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Aeronautical Weather Decisons
Aeronautical Weather Decisons
Data were obtained from information search patterns and verbal protocols
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Weather-related crashes are one of the common- sion making is often considered a skill that cannot
est causes of general aviation fatalities, accounting be prescribed during training. Rather it is expected
for 20.8% of fatal general aviation (GA) crashes in to develop gradually through practical experience.
the United States between 1982 and 1988. (Air- However, in developing this type of experience,
craft Owners and Pilots Association Air Safety relatively inexperienced pilots may be exposed to
Foundation, 1991). Weather-related decision- hazardous situations with which they are ill-
making (WRDM) skills can be defined as those equipped to cope. The aviation literature is replete
skills necessary to recognize and avoid meteorologi- with tales of survival against the odds, which have
cal phenomena that present a hazard to the flight. often been portrayed in hindsight as pivotal experi-
Most GA pilots are qualified to fly only in Visual ences that marked the authors' transition from raw
Meteorological Conditions (VMC), which are de- novice to seasoned professional (e.g., Gann, 1961).
fined by rules relating to cloud base and visibility. Although there is a growing recognition of the
Should such a pilot fail to conform to these need for WRDM to become an integral aspect of
requirements and enter Instrument Meteorologi- pilot training, the characteristics necessary for an
cal Conditions (IMC), the result will almost inevi- optimal training program remain unclear. Unlike
tably involve loss of control of the aircraft resulting
the training environments necessary for develop-
in a fatal crash (Bryan, Stonecipher, & Aron,
ing skills such as forced-landing procedures, it is
1955). Because of the variable nature of operations
in the aviation environment, weather-related deci- more difficult to simulate deteriorating weather
conditions and thereby provide an opportunity to
practice WRDM skills. In addition, there are no
Mark Wiggins, Department of Aviation and Technol- simple rules that inexperienced pilots can be
ogy, University of Newcastle, Newcastle, Australia; David taught, particularly in regards to judging the sepa-
O'Hare, Department of Psychology, University of Otago, ration distances and precise significance of various
Dunedin, New Zealand. meteorological phenomena. Therefore, what is
The computer used in this experiment was provided required is a detailed identification of the skills
by a science research grant from the New Zealand
necessary for effective and efficient WRDM, which
Lottery Grants Board.
Correspondence concerning this article should be can be used as the basis for the development of
addressed to David O'Hare, Department of Psychology, training systems. The aim of the present study was
University of Otago, P.O. Box 56, Dunedin, New Zea- to develop a task that could be used to capture the
land. Electronic mail may be sent via Internet to structure of expert WRDM in the laboratory.
ohare@rivendell.otago.ac.nz. Performance on this task was to be used to
305
306 WIGGINS AND O'HARE
examine the basic differences between expert and capability and decision-making performance dur-
novice weather-related decision making to deter- ing simulated cross-country flights. A comparison
mine if expertise in an open dynamic environment, between the performance of inexperienced and
such as aviation, can be characterized in similar experienced pilots indicated that although several
terms to those used to account for expertise in measures of information processing were predic-
more highly structured domains, such as chess and tive of inexperienced pilots' performance, no rela-
physics (Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon, tionships were found for the experienced group.
1980), The long-term goal of this research is to Because information-processing capacity is an in-
provide a theoretical foundation for the training trinsic element of analytical decision making, Stokes
and development of expert WRDM. As noted et al. (1992) concluded that experienced pilots'
above, the general aviation accident record sug- aeronautical decision making is mediated less by
gests that there is considerable need for improve- analytical strategies and more by intuitive strate-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
strategies were successful in ameleriorating the tal to the ACT*/ACT-R models that the system
situations because they were based on a large learns by doing and that task-related experience
repertoire of prior experiences coupled with a should be a better predictor of expert strategy than
well-developed mental model of the system within any global measure of experience. Ericsson and
which they operated. Charness (1994) highlighted the importance of
In contrast, novice problem-solving perfor- "deliberate practice" sustained over periods of
mance was characterized by the evaluation of years in expert performance.
