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Understanding the Revival of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

since FATA’s Merger
Article in Asian Survey · July 2023

DOI: 10.1525/as.2023.1997845
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AISHA YOUNUS, TASAWAR HUSSAIN, AND SHEHRYAR KHAN
Understanding the Revival of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

since FATA’s Merger
ABSTRACT
How can we understand the resurgence of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in
the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)? Framing FATA as
a Zomian space, we argue that its “friction of terrain” provided nonstate spaces
for the emergence as well as the resurgence of TTP. The literature describes
TTP as an outcome of global political and security compulsions, Islamabad’s
regional policies, and ideological associations with the Afghan Taliban. The
present study adds terrain to the discussion. Islamabad, after militarily
destroying TTP, announced the FATA merger in 2018. However, TTP’s revival
not only problematizes the state’s role but also affirms the continuation of
Zomian character: the nonstate spaces that facilitated TTP’s ability to regroup
and thrive again. James C. Scott’s Zomia framework is tested here against
empirical realities with the help of both primary and secondary data sources.
K E Y W O R D S : Zomia, nonstate space, FATA merger, revival, Tehrik-i-
Taliban Pakistan
T HE HILLY BORDERLAND between Pakistan and Afghanistan became signifi-

cant in regional and global politics in 2001. In this context, the US-led
international coalition against terrorism launched military operations against
the terrorists (al-Qaeda and their hosts, the Taliban) in Afghanistan. Many of
them fled and took refuge in the tribal areas of Pakistan. According to one
report, after the military operation Enduring Freedom, several militants and
AISHA YOUNUS is Assistant Professor in the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-
Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan. Email: aishayounus@qau.edu.pk. TASAWAR HUSSAIN is
Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Social Sciences, Iqra University, Islamabad, Pakistan. Email:
pop11th@gmail.com. SHEHARYAR KHAN is Associate Professor in the Faculty of Social Sciences, Iqra
University, Islamabad, Pakistan. Email: sheharyar.khan@iqraisb.edu.pk.
Asian Survey, pp. 1–29. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2023 by The Regents of the
University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or
reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Reprints and Permissions web
page, https://www.ucpress.edu/journals/reprints-permissions. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1525/
as.2023.1997845.
1
2 ASIAN SURVEY 2023
the organizers of the terrorist attacks in the United States, Osama bin Laden
and other al-Qaeda members, took refuge in the tribal belt (Rashid 2009, 96–
99). After reorganizing, these militants launched an armed campaign against
the international forces in Afghanistan. Many like-minded individuals and
groups from the tribal areas and the heartland of Pakistan also joined. Even-
tually, this area became a hub of militant activity and was declared the most
dangerous place in the world (Gul 2009, 2010; Nawaz 2009, v).
To dismantle these militants’ safe haven, Islamabad ordered its troops into
the tribal areas. Constitutionally, FATA was constructed as a “special zone”
to ensure state-free, independent, traditional living in the hills. Eventually, in
2007, an anti-state movement, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (the Pakistan Tal-
iban Movement, TTP), was launched against the state’s presence in this
region. To counter TTP, the Pakistan army began a series of military opera-
tions, which formally continued up to 2016. After claiming success against
TTP, In 2018 Islamabad announced the merger of FATA into its Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Province. But the recent resurgence of TTP problema-
tizes these claims and raises the question: How can we understand the resur-
gence of TTP since the merger?
The literature offers several competing explanations of TTP’s militancy.
Some studies explain tribal militancy by connecting it to poor socioeconomic
conditions. Karen von Hippel (2010), Stuart Gottlieb (2010), and Robert
Kemp (2008) have all suggested that poverty, unemployment, and depleted
socioeconomic conditions provide a nurturing environment for militant atti-
tudes. In personal communications, the former ambassador of Pakistan,
Ayyaz Wazir (2013), and senator Dost Muhammad Mehsud (2023d) affirmed
that the poor become natural recruits for militancy. However, James A.
Piazza (2006, 2010) and Daniel Pipes (2002) have suggested that militancy
is a multidimensional phenomenon. In the tribal areas, the socioeconomic
conditions of tribesmen have generally been poor, yet militancy has largely
been restricted to a few (Aftab 2008; Johnson and Mason 2008; Shinwari
2010). Most of the tribes have been peaceful.
Militancy has also been associated with Islamabad’s jihadi (holy war)
policies in this region. Islamabad supported jihad for strategic interests in
Indian-held Kashmir and Afghanistan. For this purpose, a network of
madaris (seminaries) was established where the Pakistani state trained and
equipped tribesmen for jihad (Abbas 2005; Haqqani 2010; Zahab 2002).
Moreover, many tribal lashkars (volunteer forces) were formed to fight in
YOUNUS, HUSSAIN, AND KHAN / UNDERSTANDING THE REVIVAL OF TEHRIK-I-TALIBAN 3
Indian-held Kashmir and to neutralize the Pakhtun ethnic sentiments on the

Pakistani side of the Durand Line (Fair 2011; Jalal 2017; Nawaz 2008; Siddi-
que 2013). During the Soviet–Afghan War, jihadis (holy fighters), in collab-
oration with international jihadi militants, fought the Soviets in Afghanistan
(Amin 1984; Coll 2004). Later, this force was directed to support Islamabad’s
pro-Taliban policies in Afghanistan (Hussain 2005; Mir 2013). Islamabad did
nurture a jihadi force, which eventually established connections with the
Afghan Taliban and transnational militants. Thus, in the context of the US’s
withdrawal from Afghanistan, the resurgence of TTP have been understood
as consequences of global and regional political realities and Islamabad’s
policy response to them. The suggestion that TTP is an outcome of Islama-
bad’s policies is relevant, but it does not explain why the state itself became
a victim or target of militancy.
PRIMARY ARGUMENT AND CONTRIBUTION
The purpose of this paper is not to disqualify the above-mentioned explana-

