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Corporate Governance Practices and © 2021 MDI
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Gulf Countries

Waleed M. Al-ahdal1 , Faozi A. Almaqtari2 , Mosab I. Tabash3 ,

Abdulwahid Abdullah Hashed4 and Ali T. Yahya5

Abstract
The purpose of this article is to analyse the impact of corporate governance practices on the performance of listed firms from coun-
tries like India and the Gulf countries. This research study relies on secondary data collected from annual reports of 100 companies
covering 8 years, from 2010 to 2017, using manual content analysis. Fifty non-financial listed companies from each emerging market
were selected; the selection is based on the market capitalization. Findings from countries’ dummy indicate that Indian companies
perform better in corporate governance practices than Gulf countries. Moreover, corporate governance practices negatively impact
Indian and Gulf countries’ firms’ performance measured by return on assets (ROA), except for governance effectiveness (GE) that has
a positive impact. In contrast, corporate governance measured by board structure (BS) is negatively affected by the performance of
Indian and Gulf countries’ listed companies measured by Tobin’s Q (TQ), whereas transparency and disclosure (TD), leverage (LEV)
and GE have a positive impact. The results have implications for managers and policyholders to understand the corporate governance
practices and their relationships with performance. Based on the best knowledge of the authors, this is one of the first studies that
addresses the comparison between India and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

Key Words
Corporate Governance, Firms’ Performance, India, Gulf Countries

Introduction Report (2003) and Higgs Report (2003), both of which

Corporate governance (CG) constitutes a set of practices,
procedures and policies that serve as guidelines in the
management and control of a company. CG has gained
popularity in the USA after the collapse of prominent
companies in the early twenty-first century. The US
regulators responded to the failure of Enron by generating
the American CG code, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (or SOX
Act) 2002, an act that seeks to protect investors and ensures
accountability. Sarbanes–Oxley, as an Act, attracts
governmental backing and mandatory compliance by US
companies. In a similar response, the UK regulators also
reacted to the collapse of Enron by generating the Smith
contain various CG regulations.
The UK regulations on CG were constituted, in May
1991, by three bodies that include Financial Reporting
Council, the London Stock Exchange and the accountancy
profession. The application and implementation of
regulations were initiated in July 1993 to enhance the
governance system of the UK corporate sector (Arcot &
Valentina, 2006). From there, the issue of CG began, and
now, it is a major issue for policymakers of new emerging
markets like India and the Gulf countries. In the backdrop
of emerging markets, in general, CG has attained greater
importance due to inadequate implementation of laws. It
may cause several disputes. Additionally, the inauthentic

1Department of Accounting, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Development, University Malaysia Terengganu, Kuala Terengganu, Terengganu,
Malaysia.
2 Department of Accounting, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Development, University Malaysia Terengganu, Kuala Terengganu, Terengganu,

Malaysia.
3 College of Business, Al Ain University, Al Ain, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.
4 Department of Accounting, College of Business Administration, Prince Sattam Bin Abdulaziz University, Al-Kharj, Saudi Arabia.
5 Faculty of Administrative Science, University of Science and Technology Hodeidah, Al Hodeidah, Yemen.