options concurrently and the subsequent integra- Process-tracing techniques are one method
tion of this information with generalized problem- through which the sequential nature of informa-
solving strategies such as means-ends analysis and tion processing can be identified and the nature of
backward chaining (Klein, 1989). The result is a decision making and problem solving examined in
cumbersome and time-consuming strategy that is detail. In previous research, this has often involved
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often unsuited to the demands associated with an analysis of eye movements or verbal protocol
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
time-limited and uncertain environments. Ironi- data (Guindon, 1990; Lusk, 1993; Terranova,
cally, this kind of analytical procedure has often Snyder, Seamster, & Treitler, 1989). The former
been recommended as a means of improving the facilitates the identification of information-search
performance of novices (e.g., Benner, 1975). patterns, whereas the latter is designed to identify
Whereas the decision-making strategies of ex- the thought processes that are engaged during the
perts show the features of automatic processing as task. However, the use of verbal protocol data
identified by Shiffrin and Schneider (1977), the exclusively has been criticized widely as being both
decision making of novices more closely resembles obtrusive and subjective (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).
that of controlled processing because the informa- Bainbridge (1979) provides a thorough discussion
tion pertaining to each situation must be mediated of the value and limitations of verbal protocol data
within working memory. As working memory is in the analysis of operator behavior in complex
both capacity limited and subject to transience, systems. Sanderson, Verhage, and Fuld (1989)
information acquired by novice performers is often showed how a combination of objective measures
lost and/or overwritten such that task-related and verbal protocol analysis can yield valuable
information must be reacquired on a regular basis. insights into complex process control behavior.
Hershey, Walsh, Read, and Chulef (1990) referred The present study was designed to use a combi-
to this reacquisition of task-related information as nation information search and verbal protocol
information recursion. Kirschenbaum (1992) hypoth- methodology (see Sanderson et al., 1989) to inves-
esized that the tendency to "re-look at" informa- tigate the differences in performance on a simu-
tion would differentiate expert and novice subma- lated WRDM task between pilots of different
rine officers. levels of experience at such tasks. The following
The most detailed model of cognitive skill acqui- hypotheses were derived from previous research
sition has been developed by Anderson (1982, on expertise in other domains, and the theoretical
1987,1993). In the ACT* model (and its successor, implications of the recognition-primed (Klein,
ACT-R), all cognitive behavior is controlled by 1989), ACT*/ACT-R (Anderson, 1982,1993), and
production rules. In the early stages of skill acqui- automatic-controlled (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977)
sition, knowledge is encoded declaratively. Prac- models of decision-making and problem-solving
tice at a task results in the compilation of task- skills.
specific productions. Therefore, the experienced Hypothesis 1: If expertise lies in the develop-
performer is not limited by the characteristics of ment of task-specific, procedural knowledge, then:
working memory, as productions are run autono- (a) experts will be less able to verbalize this
mously. The features of automatic processing dis- procedural knowledge than novices who must
cussed above can also be derived from the ACT* interpret declarative knowledge directly; (b) differ-
model (Anderson, 1992). The ACT* model strongly ences in decision quality will be less apparent when
suggests that as production systems become more expertise is distinguished on the basis of total flight
highly attuned with further task-related experi- hours than on the basis of actual cross-country
ence, experts are likely to search a problem space flying experience; (c) general problem-solving abil-
more selectively and more rapidly. It is fundamen- ity will be unrelated to differences in performance
308 WIGGINS AND O'HARE
within the expert group, but will be moderately outlined the details of the proposed flight includ-
related to performance within the novice group. ing the departure point, the intended destination,
Hypothesis 2: Experts' information search pat- and the magnetic bearing and distance between
terns will be more structured and directed. Conse- the two airports. In addition, the geographical
quently, experts will (a) acquire a smaller quantity location of each decision point was described in
of information than novices; (b) spend less time terms of its distance from the point of departure
examining information; (c) be more concerned along a magnetic bearing running directly from the
with the implications to be drawn from informa- departure point to the destination.
tion gathered; (d) be less likely to articulate their
goals; (e) be less likely to return to information
already accessed (information recursion); (f) not Method
access information on the basis of the "surface"
Participants
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15:20:13 I I ^^T I I 1 I
i I I i i i i
5 -Topographic Map
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:
- • • • •"•••: ' •' ' "• : • I : • " '. . II ' ' • • • • - . ' ' '•'• i
1 ESC for Main Menu II II Please Enter Option I I SPACE for PreviousMenu
f' " •• "
15:20:26
ESC for Main Menu Please Enter Option SPACE for Previous Menu
Figure 1. (top) The main menu and (bottom) the submenu for current state of the
aircraft. Time elapsed is indicated by the horizontal bar at the top of the screen. ESC =
escape.
