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Aippm BG
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HANNAH MORALES
INDEX
TOPIC
1. Letter from the Executive Board
2. Introduction to the Committee
3. Rules of Procedure
4. Introduction to the Agenda
5. Background History
Yes, you may have been intimidated by what the committee may
outline. But we assure you, this committee will not be a pain or
a fearful ride, but an adrenaline rush for any egoistic,
pretentious Bangalore Circuit delegate.
ii)Manipur:
Manipur became part of the Indian Union on 15 October 1949.
Manipur’s incorporation into the Indian state soon led to the
formation of a number of insurgent organizations, seeking the
creation of an independent state within the borders of
Manipur, and dismissing the merger with India as
involuntary.
Even though Manipur became a separate state of the Indian
Union on 21 January 1972, the insurgency continued. On 8
September 1980, Manipur was declared an area of
disturbance, when the Indian government imposed the Armed
Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 on the region; the act
currently remains in force.The parallel rise of Naga
nationalism in neighbouring Nagaland led to the emergence
of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN)
activities in Manipur. Clashes between the Isak-Muivah and
Khaplang factions of the .
NSCN further aggravated tensions, as Kuki tribes began
creating their own guerrilla groups in order to protect
their interests from alleged Naga violations. Skirmishes
between the two ethnic groups took place during the
1990s. Other ethnic groups such as the Paite, Vaiphei,
Pangals and Hmars followed suit, establishing militant
groups
UNLF (1964–present)
The first separatist faction known as the United
National Liberation Front (UNLF) was founded on 24
November 1964.
iii)Nagaland:
Nagaland was created in 1963 as the 16th state of the
Indian Union, before which it was a district of Assam.
Active Naga-Kuki insurgent groups mainly demand full
independence. The Naga National Council led by Phizo
was the first group to dissent in 1947 and in 1956 they
went underground.
NSCN insurgency (1980–present)
Insurgencies
Northeast India (NEI) has been witnessing insurgency
since the 1950s and there is no end in sight. Even though
some states in the NEI have remained peaceful after
ending insurgencies, overall, the situation in the region
is not conducive to peaceful living and corresponding
prosperity.
1. Nagaland
The Nagas are a collection of tribes native to the
parts of North-East India and North-west Myanmar. In
1942, as World War 2 had bloated to the epitome of its
aggression, the Japanese had reached till Kohima after
capturing the whole of Burma. The Naga Club (formed in
1918 due to World War 1) fended off the Japanese and
forced them to retreat from Kohima. After World War 2,
the Deputy Commissioner of Naga Hills established the
Naga Hills District Tribal Council, replacing the Naga
Club. Later on, the Tribal Council was reformed as the
Naga National Council (NNC) as the British withdrew
from governance over India. As the NNC was formed, the
first and immediate objective for the entity was local
autonomy over the Naga Hills to protect the interests of
the Nagas.
The objectives were rejected by the President of the
INC at that time, Jawaharlal Nehru. Then in early 1947,
the Governor of Assam, and leaders of the tribal
communities drafted the nine-point agreement and
almost agreed upon it. The nine-point agreement became
unfavoured as the agreement required to be re-drafted
every ten years by the Indian authorities. Thus, the
agreement was left disputed. As a result, the NNC
declared independence on August 15, 1947, under the
leadership of Angami Zapu Phizo.
In 1954, Phizo established the Naga Home Guard, an
underground army in order to administratively liberate
away from India. This was followed by rifles deployed by
Assam under the Assam Distributions Areas Act. Even
after the bloody incident, the Nagas remain adamant
about their separatist cause.
2. Manipur
The rise in insurgency in Manipur dates back to 1964
with the formation of the United National Liberation
Front (UNLF). The rise of separatist insurgency in
Manipur is mainly attributed to perceived discontent
over the alleged “forced” merger of Manipur with the
Union of India and the subsequent delay in granting it
full-fledged statehood. The Kingdom of Manipur was
merged with India in October 1949. It later became an
official state in 1971. Later we saw the formation of other
militant groups like the People’s Revolutionary Party of
Kangleipak (PRPK), Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP),
etc. In the subsequent years, there were a series of
domestic violent clashes between the militants and the
government forces.
