Lucretius on the Nature of Parental Love

Epicurus denies that human parental love is natural.1 In accordance with his hedonist
ethics, he maintains that parental love is a result of the rational weighing of the
advantages (pleasures) and disadvantages (pains) that might arise from loving one’s
child;2 parental love is a matter of choice. Hostile sources promote the view that the
Epicurean position is obviously unconvincing and should be dismissed out of hand.
Thus, Plutarch accuses the Epicureans: ‘And do you not deny the natural bonding of
parents to their children, which is apparent to everyone?’ (τὸ δὲ φύσει περιέχεσθαι τὰ
τεκόντα τῶν γεννωµένων οὐχὶ πᾶσι φαινόµενον ἀναιρεῖτε; Adv. Col. 1123A); Cicero,
in both his speeches (Dom. 97–8; Cael. 79–80; S. Rosc. 40–1, 52–5, 62–3) and his
philosophical works (Leg. 1.42–3; Fin. 1.23, 3.57, 3.62–8, 4.17, 5.65, 5.68–9, 5.81–4;
Tusc. 5.5; Off. 1.12, 1.54), argues that the naturalness of parental love is clear to all
reasonable people, and he expects wholehearted agreement from his Roman audience
(indeed, drawing on his own experience, his Epicurean friend Atticus apparently agreed
with him that Epicurus was wrong on this particular issue; Att. 7.2.4);3 and Epictetus
too offers a sustained critique of Epicurus’ views on parental love (Arr. Epict. Diss.
1.23).4 However, the scattered evidence in Lucretius’ De rerum natura suggests that
Epicurean views on parental love were both nuanced and sophisticated. In this paper I
gather this evidence and seek to reconstruct the details of Lucretius’ treatment of
parental love.
In the first section I position parental love in the context of Epicurus’ ethical
system and show that it fits closely with his utilitarian account of friendship. In the

1 Demetrius of Laconia, PHerc 1012, cols. LXVI–LXVIII Puglia; Cic. Att. 7.2.4; Arr. Epict. Diss. 1.23;
Plut. De amore prolis 495A–C, Adv. Col. 1123A; Lactant. Div. Inst. 3.17.5. With the exception of
Demetrius of Laconia, the evidence is presented in 525–9 Usener.
2 Plutarch reports that, according to Epicurus, it is for a return that a father loves his son, a mother her
child, and children their parents (µισθοῦ γὰρ ἀνθρώπων τίς ἄνθρωπον φιλεῖ; καίτοι κατ’ Ἐπίκουρον ὁ
πατὴρ τὸν υἱόν, ἡ µήτηρ τὸ τέκνον, οἱ παῖδες τοὺς τεκόντας, De amore prolis 495A).
3 On Cicero’s treatment of parental love, see in particular Treggiari (2005) 9–36.
4 This discourse can be seen as a supplement to 1.11, in which Epictetus presents in detail his own views
on the issue. Cf. also 2.20, 3.22.67–72, and 3.24.58–118.

1
second section I argue that the Epicureans in all likelihood engaged with views on
parental love put forward in Plato’s dialogue Lysis, most notably regarding the question
of whether or not children ‘belong to’ their parents by nature. Through a close reading
of key passages in the fifth book of Lucretius’ De rerum natura, I demonstrate that, in
addition to hedonist concerns, a model of the relationship between parents and children
in the state of nature leads to a distinctive Epicurean philosophical position: Lucretius
maintains that all human beings, including children, fundamentally are unattached
individuals who ‘belong to’ nobody else by nature; as such, even though parental love
is now ubiquitous and indeed a cultural norm, there is no basis for the naturalness of
parental love. This model of the relationship between parents and children does not,
however, apply in the case of certain animals, who, Lucretius intimates, do in fact
possess natural parental love for their offspring. In the final section I examine the
comparison that Lucretius makes between animal and human parental love, focusing
on two famous scenes, the sacrifice of Iphigenia in the first book and the forlorn heifer
seeking her sacrificed calf in the second. I argue that by highlighting the fragility of
human parental love in comparison to that of the animals Lucretius brings to his Roman
readers’ attention the relative weakness of the familial ties that bond human beings
together, and at the same time he emphasizes the need to maintain them if social and
political concord, with all its benefits, is to continue. It transpires that unlocking the
details of Lucretius’ treatment of parental love brings a key lesson of the poem into
clearer focus.

ΕΡΩΣ , ΦΙΛΙΑ, AND PARENTAL LOVE

There is no extant evidence of Epicurus himself employing either of the Greek terms
for parental love that are routinely used in later sources (στοργή and φιλοστοργία). It is
illuminating, however, to consider parental love in the framework of his hedonist
treatment of sexual desire (ἔρως) and friendship (φιλία).
Epicurus’ treatise Περὶ ἔρωτος (On Love) is recorded by Diogenes Laertius
(10.27), but it is unfortunately no longer extant. It is clear, however, that Epicurus
addresses ἔρως in the framework of his division of desires into natural and unnatural,
necessary and unnecessary (RS 29–30, Ep. Men. 127–32). The desire for sex (ἔρως) is
a natural and unnecessary desire, and so it might be readily acted upon and indulged if
no pains arise from doing so (Sent. Vat. 21, 51; Lucr. 4.1030–1287; Plut. Brut. an. rat.

