course also the distinction between things we know we don't know,
called 'known unknowns', versus the completely and truly, utterly unk
the legendary 'unknown unknowns.'57 But leaving aside the casuistry a
what are the known or unknown unknowns, and when and to who
are whatever they are, one thing is clear: Urmawl forcefully blocks th
sary's attempt to let the subject in the contested proposition have r
to something in the real world, including itself. So, interestingly, by
the subject of the contested proposition the possibility of referrin
thing having actuality, including itself, at any point in time, the prob
self-reference, which lies at the root of this paradox, is effectively so
well.
According to Urmawl, an essentialist reading of the contested proposition is

possible without involving us in any contradiction. However, on his own under
standing of the subject terms of essentialist and externalist propositions, this
should not be possible. After all, for him the utterly unknown cannot—ever—
have external existence, so that it is not a viable concept to be used in khäri
jiyya or haqlqcyya propositions. This being so, the only explanation that I can
think of comes from the fact that essentialist propositions are phrased with the
56 It deserves to be noted that he does not say that the contested proposition is false on
an externalist reading, but only that it cannot be true. Khünaji does say it is false (Kashf
at-asrär, 10.1-5), and so does al-Hillï (al-Asrâr at-khafiyya, 13.12) who knew both of the
interpretations by Tüsi and Urmawi.
57 Referred to by the then American Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, in a historic
press conference on February 12,2002.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
420 LAM EE R
help of the particle taw ('if'), as in his own example of the haqlqi proposition
cited earlier:
‫ف دجو ول نجب وه ام نك‬، ‫ب ص جاحلا ق دجو ول ثحب م خناكأ جياخلا‬
'Everything which, were it to exist externally, would be a J, would be,

insofar as it were to exist externally, a b'
Because the subject terms of essentialist propositions are regarded as hav

ing/receiving factual, external existence at some point in time, the particle law
must have a neutral conditional connotation in order for the above sentence
to be really meaningful in the context in which it is used, so that in this type of
proposition it cannot be understood as introducing an irrealis58 that expresses
an unfulfillable condition. For even though the condition of the essentialist
proposition is presented as not fulfilled at the time of the judgment, a prop
erty that it shares with the irrealis that expresses an unfulfillable condition,
they differ insofar as fulfillment of the condition at some point in time is tacitly
understood in the case of the former, while it is regarded as impossible or most
improbable in the case of the latter. So what I think may have happened is that
Urmawî was thinking of the contested proposition as something impossible,
which he then phrased in his mind in the form of a haqlqiyya proposition that
may have looked like this:
58 In this connection it deserves to ^

editors of the Mantiq aLMuLakhkhas is the one who introduced the distinction between
externalist and essentialist propositions, cites the following example of an essentialist
proposition:
َ‫الكش نأكدجو قء بجب نوكي ناو دي ال هناف اثلثم ناكو لحو اذإ ام لك‬
"Everything which, when it exists, is a triangle, is, insofar as and when it exists,
inevitably, a figure."
I believe this phrasing of the haqlq'i proposition by Razi puts the use of law in later
times in the right historical perspective. Cf. Fakhr al-DIn Razi, Mantiq ai-Midakhkhas,
141.9-10, with the commentary by the editors on page 400, first comment to page 140.
On the use of the conditional particles in, mata, taw, idha, kuliama, and lamma, cf. Razi,
Manfiq atMuiakhkhas, 208.2-3. According to Tusi, our use of conditional particles in
‫و‬،‫مءعو‬، propositions is based on the assumption of existence of the antecedent, which
effectively excludes impossible concepts. Cf. Nasir al-Dîn Tusi, Ta'âUal-mi'yâr, 162, esp.
lines 7-16.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
َ‫ثيحب وهف اقلطم ألوهحم نام جباخلا ى دجو ول اهيحب وه ام لك‬

‫وهلع م‬5
"Everything which, were it to exist externally, would be an utterly un
known, would be, insofar as it were to exist externally, impossible to be
predicated-of."
If this were really a haqlqi proposition, the utterly unknown could not be
denied existence forever. But since it is denied existence, forever, Urmawl must
have given something that must have resembled the above 7،،‫مبعو‬، proposition
the— perfectly legitimate—interpretation of an irrealis expressing an unfulfil
lable condition while retaining its 'essentialist' qualification.60 This is the only
59 In Qarâmalekï and Jâhed, "Qotboddln Râzi" 40, we find a haqlqi reading of the paradox
by Urmawi himself that was taken from his Bayân al-haqq wa-lisan al-sidq, but I am not
absolutely sure if the rendering is an exact reproduction of the text: al-majhùl al-mutlaq
bi-haythu law wujidafi l-khârijyamtani' al-hukm 'alayhi. I find the phrasing rather casual
if compared to his phrasing of the haqlqi proposition in the Matâli' al-anwâr. Further
study of the Bayân al-haqq seems desirable. For the text of Urmawi's Bayân al-haqq,
Qarâmalekï and Jâhed refer to an edition by 'A. Dhakiyânï, "Siràj al-Dln Urmawi: Bayân
al-haqq wa-lisân al-sidq" (PhD diss., Tehran University, 1374 solar). I have not seen this
work.
6o In his Munajsas, Kâtibî phrases the haqlql reading ofthe contested proposition along lines
similar to the reading proposed by me, but without mentioning that it should in fact be
read as an irrealis expressing an unfulfillable condition (Katibi, alMunassas, MS Leiden
Or. 36, folio 2a, line 15 and, slightly altered, line 18):
ّ‫؛نخلا عنمب هنا هيلع ىدصل ئجو ول ثيمب وهف ألصا مولعم رض لتا هيلع ىدك ئجو ول ام لك‬
(line 15) ‫هلع‬
(line 18)‫هينع عنما ئجو ول بيمب وهف اقلطم ألوهحم ناهو ئجو ول ام لك‬
In his explanation ofthe argument, Katibi seems unaware ofthe incompatibility—that is,
in Urmawl's understanding—between impossible concepts such as 'the utterly unknown'
and genuine haqlql propositions. Cf. Katibi, al-Munassas, MS Leiden Or. 36, folio 2a,
lines 15-18. Another example of a reading ofthe‫وآ‬،‫جهو‬، proposition, practically identical
to the one suggested by me, is found in Shams al-Dîn Samarqandfs Sharh al-Qistas, MS
Berlin, Ahlwardt 5166, folio gb, lines 9-12:
•••‫انع* رمل ص ئيتح ذخاوأ‬، ‫وهف ائلطع الوهج نكلو جملخلا ي ئجوول ثحب م اع دةَنإ‬
‫هلع ما عنمب جؤاخلا ي دحو ول ثتجب‬
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
422 LAMEER
explanation that I can find for his assertion that the contested proposit
be true on an 'essentialist' reading.
In this connection it deserves to be noted also that Abharl in the Logic
Tanzll al-afkär first mentions but then rejects the idea of the inclusion o
sible (composite) concepts such as 'non-animal-man' and 'stone-man'
the antecedents of haqlql propositions. In his Ta'dll al-mi'yär, Tüsl agrees
him, though not without adding some precisions of his own.61 While th
tainly shows that the matter of impossible concepts and haqlql prop
using the particle law was debated in Urmawl's lifetime, it does not expl
he could exclude impossible concepts from haqlql propositions in on
and then include them in another. A possible explanation would be
adopted the haqlql reading of the paradox from someone else, withou
ing through the consequences. And this might then be seen as an argum
favour of a 'common source' for Urmawl's Matäli' al-anwär and Khünajfs
al-asrär, on which see also the first note of this section on UrmawL
vi Shams al-DIn Muhammad Shahrazüri (Alive in 687/1288)
In connection with the above it is interesting to note that an account sim

the one in Urmawl is also to be found in Shams al-DIn Muhammad Shahr
Rasâ'il al-Shajara al-ilâhfyya, but with a slight difference. For while Shahr
account parallels Urmawl's in denying the truth of the contested propos
on an externalist reading, he says it can be true without involving a
tradiction, not on an essentialist reading as with Urmawl, but on a '
(1dhihnl) reading.62 Elsewhere in his Rasâ'il Shahrazüri reports that apar
the well-known externalist and essentialist propositions, some (he d
specify who) also allow a proposition like 'Every j is a b' to receive a
reading, which looks like this: 'Everything that in mental existence is a
mental existence, a b.' Shahrazüri adds that those who countenance
of mental propositions also say that they are especially suitable for
Like Kätibl, Samarqandî seems unaware of the fundamental incompatibility—f

mawi—between impossible notions and haqlql propositions. Samarqandl's own s
to the paradox will be discussed in section IX below.
6i For both texts, see Naslr al-Din Tüsi, Ta'dÜ al-mi'yär, chapter 2 on the quantific
propositions, 160.14-166.1, esp. 162.1-164.11.
62 Shahrazüri, Rasä'il at-Shajara al-llähiyyaJi ulüm al-haqä'iq al-rabbäniyya, ed. N.
vols. Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy, 1383. Third printing), vol. 1, 49.15-50.
wa-in qulta law sadaqa until wa-l-tälighayr kädhib) = ed. M.N. Görgün (3 vols. Beiru
Sädir & Istanbul: Maktabat al-irshäd, 2007/1428. Second printing), vol. 1,48.8-20.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
assertions about impossible subjects. He then cites one of their exa

according to which a proposition like 'Every impossible is nonexisten
nally' (kullu mumtani' ma'düm fi l-khärij) can only be true if rephra
'Everything which is impossible in mental existence is, in mental exi
nonexistent' (kullu ma huwa mumtani'fi l-wujüd al-dhihnîfa-huwa ma'dü
l-wujüd al-dhihnl).63 This sounds contradictory and would appear to drop
addition 'externally' without justification. Maybe this is also why Sha
himself says: "This matter needs careful study" (wa-fihi nazar), suggesti
he did not agree with their rephrasement of mental propositions inv
impossible subjects. This is of course important for our understanding o
was said earlier about his suggestion that the contested proposition c
true on a 'mental' reading. So, was there maybe another reading of
propositions involving impossible subjects? And indeed, there was, as
explained below.
In his commentary on Urmawl's Matäli' al-anwâr, Qutb al-DIn Râzï
mention of the reading of dhihni propositions involving impossible s
that is also mentioned in Shahrazüri, and he criticizes it. According to h
correct phrasing of a 'mental' proposition like 'A partner unto God is im
ble' is: 'Of everything of which it is true in the mind that it is a partner unt
it is true in the mind that it is impossible, externally' (kullu mä sadaqa '
fi l-dhihni annahu sharlk al-bàrï sadaqa 'alayhifi l-dhihni annahu mum
l-khärij). And similarly for other statements involving impossible subjec
Now in case we apply this understanding of mental propositions inv
impossible subjects to the proposition 'The utterly unknown cannot b
cated of, we would get something like: 'Of everything of which it is true
mind that it is an utterly unknown, it is true, in the mind, that it cann
63 Ibid, vol. x, 119.9-120.16 (ed. Habibi) = vol. 1, 116.14-118.2 (ed. Görgün), for th
discussion on khäriji, haqiqi and dhihnï propositions. The part specifically on the d
propositions is found at 120.7-16 (ed. Habibi) = 117.13-118.2 (ed. Gürgün).
64 Qutb al-Dîn Râzî, Lawämi' al-asrär, 92, lines 27-35. As stated earlier, Urmawl him
refers to statements involving impossible subjects and the need for a mental readi
these. Only, he does this in the Philosophy section of the Matàli' without conn
this insight to the al-majhûl al-muflaq yamtani' al-hukm 'alayhi problematic ment
in the opening passages of the Logic. There is a possibility that in his self-commen
on the Matàli' Urmawi does make this connection (in the Philosophy section or
even in the part on Logic). Unfortunately we can only hope that one day this mat
be investigated at all because the unique manuscript containing this self-comm
was last in war-torn Aleppo in Syria. Entitled the Lawâmi' al-afkâr, the commenta
described in Fr. del Rio Sanchez, Catalogue des manuscrits de la fondation Geo
Mathilde Salem (Alep, Syrie) (Wiesbaden: Reichert Verlag, 2008), 230, ms Salem Ar. 4
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
424 LAMEER
predicated of, externally.' I understand the addition 'externally' as implyi