tions. Instead it aims to enrich our understanding by adding “terrain” as
a new perspective on TTP’s militant behavior. TTP has been framed here
as an anti-state movement, an expression of resentment against the state’s
alleged presence in its zone of autonomy. In this paper, it is argued that the
militant tribal attitude has been significantly shaped by the terrain. James C.
Scott’s (2009) Zomia framework suggests that in hilly peripheral and bor-
derland regions, many state-evading movements have been launched to retain
freedom from the state. Their relative statelessness renders these areas a hub
or safe haven for all those who aspire to evade the state for various reasons.
Thus, a terrain-based understanding of TTP’s militant behavior, explaining
both its emergence and resurgence, is the original contribution of this study.
This paper not only discusses the impact of terrain on militancy but also
elaborates on the relationship between hill tribes and the larger state.
METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION
Using a qualitative research framework, data were collected from empirical

facts and historical references. In terms of primary documents, the 1973
Constitution of Pakistan, the 31st Amendment to the Constitution (on
FATA’s merger into KP Province), and legal documents extending the
4 ASIAN SURVEY 2023
jurisdiction of the High and Supreme Courts of Pakistan to FATA are

significant. In the field, the authors have conducted extensive interviews with
eminent scholars, journalists, and locals from the ex-FATA region. The inter-
views were unstructured and largely aimed at addressing the reasons and
factors leading to TTP’s anti-state militancy in pre- and post-merger FATA.
Secondary sources were books, journal articles, reports, international maga-
zines, and Pakistani newspapers.
The discussion is presented in three sections. The first section establishes
the nature and character of terrain-based militancy, using Scott’s Zomia
framework. It suggests that the hilly, rugged, and inaccessible terrain of
Zomia’s peripheral borderland areas constitutes nonstate spaces. In Zomia,
many state-evading movements have been observed aiming to achieve state-
free living in the hills. Whenever the valley state encroaches on or tries to
incorporate Zomia, it becomes a site of resentment and resistance.
The second section frames the ex-FATA region as a Zomian space. It
explains that FATA’s construction as a “special zone” was mutual; both the
valley state and the people of FATA contributed to establishing nonstate
spaces in the Pakistan–Afghanistan borderland. After 2001, when the Paki-
stani Army entered this region, the state-evading militant movement TTP
grew. Here, TTP is framed as an anti-state movement safeguarding its zone of
autonomy in the hills. But in 2018, after completing military operations and
claiming success against TTP, Islamabad incorporated FATA into KP
Province.
The third section discusses that the revival of TTP problematizes the
state’s claims of success against this militant group. It also questions the
effectiveness of the state’s presence and its merger policy by contending that
the Zomian characteristics are still alive and kicking, providing a safe haven
for TTP to re-emerge and thrive in the tribal areas.
ZOMIA: THE LAND OF STATELESSNESS
In the political world of states, the hilly, peripheral border regions have been
constituted as state-free zones. This proposition forms the central theme of
James C. Scott’s seminal work, The Art of Not Being Governed (2009). He
called all these relatively nonstate spaces Zomia. The name is derived from
zomi, which signifies “highlander in a number of Chin–Mizo–Kuki languages
spoken in Burma, India, and Bangladesh” (ix). Scott did not coin this term
but borrowed it from Willem van Schendel (2002). Technically, it represents

“all lands at altitude . . . [the] largest remaining region of the world whose
people have not yet been fully incorporated into nation-states” (647).
In the broader context of area studies, van Schendel’s seminal work,
“Geographies of Knowing, Geographies of Ignorance” (2002) questions the
naturalization of heartland and marginalized regions, respectively. Zomia
represents the forgotten lands and may be identified on the basis of
internal consistency . . . shared ideas, related lifeways, and long-standing cul-

tural ties . . . language affinities (for example, Tibeto-Burman languages),
religious commonalities (for example, community religions and, among the
universalistic religions, Buddhism and Christianity), cultural traits (for
example, kinship systems, ethnic scatter zones), ancient trade networks, and
ecological conditions (for example, mountain agriculture). (653–54)
However, he contends that such areas are not “static, timeless containers of
historicity” but have been socially constructed (658). In 2007, van Schendel
revised his Zomia region, originally comprising “Kashmir, North India, Nepal,
Tibet, Sikkim, Bhutan, Northeast India, the Chittagong Hill Tracts (Bangla-
desh), Burma, Yunnan, and Sichuan (China), Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam,”
to include the Pakistan and Afghanistan borderland(Michaud 2010, 188).
Willem van Schendel mainly investigates Zomia to underscore discrepan-
cies in area studies, which have been the primary reason for its marginaliza-
tion. A detailed investigation into the relationship between Zomia and its
respective states has not been carried out. The hill people have not only
maintained their unique sociocultural structures but also escaped the state.
Dwelling on this, Scott explains the relationship between Zomia and the
valley state as “strategic positioning” that facilitates retaining state-free living
in the hills.
Zomia’s Characteristics
Scott’s Zomian construction embodies certain material and social factors. First,
the friction of the terrain renders Zomia inaccessible and thus provides a natural
defense against the state. Scott explains that “hilly . . . jungly . . . narrow, and
torturous” land tracts that are impenetrable except “by the regular paths” create
nonstate spaces. The geography precludes accessibility and, therefore, state
presence in the region. The hill people have used this “friction of terrain” as
6 ASIAN SURVEY 2023
a strategy to counteract the state’s controlling actions, “destroying bridges,

