Chapter 2

EU Operations within the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia:

EUFOR Concordia, EUPOL Proxima and EUPAT
Israel Biel Portero*

1. Context of the Deployment

Through a referendum held on the 8 September 1991, the Macedonians proclaimed
their independence from Yugoslavia. In 1993, Macedonia gained UN membership
under the name of “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM). There were
then some years of relative stability and progressive international recognition. Due
to the war in Kosovo in 1999, Macedonia became the destination for thousands of
Kosovan-Albanian refugees fleeing from Serbian ethnic cleansing. Following the
war, some groups of Albanian radicals took up arms in pursuit of autonomy for the
Albanian-populated areas of Macedonia. This separatist movement and the escalating
scale of violence resulted in real conflict between the Government and ethnic Albanian
insurgents between March and June 2001. NATO deployed additional forces along the
border with Kosovo, but they were unsuccessful in their attempt to stop the violence.
In August 2001, the Government of Macedonia together with ethnic Albanian
representatives signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement which ended armed conflict,
granting greater recognition of ethnic Albanian rights in exchange for a pledge by the
insurgents to put down their weapons. The Orih Agreement established a framework
for securing the future of Macedonia’s democracy, and for permitting the development
of closer and more integrated relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the
Euro-Atlantic community.
NATO maintained a military presence in Macedonia to ensure stable conditions in
which to develop the Ohrid Framework Agreement objectives. Following subsequent
missions, NATO established a mission called “Allied Harmony”, the objectives of
which were to monitor operations focusing on former crisis areas in order to maintain
links with the main actors, demonstrate NATO’s continued presence and commitment
to facilitating the reconciliation process, promote stability in the area, and develop
some advisory tasks. Nevertheless, local ethnic Albanian insurgents began a scale of

* ATLAS Post-Doctoral Fellow. University Jaume I of Castellón (biel@dpu.uji.es).

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violence that could have put stability in the country at risk and additional security
was required in the crisis areas. In this context, the international presence was a way
of facilitating the reconciliation process, in order to promote stability by deterring
the resurgence of ethnically motivated violence. The EU then launched the EUFOR-
CONCORDIA military operation (March-December 2003) to further contribute
to a stable secure environment in order to allow the implementation of the Ohrid
Framework Agreement.
Following the conclusion of the EFOR-CONCORDIA military operation, the
political and security situation in FYROM remained fragile. This represented a
handicap to ensuring stable conditions in which development of the Ohrid Framework
Agreement objectives could continue. New efforts were necessary to help the
Macedonian Government to improve internal security and stability. As the EU soldiers
left FYROM, national police forces were redeployed to the former crisis areas. In this
context, the EU decided to help the FYROM authorities to improve their policing by
ensuring sustainability of the police reform and by strengthening relations between
the police and minorities. The EU launched the EUPOL-PROXIMA police operation
(December 2003-December 2005), which aimed to develop an efficient, professional
police service and to promote European standards of policing in FYROM.
The security situation in FYROM has continued to improve since the end of the
conflict in 2001. In 2005, following the CONCORDIA and PROXIMA operations,
stability was further strengthened. Steps in the preparation for and implementation
of key Ohrid Framework Agreement reforms were taken and efforts to address other
reform priorities, including the rule of law, were made. The EU’s commitment to
political effort and resources has nonetheless helped to further establish stability in
the country as well as in the region.
During consultations with the EU, the FYROM Government indicated that it
would, under certain conditions, welcome an EU Police Advisory Team to bridge the
gap between termination of EUPOL- PROXIMA and a planned project funded by the
CARDS (Community assistance for reconstruction, development and stabilization)
programme that aimed to provide technical assistance in the field. This Police Advisory
Team was called EUPAT (December 2005-June 2006), and was launched to support the
development of an efficient, professional police service based on European standards
of policing. The intention was to contribute to the overall implementation of peace in
FYROM and to achieve the EU’s overall policy in the region, notably the stabilisation
and association process.

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2. EUFOR-CONCORDIA
As seen before, after the NATO “Allied Harmony” mission in FYROM,1 additional
security was needed in crisis areas. The presence of EU troops was a way of facilitating
the reconciliation process, promoting stability by deterring the resurgence of ethnically
motivated violence. In this context, the EU launched the EUFOR-CONCORDIA
military operation in 2003.
Even in the absence of any formal qualification of the situation in legal documents,
it could be defined as a post-conflict situation of crisis because of the small focus of
frontier violence, and also because it was a follow-up to the NATO operation.
The main actors on the deployment scene were the Macedonian population and
their new authorities, on one side, and ethnic Albanian insurgents on the other side.
The presence of international organization members and monitors (OSCE and EU)
and NATO troops that were leaving the territory was also relevant.2
No major human rights violations were officially reported, but a slight focus of
ethnically motivated violence was reported in the deployment context.3

