Jlrs Article p147 147

Journal of Law, Religion and State
9 (2021) 147-177
Reforming Laïcité or Reforming Islam?

Secularism, Islam, and the Regulation of Religion in France
Berna Zengin Arslan

Ozyegin University, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Istanbul, Turkey
berna.zengin@ozyegin.edu.tr
Bige Açımuz
Ozyegin University, Faculty of Law, Istanbul, Turkey
bige.ngl@gmail.com
Abstract
This paper focuses on management of Islam by the French State since the state of
emergency declared in 2015. We analyze the legal actions of the State using a law-
in-context approach and theorize secularism as the State’s management of religion.
We focus on the Senate Report (2016) concerning Muslim worship, the legal changes
wrought by the state of emergency, and the institutions formed to govern Islam
and secularism. We examine whether there has been a change in the French State’s
approach to Muslim worship. Rather than remaining neutral, the French State has
become even more actively involved in the field of religion by adopting a reformist
attitude intended to transform not the principles of laïcité but the Muslims in France.
In this period, the State has taken concrete steps and built institutions both to support
the formation of a secularized French Islam and to govern the boundaries of laïcité.
Keywords
secularism – Islam – France – laïcité – management of religion – Fondation de l’Islam

de France – French Islam – Observatoire de la laïcité
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/22124810-2021J001

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via University of Edinburgh
148 arslan and açımuz
1 Introduction: Reforming laïcité or Reforming Islam?
At present, French secularism (laïcité) is facing an important challenge: how to

integrate French Muslims into the existing religious domain that the State has
been regulating strictly since the passing of a landmark law on the Separation
of the Churches and the State, in 1905. This legally framed religious domain
encompasses Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism, and their established
legal configurations within the secular State. The 5.5 million-strong Muslim
population of France is the largest in Europe. It includes a variety of ethnic
and cultural identifications, and its relationship with the State has deviated
from that of other religious groups. As Muslims are pushing for equal rights
and the French public fears extremist terror, the French State has responded
with attempts to further integrate Islam into its regulative scheme that applies
to all religions. In principle, the foundations of this scheme are built by the
Constitution and the 1905 law that enacts the neutrality principle as a mile-
stone of French secularism. The challenge is how to integrate Islam into the
legal and social framework of French secularism: by reforming laïcité or trans-
forming Muslims?
In 2017, President Macron announced the highly contested Projet de
Réforme (Reform Project), following the state of emergency declared in
response to the terrorist attacks at Charlie Hebdo and Bataclan in 2015, and
the Senate Report on Muslim organizations and worship in 2016.1 The Reform
Project was motivated by an urgent need to respond to the security concerns
raised by the terrorist attacks and to control foreign influence over Muslim
organizations. It made several vague proposals, including a change to the
1905 law, certifying worship places that meet certain legal requirements, pub-
licly funding worship associations, and increasing monitoring of all religious
groups for financial transparency.2 The Project sparked a public debate even
before it was fully revealed: secularists were concerned that by amending the
1905 law, the State would renounce its secularist principles and move toward a
more multiculturalist direction; and religious organizations were worried that
the State would intensify its control over their activities. Welcomed by neither
1 Rapport d’information fait au nom de la mission d’information (1) sur l’organisation, la place et le
financement de l’Islam en France et de ses lieux de culte (Information Report for the Information
Mission (1) (On the Organization, Place and Funding of Islam in France and Its Places of Worship),
757 (2015–2016), 5 Jul. 2016, 62. From now on we refer to this report as the Senate Report.
2 Ivanne Trepinbach, “Loi de 1905, les Choix de Macron”, l’Opinion, 5 November 2018, 1–2.
Retrieved 18 Dec. 2019, lopinion.fr/edition/politique/loi-1905-choix-macron-167165.
Journal of Law, Religion and State 9 (2021) 147-177

reforming laïcité or reforming islam? 149
secularists nor religious organizations, the Project was abandoned one year
later, and the questions it raised remain unresolved.
We examine the period from 2015 to the present,3 during which the State
has made a series of attempts to regulate Islam as a question of national secu-
rity. Our focus is on the legal approach of the French State toward the inte-
gration of Islam. We use a law-in-context approach, which analyzes law in its
relation to the social and political background,4 to ask whether the French
State has changed its legal and administrative apparatus to integrate Muslim
worship into its secular system. In our analysis, we define secularism as the
State’s government of religion, where even multiculturalism can work as a
governing method. We analyze how the State interfere with Muslim worship,
specifically during and after the state of emergency and over the last two dec-
ades at large. We argue that rather than remaining detached, the French State
has stepped even more actively into the field of religion by adopting a reform-
ist attitude that aims to transform not the principles of laïcité but the Muslims
in France. We show that especially after the state of emergency, the State has
invested increasingly in establishing concrete reform policies and building
institutions to carry out its regulative project: the formation of a nationalized,
secularized, and intellectualized French Islam, an Islam legible to the existing
legal and social system and free from its cultural and national attachments.
French secularism, often called laïcité to emphasize its uniqueness, has been
accepted as a distinct model that adheres strictly to the principle of the separa-
tion between State and religion.5 This principle, as established by the landmark
law from 1905, has been a building block not only of laïcité, but also of French
national identity. For French secularism, the “neutrality of the State” is a guid-
ing principle: according to Article 2 of the law, “[t]he State neither recognizes,
nor subsidizes, nor salaries any form of worship.”6 Here, the “neutrality of the
State” means that it maintains an equal distance from different religious groups
and from nonbelievers, and that it does not provide any support for religious
3 This paper was submitted in June of 2020, therefore our analysis covers the period up to that
date.
4 Mike McConville & Chui Wing Hong, “Introduction and Overview” in M. McConville & C. H.
Hong (eds.), Research Methods for Law (2nd ed. Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 1.
5 Jean Baubérot, “Laïcité and Freedom of Conscience in Pluricultural France”, in J. Berlinerblau
et al. (eds.), Secularism on the Edge: Rethinking Church-State Relations in the United States,
France, and Israel (2014).
6 Observatoire de la Laïcité, “Freedoms and Prohibitions in the Context of “Laïcité”. 2020.
Government of France. Retrieved 4 May 2020, https://gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/
contenu/piece-jointe/2017/02/libertes_et_interdits_eng.pdf. In French: “La République ne
reconnaît, ne salarie ni ne subventionne aucun culte”.
Journal of Law, Religion and State 9 (2021)Downloaded

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services. Laïcité has often been represented as a fixed model, immune to any
historical, social, or political influence, and resisting any engagement or nego-
tiation with religion. It is also typically represented as an example of “hard”7
or “aggressive”8 secularism—as opposed to the “softer” or “passive” secu-
larism of the US—a characterization that ignores the dynamic capacity of
laïcité to adapt to changing conditions. Yet, recent studies of French secular-
ism have increasingly pointed out that the State has not remained neutral in
the religious field.9 Even the law of 1905 has changed over time,10 in response
to demands from the Catholic Church and other religions of the Concordat
regime, and expanded rights to religious worship and education.11 This litera-
ture also argues that rather than keeping its distance from religion, the French
State has been actively involved in the religious field to govern and control
religious groups by causing them to assume forms that are acceptable to the
secular system.12
Therefore, rather than defining secularism in terms of the separation of
State and religion, we offer a theoretical framework that defines secularism
as the governing logic of the modern nation State13 and the “management of
religion” by the State.14 This management refers to the legal and institutional
regulation of the religious domain by the secular State, and its subsequent
7 Barry Kosmin, “The Vitality of Soft Secularism in the United States and the Challenge Posed
by the Growth of the Nones”, in J. Berlinerblau et al. (eds.), Secularism on the Edge: Rethinking
Church-State Relations in the United States, France, and Israel, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 35.
8 Ahmet Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France, and
Turkey, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
9 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2003).
10 Mayanthi Fernando, The Republic Unsettled. Muslim French and the Contradictions of
Secularism. (New York: Duke University Press, 2014); Joan Scott, Sex and Secularism,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), 13–14.
11 For a historical critique of the representation of laïcité as a single, fixed model, see Jean
Baubérot, “Les sept laïcités françaises”, 151(3) Administration & Éducation (2016). Baubérot
emphasizes the dynamic nature of laïcité in France. Baubérot points at its “fluctuations,”
negotiations, and changes under social and political influence, and offers seven models that
continually interact with the political and social domains, resulting in an “evolution of their
balance of power [that] constitutes the dynamic of what is socially called French secularism”
(Ibid., at 21). For a review of J. Baubérot’s Les 7 Laïcités Françaises- Le Modèle Français de
Laïcité n’Existe Pas, see Esther Erlings, Book Review, 6(2–3) Journal of Law, Religion and State
(2018), 311–317.
12 Fernando, supra note 10; Scott, supra note 10.
13 Asad, supra note 9.
14 Bryan Turner, “Managing Religions: State Responses to Religious Diversity”, 1(2)
Contemporary Islam (2007); Bryan Turner & Berna Zengin Arslan, The Religious and the
Political A Comparative Sociology of Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

control over the forms that the public presence of religion assumes. Although
the State is technically neutral toward religions in order to “secure religious
rights and equality,”15 it nevertheless interferes in the religious domain, act-
ing as the legitimate authority that keeps religion under control. The secular
State uses “detailed ways of governance,”16 while remaining within the legal
boundaries of the liberal democratic regime. Governance of the religious field
by the secular State involves the State defining what qualifies as religion (and
the secular) in its legal system, and establishing a normative framework that
separates the religious from the cultural and political. Therefore, despite a
seemingly detached stance from religion, the secular State actively constructs
religion in its secular vision and governs it through laws and norms. To these
ends, the State decenters religion from its role in everyday life and regulates
matters relating to religion in a demarcated domain that is distinguished from
other domains, such as law, education, and economy.17 In this process, religion
becomes a confined domain, similar to others that are subject to the control
and management of the State. The proper form of religion, as defined by the
secular State, is abstract, theological, and textual; it may be learned cognitively
and practiced privately, but it does not involve practices embedded in people’s
everyday lives.18 Thus, religion is normatively defined less as a form of affec-
tionate, embodied, and relational piety, but rather as a universal, rational, and
individualistic or privatized belief.19 This (rationalized) religion is believed to
overcome the cultural specificities and diversified practices. In the case of the
French effort to govern Muslim populations, the State is actively involved not
only in the production of new Muslim and secular subjectivities, but also in
the formation of a new Islam, an Islam de France (French Islam).
We analyze laïcité in terms of the State’s regulation of the way Islam is insti-
tutionalized, practiced, and represented in France. In the period we examine,
the French State moved toward a more active management of Islam to respond
15 Saba Mahmood, Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Report (Princeton,

NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015).
16 Ibid.
17 Asad, supra note 9.
18 Ibid. For an early critique of the conception of religion as predominantly an image or idea
and text that is independent of embodied practices, see Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Lectures and
Conversations on Aesthetics”, in C. Barrett (ed.), Psychology and Religious Belief (Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967).
19 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion (London: John Hopkins University Press, 1993); Robert
Orsi, Between Heaven and Earth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

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to several related challenges. These included the rise of Muslim religious iden-
tities20 and their claims for recognition, waves of migration to Europe, the rise
of right-wing politics and of Islamophobia, and terrorist attacks in the period
2015–2016. Since the 1970s, the classic French model of integration has shifted
from the view of the “individual first as a citizen” toward granting rights to
institutional representation for religious minorities, despite the fact that the
French government has persistently refrained from using the terms “mul-
ticulturalism and communitarianism.”21 This shift was part of a larger trend
in Europe. The period between 1990 and 2005 marked the end of an era of
“outsourcing” religious services, and the beginning of a period in which the
European states endeavored to “domesticate Islam” by “encouraging civic par-
ticipation and citizenship acquisition.”22
Since the attacks at Charlie Hebdo and Bataclan, however, the Muslim ques-
tion has become mainly an issue of security and sovereignty for the French
State,23 coupling national security and unity with the idea of protecting
French secularism. The state of emergency introduced coercive and repressive
legal measures, such as the closure of organizations and mosques, and the use
of imprisonment as a method to fight Islamic radicalism. The regulations of
this period clearly expressed the intolerance of the State of Jihadist interpre-
tations, and its approval of an Islam adapted to the idealized norms of French
society. A majority of the efforts of the State have also involved what we call
liberal measures that have introduced legal regulations designed to build the
institutions necessary for the further integration of Muslims into the secular
framework of French society. Key examples of such measures include the cre-
ation, in 2003, of the French Council of the Muslim Faith (Conseil français du
20 Nilüfer Göle, “Introduction: Islamic Controversies in the Making of European Public

Spheres,” in N. Göle (ed.) Islam and Public Controversy in Europe (Farnham: Ashgate
Publishing, 2013); Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1994). For an analysis of the recent challenges, see Silvio Ferrari, “The
Secular State in a Declining Europe: Beyond the End of the European Universal Dream”, 8(1)
Journal of Law, Religion and State (2019), 24.
21 Ayhan Kaya, Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009), 75.
22 Jonathan Laurence, The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims: The State’s Role in Minority
Integration (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2012), 107.
23 Julia Martínez-Ariño, “Governing Islam in French Cities: Defining “Acceptable” Public
Religiosity Through Municipal Consultative Bodies”, 47(4–5) Religion, State and Society
(2019), 423; Jocelyn Cesari, “Securitization of Islam in Europe” in Jocelyne Cesari (ed.),
Muslims in the West After 9/11 (New York: Routledge, 2010); Stuart Croft, Securitizing Islam:
Identity and the Search for Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012); Kaya,
supra note 21.

culte musulman, cfcm) as an umbrella association of Muslim organizations;

the establishment, in 2016, of the Foundation for Islam in France (Fondation
de l’Islam de France, fif) to produce and disseminate scientific knowledge on
“enlightened” Islam; and the foundation, in 2007, of Observatory of Secularism
(Observatoire de la Laïcité, hereinafter, Observatoire) to protect secularism and
defend its boundaries. These measures, both liberal and coercive, or inclusive
and exclusive, have focused on forming a French Islam that is in harmony with
Republican ideals.
In analyzing the State’s management of Islam in France, we focus in particu-
lar on Muslim worship, one of the main questions for the French State in the
integration of Islam. Our analysis is based on the Senate Report of 2016,24 legal
changes enacted as part of the state of emergency, and institutions formed
by the State to manage Islam over the last two decades. The Senate Report is
significant for us, as it shows, first, the intention of the State to integrate Islam
through the localization of Muslim worship, without implementing a signifi-
cant legal change, and second, the specific potential policies the State intends
to use for this purpose. Following the description of the laïc system and its
exceptions, the paper discusses the way in which the Senate Report recom-
mends the liberal reform of Islam, as well as the coercive measures relating
to Muslim worship introduced during the state of emergency. This discussion
is followed by a more detailed analysis of State actions in the areas of imam
training, the fif, and the Observatoire. The last section considers State pol-
icy to “regulate and reform Islam through institutionalization,”25 shaped by its
vision of the formation of a French Islam.
2 French Secularism and Its Exceptions
French secularism is often considered as a model for the strict separation

of church and State and the restriction of religious expression to the private
sphere. Its symbol26 is the law of 1905 that abolished unilaterally the Concordat
of 1801 and put an end to the system of “recognized religions.”27 It declared the
24 The Senate Report ascribes much greater weight to the question of Muslim worship than
other reports submitted in the 2000s.
25 We would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for suggesting the use of this phrase to
encapsulate our ideas.
26 Jean Morange, “Peut-on réviser la loi de 1905?”, 21(1) Revue française de droit administratif
(2005), 153.
27 Baubérot, supra note 5, at 103. The Concordat of 1801, signed between Napoleon Bonaparte
and Pope Pius xvii, is an agreement between the State and the Catholic Church. It regulated

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freedom of conscience and guaranteed the freedom to worship.28 The neutral-

ity of the State is the defining principle of laïcité, prohibiting State support for
religious services in order to maintain equal distance between the State and
various religions, as well as nonbelievers. This principle ensures that taxpay-
ers do not indirectly finance any worship that is against their conscience.29
The second basis of laïcité in France is the Constitution, to which the princi-
ple of secularity was added in 1946. The first article of the Constitution states
that “France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It
shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of
origin, race, or religion. It shall respect all beliefs.” This is where the freedom
of conscience is legally interpreted as “freedom from religion,” in contrast to
the American version that centers the “freedom of religion.”30 Along with the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789, which protects the
right to religious worship, these principles constitute the foundations of
the laic system.31 The idea of laïcité in France is related to national solidar-
ity and “social cohesion,” and it is deeply integrated with French national
identity.32
The State in France does not recognize religious groups, but based on
the law of 1905, it allows them to open associations to provide religious ser-
vices.33 In general, the religious associations in France are legally categorized
around a clear division between culture and religion, employing two main
models: associations created under the law of 1905 for the particular purpose
of operating places of worship (association cultuelle, religious associations),
the relations of the Church with the State and “proclaimed the Catholic Church to be the
‘religion of the great majority of the French’ without bestowing upon it the status of State
religion” (ibid., at 104). With the Concordat, the State started paying the salaries of clerics
and partially funding the construction of worship places. Later, Protestantism (Lutheranism
and Calvinism, 1802) and Judaism (1808) were also included through different regulations
as a “part of a general refinement by the public authority of the relations between religions
and the State.” (ibid., at 115) This regime ended with the 1905 law that “abolished the legal
status of the four recognized religions” and halted “public funding of clerics’ pay and other
expenses.” (ibid., at 105).
28 Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, “Secularism and Religious Freedom”. Retrieved 2
Apr. 2020, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/coming-to-france/france-facts/secularism-
and-religious-freedom-in-france/article/secularism-and-religious-freedom-in-france;
Observatoire de la laïcité, Retrieved 25 Apr. 2020, https://www.gouvernement.fr/
observatoire-de-la-laïcité.
29 Morange, supra note 26, at 155.
30 Baubérot, supra note 5, at 86.
31 Yvonne Desmurs-Moscet et al., “Fasc. 215: Cultes”, Jurisclasseur Administratif (2018), 4–5.
32 Morange, supra note 26, at 156.
33 Art. 18–24 of the law of 1905.

