A Critical Assessment of the New Elite Paradigm

Author(s): Paul Cammack

Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Jun., 1990), pp. 415-420
Published by: American Sociological Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2095765
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 A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE NEW ELITE PARADIGM

PAUL CAMMACK
University of Manchester

A critical evaluation of the new elite paradigm proposed by Field, Higley and Burton
suggests that it is beset by a number ofproblems. Two issues are explored: the relationship
between consensual unity among elites and political stability, and the role of elite
settlements and two-step transformations as routes to consensual unity of elites. I argue
that the proponents of the new paradigm fail to establish the priority of political
explanations over social structural explanations for global patterns of political stability.
They also fail to develop theories of wide explanatory power from the central contentions
of classical elite theory.

In a series of recent works, Field, Higley, ian" regimes, but neither the concept nor spe-
and Burton seek to establish and develop a cific cases are discussed or developed at length.
new elite paradigm, building upon the work of Disunity is the original state of virtually all
Michels, Mosca, and Pareto. They provide: (1) national elites, and the modal pattern histori-
critical evaluations of previous elite theory and cally (Higley and Burton 1989, pp. 20-8). Trans-
proposals for its systematization and develop- formation from elite disunity to consensual unity
ment (Field and Higley 1980; Burton and Higley is an essential precondition for political stabil-
1987a); (2) accounts of relationships between ity and lasting democratic transitions (Higley
types of national elites, elite transformations, and Burton 1989, p. 21). Three historical routes
and political stability since 1500 (Field and to consensual unity are identified: special colo-
Higley 1985; Higley and Burton 1989); and (3) nial legacies where consensus is achieved prior
to national independence; elite settlements,
detailed consideration of two types of elite trans-
formation - elite settlements in England, Swe- where elites negotiate a deliberate compromise;
den, Colombia, and Venezuela (Burton and and two-step transformations, where first a
Higley 1987b) and "two-step" transformations consensually-oriented bloc gains stable major-
in France, Italy, Japan, and West Germany ity electoral support, and at a later stage a radi-
(Field, Higley, and Burton 1988). cal minority abandons its distinctive ideologi-
bidding to fill the gap resulting from the cal position, adhering to the consensus achieved
absence of a dominant paradigm in political by its adversaries (Higley and Burton 1989, p.
sociology (Burton and Higley 1987a, pp.- 235- 27; Field, Higley, and Burton 1988, pp. 5-6).
36), the authors explore and refine contentions These works represent a substantial theoreti-
regarding the inevitability of elites, the vari- cal effort aimed at re-establishing classical elite
theory on a new, superior basis. As such, the
ability of elites, and the interdependence of elites
and nonelites. Within this framework, they effort merits critical scrutiny. This critique first
advance specific global-historical comparative addresses the relationship between consensual
explanations relating to political stability and unity and political stability, then focuses upon
the emergence of democracy, and test them the inaugural processes of elite settlement and
against historical evidence. They claim that "two-step transformation."
fundamental explanations for global patterns
of political stability and the emergence of pre-
CONSENSUAL UNITY AND POLITICAL
conditions for democracy are themselves po-
STABILITY
litical rather than social, economic, cultural, or
"social structural"; and contend that they are According to the central proposition of the ne
rooted in national elite structures and transfor-elite paradigm "A disunified national elite,
mations. which is the most common type, produces a
Three elite structures are described: ideologi- series of unstable regimes that tend to oscillate
cally unified, consensually unified, and disuni- between authoritarian and democratic forms
fied. Ideological unity is ascribed to "totalitar- over varying intervals. A consensually unified