2.1. Mandate and Deployment

Security Council Resolution 1371 (2001)4 welcomed the efforts of the EU and the
OSCE to contribute to implementation of the Framework Agreement, in particular
through the presence of international observers.
Consequently, the Council adopted the Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP of 27 January
2003 on the European Union military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia. At the explicit request of the FYROM government, the main objective of
the Joint Action was to further contribute to a stable secure environment. With this aim
it sought to allow the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement of August
2001, and more particularly: 1) to secure the future of Macedonia’s democracy and,
2) to permit the development of closer and more integrated relations between the
Republic of Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic Community.
The EUFOR-CONCORDIA operation followed the NATO “Allied Harmony”
operation, which expired at the end of March. The new ESDP mission was conducted
in accordance with “Berlin Plus” arrangements between the EU and NATO in 2002.

1 Operation “Allied Harmony” was a NATO peacekeeping mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
launched in order to minimise the risks of destabilisation through an international military presence in the country.
See http://www.nato.int/fyrom/home.htm.
2 Further information can be found at: http://www.osce.org/skopje/ and http://www.nato.int/fyrom.
3 See GRILLOT, S., PAES, R., RISSER, H., and STONEMAN, S. O.: ‘A Fragile Peace: Guns and Security in Post-conflict
Macedonia’, Special Report, UNDP, 2004, p. 8.
4 S/RES/1371, 26 September 2001.

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The new arrangement gave the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities in the
planning of its own operations, including command arrangements and assistance in
operational planning.5
Nevertheless, no particular aspects relating to human rights, IHL or gender were
mentioned in the legal foundations.6 The reason could be the general and restrained
scope of the mission.

2.2. Operational Aspects

The mission was deployed from 31 March to 10 December 2003. The operation was
originally launched on 31March 2003 for six months.7 13 EU Member States (Austria,
Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom) and 14 Third States (Bulgaria, Canada, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey) contributed to the CONCORDIA mission.
EUFOR-CONCORDIA was an EU military operation, with a contingent of about
350 soldiers. In the field, soldiers were organised into 22 light field liaison teams
travelling in non-armoured vehicles. Their tasks included patrolling, reconnaissance,
surveillance, situational awareness, and reporting and liaison activities. Troop support
was provided through eight heavy field liaison teams and support elements (armoured
vehicles and helicopters).8
Political control and strategic direction were exercised by the Political and
Security Committee under the responsibility of the Council. The EU Military
Committee monitored execution of the operation conducted under the responsibility
of the Operation Commander. The Operation Commander (Admiral Rainer Feist) was
responsible for the deployment of the forces and for execution of the mission.

2.3. Status of the Mission Personnel

Article 12 of the Joint Action 2003/92 provided for a Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA). On this basis, the CONCORDIA SOFA was concluded on 21 March 2003
and entered into force the day the operation started.9 This agreement also covered

5 See http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm.
6 See ARLOTH J., and SEIDENSTICKER, F.: The ESDP Crisis Management Operations of the European Union and
Human Rights, Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte, 2007, p. 36.
7 By way of Council Decision 2003/563/CFSP of 29th July 2003 the operation was extended to 15th December 2003.
8 See GNESOTTO N., (ed.), in EU Security and Defence Police. The First Five Years (1999-2004), Condé-sur-Noireau
(France), Paris, European Institute for Security Studies, 2004, p. 118.
9 Council Decision 2003/222/CFSP of 21 March 2003 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the
European Union and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the status of the European Union-led Forces
(EUF) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

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the personnel and assets of a third State participating in CONCORDIA. Pursuant to

article 2 of this SOFA, the European Union-led forces were to respect FYROM laws
and regulations, and Article 9 added an obligation to respect international conventions
and FYROM laws regarding the protection of the environment and cultural heritage,10
albeit subject to the requirements of the operation.11
With respect to immunities and privileges, article 6 of the SOFA stated that EU
forces personnel had been granted treatment equivalent to that of diplomatic agents
under the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations dated 18 April 1961.12 With
regard to the police and mutual assistance, the EU Commander could establish a
military police unit in order to maintain order within the forces facilities. Outside these
facilities, the military police unit could, in consultation with the Host Country, act to
ensure the maintenance of good order and discipline among EU personnel.13
Article 13 stated that claims for death, injury, damage or loss arising out of
activities in connection with civil disturbances, protection of the EU forces, or which
were incidental to operational necessities, could not be subject to reimbursement by
Member States or other states participating in the operation or by the operational
financing mechanism.14 All other claims were to be dealt with by a Joint Claims
Commission, composed of representatives of the EU and the competent authorities of
the Host Party. Settlement of claims only occurred subject to prior consent by the State
concerned or the mechanism.
Article 7(2) of the SOFA permitted EU forces to carry arms and ammunition “on
condition that they [were] authorized to do so by their orders”.