In 1980, the centre declared the state as a “disputed”
area and placed it under the provisions of the Armed
Special Powers Act (AFSPA). In the 1990s, there were
further clashes between the Kukis and the Nagas that led
to the formation of the Kuki insurgent groups. Later on,
we saw further insurgent groups like the Zeliangrong
United Front (ZUF) and People’s United Liberation
Front (PULF) were formed. Hence, the formation of
multiple insurgents in the region has caused it to be
rather volatile and looped in a traditional civil war
stand-off.
3. Mizoram
The antecedent causes of the Mizo conflict included
dissatisfaction with the Lal (chieftainship) system, the
British colonial policy residue of treating Mizo-
inhabited areas as ‘excluded areas’, resulting in
separatist tendencies, lack of civic amenities, economic
backwardness, and the continuous insensitivity and
regional hegemony of Assam. Mizo society had started
reacting against the oppressive rule of the Lals, even
before independence and this took on an organized
political form under the aegis of the Mizo Union (MU),
which was formed on 9 April 1946. The main objectives
of the MU were autonomy in matters of land, customary
laws, culture, and identity, and recognition of the Mizo
dialects. The immediate reason for conflict in Mizoram
was the dreadful famine of 1959 as a result of bamboo
flowering and the consequent boom rodent population.
In the wake of the famine, a Mizo Cultural Society
renamed itself to “Mautam Front” and took the lead in
raising the demands of the Mizos. This resulted in
political mobilization and mass support. In 1960, this
Mautam Front again renamed itself to Mizo National
Famine Front (MNFF) and thereafter dropped the name
“Famine” from its name to become the Mizo National
Front (MNF) in 1961 under the leadership of Pu Laldenga
with the stated objective to achieve sovereign
independence of Greater Mizoram. Thus, within two
years, the lack of state action to address the condition of
the hill state led MNF to launch an insurgency and seek
independence from India. The MNA started taking
various posts in not only India but also in Burma. In the
initial fights, the Indian Army recovered the posts and
forced the guerrillas to shift their headquarters across
the border to East Pakistan. By 1966, the MNA
merged into the population and started launching
guerrilla strikes against the army. The rise of MNF
resulted in large-scale disturbances in Mizoram. In 1967,
the Government outlawed MNF.
Counter-Insurgency (COIN) in the North-
East
In 2011, the government of India identified 79 armed
insurgent groups active in six of the seven 'Sister States'
of North East. Among these groups, half are splinter
groups, while others range from small ethnic militias to
well-equipped rebel armies. Many of these groups have
engaged in both formal and informal talks with the
Government, with varying aspirations, demands, and
activities. Manipur is home to more than half of these
groups, while Nagaland, Assam, and Tripura also have
long-established armed groups. Mizoram and Arunachal
Pradesh have had smaller insurgencies since the Mizo
peace accords of 1987. Several important observations
and issues regarding militarization and counter-
insurgency in the North East are worth noting. Firstly,
only a few of the 79 armed groups have been officially
labelled as "terrorist organizations." Typically, these
organizations have a political agenda centred around
seeking greater autonomy or independence. Many of the
smaller groups are tolerated due to their opposition to
the independence-seeking groups.
The history of counter-insurgency in the North East
region is as old as the insurgencies themselves. The
Assam Rifles, India's oldest paramilitary force, was
established to conduct counter-insurgency operations in
the North East and other areas under the control of the
Army. The region has been heavily militarized since
World War II, with an increase in permanent troop
presence following the Indo-China war in the 1960s.