ambushing or booby-trapping passes and defiles, felling trees along roads,
cutting telephone and telegraph wires, and so forth” (Michaud 2010, 211–
12). These strategies resemble guerrilla warfare in taking advantage of the
terrain for various reasons. Any militant resistance in Zomia has the poten-
tial not only to escape the state but also to initiate a movement that could
evolve into a substantive security threat for the valley state.
Second, “statelessness” may be understood as a consequence of the friction
of terrain. Scott termed Zomia the “shattered zone” for its lack of infrastruc-
ture, roads, and state institutions, which makes it difficult for the state to
access and control. Thus Zomia becomes a safe haven for banned religious
sects, rebels, defeated armies, asylum seekers and others who are fleeing state
taxes, forced labour, epidemics, warfare, and so on (Scott 2009, 157).
Third, a traditional sociocultural and political way of life is clearly observed
in Zomia. These structures are egalitarian, acephalous, and tribal (segmen-
tary, unilineal descent groupings). This social organization facilitates physical
mobility, dispersion, and fusion or fission into larger or smaller units on short
notices (Scott 2009, 217–19). Overall, these mobile social structures and oral
culture and history segregate the hills from the valley state (235). The absence
of hierarchy ensures autonomy and freedom because a “highly egalitarian
social structure makes it difficult for a state to extend its control through
local chiefs and headmen” (279). Indeed, chiefs have been deposed in Zomia
for being the state’s interlocutors.
Fourth, prophetic or millenarian movements are common in Zomia.
Whenever the state asserts itself, for various internal or external reasons,
secessionist movements grow or armed resistance develops (294). In these
movements, the otherwise egalitarian tribes unite under a religious leader to
thwart the state’s efforts to control them. A resistance movement, largely
framed as a religious movement, also has the potential to forge unity between
hill and valley and so may pose a serious threat to the valley state.
The Zomia framework is relevant because it elucidates how terrain shapes
the relationship between the state and the hill people. Some, however, have
argued that it is not new, suggesting that it has already been called out as the
Southeast Asian Massif (Lieberman 2010, 333). Lieberman also pointed to
empirical and factual discrepancies in it (337). The Zomian explanation has
been further criticized for ignoring internal dynamics and sociocultural and
religious influences from the valley state to the hills and vice versa. There is
also a question about the influence of natural and built environments, along
with unexpected occurrences or accidents (Brookfield 2011; Marolt 2014).
Given their diversity, Michaud (2010, 202–03) believes that each Zomian
space is a unique case for analysis. And given this uniqueness, one may
observe diversity in state-evading movements or strategies from one Zomian
space to another (Kreutzmann 2013, 169). One might also explore the pres-
ence of Zomian thinking or characteristics in areas other than those men-
tioned by Scott (Shneiderman 2010, 293).
For the purposes of the present study, the ex-FATA region is described as
a Zomian space. In the next section we discuss the Zomiafication of the tribal
borderland and classify TTP as a state-evading movement.
THE EX-FATA REGION: A ZOMIAN SPACE
In this section, the Zomiafication of the ex-FATA region is discussed in light

of itspreviously mentioned characteristics.
Inaccessibility of Terrain
The region encompasses over 27,000 square kilometers, including a 600-

kilometer-long border with Afghanistan. It is mountainous terrain that spans
the Himalaya, Pamir, and Hindu Kush mountain ranges. Its three parts
(north, center, and south) are home to seven agencies (or districts): Bajaur,
Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, and North and South Waziristan.
Bajaur and Mohmand are in the north, between the Swat and Kabul Rivers.
Khyber, Kurram, and Orakzai lie in the center. The hilly south, between the
Gomal and Kabul Rivers, is divided into North and South Waziristan. On
three sides, it is bounded by six Frontier Regions: Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan,
Kohat, Lakki, Peshawar, and Tank; on the western side, the Durand Line
forms the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The “friction of terrain”
(a hilly, rugged region), inadequate transportation infrastructure, lack of
military technology, and poor demographic conditions have inhibited the
incorporation of these areas into the larger state.
Tribes and Traditional Social Structures
This region is home to Pakhtun tribes whose dwellings have ended up on

both sides of the Durand Line. Zomian societies are largely tribalized, with
8 ASIAN SURVEY 2023
oral genealogies and histories. Scott (2009, 30) correctly stated that
“ethnicity and tribe began, by definition, where sovereignty and taxes
ended.” Pakhtun tribes are essentially unilineal, acephalous, and egalitarian
in character. They may be divided into valley and hill tribes, called qalang
(ranked) and nang (honor), respectively (Ahmed 1993, 199; Goodhand
2012, 335). The qalang settled in the valleys, while the nang occupied the
hills of Zomia.
The nang tribes that largely occupied the western frontier hills are self-
governing units with a strong tradition of invasions and raids, and thus are
largely known as warriors. Their mobile and egalitarian-unilineal social struc-
tures not only thwart any internal hierarchy but also keep the state at a dis-
tance. The absence of a state does not entail disorder; in fact, they administer
lives according to the oral culture called Pakhtunwali, the Pakhtun code of
life. The sociopolitical life of nang tribes is more aligned with Pakhtunwali
(Ahmed 1976, 74, 1980, 89; Barth 1981, 105–06; Lindholm 1982; Spain 2011).
The qalang are also supposed to follow the code, but the tribal and cultural
ties among these tribes have been weakened by their adherence to the laws
and rules of the valley state (Ahmed 1980, 94).
The hill Pakhtuns, or nang, rely more on Islamic symbols and practice
them vehemently as a manifestation of their “Muslimness.” Emphasizing
symbols, Pakhtuns accept Islam not as a theology but as a cultural system
(Ahmed 1984, 311). The qalang societies are more aligned with the larger
state’s religious orientations. Despite these differences, one may not rule out
greater religious connections between nang and qalang as well as with the
valley state at large.
Relative Statelessness
The valley state somehow has a minimal presence in the tribal areas
through an indirect system of administration. This region was accorded
“special status” under the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan. Per Article 246,
it was divided into two domains: Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). The exec-
utive authority of the federal government was extended to FATA, while
the Provincial Executive exercised authority over PATA. Article 247 fur-
ther explained the unique status of FATA by suggesting that neither any
act of the Parliament nor the verdict of the High and Supreme Courts of
Pakistan would apply here. Instead, it was managed by Frontier Crimes