2.4. Interaction with other International Organizations

With respect to interaction with other International Organizations, CONCORDIA
represents the beginning of the EU- NATO relationship in crisis management. Contacts
and meetings between the two international organizations were held in the framework
of the “Berlin Plus” Agreement. Despite this, there was a lack of complicity in
their relationship. However, although NATO was informed about developments in

10 See Article 9 on protection of the environment and cultural heritages.

11 See Articles 2 and 9 of the SOFA. See also NAERT, F.: ‘ESDP in Practice: Increasingly Varied and Ambitious EU
Security and Defence Operations’, in M.Trybus, N. D. White, (coord.), European Security Law, Oxford University
Press, 2007, pp. 70 ff.
12 Moreover, the preamble of the SOFA clarifies that the purpose of the privileges and immunities “are not to benefit
individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the EU operation”.
13 See Article 11 of the SOFA.
14 See Article 14 of the SOFA.

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ISRAEL BIEL PORTERO

the situation, the entire chain of command remained under the political control and
strategic direction of the EU.

3. General Assessment of the Mission

3.1. Particularities of the Mission
CONCORDIA can be highlighted as the first military mission undertaken by the
EU. It was also the first time that the EU made use of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy instruments included in the Treaty of Amsterdam.
This initiative originated from the FYROM authorities, who invited the EU to
assume responsibility for the follow-up to NATO operations. It facilitated the
deployment of and intervention by the EU soldiers, since they were deployed to a
benevolent territory with the support of the regional authorities.
CONCORDIA represented the first use of the EU-NATO “Berlin Plus” Agreement
as part of a framework for cooperation between the two international organizations.

3.2. Main Constraints

The guidelines of the mission were poorly described in the Council Joint Action.
This could be explained by the fact that there was no previous experience in military
operations. For this reason, the EU faced significant difficulties on deciding the
guiding strategy for the mission.
CONCORDIA was not an entirely independent mission. Within the “Berlin Plus”
framework the EU made use of the NATO’s assets and capabilities.

3.3. Best practices

CONCORDIA was a successful test of the EU’s ability to undertake military
operations. It was not easy to develop a military operation when there was no previous
experience, but the EU intervened properly in the FYROM. Some factors contributed
to that success: the collaboration of the local authorities, the simplicity of the mission
and the small number of soldiers deployed, together with continuous stabilization in
the territory.15
The staff in charge of CONCORDIA and the EU Special Representative worked
together to ensure continuous dialogue with the FYROM authorities.

15 See SIMÓN, L.: Command and control? Planning for EU military operations, EU Institute for Security Studies,
Occasional Paper, 2010, p. 28.

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 EU OPERATIONS WITHIN THE FYROM: EUFOR CONCORDIA, EUPOL PROXIMA AND EUPAT

CONCORDIA contributed to increasing the EU’s role in international security

issues and indicated that the EU was ready to take on further security functions.16
Above all, by maintaining a visible military presence, CONCORDIA achieved its
commitment of fostering a stable and secure environment in FYROM that allowed the
Ohrid Framework Agreement to be implemented.17

3.4. Lessons Learned

There were problems in coordination between EU and NATO, especially regarding
information sharing and the reporting chain.18 Better mechanisms of collaboration do
need to be developed.
There was a lack of connection between the political and military aspects of the
mission. By joining both aspects this could provide a more comprehensive approach
to the mission.19
The EU presence was not very strong in a relatively “benign theatre”.20 The EU
only deployed 350 soldiers to patrol the crisis areas (mainly the frontier borders with
Albania). This appears to be a small number of soldiers for that territory.21
Even when there was continuous dialogue with the FYROM authorities,
responsibilities were not shared or transferred to the Macedonian security forces,
perhaps due to a lack of confidence in the new Macedonian forces. This was interpreted
as disregard for suggestions made by the FYROM authorities.22
No human rights tasks were explicitly included in the mandate. Even when ethnic
Albanian confrontation and integration in the FYROM population represented a real
problem and a task to undertake, there was no human right or gender component in
any official document.

16 GROSS, E.: ‘Operation CONCORDIA (fYROM)’, in Grevi, G., Helly, D., and Keohane, D., (eds.), European
Security and Defence Policy: The First Ten Years (1999-2009), European Union Institute for Security Studies,
Paris, 2009, p. 174.
17 See IOANNIDES, I.: ‘EU Police Mission PROXIMA: Testing the ‘European’ Approach to Building Peace’, in A.
Nowak, Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way, Paris, 2006, p. 5.
18 See International Crisis Group, ‘Macedonia: No Room for Complacency’, Europe Report, nº 149, 2003, p. 8.
19 GROSS, E., op.cit., p. 180.
20 Ibid.
21 Nevertheless the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Colonel Augustin, considered that, from a tactical point
of view, the deployed resources were of the correct size for the operation. See AUGUSTIN, P.: ‘Lessons learned:
Operation CONCORDIA/Altaïr in Macedonia’, Doctrine nº 6, 2005, p. 58.
22 See International Crisis Group, ‘Macedonia: No Room for Complacency’, op.cit., p. 9.