Corresponding author:
Mosab I. Tabash, College of Business, Al Ain University, P.O. Box: 64141, Al Ain, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.
E-mail: mosab.tabash@aau.ac.ae
2
information results in deterring adequate supervision and
control, therefore, encouraging the spread of corruption
and lack of confidence.
On the other hand, applying the doctrines of CG assists
in creating the needed precautions against mismanagement
and corruption and encourages transparency in economic
life, not to mention eradicating the resistance to reforms in
institutions (Baydoun et al., 2013). The aim of financial
performance measures is to eliminate the distortions in
accounting data in order to provide comparability across
time, companies and industries. Assessments of how
businesses build or reduce shareholder capital are possible
after the anomalies in accounting data have been eliminated,
and more informative assessments can be offered (Al-ahdal
et al., 2018).
In India, Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI)
issued the CG code entitled ‘Clause 49 of listing agreement’
in 2000 and recently revised it in 2014. In the Listing
Agreement, particularly provisions of Clause 49 along
with the Companies Act of 2013 have a major impact on
regulating CG issues in India (Saini and Singhania 2018).
In Saudi Arabia, Capital Market Authority (SCMA) issued
the CG code entitled ‘Corporate Governance Regulations
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ in 2006 and revised it in
2009 (Kalyanaraman and Altuwaijri, 2016). Recently, a
revised CG regulation has taken place, which has been
effective since 2017. In the Omani context, the code of CG,
entitled ‘Code of Corporate Governance for Muscat
Securities Market (MSM) Listed Companies’ was the first
code to be issued in the region. The code was issued in
2002 by the Omani Capital Market Authority (OCMA) and
was later amended in 2015 (Shehata, 2015). With regard to
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), in 2006, a drafted CG
code was issued by the Emirates Securities and
Commodities Authority (ESCA) and was launched in
2007. The code was issued on a mandatory, comply or
penalize basis effective from 30 April 2010. It was further
revised and amended in 2015. It must be reemphasized that
all UAE companies must enforce the code of CG, as it is a
mandatory legal instrument. Comply or explain is a
regulatory approach used in India and Gulf countries in the
field of CG and financial supervision. The approach
suggests that listed companies may either comply with or,
Table 1. Corporate Governance Codes in India and GCC Countries
Principal Source Date of Recently Revised/
Country of Code Issuance Replaced
India Clause 49 2000 2014
Companies Act. And And
1956 2013
Saudi Arabia CG regulations 2006 2017
Oman CG code 2002 2016
UAE CG code 2007 2016
Source: The authors.
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if they do not comply, explain publicly why they do not.
The Gulf countries’ CG code uses this approach in setting
minimum standards for companies in their audit
committees, remuneration committees and
recommendations for how good companies should divide
authority on their boards. The concept was first introduced
after the recommendations of the Cadbury Report of 1992.
Table 1 presents the CG Codes in India and GCC member
countries.
This study is motivated by several considerations. Frist,
the Gulf countries and India are developing emerging
economies that have been strongly influenced by the
unique economic and social environment. Second, GCC is
India’s second largest partner in terms of merchandise
trading. Similarly, India is the ninth largest trading partner
for the GCC (Rigiladez & Khan, 2014). The GCC is of
great potential for cooperation in different fields such as
manpower, trade, investment, energy, etc. Third, the
economic relations between India and GCC are of vital
interest to India, which is tied to growing imports of oil and
gas, increasing investments and trade, and the presence of
around 6.5 million Indian workers in the GCC (Embassy of
India—Riyadh, 2016). Hence, this work contributes to CG
and firm performance literature in numerous ways. It
promotes a better understanding of the subject of CG based
on the background of India and Gulf countries’ non-
financial listed firms. A content analysis is used for
collecting codified qualitative and quantitative data into
prearranged classifications to obtain attributes present in
information. Ultimately, this study provides new insights
into the existing body of academic evidence on corporate
governance in India and Gulf countries by examining the
effect of CG on firms’ performance for their non-financial
listed firms. Based on existing literature and findings, there
is little notable empirical work that has wholly linked CG
scores to encapsulate the magnitude of their impact on
financial performance in India and the Gulf countries.
Therefore, this study will fill the gap by using India and
Gulf countries’ markets as proxies of the Gulf market to
examine the effect of CG structure on firms’ performance.
The remainder of the current study is presented as
follows. The second section constitutes the surveyed
literature pertinent to the study. The third and fourth
Issuing Comply or
Entity Explain
Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Comply basis
And Ministry of corporate affairs
Capital Market Authority (SCMA) Comply basis
Capital Market Authority (OCMA) Comply basis
Capital Market Authority (ECMA) Comply or-Pay
Penalty
Al-ahdal et al.
sections cover the objective and rationale of the study. In
the fifth section, the authors discuss the methodology of
the study. The sixth section elaborates on the diagnostic
tests performed. The seventh section presents and discusses
the findings of the results and the study. In the eighth
section, the article further discusses the conclusion along
with the implications of the study. Finally, a detailed
conclusion of the findings is explained.
Review of Literature
Earlier research studies largely concentrated on the impact
of corporate governance on firms’ performance in
developed countries. However, there is little research
focusing on the link between CG and financial performance,
especially in the Indian and Gulf countries’ context
(Abdallah & Ismail, 2017; Aggarwal et al., 2010; Al-ahdal
et al., 2020; Iqbal et al., 2019), among others, have explored
the impact of CG on firms’ performance in the emerging
markets, but hitherto, none of them has analysed the effect
of corporate governance on the performance of firms
employing ROA as a dependent variable in comparing
India and the Gulf countries’ markets.
Studies Conducted in India
Charumathi and Ramesh (2020) investigated the effect of
voluntary corporate disclosures on a firm’s value in Indian
companies. This study found a positive association between
voluntary disclosures and firm value as measured by
Tobin’s Q. Yameen et al. (2019) concluded that the size of
the board directors, size of the audit committee and foreign
ownership of hotels in India have a positive impact on
performance as measured by Tobin’s Q ratio. Saini and
Singhania (2018) found that CG has a positive and notable
substantial impact on 255 Indian firms’ performance.
Varshney et al. (2012) showed a positive relationship
between CG and firm performance on the basis of the CG
rate. Furthermore, Balasubramanian et al. (2010) examined
the relationship between firm-level CG and market
performance. The authors noted a positive cross-sectional
correlation linking a firm’s market performance and an
aggregate governance index. This finding also applied to
the sub-index covering shareholder rights.
Studies Conducted in Gulf Countries
Queiri et al. (2021) investigated the relationship between
selected board characteristics and ownership elements and
the performance of firms listed in the Muscat Securities
Market. Results reveal that the ratio of the independent
board of directors, the number of board director’s meet-
ings, state ownership and concentrated individual owner-
ship were inversely affecting the firm’s performance.
However, institutional ownership and board size were
found to have a positive effect on firms’ performance.