and associations created under the law of 190134 that are cultural associations
(association culturelle), but are allowed to hold religious activities.35 The activ-
ities of worshipping associations are strictly limited to funding and providing
for the public exercise of worship; the associations are prohibited from con-
ducting any social or cultural activities.36 The 1905 associations do not receive
public subvention37 but are granted certain financial advantages over 1901
associations, such as the ability to raise funds in other ways. Whereas regular
1901 associations can receive only membership fees and hand-to-hand gifts,
1905 associations have more diversified sources of income, such as donations,
bequests, and various tax exemptions.38 Furthermore, donors to the 1905 asso-
ciations can deduct the donations from their taxable income.39 These financial
advantages come with stricter control by the State than is applied to 1901 asso-
ciations. The 1905 worship associations are required to file an annual financial
statement and an inventory of their possessions, which can be inspected by the
Ministry of Finances.40 To benefit from the financial advantages cited above,
they also need permission from the public authorities, which can be refused if
the activities of the association exceed the limits of “worshipping practice” as
defined by the law.41 At present, Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish worshipping
organizations are generally organized under the 1905 law, whereas most of the
Muslim organizations choose to operate under the 1901 law.42
2.1 Exceptions and Modifications

Although the legal foundation of laïcité is built on the idea of the clear sepa-
ration of religion from the State and the protection of the original principles
34 The law of 1901 regulates the foundation and organization of associations in general, but it
also allows these associations to hold religious activities. Some religious groups choose to
organize their activities by founding associations regulated by the law of 1901 rather than
that of 1905.
35 The Catholic Church is predominantly organized as diocesan associations that follows the
hierarchical organization of the Catholic Church, based on the governance of dioceses.
The diocesan associations are also subject to law of 1905. The creation of congregations is
subject to the authorization of the State, a procedure less practical than the formation of
associations and thus not favored by most religious organizations. For a variety of models
of associations employed by religious groups, see Caroline Leclerc, “Le statut d’association
cultuelle et les sectes”, 21(3) Revue française de droit administratif (2005), 565.
36 Ibid.
37 Art. 19 of 1905 Law.
38 Ibid.
39 Senate Report, supra note 1, at 62.
40 Art. 21 of 1905 Law.
41 Leclerc, supra note 35, at 565.
42 The Buddhists are organized under the worship association or congregation model. Ibid.

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of the law of 1905, over time exceptions have continually been introduced
into the legal framework. The landmark law of 1905 has been modified over
the years, and other legal changes have been introduced that have indirectly
affected the organization of religious affairs and the practices of secularism.
Some of the main exceptions to the principle of separation relate to the
organization of worship.43 An example of State involvement in this field is the
provision of worship services in prisons, the army, hospitals, and schools, with
chaplains paid by the State and selected by their respective religious authori-
ties.44 Payment of the salaries of these chaplains by the State was allowed in the
original law of 1905, justified by the need to ensure freedom of worship for per-
sons whose mobility is restricted.45 The State is also involved in the religious field
through a series of regulations that concern places of worship. For example, “[t]
hough [the law of 1905] forbids government financing of new religious buildings,
it allows the government to pay maintenance costs for religious edifices built
before 1905 – most of them Catholic churches.”46 According to the law of 1905,
these public funds can be used only for the maintenance of churches classified
as historical monuments. But an amendment introduced on Christmas of 1942,47
under the Vichy regime, allows local authorities to participate in the conservation
and maintenance of places of worship that they own, despite the fact that these
places are managed by worship associations. Furthermore, a law introduced in
1961 allows local authorities to guarantee loans that finance the construction of
new places of worship.48 Finally, an ordinance introduced in 2006 allows local
authorities to lease property to worship associations to use as worship space for
99 years.49 This mechanism is called “emphyteutic lease.” At the end of the con-
tract, ownership of the building is returned to the local authority.50
43 Private schools that provide religious education with the sponsorship of the State, albeit
indirectly, are another exception to the secular framework. For more information, see Fleur
Dargent, “L’enseignement privé hors contrat mais pas hors contrôle”, Actualité juridique droit
administratif (2019), 216. Another exception to the secularism of public schooling is the
scheduling of the public-school calendar around Catholic holydays and the serving of fish
on Fridays at public school cafeterias; Fernando, supra note 10.
44 Art.2 of 1905 law. See Victor Guset, “Les aumôniers entre les églises et l’état”, 34(4) Revue
française de droit administratif (2018), 639.
45 Ibid.
46 Fernando, supra note 10, at 11.
47 The Law of December 25, 1942, amended the article 19 of the 1905 Law.
48 Article 11 of the law 61–825 of 29 July, 1961, codified in Art. L. 2252–4 et L. 3231–5 of Code
général des collectivités territoriales (General Code of Territorial Communities).
49 Ordonnance 2006–460 of 21 April 2006.
50 Olivier Henrard, “Le bea « cultuel » ne peut bénéficier qu’aux associations soumises à la loi
du 9 décembre 1905”, 73(12) Actualité juridique droit administratif (2017), 686.

These legal changes have allowed the State to provide indirect financial sup-
port to places of worship. The only exception to the prohibition on direct State
funding of a place of worship was the construction of the first mosque in met-
ropolitan France, the Grande Mosquée de Paris, which opened in 1926, in the
period following the Separation Law of 1905, but before the principle of laïcité
was added to the Constitution, in 1961.51 A new ad hoc law was enacted in 1920
that permitted public funding for its construction, circumventing the obliga-
tions of the 1905 law.52 The law of 1920 was unique also in the sense that all
other exceptions to the law of 1905 have been justified by the State as matters
of public safety or the preservation of cultural heritage. By contrast, the Grand
Paris Mosque was built as a gesture of thanks to the Muslims who fought in
World War I, during the period when migrants from the Maghreb started arriv-
ing in France. The foundation of the Paris Mosque is often considered a first
step toward the institutionalization of Islam in France.53 The Federation of the
Grand Mosque of Paris was the first Muslim organization accepted as an offi-
cial interlocutor by the French State and retained its privileged status among
Muslim organizations until the 2000s.
Probably one of the most controversial exceptions to the principle of laïcité
is the conservation of the Concordat system in Alsace-Moselle and some over-
seas areas for historical and social reasons. Because it was under Prussian rule
at the time, Alsace-Moselle is exempt from the law of 1905. In this region,
Catholicism, Calvinism, Lutheranism, and Judaism are still officially recog-
nized religions.54 As a result, education in one of these religions is obligatory
for public school students, and the regional government pays the salaries of
their clergy.55 Children can be exempted from religious education following a
written demand by their parents.56 The presence of theology faculties at State
51 Another exception is the Evry Cathedral, constructed in 1995, partially by public funding.
Unlike the case of the Grand Mosque of Paris, the public funding of the Evry Cathedral,
provided mostly by the Ministry of Culture, was limited to the construction of a “sacred art
museum” (musée d’art sacré) and “the promotion of contemporary art.”
52 Henrard, supra note 50, at 688.
53 Vincent Latour & Philippe Vervaecke, “11. Institutionnaliser l’Islam: Comparaison
transmanche”, in James Cohen (ed.), L’Atlantique multiracial: Discours, politiques, dénis
(Paris: Editions Karthala, 2012), 291.
54 Jean-Marie Woehrling, “Le culte musulman et le droit local alsacien-mosellan”, 4 Revue du
droit des religions (2017).
55 Mayanthi Fernando, “The Republic’s “Second Religion” Recognizing Islam in France”, 235
Middle East Report (2005).
56 Commission de réflexion sur l’application du principe de laïcité dans la république
(Commission for Reflection on The Application of The Principle of Secularism in The
Republic), Rapport au président de la République (Report to the President of the Republic), 11
Dec. 2003, 51. This report is also known as the Stasi Report.

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universities is another exception, providing an opportunity for these religious

groups to educate their religious personnel. The exceptional condition of
Alsace-Moselle does not apply to Muslims, mostly because Islam was not one
of the recognized religions before 1905.57
These exceptions and legal modifications reflect the long-established prac-
tice of the State to engage in the religious field in order to regulate it, which
goes back to the law of 1905 itself. Such changes responded to the demands
of religious groups within the limits of the framework of neutrality and reli-
gious freedom. After a long period of contestation, the laic system has estab-
lished a relatively stable yet complex relationship with the religions that were
previously recognized by the Napoleonic Concordat regime, particularly with
Catholicism.58 Under this arrangement, the religions developed their own struc-
tures and practices that are in harmony with the regulations and values of the
secular system. In exchange, these groups have increasingly secularized them-
selves by integrating their institutional and pedagogical forms into the secular
framework, which privileges certain acceptable forms of religious expression,
such as abstract, cognitive, and non-passionate religious interpretations and
practices.59 The question for the secular State is now how to manage Islam.
3 Managing Islam: The Senate Report and Nationalizing Muslim

Worship in France
Islam has become more visible lately owing to issues such as the headscarf and
the cartoon crises, but it has been on the agenda of the French State for at least
the last four decades.60 It has been a priority for the State to engage Muslim