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4. EUPOL-PROXIMA
4.1. Introduction
When the EU CONCORDIA military operation concluded, the political situation
and security in FYROM were far from consolidated. It was necessary to continue
ensuring stable conditions for the development of the Ohrid Framework Agreement’s
objectives.
While national police forces were redeployed to the former crisis areas, substituting
EU soldiers, the FYROM authorities invited the EU to deploy a police mission. The
EU agreed to help the FYROM authorities to improve their policing by ensuring
sustainability of the police reform and by strengthening relations between the police
and minorities, launching the EUPOL-PROXIMA police operation. This operation
aimed to develop an efficient, professional police service and to promote European
standards of policing in FYROM. The EU named the operation “PROXIMA” with the
aim of suggesting proximity to Macedonian citizens.
Formal qualification of the situation in legal documents defined it as a stable
security situation that was however susceptible to deterioration.23 No specific human
rights violations were officially reported, but some dissidents and mistrust of ethnic
rights were reported in the deployment context. Even when ethnic Albanian conflict
and integration within the FYROM population represented a real problem and a task
to undertake, there was no such component in any official document. No violations
of human rights committed by police officers were reported either, despite reports by
some human rights organizations.24

4.2. Mandate and Deployment

As mentioned before, in September 2001, the Security Council adopted Resolution
1371 (2001) which welcomes the efforts of the EU and the OSCE to contribute to the
implementation of the Framework Agreement, in particular through the presence of
international observers. Within this framework the Council launched the CONCORDIA
military operation.
When CONCORDIA concluded, the Prime Minister of FYROM invited the EU
to assume responsibility for an enhanced role in policing and in the deployment of a
Police Mission. As a consequence, the Council adopted Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP
of 29 September 2003 in the European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav

23 See Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP of 29 September 2003 in the European Union Police Mission in the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
24 See IOANNIDES, I., op.cit., p. 74.

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Republic of Macedonia. Subsequently the Council adopted Joint Action 2004/789/

CFSP of 22 November 2004, which extended the mission for an additional year.
Thanks to the invitation from the Macedonian Prime Minister to the EU a SOMA
agreement was concluded between the FYROM authorities and the EU.25 According to
the agreement, signed in December 2003, EUPOL-PROXIMA status was equivalent
to a diplomatic mission under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic relations dated
18 April 1961.26
Pursuant to the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, the EU contribution was
based on a broad approach, and activities were to address a whole range of legal
issues, which particularly enhanced its role in policing so as to further contribute to a
stable, secure environment. Specifically, the mission statement of PROXIMA was:27
1) the consolidation of law and order, including the fight against organized crime by
focusing on sensitive areas; 2) the practical implementation of the comprehensive
reform of the Home Office, including the police; 3) the operational transition towards
and the creation of a border police as part of the wider EU effort to promote integrated
border management; 4) local policing, building confidence within the population; 5)
enhancing cooperation with neighbouring States in the field of policing.
As with CONCORDIA, no particular aspects relating to human rights, IHL or
gender were mentioned in the mandate. Nonetheless, it has been pointed out that
PROXIMA had a human rights focus, which embraced the human rights tasks of
monitoring and capacity-building.28

4.3. Interaction with other International Organizations

With respect to coordination with other International Organizations, there was
cooperation with the OSCE in the planning phase of the mission29; however there was
no specific mechanism for coordination and cooperation with the OSCE. Consequently
it was not easy to coordinate the EU and OSCE as there were discrepancies in the way

25 Agreement between the European Union and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the status and
activities of the European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL
PROXIMA) of 11 December 2003. The full text can be viewed in: http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/
prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=155.
26 Article 5.
27 See Articles 3 in Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP of 29 September 2003 in the European Union Police Mission in the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Joint Action 2004/789/CFSP of 22 November 2004.
28 See ARLOTH J. and SEIDENSTICKER, F.: The ESDP Crisis Management Operations of the European Union and Human
Rights, Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte, 2007, p. 45.
29 Article 2 of the Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP of 29 September 2003 on the European Union Police Mission in the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. See also: http://www.osce.org/skopje.