2
uti 989B–C; Diog. Laert. 10.118).5 There is no extant evidence that the Epicureans also
thought of parental love as a natural and unnecessary desire, but such a position might
seem eminently plausible for them to hold. In an analogous manner to ἔρως, it could be
maintained that one has natural parental love for one’s offspring—this might, for
instance, be in the form of a naturally occurring desire for the safety and well-being of
one’s children; however, acting on this desire—for instance by protecting and nurturing
one’s children—is not necessary for one’s own happiness, although it is of course fine
if it leads to no harm.6 But evidently Epicurus denied that parental love is natural, so
that option is unavailable. Is parental love, then, to be declared an unnatural and
unnecessary desire, something to be avoided altogether since it is detrimental to
happiness? In this case one should not have children in the first place and, failing that,
should not love and care for them. Such a stance would appear to be the obvious
conclusion of Epicurus’ denial of the naturalness of parental love, if it is to be
understood as some sort of desire. One can derive support for this interpretation from
Lucretius: at the start of the final book of De rerum natura he declares that Epicurus
saw that honour, wealth, fame, and pride in successful children (bona gnatorum
excellere fama)—all things that may seem legitimate objects of desire—are all alike
empty, neither necessary nor sufficient for happiness (6.11–16). However, although
there is clear evidence that Epicurus advocated remaining childless barring exceptional
circumstances (Diog. Laert. 10.119; Clem. Alex. Strom. 2.23.181.25; Lactant. Div. Inst.
3.17.5), 7 there is no evidence that he advocated actively neglecting one’s children
beyond the aspersions cast by Epictetus, who suggests that his logic condones
infanticide (Arr. Epict. Disc. 1.23.1, 7, 10).8
It appears instead that Epicurus saw parental love as something akin to
friendship (φιλία). The denial of the naturalness of parental love accords with well-
documented Epicurean views on the instrumental judgements involved in forming and

5 For detailed discussion of the Epicurean treatment of ἔρως, see Brown (1987) 112–18; Jufresa (1994);
Arkins (1984); Stearns (1936).
6 See further Alesse (2011) 208–9.
7 See further Brennan (1996) and Chilton (1960).
8 On the contrary, although childless himself, Epicurus’ own attitudes towards children appear
affectionate and generous: for instance, his will provides for the maintenance of Metrodorus’ and
Polyaenus’ children (Diog. Laert. 10.19–22); see further Brennan (1996) 349–52 and Brown (1987) 118–
20.

3
maintaining friendships (e.g. Sent. Vat. 23; Cic. Fin. 1.69; Plut. Adv. Col. 1111B).9
According to Epicurus one is motivated to have friends for security and for confidence
of aid in times of need and distress (Sent. Vat. 34, 56–7; frag. 175 Usener). Friendship
qualifies as ‘a natural good’ (κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθόν) in so far as it provides for the
satisfaction of natural and necessary desires for things like security, but there is no
necessary connection between having friends and having security (RS 6–7, 27; Sent.
Vat. 78). Indeed, in keeping with his views on kingship and political rule, which can
also qualify as natural goods (as indeed can anything whatsoever that happens to
provide security in practice; RS 6–7; Plut. Adv. Col. 1124D),10 Epicurus maintains that
the good of friendship is conditional and must be judged on a case-by-case basis:
friendships are not by definition natural goods since certain cases might have
detrimental effects—for example, if one has an extremely demanding friend, or if one
is betrayed by a friend (Sent. Vat. 28, 39, 56–7). This leads to a somewhat delicate
Epicurean position: friendship does not appear in the original state of nature, in which
humans are unattached individuals, and so it is not a natural state of affairs for human
beings (neither, notoriously, are justice and political community); 11 friendship only
emerges as a result of the development of domestic units and a shared desire for
security, neither to harm nor be harmed (Lucr. 5.1018–23; cf. RS 31–3); this explains
why friendship qualifies as a ‘natural good’, in so far as it provides security, while not
itself being natural. All these elements can be seen also in the case of parental love.
We shall consider the lack of parental love in the state of nature in detail in the
next section. When it comes to the desire for security, children clearly might perform
the same function as friends. Indeed, Lucretius alludes to this explicitly when he says

9 To be sure, the self- and other-regarding motivations involved in Epicurean friendships are the subject
of scholarly dispute owing to the complexities of the surviving evidence. For a range of views, see Mitsis
(1988) 98–128, O’Connor (1989), Annas (1993) 236–44, O’Keefe (2001), and in particular Evans
(2004), who makes the compelling point that egoistic motivations and instrumental judgements can be
compatible with the other regarding behaviours and the benefits routinely associated with ‘genuine’
friendships in which one values a friend for his own sake.
10 KD 6: ἕνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ἦν κατὰ φύσιν [ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας] ἀγαθόν, ἐξ ὧν ἄν ποτε
τοῦθ’ οἷός τ’ ᾖ παρασκευάζεσθαι (‘In order to have the security coming from men, anything whatsoever
[kingship and political rule] that was able to provide this was a natural good’). See further McConnell
(2010) 179–82 and Roskam (2007) 37–9.
11 I discuss the unattached human individuals in the state of nature in more detail below.