in the outside world, individual utterly unknowns do not and canno
exist, so that they can never fulfill the role of a subject term in propos
asserting something about them. So there is in fact a double unders
of impossibility here: a) the impossibility of a connection and b) the out
impossibility of external existence of the subject term.
So this, then, is a possible interpretation of the claim found in Shahr
that the proposition 'The utterly unknown cannot be predicated of can
on a 'mental' reading. I say 'the claim found in Shahrazüri' and not 'the
Shahrazüri' because I have reason to believe that the claim was not his ow
merely a repetition of something found in other sources (what source(s)

remains to be determined). I shall return to Shahrazüri shortly to subst
this point. But let us first turn to Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hilli.
vu Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hilli (d. 726/1326)
An approach similar to the above interpretation but without any re

to mental propositions can be found in Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hilli's a
al-khafiyya, where we find the following report:
‫عتي ام وه أقلطم لوهحناو ملآخ؛'' وه هتضقئا هذه ق هيلع موكحما ناب مهضعي باجاو‬
‫ظهألاد هيلع رقو ؟َوصواا‬-‫ا عظتماب ال أ‬-‫مخ يلا اياضقلا راك ضقانت الف ركل‬
‫عمس سفن‬65
"Some people have answered that the subject of this proposition is the
predicative act,66 while the utterly unknown is that by which this subject
is rendered specific.67 And [that] in fact, it is the impossibility which is
predicated of the subject, rather than the impossibility of being predica
ted-of.68 In this way there is no contradiction, as is true of all propositions
whose predicate is mere impossibility."
65 Al-Hillï, al-Asrär al-khafiyya, 14.2-4. Please note the use of two synonyms for grammatical
'subject': mahküm 'atayhi and mawdü'.
66 'Predicative act' renders the Arabic hukm.
67 In the sense that 'utterly unknown' and 'predicative act' together form the complex subject
'For the utterly unknown to be predicated-of (with the stress on 'predicated'). Whether
this is a viable analysis is another matter.
68 With the stress on 'predicated.' The proposition being: 'For the utterly unknown to be
predicated-of, is impossible.'
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
I mention this passage from al-Hilll here because it concurs with what we
found in Shahrazüri in that in both accounts the problematic statement is asso
ciated with impossibility. But while for Shahrazüri there is an impossible subject
which is 'the utterly unknown', in the account by al-Hilll, the impossibility is
associated with the predicate.691 am not certain if al-Hilll himself actually sup
ported this interpretation or that he merely reports on its existence because he
seems to agree with those who criticized it on the grounds that it was no more
than an ineffective shuffling around of sentence parts.70
In connection with al-Hilll it is also interesting to note that in his al-Asrär
al-khafiyya he mentions three answers to the paradox: Tüsl's interpretation
of Abhari (but without the universal quantifier), the one by Urmawï, and the
one just cited.71 And even though he seems to have rejected the third solution,
there is in the Asrär nothing that would indicate which one from among the
other two, if any, had his preference. Now if we look at his commentary on
Najm al-Dïn Kâtibî's Risâla Shamsiyya, we see that he mentions the objections
against Räzl's account of conception, belief and the judgment as they are also
found in Urmawl. But he only reproduces part of Urmawl's answer, which he
then also uses for his own purposes:
‫سكع قدصل ام رابتعاب وئو امولعم هنك بحو ول هيلع موكحنا نا وهو لاوحم انه دنويو‬
‫هف هيلع موكفا نإف هلثم موقلاف لطاب شكاو هيلع ما عنمب أئلطم لوهحنا نا وهو هضقن‬
‫هص بيجاو ملْ عاعمالاب عذاو هيط مل؛لا عنما الوهج ناكنام ملةاحُ ائولمم نآكدا‬
‫ضيحو ريقنلا لع لب ققحتلا لع ادوجوم ارمأ نوك نأ بجب ال ةئم عضوم نآل‬
‫ دةَيلاتلا ىعْ قبي‬U ‫ول‬72 ‫ا ما دجو ول ثجب وهف ظطم ألوهحم نكلو دجو‬-‫هيط ملتف‬
‫مهمب ال اذهو‬/‫مخلا داح الوهجم دن‬.73
69 Possibly this interpretation is based on the belief that the contested proposition is an affir
mation rather than a negation, an understanding that is also found in Kätibx's Munassas,
MS Leiden Or. 36, folio 2a, lines 26-28 referred to earlier in section v. Towards the end of
section x below, the affirmative reading of the impossibility statement will be dealt with
in some detail.
70 Al-Hillî, al-Asràr al-khafiyya, 14.5-10.

71 Ibid., 12.18-14.10.
72 The editor mentions law as an alternative reading in the footnotes. I believe it must be
included in the text.
73 Al-Hilli, al-Qawä'id al-jaliyya fi sharh al-Risäla at-Shamsiyya, ed. F. Hasün Tabrîziyân

(Qom: Mu'assasat al-Nashr al-Islâmï, 1432. Third printing), 191.12-92.5.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
426 LAMEER
"Here, a question is raised, namely:
'If it is necessary for that which is predicated of4 to be known, if

in some sort of manner, then its contrapositive—to the effect t
the utterly unknown cannot be predicated of—must [also] be tru
But the consequent is false, and so is the antecedent. This is beca
if the subject [of the consequent] is known, then predication
possible; and if unknown, then it cannot be predicated of, while
predication of the impossibility [of being predicated-of75 of it,]
a[n act of] predication.'
My answer is that the subject of an essentialist proposition is n

essarily something having actual existence, but rather something wh
existence is postulated. If viewed in this way, the meaning of the co
quent remains unchanged: 'Everything which, if it were to exist, wo
be (something) utterly unknown, would be, in so far as it were to ex
impossible to be predicated-of.' And this does not require its bein
known at the time of the predication."76
As one can see, al-Hilll's solution is based on an essentialist reading of the

dox. This places him effectively in the tradition of Urmawî, but interestin
does not mention Urmawl's rejection of the externalist reading on which
focus on the essentialist reading was based. This can in my view only
that al-Hilll had an interest in not mentioning this part of Urmawl's ans
And this, again, would mean that contrary to Urmawl, he must have acc
the existence of utterly unknowns. As a consequence, al-Hilll must have
stood the haqlqï proposition as a conditional 'If... then ...' propositio
not as an irrealis expressing an unfulfillable condition. His explanation of
essentialist proposition by introducing the time factor appears to testify t
as does his account of the subject terms of essentialist and externalist pr
tions later on in his commentary, where impossible subjects are excluded
the domains of essentialist and externalist propositions,77 but that accou
in fact standard and also found in Urmawî.
74 With the stress on 'predicated.'

75 With the stress on 'predicated.'
76 'at the time of the predication,' i.e. at the time of the pronunciation of the jud
expressing the impossibility of being predicated-of of the subject.
77 Al-Hilli, al-Qawâ'id ai-jaliyya, 253.15-255.5.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
GHAYRAL-MA'LÜM YAMTANÏAL-HUKM 'ALAYHI 427
In connection with the 'conditional' character of haqlql propositions it may

further be interesting to note that some 300 years after al-Hilli, Mir Dämäd
(d. 1041/1631) in his at-Ufiiq al-mubln explains that the conditionality of a haqlql
statement—which in his vocabulary is called a qadiyya hamliyya ghayr bat
tiyya, i.e. a predicative proposition that is not phrased 'definitely' but rather on
the basis of an assumption—is different from that of other conditional state
ments. According to Mir Dämäd this is because the unification of subject and
predicate only depends on the existence of the subject, with the predicate 'com
pleting' it if the bare existence of the subject is postulated.78 In other words: the
subject has no independent existence so that the predicate could attach to it
merely at a certain time or on fulfillment of some additional condition.79 It thus
seems that Mir Dämäd associated haqlql propositions above all with affirma
tive connections,80 which might be seen as an additional argument to interpret
Urmawl's 'essentialist' reading de facto as an irrealis expressing an unfulfillable
condition.
Finally it should also be noted that even though al-Hilli and Tùsl both allow
for the existence of (utterly) unknowns, al-Hilll's solution is different from
Tüsl's in that Tüsl regards one and the same thing at one and the same time from
two different angles, while in the approach of al-Hilli there is a clear separation
in time between one and the same thing's being an utterly unknown and its
being a known.
vi 11 Shahrazüri Again
An answer resembling the above explanation by al-Hillï but not associated with
haqlql propositions can also be found in Shahrazüri:
78 This 'completion' must be understood in an analytical, and not in an ontological sense.

79 Mir Dämäd, al-Ufuq al-mubïn, ed. 'A. Nüränl, Musannafät Mir Dämäd (2 vols. Tehran:
Anjoman-e äthär 0 mafakher-e farhangi, 1381-85 solar), vol. 2, 44.4-14 (reading battiyya
instead of ghayr battiyya in line 4) = ed. H. Näji Esfahanï, al-Ufiiq al-mubin Al-Amir
Muhammad Bâqir al-Astarâbâdî (Mir Dämäd) (Tehran: Miräth-e Maktüb & Institute of
Islamic Studies—Free University of Berlin, 1391 solar), 93.1-14.
8o This is not so strange because statements about essential relationships are naturally seen
as affirmative and inclusive, informing us as they do on the conditions of the being (esse
in Latin) of a thing, while negative essentialist propositions only tell us what a thing is not,
once it is. So, if the latter are called 'essentialist' propositions at all, it is in my opinion only
by a stretching of the term 'essential' that this is possible.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
428 LAMEER
‫اماو‬ ‫هلوق‬ ‫نكلَول‬ ‫لا‬
‫تنكو‬ ‫دق‬ ‫كح‬
‫تلق‬ ‫ال‬ ‫رس‬ ‫وا‬ ‫لذ‬

/‫هن‬ ‫لوهحم‬
"As for his obse
'If the consequ

be known in so
predicated of,
means that it82
I would say [in

tradiction beca
predicated-of]
while the impo
that it is (somet
in this."
The above interpretation by Shahrazürl would seem to presuppose the possi

bility of a thing's being utterly unknown at some point in time. But his earlier
statement that the proposition 'The utterly unknown cannot be predicated
of can (only) be true on a mental reading presupposes that nothing can ever
be (something) utterly unknown. As it happens, these two conflicting views
occur next to one another on one and the same page. This leads me to believe
that Shahrazüri himself had no definite opinion on this issue and that he only
reported on what he had read or heard from others.
IX Shams al-DIn b. Ashraf Samarqandl (fl. Second Half 7th/i3th cent.)
In his Qistäs al-ajkärfi tahqlq al-asrär, Shams al-Dîn Samarqandl reproduces

Urmawl's account and solution, with the difference that he uses a universal
81 Shahrazüri, Rasä'il al-Shajara al-ilähiyya, vol. 1, 50.10-14 (ed. Hablbî) = vol. 1, 48.20-49.3
(ed. Görgün).
82 'it,' i.e. the original claim that the unknown cannot be predicated-of.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
GHAYRAL-MA'LÜM YAMTANl'AL-HUKM 'ALAYHl 429
quantifier instead of the article as we find it in Urmawl.83 But assuming for

the sake of the argument that he himself regarded it as possible to understand
the subject of the universal statement as (potentially) self-referential, the first
thing that deserves our attention is the manner in which he concludes his
report on Urmawl and his followers. As the reader will remember, Urmawl
stated at the end of his account that the contested proposition could only be
true on an essentialist reading. I then explained this by assuming that Urmawl
must have read the haqlql proposition in question as an irrealis expressing an
unfulfillable condition. Then, in my discussion of al-Hillï I showed that the
latter understood the haqlqï proposition as a conditional statement but not as
an irrealis expressing an unfulfillable condition. Here is what SamarqandT has
to say on the reason given by those who say that utterly unknowns cannot exist
but that the contested proposition can be true on an essentialist reading:
••• ‫آح هيلع انكح انأل‬3َ‫صقانت الو هيلع زكخلا عتما اقلطم ألوهحم دحو ول هئاي امولعم هنؤ‬
‫هم‬84
"... because in that case we would, at the time of its being (something)
known, have asserted of it that, if it were to be (something) utterly un
known, then it would be impossible for it to be predicated-of, which
involves no contradiction."
At first sight, Samarqandl's reporting would appear to be slightly incorrect. This

is because haqïqï propositions do not presuppose the pre-existence of some
subject in order for it to be possible to postulate its existence as something
else, so that a predicate then belongs to it in virtue of this supposed other
form of existence. A haqïqï proposition starts from 'zero' as it were, and simply
posits the existence of a subject in virtue of which it then posits its existence as
83 Samarqandl, Qis(äsal-afkärfitahqlqal-asrär, ed. N. Pehlivan, "§emsu'd-DIn Muhammed b.