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ISRAEL BIEL PORTERO

that police reform was carried out. Informally, the OSCE also assisted PROXIMA
staff with material aid and essential equipment.30

4.4. Operational Aspects

The European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(EUPOL “PROXIMA”) mission was deployed from 15th December 2003 to 14th
December 2005 (2 years).31 24 EU Member States contributed to the mission (Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, and United Kingdom) and 4 Third States (Norway, Switzerland,
Turkey, and Ukraine).
EUPOL-PROXIMA was a police operation consisting of 200 police experts
comprising uniformed police personnel and civilian international police. Additionally,
PROXIMA employed local Macedonian staff in support functions. As the police
officers were seconded by Member States, the international civilian police and local
staff were recruited by EUPOL-PROXIMA on a contractual basis. PROXIMA police
experts monitored, mentored and advised the FYROM police, thus helping to fight
organized crime, as well as promoting European standards of policing.32

4.5. Status of the Mission Personnel

According to Article 2 of the aforementioned SOMA,33 the mission forces,
headquarters, and assets were to comply with the laws and regulations of FYROM,
including those regarding the protection of the environment and cultural heritage, and
mission staff were to refrain from any activity incompatible with the impartial and
international nature of their duties or inconsistent with the SOMA.34
With respect to immunities and privileges, article 6 of the SOMA stated that EU
personnel, with the exception of administrative and technical staff, were eligible for
treatment equivalent to that of diplomatic agents, as granted under the 1961 Vienna

30 See “Lessons Learned and Conclusions” in this Chapter.

31 The first one-year period forecast in the Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP was subsequently extended
to an additional year by the Council Joint Action 2004/789/CFSP. The budget amounted to 30.000.000 Euros
approximately between the two mission phases.
32 See “Lessons Learned” in this Chapter.
33 Agreement between the European Union and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the status and
activities of the European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL
PROXIMA) of 11 December 2003.
34 See Article 2 of the SOMA, and NAERT, F.: ‘ESDP in Practice: Increasingly Varied and Ambitious EU Security and
Defence Operations,’ in Trybus, M., White, N.D., (coord.), European security law, Oxford University Press, 2007,
pp. 78ff.

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Convention on Diplomatic Relations, subject to which the Member States and the
Sending States shall have priority of jurisdiction. Administrative and technical staff
had status equivalent to that enjoyed by staff in diplomatic mission.35 The funds and
assets of the mission also enjoyed immunity from the jurisdiction of the Host State.36
Article 14 of the SOMA stated that neither the States participating in the mission
nor the EU institutions were to be obliged to reimburse claims arising out of activities
in connection with the protection of the mission or its personnel nor which were
incidental to operational necessities. All other claims had to be submitted to the Head
of Mission and were to be dealt with under separate arrangements.37
In accordance with article 8(3) of the SOMA, PROXIMA had the right to establish
an armed protection element, whose task was that of providing incident management
capacity for exceptional cases in order to ensure the protection of personnel, including
other EU and OSCE staff. This protection element had the right to use all means
necessary to perform its tasks, including weapons, in accordance with specific rules to
be determined by the EU.38
Political control and strategic direction were exercised by the Political and Security
Committee under the Council’s responsibility. The Head of the Mission (firstly Bart
d’Hooge, and subsequently Jürgen Scholz) was responsible for disciplinary control of
personnel.39 Disciplinary action involving seconded personnel was exercised by the
relevant national or EU authority.
The Planning Team, which worked in cooperation with the OSCE, was responsible
for the necessary planning process required to deal with functions ensuing from the
mission needs.
The chain of command was as follows: 1) The European Union’s Special
Representative (EUSR) was to report to the Council through the High Representative;
2) The Political and Security Committee was to provide political control and strategic
direction; 3) The Head of the Mission was to lead EUPOL-PROXIMA and assume
its day-to-day management; 4) The Head of the Mission was to report to the High
Representative through the EUSR; 5) The High Representative was to provide
guidance to the Head of the Mission through the EUSR.
With regard to its logistic aspects, the mission was structured as follows:
Headquarters in Skopje composed of the Head of the Mission and staff; one central

35 Article 6(2) of the SOMA.

36 See Article 5 of the SOMA.
37 Article 14(2) of the SOMA.
38 Article 8(4) of the SOMA.
39 Article 5(4) of the Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP of 29 September 2003 in the European Union Police Mission in the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

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ISRAEL BIEL PORTERO

co-location unit at Home Office level; and some units co-located within the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at appropriate levels. Some delay in the setting up
of the equipment and necessary resources was reported.40

5. General Assessment of the Mission

PROXIMA represented a shift from a military to a civil mission in FYROM. It
reflected the EU compromise in its long-term policies.41 It was the first EU police
mission with no previous international organization operation. The previous police
mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina took over from the United Nations International
Police Task Force.42 Likewise, it was the first ever mission to be formally extended
with a new mandate.43 The Council Joint Action 2004/789/CFSP extended the mission
for an additional year until 2005.
There was an invitation from the FYROM authorities to deploy the police mission.
As a consequence of this fact, the FYROM authorities and the EU concluded an
agreement on the status and activities of the mission.

5.1. Main Constraints

PROXIMA suffered from a short planning phase. This resulted in slow and
ineffective implementation of the mission. The setting up of basic equipment and
resources was poor and delayed. For instance, experts received computers and other
essential equipment three months after the launch of the mission and,44 even after
receipt, the required software was not provided.45 In this context, the OSCE helped the
mission with its resources so that it could start on time.
The number of monitors was too low. Altogether, the number of experts was around
200 and this appears to be a small group for the mandate’s purposes.46

40 ‘Final report on EUPOL PROXIMA’, Doc. 6592/06, 13 November 2009.