58 Balibar uses the term Catho-laïcité in his critique of the “neutrality claims of secularism”
and to explain the “Catholic Underpinnings of Secularism” (Etienne Balibar, “Dissonances
Within Laïcité”, 11(3) Constellations (2004), 353–367 cited in Nilüfer Göle, “The Civilizational,
Spatial, and Sexual Powers of the Secular” in Michael Warner et al. (eds.), Varieties of
Secularism in a Secular Age (Harvard University Press, 2010), 245). Also see Jean Baubérot,
“Editorial”, Libération, 15 Dec. 2003, 39. The term Catho-laïcité suggests that the hierarchical
organizational structures of Catholicism have shaped the management of the religious field
in Europe by the State. Following Talal Asad’s work, we also note that secularism in France
secularized Catholicism while integrating it into the legal secular framework. Asad, supra
note 19.
59 Asad, ibid.; Orsi, supra note 19.
60 We do not extend our analysis to colonial territories because the law of 1905 was not applied
there. Saaida shows, however, that the “roots of the government of Islam in France go
back to the colonial Algeria” (1830–1962), where the Church also played a role in the State

citizens and find ways of integrating Islam into the existing secular scheme,
starting from concrete attempts in the late 1980s, during the Algerian civil
war,61 and accelerating after the terrorist attacks in 2015. In recent decades, the
number of reports on Islam and secularism has increased,62 and the State has
started engaging Muslim representatives more actively. The distinctiveness of
the Muslim community has been the main challenge for the State in its attempts
to accommodate and govern Islam within the existing laic system, which relies
predominantly on institutionalized religions with more or less homogenous
populations and high financial autonomy. Following Catholicism, Islam is the
second-largest religion in France—it is often called the second religion—and
France has the largest Muslim population in Europe. Despite their historical
presence and large population, French Muslims are far from having the same
opportunities as—Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. For example, they have far
fewer places of worship per capita. Currently, there are around 2,500 mosques
in France, meaning one for every 2,000 adherents of Islam, whereas this num-
ber is 589 for Catholics, 625 for Jews, and 400 for Protestants.63 Furthermore,
the Muslim community in France is highly diverse, with variable historical
attachments to French society and internal cultural differences. The Muslim
population is a community of immigrants, largely from former French colonies
in North and sub-Saharan Africa, resulting in a complex patchwork of relations
and problems specific to these variable past experiences. It also comprises
immigrants from Turkey and the Middle East, with differing conceptions of
secularism and religiosity. Although Muslim immigrants have diverse ethnic
and national backgrounds, they share a similar class position in having pre-
dominantly lower income than other religious groups.64
interference and control of the Muslim religious domain. (Oissila Saadia, Algérie coloniale.
Musulmans et chrétiens: le contrôle de l’État (1830–1914) (cnrs Éditions, 2015) cited in Frank
Frégosi, “De quoi le gouvernement de l’Islam en France est-il le nom?”, 106(3) Confluences
Méditerranée (2018), 36. Fregosi argues that “[t]he desire to regulate, monitor and therefore
control the expression of Islam in France is a result of political dynamics that have ‘emerged
throughout history under colonization’ and ‘still seem to be relevant today’” (ibid. at 37).
62 The well-known examples are the Report of the High Council of Integration, Islam dans
la République (Islam in the Republic) (2000); Stasi Report, supra note 56; Council of State
Report, Un siècle de laïcité (A Century of Secularism), Etudes et documents du Conseil d’État
n° 55 (Paris: La Documentation Française, 2004); Machelon Report, Les relations des cultes
avec les pouvoirs publics – Rapport au ministre de l’intérieur (The Relations of Religions with
Public Authorities – Report to the Minister of the Internal Affairs); Senate Report, supra note
1.
63 It is 2,631 for Buddhism and 3,846 for Orthodox Christianity. See Senate Report, supra note 1,
at 531.
64 Ibid., at 57; Kaya, supra note 21, at 62.

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The organization of Muslim worship accounts for a significant part of the

State project of integrating Islam into the existing religious domain. Although
only 10%-30% of Muslims in France “consider themselves to be ‘practicing,’”65
and a large majority are already integrated into secular life, the organization of
Muslim worship has been a main concern of the French State for the last few
decades. Some regulations concerning Muslim practices that do not directly
relate to mosques are implemented either through amendments to existing
regulations or through exemptions from the law. For example, in the case of the
halal slaughtering of animals, a legal exception was introduced to the general
obligation that the animal must be stunned before slaughtering.66 For the cre-
ation of special spaces called “carrés confessionnels” for Muslims in cemeteries,
a de facto exception is made to the existing law that prohibits establishing dis-
tinctions or meeting particular requirements based on the religious beliefs of
the deceased.67 As the law has not been modified, some scholars have viewed
this practice as an application of the doctrine of tolerance.68
The State has incorporated some Muslim practices into the secular legal
framework, as in these relatively minor issues, but regulating aspects of
Muslim worship that concern places of worship and religious leadership has
been more challenging. Since the late 1980s, government reports and political
debates have frequently addressed these questions, identifying two issues as
key problems that concern Muslim worship: first, Muslim community organ-
izations are still supported by their countries of origin,69 and second, these
organizations are highly diverse in their ethnic and national affiliation. Among
the funding countries, Saudi Arabia is noted as influential, financing eight

66 Article 214–270 of the Rural Code regulates the stunning of animals before slaughter. The
exception introduced in 1964 is justified on the basis of the principle of free practice of
religion, following the decision of the Council of State (5 July 2013, Œuvre d’assistance aux
bêtes d’abattoir, n° 361441). The local authorities can also allocate places for the slaughter of
animals during the Feast of the Sacrifice (eid al-Adha) if the number of slaughterhouses in
the region is insufficient. This is not seen as a violation of the neutrality principle because it
seeks to preserve public sanitation.
67 Council of State Report, supra note 62, at 326. This rule guarantees equal treatment, but
the Muslim community has demanded to reserve special places in municipal cemeteries.
Regarding this question as part of the integration of Muslims, the government encouraged
the creation of carrés confessionnels with the permission of the mayor. Nevertheless, the
Council of State Report mentions that Muslim cemeteries are still insufficient, and some
mayors are reluctant to create them.
68 Stéphanie Hennette-Vauchez, “Séparation, garantie, neutralité… Les multiples grammaires
de la laïcité”, 53(4) Les Nouveaux Cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel (2016), 326.

mosques in France and paying the salaries of 14 imams.70 The Senate Report is
also concerned about the social media influence of imams from Saudi Arabia.
The reports see “foreign influence,” the financing of Muslim organizations by
external resources and the importing of imams from other countries, as an
obstacle to the integration of Muslims into French society or the formation of
a French Islam. The Senate Report states that Muslim organizations are funded
by donation, and as most Muslim associations are not organized under the
law of 1905, the origin of these donations is not traceable.71 The Report rec-
ommends that to ensure the transparency of their funding and to strengthen
their financial condition, Muslim organizations should organize under the law
of 1905.72
The importing of imams and the receipt of foreign financial support reflects
the fact that Muslim communities cannot afford to support organizations that
provide religious services. There are approximately 2,000–2,500 imams in
France, most of them unpaid volunteers. Only one third of the imams in France
work part-time or full-time, and 20%-30% are French citizens.73 Through bilat-
eral agreements, approximately 300 imams have been appointed whose sala-
ries are paid by other countries, including Turkey, Morocco, and Algeria. These
imams détachés (detached imams) are employed by their countries of origin
and serve in France only for a temporary period. The Senate Report points out
that imams détachés often cannot speak French, are unfamiliar with French
culture, and therefore cannot relate to Muslims who grew up in France.74
Although the importation of imams from different countries is a longstanding
practice, recently the State has started regarding these imams as an important
source of the problem and as a challenge to French sovereignty and security,
especially with the rising threat of terror.
The secular legal framework in France does not allow the State to fund reli-
gious worship or the training of religious personnel directly. Thus, the State
manages the religious field in indirect ways, mainly by forming mechanisms,
such as the Foundation for Islamic Works in France (Fondation pour les œuvres
de l’Islam, foif),75 that allow Muslim communities to organize and finance
70 Ibid., at 59.
71 Ibid., at 57.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., at 36.
74 Ibid., at 39.
75 The French State manages the religious field in indirect ways because it cannot directly
fund religious organizations. foif was founded in 2005 as a state initiative in an attempt
to strengthen the financial capacity of the national Muslim organizations in France. Its

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their mosques within the legal framework. The Senate Report recommends
strengthening Muslim organizations to free them from financial dependence
on other countries. It also suggests nationalizing the training and employment
of imams and encouraging Muslim organizations to conduct the training
within their own networks. Nevertheless, the State still indirectly shapes the
content of the imam training by encouraging civic instruction and building
institutions to support the development of knowledge of a secular Islam.
The intention in the Senate Report, to institutionalize Islam is clear. Indeed,
it suggests re-establishing the foif, or another Foundation, to facilitate more
comprehensive regulation of Islamic organizations, including monitoring
finances and issuing halal certificates,76 as well as collecting funds donated
to Muslim organizations. The aim is to spend part of those funds on the civil
training of imams, and the maintenance of mosques77 and (Muslim) private
schools.78 In its existing form, fif—founded to replace foif when it was dis-
mantled—has a more limited function, mainly investing in producing knowl-
edge on Islam and partially funding the civil training of imams. Imam training
and the effective functioning of fif are among the priorities of the State in
regulating and reforming Islam. We revisit these issues in greater detail below.
Ethnic and national diversity within Muslim organizations has been
reported as the second most important challenge in regulating Muslim wor-
ship. Historically, French Muslims have been represented by organizations with
varied national, ethnic, and ideological affiliations.79 In an attempt to manage
these associations, the State has made an ongoing effort since the late 1980s to
build an umbrella organization that would represent the entire Muslim com-
munity in France. The French Council of Muslim Faith (cfcm) is a result of
this effort, which has lasted for more than a decade.80 Following several failed
attempts, the cfcm was founded in May 2003 as a 1905 association to act as
a possible representative of the entire Muslim community in France, similar
role was to develop channels that could provide financial support for the umbrella Muslim
organization cfcm (French Council of Muslim Faith). The foif is discussed below.
76 Ibid., at 81.
77 Ibid., at 80.
78 Ibid., at 114.
79 For example, the Assembly of Muslims of France (Le Rassemblement des musulmans
de France) is under Moroccan influence, and the Coordination Committee of
Turkish Muslims in France (le Comité de coordination des musulmans turcs) was formed by
Turkish immigrants. Ibid., at 32.
80 Zana Çitak, “Between ‘Turkish Islam’ and ‘French Islam’, the Role of the Diyanet in the
Conseil Français du Culte Musulman”, 36(4) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (2010);
Fernando, supra note 55.