4
that people have children so that they may have security in their old age (ut possint
gnatis munire senectam, 4.1256).12 Thus, in so far as parental love is akin to φιλία, it
too is a matter of rational calculation about advantages to oneself, but it might so happen
that (for most people at least) loving one’s children is an excellent strategy to gain
things such as security and the confidence of aid in the future. Treating parental love
under the category of φιλία explains why parental love is clearly ubiquitous and indeed
in most cases a natural good (as a matter of fact, most children do provide security and
aid to their loving parents in their old age), while not itself being natural. Further, it
also explains why Epicurus maintains the provocative view that one should not have
children barring exceptional circumstances: there are other candidate friends readily
available and there is simply no need to have children in order to have security in one’s
old age (especially since, as Democritus notes, they may in fact turn out to be sources
of pain and disappointment—so why take the risk?).13 Moreover, on this model we can
appreciate that even if one does have children there is no compulsion to love them
regardless of what sort of person they are: if they do not provide advantages presently,
and if they do not inspire the confidence of doing so in the future, it is best not to love
them, and one is free and able to make that choice.14 It is very tempting to conclude
that, for Epicurus, one’s children are just other candidate friends, with no privileged
position beyond that.15

12 Lucretius seems to imply that childlessness is a legitimate source of anxiety for the Epicurean, owing
to concerns about security. Brown (1987) 126–7 argues persuasively that Lucretius is acknowledging a
standard Roman concern rather than presenting an orthodox Epicurean advocacy of having children for
security in old age.
13 Democritus acknowledges the existence of a natural desire to have children (B 278) while stressing
the risk involved, owing to the avoidable pains that children might bring (B 276–7; Clem. Alex. Strom.
2.23.181.25). He even suggests that the desire to have children is best satisfied by choosing to adopt a
friend’s child whose good nature is already familiar, rather than risking the natural lottery in having one’s
own. On Democritus, see Farrar (1988) 246–8 and Cole (1967) 112–15.
14 Demetrius of Laconia (PHerc 1012, cols. LXVI–LXVIII Puglia) offers the best example of an
Epicurean arguing against the view that there is a natural compulsion to love one’s children for their own
sake, regardless; see further McConnell (2017).
15 To be sure, Sent. Vat. 61 appears to acknowledge the fact that we find most dear those who are related
to us by blood (καλλίστη καὶ ἡ τῶν πλησίον ὄψις τῆς πρώτης συγγενήσεως ὁµονοούσης ἢ καὶ πολλὴν
εἰς τοῦτο ποιουµένης σπουδήν), which at first blush suggests that we are in fact more likely to form and
maintain relationships with our close family owing to a greater strength of feeling (perhaps some form

5
 EPICUREAN ENGAGEMENT WITH PLATO’S LYSIS:
DO CHILDREN BELONG TO THEIR PARENTS BY NATURE?

By aligning the Epicurean account of parental love with their instrumental account of
φιλία strong resonances appear with a section of Plato’s Lysis in which parental love is
also placed under the category of φιλία and discussed in instrumental terms (207d–
210d).16 In this passage Socrates presents a provocative argument that Lysis is loved
by his parents not for his own sake but only in so far as he is useful and provides
advantages. Lysis had presumed that his mother and father love him purely out of a
concern for his happiness, but Socrates develops the line that, since they do not let Lysis
do whatever he wants, they are not really concerned with his happiness. Rather, it seems
that they are concerned with their own happiness and how he contributes to it; and
Socrates contends that Lysis fails to contribute to his parents’ happiness unless he is
wise: only then would his parents let him do what he wants, for then they will benefit
from being subject to his wisdom. Hence, it is questionable whether his parents do in
fact truly love him for his own sake (despite their efforts in securing his well-being by
caring for him in various ways), whether he is worthy of such love if they do love him
for his own sake (perhaps he is only worthy if he seeks to become wise), and whether
they would love him for his own sake if they themselves were already wise and did not
need him for anything.17 In addition to such questions about parental love, Socrates
appears to advance the thesis that wisdom is sufficient for happiness: either one’s own
wisdom suffices or else one can perhaps rely on that of another.
Epicurus’ own engagement with Plato’s Lysis is uncertain, but his follower
Colotes wrote a tract Against Plato’s Lysis, a very few parts of which survive in a

of natural affection). The motivation, however, still involves a weighing of advantages and
disadvantages: it is simply common to place more confidence in our immediate family performing the
beneficial functions of friends.
16 Nowhere does Plato use the terms στοργή or φιλοστοργία to denote parental love.
17 On the arguments in this controversial passage, see further Penner and Rowe (2005) 12–38 (who take
the positive line that Socrates is actually suggesting that loving someone for their own sake involves
wanting that person to acquire wisdom); Glidden (1981) esp. 41–9; Bolotin (1979) 83–103; and Vlastos
(1973) 7–8 (who takes a very dim view on the utilitarian model of parental love that Socrates entertains).

6
fragmentary papyrus from Herculaneum (PHerc 208). 18 These include a sequence
criticising the thesis that wisdom is sufficient for happiness that most scholars identify
as a response to Lysis 207d–210d, which also contains discussion of the nature of
parental love (PHerc 208 T. VI, p. 12ba17–12c16 Crönert).19 The extent of Colotes’
engagement with Plato’s treatment of parental love throughout the Lysis is uncertain,
but it is possible that the Epicureans latched upon the idea of parents weighing the
advantages that their children might provide in the pursuit of their own end, since it
suggests that parental love does not arise ‘by nature’ but rather by rational calculation.
At any rate, the Lysis as a whole raises some key questions about the basis of ‘natural
love’ that ought to have caught Epicurean attention.
In particular, towards the end of the dialogue Socrates suggests ‘what belongs
to us by nature has shown itself to us as something we must love’ (τὸ µὲν δὴ φῦσει
οἰκεῖον ἀναγκαῖον ἡµῖν πέφανται φιλεῖν, 222a). On the one hand, he entertains the view
that it is things that are like (ὅµοιον) or akin to us that present themselves as necessary
objects of our love—like belongs with like (222b). He does not explicitly say that on
this criterion of likeness or kinship children fit the category of ‘what belongs to us by
nature’ (φύσει οἰκεῖον). 20 On the other hand, he also entertains the view that what
‘naturally belongs to us’ (φύσει οἰκεῖον) are those things that we need or those things
in which we are deficient (ἐνδεές)—like belongs with unlike (221d–e). The question of
whether or not friends or children qualify as such things is left open at the end of the
dialogue.21 We can infer that the Epicureans deny that parents and children ‘belong to