3
A study carried out by Husam-Aldin et al. (2018), as meas-
ured by the Q ratio, proved that corporate governance prac-
tices and processes have a significant statistical connection
with firms’ performance. Abdallah and Ismail (2017)
studied the association between corporate governance and
firms’ performance. Evidence from the study pointed out a
significant positive relationship between governance
quality and a firm’s performance. A similar research con-
ducted by Pillai and Al-malkawi (2017) focused on the
impact of internal practices of corporate governance with
regard to the performance of firms in the Gulf region.
Empirical findings provided evidence that government
ownership, audit type, size of the board of directors, corpo-
rate social responsibility and leverage have a significant
bearing on corporate performance in most countries in the
Gulf countries.
Studies Conducted in All Over the World
On the global stage, CG has witnessed widespread research
in an endeavour to determine its impact on various man-
agement variables affecting a firm’s performance. A recent
study by Phan and Duong (2021) showed that board struc-
ture is positively associated with a firm’s performance,
whereas age of the firm is negatively associated. Al-ahdal
et al. (2020) observed that board accountability does not
have a significant impact on firms’ performance measured
by return on equity and Tobin’s Q. Enache and Hussaine
(2019) noted that CG increased corporate performance,
while the marginal effect of trustworthy disclosures
decreased in governance. Iqbal et al. (2019) analysed cor-
porate governance and financial performance relationship
for MFIs in Asia. They constructed a corporate governance
index based on seven measures about board size and com-
position, CEO characteristics, and ownership type. Results
confirm the endogenous nature of corporate governance
and financial performance. Shao (2018) documented that
CG policies and procedures in China are a result of the CG
mechanisms investigated. The author found further evi-
dence that there is no relationship between board size and
a firm’s performance. He also noted that the concentration
of ownership significantly improves the performance of
the firm. In addition, a supervisory board has a positive
correlation with a firm’s performance. Gupta and Sharma
(2014) examined the link between CG practices and the
performance of select listed Indian and South Korean com-
panies. The study concluded that financial performance is
hugely affected by CG practices. Bhagat and Bolton (2008)
estimated the relationship between CG and performance,
by taking into account the interrelationships among CG,
corporate performance, corporate capital structure and cor-
porate ownership structure. They found that CG as indices,
stock ownership of board members and chief executive
officer (CEO)-Chair separation are significantly positively
correlated with better contemporaneous and subsequent
operating performance. Also, interestingly, board inde-
pendence is negatively correlated with contemporaneous
and subsequent operating performance.
4
Objectives
There exists a research gap in the literature regarding the
impact between CG practices and a firm’s performance in
India and the Gulf countries. This study seeks to establish
a link or connection between listed non-financial entities in
India with special emphasis on the relationship of CG
practices and their impact on firm performance.
Rationale of the Study
India and countries in the Gulf region are geographically
separated by sea. They have different business and opera-
tional environments. The same applies to the rules and
regulations governing how firms in these countries are
operated, controlled and managed. As a result, suitable
guidelines, monitoring policies and procedures are put in
place to ensure transparency, clarity and accountability of
firms operating in these countries. On the contrary, it can
be empirically observed that family-owned or centralized
holding firms and businesses constitute a majority of com-
panies in Asia as compared to Western countries, particu-
larly in the UK or the USA (Tsamenyi et al., 2011). The
differences in these operational environments imply that
CG guidelines and business regulatory frameworks differ
significantly between countries and regions. Effective and
efficient corporate governance guidelines, principles, prac-
tices, procedures and regulations are found to protect
investors, government agencies and other concerned stake-
holders. Therefore, it can be observed that good corporate
governance practices foster a harmonious existence of a
business, its management and relevant stakeholders.
Data and Methodology
Data Source
Sample data for corporate governance from Indian compa-
nies have been extracted from official company websites
and annual reports. For assessing a firm’s performance and
leverage, data for this purpose were sourced from the
Prowess IQ database. As for determining governance effec-
tiveness, relevant data have been obtained from the World
Bank website. Any missing data set from Prowess IQ data-
base has been manually collected from annual reports of
respective companies. As for Gulf countries, the data for
corporate governance index have been manually collected
and compiled from official company websites and annual
reports. For assessing a firm’s performance and leverage,
data have been extracted from DataStream financial data-
base. The data for determining governance effectiveness
have been sourced from the website of the World Bank.
Sample Description
The study seeks to examine 50 non-financial listed compa-
nies from India and another from Gulf countries. Companies
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in this sample are selected based on market capitalization.
Since the Gulf region is constituted by several countries,
the selection criteria for this group is performed using a
multistage sampling technique. For Gulf countries, Oman,
Saudi Arabia and the UAE are selected purposively. This is
because governments in these respective countries were
proactive to adopt and mandatorily implement CG prac-
tices prior to or in 2009. Top 50 listed companies belonging
to non-financial firms on the NIFTY 100 Index were
selected to constitute the Indian sample. It is important to
note that the NIFTY 100 is representative of the top 100
companies with regard to market capitalization. The 8-year
sample time period under observation spans from 2010 to
2017. The period has been purposefully considered bearing
in mind that countries in the Gulf region did not adopt
meaningful corporate governance practices and procedures
before 2010.
Definition of Variables
Table 2 contains a summary of variables and a list of
surveyed literature in which they were utilized by various
authors. The variables include two dependent variables,
two independent variables and control variables.
Dependent Variables
Return on assets: It can be determined as the percentage
of profit after tax spanning 1 year for the total assets of the
same year.
Tobin’s Q: Tobin’s Q ratio is a ratio that seeks to determine
the company’s total assets in relation to the total market
value of the concerned company. It is calculated as the total
market value of the firm/total asset value of the firm.
Independent Variables (Corporate Governance Grading)
For this study, a checklist encompassing 30 items was
constructed (see Appendix A). These items were divided
into two subcategories, namely Board Structure and
Transparency and Disclosure. The categories and items
have relied on previous literature (Aggarwal et al., 2010;
Al-ahdal et al., 2020; Al-Malkawi et al., 2014; Ammann et
al., 2011; Balasubramanian et al., 2010; Cheung et al.,
2007; Henry, 2010; Khan & Banerji, 2016; Srairi, 2015)
and organisation for economic co-operation development
(OECD, 1999, 2015).
Control Variables
The study utilizes three control variables. These are
leverage, governance effectiveness and country dummies.
1. Leverage: It is the use of debt capital for opera-
tional purposes. It is determined as total company’s
debt/ordinary equity.
2. Governance effectiveness: It is a measurement cri-
terion widely used by the worldwide bank to assess
Al-ahdal et al. 5