Counter-insurgency operations reached their peak in the
1970s and again in the 1990s when more troops and
paramilitary forces were deployed to contain the
insurgencies, maintaining a permanent presence. Large
battalions have also been established to patrol the borders
with China, Burma, and BangladeshThe Indian government
has employed the Indian Army proportionately in its
counter-insurgency strategies, avoiding indiscriminate use
of force. This approach recognizes that groups such as
ULFA, the NSCN (IM), the UNLF, and the PLA enjoy a
certain level of social support, and disproportionate use of
force can be counterproductive. Assam has witnessed a
gradual change in its overall counter-insurgency strategy
due to measured military responses by the army after the
1990s. In recent years, there has been a shift in the attitudes
of locals; however, the Indian army still faces routine
accusations of human rights violations. There is social
resistance to counter-insurgency operations and the
militarization of society. Consequently, an all-out military
approach against the armed groups has never been utilized
in the North East.
Dialogue and negotiations have always been considered
viable alternatives for the Indian government's response to
the armed conflicts in the Northeast. In the Naga conflict,
dialogue began as early as 1947 with the Akbar Hydari
agreement, followed by civil society interactions in the
1950s, the Naga Peace Mission of 1964, the Shillong Accord
of 1975, and the ongoing peace negotiations with the NSCN
(IM) and the NSCN (K).In the case of the ULFA, jailed
ULFA leaders have been released, and "unconditional talks"
have taken place within the framework of negotiations. In
2011, ULFA submitted its charter of demands to the Centre,
which included seeking constitutional amendments to
protect the rights and identity of the indigenous people of
Assam.
Other demands by ULFA included discussions on the grounds
for their struggle, a status report on missing ULFA leaders and
members, and various socio-economic issues. In the same year,
a tripartite agreement for the Suspension of Operations (SoO)
was signed among the Centre, the Assam government, and
ULFA. According to the agreement, both ULFA and the security
forces agreed not to carry out operations against each other.
Under the pact, the rebel group's approximately 600 members
were to be placed in special camps known as "navnirman
kendras." However, ULFA has refused to surrender their arms
and ammunition.
QARMA
1. To what extent is regional legislation required? If
required, how may the government implement it?
2. 1.Is there a need for administrative changes in the
local governance of NEI states?
3. 2.To what extent can the tribal outfits and insurgent
groups be consolidated?
4. 3.What measures may be provided to assure citizens
living in volatile regions of NEI of any form of
security?
5. 4.What measures should be taken to prevent inter-
state insurgency spillovers?
6. 5.To what extent could possible foreign influence be
restricted from insurgent groups?
7. 6.How may the government punish insurgents?
8. 7.Are there any separate intelligence agencies or
regiments required for the NEI regions?
Further Readings
1.https://mdoner.gov.in/contentimages/files/ARC_7thRep
ort_Ch12.pdf
2.https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/the-
neglected-states-of-the-nation/220206
3.https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/et-
commentary/indias-north-east-a-story-of-
neglect/articleshow/30229570.cms?from=mdr
4.https://thewire.in/world/india-cannot-forge-bonds-
with-southeast-asia-ignoring-issues-of-its-northeast-
region
5.https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/videos/news/congr
ess-ignored-northeast-for-60-years-alleges-sarbananda-
sonowal/videoshow/100279845.cms?from=mdr
6.https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/How-Tripura-
overcame-insurgency/article13606760.ece
7./http://mzuir.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/123456789/98/1/L
althakima%20(Pol.Sc)%20-%202008.pdf
8.https://thewire.in/politics/bridging-spaces-widening-
schisms-look-east-policy-northeast
Bibliography
1.https://www.gktoday.in/government-of-indias-
response-to-north-eastern-insurgencies/
2.https://www.insightsonindia.com/security-
issues/extremism/insurgency-in-north-east-india-nei/
3.https://www.cnbctv18.com/india/explained-naga-
insurgency-and-the-anti-insurgency-op-that-went-
horribly-wrong-11719972.htm
4.https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/how-big-
is-insurgency-threat-in-manipur-7786366/
5.https://www.gktoday.in/insurgency-in-mizoram/
6.https://byjus.com/free-ias-prep/tribal-insurgency-in-
assam-upsc-notes/
7.https://www.insightsonindia.com/security-
issues/armed-forces-special-powers-act-afspa/
8.https://thewire.in/politics/bridging-spaces-widening-
schisms-look-east-policy-northeast
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