Regulation (FCR).
The “special status” of FATA was in accord with the administrative struc-
ture introduced by the British colonial power. This system was based on the
FCR (1901), which established principles of administration through jirgas
(tribal councils of elders), permitted collective punishment, and invested the
central government with extraordinary powers (Khan 2010, 70–71; White
and Malik 2012, 1). The British influence was administered through a network
of political agents. Supported by assistants (tehsildar) and deputy political
agents, political agents enjoyed extensive powers with almost no accountabil-
ity (Fazli 2011). They exercised influence in tribal society through selected
maliks or lungis (representatives of sub-tribes or clans largely known as tribal
elders, or mashers), who were rewarded with mojib (allowances) for their
loyalty (Baha 1978; Devji 2012, 34–35). The political agent could also convoke
khassadars or local police, who were at the disposal of the maliks, per the
requirement for security.
After 1947, the provisions of the FCR (1901) were challenged and subse-
quently modified in 1993, 1997, and 2011 (Fazli 2011; Khan 2010; News Inter-
national 2011). However, for lack of preparatory groundwork, the
amendments were not implemented (Jalalzai 2011). Overall, the implementa-
tion of FCR cast the “special status” of the ex-FATA region as “tribal” and
thus “uncivilized,” as maintained by the British colonial rulers on the Indian
subcontinent (Hopkins 2015, 375). Islamabad continued “managing” rather
than “governing” Pashtuns “as imperial objects who could be acted
upon . . . often violently—with no promise of colonial justice . . . who instead
were characterized as ‘independent tribes’ inhabiting the liminal lands of the
tribal agencies” (Hopkins 2020, 28–30). As a result, the state-making process,
state institutions, and infrastructure were neither properly established nor
sustained.
What distinguishes FATA from other hilly and border regions of Pakistan
is the absence of a strict hierarchical structure and a tradition of not being
formally conquered or controlled by the state or any other external power. As
mentioned, van Schendel regards both Kashmir and tribal areas as Zomian
space because of their similar lifestyles and shared culture (Figure 1). How-
ever, his main thrust is to highlight the construction of Zomia as an “area of
ignorance,” a judgement which is subjective and influenced by domestic,
regional, and global political practices. With an inward-looking approach,
10 ASIAN SURVEY 2023
figure 1. Van Schendel’s Zomia from 2002 and 2007, Plotted Together on a Map by the
Author
Scott constructs Zomia in terms of its relationship to the valley state to

suggest that state repulsion has been its general political behavior. But the
Zomian characteristics are not natural or fixed and may vary in the presence
of formal hierarchies or in varied contexts. Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan may
be identified as “areas of ignorance,” but historically they have been governed
by strict hierarchical structures of kings or mahrajas (local rulers) and thus
may not qualify for Scott’s Zomia classification (Figure 2).
In the present study, Scott’s Zomia classification is extended beyond
Southeast Asia in order to construct FATA as a nonstate space. The egalitar-
ian tribal social structures, where everyone claims to be a leader and a warrior,
inhibit any formal hierarchy. As discussed earlier, the British policy of indi-
rect rule was not aimed at governing but at administering the tribes to
maintain peace in the borderlands. For that purpose, they exercised influence
through maliks, or tribal elders, who functioned as interlocutors between
tribes and the British Empire. After 1947, the Pakistani state retained this
system and did not extend its formal presence and control into this region.
Eventually, the tribal areas became a safe haven for all those fleeing the state
(Abbas 2014, 33–34).
figure 2. Scott’s Zomia (2009)
TTP: A State-Evading Movement
Theoretically, one may observe both defensive and offensive state-avoiding

strategies in Zomia. The defensive strategies include “avoiding taxes, corvee,
and political suppression [and] subsisting on swidden agriculture, hunting,
and collecting”; on the offensive side, military confrontation with the state
was used to establish a polity under religious leadership (Scott 2009, 305).
The offensive rebellion is a “prophetic movement,” a violent ingathering of
peoples carrying out resistance to the lowland states by disrupting or threat-
ening routines of administration and tributary relations (283–84).
One may observe a number of prophets simultaneously involved in leading
or mobilizing people. But only those with “larger followings” and “more
audacious goals” become eminent (Scott 2009, 312). Declaring village heads
or tribal elders allies of the state, a prophet might issue an edict demanding
their execution or their expulsion from the village (304–05). Subsequently,
when followers “burn their bridges,” a small-scale prophetic movement trans-
forms into a larger “millenarian movement” aiming at creating a new world
through radical change (312). Generally, religious leaders project resistance in
a religious or ethical framework or for the reasons of association with a king