American Sociological Review, 1990,Vol. 55 (June:415-420) 415

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 416 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

national elite, which is historically much rarer, ing any formal structure or hierarchical organi-
produces a stable regime that may evolve into zation, but defining themselves and throwing
a modem democracy, as in Sweden, or Britain, up "leaders" in the course of conflict against
or the United States, if economic and other established authorities. The proponents of the
facilitative conditions permit" (Higley and new paradigm are not unaware of this possibil-
Burton 1989, pp. 17-8). ity. In order to maintain their rigid separation
National elites are defined as "persons who of elites and nonelites, they have responded to
are able, by virtue of their authoritative posi- it by including in their definition of elites "au-
tions in powerful organizations and movements thoritative positions in . . . movements of
of whatever kind, to affect national political whatever kind" that may affect national out-
outcomes regularly and substantially" (p. 18), comes regularly and substantially. By defining
or alternatively, "all those persons capable, if elites in this way, they destroy the distinction
they wish, of making substantial political troublethey otherwise carefully maintain between elites
for high officials . . . without being promptly and nonelites. The definition is so permissive
repressed" (Burton and Higley 1987b, p. 296). as to make the term "elite" extremely elastic.
A national elite is "consensually unified" when More seriously, by including in the elite lead-
"its members (1) share a largely tacit consen- ers of movements that may lack any permanent
sus about rules and codes of political conduct organizational structure any sharp differentia-
amounting to a "restrained partisanship," and tion between elites and nonelites over time is
(2) participate in a more or less comprehen- ruled out. As a result, a "fully consensual elite,"
sively integrated structure of interaction that if achieved, is unstable by definition.
provides them with relatively reliable and ef- A second problem is that in some cases
fective access to each other and to the most (Uruguay from 1904 to 1973, Chile from 1932
central decision-makers." An elite is character- to 1970-71, France from 1875 to 1940) long
ized as disunified when "its members (1) share spells of apparent political stability turn out to
few or no understandings about the proprieties eventuate in regime overthrow. Faced with this
of political conduct and (2) engage in only difficulty, Higley and Burton argue that appar-
limited and sporadic interactions across fac- ent stability may mask an "underlying condi-
tional or sectoral boundaries" (Higley and tion of elite disunity" and propose to consider a
Burton 1989, p. 19). A political regime is said regime as politically stable only if an identifi-
to be unstable "whenever government execu- able elite transformation to consensual unity
tive power is subject to irregular seizures, at- has taken place. In the absence of evidence of
tempted seizures, or widely expected seizures such a transformation, "the analyst should pre-
by force" (Higley and Burton 1989, p. 20). sume that the elite remains disunified and the
Several problems arise from these definitions regime remains unstable" (Higley and Burton
and their implications for the relationship be- 1989, p. 21). This makes the statement that a
tween consensual unity of elites and political disunified elite produces a series of unstable
stability. One concerns the dividing line be- regimes true by definition and goes against their
tween elites and nonelites. The authors claim methodological stipulation that "Criteria for
that only elites, defined as "a nation's top lead- classifying elites and outcomes must be inde-
ership in all sectors," are able to affect national pendent and tied to distinct observables"
political outcomes to the extent of forcibly (Burton and Higley 1987a, p. 230). To meet
overthrowing the regime. Otherwise, consen- this requirement in a way that supports the the-
sual unity of elites would not rule out regime ory, a definition of political instability must be
overthrow. The ability of elites and nonelites to provided, with its own independent referents,
affect national outcomes is fundamentally dif- that plausibly fits cases lacking an elite trans-
ferent. Yet the line between elites and nonelites formation to consensual unity while excluding
is blurred. Consider the implicit equation be- cases where such a transformation is claimed
tween "a nation's top leaders in all sectors", to have taken place. As they stand, the defini-
and "all those persons capable, if they wish, of tions of consensual unity and political stability
making substantial political trouble for high are circular. If long periods of apparent stabil-
officials . . . without being promptly re- ity can mask underlying instability in regimes
pressed." Serious political trouble is not always lacking a prior elite transformation, then appar-
caused by top leaders in particular sectors. It ent stability in regimes where an elite transfor-
may come from mass movements, initially lack- mation has taken place cannot be taken as inde-