18 For the Greek text, see Crönert (1906) 163–7. For discussion of Colotes’ critical engagement with the
Lysis, see Kechagia (2011) 55–62 with further references.
19 Crönert (1906) 171; Concolino Mancini (1976) 63–4; Kechagia (2011) 59–61.
20 Pangle (2001) 312 states: ‘Parents love children not because they are good or good for them but
because they are their own, and at the end of the dialogue Socrates will give the phenomenon of love
based on kinship its due’. However, as far as I can see, such a dogmatic view on parental love does not
appear to be condoned in the Lysis. Aristotle, on the other hand, condones such a view (EN 1161b17–
34).
21 See Pangle (2001) 317–22 and Glidden (1981) 50–8. Clearly the distinctions and entailments between
‘being like’ (ὅµοιον) and ‘belonging’ (οἰκεῖον) are fundamentally important (222b–e), but precisely how
it all plays out in the case of friendship is unresolved at the end of the dialogue. For discussion of the
dialogue’s concluding sections, which many scholars have found deeply unsatisfying, see Penner and
Rowe (2005) 173–88; Pangle (2001) 321–2; and Bolotin (1979) 182–99.

7
each other’ in either of the relevant senses for parental love to be classified as natural,
and we can go some way in reconstructing their arguments.
First, the reasoning on display at Lysis 221d–e fits closely with the Epicurean
view that natural and necessary desires direct us to those things that we need and in
which we are naturally deficient (such as food and drink and shelter), which are those
things that we seek ‘in accordance with what belongs to nature’ (κατὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως
οἰκεῖον, RS 7) and that we must love if we are to attain the end and be happy (Ep. Men.
127–32). As we have seen, for Epicurus children do not fit into this picture: despite the
natural urge to have sex, having and loving children is not necessary for our happiness
and the sage will ordinarily remain childless.22
Secondly, the Epicureans are not committed to the view that our children are
things that are like (ὅµοιον) or akin to us and therefore present themselves as necessary
objects of our love. Epicurus’ follower Hermarchus refers to the possible effects of a
natural οἰκείωσις among human beings, but his account of the original development of
justice and laws against homicide, preserved by Porphyry (Abst. 1.7.1–12.7), does not
admit that other human beings in general or our children in particular are like or akin
to us in any deep sense.23 This position is further apparent in Lucretius’ treatment of
parental love in De rerum natura. To be sure, from the very beginning of the poem
Lucretius stresses that offspring resemble or are like their parents: in the proem to the
first book he describes how Venus strikes love into the hearts of all creatures and causes
them to propagate new generations of their own kind (omnibus incutiens blandum per
pectora amorem, / efficis ut cupide generatim saecla propagent, 1.19–20; cf. 1.159–73,

22 Compare also Philodemus, On Death cols. XXII.9–XXV.33 Henry, where he argues that being
childless when one dies is not a bad thing, for having heirs in the form of one’s children offers no solace
and no guarantees of anything.
23 On Hermarchus’ use of the term οἰκείωσις, which immediately brings to mind Stoicism as some
scholars have noted (e.g., Alesse (2011) 214–15; Vander Waerdt (1988) 88, 90, 93–106), see in particular
Roskam (2007) 76–9 and Kechagia (2010) 143–6. They refute Vander Waerdt (1988), who argues that
Hermarchus is specifically engaging with the Stoic theory of οἰκείωσις and adapting it for Epicurean
ends. Roskam (2007) 78 makes the compelling suggestion that ‘primitive legislators were not proto-
Stoics who felt akin to other human beings on account of their rationality, but merely saw that they
resembled them more than, say, a snake or a lion, and thus were less inclined to kill them’. There is also
the possibility that Hermarchus himself did not employ the term οἰκείωσις but rather it is an interpolation
on the part of Porphyry; thus Long and Sedley (1987) 2.137 among others.

8
2.342–70). 24 This likeness between human parents and children does not, however,
entail that our children belong to us by nature. In the fifth book Lucretius presents
human beings in the state of nature as essentially unattached individuals, belonging by
nature to nobody except themselves. These original humans are not able to look to the
communal good (nec commune bonum poterant spectare, 5.958) and are aware of no
bonds of custom or law (neque ullis / moribus inter se scibant nec legibus uti, 5.958–
9). There is no notion of a natural human community, of belonging together: these
humans live alone and look out solely for themselves (quod cuique obtulerat praedae
fortuna, ferebat / sponte sua sibi quisque valere et vivere doctus, 5.960–1), with nature
readily providing each individual with what is necessary (5.925–1010).
As Campbell rightly observes, ‘clearly there is no sign here of any innate
affection of φιλαλληλία between the first humans that we find in Stoic and Aristotelian
theories’. 25 This lack of interpersonal affection extends to the case of parents and