to a parallel organization for French Catholics, working “with the State in the
regulation of Islamic worship and public ritual practices.”81 “One of the primary
tasks of this national representative body is to reflect on the development of
an officially recognized curriculum for imams in France.”82 Initially, both the
Muslim organizations and the State “considered the cfcm an opportunity to
legitimize and normalize the presence of Islam in France.”83 But later, it was
criticized by members of the Muslim community for including only some of the
existing Muslim associations and for representing Muslims on the basis of their
ethnic and national identities. Failing to represent French-born Muslims, who
could identify as Muslim and feel loyal to the values of the Republic,84 the cfcm
seems to perpetuate precisely what the French State wishes to abolish: Muslims’
strong ties to their ethnicity and nation of origin. Still, as Peter85 argued, the
cfcm has contributed to State effort to push more radical organizations toward
the center and empower “Muslim power structures” that promote “civil Islam”.
Although the internal conflicts between organizations that have undermined
the functioning of cfcm are still not resolved, the cfcm remains the only organ-
ization speaking for French Muslims that the State acknowledges. In a speech
delivered in March 2020, President Macron stated that the cfcm should be the
main partner in resolving the question of outsourcing imams.86
Overall, the Senate Report has a clear liberal agenda that recommends
reform and regulation through the institutionalization of Islam. This is in har-
mony with the actions of the State, which has invested extensively in the for-
mation of institutions such as the cfcm and fif to reform and control Islam
by turning it into a form that is manageable by the existing legal system and
understandable to it. The French State is particularly concerned about vari-
ous Islamic organizations that rely predominantly on external financial and
human resources, which deviates from the existing legal/secular system, built
for the regulation of “organized religions” in France. Yet, the Senate Report was
prepared during the state of emergency (soe), when the State applied coercive
and restrictive methods of control over worship organizations and legitimized
these actions with reference to security and public order. The Report does not
81 Ibid.
82 Frank Peter, “Training Imams and the Future of Islam in France”, 13 ISIM Newsletter (2003),
20.
83 Fernando, supra note 55.
84 Ibid., at 17; Fernando, supra note 10.
85 Frank Peter, “Leading the Community of the Middle Way: A Study of the Muslim Field in
France”, 96 The Muslim World (2006), 708.
86 President Macron’s speech in Mulhouse, 18 Feb. 2020. Retrieved 20 Apr. 2020, youtube.com/
watch?v=YE6h00Fjyjc.

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mention the soe, however, despite the fact that the soe targeted the control of
worship organizations and introduced new rules for their regulation. Whereas
the Senate Report outlines the reformist theory of the State, the soe reveals its
coercive practices.
3.1 Controlling Islam: The Effects of the State of Emergency on Places

of Worship
The soe, lasted from November 2015 to November 2017, was a period during
which the State employed coercive and restrictive measures by controlling
places of worship, believing that Salafist groups operate through mosques and
religious organizations. Under existing legal regulations, prior to the soe, it
was already possible for the State to take security measures in worship places
to monitor whether buildings were safe and whether the organizations spon-
sored activities unrelated to religion. Article L. 212-1 of the Internal Security
Code allows the Council of Ministers to dissolve associations or de facto groups
if they organize armed demonstrations; if they promote discrimination, hatred,
or violence against a person or a group because of their origin, membership (or
non-membership) in an ethnic group, nation, race, religion; or if they propa-
gate ideas or theories justifying or encouraging such discrimination, hatred, or
violence. With the soe, stronger security measures were introduced, enabling
the State to take quick action by bypassing the need to connect the actions of
the members or the leaders of the association with the association itself.87
During the soe, the administrative dissolution of associations and the clo-
sure of places of worship were made easier with the insertion of two articles
into the existing Emergency State Act of April 3, 1955: Article 6-1 (November 20,
2015) and Article 8 (July 21, 2016). In its new form, Article 6-1 allows an associa-
tion to be dissolved if it commits, facilitates, or incites acts threatening public
order.88 Article 8 directly targets places of worship: the Minister of Internal
Affairs or the governor (préfet) can now decide to temporarily close places of
worship, performance halls, places selling alcoholic beverages, and meeting
places (within the designated soe area), if they promote hatred or violence, or
if they provoke, encourage, or justify acts of terrorism.
Although the term “meeting places” includes places of worship, and there-
fore there was no need for an additional reference,89 the expression “places
87 Jean-Charles Jobart, “État d’urgence étatique et ordre public communal”, 11 Actualité

juridique collectivités territoriales (2016), 545.
88 Based on this Act, on 14 January 2016, the Council of Ministers dissolved three associations/
mosques that managed the same mosque, Mosquée de Lagny-sur-Marne, ibid. Décret du 14
janvier 2016 portant dissolution de trois associations, jorf n°0012, 15 January 2016.
89 The previous version of Article 8 already mentioned shutting down various meeting
places, and in one case, a judge confirmed this to include places of worship. Council

of worship” was added and emphasized in the bill of July 21, 2016.90 This
addition clearly shows the willingness of the State to take action at places of
worship. On this basis, 19 Muslim centers were shut down, and 11 mosques
and prayer halls remained closed after the soe ended.91 When the soe was
lifted, on November 1, 2017, the language justifying the closure of places of
worship was retained in the legal regulations. The new article, L. 227-1 of the
Internal Security Code,92 which is scheduled to remain in force until July 31,
2021,93 allows the government to close places of worship only for the pur-
pose of preventing acts of terrorism. According to this article, the State rep-
resentative in the province, or the governor (préfet), may order the closing
of places of worship in which “the words, ideas or theories that are spread,
or the activities that take place, incite violence, hatred, or discrimination,
endorse terrorism, or support such activities.” The closure is temporary,
its duration should be proportional to the circumstances, and it must not
exceed six months. The Senate Report argues that the aim of the closure is to
allow a profound modification in the orientation and function of the place,
which requires time. The modification expected includes measures such as
the replacement of the leadership or management team, the installation of
video surveillance, or the holding of vigils designed to ensure public order in
and around the worship place.94
The closure is accompanied by several procedural guarantees: worship places
must have been subject to a prior adversarial procedure and given 48 hours’
notice, allowing an interim order application to be filed before an administra-
tive judge. In case of a referral to court, the decision to shut down is suspended.
The closing of a place of worship clearly interferes with the freedom of associ-
ation and of religion. Nevertheless, the system is considered acceptable under
of State, ord., 25 February 2016, 397153, 72(23) Actualité juridique droit administratif
(2016), 1303.
90 Olivier Le Bot, “Prorogation de l’état d’urgence et mesures de lutte antiterroriste”, 72(34)
Actualité juridique droit administratif (2016), 1921.
91 Ministère de l’Intérieur, Sortie de l’état d’urgence: un bilan et des chiffres clés, Information
Presse. Retrieved 30 Apr. 2020, interieur.gouv.fr/Espace-presse/Dossiers-de-presse/
Sortie-de-l-etat-d-urgence-un-bilan-et-des-chiffres-cles.
92 The article has been added by Law 2017-1510, of October 30, 2017, reinforcing domestic
security and the fight against terrorism.
93 The article L. 227-1 was initially scheduled to remain in force until December 31, 2020.
However, on December 24, 2020, it is extended to July 21, 2021. This change took place after
we submitted our article in June 2020.
94 Olivier Le Bot, “Un état d’urgence permanent? (Loi n° 2017-1510 du 30 octobre 2017
renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme)”, 33(6) Revue Française de
Droit Administratif (2017), 1117.

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the Constitution,95 but some scholars question the legitimacy of this measure,
especially in the presence of other individual anti-terrorist measures and the
possibility that the association might be dissolved. They argue that the prob-
lem is not the place of worship itself, but rather individual bad actors, and that
the closure affects not only the preachers but also the faithful. These scholars
suggest that by forcing the place to close, the State considers the faithful dan-
gerous simply because they have chosen to listen to Jihadist discourse.96 Since
October 30, 2017, seven mosques have been closed under the Art. L. 227-1. Most
of them have not been opened after six months, whether because of the termi-
nation of the lease or the dissolution of the association.97 Data provided by the
Ministry of Internal Affairs to the National Assembly on March 27, 2020 does
not report any new decisions to close mosques.
Following the terrorist attacks in 2015, Islam has increasingly been identi-
fied as a matter of security for the State and the French public at large. The
legal changes carried out during the state of emergency explicitly declared
places of worship as areas in which the State can intervene. Although this was
legally possible before, the soe has made mosques a more explicit target of the
law. Although the State has used this period to restrict and coercively control
mosques, it has not extensively used the soe laws. Instead, the French State
is relying more on institutionalization rather than on coercive measures as its
strategy for regulating and reforming Islam. It identifies the cfcm as the entity
speaking for Muslims, targets the civic education of imams, and supports the
development of scientific knowledge of Islam. All these measures are intended
to advance the long-term goal of producing a secularized French Islam.
4 Reforming Islam: Formation of a French Islam
The formation of a French Islam is touted in reports and public discussions

as a key solution to the problems of “foreign influence” and “radicalization.”98
It was first expressed formally by Charles Pasqua, the Minister of Internal
Affairs, who made “the distinction between ‘foreign Islam’ (Islam étranger) and
95 Constitutional Council, Decision 2017–695 qpc of 29 March 2018.https://www.conseil-

constitutionnel.fr/en/decision/2018/2017695QPC.htm.
96 Emmanuel Dreyer, “Fermeture des lieux de culte appelant au djihad”, 3 Gazette du Palais
(2018), 78.
97 2e Rapport du Gouvernement au Parlement, Mise en œuvre de la loi n° 2017-1510 du 30
October 2017. Retrieved 25 Apr. 2020, http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/content/
download/303874/2926953/version/1/file/Loi+SILT+-+Rapport+du+Gouvernement+au+Parl
ement+2019.pdf.
98 See, e.g., Senate Report, supra note 1, at 46.