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CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE NEW ELITE PARADIGM 417

pendent evidence in support of the

events.theory, forwithout
In other words, it the insistence
cannot be empirically differentiated from the on elite unity and disunity as polar opposites
latent instability said to prevail in countries rather than end points on a continuum, the case
where no settlement has been achieved. Unless for the distinctive origins of historically rare
means of identifying political instability (short states of consensual unity is greatly weakened.
of regime overthrow) are specified, we have no At the same time, the proponents of the new
independent criteria for identifying the politi- paradigm disclaim the ability to provide any
cal stability created by consensual unity among criteria by which consensual unity can be inde-
elites. pendently identified. This reluctance to enquire
A third problem arises from the dispropor- in any systematic manner into possible direct
tionality between political stability as an ab- empirical referents of elite unity detracts con-
sence of expected, attempted, or actual regime siderably from the persuasiveness of the strong
overthrow, and elite consensus as embracing claims made. In particular, it places great weight
all those capable of regularly and substantially on presumed elite settlements and two-step
affecting national political outcomes. Consid- transformations of elites.
ered in isolation, the definition of elites as "top
position-holders in the largest or most resource-
ELITE SETTLEMENTS AND TWO STEP
rich political, governmental, economic, mili-
TRANSFORMATIONS
tary, professional, communications and cultural
organizations and movements in a society" Field, Higley, and Burton attach particular
(Higley and Burton 1989, p. 18) is acceptable importance to their ability to identify elite trans-
and even conventional. But it sits uneasily be- formations from disunity to consensual unity.
side the related treatment of political stability Elite settlements are defined as "relatively rare
as terminated only by regime seizure by force. events in which warring national elite factions
The ability to affect national political outcomes suddenly and deliberately reorganize their rela-
regularly and seriously is one thing; the ability tions by negotiating compromises on their most
to mount a credible threat to overthrow a re- basic disagreements" (Burton and Higley
gime is quite another. In view of the substantial 1987b, p. 295). They are "the result of rela-
distance between the two, some differentiation tively autonomous elite choices and thus can-
between elite sectors is required. not be predicted or explained in terms of social,
A further disproportionality arises from the economic, or cultural forces," while "the con-
polarization of elite types as "consensually sensually unified elite structure created by a
unified" or "disunified." Between the sharing settlement constitutes the primary basis for
among all elites of a largely tacit consensus subsequent political stability" (Burton and
amounting to restrained partisanship on the one Higley 1987b, p. 304). Such transformations
hand, and the sharing of few or no understand- are claimed to have two main consequences:
ings about the proprieties of political conduct the creation of peaceful competition in accor-
on the other, there lies a vast space, as there dance with the norms of restrained partisan-
does between a more or less comprehensively ship, and the generation of regimes in which
integrated structure of interaction, and limited "forcible power seizures no longer occur and
and sporadic interactions across factional or are not widely expected" (Burton and Higley
sectoral boundaries. On any rough empirical 1987b, p. 295). In the most recent account, the
assessment, a substantial number of elites would latter consequence is said to follow from the
presumably fall between these two poles, cre-first, and the procedural consequence of re-
ating a continuum. Furthermore, many elites strained partisanship is supplemented by a sub-
would move back and forth over time without stantive consequence also touched upon in the
achieving consensual unity or experiencing earlier article: assured access to decision-mak-
regime breakdown. Once the idea of a contin- ing that over time allows elites to achieve their
uum is accepted, however, it seems plausible to most basic aims (Higley and Burton 1989, p.
suggest that elite consensus may come about 19).
gradually over time as different elite sectors Again, several problems arise. The explana-
move closer, or be lost as they drift apart. If so,tion for elite settlements revolves around the
there is no compelling reason for seeing elite motives of elites, and their autonomy from
settlements as necessary or identifiable, let alonepressure from nonelites. As a consequence of
as rare, dramatic, and theoretically significant costly and inconclusive conflict, "elites are