or prophet or shared history, and thus create some degree of equality
between highlands and lowlands (305–07). On the basis of this common-
ality, these movements may become widespread in both hills and valleys
simultaneously.
Overall, millenarian movements are framed as divine (total, ultimate, and
irrevocable) and with an intent to change the existing social order. When
mobilized by messianic leaders, the followers of millenarian movements dis-
play their enthusiasm and asceticism in a wild and frenzied manner (Talmon
1966, 166–72). Interestingly, these leaders or prophets may belong to mar-
ginalized or underprivileged social strata but might have been elevated
socially due to an accident or a leap of faith. In any case, prophets play
a paramount role in molding “millennial tendencies into a persuasive
ideology” (Adas 1979, 92). Organizationally, these movements may vary in
their leadership, the cohesion and stability of their structure, and the number
and character of their followers (Talmon 1966, 171). Whenever the movement
suffers a setback, it goes undercover until it senses a greater chance of flour-
ishing and progressing.
All millenarian movements may not be identified strictly by these crite-
ria, as they may appear in different contexts and times that may impact their
outlook. Still, TTP may be identified as a millenarian or prophetic move-
ment given its messianic or prophetic leadership, which has encompassed
various leaders or prophets simultaneously, its message of salvation, and its
mission of jihad against infidels (non-Muslim forces and their Muslim
supporters—the Pakistani state), which has been total, ultimate, imminent,
and irrevocable in essence (Younus 2015). In aiming for revolutionary social
change it has introduced an alternative state structure, and, last but not
least, its loose structure means that fusion and fission can be accomplished
on short notice.
Zahab (2020) notes that most of TTP’s recruitment was based on kashars,
or underprivileged people, the landless, shopkeepers, the downtrodden, and
unemployed youth. They aspired toward change and for that reason deposed
the pro-status-quo mashars: privileged people, including tribal elders and
maliks (118, 130). Meanwhile, its religiously interpreted and violent model
of socioeconomic change not only demarcated TTP from the secular, non-
violent nationalist movement of qalang Pakhtuns but also posed a serious
security threat to the valley state (Ghufran 2009).
TTP’s Millenarianism in the Hills
TTP has been a loosely structured umbrella organization with recruits from
almost all tribal agencies. According to one estimate, there were 27 militant
groups from South and North Waziristan, including people from Kurram
Agency, Orakzai Agency, Bajaur Agency, Mohmand Agency, Darra Adam
Khel, Swat Valley, Buner, Upper Dir, Lower Dir, Bannu, Lakki Marwat,
Tank, Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, Mardan, and Kohat (Yusufzai 2008). In
addition, many militant groups from mainland Pakistan that have ideological
associations with it, such as the Punjabi Taliban, have joined TTP (Fair 2011;
Hussain 2012; Rana 2013; Riikonen 2010). TTP has been located in FATA
because it provided nonstate spaces and therefore became a safe haven for all
those rejecting the state.
The name of this resistance movement, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, sug-
gests a relationship to the Afghan Taliban. This relationship was reflected
when TTP leaders—Baitullah Mehsud, Hakimullah Mehsud, and others—
vowed loyalty and allegiance to the Afghan Taliban commander Mullah
Omer. They also joined his cause: jihad against a common enemy, the
US-led international forces in Afghanistan. Batullah Mehsud, the founder
of TTP, hailed from a poor socioeconomic background but was celebrated as
a savior from the “foreign” and “un-Islamic” military interference and influ-
ences in the tribal area. He wanted to enforce sharia (the Islamic code of
living), establish an alternative administrative structure, and fight off the US–
NATO forces in Afghanistan (Rashid 2013; Siddique 2010, 4–7). TTP leaders
not only criticized the Pakistani government for supporting an un-Islamic
war in Afghanistan but also declared it an “infidel state” to justify jihad
against it (Hussain 2010, 119–20).
Jihad has always been a symbol of tribal religion and martial tradition.
However, waging it against an Islamic state, Pakistan, was a manifestation of
Ibn-e-Tamiya’s idea of takfir (jihad against a Muslim state or ruler considered
as infidel) (Knudsen 2003, 1; Lahoud 2005, 14–18). It portrays Islam as
antithesis to the Westernization, secularization, and materialism which
threaten Muslim societies; thus it aims for the salvation of Muslims (Appleby
2002, 506–09). These ideas were ingrained during the Soviet–Afghan War
(1979–1988), when tribes established close connections with Arab jihadis.
Through this ideological association, the tribal areas became a safe haven
for all like-minded individuals, militant groups from lowland Pakistan
(the Punjabi Taliban and banned jihadi groups from the valley state), and
transnational militants (Siddiqa 2013).
As a US ally in the “global war on terror” in Afghanistan, the Pakistani
state started its first military operation in Azam Warsak, South Waziristan, on
June 22, 2002. The reaction of the pro-Taliban tribal factions was quite
negative (Dawn News 2002). Despite assurances that the tribes would be
allowed to handle the issue—the expulsion of foreign militants—on their
own, the Pakistan Army continued military operations in this area, which
were called Al Mizan (2002–06) and Rah-e-Haq (2007) (Shahzad 2011). By
2007, many peace agreements had been concluded between dissenting tribes
and the state, with tribal elders and maliks as intermediaries, in which Isla-
mabad promised noninterference in the tribal areas (Dawn News 2002).
Where the state failed to comply with the terms of peace agreements, the
state representatives in tribal areas (tribal elders or maliks) were deposed
(Jones and Fair 2010, 55–56). Arguably, this was a rejection of not just the
state but also its ideological stance in the “war on terror,” in which Islamabad
joined the US-led coalition. As previously discussed, inspired by the ideas of
takfir, the tribes declared Islamabad an infidel and therefore a “foreign” state
and declared jihad against it in the hills and beyond, which also brought
civilian killings and bombings in the valley state. Eventually, maliks were
replaced by religiously motivated prophets called mullahs in the tribal society.
Historically, mullahs played a significant role in violently resisting any
foreign or external presence in FATA. For instance, Mullah Powindha
became a symbol of freedom in the fight against the British military excur-
sions in this region. He was involved in mobilizing, plotting, and carrying out
numerous attacks on British forces (Alikuzai 2013, 295, 300; Tribal Analysis
Center 2012). Paradoxically, Pakhtuns, who have never been subject to any
internal or external authority, may unify in the name of Islam and in the
presence of a “common enemy” (Hauner 1981, 184–85; Marwat, Khan, and
Kakakhel 1993, 235–36). Eventually, FATA became an epicenter for the train-
ing and planning of attacks around the world (Iqbal 2010, 5–6; Stenersen
2009). This suggested that the tribal militancy, which was initially launched
to preserve tribal autonomy and freedom, now had larger millenarian objec-
tives. By associating it with foreign militants and the Afghan Taliban, TTP
demonstrated a potential to attract transnational jihadis from all over the
world. Moreover, the inclusion of jihadi groups from lowland Pakistan sug-
gested a wider ideological appeal and operational scope for TTP in the valley
state (Tellis 2008, 4–9). Finally, a rise in militant activities, protests, bomb
blasts, and suicide bombings was recorded across Pakistan.
David J. Kilcullen (2009a, 224) estimated that 90% of TPP’s militant
behavior was shaped by the terrain. He quoted Akbar S. Ahmed, an anthro-
pologist and a former political agent of FATA, as stating that TTP’s militant
behavior has been shaped by terrain and by tribal social structures. He further
noted that “you have to know their game and learn to play it, which means
you first have to understand their environment” (2009b). At times of intru-
sion, they coalesce and rise to demonstrate “resistance and control” on the
borderland. The mobile social structures allowed fission and fusion on short
notice, rendering guerilla warfare—hit and run—a natural fighting strategy.
The tribes inflicted harm indiscriminately, attacking “defenseless schoolgirls
or military and political officials . . . individuals as symbols of something
bigger than the victim represents, such as the state itself” (Ahmed 2013, 76).
Nevertheless, in 2016, after a series of military operations in the tribal
region (Zalzala, 2008; Sher Dil, 2008; Rah-e-Rast, 2009; Rah-e-Nijat,
2009; Zarb-e-Azb, 2014), the Pakistani state officially declared victory over
TTP. TTP fissured away or went undercover in the tribal society, in adjacent
Afghan provinces, or in the valley state, to reappear at another time of its
convenience. In 2018, Pakistan announced FATA’s merger into KP Province
in a bid to mainstream the hill societies.
FATA MERGER AND THE RESURGENCE OF TTP
The 31st Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan enacted FATA’s merger