41 RUIZ, X.: La evolución de las misiones civiles de la Política Europea de Seguridad y Defensa, UNISCI Discussion
Papers, n. 16, 2008, p. 70.
42 See IOANNIDES, I.: ‘EUPOL PROXIMA/EUPAT (FYROM)’, in Grevi, G., Helly, D., and Keohane, D., (eds.),
European Security and Defence Policy: The First Ten Years (1999-2009), European Union Institute for Security
Studies, Paris, 2009, p. 190.
43 Ibid, p. 191.
44 Ibid, p. 194.
45 ‘Final report on EUPOL PROXIMA’, op.cit., p. 7.
46 See RUIZ, X., op.cit., p. 73. See also IOANNIDES, I., (2009), op.cit., p. 197.

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5.2. Best Practices

The Head of the Mission, Scholz, heralded the success of the mission by asserting
that PROXIMA would set the standards for future EU police missions.47 Additionally,
the Final Report noted that the police mission helped FYROM to advance towards
European best practices, although a lot of work remained to be done.48 For example,
minor but more or less effective integration of ethnic Albanians into the FYROM
police force was achieved. Furthermore, trust in the FYROM police increased, as
shown by interviews with local citizens.49 In many ways, police officers improved the
visibility of the mission amongst the population, reinforcing the role of the EU in the
field of policing.
The EU demonstrated its ability to learn from past experience and to adjust to
operational demands. As the organization of the police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina
was complicated and useless, PROXIMA established a “benchmarking system” as
a political tool.50 After the initial period of confusion, the “benchmarking system”
resulted in an operational model, setting clear project aims, milestones, and a timeframe
for that which needs to be achieved.51
The EU increased its position in international policing issues. PROXIMA was the
second police mission and as such it contributed to consolidating the implementation
of the European Security and Defence Policy.
EUPOL-PROXIMA was part of the European Union’s overall commitment
to assisting the efforts of the Government of FYROM to move closer towards EU
integration.52

5.3. Lessons Learned

There was poor coordination with other actors.53 The relationship with the
European Agency for Reconstruction or the Head of the Commission Delegation was
far from satisfactory. There was a certain amount of competition and rivalry between
the Council and the European Commission that put European policing at risk.54 The
lack of an appropriate mechanism for cooperation with the OSCE resulted in many

47 Welcome speech from Head of Mission Scholz, Induction Training on 24 January 2005.
48 ‘Final report on EUPOL PROXIMA’, op.cit.,p. 3.
49 See IOANNIDES, I., (2009), op.cit., p. 197.
50 Ibid, p. 192.
51 IOANNIDES, I., (2006), op.cit., p. 76.
52 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=584&lang=EN
53 See IOANNIDES, I., (2009) op.cit., p. 194.
54 See IOANNIDES, I.: ‘European Policing’? A Critical Approach to European Union Civilian Crisis Management with
Special Reference to Macedonia’, Belgrade: Forum for Ethnic Relations, 2007, pp. 20 ff.

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overlaps in activities. It was also difficult to exchange information and experience

with the local police.
As mentioned above, the mission was not well planned before it was launched.55
Mandates need to be clearer and tighter otherwise the results of a mission will be far
from satisfactory. This can also cause the aforementioned logistical problems relating
to resources.
Effectiveness of the mission could have improved by linking police issues with
justice and public administration practices. The Final Report on the mission pointed
out that police missions “cannot monitor, mentor and advise an isolated police force”,
adding that “the crucial need to rebuild the “rule of law” in nations in transition
requires a whole encompassing approach which includes the public prosecutor and
judiciary offices as well as other law enforcement agencies. For this purpose, ESDP
police missions should include the cooperation of the Ministry of Justice within
their mandate in order to allow the legal monitoring component to adequately and
effectively perform its functions.”56
Even when official and working documents refer to “European standards of
policing”, it is difficult to determine the content of these standards as there is no
official definition for this concept.57 This lack of determination has led to a number of
problems.58 It is therefore necessary to define these standards in order to achieve more
coherency and effectiveness in European policing.
Literature highlighted political aspects as the reason why the operation terminated
relatively soon. The main reason why EUPOL-PROXIMA ended in 2005 was because
the FYROM authorities were afraid that continuing the mission could risk their option
of becoming an EU candidate.59
No human rights tasks were explicitly included in the mandate. There was no
explicit reference to human right or gender component in any official document. In
fact, although the condition and treatment of detainees were supposedly monitored,
there was no declassified information about how this was carried out.