EXPERTISE IN AERONAUTICAL DECISION MAKING 311
Format (GIF). In each case, the first image por- Verbal Protocols
trayed a 120 run x 45 nm quadrant. It depicted the
Following the practice decision-making sce-
decision point and the proposed track between the nario, participants were given a description of
departure and destination aerodromes. This was "Duncker's candle problem" as described by
displayed at 50% of the original size and provided Anderson (1980). The problem consists of finding
a broader perspective for those participants unfa- a way to attach a candle to a door. The following
miliar with the region. The remaining images objects are available on a table: the candle, some
portrayed 32 x 20 nm quadrants of and about the matches, and a box of tacks. Participants were
decision point. They were to 192% of the original instructed to think aloud as they worked on the
size and oriented toward true north. problem: to say everything they were thinking from
Access to each of the 50 screens of information the start of the problem until they came up with an
(see Table 1) could be accomplished by depressing answer (Ericsson & Simon, 1984). If they stopped
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
the appropriate numeric key on the computer verbalizing for more than 3 s, the experimenter
keyboard. Pressing the space bar returned the user prompted them to continue. On completion, par-
to the screen accessed previously; the escape key ticipants were told that they would be required to
returned the user to the main menu. For those think aloud during each of the weather-related
screens where information was displayed as text, decision-making scenarios.
prompts were provided at the base of each informa-
tion screen. Graphics screens did not include Results
prompts. Therefore, a card detailing the functions
of the computer keys was positioned permanently Information Acquisition
to the side of the computer. A time line, displayed
in the top right-hand corner of both the informa- To differentiate between the types of informa-
tion and menu screens, indicated the proportion of tion accessed, we divided the 50 computer screens
time remaining in which to complete the informa- of aeronautical information available in each sce-
nario into eight distinct categories. These were
tion search.
based on the submenus in the computer program
For each of the six decision scenarios, the
and the subject of the information screens con-
computer recorded both the information screens
tained therein. Table 1 provides a list of these
accessed by participants, and the duration in categories, in addition to the number of informa-
seconds between the selection and subsequent exit tion screens, and the percentage of the total
from a particular screen. Following completion of number of screens that they represented. Encod-
each scenario, participants were presented with a ing the information screens according to these
forced choice that involved either continuing to- categories allowed comparisons to be made be-
ward the proposed destination or returning to the tween both the type of information accessed by
point of departure. participants and the extent to which the sequence
with which their accessed information followed
these experimenter-defined categories.
Table 1 For each aeronautical decision scenario, informa-
Information Categories and the Number of tion screens were coded in sequence with the
Information Screens Contained In Each Scenario Hemi-Semi-Automated Protocol Analyzer
(SHAPA) computer software package for protocol
Information Information screen analysis (Sanderson, James, & Seidler, 1989). This
category Number Percentage program assists in establishing patterns and se-
Current state 5 10 quences in both verbal and nonverbal protocol
Distance to airports 5 10 data with the predicate-argument notation for
Bearings to airports 5 10 encoding. According to Sanderson et al. (1989),
Cockpit views 4 8 predicates are general terms that represent the
Performance 3 6 particular activity of interest, whereas arguments
Meteorological information 12 24 are specific to a situation and are used to qualify
Aerodrome diagrams 6 12
Topographic map
predicates. SHAPA provides for a maximum of 20
10 20
predicates, each containing at least one argument.