E§ref es-Semerkandl'nin Kistäsu'l-efkär fi tahkjki'l-esrär adh eserinin" (PhD diss., Ankara
University, 2010) vol. 1/3,11.12-12.3, accessed October 20,2013, http://acikaisiv.ankara.edu
•tr/browse/587i/397482.pdf. Unfortunately the Arabic has many mistaken or doubtful
readings and should therefore be used with care. A universal quantifier is also found in his
Sharh al-Qis(äs, MS Berlin Ahlwardt 5166, folio ga, lines 23-24. In this treatise, Samarqandl
also shows that he understands that the paradox was an answer to the assertion (by
Räzl) that every belief is (analytically) preceded by three conceptions. Cf. ibid., folio ga,
lines 20-21.
84 Samarqandl, Qistäs, 12.2-3. Similarly in his Sharh al-Qistäs, MS Berlin, Ahlwardt 5166,
folio 9b, lines 29-31.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
430 LAMEER
characterized by the predicate. So I think that Samarqandl's way of expre

himself must be seen against the background of the earlier objection that
subject (viz. the majhûl mutlaqan) is known in some manner, then it
not be true to assert of it that it cannot be predicated of. Also, the
statement, by its use of the adverb hâta ('at the time of'), is reminis
my earlier quotations from Shahrazuri (the second one) and al-Hilli (a
second one) which contextualize the problematic proposition by intro
the time factor: hâlata ('at the time of) for Shahraztirl, and hala ('at the
of) for al-Hilli. Both of the above considerations point at a frame of refe
in which the existence of utterly unknowns is countenanced. Since U
categorically rejected the possibility of the existence of utterly unknown
any time, Samarqandl's account is not what it purports to be. At best
self-contradictory conflation of the ideas of Urmawï and people like Shah
and al-Hillï.
More important than the question whether Samarqandl's report on

mawl-type of account was entirely accurate or not is the fact that he did
agree with it on several points. Of these, the most important one is in m
the fact that he fails to see why utterly unknowns could not exist, ther
in his opinion no requirement in order for something to exist, that it be
thing) known.85 He then proposes the following solution to the paradox:
*٠■ ‫ نأ هلح‬٣١‫؛؛‬، ‫ا عاسما يحمق ال مّوصولا تاذ نأل قتفصو ةيضق‬-‫يمتقلا لب إكل‬
‫ هلع عذا عنمب اقلطم لوهحم دتَْطام فصولا‬U ‫هط ألوهحم ماد‬... ‫ال ذئنيحو‬.‫لا مزلي‬
‫ هلع موكغا مول‬،‫اموجو انولع‬...®8
"Its solution consists in [that we realize] that the consequent is a desc

tional proposition because the underlying subject does not requir
predication be impossible. Rather, the thing requiring this is the des
85 Samarqandî, Qistâs, 12.7-8. See also his Shark al-Qistàs, MS Berlin Ahlwardt 5166, f
lines 7-13.
86 SamarqandI, Qistas, 12.10-12. For a similar reading, see also his Sham al-Qis(às, MS Berlin
Ahlwardt 5166, folio 10a, lines 28-34. A wasftyya reading of the problematic proposition is
also found in Kâtibï's Munassas, but not under that or any other specific name and also
without the helpful explanation that we find in Samarqandi It is however certainly possi
ble that Samarqandi was inspired by the Munassas at this point, cf. Kàtibï, al-Munassas,
MS Leiden Or. 36, folio 2a, lines 29-30:
‫اقلط ألوهحم ماد امب هيلع ركيا عتمت ئجو وئ نيجب وهف اقلطي ألوهحم ناثو ئجو ول ام لك‬
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
ghayral-ma'lümyamtani'al-hukm 'alayhi 431
tion, [so that] its meaning is: 'Everything utterly unknown is impossible
to be predicated-of, for as long as it is (something) utterly unknown.'...
And then no contradiction follows if the subject should be known in some
way."87
In a 'descriptional proposition' (qadiyya wasfiyya), an affirmative or negative

necessity relation between a subject and its predicate is conditioned by a
thing's having the attribute by virtue of which it takes on the role of a subject
in a particular proposition of this kind.88 For example: 'Every writer moves
his hand of necessity, for as long as he writes.' In this proposition there is no
necessity relation between the underlying subject and the attribute by virtue of
which it takes on the role of the subj ect in this proposition. Thus a human being
is not necessarily a writer, but in case he writes, then he will move his hand,
necessarily, for as long as he writes.89 If we link this to 'the utterly unknown', this
means that Samarqandl wants us to understand that we are not talking about
'the utterly unknown' per se, but rather about its underlying subject (this is how
we have to understand Samarqandl's dhät al-mawdü') that may or may not be
utterly unknown, in relation to someone, at some point in time. Thus there is
no incompatibility between a thing's impossibility of being predicated-of at the
time of its utter unknownness to someone, and its acceptance of the role of a
subject in some statement at the time at which it is, in relation to someone,
something known. In this way vicious self-reference is also impossible because
87 For a similar interpretation, cf. 'Abdallah Jïlânï's (between ca. 950-1200/ca. 1545-1785) al
Risäla al-muhlta bi-tashkikâtfil-qawâ'idai-mantiqiyya wa-tahqlqätihä, ed. 'A. Sh. al-Islâmï,
in Manteq va mabäheth-e alfa?, ed. M. Mohaghegh and T. Izutsu (Tehran: McGill Uni
versity, Institute of Islamic Studies, Tehran Branch, 1353 solar/1974), 377.21-378.10, tashklk
no. 2 and Jïlânï's answer. The only difference is that Jïlânï omits to include the necessity
operator where he phrases the proposition as: La shay'min al-majhülal-mutlaq bi-mahküm
'alayhï mä dama majhülan mutiaqan. This proposition is however clearly understood as
having necessity. For an introduction to the work and its author, see this same publication,
Introduction, lxxxii-lxxxvii.
88 Samarqandî, Qistâs, 85.1-2, where this proposition is given the more common name of
qa4iyya mashrüta 'âmma or 'general, conditioned' proposition. For a detailed exposition
of the mashrüfa 'âmma proposition in which the example of the writer is also given, cf.
Qutb al-DIn Râzï, Tahrlr al-qawä'id al-manfiqiyya fi shark al-Risäla al-Shamsiyya, 280.1
282.20, ed. M. Bîdârfar (Qom: Enteshärät Bïdâr, 1390 solar. Fifth printing) = 103.21-104.17
(Cairo: Mustafa al-Bâbî al-Halabî, 1367/1948. Second printing).
89 On the disctinction between wasfryya ('descriptional') and dhâtiyya ('substantial') propo
sitions and its origin in Avicenna, see T. Street, "An Outline of Avicenna's Syllogistic," Archiv
filr Geschichte der Philosophie 84 (2002): 133-34.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
432 LAMEER
it will simply be said that the subject in the proposition 'the utterly un
cannot be predicated of' is the thing that, in relation to someone, i
known and the subject of this sentence, but which may, at some point
in relation to someone, be an utterly unknown, and it will be at that po
time and in relation to that individual, that it cannot possibly be predic
and not now.90
x Sadr al-Din Shirazï (d. 1045/1635)
The last thinker to be presented here is Sadr al-DIn al-ShlräzI, better

as Mollä Sadrä. His works are interesting in as much as they are t
articulate among the texts presented in this article, although this d
mean that they are entirely unproblematic. The first two quotations were
from his magnum opus on 'transcendental' philosophy, al-Hikma aL-mut
fi l-asfär al-'aqliyya al-arba'a. The reader will see that I selected con
portions from two larger fragments, followed by two statements that pu
of the assertions of the second account in the right perspective. If I lef
some elements in the quotations this is because 1 wanted the reader not
distracted by things that are not absolutely essential to the argument in
Sadra's first account is as follows:
‫ قللنا لوحمو قلطلا موككتأليحتملا قح ءيق ص روصتي نأ لقعلل نإ‬٠٠.

‫ اياضق دقعيو اهل ةبسانم اماكحا هيلع محيف اناونعو‬٠٠٠ ‫اياضقلا كلت تاعوصوحم‬
‫• نوبلا نم تفح اهلو لقعلا ي تاموهفم إنا‬٠• ‫نمو إتلع أكحلا ةحصل اشنم ريصت‬
‫انتمال اشنم ريصت الطاب رومأل ناونع إّا‬۶ ‫مدعب اينع نكحي نمبتلثيخلا رابتعا دنعو إيلع زكلل‬
‫ إنع رابخإلا‬... ‫ا همشلا عفدنت اذمو‬،‫رخي ال قلطلا لوهحنا انلوق ي آلوهشل‬
go This is in my view also the background of his words where he, at the end of his account
of the majhüt mutlaq problem says: kawn al-mawdü' ma'lüman bi-'tibâri annahu majhül
mutlaqan amrdarùri, "The circumstance that the subject is known as (something) utterly
unknown, is a matter of necessity" (Qistàs, 13.1). For in my understanding this must be
taken to mean that there is no denying that anything known was, is, or will be something
utterly unknown, in relation to someone, at some point in time. 'Anything known' must
here be understood in terms of one's knowledge of whatever may underlie/serve as
a substrate of, the subject of a descriptional proposition. See also Samarqandï, Sharh
al-Qistäs, MS Berlin Ahlwardt 5166, folio 10b, lines 20-21.
91 Sadr al-Dïn Shïrâzî, ai-Hikma al-muta'äliyafil-asfäral-'aqtiyya al-arba'a (9 vols. Beirut: Där
Ihyä' al-Turäth, 1981. Third printing), vol. 1, 239.3-11. For those readers who use another
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
GHAYRAL-MA'LÜM yamtanïal-hukm 'alayhi 433
"The intellect can think up92 a notion or label of anything, even of impo
sibles such as the absolute nonexistent or the utterly unknown make
appropriate assertions about these and construct propositions ... whos
subjects insofar as these are notions in the intellect that have their part of
existence ... provide justification for judgments about them, while ins
far as they are labels for things that are nonexistent, they provide justi
fication for the impossibility of any judgment about them. And it is by
taking these two considerations into account that the impossibility o
being predicated-of is predicated of these things ... and this is the wa
to deal with the famous sophism regarding the statement that 'the utterly
unknown cannot be predicated of.'"
Even though this is a clear statement, the second quotation provides som
additional details:
‫مودلاو قلطلا مولعلاو مدعلا مدعو همش مدع قح تاموهفملا عم روصتي نأ لمعلل‬
‫ و قلطلا لوهحنأ معي نا دلو تاعنتملأ عمو نهذلأ‬٠٠. ‫رابخإلا مييكاحم اي إيلع عذتو‬
‫لطاا لوهجلا تاذ م ْ;ؤص؛ي ام نوك نأ لع ال ••• قلطملا لوحم ي‬3‫ ؛‬... ‫لمعتل لقعلا لي‬
‫ققحتلا عتمم تاذلا لطاب ام دمل ناونع تاموهفملا هذه نم ائيس نا ضميو ريثي هل يذلا‬
‫ئؤَرتق يذلا موهفا اذه لثمت لجأل هيلع اكحف ألصا‬4 ‫ ألومن‬.‫اإ‬93‫صأ هيلع عذا عظمآب‬
...َ‫نفم ةقداص رض ةيمونل ةتطرش ةوق ق ةبق رض هتلمح ةتضق باجبإ ليم لع كلذ دك‬
‫لثء؛ ثيح نم قلطملا لوهحنا موهفم ص‬4‫اكناٍو هنع رابخإلا ةقم هيلع هجوتي هفنو‬
‫لقعلا هضم احم لع قابطنالأ رابتعاب هيلإ هجوتي انإ رابحألا علتتما نإؤ هنع رابخإلا ميمب‬
‫إ ئرق هيأ‬4 ‫إممنلت‬5‫و‬
edition or printing it may be helpful to know that the text as cited by me is contained i
safar 1, maslak 1, marhala 1, manhaj 2, fast 19, the paragraph starting with wa-anä aqül
inna li-t-'aql.
92 I translate tasawwara in this case not as 'conceive.' That would not be right here because
of an undue association with essences. 'Imagine' is another possible translation here.
93 Sic, the reference being to hadhä l-mafliüm so that one would have expected bihi.
94 Sic. I think however that the use of haythu requires either a) min haythu innahuyatamath
thalu nafsahu or b) min haythu tamaththulihi li-nafeihi.
95 Sadr al-Dîn Shlrâzî, al-Hikma al-muta'âliya, vol. i, 345.12-347.8 (=safar 1, maslak 1, marhala
2, fasl 4, latter part, starting with: fa-fihàdhâ l-mawçli' naqùl... until the next paragraph
starting with wa-'alâ hàdhâ l-qiyäs...).
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
434 LAMEER
"The intellect is capable of thinking up any notion, including its o