55 See ‘Final report on EUPOL PROXIMA’, op.cit., p. 7.

56 Final report on EUPOL PROXIMA, op.cit., p. 8, para. 77.
57 See IOANNIDES, I., (2007), op.cit., pp. 15 ff.
58 For instance, the different experts of PROXIMA normally used their internal standards of his respective countries
when exercising their tasks. See RUIZ, X., op.cit., pp.71- 72.
59 Among others, see IOANNIDES, I., (2009) op.cit., p. 195.

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6. EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT)

6.1. Introduction
The security situation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continued
to improve following conflict in 2001. In 2005, after the CONCORDIA and
PROXIMA operations, stability was further strengthened. Steps in the preparation and
implementation of key Ohrid Framework Agreement reforms were taken and efforts
to address other reform priorities, including the rule of law, were made.
The FYROM Government indicated to the EU that it would, under certain
conditions, welcome an EU Police Advisory Team to bridge the gap between the end
of EUPOL-PROXIMA and a planned project funded by CARDS that aimed to provide
technical support in the field. The CARDS programme was intended to provide
assistance to countries in South-Eastern Europe with a view to their participation in
the stabilization and association process with the EU.60 In this context, an EU Police
Advisory Team (EUPAT) was launched aiming to support the development of an
efficient, professional police service based on European standards of policing.

6.2. Mandate and Deployment

As mentioned above, in September 2001, the Security Council adopted Resolution
1371 (2001), which welcomes the efforts of the EU and the OSCE to contribute to
implementation of the Framework Agreement, in particular through the presence of
international observers. Within this framework, the Council launched the EUFOR-
CONCORDIA military operation, followed by the EUPOL-PROXIMA police
operation.
During consultations with the Macedonian authorities, they indicated that a
European Advisory Team would only be welcome under certain conditions. The
FYROM Government did not wish to compromise the prospect of becoming an
EU member candidate. Some of these conditions included not defining EUPAT as a
stabilization-oriented “mission”, but rather presenting it as a reform-oriented effort
or to link EUPAT to the CARDS programme as a transitional measure (and not as a
follow-up to PROXIMA).61
When PROXIMA ended therefore, the Council adopted the Joint Action 2005/826/
CFSP of 24 November 2005 on the establishment of an EU Police Advisory Team

60 See Council Regulation (EC) nº 2666/2000 of 5 December 2000 on assistance for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, repealing Regulation
(EC) No 1628/96 and amending Regulations (EEC) No 3906/89 and (EEC) No 1360/90 and Decisions 97/256/
EC and 1999/311/EC. Further information can be found in: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/
western_balkans/r18002_en.htm.
61 IOANNIDES, I., (2006), op.cit., p. 84.

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ISRAEL BIEL PORTERO

(EUPAT) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Rather than a

mission in itself, EUPAT was presented as a reform-oriented effort launched to bridge
the six-month gap between the end of PROXIMA and the CARDS-funded field-level
project that was to begin in June 2006.62
Pursuant to the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, the EU contribution was based
on a broad approach to activities, which was to address a whole range of rules on legal
aspects, including institution-building programmes and police activities that were to
be mutually supportive and reinforcing. The aim was to contribute to overall peace
implementation in FYROM as well as to achievement of the EU’s overall policy in the
region, notably the process of stability and association.
Specifically, the EUPAT’s mandate involved monitoring and mentoring the
country’s police on priority issues in the field of Border Police, Public Peace and
Order and Accountability, the fight against corruption and Organized Crime.63 EUPAT
activities (focused on middle and senior levels of management) were to pay special
attention to: a) overall implementation of police reform in the field; b) police-judiciary
cooperation; c) professional standards/internal control.

6.3. Operational Aspects

EUPAT was closer to PROXIMA in its objectives and organization it was however
on a smaller scale. The mission was deployed for only six months (from 15 December
2005 to 14 June 2006).64
16 EU Member States contributed to the mission: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom.
EUPAT was a police mission that aimed to achieve capacity building, even though
it was not formally described as a “mission”.65 It comprised an EU police advisory
team, formed of around 30 police advisors. EU police experts monitored and mentored
the FYROM police on priority issues like border police, public peace and order and
accountability, the fight against corruption and organized crime.
Political control and strategic direction of EUPAT were exercised by the Political
and Security Committee under the Council’s responsibility. The Head of the Mission

62 IOANNIDES, I., (2009), op.cit., pp. 192-193.

63 Council Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP of 24 November 2005 on the establishment of an EU Police Advisory Team
(EUPAT) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM), Article 2.
64 The budget of the mission was 1,500,000 Euro approximately.
65 EUPAT was described as an EU police advisory team. See Council Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP of 24th November
2005 on the establishment of an EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(FYROM), or the Press release from the Council of the EU 14912/05 of 24th November 2005.