24 The process begins with Mother Earth, who gives rise to the first living things (2.589–729, 5.783–
924).
25 Campbell (2003) 222. It is worth noting how the Epicurean account is in direct opposition to the Stoics
and Aristotle. The Stoics argue that nature herself shows that a child belongs to her parents since, in the
case of essentially all living things, there is a natural impulse to nurse and care for one’s own offspring.
This natural impulse, the love of parents for their children, indicates ‘what belongs to us by nature’ and
is the first principle of the Stoic theory of social οἰκείωσις that underpins the naturalness of justice and
human political community. Blundell (1990) 221 summarizes the Stoic theory succinctly: ‘Stoic
οἰκείωσις is the process by which we recognize our natural affinity first to ourselves and subsequently
to various features of our environment, which we pursue as being οἰκεῖος or ‘belonging to us’. This
natural tendency comes in two forms: towards ourselves and towards others. These have been called
‘personal’ and ‘social’ οἰκείωσις respectively. The theory was supported by careful observation of human
and animal nature, especially the urge to self-preservation, which underpins the concept of personal
οἰκείωσις, and the love of parents for their offspring, which provides the strongest evidence for social
οἰκείωσις’. The key sources for the Stoic notion of social οἰκείωσις, and in particular the role played by
natural parental love, are Cic. Fin. 3.62–8; Diog. Laert. 7.85–6; Sen. Ep. 121.6–15; Hierocles, 1.34–9,
1.51–7, 2.1–9, 9.3–10, 11.14–18; Stob. Ecl. 4.671.7–673.11; Plut. De Stoic. rep. 1038B. The evidence
can be found along with helpful commentary in Long and Sedley 1987: 1.346–54. For social οἰκείωσις
as a foundation of justice, see also Plut. De soll. an. 962A; Porph. Abst. 3.19; Stob. Ecl. 2.120.8–14;
Anon. In Plat. Theat. 5.19–20. For critical discussion of the Stoic arguments concerning οἰκείωσις, see
further, for example, Pembroke (1971); Striker (1983); Brunschwig (1986); Engberg-Pederson (1986)
145–83 and (1990); Blundell (1990); Inwood (1983), (1985) 182–201, and (1996). Aristotle has
something very similar to say on the topic. He argues that human beings (as well as other living things)
have a natural impulse to procreate and have children that resemble themselves (Pol. 1252a26–30, De

9
children: there is no sign of any parental love, let alone natural parental love. There
appears to be no relationship between parent and child beyond the biological facts of
birth: there is no notion of any impulse to care for one’s offspring; nor is there any
notion of parental possession or ownership of one’s children. Human reproduction is
explained as being a result of chance sexual encounters (5.962–5). There is, to be sure,
a natural human desire to come together and procreate (Venus is explicitly mentioned
at line 5.962), but Lucretius does not mention the lot of the resulting children at all.
Perhaps he assumes that they were merely left to their own devices after birth, and by
chance some happened to survive and become the unattached individuals he describes.
Much earlier in his account of creation, however, Lucretius makes it clear that,
unlike the offspring of other animals, the human child is helpless at birth and needs
parental care to survive (5.222–7):

tum porro puer, ut saevis proiectus ab undis

navita, nudus humi iacet, infans, indigus omni
vitali auxilio, cum primum in luminis oras
nixibus ex alvo matris natura profudit, 525
vagituque locum lugubri complet, ut aequumst
cui tantum in vita restet transire malorum.

Then, moreover, the child, like a sailor thrown up by the savage waves,
lies naked on the ground, speechless, in need of every kind of vital
support, when first nature has poured him out with struggles from his
mother’s womb into the regions of light, and he fills the place with
doleful cries, as is just for one whom in life so much trouble lies in store
to pass through.

gen. an. 735a17–19). Moreover, he asserts that it is natural to love the product of one’s capacities and
activities (EE 1241a39–b9, Rhet. 1371b21–5); procreative activity produces children and so it is natural
to love one’s children. In the Nicomachean Ethics (1161b17–34) he also contends that parents love their
children as ‘part of themselves’ (ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα) or as ‘something originating from them’ (τὸ ἐξ
αὐτοῦ); our children are extensions or parts of ourselves (they are ‘our own flesh and blood’) and, as
such, they belong to us by nature. See further Blundell (1990) 226–33.

10
Lucretius then states that nature does not provide for the survival of human children in
the same fashion as other animals (5.228–34). Given the vulnerability and dependency
of human children, a story of random survival in the state of nature would seem highly
unlikely as an account of the survival of the human race. Lucretius himself voices such
concerns again later in the fifth book when he suggests that the total breakdown of
concordia between people would lead to the destruction of the human race (5.1024–5),
and also that without such concord successful propagation to the present day would not
have been possible (aut genus humanum iam tum foret omne peremptum, / nec potuisset
adhuc perducere saecla propago, 5.1026–7). A serious tension thus emerges within the
fifth book: there is a clear picture of unattached individuals concerned solely with
themselves alongside a powerful statement that human infants need care if they are to
survive and the human race continue.
It appears certain that Lucretius envisions a vital role for parental love in the
propagation of the human race. But he depicts parental love emerging only at a
surprisingly late stage of human cultural development. He places marriage before child
rearing in the first stages of the development of human communities (5.1011–18):

inde casas postquam ac pellis ignemque pararunt,

et mulier coniuncta viro concessit in unum
. . . . . . .
cognita sunt, prolemque ex se videre creatam,
tum genus humanum primum mollescere coepit.
ignis enim curavit ut alsia corpora frigus 1015
non ita iam possent caeli sub tegmine ferre,
et Venus inminuit viris, puerique parentum
blanditiis facile ingenium fregere superbum.

Then after they had got huts and skins and fire, and woman having been
joined with man yielded into one . . . [?] became known, and they saw
offspring born from themselves, then first the human race began to grow
soft. For the fire saw to it that their cold bodies were thus now unable to
endure the cold weather under the covering of the sky, and Venus sapped
their strength, and children easily broke the proud spirit of their parents
with their charms.