‘French Islam’ (Islam de France).”99 For politicians and policymakers, French

Islam refers to an Islam that is “loyal to or compatible with France’s republican
norms, values, and institutions.”100 The formation of a domesticated and sec-
ularized version of Islam has been on the agenda of the State since the early
2000s. Today it has been actively integrated into the State’s management of
Islam in France. The civic education of imams, as well as the institutions of
fif and of the Observatoire reflect a vision of Islam as a singular and universal
faith with abstract principles and rules that override the diversity of Muslim
practice. The French Islam that is envisioned by the State is arguably both uni-
versal and French: it is embedded in the national culture of France and imbued
with a scientific approach, representing a cognitively learned, theological, and
non-passionate Islam, harmonious with the secular vision of religion. The pro-
duction and study of scientific knowledge on Islam, the teaching of Republican
values to imams through civic education, and the foundation of representative
Muslim organizations are some of the concrete steps that the French State has
taken during the last two decades in the formation of a French Islam.
4.1 Formal Education (Formation) of Imams in France

As noted, the training of imams (formation des imams) has been a priority for
the State since the 1990s,101 as imams are considered to be key figures in the
formation of an Islam compatible with the values of the Republic.102 Reports
prepared since 2000 commonly address the education of religious personnel
in France as essential.103 The Senate Report of 2016 refers to the system of
imams détachés as a “palliative measure that reinforces the influence of the
[imams’] countries of origin.”104 It questions the sincerity of official discourse
that expresses the wish to limit the foreign influence while bilateral agree-
ments for the importation of imams are still in force.105 More recently, in a
press conference on laïcité on February 18, 2020,106 President Macron clearly
identified this system as contributing to the development of political Islam in
France and the separatism that jeopardizes the respect for Republican values.
He stated that some of the imams working in France neither speak French nor
respect French laws. In this speech, he also presented the government “strategy

100 Çitak, supra note 80, at 620.
101 Peter, supra note 82, at 20.
102 Solenne Jouanneau, Les Imams en France. Une autorité religieuse sous contrôle (Marseille:
Agone, 2013), 334.
103 Report of the High Council of Integration, supra note 62, at 70.
105 Ibid., at 39.
106 President Macron’s speech in Mulhouse, supra note 86.

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to fight against Islamic separatism,” and designated the struggle against foreign
influence on imams as one area of action. He also declared that the French
government “will progressively put an end to the system of imams détachés”
and that “the imams who arrive in 2020 will be the last generation.” Because
the State cannot intervene in choosing or training imams, the government has
called for the cfcm to take action. In this speech, Macron also identified the
“self-proclaimed imams of Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood” as problem-
atic because they preach against the Republic. As a solution, he proposed the
creation of a structure of “imamate” in France that can be managed by the
cfcm. The government had already taken steps to build a dialogue with
the cfcm and had asked the organization to take responsibility for the training
and certification of imams in France.
With respect to the training of religious leaders, Jews, Protestants, and
Catholics benefit from the pre-1905 tradition that permitted them to establish
their own theology faculties. After the law of 1905, those faculties were sim-
ply privatized.107 By contrast, Muslim groups, whose numbers have risen more
recently, do not benefit from this option. Debates on the creation of an Islamic
Theology Faculty go back to 1997, when the idea was first proposed at the State-
owned Marc-Bloch University of Strasbourg, through the mobilization of schol-
ars and the support of Muslim groups and local administrations.108 The initial
proposal, by Etienne Trocmé (ex-president of the University), intended to cre-
ate a program for the education of theological scholars (des savants), rather
than for the formal education of imams.109 This proposal was rejected by the
Faculty of Protestant Theology in Strasbourg.110 But the idea was adopted in
the Machelon Report of 2006, which emphasized the need to create a system
for the formal education of religious personnel and potential teachers of Islam
in Alsace-Moselle.111 As of today, a faculty of Islamic theology has still not been
established, but a master’s program of Islamology, recently renamed “Muslim
World” (Mondes musulmanes), was founded in 2011.112

108 Anne-Laure Zwilling, “L’Enseignement de l’Islam dans les universités en France: une
histoire mouvementée”, in M. Aoun & J.-M. Tuffery-Andrieu (eds.), Droit et Religion.
Etudes en l’honneur de Francis Messner (Strasbourg: Presses universitaires de Strasbourg,
2014), 242.
109 Francis Messner, “Les pouvoirs publics et la formation des cadres religieux en France”, in
F. Messner & A.-L. Zwilling (eds.), Formation des cadres religieux en France: Une affaire
d’État? (Genève: Labor et Fides, 2010), 20.
110 Frank Frégosi, “L’Islam en terre concordataire”, 1209 Hommes et Migrations (1997), 47.
111 Machelon Report, supra note 62, at 72.
112 Université de Strasbourg, Contenu du Master Civilisation, Cultures et Sociétés, Retrieved
30 Apr. 2020, http://histoire.unistra.fr/formation/offre-de-formation-2020–2021/
formation/rof/ME205/#data-rof-tab-presentation.

Currently, various minor institutions in France offer programs and courses

on Islam.113 The Senate Report mentions two main institutions for the educa-
tion of imams, both founded in the 1990s: the European Institute of Human
Sciences (L’Institut européen des Sciences humaines) (iesh)114 and Al-Ghazali
Institute (L’Institut Al-Ghazali).115 Although neither institution is yet recog-
nized, and they use different educational programs, they have expressed their
willingness to coordinate their respective curricula to establish a uniform
program.116 An important issue raised by the Senate Report is that these insti-
tutions are insufficient for the formal education of imams in France, as they
are set up to provide only general teaching of the Quran and Islamic sciences.
Thus, most students who attend do not wish to become imams but rather to
acquire knowledge about Islam and Muslim culture. The majority of the stu-
dents are women,117 who cannot become imams in practice under most inter-
pretations of Islam.
The Senate Report also emphasizes the need for uniform educational pro-
grams for imams, and as a solution, it recommends strengthening Muslim
organizations to allow them to develop stronger training programs. According
to the Report, this would allow these organizations to create alternatives to rad-
icalism in Islamic discourse and to support these alternatives with a stronger
institutional framework. To “fight extremism and radical interpretations of
Quran… the Islam of France” needs competent religious groups that are capa-
ble of being an “authority in their domain” and to “develop a counter-discourse
necessary to discredit the extremist discourse.”118 The Report recommends
that these institutes build “a scientific council” composed not only of theologi-
ans but also “lecturers of secular disciplines – not only of Islamology but also
sociology and philosophy.”119
113 Peter, supra note 85, at 728; Zwilling, supra note 107.
114 iesh received its first students in 1992. Currently, 500 students are enrolled, 180 of whom
study exclusively the Quran. A related institute is the l’IESH of Saint-Denis. Senate Report
supra note 1, at 47.
115 Institute Al-Ghazali is connected to the Grande Mosquée de Paris and was founded in 1993,
at the instigation of Charles Pasqua. It educates 20 to 50 imams per year, to be employed
at the 540 mosques affiliated with Grande Mosquée de Paris. Ibid., at 48.
116 Ibid., at 47. In 2012, the Turkish Diyanet, organized under the name ditib in Europe,
attempted to open a theology faculty in the Alsace-Moselle region, but the enterprise
failed, and closed quickly.
117 Ibid., at 49.
118 Ibid., at 46.
119 Ibid., at 49.

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The question of the imams’ education in France is still not resolved. France
is far from training enough French religious personnel for all the mosques
in the country. As a short-term solution, the State has encouraged imams to
participate in “civic and secular training” (formation civique et laïque), which
involves seminars and courses designed to teach basic knowledge of laïcité and
French values. These seminars and courses do not target only imams, and are
open to anyone, including all public servants and members of associations.
Some universities and institutes of higher education have opened programs
and courses for this training. Since 2017, chaplains who work in prisons, hospi-
tals, and the military are required to obtain a university diploma (du) in one
of these programs.120
All these efforts show how the integration of secular and republican values
into the education of imams has become a central concern for the State in
the formation of French Islam. The State’s focus on the imam’s education has
been criticized for exaggerating the role of imams in the Muslim community in
France, representing them as “the main agent in the transmission of Islam, and
the mosque as the center of Islamic life.”121 Yet, as the Senate Report demon-
strates, imams are still crucial for the State because of their capacity to affect
the population and to spread the counter-discourse that discredits the Jihadist
Islam, which threatens secular Republican values.122 The State has begun
actively supporting the production and dissemination of knowledge on Islam
for the education of imams. fif is one principal institution founded recently
to produce “scientific knowledge of Islam” and contribute to the formation of
a French Islam with a universal vision.
4.2 Foundation for Islam in France: Producing and Disseminating

Scientific Knowledge of Islam
The Foundation for Islam in France (fif) was established in 2016, with the
support of the State, reflecting its decision to take an active role in forming a
French Islam and offering clear clues about what “French Islam” means. The
main objectives of the Foundation are to produce and disseminate “scientific
knowledge of Islam,” and to promote mutual understanding between French
society and the Muslim community.123 The Foundation designates three areas
of ongoing activity: strengthening research in Islamology, the “civic training” of
120 Ibid., at 51.