Table 2. Definition of Variables

Type of Name of
Variable Variable Symbol Proxy Measure Use in Current Literature
Dependent Return on Assets ROA It can be determined as the percentage of profit after Coşkun and Sayilir (2012) Gupta
variables tax of 1 year for the total assets of the same year and Sharma (2014)
Tobin’s Q TQ In calculating Tobin’s Q, market capitalization ratio Al-ahdal et al. (2020); Singh
with the addition of aggregate debt divided by the et al. (2018)
aggregate value of all the companies’ assets
Independent Board Structure BS Board Structure Index (16 items) (Abdallah and Ismail (2017); Al-
variables ahdal et al. (2020)
Transparency and TD Transparency and disclosure Index (14) Al-ahdal et al. (2020); Hassan
Disclosure (2012); Samaha et al. (2012)
Control Leverage LEV It is determined by dividing the aggregate assets Bhat et al. (2020); Gupta et al.
variables upon aggregate liabilities (2020)
Governance GE Worldwide governance index Akbar et al. (2016); Al-Ahdal
Effectiveness et al. (2020); Del Carmen Briano-
Turrent and Rodríguez-Ariza
(2016); Kaufmann et al. (2011)
Country Dummies CD 1 if Indian firms, 0 if Gulf countries’ firms Al-ahdal et al. (2020); Eulaiwi
et al. (2016)
Source: Derived from surveyed literature by the researcher.

dimensions and standards of policy formulation and
its implementation, the status of public services, the
nature and willingness of government’s dedication
to undertake and execute concerned policies. It also
includes the degree of control from political influ-
ence as well as the characteristics and effective civil
service.
3. Country dummies: To effectively differentiate
India and Gulf countries under observation, the study
adopts a dummy variable. In so doing, the author
designate (1) as a performance control dummy,
whereas (0) is assigned to the Gulf countries.
was chosen over the fixed-effects model (FEM) because
FEM cannot consider the effect of a time-invariant dummy
variable (Arellano, 2003; Baltagi, 2008). In the current data
set, time-invariant dummy variables were present (dummies
representing country type). Hence, FEM was not applied;
the current study deployed one-way REM procedure to
generate the final results. To achieve the study objectives,
the following regression models are developed:
ROA it = n + b 1 BS it + b 2 TD it + b 3 LEVit + b 4 GE it + f it
(Model 1— India)