nonexistence, the nonexistence-of-nonexistence, the absolute no
tent, the nonexistent-in-the-mind—anything impossible. It is able to
template the utterly unknown and... and to make assertions about th
such as the impossibility96 of predication with regard to the utterly
known ..., not in the sense that what it imagines should be the u
unknown itself... rather, with the functionality that is its own, the
lect is capable of supposing that one of these things is a label for
nonexistent individual, impossible of acquiring actuality, ever, and t
to assert, by virtue of the representation of this notion by which it
posed the former to be labeled, that it cannot be predicated of, ever
this in the way of a predicative proposition that is not definitive in w
asserts, an implication rather, whose terms are not true.97 And inso
the 'utterly unknown' embodies Itself [being nothing but a label] its
ability to being predicated-of is claimed of it, even if this should re
the impossibility of its being predicated-of, while its being predicat
is claimed to be impossible insofar as it is applicable to what the inte
posited as an individual instance of it, by way of assumption."
In the Metaphysics of the Shifä', there is a passage in which Avicenna ex

that the 'absolute nonexistent' (al-ma'düm al-mutlaq) cannot be predic
because it is a notion that has no referents, i.e. of which there are no ex
individual instances of which something could be asserted.98 In his co
96 'Impossibility' renders the Arabic 'adam, lit. 'absence.' Since this absence is a nec
'impossibility' is the better translation.
97 "... all this in the way of a predicative proposition that is not definitive in what it as
implication rather, whose terms are not true." This important (as we shall see) pre
stands somewhat isolated here; it receives no explanation while itself, it does not e
the final statement that immediately follows either. For Mollä Sadrä's 'condition
spective on the impossibility statement, see below. It seems that the mentioning o
conditional perspective was triggered by the fact that in that context, Çadrâ's mast
Dämäd also refers to impossible concepts as labels for empty notions ('unwän li-tab
mä bätila al-dhät). Cf. Mir Dämäd, al-Ufuq al-mubln, 45.5-6 (ed. Nüräni) = 94.7-9 (ed
Esfahänl). However, as we shall see, the 'conditional' perspective has nothing to d
the 'hierarchy of discourse' type of solution in which it is embedded here.
98 There is a difference with Tûsî because in Tüsi there is a suggestion of some kind
tence' of the absolute nonexistent which is other than its existence as a mere notion
mind: "The negation of permanence (i.e. being), comprising the mental and the ext
tal, is a conception of what has no permanence and whereof there is no conception
being so, its being predicated-of is countenanced insofar as it is that [very] concep
while it is not countenanced insofar as it has no permanence (i.e. being)." The quest
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
ghayral-ma'lûm yamtani' al-hukm 'alayhi 435
tary on this passage, which according to the author has a direct bearing o
al-majhül al-mutlaq Läyukhbar 'anhu paradox, Mollä Sadrä says the foll
about the absolute nonexistent:
what 'it' (Ar. huwa) in insofar as it has no permanence" exactly refers to. Cf. Naslr al-DIn
Tiisi, Talkhls al-Muhassal, 30.7-9:
‫هيلع كئا خصيف ألصا روصتم الو تلاثب سيل آل روحم يهدئاو يمراخلل لماشلا توكا غ‬
‫تباثي سمل وه سح نم خمب الو رومنا كذ وه ص نم‬.
In Avicenna there is no suggestion in any form of the existence of the nonexistent other
than as a notion in the soul; he just says that purely as a notion and something known,
it exists in the soul and as such (i.e. in its capacity as a known), it can in principle stand
in some relation to something external which, according to Avicenna, is however not the
case at the time of speaking (Ibn Sïnà, alShtfa', alttahiyyat, vol. 1,33.12-15):
‫ناةَجراخ لإ هف رشي رإو ظف سفنلا ق لفحن اذإ ىيا نألف مودعلا اتلع طل نإ لوم أمإؤ‬
‫عاط ق زثاج هنا وه هينج نع رومنلا نإل خاولا قدصلاو طق صنلا ي ا• سش مولعلا‬
‫هرض مولعم الف هل هبس الف تقولا اذه ق امأو جباح لإ ةاومعم هل ةبس عمو مولعلا اده‬
"However, we say that we do have knowledge of the nonexistent. Now, since this
notion [of the nonexistent] merely comes to be in the soul, without any reference
to something extramental, what is known [to us] is identical with and does not
exceed that which is in the soul. And the judgement relative to the two parts
conceived amounts to the assertion that in its capacity as a known, the occurrence
of an intellected relation between this [notion] and some extramental thing is
countenanced; only, at this very moment, there is no such relation, there being
nothing known other than it."
It should be noted that going by the apparatus to the edition of the Ilàhçyyât of the
Shifa', there is some uncertainty as to the reading 'something extramental' (kharij) or 'the
extramental world' (aikhartj). 1 decided to follow the reading of the editors {kharij) as this
reading is certainly possible. The Arabic idha in fa.-li-a.nna al-ma'nâ idha... does not mark
the beginning of a conditional sentence because kana al-ma'lùm ... completes li-anna and
is not the beginning of an apodosis to a protasis starting with idha as one might think It
seems that Avicenna was thinking in Persian here and then writing in Arabic: va churl
... (now since —), so that/a-/،'-an_ ... idha is a kind of double translation of va chun.
In my forthcoming edition of the Arabic translation of fùsï's Nasirean Ethics I refer to
the translation of chun by idha on several occasions. Finally, Avicenna's '... the judgment
relative to the two partsneeds two explanations: 1) 'judgment' is in this case a better
rendering of fas،،،‫ ؟‬than 'belief' (see my note to 'belief in my translation of the quotation
from Fakhr al-Dïn Râzî in Section II above; and 2) 'the two parts' refer to the subject and
the predicate of the proposition asserting that 'the nonexistent cannot be predicated-of.'
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
436 LAMEER
... ‫ا كلذو تاذلا لطاب رمأل ناونع ••• لب هل ةعيبط ال •••و ائهذ ال و اجراخ هل ئرق ال‬
‫ هسفنل ادم سيلو دوجولا دإحما نم‬... ‫خلا هحمء بجوي ادوجوم ثيح نم وهف‬
‫دنع رابخإلا مدعي هنع رابخإلا غؤ قلطملا مودللا ناونع هلإ ثيح نمو‬
"... it has no [corresponding] individuals, neither in the extra-m

world nor in the mind ... it has no essence [either], rather ... [it
label for something void, and this label is something that has individ
existence [qua label], while it is not an individual instance of itself...
insofar as it is something existent, its suitability as a subject of predi
is warranted, while insofar as it is a label for the absolute nonexiste
is predicated of the impossibility100 of its being predicated-of."
The 'label' therefore, is a 'tag' without any conceptual content and which
existing referent. Extrapolating the above, we can say that the majhuL m
is a barren name that cannot signify, a mere tag, an empty shell, a false
impossible notion, of which individual instances will never, ever exi
whose existence is purely imaginary when we say that the absolute unkn
cannot be predicated of. Nevertheless, the distinction between the 't
its imaginary referent has all the elements of a solution to the paradox t
based on a hierarchy of discourse. Only, insofar as the majhul mutlaq can
no individual existence for Mo lia Sadrâ, his solution is problematic, in th
way in which Tûsl's account of the impossibility of the being predicated-
the absolute nonexistent was problematic. Nevertheless, Tus! did allow fo
existence of absolute unknowns, so that potentially, he had solved the pa
involving the utterly unknown, even though in his Ta'dît al-mi'yar n
solution is (yet) mentioned. Mollâ Sadrâ's proposed solution does therefor
have the same potential as the explanations in Tusl's Talkhls al-Muhass
In the matter of impossible concepts, Mollâ Sadrâ also says:
‫ربت ماعاي إيلع متتو تأليحتحّملل اناونع هلعجبو تاموهفملا ضعي روصتي نهذئا‬
‫هتتبلا رض ةقيقحلا ألكلا ق اكردمملاو ضرفلا ليس لع‬101
99 Sadr al-Dïn Shîrâzï, Shark va taïïqe-ye Sadrolmota'allehln barllâhiyyât al-Shifâ', e

bibi (2 vols. Tehran, Enteshâràt-e Bonyàd-e Hekmat-e Eslâmï Sàdrà, 1382 solar),
121.16-122.3, with Ibn Sînâ, al-Shifâ', al-Ilâhiyyât, vol. 1, ed. G. Qanawâtï and S. Zâyid
Al-Hay'a al-'âmma li-shu'ùn al-matàbi' al-amlriyya, i960), 32.12 ff.
100 Interpreting Warn again as impossibility rather than mere nonexistence.
101 Sadr al-Dln Shïràzî, al-Hikma al-muta'âliya, vol. 7, 97.13-14 (= safar 2, qism 2, t
al-fann aL-awwaL, mawqif 8, fast 8, the paragraph starting with wa-lammâ tahaqqaq
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
ghayral-ma'lüm yamtani' al-hvkm 'alayhi 437
"The mind devises notions that it designates as labels for impo

items, concerning which it pronounces judgments that are not defin
in character but rather in the way of suppositions and assumptions,
in essentialist propositions, which are not definitive [either]."
Interestingly, this brings us back to my interpretation of Urmawl, where

was said to be a haqiqi proposition which turned out to be an irreaäs expr
an unfulfillable condition, even though Shlrâzï nowhere cites an example
proposition involving an impossible item thus formulated. And like U
Shlrâzï does not accept the existence of utterly unknowns nor self-refer
although, like Urmawl, he does not characterize the majhül mutlaq
as a problem of self-reference. The big difference with Urmawl is the t
cal underpinning of a correct reading of the impossibility statement. Bu
reading was not introduced by him. In fact, we find it already in his mast
Dämäd's (d. 1041/1631) al-Ufuq al-mubln, in which the link between e
predication and propositions that are not definitive (ghayr battiyya) but
on suppositions (fard) is also found.102 However, as stated in the penulti
paragraph of section vu above, Mir Dämäd regarded the predicates of
battiyya propositions as completing (mutammim) the essence of the
when the latter's existence is postulated. I understand this as the predica
the differentia of the species, as in: "If'man', then, qua man and insofar a
'rational.'"103 The 'completion' lies in the consideration that the genus of
viz. 'animal', needs to be 'completed' by 'rational' for there to be a 'man',
nal animal' being after all the definition expressing the essence of'man.'1
the completion of a thing's essence can only be effected through an affirm
attribution. Being is completed by being and not by non-being. This mu
an explanation of the qaçltyya haqïqiyya ghayr battiyya, cf. also the penultimate pa
of the section on al-Hilli.
102 Mir Dämäd, at-Ufuq al-mubin, 44.4-45.11 (ed. Nüränl, reading battiyya instead aï
tiyya at 44.4, bi-l-haml al-awwali at 45.2, bi-l-haml al-shä'i' at-sinä'l at 45.4 and tam
at 45.7) = 93.1-94.14 (ed. Näjl Esfahäni, reading bi-l-haml al-awwali at 94.5 and t
94.10) (with section vu above, penultimate paragraph). Even though Mir Dämäd d
refer to the qadiyya haqlqiyya by name, it is clear that the qadiyyaghayr battiyya is d
the same.
103 1° this schematic representation, 'qua' introduces the conceptual aspect, while 'in
introduces the ontological consideration.
104 See also $adr al-Dîn Shîrâzï, al-Hikma al-muta'äliya, vol, 2, 21.12 (= safar 1, m
marhala 4, fast 4, the paragraph starting with the words: wa-1-jawäb anna al-
which the adjective mutammim is also used in the context of the relation betw
genus and the differentia.
0RIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
438 LAMEER
be why Mir Dämäd himself says that predications involving impossible s