121 Peter, supra note 82, at 20.
123 fif, Nos missions. Retrieved 15 Apr. 2020, https://fondationdelislamdefrance.fr/
nos-missions/.

imams, and the creation of a website for online education on scientific studies
of Islam, named the Campus of the Lights of Islam (Campus Lumières d’Islam),
launched on December 10, 2018.124 The creation of fif addresses three main
issues stressed by the Senate Report: the training of imams, the development
of knowledge about Islam, and the fight against Islamophobia.
fif is a continuation of the foif, which was created in 2005 to develop
means for the financial support of the cfcm. When foif failed to operate as
a result of conflicts within the cfcm, the State abolished it and transferred
its budget to fif, a new organization that was assigned a completely different
mission. fif was founded after the attacks of 2015, as a non-profit organization
(fondation reconnue d’utilité publique). The State did not directly fund it, but
was indirectly involved in its organization and funding. Public companies, like
the sncf (railways), adp (airports), and sni (an investment group) heeded
the call of the Minister of Internal Affair and joined fif as founding mem-
bers.125 Representatives of adp and sncf sit on the administrative board of
fif. The composition of this board was shaped by the State and reflects the
mission of the organization. It consists of both presumed representatives of
the Muslim community, such as the president of the cfcm and the rector of
the Lyon Mosque, and State representatives from the Ministries of Culture and
Internal Affairs. The scientific director of the humanities and social sciences
department of the Ministry of Higher Education, Research, and Innovation
is also a member of the board, reflecting its purpose to produce knowledge
from a social-scientific perspective.126 Jean-Pierre Chevènement, ex-Minister
of Internal Affairs, was the president of fif between its foundation and 2019.
The main purpose of fif is to contribute to the formation of a French
Islam, which is understood as a rational, modern, and progressive Islam
“rooted in French society, in republican principles and values.” As stated in
its webpage, “Our Mission,” fif aims at “promoting progressive Islam through
knowledge and culture, in harmony with the requirements of modernity.”127
The Foundation is considered to respond to the “urgency” of “consolidating
national harmony” in France, by contributing to “the construction of a French
Islam anchored in French society and in Republican principles and values,”
124 fif, Nos actions. Retrieved 15 Apr. 2020, https://fondationdelislamdefrance.fr/nos-actions/.

125 Bruno Le Roux, Communiqué de presse, 08 Dec 2016. Retrieved 3 Mar 2020, interieur.
gouv.fr/Archives/Archives-des-actualites/2016-Actualites/Lancement-de-la-Fondation-
de-l-Islam-de-France.
126 fif, Nos cultures en héritage la République en partage: Pour un islam humaniste et
progressiste, https://fondationdelislamdefrance.fr/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/
Plaquette-FIF-juin-2020.pdf. Retrieved 14 Nov. 2020.
127 fif, Nos missions, supra note 123.

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and showing how “the fight against prejudice and ignorance” is a part of both
“the history of France and that of Islam.”128 The mission of fif is to produce
knowledge of Islam from a secular perspective, rather than leaving knowl-
edge production entirely to Muslims. In this endeavor, the rational currents
in Islamic thought and the scientific accomplishments of Muslim thinkers are
emphasized as aspects of Islamic tradition that reflect critical thinking.
This approach can be seen best on the Campus Lumières website, which
claims to be the “[f]irst secular and scientific website on the thought, history,
and cultures of Islam.”129 Campus Lumières represents what fif means by the
scientific knowledge of Islam. fif presents the website as a platform where
Islam is understood “through the scientific study of its texts and its practices
historically and today.”130 It makes clear reference to Enlightenment values as
the founding values of the website: “privileging reason, reflection, and debate;
having the courage to think for oneself as a citizen capable of detachment…
from dogma.” The website also aims to be a reference where visitors can find
“definitions… an abc and, more broadly, reliable and scientific data on Islam…
in a secular framework.” This knowledge is “not for [the Muslim] community
alone, it is not apologetic and not proselytic, but rather quite simply repub-
lican and secular, and as scientific as possible” (italics added). The website is
also presented as a reliable resource, contrary to other Internet sources that
provide “abundant content on Islam,” but that most often “do not offer reliable,
qualitative, and objective information.”131 In this view, the scientific knowledge
of Islam, which is acquired through rational analysis from the perspective of
the social sciences, represents neutral knowledge, free from the interpretive
approach of religious figures. It is believed to overcome the diversity of inter-
pretations and to facilitate building a “better mutual knowledge” that can “pro-
mote fraternity” and “strengthen national cohesion.”132
The website includes almost a hundred 5-20-minute-long educational vid-
eos by academics from various social fields of science.133 The videos cover a
wide range of subjects, including the history of Islam, secularity, freedom of
religion, and Islamic theology. The cultural history of Islam, as well as various
themes selected as essential for the politics and sociology of Islam, are also
128 Ibid.
129 Campus Lumières d’Islam, Retrieved 15 Apr. 2020, https://campuslumieresdislam.fr/fr.
130 fif, Le Campus “Lumières d’Islam”. Retrieved 30 Nov. 2020, https://
fondationdelislamdefrance.fr/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/campus-lumiere-islam.pdf.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 Campus Lumières d’Islam, Toutes les videos. Retrieved 30 Nov. 2020, https://
campuslumieresdislam.fr/fr/blog?page=13.

explained briefly and concisely. The clips approach Islam as a subject of scien-
tific research and represent a secular view of Islam, stating that the Quran, for
example, has different versions134—a view that contradicts the Muslim tenet
that the Quran is not distorted, thus is the single book of God. Most of the vid-
eos are devoted to the discussions of rationalist, scientific, and reformist cur-
rents in the Islamic tradition, such as the Mutezile school, the work of Averroes,
and the Ernest Renan and Jamal al-Din al-Afgahi debate. By foregrounding
those aspects of Islam that resonate with progressive and secular values, the
videos aim to show that Islam is a religion of peace and that it includes pro-
gressive and rational currents, consistent with the Republican values.
To encourage the development of knowledge, fif grants scholarships for
masters and PhD programs. The foundation identifies four axes of research
eligible for these scholarships: political Islam, Islam and denominational or
conviction-based otherness, law and religious norms in Islam, and the influ-
ence of the Wahhabi-Salafist movement on young people in France.135 These
supported research areas focus more on contemporary social issues related
to Islam than on developing theological knowledge. Because the foundation
receives public funds, it cannot provide financial support for religious associa-
tions or the formal education of imams.136 But it can grant scholarships for du
programs that offer civil training for imams and chaplains. Such scholarships
are granted to imams (barring those employed by foreign States), chaplains,
members of Muslim religious associations, and students attending Muslim
theology institutes.137
134 Campus Lumières d’Islam, Le Coran 2/2: Des Différentes Versions à la Version Unique
Officielle, Retrieved 30 Nov. 2020, https://campuslumieresdislam.fr/fr/blog/lislam-
en-debats/le-coran-22-des-differentes-versions-a-la-version-unique-officielle-120. As
examples of this approach to Quran, see also Qu’est-ce que le Coran? 3/5 Langue et
traduction, https://campuslumieresdislam.fr/fr/blog/lislam-en-debats/comprendre-le-
fait-religieux/quest-ce-que-le-coran-35-langue-et-traduction-100 (entitled as ‘All Quranic
verses have received different interpretations throughout history’). Qu’est-ce que le Coran?
5/5 perspectives pour la recherche scientifique, https://campuslumieresdislam.fr/fr/blog/
lislam-en-debats/comprendre-le-fait-religieux/quest-ce-que-le-coran-55-perspectives-pour-
la-recherche-scientifique-102 (entitled “We must be able to ask about the Quran the same
questions as we ask about the Bible”).
135 fif, Nos bourses. Retrieved 15 Apr. 2020, https://fondationdelislamdefrance.fr/
les-bourses/#allocation.
136 Cécile Chambraud, “La fondation de l’Islam de France veut cibler en priorité la jeunesse”,
Le Monde, 13 Dec. 2016. Retrieved 12 Apr. 2020, lemonde.fr/religions/article/2016/12/13/
la-fondation-de-l-islam-de-france-veut-cibler-en-priorite-la-jeunesse_5048203_1653130.
html.
137 fif, Nos bourses, supra note 135.