Specification of Model and Econometric
Techniques
The study utilizes panel data for a sample period of 8 years,
that is, from 2010 to 2017. In addition, a sample of 100
companies is selected. There are several merits of using
panel data for analysis as confirmed in multiple studies.
Hsiao (2003) and Samal (2020) have found it to be an
efficient way of econometric estimates as compared to an
absolute time series and absolute cross-sectional data.
Moreover, it has robust control for individual heterogeneity
as well as multicollinearity. The selection between a random-
effects model and fixed-effect model in the case of analysis
India data and Gulf countries’ data based on the Hausman
test. The study applied the fixed-effects model based on
Hausman test result (p-value < 0.05) to determine the effect
of corporate governance practices and procedures to assess
performance of firms in the Indian context. Meanwhile, the
study also applied the fixed-effects model based on Hausman
test result (p-value < 0.05) to determine the effect of
corporate governance practices on performance of firms in
Gulf countries. Regarding the overall data between India
and the Gulf countries, the random-effects model (REM)
ROA it = n + b 1 BS it + b 2 TD it + b 3 LEVit + b 4 GE it + f it
(Model 1—Gulf countries)
ROA it = n + b 1 BS it + b 2 TD it + b 3 LEVit + b 4 GE it +
mCD + f it (Model 1—Overall)
TQ it = n + b 1 BS it + b 2 TD it + b 3 LEVit + b 4 GE it + f it
(Model 2—India)
TQ it = n + b 1 BS it + b 2 TD it + b 3 LEVit + b 4 GE it + f it
(Model 2—Gulf countries)
TQ it = n + b 1 BS it + b 2 TD it + b 3 LEVit + b 4 GE it +
mCD + f it (Model 2—Overall)
where
n is the intercept, ε is the error term of the model, i and t
correspond to firm and year, ROA is return on assets, TQ
are initials for Tobin Q, BS refers to board structure Index,
TD denotes transparency and disclosure score, LEV
represents leverage, GE is short form for government
effectiveness and CD stands for country dummies.
6 Vision

Diagnostic Tests
Validity and Reliability of Corporate
Governance Indexes
The study places greater emphasis on the content analysis
of reliability and validity analysis. To ensure the content
validity of the initial research instrument, it was reviewed
independently by two other researchers. Subsequently,
after the researcher received the independent researcher’s
comments and suggestions, a fourth experienced academic
was required to discuss any ambiguities raised. The final
disclosure checklist included 30 items. In terms of
reliability of CG Index, it was measured by using a
Cronbach’s alpha test. The test generates a number in the
range of 0–1, which was greater than 0.8, which means the
data are ideally considered as significantly acceptable.
Panel Data Assumptions Test
Parametric tests are valid only if the errors are normally
distributed (Ayyangar, 2007). The statistics for the models
show no performance in the kurtosis or skewness of up to
+10 or +3; hence, the data are normal for regression
analysis. In terms of multicollinearity, the variance inflation
factor statistic is calculated for all variables and for each
country. The mean performances for all countries are much
lower than the threshold performance of 10, indicating no
major signs of multicollinearity problem (Gujarati &
Sangeetha, 2007). For further check, the correlation
matrices (not reported) confirm the absence of high
correlation among variables for all countries. Regarding
the heteroscedasticity assumption, it was examined by the
Breusch–Pagan–Godfery test. The results of Breusch–
Pagan Test showed that the p-performance is greater than
0.05 in the model, indicating that heteroscedasticity does
not exist.
Endogeneity Test
Redundant fixed-effects likelihood ratio was conducted to
carry out a comparison between the pooled ordinary least
squares (OLS) and the FEM. The primary distinction
between them lies in the premise of the individual effects.
While the OLS claims individual endogeneity, the FE
model claims individual endogeneity, and it is associated
with a single or more regressors. This indicates the use of
the restricted F-test with a low p-performance of less than
0.05. Fixed effects is utilized rather than pooled OLS as the
null hypothesis of individual effect is not accepted, and
there is no evidence supporting the presence of individual
effects. For this reason, the study opts for fixed and random
effects testing, redundant fixed effects likelihood ratio,
which tests the endogeneity of the panel. The results
indicate that all models have a one-way variable intercept
model.
Study Results and Discussion
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive analysis is conducted to give brief information
about the sample target that can prompt simple and better
elucidation of data (Genser et al., 2007). Table 3 includes
the information of mean, standard deviation, minimum and
maximum of the variables of the data set. Table 3 also pre-
sents the overall reporting information about ROA and TQ
involving Indian and the Gulf countries’ firms. The mean
performance of financial performance (ROA, TQ) are
11.26, 2.92 for India and 10.57,1.72 for Gulf countries,
with firms having the highest performance of ROA
(38.71,12.90) and TQ (12.90,6.96), respectively, and a
minimum performance of (−6.85,0.30) for India and
(7.25,0.51) for the Gulf countries, respectively. These
results show a substantially lower variation in the data set
that is significantly nearer to the mean. This further indi-
cates a possible future rise in profitability in the near future.
Regarding the implementation of corporate governance
in India, findings reveal that the mean performances of BSI
and TDI are 74.32 and 93.03 for India and 70.87 and 71.82
for the Gulf countries, respectively. These results indicate
that CG practices are better practised in India than in the
Gulf countries’ listed firms; the standard division of each
CG indicator is 10.50, 13.58, 8.44 and 12.85 respectively.
Lastly, the mean performance of the GE and LEV in Indian

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics by Country Wise

Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.