into KP Province. Domestically, the main thrust of the merger was to
improve socioeconomic conditions by initiating development projects, cre-
ating employment opportunities, enhancing infrastructure (schools, hospi-
tals, etc.), and improving the law and order situation by expanding the
jurisdiction of the High and Supreme Courts of Pakistan (Khan, Ijaz, and
Saadat 2021). Globally, the international community aspired to abolish non-
state spaces to eliminate militants’ safe havens in the Pakistan–Afghan bor-
derland (Miko 2004). Out of the three suggestions—making it a new
province, making it part of KP Province, and retaining its “special
status”—the government opted for the second option due to the area’s
Pakhtun ethnic associations, geographical proximity, and other administra-
tive and monetary constraints.
Substantial reforms were announced regarding the constitutional, admin-

istrative, and legal structures of FATA (Ali 2018; Fayaz, Gul, and Khattak
2021, 1–6). The provisions that gave special powers to the president of Paki-
stan as the constitutional head of the tribal region (Articles 244–47) were
annulled, and the chief minister of KP Province was declared the executive
head of the ex-FATA. The FCR was replaced by provincial laws and regula-
tions. The office of political agent was replaced with those of deputy and
assistant commissioners. Legally, the tribal areas were placed under the juris-
diction of the Peshawar High Court and the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The
amendment also stated that the special local enforcement forces, the khassa-
dars and Federal Levies, would be replaced with a regular police force. It is
pertinent here to investigate whether the Pakistani state has been successful in
abolishing nonstate spaces in FATA.
In essence, a merger or incorporation needs to be viewed as a process
rather than a thing, and thus needs to be assessed against time and the
realities on ground. There are various views on the success of the FATA
merger. However, in view of the absence of proper implementation mea-
sures, it can be considered a flawed process (Abdullah 2021; Yusufzai 2018).
Khattak (2017, 539) also highlighted contradictions in the reform project.
For instance, the FCR has been abolished as a legal structure, but the Rewaj
Act retained jirga, the traditional method of adjudication, leading to two
parallel judicial systems, with jirga on the one side and the High and
Supreme Courts of Pakistan on the other. In the following discussion, the
FATA merger is evaluated against the conditions described by the Zomia
framework.
State Presence in the Ex-FATA
An incorporation or merger involving Zomia may be problematic for the

following reasons. First, the “friction of terrain” and mobile social structures
make incorporation a difficult task. For Scott (2009, 182), inaccessible
locations provide a natural advantage in resisting armies and thus render
incorporation if not impossible, at least hard. Incorporation thus requires
distance-reducing strategies: “all-weather roads, bridges, railroads, airplanes,
modern weapons, telegraphs, telephones, and now modern information tech-
nologies, including global positioning systems” (11). Other arrangements may
include the establishment of armed checkpoints and border posts, replacing
dissidents with conformists on the border, and keeping a record of all those
who aspire to escape the state for various reasons.
Second, mobile social structures allow fission and fusion on short notice,
making the establishment of hierarchical structures unlikely. Whenever con-
fronted by the state, the hill people retreat, disperse, and disaggregate (Scott
2009, 219). Eventually, whenever state armies advanced, local people “would
retreat to the desert, beyond reach, with their livestock and families” (184).
Third, states pursuing incorporation need interlocutors, or people to nego-
tiate the terms and conditions of incorporation. Such a process is long and
complex, requiring stable, reliable, hierarchical, and tangible social structures
that seem alien in Zomia. Leaders who play the role of interlocutors become
crucial for mediating with tribes, speak for them, and may be held responsible
for political and administrative stability (Scott 2009, 20). The unique aceph-
alous, egalitarian, and mobile social structures render the state-making pro-
cess—the formation of state institutions (courts, police forces) through which
the state could penetrate or exercise control—extremely unlikely.
Fourth, the administrative and military costs of incorporation make Zomia
less attractive for the valley state. Whenever the valley state asserts itself, it
may lead to the incorporation of a section of hill tribes “as a tributary society
with a designated leader (indirect rule)” (Scott 2009, 178–209). Otherwise,
hill tribes may either “fight to defend their autonomy” or be defeated and
accept relocation (209).
Fifth, Zomian societies are inherently different from those of the valley
state, with distinct sociocultural practices (Scott 2009, 20). The valley and hill
societies may be demarcated as centripetal (with cultural and religious uni-
formity) and centrifugal (with a variety of cultures and religions), respec-
tively. States, then, generally try to bridge linguistic, cultural, and religious
discrepancies and encourage alignment with the majority population (12).
This process of “reduction of vernaculars”—languages, minority peoples,
cultivation techniques, land tenure systems, hunting, gathering, forestry tech-
niques, and religion—may amount to “internal colonialism” (12–13). But
weak states, if they cannot bridge differences, may allow or tolerate a certain
degree of autonomy in the hills (11). In this situation, the valley state inten-
tionally constructs the hill societies, for reasons discussed earlier, as a “special
area” beyond the direct jurisdiction of the state. To evaluate the FATA
merger against the above-mentioned criterion, it first needs to be assessed
in relation to the “friction of terrain.” State penetration requires strategies
that demolish distance: railroad networks. After 9/11, when the Pakistan
Army entered this region, it constructed roads and communication tracks
at strategic positions. It also initiated a road construction project in collab-
oration with USAID (2013). However, without a detailed and structured
program to develop communication networks and access to information, the
remoteness and inaccessibility of this region could not be altered.
At the second level, acephalous, egalitarian, and mobile social structures
inhibit any form of hierarchy in tribal society. The very structure of hill
society is based on tribes, sub-tribes, and clan systems. Thus, introducing
an overarching hierarchy would be very hard. In the tribal system, everyone is
a leader, as demonstrated at the tribal jirga processions. This fissure has been
very much in accordance with the “tribal game of survival,” which was aptly
described by Scott (2009, 219) as “divide that ye be not ruled.” It has been
suggested that a “local body system” should be introduced to position inter-
locutors between the tribes and the state (Yousafzai 2020). Perhaps, without
a program to promote awareness of the merits of local bodies, and in view of
corruption and the apparent rejection of new structures by the guardians of
the old system (the tribal elders), nothing substantial could have been
achieved (Daudzai 2018). Still, the locals did take an interest in the 2021
elections. But these prompted concerns about long voting queues, lack of
awareness of the voting process, suspension of voting in a few areas, and
allegations of favoritism among the staff (Dawn News 2021).
The third and most important state-building process may be the cultural
integration of the tribal society. First and foremost is the question of identity.
The hill tribes identify as both Pakhtun and Muslim. They are Pakhtuns for
strictly following the code, and Islam has been the most important part of it.
Illustrating their Muslim identity, they not only decided to join the domin-
ion of Pakistan in 1947 but also stood by the Pakistani state in its Islamic
causes: jihad in Kashmir and Afghanistan (Abbas 2005, 114; Nawaz 2008,
118–19; Schofield 2011, 45; Spain 1963, 210). Thus Islam has been the common
identity that aligned tribes with the Pakistani state. Following 9/11, this
common ground was questioned when TTP declared the Pakistani state an
infidel and launched jihad against it. After the merger, therefore, a new three-
tiered identity—combining Pakhtun-ness, Muslimness, and Pakistan-ness—
need to be constructed. However, it would be a difficult process given the
presence of intra-Pakhtun schism and the existing Pakhtun nationalist move-
ment in the valley state.
Another cultural challenge is the homogenization or standardization of the