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 418 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

disposed to compromise if at all possible"
(Burton and Higley 1987b, p. 298). But since
we have already learned that frequent, costly,
and presumably inconclusive conflict is the
generic condition of disunified elites, we must
ask why all elites are not so disposed, and why
elite settlements are not the norm rather than
the exception. This directs our attention to a
further question, essential to any coherent ex-
planation and begged by the phrase "disposed
to compromise if at all possible" (emphasis
added): when is it possible for warring elites
who may wish to compromise to do so? One
answer is given: when they are not unduly
constrained by pressure from nonelites. But this
situation is held to be characteristic of coun-
tries at low levels of socio-economic develop-
ment, so all qualify at an early historical stage.
Further, no account is taken the substantive
interests of elites, although it is assumed that
after a settlement those interests are assured.
Indeed, it is argued at one point that "all four
national elites enjoyed considerable autonomy
from mass followings and pressures. Elite fac-
tions and their leaders could compromise on
questions of principle without strong pressures
to stand firm" (Burton and Higley 1987b, p.
301). This implies that followers have principles
but elites do not and that either elites have no
substantive interests to defend, or such inter-
ests do not enter into or impede settlements. If
followers relinquish their commitments to spe-
cific outcomes, elites are free to negotiate bind-
ing settlements among themselves. This appears
implausible, and is not persuasive in the ab-
sence of any discussion of the various substan-
tive interests of participating elites.
In sum, no adequate explanation is provided
for the ability of elites to achieve settlements,
as their own ability to compromise is not ex- All in all, elite settlement has not been shown
plored. The general explanation does not dif- to be causally prior to the achievement of po-
litical stability in any sense that validates a
ferentiate the four paradigmatic cases from other
cases of disunified elites and simply assumes political over a social structural analysis. At
the absence or automatic resolution of funda-
mental conflicts over substantive issues. Indeed,
Burton and Higley acknowledge that their ap-
proach does not allow them "to sort out and
look for causal connections between the vari-
ous social, economic, cultural and political
forces that may affect elite settlements"
and Higley 1987b, p. 304). Therefore, they
cannot claim to have advanced an explanation
for such settlements, nor to have provided a
better account than might be derived using the
social, economic, and cultural forces they have
declined to explore. At most, they may claim to
have identified such settlements and to have
provided a partial description of them that
remains agnostic as to their necessary or suffi-
cient causes. The lack of development of the
theory in this direction throws serious doubt on
the claim that such settlements should be viewed
as primary, fundamental, or causally prior
events that give rise to consensual unity and
political stability. There is no reason to reject
the view that such settlements, if they are a
distinctive set of events, are the possible but
not inevitable result of the prior elimination of
serious social and economic sources of elite
disunity, and remain vulnerable to the re-emer-
gence of such sources of disunity.
These considerations are reinforced by the
treatment of the English case. Burton and Higley
accept the argument, advanced by Moore and
Skocpol, that the upper class secured dominance
during the seventeenth century, but add that
"unlike them we think the crucial development
in this process was the settlement fashioned by
previously disunified, mainly upper-class elite
factions in 1688-89" (Burton and Higley 1987b,
p. 302). Here, then, class analysis is not re-
jected; on the contrary, the possible array of
elite sectors is reduced to class forces. Elite
settlements are located within a broad social
process. The view that settlement was the cru-
cial step is affirmed but not defended. Settle-
ment appears to come at the end of a larger
process, rather than to originate it. Finally, no
attempt is made to ascertain the substantive
interests of the groups involved in elite settle-
ment, or the extent to which elites or their inter-
ests may have been reshaped during and after
the years of civil war and prior to the settle-
ment.
most, the emphasis on elite settlement suggests
that a political dimension should be taken into
account. The authors claim at one point that
they "find few indications that in arranging
settlements elites were mainly reflecting broader
social or economic or cultural forces." But this
(Burton
claim is consistent with the view that elites were
setting up a system that was congruent with
social or economic accommodations reached
in the past; or were setting up a system that
would allow them to reconcile, advance, and
protect their interests in the future. The former