Gulf Gulf Gulf Gulf
Variables India Countries Overall India Countries Overall India Countries Overall India Countries Overall
ROA 11.26 10.57 10.90 38.71 47.03 47.03 −6.85 −7.25 −7.85 7.65 9.81 8.80
TQ 2.92 1.72 2.32 12.90 6.96 12.90 0.30 0.51 0.30 2.40 0.98 1.93
BSI 74.32 70.87 72.60 93.75 93.75 93.75 43.75 31.25 31.25 10.50 13.58 12.25
TDI 93.03 71.82 82.42 100 100 100 64.28 42.85 42.85 8.44 12.85 15.19
GE 52.96 67.51 60.24 57.21 91.34 91.34 45.19 45.49 45.19 4.54 12.03 11.64
LEV 53.88 44.11 48.53 94.37 85.58 85.58 0.46 2.50 0.46 21.94 19.47 14.80
Obs. 400 400 800 400 400 800 400 400 800 400 400 800
Source: The authors.
Al-ahdal et al. 7

firms is 52.96 and 53.88 with a minimum performance of
45.19 and 0.46 and a maximum of 57.21 and 94.37,
respectively. On the other hand, the mean performances of
GE and LEV in the Gulf countries’ firms is 67.51 and 44.11
with a minimum performance of 45.49 and 2.50 and a
maximum of 91.34 and 85.58, respectively. The results
show a limited disparity in the governance effectiveness
over the Indian and Gulf countries’ firms in the sample.
Multiple Regression Analysis
The regression model is an important statistical technique
that assesses or investigates the link between an independent
variable and a dependent variable. In addition, it determines
the degree of change of the dependent variable in relation
to the independent variable. After the assumptions of
regression were met, in this section, an analysis of the
relationship between financial performance measures by
ROA and TQ as a dependent variable and CG Index
measured by the board of accountability index, transparency
and disclosure index, and government effectiveness,
leverage and country dummy as control variables using a
multiple regression techniques are conducted.
The study noted significant findings in the REM for the
dummy variables. Results from the regression analysis
presented a positive connection or link between the
countries and CG practices. These findings point out a
maximum convergence of CG code and its practices in
India as compared to the Gulf countries as per OECD
recommendations. An analysis of dummy results, taking
all models into account (ROA, TQ), also proves that Indian
firms perform better in comparison to those in the Gulf
countries. It is interesting to note that the results of country
dummies contrast to what was found in the results of
descriptive statistics, which showed a significantly higher
mean for all the variables of Indian firms under observation.
Result of Model One: Return on Assets
Table 4 shows that the board structure index has an
insignificant impact on Indian listed firms, the Gulf
companies and in the collective model measured by ROA
(p < 0.05); this result contradicts with the studies performed
by Abdallah and Ismail (2017); Conheady et al. (2015);
and Mohd et al. (2014) who argue that board structure
index has a significant impact on ROA. The result of the
study regarding board structure index is consistent with the
study performed by Al-Matari et al. (2012) and Bonn et al.
(2004) who believe that board structure index has
insignificant impact on ROA.
As for transparency and disclosure index, Table 4 shows
that TDI insignificantly affects ROA in the case of India,
the Gulf countries and collective model. This result is
inconsistent with the studies performed by Sharif and Ming
Lai (2015) and Zaman et al. (2015) who argue that TDI
significantly impacts firms’ performance measured by
ROA. On the contrary, this finding is in line with the study
performed by Hassan (2012) who found that TDI
insignificantly impacts the ROA.
For control variable ‘governance effectiveness’, it has
been observed that it shows a positive and significant rela-
tionship in the case of Gulf countries as well as an overall
model, while it has a positive but insignificant relation with
Indian firms. This clearly shows that control variable has a
positive controlling effect over the ROA. However, finan-
cial leverage ratio has a negative relationship with ROA in
the case of Gulf countries and overall model and positive
relationship in the case of Indian firms. The regression
models show that there is a significant impact of leverage
on ROA in the Gulf countries, collective model as well as
in the case of India. The result is supported by Aggarwal et
al. (2010) and Husam-Aldin et al. (2018).
With reference to the total sample in which all the
companies from India and the Gulf countries were grouped
in one model, it was observed that GE and CD have a