hill society. Generally, nang Pakhtuns have been demarcated by their exclu-
sive oral genealogies, culture, tribal structures, and unorthodox religious
practices. But the settlement in the valleys demands an inclusive approach,
which would constrain peculiar sociocultural practices in accordance with
constitutional rules and regulations. The state-building process (norm-
following and law-abiding behavior) requires standardization, reducing ver-
nacularity (cultural, linguistic, religious, and social), which may amount to
state intervention or “internal colonialism.” But without a cultural policy,
mere physical incorporation may generate irredentist or secessionist move-
ments in the borderlands.
The resistance to the state has been an alarming reality in the post-merger
FATA. The Pakistan Army, which entered the tribal area to conduct mil-
itary operations, has been blamed for intervention in tribal autonomy and
indiscriminate use of force (Jones and Fair 2010). The tribes charged that
these operations were as destructive as those they endured during the Brit-
ish rule on the Indian subcontinent (Tohid 2004; Usman 2004). Many
viewed these operations as counterproductive because of the killing of
innocent civilians, enforced disappearances (approximately 32,000 in the
ex-FATA alone), extrajudicial killings, destruction of property, mistreat-
ment and harassment of the Pakhtun community, and landmines as a con-
stant threat to life in tribal areas (Farooq 2020; Global Village Space 2018).
These actions amounted to violations of basic human rights (Mehsud
2023a). Despite the promises, nothing substantial, in terms of repairing
damage or improving administration, has been delivered by the state (Meh-
sud 2023c).
Theoretically, the Pakistan Army strategized counter-militancy operations
as people-friendly, aiming to clear adjoining areas, destroy the command and
control systems of TTP, cleanse far-flung areas of militant influence, and
provide reconstruction and rehabilitation for internally displaced persons
(Bukhari 2009). However, Audrey Cronin (2008, 25–31) has suggested that
neither repression nor winning people’s hearts can bring about the demise of
militant groups. Even killing selected leaders may not take down the orga-
nization. But a policy that synergizes with the group’s natural tendency to
implode might work. Moreover, a wedge between a militant group and its
constituent audience, arising due to its own weakness or tactical error,
“operational errors, burn-out, internecine splintering, doctrinal infighting,
targeting errors, and revulsion or a backlash,” may be used to gain an advan-

tage over the militant group.
Interestingly, the Pakistan Army lacked expertise in fighting insurgencies
and guerrilla warfare. Fair and Jones (2009) note that the Army was poorly
equipped to deal with such domestic threats. Therefore, the patchwork of
peace agreements not only legitimized TTP leadership but also gave them
useful military experience (Hussain 2013). The Pakistan Army was successful
in killing TTP leaders, but it failed to drive a wedge between TTP and the
common tribesmen. Indeed, the nonviolent Pakhtun rights group called the
Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (tahaffuz meaning protection), could function
as such a wedge. However, it has been vehemently suppressed by the state
(Afzal 2020; Jamal 2018). Moreover, Islamabad could not synergize with
TTP’s natural tendency to implode, preventing it from using the terrain to
its advantage.
As a consequence, the resurgence of TTP has become a tangible reality in
the former FATA. It has already engaged in violent activities in the hills (Afzal
2022; Giustozzi 2021; Hashim 2021). There are various reasons for this resur-
gence, including inspiration from the return of the Afghan Taliban after the
US withdrawal, ideological associations with transnational militants, the
ineffectiveness of Islamabad’s military operations before the merger, the haste
of the merger program, and Islamabad’s indecisiveness in dealing with TTP.
Still, TTP might not have been revived without the help of the nonstate
spaces in the tribal areas.
A delegation led by the former chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence
agency, Faiz Hamid, negotiated with TTP. TTP demanded a reduction in
the number of troops and the reinstatement of FATA as conditions for
negotiation (Mir 2022). But one may observe internal fissures within this
militant group on the question of its relationship with Islamabad. Interest-
ingly, the TTP moderates or “good Taliban” (largely Waheedullah Mehsud’s
group) want to continue negotiations in return for relative autonomy and
control, while the radicals or the “bad Taliban” (largely Mufti Noorwali
Mehsud’s group) have completely rejected negotiations due to their distrust
of Islamabad. If TTP could manage to retain negotiated autonomy in the
tribal region, its “ideological brothers,” the al-Qaeda core, al-Qaeda in the
Indian Sub-Continent and Islamic State’s Khorasan Province, would view it
as a safe haven for their transnational jihadi activities (Mir 2022; Mr. X 2023).
Undermining the security forces’ policy of negotiation, the incumbent
civilian government is trying to handle this issue without differentiating