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CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE NEW ELITE PARADIGM 419

possibility is already covered by the willing- settlements were neither comprehensive nor
ness to accept that the outcome of the civil warsuddenly concluded. Significant and fairly
was a government of landlords, while the latter unusual acts of sudden and deliberate compro-
is suggested by the authors themselves: "the mise between some elite factions took place,
settlements apparently grew out of deliberate, but consensually unified elites were not cre-
relatively autonomous elite choices among an ated as a result. Third, no empirical evidence is
provided concerning acceptance of procedural
array of possible strategies for protecting their
diverse factional interests" (Burton and Higley norms, restrained partisanship, and effective
1987b, p. 302). We are never told how upper- access, despite their significance for the settle-
class elites got into a position to make such ment. In sum, the unique character of elite set-
"deliberate, relatively autonomous" choices. No tlements as sudden and deliberate resolution of
defense is mounted against an alternative ex- differences that incorporates all elites and en-
planation that seems consistent with the facts: sures political stability is not established. Elite
elite settlement, while not inevitable, was pos- settlements become difficult to distinguish from
sible only because of a reordering of class forces myriads of other successful broad alliances
during and after the civil war. A process of against ruling regimes throughout history.
unification of a dominant class and establish- A final neglected issue concerns the mecha-
ment of hegemony may have culminated in nisms by which elite settlements might be pro-
settlement, but it did not consist solely of that jected into the future. The failure to provide
settlement. It was a protracted, multi-faceted any account of such mechanisms stems from a
process in which the resolution of fundamental problem that appears when the static and dy-
social and economic sources of conflict may namic treatments of elite consensus are com-
still merit explanatory priority. If so, the para- pared. Consensual unity is characterized by tacit
digm at best offers a possible alternative to classconsensus on the rules of the game and effec-
analysis rather than a refutation of it. tive access. Yet over time the rules of the game.
Another issue concerns the extent to which cease to command general support and change,
elite settlements fulfill the conditions required sometimes in an atmosphere of considerable
for the generation of consensual elites. First, conflict and dissent, after elite settlements have
they are not comprehensive, as elites ruling at taken place. Such developments do not violate
the time of the settlement are excluded. The the rule of political stability so long as they do
definition specifically refers to a sudden and not lead to regime overthrow; yet they clearly
deliberate reorganization of relations between contradict the characterization of elite consen-
previously warring elites. A true elite settle- sus. In part, such conflicts represent the incor-
ment, therefore, would presumably be struck poration of new elites, which may be facili-
between currently warring factions in and out tated by the consensual framework previously
of power, not between previously hostile fac- established as a result of settlement. But they
tions currently out of power who combine to also involve the downgrading or elimination of
regain it. Burton and Higley specifically note old elites. If elites that participated in original
that their settlements were not comprehensive, settlements are later excluded, they have either
and point to the need to "distinguish between been forced out, or accepted new rules that deny
the initial, basic settlement and its subsequent them access. Neither alternative is compatible
consolidation" (Burton and Higley 1987b, p. with the paradigm. If the rules of the game can
299). They acknowledge that the ousted rulers cease to command a consensus and change, and
and other groups were initially excluded, but if effective access can be lost, then there is no
fail to admit to the necessary consequences for once-and-for-all settlement, only a continual
their theory. process of negotiation among changing elite
Second, no attempt is made to establish that groups, jointly commanding more or less com-
all other elites were involved. On the contrary, prehensive support, some rising and some fall-
considerable emphasis is given to the point that ing through history and sharing a varying de-
those engaged in negotiation were primarily gree of consensus. The authors of the new para-
leading politicians from previous regimes. By digm cannot easily address this issue, for if they
the authors' own account, only political elites did the case for elite settlement as a distinctive
were involved in England, Sweden, and Co- and significant episode, and the sharp distinc-
lombia, and only political and business leaderstion between elite unity and disunity, would be
in Venezuela. On the present evidence, these gravely damaged.