Table 4. Regression Results Estimation of Model (1) by Country Wise

Model 1—Panel A (India) ROA Model 1—Panel B (Gulf countries) Model 1—Panel C (overall) ROA
Model (fixed effects) ROA (fixed effects) (random effect)
Variables Coef. p-Value Coef. p-Value Coef. p-Value
C 6.87 0.16 −8.02 0.02 9.59 0.00
BSI −0.005 0.91 −0.012 0.71 −0.01 0.51
TDI −0.005 0.89 −0.065 0.09 −0.03 0.18
GE 0.044 0.23 0.20 0.00 0.19 0.00
LEV 0.086 0.04 −0.13 0.00 −0.12 0.00
CD 9.41 0.00
Obs. 400 400 800
R-squared 0.79 0.84 0.82
Adjusted R-squared 0.76 0.81 0.80
F-statistic 25.54 23.27 32.14
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hausman test 0.021 0.041 REM
Source: The authors.
8 Vision

positive impact on ROA, while BSI, TDI and LEV have a
negative impact on TQ of Indian and Gulf countries’ listed
firms. The R2 and adjusted R2 are fairly good; R2 is 0.82.
This means that 0.82 of the variation in ROA is attributable
jointly by BSI, TDI, GE, LEV and CD, while the rest of the
variation in ROA of Indian and Gulf countries’ listed firms
can be explained by other variables, which are not included
in this study.
Result of Model Two (TQ)
Table 5 clearly shows that board structure Index has an
insignificant effect on TQ of Indian and Gulf countries’
listed firms as well as in the overall model. This result is in
line with the findings of Conheady et al. (2015) and Shao
(2018). Regarding transparency and disclosure index,
Table 5 shows that TDI has a positive impact on TQ of
Indian listed firms and positive but insignificant impact on
the Gulf countries’ listed firms with a coefficient of 0.03
and 0.004, respectively. This result is supported by the
study performed by Balasubramanian et al. (2010) and
Black et al. (2006) who argue that TDI has a positive
impact on TQ. This means that when TDI increases, TQ of
Indian and Gulf countries’ listed firms increase.
Regarding the controlling variables, Table 5 demon-
strates that governance effectiveness and leverage have a
positive effect on TQ of the Gulf countries and the overall
model. This means that when GE and LEV increase, TQ of
Indian and Gulf countries’ listed firms increase.
Notably, when all the companies from India and Gulf
countries were grouped in one model, it was found that
BSI, LEV have an insignificant impact on TQ of Indian
and Gulf countries’ listed firms. The R2 and adjusted R2 are
fairly good, R2 is 0.83. This means that 0.83 of the variation
in TQ is attributable jointly by BSI, TDI, GE, LEV and
CD, while the rest of the variation in TQ of Indian and Gulf
countries’ listed firms can be explained by other variables,
which are not included in this study.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
The purpose of this article was to determine the impact of
CG practices, procedures and guidelines, commonly known
as CG mechanism, on the firms’ performance between com-
panies listed in India and those in the Gulf countries. This
research utilized secondary data listed and published on
multiple web sources and annual reports, respectively. It
spans the time period from 2010 to 2017. FEM and REM
were utilized in the analysis. The findings of the study
proved that Indian firms perform significantly better than
those in the Gulf countries. This result is attributed to better
corporate governance practices in India as compared to the
Gulf countries. Moreover, the findings indicate that (BS)
and (TD) do not have a significant impact on the firms’ per-
formance measured by ROA, while (TD) and (GE) are sig-
nificant on TQ in the collective models.
Results from the regression analysis presented a positive
relationship of corporate governance practices between
India and the Gulf countries. These findings show that the
CG code of India has a notable maximum convergence
with its CG practices as compared to that of Gulf countries.
This research is of utmost importance to financial prac-
titioners, government policymakers and academicians. It
also adds vital information to current corporate governance
literature by fulfilling the existing research gap between
India and the Gulf countries. The findings of this study
hold implications for academicians and finance research-
ers, in terms of further investigation in the field of the
dynamics of firms’ performance and corporate governance,
using different proxies of the same variables used in this
study.
Limitation and Recommendation
for Future Research
This article has useful implications in providing significant
evidence to support the relationship between firms’

Table 5. Regression Results Estimation of Model (2) by Country Wise

Model 2—India Model 2—Gulf countries Model 2—Overall

Model TQ (fixed effects) TQ (fixed effects) TQ (random effect)
Variables Coef. p-Value Coef. p-Value Coef. p-Value
C −3.46 0.018 0.50 0.12 −0.19 0.72
BSI 0.012 0.38 −0.001 0.73 −0.002 0.664
TDI 0.032 0.005 0.004 0.25 0.014 0.008
GE −0.007 0.50 0.014 0.003 0.021 0.002
LEV 0.048 0.00 0.00 0.81 0.003 0.43
CD 1.16 0.00
Obs. 400 400 800
R-squared 0.81 0.86 0.83
Adjusted R-squared 0.79 0.84 0.81
F-statistic 29.46 42.21 34.80
Prob (F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hausman test 0.001 0.011 REM
Source: The authors.
Al-ahdal et al. 9