are affirmative in character.105 We saw this earlier in the penultimate pa
of the section on al-Hilll, while the affirmative interpretation was also f
in Kâtibï who was mentioned there in a footnote. 1 think however that
Dämäd's claim is mistaken, for the simple reason that 'impossible' is n

but 'not possible' in the sense of'necessarily not.' I see no way to convinc
one that this is an indefinite predicate in the sense of'not-possible' becau
this context that would be taken to mean that it is either necessary or i
sible. But the necessity of an affirmative relation being out of the quest
end up with impossibility in the sense of a negation of possibility (i.e. of
possibility of being predicated-of) in the form of a negative necessity stat
('necessarily not'). I think Mir Dämäd came to take this view on impossib
statements because of the historical connection between the majhül
paradox and essentialist predication as first proposed by Urmawl. But ho
this may be, as an explanation of the conditions under which the parado
be interpreted as a true proposition, Mir Dämäd's and Mollä Sadrä's view
their own statements regarding the 'complementary' character of the di
tia, necessarily mistaken.
Another problem is the association (in the sense of 'presented as
ing its explanation in ...') of the above solution—in Mir Dämäd and
Sadrä—with the distinction between two kinds of predication, called
gent' ( *aradl)106 and 'primary' (awwali) predication respectively. Of thes
former is used to express connections at the level of created being w
talk about concrete things as people commonly do—which is probabl
why this kind of predication is alternatively called shä'i' ('common')1
sinâ'l predication, creation after all being the work of the säni' or 'Maker
while the latter, called alternatively'essential' (dhäti) predication, only in
105 Dämäd, al-Ufuq al-mubln, 45.7-11 (ed. Nüränl) = 94.10-14 (ed. Näjl Esfahäni).
106 I translate 'contingent' because this kind of predication relates to whatever is pr
of things that are, irrespective of the fact whether the predication takes place in t
of a thing's essence or in the way of an accident. So, in the propositions 'Socrates is
and 'Socrates is sitting,' the terms 'man' and 'sitting' are both 'aradl predicates b
the assertion is made relative to a concrete, existing individual. This being so, to tr
'aradl as 'accidental' would in this case not be appropriate. For bibliographical refer
concerning 'aradl and awwali predication, see three notes below.
107 'Urft (alt- muta'äraf) or 'conventional' predication is another variant, the back
apparently being similar. Source references will be given below.
108 I think I am the first to suggest the above interpretation of sinal in this conte
there is not one adjective in English that could capture the implications of the Arabi
I suggest to translate the expression haml sinäl by 'predication involving created b
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
ghayral-ma'lümyamtani'al-hukm'alayhi 439
essences. The idea is then that you say that the subject in a propositio
majhüt al-mutlaq läyukkbar 'anku can be a subject of predication u
awwallldhätl consideration, while it cannot possibly be predicated
the 'àradï/sinâl consideration.109 Clearly, the distinction between aww
'aradl predication is inspired by—and as far as I can see also mater
tical to—the distinction between haqïqiyya and khârijiyya proposi
was at the basis of Urmawï's solution to the paradox.110 Only, and tha
Usually the adjective sinäl in haml sinä'i is understood in a technical or product

But what speaks against such an interpretation is the fact that the use of whatev
nical would seem to be restricted to those who are familiar with a specific 'art' (
In this case, however, we are talking about the customary way of talking about
things as is common among the general public and not about a technical lang
by specialists. For the 'technical' interpretation, cf. for instance M.R. Muzaffar,
(Beirut: Dar al-ta'äruf li-1-matbü'ät, 1427/2006. Reprint of the third printing of 13
83, where in the section on essential (dhâtï) and common (shâ'ï) predication
associated with sinä'at al-'ulüm, even though I would not know how to preci
late this expression ('the art of the sciences,' or simply: 'the sciences'?). In his t
of Mollä Sadrâ's Kitäb al-Mashä'ir, Henry Corbin translates haml shä'i'sinä'i a
tion empirique d'un universel commun à plusieurs choses' ('empirical attrib
universal common to a plurality of things') without giving any explanation for
H. Corbin, Mollä Sadra Shirazi, Le livre des pénétrations métaphysiques (Kitäb a
(Tehran-Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1964), Arabic section: 38-39 (§93), Frenc
159. It seems however that most people prefer to ignore the question of what h
precisely means, as in Ibrahim Kalin, Knowledge in Later Islamic Philosophy. M
on Existence, Intellect, andlntuition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 192
'common predication' (hamlshä'i'final).
log For the distinction between the two kinds ot predication by means ot any on
above-mentioned alternative names (which were all known to both thinkers),
importance in solving the paradox, see Mir Dämäd, al-Ufuq al-Mubin, 44.15-4
Nûrànî) = 93.16-94.14 (ed. Näji Esfahänl); Sadr al-Dïn Shîrâzî, al-Hikma al-muta'äli
146.17-20 (= s afar 1, maslak 1, marhala 1, manhaj 2, fa?l 6, second part of the
starting with wa-dhälika ti-annahu ma'a kawnihi), 239.11-12 (= safar 1, maslak 1,
manhaj 2, fa?l 19, end), 292.12-294.5 (= safar 1, maslak 1, marhala 1, manhaj 3, fa
1, tahqiq), 346.5-347.1 (= safar 1, maslak 1, marhala 2, fasl 4, in the paragraph sta
thumma mutlaq al-wujüd li-l-shay'...).
no According to Asadolläh Falâhï, Jaläl al-Dïn Dawânï (d. 908/1502) was the first t
the distinction, using the terms haml awwali and haml muta'âraf. Falâhï does n
the connection with the distinction between khârijl and haqiql propositions i
by Fakhr al-DIn Râzi. Instead, he recognizes the distinction between haml aw
shâ'i'everywhere, starting in Aristotle, then Fârâbï, Avicenna etc., all through the h
philosophy and logic until the present time. Because of the specificity of the te
and the underlying frame(s) of reference, I am not sure if this is a good idea. Cf
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
440 LAMEER
problem, the reference here is not to a special way of reading the parad
Urmawl, but to another kind of proposition. Let me explain.
In the fragment from the Asfär that I just referred to, Mollä Sadrä ma
explicit statement to the effect that some notions are true of themselves
of primary (i.e. essential) predication but not true by way of common p
tion and that impossible notions such as the majhül mutlaq come under t
and this would then be the key to solving the paradox.111 Even though
not give any example of something being true of itself by primary pre
but not true of some concrete thing by common predication, one could
the phoenix (Ar. 'anqä'), which as a creature can be defined but which no
(as yet) has come across. One could thus truly say: "A phoenix is a so
(definition of the phoenix)," while it would (as yet) not be possible to sa
"This here is a so-and-so" (common predication). While all this is certainl
sible with notions such as the phoenix—which was not an impossible
for Mollä Sadrä112—I think that insofar as the paradox is concerned, Sad
gestion is in contradiction with his statement elsewhere—in a passage th
already referred to above—where he says, speaking about impossible
in general:
"... rather... [it is] a label for something void, and this label is something
that has individual existence [qua label], while it is not an individual
instance of itself ..."113
The impossible notion is a "label for something void" (1) and "not an individual
instance of itself" (2). Since impossible notions have no essence or definition
(by 1 above), primary or essential predication is only conceivable in the form
of a tautology. But for that to be possible, an impossible notion must at least be
able to refer to itself, which is impossible (by 2 above). And individuals cannot
*'Haml-e awati o shäye' dar manteq-e qadim o jadld" Äyene-ye Ma'refat, 19 (1388 solar):
26-40, esp. 39-40, accessed October 20, 2013, http://maaref.sbu.ac.ir/Default.aspxTtabid
=2275.
ni Sadr al-DIn Shîrâzï, al-Hikma ai-muta'äliya, vol. i, 239.3-240.2, esp. 239.9-240.2 (= safar
l, maslak 1, rnarhala 1, manhaj 2, fast 19, the paragraph starting with wa-anä aqülu inna
li-l-'aql...).
112 Ibid., 61.9 (= safar i, maslak 1, marhata 1, manhaj 1, fast 7, ishkälät wa-tafifyät, in the
paragraph starting with wa-l-awtä anyürada ...), 244.12-13 (= safar 1, maslak i, marhata
1, manhaj 2, fast 21, in the paragraph starting with wa-minhä l-häja...).
113 Sadr al-Dïn Shîrâzï, Sharh va ta'Llqe-ye Sadrolmota'allehln bar Hähiyyät al-Shifä', vol. 1,
121.17-122.1.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
take the role of a predicate.114 This means that an impossible notion ca

predicated of itself even though Mollä Sadrä continues the above fragm
the remark that: "It is however predicable of itself in terms of primary
tion ..."115 Significantly, Mollä Sadrä (and the same goes for Mir Dämäd
not show us—by forming an actual proposition—how this is possibl
this is because it is simply not possible, for the reasons just stated. An
the being and not being predicable of itself seems to be a pre-condition
possibility of the introduction of the awwall/dhätl—shä'i'/'aradi distinc
a solution to the paradox, this solution does not work either. What
good at first glance is incompatible with other and more fundamen
ments elsewhere. Also, the distinction between dhätl and 'aradl predica
presented by Mir Dämäd and Mollä Sadrä does not address the self-refe
ii4 It would seem that Asadolläh Falâhî would not agree with me, since he beli
after Dawânï the predication of individuals in identity statements like "Zayd
became generally accepted, to the point that over the last four centuries, the
discussion of it any more. This is an argumentum ex silentlo whose conclusion
accept. By this I mean: I do not accept it as a conclusion, which is not the sam
ing that the proposition is false. However, in one case it certainly is false, becau
Sadrä himself states very clearly that impossible notions cannot be predicated
selves by common predication, which also rules out identity statements involv
viduals. Cf. Falâhî, "Haml-e awalio shâye'," 41; Sadr al-Dîn Shîrâzî, al-Hikma al-mu
vol. 1,188.9-15, esp. lines 14-15 (= safar 1, maslak 1, marhala 1, manhaj 1, fasl1
paragraph starting with thumma a'lam). In another (co-authored) article, Fal
ciates self-predication again with the solution proposed by Mollä Sadrä, basing
on just two lines (!) from a very minor logical treatise by Mollä Sadrä (i.e. al-L
mashriqiyyafil-fiinün al-mantiqtyya, ed. A. Meshkâtoddïnî (Tehran: EnteshärätÄ
solar), 14-15 (lam'a 3)), without any apparent knowledge of the very detailed disc
in the Asfär and in Mollä $adrä's commentary and glosses on the llâhiyyât of Av
Shifà'. Also, nowhere in Mollä Sadrä do we find the Arabic equivalent of a pro
like ma'düm-e motlaq ma'düm-e motlaq ast as suggested in this article, whic
invention by the authors. Cf. A. Falâhî and Seyyed B. Movahhed Abtahî, "Kärb
nâdorost-e haml-e await 0 shâye"! in Majalle-ye falsafe 0 kalâm-e eslâmï 43, no
solar): 105-106, accessed October 20, 2013, http://jitp.ut.ac.ir/?_action=articleInf
=22811.
115 Sadr al-Dîn Shïrâzl, Shark va ta'llqe-ye Sadrolmota'allehïn bar Ilähiyyät al-Shifä', vol. i,
122.1-2. According to Hojjatï and Sharïfzâdeh, Mollä Sadrä believes that al-majhül al
mutlaq can be predicated of itself and they even proceed to make statements in which
the majhül mutlaq is predicated of itself. Cf. Hojjatï and Sharïfzâdeh, "Pärädoks-e ekhbär"
82-83. But even though Mollä Sadrà does indeed refer to self-predication of impossible
notions, this is by his own statements on the nature of impossible notions in fact not pos
sible and significantly, no example is ever given.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
442 LAMEER
aspect of the paradox, but simply states under what conditions the p
tion is true or not. It is therefore also not possible to suggest, as Mir
and Mollä Sadrä do, that the theory of the distinction between 'aradl and
predication could somehow explain the 'gkayr battiyya! reading of the pa
As has now been shown, the two approaches have nothing in common
maybe the notion of essential predication being somehow involved (i.e. g
battiyya resp. dhätiyya (as opposed to 'aradiyya) propositions) and their f
to solve the paradox.
The conclusion is therefore that neither the solution involving gha
tiyya propositions, nor the distinction between the two kinds of predica
is able solve the problem. If Mir Dämäd and Mollä Sadrä had only ma
distinction between the majhül mutlaq as an empty label on the on
and its imaginary referent on the other, we would have had somethi
a universal proposition couched in the form of an indefinite judgme
the problem would have been 'solved.' There would of course still hav
the strange conviction that the majhül mutlaq is impossible of existence,
within the confines of that supposition the paradox would have be
dered ineffective. As things are, they did not only inherit Urmawl's view
the impossibility of existence of utterly unknowns, but also his suggesti
an essentialist interpretation of the paradox. But where this interpr
was for Urmawl most likely only an interpretation of form as he must
understood the essentialist proposition de facto as an Irrealis expres
unfulfillable condition, this is not so for Mir Dämäd and Mollä Sadrä. I th
however that, given their acceptance of the utterly unknown as an i
ble concept, Mir Dämäd's and Mollä Sadrä's Avicennan' intuitions ab
were right, and that their mistake was that they tried to incorporat
ideas into two alternative, literal interpretations of a tradition that starte
Urmawl.
Unfortunately Mollä Sadrä's various accounts do not only contain a lot of