11
Human beings do not appear to have concerns about their children until such time as
the formation of domestic units and the softening effects of fire, of easy access to sex,
and of exposure to the sweet charms of their own children, which result. On this
Epicurean model affectionate bonds between parent and child arise only following the
softening of human nature, which finds its full unadulterated expression in the state of
nature. 26 Civilized life both produces and sustains this new softer nature, in which
humans beings are social animals with a genuine concern for the communal good.27 As
a result Lucretius can readily refer to the love and delight that parents in a civilized
context get from and feel towards their children, which he does throughout the poem as
a whole: in the first book he refers to happy cities blooming with children (hinc laetas
urbes pueris florere videmus, 1.255), a good thing since it means the race will continue
and something that is made possible by the death of previous generations (1.250–64);
in the proem to the third book Lucretius calls Epicurus a father (tu pater es), who
supplies us (his children) with fatherly precepts (tu patria nobis / suppeditas praecepta)
so as to help us attain peace of mind (3.11–30); in the diatribe against the fear of death
sweet children are said to bring joy to the heart (nec dulces occurrent oscula nati /
praeripere et tacita pectus dulcedine tangent, 3.895–6), although a man will not miss
such ‘gifts of life’ (praemia vitae) in death (3.898–903); in the fourth book he maintains
that compatible partners in marriage conceive successfully and gain the gift of sweet
children, a source of security for their old age (4.1248–56); the conclusion of the plague
in the sixth book contains the moving images of corpses of children and parents piled
on top of each other (6.1256–8) as well as the fraught cremation of one’s own kin (suos
consanguineos, 6.1282–6). At the same time Lucretius can somewhat uneasily uphold
Epicurus’ denial of the naturalness of parental love, since children, like all humans, are
essentially unattached individuals and do not belong to their parents by nature—it is
civilized life that produces and sustains the conditions for parental love, and without it
humans’ intrinsically harsh nature will find expression once more. The explanation for

26 For detailed commentary on Lucretius’ account of early human beings and the shift to a softer human
nature, see Campbell (2003) 217–27.
27 For critical discussion of the implications of the development of sociability and novel concerns for the
communal good, see further McConnell (2012) 102–3; Campbell (2003) 252–83; Dobbin (1998) 194–5;
Algra (1997); Armstrong (1997) 325–8; Alberti (1995) 164–75; Vander Waerdt (1987) and (1988); Long
(1986) 285–94, 313–16; Goldschmidt (1982) 311–17; Cole (1967) 70–9.

12
children’s survival in the original state of nature can, in characteristic Epicurean
fashion, be put down to chance.

COMPARISONS BETWEEN ANIMALS AND HUMANS

Lucretius’ treatment of human parental love differs from his treatment of animal
parental love.28 In the case of animals parental love appears to be natural. Consider the
following celebrated passage from the second book of De rerum natura (2.349–70):

nec ratione alia proles cognoscere matrem

nec mater posset prolem; quod posse videmus 350
nec minus atque homines inter se nota cluere.
nam saepe ante deum vitulus delubra decora
turicremas propter mactatus concidit aras
sanguinis expirans calidum de pectore flumen;
at mater viridis saltus orbata peragrans 355
novit humi pedibus vestigia pressa bisulcis,
omnia convisens oculis loca, si queat usquam
conspicere amissum fetum, completque querellis
frondiferum nemus adsistens et crebra revisit
ad stabulum desiderio perfixa iuvenci, 360
nec tenerae salices atque herbae rore vigentes
fluminaque ulla queunt summis labentia ripis
oblectare animum subitamque avertere curam,
nec vitulorum aliae species per pabula laeta
derivare queunt animum curaque levare; 365
usque adeo quiddam proprium notumque requirit.
praeterea teneri tremulis cum vocibus haedi

28 Note that this is somewhat unusual as Lucretius more often highlights similarities between animals
and human beings. Thus Gale (1991) 415: ‘At the human level, the behavior of animals is often analogous
to that of human beings: animals exemplify the operation of free will (2.263–5); the working of the senses
(4.547–8, 638–41, 678–83, 710–21); the way we dream about our daily activities (4.984–1010); the fact
that the female as well as the male derives pleasure from sexual intercourse (4.1197–1207)’.

13
 cornigeras norunt matres agnique petulci
balantum pecudes; ita, quod natura resposcit,
ad sua quisque fere decurrunt ubera lactis. 370

By no other principle are offspring able to recognize their mother or a

mother her offspring; which we see that they can do and that they are
known to each other no less than men are. For often before the decorated
temples of the gods a calf falls slain beside the incense-burning altars,
breathing up a hot river of blood from his chest; but his mother,
bereaved, wandering through the green glade, seeks on the ground tracks
pressed by cloven feet, scanning every place with her eyes if somewhere
she may be able to catch sight of her lost offspring, and standing by she
fills the leafy woods with her moaning, and often she returns to the
stable, pierced with sad longing for her young calf. Nor can tender
willows and grasses thriving in the dew and rivers gliding level with
their banks delight her mind and avert her sudden care; nor can the sight
of other calves in the happy pastures divert her mind and lighten her
care: so much she seeks something of her own that she knows well.
Besides, young kids with trembling voices know their horned mothers
and butting lambs the flocks of bleating sheep; thus, as nature demands,
they as a rule run down each to its own udder of milk.