between the “good” and “bad” Taliban (Mir 2022).
The locals have also raised concerns about TTP’s influence in the tribal
areas. Many protests have been recorded in KP Province, including in Swat
and Shangla, against TTP’s revival (Khaliq and Bacha 2022). The mayors of
Badar Valley and Tehsil Serwaikai (South Waziristan), Saifullah Saifi (2023),
and Shah Faisal Ghazi (2023), respectively, questioned the state’s presence
and influence due to the poor law and order situation in the former FATA.
Ghazi and a local from Badar Valley, Mr. Z (2023), said that TTP has been
involved in extortion. The enlarged role and power of TTP have also been
noted by the former minister of the Provincial Assembly, Sir Kalam Wazir
(2023). With no court jurisdiction and an ineffective police force, TTP has
been the sole adjudication and implementation authority (Mehsud 2023b,
2023e, 2023f; Wazir 2023). The state, with its weak resolve and limited
resources, could not overcome the “friction of terrain” that rendered TTP
the most powerful force in the tribal areas.
CONCLUSION
The presence of nonstate spaces provides a substantial explanation for the

resurgence of TTP in the tribal areas. TTP’s state evasion has been in accor-
dance with the “friction of terrain.” After 9/11, when the Pakistani Army
entered the tribal areas, TTP emerged as a symbol of state rejection with
a millenarian message, introducing parallel political structures. Many local
militant outfits aligned with TTP’s message joined its ranks. After destroying
TTP’s organizational structures, in 2018 Islamabad announced the merger of
FATA with the mainland in a bid to eliminate nonstate spaces on its bor-
derland. But without a detailed program for both physical and cultural
incorporation, the merger proved to be too hasty. The resurgence of TTP,
demanding a reversal of the merger, has again called into question Islama-
bad’s role in this region.
Overall, the revival of TTP suggests the continuation of the Zomian
character, where it uses the terrain to its advantage. TTP’s appearance, dis-
appearance, and reappearance have all been in accordance with the tribal
game of survival. In 2007 it emerged to preserve state-free living in the hills.
In the face of Islamabad’s military operations, TTP fissured away to become
invisible, unattractive, an object of appropriation—or moved into the
adjacent provinces, in Afghanistan. Once the exigency of the situation dis-

appeared, it reunited and reactivated. Along with other competing explana-
tions, the Zomia framework has significant explanatory value in accounting
for TTP’s state-evading behavior. Without these nonstate spaces, TTP could
not have re-emerged in the tribal areas of Pakistan.
Published online: July 19, 2023
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Understanding the Revival of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

Article in Asian Survey · July 2023

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Understanding the Revival of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

T HE HILLY BORDERLAND between Pakistan and Afghanistan became signiﬁ-

Indian-held Kashmir and to neutralize the Pakhtun ethnic sentiments on the

PRIMARY ARGUMENT AND CONTRIBUTION

The purpose of this paper is not to disqualify the above-mentioned explana-

METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION

Using a qualitative research framework, data were collected from empirical

jurisdiction of the High and Supreme Courts of Pakistan to FATA are

ZOMIA: THE LAND OF STATELESSNESS

but borrowed it from Willem van Schendel (2002). Technically, it represents

internal consistency . . . shared ideas, related lifeways, and long-standing cul-

a strategy to counteract the state’s controlling actions, “destroying bridges,

THE EX-FATA REGION: A ZOMIAN SPACE

In this section, the Zomiaﬁcation of the ex-FATA region is discussed in light

The region encompasses over 27,000 square kilometers, including a 600-

Tribes and Traditional Social Structures

This region is home to Pakhtun tribes whose dwellings have ended up on

Pakistan would apply here. Instead, it was managed by Frontier Crimes

Scott constructs Zomia in terms of its relationship to the valley state to

figure 2. Scott’s Zomia (2009)

TTP: A State-Evading Movement

Theoretically, one may observe both defensive and offensive state-avoiding

a religious or ethical framework or for the reasons of association with a king

TTP’s Millenarianism in the Hills

FATA MERGER AND THE RESURGENCE OF TTP

The 31st Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan enacted FATA’s merger

Substantial reforms were announced regarding the constitutional, admin-

State Presence in the Ex-FATA

An incorporation or merger involving Zomia may be problematic for the

Another cultural challenge is the homogenization or standardization of the

targeting errors, and revulsion or a backlash,” may be used to gain an advan-

civilian government is trying to handle this issue without differentiating

The presence of nonstate spaces provides a substantial explanation for the

adjacent provinces, in Afghanistan. Once the exigency of the situation dis-

Published online: July 19, 2023

_. 1984. “Religious Presence and Symbolism in Pakhtun Society.” In

Hopkins, Benjamin D. 2015. “The Frontier Crimes Regulation and Frontier

Siddique, Qandeel. 2010. “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan: An Attempt to

Yusufzai, Rahimullah. 2008. “A Who’s Who of the Insurgency in Pakistan’s

Ghazi, Shah Faisal. 2023. Mayor of Tehsil Serwaikai, South Wazirista.

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