static from Urmawl, but also from Tüsl. And this is the more surprising since the
reference to Tüsl comes right after Sadrä's long account of the majhül mutlaq
problematic contained in the second quotation given in this section. In that
large fragment, it was said that the utterly unknown is an empty label, an
impossible notion, a mere tag, devoid of any essence and having no reference,
there being no individuals corresponding to it. In view of this very outspoken
position, it is remarkable that within the space of a few lines, starting on the
same page where our second quotation ended, he should give an elaborate def
inition of the majhül mutlaq, saying that the concept (mafliüm ) majhül mutlaq
corresponds to a consideration under which a thing is regarded as stripped of
all knownness, even of this latter consideration, and that it is under this angle,
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
that it cannot possibly be predicated of, while the consideration of its being a
majhüt mutlaq, a consideration that turns it into something known under that
aspect, warrants the predication of the impossibility of being predicated-of,
of it.116 This is strongly reminiscent of Tûsï, whose answer to Räzl regarding
the impossibility of the (absolute) nonexistent's being predicated-of is even
quoted by Mollä Sadrä, right after the above, in conclusion to this chapter.117
The reader will understand that Tûsi's position is completely incompatible with
Mollä Sadrä's earlier explanations. For Tüsl, the majhül mutlaq is a concept that
has content and reference, because individuals of it exist (even though in the
Ta'dïl al-mi'yâr the referent turned out to be the subject of the contested propo
sition itself). Before his reference to Tüsl, Mollä Sadrä had just argued in detail
that for him, the majhül mutlaq is nothing but a tag, an empty notion, devoid
of essence, that has no reference because individuals of it do not and cannot
exist. I have no explanation for this manifest contradiction other than that it
is not conceivable that Mollä Sadrä wrote the last four pages of safar 1, maslak
l, marhala 2, fasl 4 of the Asjar in one session or even that he could have con
sciously put the opposing accounts next to one another. In my opinion this
‫ ؛؛‬6‫أأ‬adr al-Dïn Shïràzî, aiHikmaalmuta'àUya, vol. 1, 347.16-20 (= safar 1, maslak 1, marhala

2, /as/ 4, latter part, the quotation given below being contained in a separate paragraph
towards the end):
‫اتءا مأ قلطلا لوحم موهمع نأ بانا اذه ي امباس هلإ انرشأ اع ليسو‬3‫ءيقلا نوكا إ‬
‫نع ىح نيمولعملا ماثا نخي ص ىرمس ةظحالملا ءذه م همولعلا ءاحنا عيم نع أخلمنم‬
‫ءاحنا نع وحن ةظحاللل هده نا سحو هنع راحإلا عا؛تعا طاّتم وه اذهو هجونا ادم ةتمولعملا‬
‫ةحمم طانمب وه أدهو ةتمولعلا بلس ضء ي هتمرملعلاب اوشم وه نااكء ءيثلا اذه هتمولعم‬
‫هنع رابخإلا ميمب هع رابخإلا‬
"And the approach that we referred to previously in this matter consists in [that
we say] that the notion of the utterly unknown, insofar as it stands for the consid
eration of a thing, stripped of all forms of knownness (ma'lumiyya), so that from
this perspective it is denuded of all parts into which knownness divides, even of its
being known under that aspect, so, [that we say thatj this [consideration] is what
the impossibility of its being predicated-of is dependent upon, adding that, inso
far as this perspective is one of the forms of knownness of this very same thing, it
is commingled with knownness in the very act of negation of [all] knownness [of
it], it being this [latter] consideration, that its aptness to being predicated of the
impossibility of being predicated-of, is dependent upon [in turn]."
117 Ibid., 347.21-348.8, esp. 348.3-8 where he quotes from Tûsï's Talkhls al-Muhassal, 30.7-12,
but with some slight changes.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
444 LAMEER
can only mean that the assembling of the elements making up the
the chapter to which they belong only took place long after they
been written, and that before that time, they must first have exist
texts.
As a kind of afterthought to the above analysis of Mollà Sadrà it

esting to note that the al-majkûl al-mutlaq làyukhbar 'anhu parado
al-ma'Lûmyamtanïal-hukm 'alayhi or similar forms) was originally
in criticism of Fakhr al-DIn Râzï's assertion that there can be no b
ments without conceptions. The reader may therefore think that an
to defuse the paradox must therefore have been a supporter of a l
pretation of Râzï in that beliefs (and judgments) are composed of c
with the consequence that belief is made to depend upon conce
ever, in the case of Mollâ Sadrâ this is not so. For in his Treatise o
and Belief he does not only say that:
... ‫رمشا اكتعُرأ وأ ةثالث رومأ نم انكم قدصلا لعج نه يإ فحمّا احم‬
‫آاحمد‬1
"... the view according to which some construe belief as being made up of
three or four things, as is known of Imam al-RâzI, is really obtuse",119
but, more importantly, he interprets Râzl in such a way as to comply with his
own understanding of beliefs as single, i.e. not complex apprehensions, where
he says:
‫هت موكحناو هيلع موكحنا روصت عؤحم نع ةرابع هنا اهيتايو ••• روماي قيدصتلا اورمف معناف‬
‫هذه نم ق قمحتي امإ ممشلا اذه دوجو لا وه هصم' نعلو يناملا بهذم وهو ملآخلاِو‬
‫ ةموقتحم هانعم بسحن قدصتلا ةيهام نا ال تاروصتلا‬-‫إ‬120
118 Sadr al-DIn Shïrâzl, Risâlat al-tasawwur wa-l-tasdiq, ed. M. Sharî'atï, Risâlatân fi L-tasaw
wur wa-l-tasdiq. Ta'lîf al-Qutb al-Râzi& al-Sadr al-Shlrâzl (Two texts in one volume. Qom:
Mo'assase-ye Esmâlliyàn, 1416), text 2, 53.6-7. The editor published this text for a sec
ond time with only very slight alterations and no change of page numbers as part two
of the three-texts-in-one-volume Risâlatânfi l-tasawwur wa-l-tasdiq... wa-yalihumâ Shark
aL-Risâla at-ma'mûiafil-tasawwurwa-L-tasdiq wa-ta'liqâtuhu ta'lif MuhammadZâhid... al
Harawi (Beirut: Dàr al-kutub al-'ilmiyya, 1425/2004).
iig Lameer, Conception and Belief, 112.
120 Sadr al-Dïn Shlrâzl, Risâlat al-tasawwur wa-l-tasdïq, 61.1-9.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
"For they have explained belief in several ways... Secondly, [they explain
belief] in that it represents the sum total of [one's] conception of the
subject, the predicate and the judgment [respectively], which is the view
of al-RäzI. Maybe he rather meant to say that this part of the division
comes to be if and when these [three] conceptions are in conjunction,
and not that the essence of belief in the proper sense should have them
as constituent parts."121
In the whole of his Treatise on Conception and Belief there is not a single
mention of the al-majhül al-mutlaq Läyukhbar 'anhu paradox. Conversely, in
the passages from his Asfär and commentary on the Ilähiyyät of the Shija'
where the paradox is discussed, no mention is made of conception, belief, and
their interrelations. This leads me to conclude that Mollä Sadrä regarded the
paradox merely as a problem of how to deal with impossible concepts, so that
by his time the paradox must have become completely disconnected from the
context in which it originally had arisen.
xi Conclusion
The above discussions have shown that the ghayr al-ma'Lümyamta

'alayhi paradox was dealt with in several ways, the most influ
of it coming in my view from Siräj al-Dîn Urmawl. All the think
generations referred to in this article took their positions somehow
to him, even if no one mentioned him by name. Themes tha
combinations, turned out to be central to the discussions were:
- Nature of contradictions
- Sense and reference
- Acceptance or rejection of self-reference and of the existence of (utterly)

unknowns
- The utterly unknown as an impossible concept

- 'Externalist' vs. 'essentialist' propositions
- The essentialist proposition as an irrealis expressing an unfülfillable condi
tion
- Use of temporal constraints in defusing the paradox
121 Lameer, Conception and Belief, 125-126. Meaning: maybe the focus was for Râzï on the
conditions of the being of beliefs, rather than on the conditions of their essence.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
446 LAMEER
- Distinction between properties and underlying subjects

- Use of'mental' propositions to deal with impossible concepts
- Impossible concepts as empty 'labels' or 'tags'
- Ghayr battiyya propositions
- AwwaLl vs. 'aradl predication
In spite of this multitude of issues and positions, and notwithstanding t

that the paradox was labeled a 'sophism' ( shubha, mughälata ) by more th
author,122 no one actually put his finger on the nature of the problem. N
less, Tüsl in his Talkhls al-Muhassal clearly had the right intuition and ma
be said to be the first person on record before modern times—in the Isla
world at least—to have understood how to solve paradoxes of self-ref
even though I know of no passage in which he applies this intuition
paradox involving the (utterly) unknown. If Mollä Sadrä (and his teach
Dämäd) refused any kind of reference for the utterly unknown, includin
reference, this was in my view not because they understood the nature o
doxes of self-reference. Rather, it was Urmawl's assertion that the existe
utterly unknowns is totally impossible in combination with Avicenna's ac
of the impredicability of the absolute nonexistent which must have i
them—directly or through the intermediary of other authors—to tr
paradox as they would treat any proposition involving impossible concept
by some quirk of fate, Urmawl's rather blunt way of dealing with the pro
saying that utterly unknowns cannot exist, ever, was picked up by Mir D
and Mollä Sadrä who, after drawing the utterly unknown into the d
of impossible concepts and taking their inspiration most probably fr
cenna, explicitly denied it any kind of signification, including self-refer
I think that future research on the paradox should, among other t
concentrate on two areas:
1) First of all there is the commentary tradition around Urmawl's Matäli' a

anwär. There is of course Urmawl's self-commentary referred to earlier, but
122 E.g. Qu{b al-Dïn Shîrâzî, Mir Dämäd, and Mollä Sadrä in the passages from their works
referred to earlier. Najm al-Dïn Kâtibï, too, in his commentary on Khünaji's Kashfal-asrâr,
employs the term mugkalafa and even states that the whole issue deserves to be ignored.
Cf. Kâtibï, Sharh Kashf al-asrär, MS Tehran, Ketäbkhäne-ye Majles-e Shürä-ye Eslämi,
no. 1505, folio 12b, line 20 (mughätafa), and folio 10a, lines 19-20 ... al-mu$annif ajâha
'an hädhä al-su'ät wa-in käna al-wäjib an läyaltafit ilayhi wa-läyasma'ahu wa-qâta ..., "...
The author (i.e. Khünaji) replied to this argument—even though he should actually have
ignored and paid no attention to it—saying:..."
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
GHAYRAL-MA'LÜM YAMTANÏ AL-HUKM 'AL AY HI 447
today that may be hard to gain access to, since it was last in Aleppo, Syria.123
Then there is the one written by Mahmüd b. 'Abd al-Rahmän Isfahan! (d. 749/
1348), entitled Tartwir al-Matäli'wa-tabslr al-mutäli'fisharh Matâlï al-anwär
and of which in Iran alone, at least seven (partial) copies remain.124 Isfahänl
was of the generation before Qutb al-Dïn Räzl, so that his commentary was
probably not influenced by the latter. As for the commentary by Qutb al-DIn
Räzl125 and the Glosses thereon by 'All b. Muhammad b. All Juijânï ('al
Sayyid al-Sharlf,' d. 816/1413),126 it deserves to be noted that the extensive
commentary on the Logic of the Matäli' by Qutb al-DIn Räzl does in fact no
more than sum up the various positions of previous authors (not referred to
by name) as we can find them throughout this article,127 save Mir Dämäd and
Mollä Sadrä of course. But in so doing Räzl often expresses himself unclearly
or inaccurately, so much so that I sometimes had the impression that this
commentary is a juvenile work, much different from his commentary on
Kätibl's Risäla Shamsiyya, which rather reminds me of a Swiss precision
clock.128 And in his Glosses on the relevant part of Räzl's commentary, Jur
jänl says nothing that was not already mentioned by others or if he did, it had
no direct importance for the discussions in this article.129 Instead, I think
123 See section vi above, last note to the section.