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 EU OPERATIONS WITHIN THE FYROM: EUFOR CONCORDIA, EUPOL PROXIMA AND EUPAT

Brigadier Jürgen Scholz (formerly PROXIMA’s Head of Mission) was responsible for
managing and coordinating EUPAT activities.
The planning phase was undertaken by the EUPOL-PROXIMA Head of the
Mission in cooperation with the European Commission, the FYROM authorities and
OSCE, drawing up a General Plan on the basis of guidance from the Political and
Security Committee.
The chain of command was as follows: 1) the Political and Security Committee
was to provide political control and strategic direction; 2) the High Representative
was to provide guidance to the Head of EUPAT through the EUSR; 3) the Head of
EUPAT was to lead EUPAT and assume its day-to-day management; 4) the Head
of EUPAT was to report to the High Representative through the European Union’s
Special Representative; 5) the European Union’s Special Representative was to report
to the Council through the High Representative.
With regard to logistical aspects, EUPAT was structured following the model
developed in PROXIMA: Headquarters in Skopje, composed of the Head of EUPAT
and staff, as defined in the General Plan; one central co-location unit at Home Office
level; and mobile units co-located within the FYROM at appropriate levels.
With regard to other International Organizations and Institutions, there was
cooperation with the OSCE in planning the mission, but there was still no specific
mechanism for coordination and collaboration with the OSCE. There were references
to OSCE and NATO in the Joint Action regarding the release of information,66 and a
mandate to the Commission to cooperate with EUPAT in order to ensure consistency
with Community action.67

7. General Assessment of the Mission

EUPAT was the third and last EU mission in FYROM. Unlike the other missions,
EUPAT was more focused on reforms in the police field than on stabilization. When
it terminated, further assistance was delivered under the CARDS programme to
support the country in the framework of the stabilization and association process, and
it remained the main channel for EU’s financial and technical cooperation with the
country.

7.1. Main Constraints

EUPAT faced various constraints. The staff and budget planned in the mandate
were very limited. It made the possibility of implementing the objective of support to

66 Council Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP of 24 November 2005 on the establishment of an EU Police Advisory Team
(EUPAT) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Article 10.
67 Ibid, Article 9.

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ISRAEL BIEL PORTERO

the development of an efficient and professional police service difficult. Moreover, the
short duration of the mission (only six months) represented an important constraint on
meeting this target.
The FYROM authorities welcomed the mission “under certain conditions”, which
limited the scope of the mandate. For the purpose of ensuring that its EU membership
prospects would not be compromised, EUPAT could not operate as an actual police
mission.

7.2. Best Practices

Despite lots of constraints and difficulties, the EU was able to manage the crisis
in FYROM, from the NATO-led mission to subsequent achievement of FYROM EU
member candidacy.68 When EUPAT began, the European Council granted FYROM the
status of candidate country for EU accession.69 In this respect, EUPAT contributed to
preparing FYROM for the EU membership candidature.
In comparison with PROXIMA, EUPAT improved the consultation mechanism.
A new “consultation mechanism” has been created improving PROXIMA’s
“benchmarking system” based on a monthly report addressed to the Macedonian
authorities on reforms, progresses and shortcomings in local police.70
Coordination has also improved and the mandate formally stated that there was to
be close coordination with the Commission.71 Furthermore, Jürgen Scholz was again
appointed as Head of the Mission, taking advantage of his experience, knowledge and
local contacts.

7.3. Lessons Learned

Literature considered EUPAT more of a “closing mission” or a “transitional
measure” than a mission in itself.72 The constraints and main characteristics of EUPAT
were such that it was not considered as a relevant or significant EU operation.
Another lesson learned was that actions should be taken based on collaboration
between the Council and the Commission’. Moreover, it is necessary to coordinate
European Institutions and actors that operate in the same scenario in order to attain a
single overarching EU concept.73

68 See CIAMBRA, A.: ‘Normative Power’ Europe: Theory and Practice of EU Norms. The Case of Macedonia’, Jean
Monet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics, 2008, p. 20.
69 Decision of the European Council 15914/1/05 of 16 December 2005.
70 See IOANNIDES, I., (2009), op.cit., pp. 193-194.
71 See Articles 2 and 9.
72 Ibid. See also RUIZ, X., op.cit., p. 62.
73 IOANNIDES, I., (2009), op.cit., p. 197.

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The main critical issues that arose with respect to EUPOL-PROXIMA are
applicable to EUPAT. For instance, no human rights tasks were explicitly included in
the mandate and, as with previous missions in FYROM, no mention to human right or
gender component is made in any official document.74
In general terms, EUPAT and all other missions in FYROM were very valuable.
Nevertheless, they were not sufficient for solving some important problems (social
cohesion was not achieved; ethnic conflicts were not completely resolved, etc.). With
regard to specific issues like conditions for and the treatment of detainees, police
behaviour, confidence in the rule of law or discrimination in FYROM, it remains still
much to do.75

74 See ARLOTH, J., and SEIDENSTICKER, F., op.cit., p. 46.

75 See the Report by the Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr Thomas Hammarberg, on his visit to “the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, 25 – 29 February 2008, CommDH(2008)21, 11 September 2008.

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