performance and CG index. The contradicting results from Declaration of Conflicting Interests
the model suggest a need to perform further research. The The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect
results of this article exhibit some limitations. The first limi- to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
tation of the study is the use of Q-ratio and ROA to measure
corporate performance. This study could also have utilized
other firm performance ratios like market performance Funding
added because market performance added is related to the The authors received no financial support for the research,
market performance of a company. Second, this study disre- authorship and/or publication of this article.
gards the external factors affecting corporate performance.
For example, the introduction of new laws and regulations,
change in inflation rate and political change in a country ORCID iDs
may have a substantial impact on the company’s perfor- Waleed M. Al-ahdal https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3194-3864
mance. Lastly, there is a limitation due to the limited sample Faozi A. Almaqtari https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5625-3643
size. In order to reflect the Indian and Gulf countries’ Mosab I. Tabash https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3688-7224
markets, the sample may include all companies listed in both Abdulwahid Abdullah Hashed https://orcid.org/0000-0002-
markets. In addition, a longer time series, for example, 15 6791-235X
years’ data can improve the accuracy of the sample results. Ali T. Yahya https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0363-8902

Appendix A. CGI Items

Number Items
Category 1: Board 1 The board of directors’ size constitute a minimum of 5 members, but not exceeding 16
Structure Index
2 Presentation of a report outlining the academic and professional qualifications of individuals
constituting the board of directors
3 A minimum attendance of 75% for members in attending board meetings
4 A disclosure of the number of times in which meetings were held and how the board members
attended them, be it in person or through electronic means
5 Adoption and execution of practices and procedures for evaluating the board
6 Disclosure of positions and employment of independent directors in other organizations and
companies
7 Ensuring the disconnection and disunion of the position of chairman and that of the CEO
8 An annual general meeting of the firms’ board of non-executive directors
9 A periodic assessment or examination of the effectiveness and efficiency of the board of directors
10 Chairman of board independent director
11 The committee responsible for governance and nomination of the board comprises board members
who are independent
12 Board meeting time intervals do not surpass 4 months
13 A clear charter of policy terms and other relevant terms acts as a reference for the nomination or
governance committee
14 Independent directors of the board constitute greater that 50% and have majority control of the
board
15 Full declaration of the salary and remuneration of the company’s CEO and members of the board
16 The board has a committee of consultants and support team
Category 2: 17 Goals and short-/long -erm targets of the company
Transparency and 18 Laid out accounting procedures and principles are disclosed
Disclosure Index 19 Full disclosure and publication of yearly records and statements of corporate governance practices
and guidelines
20 A report of relevant party undertakings or transactions
21 Publishing of financial accounts, reports and statements on the web page of the firm
22 Historical and current prices of the company’s stock or equity is disclosed
23 Annual report contains risk management practices and details
24 Full disclosure of material information and facts related to fines, penalties and legal sanctions incurred
by the firm
25 A publication of the expected code of conduct and acceptable ethical practices
26 The yearly report of the company includes details regarding notification of the annual meeting
27 English language is the preferred language of detailing and publication of the annual report
28 An operational and adequately detailed company website
29 Availability of quarterly, half yearly and annual reports and financial statements
30 Full disclosure of information and engagements of corporate social responsibility in the annual report
Source: The authors.
10
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About the Authors
Waleed M. Al-ahdal (wm.alahdal2011@gmail.com) is a
researcher at Department of Accounting, Faculty of
Business, Economics and Social Development, University
Malaysia Terengganu, Malaysia. His areas of interest are in
the field of Corporate Governance; Environmental
disclosure; CSR; IFRS and Financial performance.
Faozi A. Almaqtari (fouzi_gazim2005@yahoo.com) is a
PhD assistant professor at Hodeidah University. His
research interests include disclosure, corporate governance,
demonetization, value relevance of BV and EPS, financial
reporting quality and financial performance.
Mosab I. Tabash (mosab.tabash@aau.ac.ae) is currently
working as MBA Director at the College of Business, Al
Ain University, UAE. He is BE (Industrial Engineering),
MBA and PhD in Management/Finance. His research
Vision
interests include monetary policies, corporate governance,
financial performance, investment management, risk
management and other interdisciplinary research as well.
Abdulwahid A. Hashed (aa.abdullah@psau.edu.sa) is the
chairman of the department of accounting, Prince Sattam
Bin Abdulaziz University, Saudi Arabia. His areas of
research include costing, auditing, corporate governance
and financial performance. He has published several
articles in different reputed Scopus and ISI journals.
Ali T. Yahya (ali.ust77@gmail.com) is an assistant profes-
sor of finance at the Faculty of Business of University of
Science and Technology, Yemen. He obtained PhD in
Finance from the Faculty of Management Studies and
Research, Aligarh Muslim University, India. He partici-
pated in several national and international conferences/
seminars and also has several publications in different rec-
ognized national and international journals.