124 Deräyati, Fehrestväreh, vol. 3,377.
125 The commentary on the relevant passage from Urmawï is contained in Qutb al-Dïn Râzï,
Lawâmï al-asràr, 18.2-19.29.
126 For the glosses in question, see Jurjânï, al-Häshiya al-kubrä ma Shark al-Matäli', 56.24
61.25.
127 With the exception maybe of his remark that the utterly unknown is always a 'possible'
or a 'thing' (whether existing or not), meaning that it can always take the role of a
subject in some affirmative or negative statement, and which would then for him disprove
the paradox. Cf. Qutb al-Dîn Râzï, Lawâmi' al-asrâr, 19.19-25 (where he also refers to
the paradox as a 'sophism' or shubha). There might be a connection here with certain
positions on the non-existent (ma'düm) in Islamic theology which may be worthwhile to
explore, and on which see also e.g. R.M. Frank, "Al-ma'düm wa-l-mawjüd: The Nonexistent,
the Existent, and the Possible in the Teaching of Abü Häshim and his Followers" in mideo
14 (1980): 185-210. See also below.
128 I think that a more comprehensive and in-depth comparison between his Lccwâmi' al
asrâr fi shark Matäli' al-anwär and the Tahrïr al-qawâ'id al-mantiqiyya fi sharh aL-Risäla
al-Shamsiyya may very well confirm this first impression.
129 In his glosses Juijänl spends quite a lot of time on discussing various modal readings of
the paradox. Interesting in their own right, these discussions do not appear to contain any
genuinely new insights, so that I desisted from including them among the texts presented
in this article.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
448 LAMEER
that special attention should be given to a series of rival super- an

super-glosses on Râzl's commentary and Jurjäni's glosses thereon that
written in Shiraz by the opposing thinkers Jaläl al-DIn Muhammad b.
Dawânl (d. 908/1502) on the one side, and Mir Sadr al-DIn Muhammad D
takl (d. 903/1498) and his son Ghiyäth al-DIn Mansür b. Sadr al-DI
taki (d. 948/1541) on the other.130 There are of course other super-glo
Räzl and Juijânï, and it goes without saying that these, too, all deserv
studied in their own right.131 Among these, there are for instance the
glosses by Kamâl al-DIn Mas'üd Sharwänl (d. 905/1500), of which th
on the al-majhül al-mutlaq läyukhbar 'anhu paradox has been prese
MS 494 at the research institute (pazhüheshgäh) of the Markaz-e m
0 tahqîqât-e esläml in Qom, folios ii3b-i27a. This is a large piece of
estimate 40 to 50 pages in print) which would certainly deserve to be
alongside the texts upon which it comments. In Sharwânï's glosses
al-DIn Räzl is also often criticized for the many inaccuracies that h
mentary contains.132
2) As a complement to the study of the Matäli' complex, it might be
while to make a more detailed study of the later elaboration of the al-m
al-mutlaq läyukhbar 'anhu theme as it is found in Avicenna. Here w
think of the interpretative summary of the Metaphysics of Avicenna's
by Abu l-'Abbäs Lawkari (d. 517/1123),133 or of the summary of and g
on different parts of the Metaphysics of the Shifâ' by Ghiyäth al-DIn
takl.134 Apart from Avicenna, I think research could certainly be bro
130 See R. Pouij avady, Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran: Najm al-Din Mahmüd al-Nayrlz
Writings (Leiden: Brill, 2011), chapter 2, esp. 80-81; DeräyatI, Fehrestväreh, vol. 11,4
498-500.
131 For a preliminary overview, see R. Wisnovsky, "The Nature and Scope of Arabic Philosoph
ical Commentary in Post-classical (ca. 1100-1900AD) Islamic Intellectual History: Some
Preliminary Observations," in Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin
Commentaries, ed. P. Adamson et. al. (2 vols. London: Institute of Classical Studies, School
of Advanced Study, University of London, 2004), vol. 2,165-166.
132 Many more super-glosses are mentioned under the common title Häshfyat häshiyat Sharh
Matäli' al-artwär in Derayatï, Fehrestvàreh, vol. 4,179-184.
133 Abü l-'Abbäs Lawkari, Bayän al-haqq bi-damwn al-sidq. AI- 'Ilm al-ilähi, ed. 1. Dïbâjï (Tehran:
Enteshärät-e Däneshgäh-e Tehran, 1373 solar). See alsoj. Janssens, "Lawkarl's reception of
Ibn Sînâ's Ilähiyyät " in The Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin Reception ofAvicenna's Metaphysics,
ed. D.N. Hasse and A. Bertolacci (Berlin-Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2012), 7-26.
134 Cf. Ghiyâth al-Dîn Dashtakï, Mosannafàt-e Ghtyâthoddïn Mansûr-e Dashtakï-ye Shirâzï,
ed. 'A. NüränI. 2 vols. Tehran: Enteshârât-e Ketâbkhâneh, Müzeh va Markaz-e Asnâd-e
Majles-e Shûrâ-ye Eslâmï, 1386 solar, vol. 2, 377-487.
0RIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
GHAYRAL-MA'LÜM YAMTANl'AL-HUKM 'ALAYH1 449
to encompass similar discussions in the whole or at least the major repre

sentatives of the post-Avicennan Islamic philosophical tradition. Also, and
this matter should certainly be examined, there is a real possibility that the
question of the (absolute) nonexistent and its suitability to take on the role
of a subject of predication led to as yet unexplored accounts of the paradox
in Islamic theology, maybe especially after Avicenna. The passage from Tüsl's
Talkhïs al-Muhassal discussed at the end of section iv above would seem to
indicate that this is indeed the case.
In closing, I would invite anyone reading the introductory parts of logical

works in Arabic or Persian or works on theology or metaphysics, to be on the
lookout for the paradox, and to compare whatever is in there with the overview
sketched in this preliminary anthology. What would be especially interesting,
is finding someone who says that the paradox is based on undue self-reference,
while founding his argument on something other than the assertion that the
utterly unknown is an impossible concept. It would also be interesting to find
someone from the 8th/i4th century or later who actually remembers that the
whole issue started with a critique of Fakhr al-DIn Râzï's account of the relation
between judgments, beliefs, and conceptions.
Bibliography
Abharï, Athïr al-Dïn. Tanzll al-qfkârfi ta'dll al-asràr. The Logic of this tripartite philo
sophical compendium is included in the text of Naslr al-Dïn Tüsl's Ta'dll al-mi'yärfi
naqd tanzll al-afkär.
Ahlwardt, W. Verzeichnis der arabischen Handschriften der Königlichen Bibliothek zu
Berlin. 10 vols. Berlin: A. Asher & CO, 1887-1899.
Ajam, R. al-. al-Mantiq 'inda l-Färäbi. 3 vols. Beirut: Dar al-mashriq, 1985-86.
Alwishah, A. and D. Sanson. "The Early Arabic Liar: The Liar Paradox in the Islamic
World from the Mid-Ninth to the Mid-Thirteenth Centuries ce." Vivarium 47 (2009):
97-127.
Baltzly, D. "Stoicism". In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition),

edited by E.N. Zalta. Accessed January 5, 2014. http://plato.Stanford.edu/archives/
win20i3/entries / stoicism/.
Bolander, Th. "Self-Reference." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013

Edition), edited by E.N. Zalta. Accessed October 20,2013. http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fall20i3/entries/self-reference/.
Corbin, H. Mollä Sadra Shirazi, Le livre des pénétrations métaphysiques (Kitäb al-Mas
hâ'ir). Tehran-Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1964.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
450 LAMEER
Dashtakï, Ghiyäth al-Dîn. Mosannafät-e Ghiyäthoddln Mansür Dashtakî Shlrâzl

by 'A. Nûrânï. 2 vols. Tehran: Enteshärät-e Ketäbkhäneh, Müzeh wa Markaz-
e Majles-e Shürä-ye Eslâmï, 1386 solar.
Del Rio Sanchez, Fr. Catalogue des manuscrits de Lafondation Georges et Mathil
(.Alep1, Syrie). Wiesbaden: Reichert Verlag, 2008.
Derâyatï, M. Fehrestvâre-ye dastneveshthä-ye îrân. 12 vols. Tehran: Ketäbkhäneh
va markaz-e asnäd-e majles-e shürä-ye eslâmï, 1389 solar.
Eichner, H. "Dissolving the Unity of Metaphysics: from Fakhr al-Dïn al-Râzî t
Sadrä al-Shïrâzï." Mectoevo 32 (2007): 139-197.
Falâhï, A. "Haml-e awalï 0 shâye'dar manteq-e qadïm 0jadïd." Àyene-ye Ma'refat
solar): 19-46. Accessed October 20,2013. http://maaref.sbu.ac.ir/Default.aspxT
=2275.
Falâhï, A. and Seyyed B. Movahhed Abtahï. "Kärbordhä-ye nàdorost-e haml-e

shäye'." Majalle-ye falsafe 0 kalâm-e eslâmï 43, no. 2 (1389 solar): 103-119. Ac
October 20,2013, http://jitp.ut.ac.ir/?_action=articleInfo&article=228n.
Fârâbï, Abü Nasr al-. Kitäb al-Qiyâs al-saghïr. Edited by M. Türker, "Fârâbï'nin b
tik eserleri."fievue de la Faculté de Langues, d'Histoire et de Géographie de l'Univ
d'Ankara 16 (1958): (165-286) 244-286.
Frank, R.M. "Al-ma'düm wa-l-mawjüd: The Nonexistent, the Existent, and the
in the Teaching of Abü Häshim and his Followers." mideo 14 (1980): 185-210.
Hä'eri, A.H. Fehrest-e ketäbkhäne-ye majles-i shürä-ye melll, vol. 4. Tehran: Ch
ye Majles-e Shürä-ye Melll, 1335 solar.
HillI, Jamâl al-Dïn Hasan b. Yüsuf b. al-Mutahhar ak Al-Asrär al-khaftyyaftl-'
'aqliyya. Qom: Markaz al-'ulüm wa-l-thaqäfa al-islämiyya—Markaz ihyä' al-
al-islâmï, 1387 solar/1430. Second printing.
. Al-Qawâ'id al-jaliyyafisharh al-Risäla al-Shamsiyya. Edited by F. Hasün
ziyän. Qom: Mu'assasat al-Nashr al-Islämi, 1432. Third printing.
Hojjatï, Seyyed M. A. and R. Sharifzädeh. "Pärädoks-e ekhbär az majhül-e motlaq
mafiiüm-ekhabar"Manteqpazhühl3, no. 1 (1391 solar): 77-95. Accessed Octo
2013, http://logicalstudy.ihcs.ac.ir/?_action=articlelnfo&article=5i4.
Ibn Sïnâ, Abü Ali al-Husayn. Al-Shija', al-llähiyyät, vol. 1. Edited by G. Qanaw
S. Zäyid. Cairo: Al-H ay'a al-'ämma li-shu'ün al-matäbi' al-amïriyya, i960.
Janssens, J. "Lawkari's reception of Ibn Sinä's Ilähiyyät." In The Arabic, Hebrew, a
Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics, edited by D.N. Hasse and A. Bertolacci,
Berlin-Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2012.
Jïlânï, Abdallah. Al-Risäla al-muhita bi-tashkikätfi l-qawä'id al-mantiqiyya wa-

tihä. Edited by A. Sh. al-Islämi. In Manteq va mabäheth alfaz: Majmü'e-ye mo
maqälät-e tahqïqi, edited by M. Mohaghegh and T. Izutsu, 357-395. Tehran:
University, Institute of Islamic Studies, Tehran Branch, 1353 solar/1974.
Juijäni, Alï b. Muhammad (al-Sayyid al-Sharïf). Al-Häshiya al-kubrä 'alä S
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
ghayral-ma'lüm yamtani' al-hukm 'alayhi 451
Matäli'. Istanbul: Dar al-tibä'a al-'ämira, 1277/1861. Accessed Oct

al-mostafa.info/data/arabic/depot3/gap.php?fileioo4o86.pdf.
. Al-Häshiya 'alä Tahrïr al-qawä'id al-mantiqiyyafi sharh al-R
See Qutb al-DIn Räzi, Tahrïr al-qawä'id al-mantiqiyyafi sharh
ya.
Kaiin, 1. Know Ledge in Later Islamic Philosophy. Mulla Sädrä on Existence, Intellect, and
Intuition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Khünaji, Afdal al-Dïn. Kashfal-asrâr 'an ghawämid al-afkär. Edited by Kh. El-Rouayheb.
Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy & Institute of Islamic Studies—Free Univer
sity of Berlin, 2010.
Lameer, J. Al-Färäbl & Aristotelian Syllogistics-. Greek Theory & Islamic Practice. Leiden:
Brill, 1994.
. Conception andBeliefin Sadr al-Dïn Shlräzi: Al-Risälafi l-tasawwurwa-l-tasdlq.