At this point of the second book of De rerum natura Lucretius is arguing that there is
an indefinite variety of atomic shapes (2.333–41). This variety at the atomic level
explains the individuality of different things (2.342–8), which (as lines 2.349–70 show)
can be seen through examples such as a cow identifying her own calf from all the other
calves, or kids and lambs picking out their own mothers from among the flocks of goats
and sheep (if there were a limited number of atomic shapes, it seems, such distinctions
could not be made). But the passage also betrays views on parental love. In addition to
offspring being able to recognize their own mothers and vice versa, Lucretius suggests
that nature provides for the care of offspring, most obviously in the form of mothers’
milk. Such innate abilities and physiological changes, governed by natura (2.369),
seem to indicate that there is some sort of natural bond between at least mothers and
their offspring. It would also appear that this bond is based on the fact that offspring

14
‘belong to’ their mothers by nature. At the climax of the famous image of the grieving
heifer (2.366), Lucretius explains that she has lost ‘something of her own that she
knows well’ (usque adeo quiddam proprium notumque requirit), her own calf that
belongs to her and cannot be replaced by any other. The adjective proprius emphasizes
that the calf properly belongs to her, its mother, and nobody else, especially not the
superstitious humans who have callously broken a natural bond in taking her calf to the
sacrificial altar.
In this passage Lucretius appears to powerfully uphold a natural bond between
parent and child in the case of animal mothers. But humans would not appear to be so
different. Indeed, much of the scene’s emotive force comes from the personification of
the grieving mother heifer, in particular the human emotion of desiderium that she
experiences at the loss of her ‘young man’ (iuvencus) (2.360). Moreover, human
mothers also produce mothers’ milk, nature’s way of providing care for offspring, and
human parents can recognize their own offspring in the same way that different kinds
of animal recognize theirs (2.349–51). So, if such factors are to be admitted as evidence
for the naturalness of parental love in the case of animals, why should it be different in
the case of human beings?
As it happens, in his De amoris prolis (περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ ἔγγονα φιλοστοργίας or
On the Love of One’s Offspring) Plutarch attacks the Epicureans on just this point.29 He
argues that both animals and human beings alike exhibit natural parental love for their
offspring, citing as evidence various facts of human and animal behaviour and
physiology, such as the shared production of mothers’ milk (495D–496A) and the
courage, pain, and self-sacrifice shown by both human and animal parents when
defending and nurturing their vulnerable and helpless offspring (496B–497C). The
Epicureans, however, refuse to accept that such analogies between human beings and
animals entail that parental love is natural in both cases: they accept that parental love
is natural in the case of animals but claim that human parental love is unique (494F–
495B). For Epicurus, it is the capacity to reason and calculate about gain that
fundamentally distinguishes the unique case of human parental love from other animal
examples, making one natural and the other not, even though they evidently have much
in common (495A–B). Thus, Plutarch fulminates: αἰσχρὸν γάρ, ὦ Ζεῦ, τὰς θηρίων

29 For detailed discussion of the anti-Epicurean line in De amoris prolis, see Roskam (2011) and
Barigazzi (1994).

15
γενέσεις καὶ λοχείας καὶ ὠδῖνας καὶ τεκνοτροφίας φύσιν εἴναι καὶ χάριν, τὰς δ’
ἀνθρώπων δάνεια καὶ µισθοὺς καὶ ἀρραβῶνας ἐπὶ χρείαις διδοµένους (‘For it is
disgraceful, o Zeus, that the begetting, the birth, the throes of labour, and the nurturing
of beasts are by nature and a gift, but that those of humans are loans and wages and
caution-money, given for a gain’, 495B).30
Lucretius’ treatment of human and animal parental love appears to capture this
Epicurean approach to the topic. There is no doubt that he does treat human parental
love differently and indeed contrasts it negatively with the example of animal mothers
such as the grieving heifer. This is apparent when we consider the earlier account of
the sacrifice of Iphigenia at the hands of her father Agamemnon (1.80–101), a passage
that foreshadows and parallels the sacrifice of the calf. Throughout this moving scene
Lucretius provides no obvious sign of parental love and affection on the part of
Agamemnon beyond his being ‘sorrowful’ (maestus, 1.89) as Iphigenia approached the
altar. Any affection that Agamemnon might have had, the fact that Iphigenia had first
called him pater (1.94), clearly that was not sufficient to outweigh the calculations of
gain—a fair wind for the fleet (1.100)—that would result by sacrificing his own
daughter. Lucretius’ judgement on Agamemnon’s actions is explicit: tantum religio

30 Note that a few lines earlier Plutarch reports that, according to Epicurus, human parental love is
distinguished by calculations of advantage (µισθοῦ γὰρ ἀνθρώπων τίς ἄνθρωπον φιλεῖ; καίτοι κατ’
Ἐπίκουρον ὁ πατὴρ τὸν υἱόν, ἡ µήτηρ τὸ τέκνον, οἱ παῖδες τοὺς τεκόντας, 495A). Democritus, who was
a major influence on Epicurus, maintains the exact same view: human beings expect a return from their
offspring whereas other animals do not (B 278). Plutarch himself seeks to demolish the Epicurean
position by arguing that calculations of gain fail to explain human parental behaviour. Most strikingly,
he uses the state of nature model against the Epicureans: in the state of nature no law dictates loving
one’s children (so there is no fear of punishment as a hedonist motivation) (496C); nor is there any hope
for a return from parental love in the state of nature (and, indeed, there is no guarantee of such a return
even now; 496C); most tellingly, given the obvious pains and dangers of child-birth and child-rearing in
the state of nature (worse even than the serious risks that pertain presently), ancient parents loving their
children (which indeed happened since that love is needed for them to have survived and for the race to
have continued to the present) must rely on some other factor than calculations of gain (496C–E): either
we take the Epicurean line and say that humans are in the main just terrible at making proper judgements
about gain (in which case, one needs Epicurean education to think properly about things like loving one’s
children), or there is natural parental love in the case of humans and that explains things—which is just
what Plutarch posits in De amore prolis.