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Through fif and its website, Campus Lumière, the State engages in the
production of knowledge about Islam from a secular perspective. Claiming
to represent a neutral and progressive Islam, it aims to govern the contested
field of Islamic knowledge and learning. Institutionalization, however, serves
to control not only Islam, or the domain of religion, but also the conception of
laïcité, which is also being contested socially and politically. This shows that
for the State, controlling and reforming Islam cannot be separated from pro-
tecting or controlling public conceptions of laïcité in order to find a delicate
balance between Islamic and secularist radicalisms. The Observatoire can be
understood as another related institution founded to control the acceptable
definitions of religion as well as of secularism in France.
4.3 Observatoire de la laïcité: Defending the Boundaries of Secularism

The education of imams and the foundation of fif illustrate how the French
State has moved further into the religious domain to govern religious popula-
tions. This has required a degree of flexibility on the part of the State in engag-
ing with Islam and working to form a French Islam within a liberal framework.
We initially argued that secularism is in a state of flux, in the sense that it has
adapted to emerging conditions and challenges to include Muslim popula-
tions into its regulative scheme. The boundaries of the State and of secularism
can be stretched but cannot disappear, as they are regulated by the secular
legal and normative framework. The Observatoire is a good example of State
attempt to draw and defend the boundaries of secularism in order to balance
and control its transformation in its engagement with Muslim populations and
organizations. It also shows how the definition of laïcité has become a con-
tested domain in France: Who will define what it really means?
The Observatoire was created on March 25, 2007, by decree no 2007–425. Its
mission is “to assist the government in its efforts/actions to respect the prin-
ciple of laïcité in public services.”138 The main function of the Observatoire is
to collect and analyze data on the condition of secularism in France in order
to inform public and private agents, including users of public services, elected
officials, and religious representatives. It also has the authority to propose
measures to the Prime Minister “for a better implementation of the principle
of laïcité and for the information of public servants and citizens.”139 The Prime
Minister or other ministers can consult the Observatoire about legislative bills
138 Observatoire de la laïcité, Missions et composition. Retrieved 10 Mar. 2020, gouvernement.

fr/missions-et-composition.
139 Ibid.

and regulatory texts. Other elements of its mission include preparing “guides
on secularism for citizens and public servants” and responding to “individual
claims by providing legal analyses.”140
The function of the Observatoire is to monitor and protect the position
of laïcité, as well as to disseminate knowledge of secularism through edu-
cation. By developing a curriculum to teach laïcité to public employees, the
Observatoire also takes part in the education of imams. State officials often
emphasize secularism as a fundamental value for unity, and of late, part of a
government website has been dedicated to explaining the principle of laïcité
as the “fundamental value and essential principle of the Republic.”141 The web-
site emphasizes that laïcité is “needed now more than ever” because of the
“greater cultural diversity in France today than in the past.” Secularism, which
is facing new challenges, ensures that a citizenry with varying “philosophical
or religious beliefs can live together, enjoying freedom of conscience, freedom
to practice a religion or to choose not to.”142 As stated in the Stasi Report,143
the State considers the growth of religious identities to come at the expense
of national identity and to pose a danger of fragmentation. On April 25, 2019,
President Macron “asked the government to be intractable/intransigent”
against “people who, in the name of religion pursue a political project, of a
political Islam that wants to secede from our Republic.”144
Despite this increasingly public embrace of laïcité by the State, the
Observatoire keeps away from the radical defense of secularism against
the perceived threat of Islam. The Observatoire has even claimed its inde-
pendence from the government in a conflict that emerged in 2016 over the
meaning of laïcité. The debate started when the General Rapporteur of the
Observatoire, Nicolas Cadène, criticized philosopher Elisabeth Badinter for
declaring on State radio (France Inter) that people should “not feel ashamed
of being called Islamophobic.”145 After the interview, Cadène tweeted that the
140 Ibid.
141 Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères, Secularism and Religious Freedom, supra
note 28.
142 Ibid.
143 Stasi Report, supra note 56, at 18, 36.
144 La Presse, 25 Apr. 2019. Retrieved 13 Mar. 2020, lapresse.ca/international/europe/
201904/25/01-5223512-emmanuel-macron-promet-detre-intraitable-contre-lislam-
politique.php.
145 Franceinfo:, 15 Jan. 2016. Retrieved 12 Mar. 2020, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/politique/
la-polemique-au-sein-de-l-observatoire-de-la-laicite-en-cinq-actes_1277437.html.All other
quotes in this paragraph are retrieved from this resource.

147-177 from Brill.com04/30/2023 06:27:09PM
effort of three years on laïcité was destroyed by one interview by one person.
After three members of the Observatoire protested against Cadène’s state-
ment, Minister Manuel Valls defended Badinter and asked the Observatoire
to explain its position, stating that “[t]he Observatory is independent, but
there are lines that have been crossed,” and that the Observatoire cannot dis-
tort the true meaning of laïcité. In the same speech, Valls also criticized the
President of the Observatoire, Jean-Louis Bianco, for signing the petition “We
are united,” together with so-called moderate Islamist groups. Bianco and
Cadène signed this appeal in the wake of the attacks in November 2015, as
two of eighty signatories that included groups and individuals allegedly close
to the Muslim Brotherhood. In response, Bianco stated in a press release that
the Prime Minister “disregards the reality of the independence of institutions
of the Republic. The Observatoire de la laïcité is not under his authority.”
This debate shows how the Observatoire has differentiated itself from the
government and its perspective, and has sought to establish an expert posi-
tion of the State on laïcité. The Observatoire has acknowledged the delicacy
of the subject and sought a solution through dialogue with Muslims. This is
consistent with State policy in the last two decades, which has aimed to inte-
grate Muslims through liberal measures. At present, the debate concerns how
and by whom secularism in France will be defined, and whose approach will
be presented as the State view on laïcité. In this debate, the Observatoire has
defended its own definition against more radical interpretations of secularism,
revealing that the French State does not want social division around the idea
of laïcité. Just as it fears the formation of social enclaves of religious identities
and ideologies within French society, the State also fears social division over
the multiple conceptions of secularism in France.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we have theorized secularism as the governing logic of the nation
State and its management of the religious field, rather than as the separation
of State and religion. We also argued that secularism operates mainly through
the transformation of religion into a secular form built on abstract and cog-
nitive principles—a form that contrasts starkly with the vision of religion as
a living tradition that reveals itself in the diversity of everyday practices and
the affectionate bonds between believers. We saw the need for the formation
of a French Islam expressed in the Senate Report and in various government
policies aiming to integrate Islam into the legal framework of laïcité. To these
ends, the French State has taken both repressive and liberal measures. Yet, for

the period we examined, we noted that although the issue of security has often
framed the question of the integration of Islam, the State has invested more
comprehensively in methods of transformation through inclusion and secular-
ization. We understand these methods as regulation and reform through insti-
tutionalization, practices that aim to fit Islam into the existing organizational,
legal, and normative frameworks of the State. Overall, we found that rather
than introducing significant legal changes, or reforming laïcité, the State took
steps targeted at re-forming Islam in France. The formal education of imams
and the production of a scientific knowledge about Islam are some of the ini-
tial steps that the State has taken to date. The foundation of cfcm, fif, and the
Observatoire can be considered as three components of the project of forming
a scientifically informed, knowledge-based, and nationally grounded French
Islam that fits into the framework of Republican values. We also saw that for
the French State, the question of how to integrate Islam into the secular frame-
work is also about how to define the true laïcité and to protect its boundaries.
The article illustrates a case in which the secular state and religion are deeply
entangled: any move of the French state toward reforming Islam means its fur-
ther intervention in the religious domain. As a result, the steps taken toward
the reformation of Islam in France, as elsewhere, inevitably entail a simultane-
ous reformation of the boundaries of laïcité.

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Journal of Law, Religion and State

Reforming Laïcité or Reforming Islam?

Berna Zengin Arslan

secularism – Islam – France – laïcité – management of religion – Fondation de l’Islam

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/22124810-2021J001

1 Introduction: Reforming laïcité or Reforming Islam?

At present, French secularism (laïcité) is facing an important challenge: how to

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15 Saba Mahmood, Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Report (Princeton,

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20 Nilüfer Göle, “Introduction: Islamic Controversies in the Making of European Public

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culte musulman, cfcm) as an umbrella association of Muslim organizations;

2 French Secularism and Its Exceptions

French secularism is often considered as a model for the strict separation

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freedom of conscience and guaranteed the freedom to worship.28 The neutral-

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2.1 Exceptions and Modifications

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universities is another exception, providing an opportunity for these religious

3 Managing Islam: The Senate Report and Nationalizing Muslim

57 Senate Report, supra note 1, at 16.

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The organization of Muslim worship accounts for a significant part of the

65 Fernando, supra note 55, at 15.

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3.1 Controlling Islam: The Effects of the State of Emergency on Places

87 Jean-Charles Jobart, “État d’urgence étatique et ordre public communal”, 11 Actualité

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4 Reforming Islam: Formation of a French Islam

The formation of a French Islam is touted in reports and public discussions

95 Constitutional Council, Decision 2017–695 qpc of 29 March 2018.https://www.conseil-

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‘French Islam’ (Islam de France).”99 For politicians and policymakers, French

4.1 Formal Education (Formation) of Imams in France

99 Fernando, supra note 55, at 13.

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107 Senate Report, supra note 1, at 46.

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Currently, various minor institutions in France offer programs and courses

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4.2 Foundation for Islam in France: Producing and Disseminating

120 Ibid., at 51.

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124 fif, Nos actions. Retrieved 15 Apr. 2020, https://fondationdelislamdefrance.fr/nos-actions/.

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4.3 Observatoire de la laïcité: Defending the Boundaries of Secularism

138 Observatoire de la laïcité, Missions et composition. Retrieved 10 Mar. 2020, gouvernement.

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