Introduction, Translation, and Commentary. Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy,
2006.
Lawkari, Abü 1-Abbäs. Bay an al-haqq bi-damän al-sidq. Al-'Ilm al-ilähi. Edited by I. DI
bâjï. Tehran: Enteshärät-e Däneshgäh-e Tehrän, 1373 solar.
Marlow, L. "A Thirteenth-Century Scholar in the Eastern Mediterranean: Siräj al-DIn
Urmavî, Jurist, Logician, Diplomat." Al-Masäq 22, no. 3 (2010): 279-313.
Mir Dämäd, Muhammad Bäqir Astaräbädi. Al-Ufuq al-mubïn. Edited by 'A. Nüränl,
Musannajat Mir Dämäd (2 vols. Tehran: Anjoman-e äthär va mafâkher-e farhangl,
1381-85 solar), vol. 2.
. Al-Ufuq al-mubïn. Edited by H. Nâjî Esfahânï. Tehran: Mïrâth-e Maktüb &
Institute of Islamic Studies—Free University of Berlin, 1391 solar.
Modarres Radavï, M.T. Ahwäl-o äthär-e... Mohammad b.... al-Tûsï molaqqab beh Khwä
jeh Nasïroddïn. Tehran: Däneshgäh-e Tehran, 1334 solar.
Muzaffar, M.R. Al-Mantiq. Beirut: Dar al-ta'äruf li-l-matbü'ät, 2006/1427. Reprint of the
third printing of 1388.
Pouijavady, R. Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran: Najm al-Dïn Mahmüd al-Nayrïzïand his
Writings. Leiden: Brill, 2011.
Qarâmalekï A.F. and M. Jâhed. "Qotboddïn Ràzïva hall-e mo'ammä-ye majhül-e motlaq."
Andïshehâ-ye Falsafl 1, no. 2 (1384 solar): 33-46. Accessed October 20, 2013. http://
www.n00rmags.c0m/view/fa/articlepage/92047.
Qazwînï, Najm al-Dîn KätibL Al-Munassas fi sharh al-Mulakhkhas. MS Leiden, Or. 36
(dated 692/1293). Accessed October 22,2013. http://www.primarysourcesonline.nl/
c55/search.php.
. Sharh Kashf al-asrâr, MS Tehran, Majles 1505 (carrying the date 678/1279).
Digital copy on CD.
. Al-Risäla al-Shamsiyya. Contained in Qutb al-Dïn Râzï, Tahrïr al-qawä'id al
mantiqiyyafi sharh al-Risäla al-Shamsiyya.
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
452 LAMEER
Râzï, Fakhr al-Dï

häd. Tehran: Dän
Räzl, Qutb al-DIn
'alayhä häshiyat
Bïdâr, 1390 solar.
. Tahrlr al-qawä
häshiya li-l-Say
mantiqiyya. Cai
Second printing
. Lawämi' al-asr
1277/1861. Acces
depot/gap.php?f
Samarqandï, Sha
Accessed Octobe
. Qistäs al-afkär
med b. Eçref es-
1/3. PhD diss., A
.ankara.edu.tr/b
Schwitzgebel, E.
tion), edited by
archives/win2on
Shahrazürl, Sham
al-rabbäniyya. E
1383. Third print
. Rasä'il al-shaja
M.N. Görgiin. B
printing.
Sharï'atï, M. Risälatän fi l-tasawwur wa-l-tasdlq. Ta'llf al-Qutb al-Räzl & al-Sadr al
Shlräzl. Qom: Mo'assase-ye Esmâ'ïliyân, 1416.
. Risälatän fi l-tasawwur wa-l-tasdlq. Ta'llf al-Qutb al-Räzl & al-Sadr al-Shlräzl.
Wa-yallhumä Sharh al-Risäla al-ma'müla fi l-tasawwur wa-l-tasdlq wa-ta'llqätuhu
ta'llf Muhammad Zähid... al-Harawi. Beirut: Dar al-kutub al-'ilmiyya, 1425/2004.
Shïrâzï, Qutb al-Dïn. Durrat al-Täj li-'Izzat al-Dabbäj. Edited by Seyyed M. Meshkät and
H. Meshkân Tabasï. Five parts in two volumes. Tehran: Vezärat-e Farhang, 1317-1324
solar.
Shïrâzï, Sadr al-Dïn. Al-Hikma al-muta'äliyafi l-asfar al-'aqliyya al-arba'a. 9 vols. Beirut:
Där Ihyä' al-Turâth, 1981. Third printing.
. Sharh va ta'llqe-ye Sadrolmota'allehln bar Ilähiyyät al-Shifä'. 2 vols. Edited by
N. Habïbï. Tehran. Enteshärät-e Bonyäd-e Hekmat-e Eslàmï Sädrä, 1382 solar.
. Risälat al-tasawwur wa-l-tasdlq. Edited by M. Sharï'atï, Risälatänfi l-tasawwur
ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00
GHAYRAL-MA'LÜM yamtanï al-hukm 'alayhi 453
wa-l-tasdïq. Ta'tïf al-Qutb al-Räzl & al-Sadr al-Shlräzl, Text 2. Qo

Esmälliyän, 1416.
. Al-Lama'ät al-mashriqiyya fi l-ficnün al-mantiqiyya. Edited by
dïnï. Tehran: Enteshärät Ägäh, 1362 solar.
Street, T. "Arabic and Islamic Philosophy of Language and Logic". In T
clopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), edited by E.N. Zalta.
2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/arabic-is
. "An Outline of Avicenna's Syllogistic." Archivfür Geschichte de
(2002): 129-160.
Strobino, R. "Truth and Paradox in Late xivth Century Logic: Peter of
on Insoluble Propositions."Documenti e studi sulla tradizionefilosof
(2012): 475-519
Tûsï, Nasïr al-Dîn. Ta'dJlal-mi'yârfinaqd tanzïl al-afkär. Edited by Ä.
va mabäheth-e alfäz: Majmü'e-ye motün 0 maqälät-e tahqlql, edit
hegh and T. Izutsu, 137-248. Tehran: McGill University, Institute o
Tehran Branch, 1353 solar/1974.
. Talkhts al-Muhassaù With Thirty Philosophical and Theological

ted by A. NüränI. Tehran: McGill University, Institute of Islamic
Branch, in Collaboration with Tehran University, 1359 solar/1980.
Urmawî, Siräj al-Dïn. Matäli'al-anwär. Edited by H. Akkanat, "Kadi Sir
ve Metâliu'1-envâr", vol. 1/3. PhD diss., Ankara University, 2006.
. Bayän al-haqq wa-lisän al-sidq. Edited by 'A. Dhakiyäni, "Sirâj a
Bayän al-haqq wa-lisän al-sidq." PhD diss., Tehran University, 1374 s
Voorhoeve, P. Handlist of Arabic Manuscripts: In the Library of the Uni
and other Collections in The Netherlands. Second Enlarged Editio

den University Press, 1980.
Wisnovsky, R. "The Nature and Scope of Arabic Philosophical Com
classical (ca. 1100-1900AD) Islamic Intellectual History: Some Prel
tions." In Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Lati
ed. P. Adamson, H. Baltussen, and M.W.F. Stone, vol. 2,149-191.2 vo
tute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of L
Witkam, J.J. Inventory of the Oriental Manuscripts of the Library of
Leiden. 16 vols. Leiden: Ter Lugt Press, 2007-2008. Accessed October
www.islamicmanuscripts.info/inventories/leiden/index.html.
0RIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

12.32.251.250 on Thu, 17 Aug 2023 21:29:08 +00:00

Lameer, Joep - غير المعلوم يمتنع الحكم عليه) An Exploratory (Ghayr al-maʿlūm yamtaniʿ al-ḥukm ʿalayhi Anthology of a False Paradox in Medieval Islamic Philosophy

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Lameer, Joep - غير المعلوم يمتنع الحكم عليه) An Exploratory (Ghayr al-maʿlūm yamtaniʿ al-ḥukm ʿalayhi Anthology of a False Paradox in Medieval Islamic Philosophy

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

An Exploratory (Ghayr al-maʿlūm yamtaniʿ al-ḥukm ʿalayhi) ‫غير المعلوم يمتنع الحكم عليه‬

Anthology of a False Paradox in Medieval Islamic Philosophy

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24801753

This content downloaded from

‫هيلع نكحا عتمي مولعملا رض‬

In Islamic philosophy, knowledge is divided into 'conception' (tasawwur) and 'belief'

© KONINKUJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2014 | DOI: 10.1163/18778372-04203005

This content downloaded from

Islamic philosophy - paradoxes of self-reference - 'impossible' concepts - ways of

i Siräj al-DIn Urmawl,Matäli'al-anwâr, ed. H.Akkanat, "KadiSiraceddinel-Ü

ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

This content downloaded from

positions are covered. But as a number of details still need to be investigated, I

In this connection and before anything else it is important to refer to two

0RIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

This content downloaded from

I mention these two articles because someone might ask: "Why do we

ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

This content downloaded from

2013 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta, accessed October 20,2013, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/

îo Hojjatï and Sharifzàdeh, "Pärädoks-e ekhbär," 82 ff.

ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

This content downloaded from

il Fakhr al-Dïn Räzi (d. 606/1210)

‫إيف حيتي ال تألرورضلا ؛ؤ كّكشتلا لوت انأل‬4‫ا‬

"We have a 'conception,'15 and if this conception is subjected to an affir

‫ ثالث‬3‫ أ‬instead of ‫ ةثالث‬is a feature of Middle Arabic here.

ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

This content downloaded from

ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

This content downloaded from

judgment, the subject and the predicate represent, then such a

It makes no sense to say:18

'Did you not predicate the impossibility of being predicated

Because we say: Doubts raised about things that cannot be other

17 It seems that in this passage there is an oscillation between hukm as copu

ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

This content downloaded from

According to Râzï, every belief is composed of conceptions and identical with a

ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

This content downloaded from

ghayr al-ma'lüm yamtani'al-hukm 'alayhi

s in this sentence is either of 1 or 2 below:

ghayr ma'lüm ma'lüm bi-l-lä-ma'lümiyya

Predication said to be impossible, but Predication said to be impossible, but it is

It may be useful to spell out the reason

This content downloaded from

of individual unknowns of which the impossibility of being predicated-of is

ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

This content downloaded from

The oblique objection against belief's dependence upon conception

111 Athîr al-Dïn Abhari (d. 663/1264)

is from Athîr al-Dïn Abhari's Tanzll al-afkärfi ta'dll al-asrär, in which w

ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

This content downloaded from

"It makes no sense to say:

'If it were true to say that everything predicated of is known in

ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

This content downloaded from

ORIENS 42 (2014) 397-453

This content downloaded from

iv Nasïr al-DIn Tüsl (d. 672/1274)