16
potuit suadere malorum (‘To evils so great religion was able to persuade’, 1.101).31
The attitude that Lucretius presupposes and condones is obvious: parents should not
put their children to death for gain but should love and care for them—that Agamemnon
is prepared to sacrifice his innocent daughter for gain is abominable, and religio is to
blame.
The human parent-child relationship on display with Agamemnon and Iphigenia
is clearly very different in kind to that between the mother heifer and her calf. Assessing
the force of the scene with the grieving heifer, Saylor comments: ‘As an example set in
the discussion of diversity of kinds (333–87) and against the background of the earlier
sacrifice, the whole description intimates that man (present here only by way of
introduction in 342, 351) fails in a very significant way to know his own offspring so
well as animals know theirs’.32 The reason is the lack of a natural bond between human
parents and their children, which is signalled by Agamemnon’s demonstration of the
unique factor that sets apart human parental love: the calculation of gain in the choice
to love or not love one’s children. Rather than a natural state of affairs, it is a cultural
norm that human parents love their children—according to the Epicureans, because of
utilitarian considerations about gain (in most cases children do, as a matter of fact,
provide security in old age, and so on); but, as Agamemnon illustrates, in certain cases
that norm might be violated (for valid or, in his case, invalid reasons).33 In contrast,
there is simply no possibility of the cow even contemplating sacrificing her calf in the
manner that Agamemnon sacrifices his daughter: her natural parental instincts do not
allow it, and, once her calf is gone, she is ‘unable even to comprehend the destructive
act of man’. 34 In both examples the emotive force relies on the perversion of the
normative model of a loving parent-child relationship by religio, but the foundation for
the normative model differs in each case: the animal relationship is based on a natural
bond; the human relationship is a cultural norm.
Taken together, then, these two scenes suggest that Lucretius himself admires
the naturalness of animal parental love as human beings certainly compare

31 For detailed exploration of how the theme of religio connects this passage to others in the poem, see
Segal (1970).
32 Saylor (1972) 307. Segal (1970) 115, in contrast, argues that ‘the slaughter of the calf affirms man’s
mastery over nature only to suggest that it is a false mastery’.
33 Recall the discussion on pages 3–6 above.
34 Saylor (1972) 307.

17
unfavourably. 35 Indeed, we can appreciate that humans can only imitate the animal
model with their cultural norms of parental love and affection. As we have seen, in the
fifth book Lucretius accounts for the development of such bonds and stresses their
utility (5.1011–23); but in the earlier books he stresses that, unlike the case of the
animals, such constructed bonds always risk breaking down or being perverted by other
factors such as religio (1.80–101, 2.352–66) and misguided fears (3.59–93), concerns
that return vividly with the account of the plague and the breakdown of Athenian
society that concludes the poem (6.1138–1286).36 At this point we can appreciate that
the theme of parental love is central to the De rerum natura as a whole.37 From the first
book to the last Lucretius shows that the bonds between human parents and their
children are fragile, lacking a firm basis in nature. But, he stresses, it is imperative that
parents do love their children and nurture the bonds that ultimately underpin society
and the propagation of the human race (5.1024–7)—failure to do so is both deplorable
and potentially catastrophic.

CONCLUSION

Lucretius is committed to the view that human parental love is a fundamental aspect of
civilized life and in most cases ‘a natural good’: barring exceptional circumstances,
parents should love their children owing to the benefits, and there are cultural norms
that encourage and condone this love. He is also committed to the orthodox Epicurean
view that human parental love is not natural: in the state of nature human beings are
unattached individuals, and as such there is no basis for the naturalness of parental love.
For Lucretius, this appears to be an unfortunate fact of human nature that sets us apart

35 Segal (1970) perceives this attitude, but for a different reason: he notes that the cow ‘gains a certain
moral superiority over her tormentors through her association with nature’s beauty and serenity’.
36 On Lucretius’ concern with civil strife and the breakdown of established social bonds, see further
McConnell (2012).
37 Indeed, it is clear that the related themes of fertility, new life, creation, generation—captured most
strikingly in the maternal and fecund figures of Venus (1.1–40, 1.228, 2.173, 2.437, 3.776, 4.1037–1287,
5.737, 5.848, 5.897, 5.962, 5.1017) and the Great Mother (2.589–660, 5.783–924)—permeate the entire
poem at all levels, from the physical processes of nature through the plant and animal kingdoms. For a
succinct discussion, see further Segal (1970) 111–13. For detailed discussion of the examples in the fifth
book in particular, see the commentary in Campbell (2003).

18
from other animals, but ultimately it means that we ourselves must be attentive to
maintaining such parent-child bonds in the face of pressures such as religion, ambition,
plague, the fear of death, and so forth. The importance of being a good and loving parent
and upholding familial bonds no doubt would have been a welcome moral lesson to
Lucretius’ Roman readers, since families were of paramount importance in the
organisation and functioning of Roman society.38 Lucretius’ decision to assert this line
firmly in De rerum natura, despite Epicurus’ own provocative statements on the
undesirability of having children, not only reflects his own convictions but also shows
him carefully tailoring his Epicurean message to the cultural expectations of his Roman
audience.

38 Brown (1987) 122–7 discusses how Lucretius was influenced by traditional Roman values concerning
marriage and children.

19
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