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 420 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

The recent themselves

description of political
the rather than "social struc-
"two-step" tra
formation to consensual unity (Field, Higley, tural" is not supported. In the final analysis,
and Burton 1988) compounds the problem by political stability is inferred from a previous
reversing the analytical procedure reflected in elite settlement. Yet if the polar states of elite
the discussion of elite settlements. While else- unity and disunity are reinterpreted as a contin-
where the argument has rested upon the identi- uum, there appears to be no role for such sud-
fication of moments of elite transformation, den and distinctive elite transformations. Fi-
without which we must assume that apparent nally, the emphasis upon once-and-for-all elite
stability is still precarious, the authors now take settlements turns out to be unsustained empiri-
political stability as given and set themselves cally as regards the originating event, and theo-
the task of finding evidence of elite movement retically deficient as regards the mechanisms
to consensual unity. They state: "Few students by which stability is sustained over time. The
of comparative politics would dispute the as- methodology by which such settlements are ap-
sertion that France, Italy, Japan and West Ger- proached is reversed when two-step transfor-
many are today stable democracies" (Field et mations are considered. All in all, it does not
al. 1988, p. 1), then seek to identify two-step appear that theories of wide explanatory power
transformations in these countries. In the struc- have yet been developed out of the contention
ture of the argument, which now infers consen- that national elite structure and transformations
sual unity and looks for turning points to serve and lasting political stability are intimately
as the two steps that will justify the model, the connected.
authors are suggesting in practice that the
PAUL CAMMACK is Senior Lecturer in the Department
achievement of elite consensus is a gradual and of Government, University of Manchester, UK. He
incomplete process and a matter of degree rather spent the academic year 1988-9 as AdjunctAssociate
than abrupt transformation. Furthermore, by Professor in the Department of Government,
arguing that political stability can be unerringly University of Texas at Austin. His primary field of
identified, and that what preceded it must there- research is Latin American and Third Worldpolitics,
fore have been the achievement of consensual but he is also currently researching competing
unity of elites, the method by which elite settle-theoretical paradigms in the social sciences, and
theories of the state.
ments were explored is reversed. In the first
case, elite settlements were initially identified,
and what followed was political stability; in the REFERENCES
second case, political stability is identified first,
and then it is argued that what preceded it were Burton, Michael G. and John Higley. 1987a. "Invi-
tation to Elite Theory." Pp. 133-43 in Power Elites
transformations (in two stages) to elite unity.
and Organizations, edited by G. William Dom-
hoff and Thomas R. Dye. Newbury Park, CA:
CONCLUSION Sage.
. 1987b. "Elite Settlements." American
The proponents of the new elite paradigm Sociological
have Review 52:295-307.
pinned their hopes upon its ability to provide Field, G. Lowell and John Higley. 1980. Elitism.
theories of broad explanatory power. At pres- London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
ent, however, it is beset with fundamental prob- . 1985. "National Elites and Political Sta-
lems. The dividing line between elites and bility." Pp. 1-44 in Research in Politics and Soci-
nonelites is blurred, and no attempt is made to ety: The Structure of National Elite Groups, vol.
differentiate between elite sectors. The charac- 1, edited by Gwen Moore. Greenwich, CT: JAI
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is no independent basis for the empirical verifi- Field, G. Lowell, John Higley, and Michael G.
cation of the states of unity and disunity. Like-
wise, no basis is given for discriminating be-
tween political stability and instability. The
explanation for the elite transformations that
are the central focus of the paradigm does not
distinguish the four paradigmatic cases from
countless other cases of elite disunity; and the
claim that explanations of political events are
Burton. 1988. "Elite Transformations in France,
Italy, Japan and West Germany since World War
II." Paper delivered to XIVth World Congress of
the International Political Science Association,
Washington DC.
Higley, John and Michael G. Burton. 1989. "The
Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and
Breakdowns." American Sociological Review
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