312 WIGGINS AND O'HARE
In addition to the frequency with which predi- flying experience, with novices making the most
cates and arguments occur, the SHAPA computer recursions and experts the fewest.
program also produces transition matrices, detail-
ing the sequence in which predicates occur. First,
second, and third order transition matrices are Search Patterns
provided, corresponding to the frequency of predi-
cate* given predicate A (first order), the frequency As outlined previously, the sequence in which
of x given A then B (second order), and the participants accessed the information screens was
frequency of A: given A then B then C (third order; recorded for each scenario. These screens were
Sanderson et a!., 1989). These facilitate the identi- categorized according to the information category
fication and quantification of interrelationships from which they originated, and the sequences
that may exist between successive predicates gener- were examined with transition matrices. Transi-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
ated during the performance of a task. tion matrices are used primarily for the identifica-
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
A 3 x 2 x 3 mixed factorial analysis of variance tion and tabulation of recurring patterns of behav-
(ANOVA) with repeated measures on the second ior during protocol analysis (Sanderson et al.,
and third variables was conducted for each of the 1989). In the present study, the behavior of particu-
measured variables (number of information screens lar interest related to the frequency with which
successive information screens were accessed from
accessed; time spent examining the information
the same information category (predicate). This
screens; number of information recursions). The
provided an indication of the extent to which
aim was to establish whether differences existed
information was being accessed according to the
between cross-country flying experience (three
experimenter-defined categories shown in Table 1
levels), the relative familiarity of the scenario
or in some other sequence. Tabulations of pairs of
characteristics (two levels), and responses across predicates were referred to as first-order transition
trials (three levels). matrices, and sequences involving triples or qua-
Analysis of the results arising for the number of druples were labeled second- and third-order tran-
information screens accessed during scenarios re- sition matrices respectively. Transition matrices
vealed a significant main effect for cross-country enabled the tabulation of frequencies and thus the
flying experience, F(2, 37) = 3.51, p < .05. Post calculation of the proportion of the total number
hoc tests with the Tukey (B) statistic indicated that of sequences that originated from the same infor-
the difference lay between the inexperienced and mation category.
experienced groups, with novices accessing the A 3 x 2 x 3 repeated measures multivariate
greatest number of information screens, and ex- analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to
perts the least. examine the relationship between cross-country
The ANOVA of the time spent examining the flying experience (three levels), relative familiarity
information screens revealed a significant main with the characteristics associated with scenarios
effect for cross-country flying experience, F(2,37) = (two levels), trials (three levels), and the three-
4.55, p < .05. Post hoc tests indicated that the element vector of measured variables comprising
inexperienced group took significantly longer than the proportions derived from the first-order, sec-
the experienced group to examine the information ond-order, and third-order transition matrices.
screens. The results disclosed a statistically significant main
The ANOVA for the number of information effect for cross-countryflyingexperience, F(2,37) =
recursions revealed a significant main effect for 3.46, p < .01, although there were no main effects
cross-country flying experience, F(2, 37) = 7.88, or interactions relating to familiarity or trials. In
p < .01, with no main effects or interactions order to identify the variable or variables within
involving familiarity or trials. Post hoc tests dis- which these differences lie, we conducted univari-
closed significant differences between the experi- ate tests between the cross-country groups for each
enced group and both the intermediate and inexpe- of the three measured variables. Statistically signifi-
rienced groups. The differences indicate that overall cant differences were evident between groups for
the number of information recursions made during the proportions derived from each of the first-
scenarios decreased as a function of cross-country order, F(2, 37) = 6.23,p < .01, second-order, F(2,
EXPERTISE IN AERONAUTICAL DECISION MAKING 313
37) = 8.72, p < .01, and third-order, F(2, 37) = ences between scenarios or between the sequence
11.82, p < .01, transition matrices. with which the scenarios were presented. How-
Because all three measured variables showed ever, statistical analysis revealed differences be-
significant main effects for cross-country flying tween levels of cross-country flying experience.
experience, it was considered appropriate to deter- Pilots in the intermediate and experienced groups
mine whether any similarities existed between the were more likely to choose to continue toward
responses. Post hoc tests (Tukey B) for each of the their destinations than pilots categorized as inexpe-
first-, second-, and third-order transition matrices rienced who were more likely to elect to return to
revealed a significant difference between the expe- their take-off points, x2(2,N = 40) = 9.02, p < .02.
rienced group and the intermediate and inexperi-
enced groups. These results indicate that of the
Response Latency
total number of information screens accessed by
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each pilot, the proportion of successive screens In addition to recording the particular informa-
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
from the same information category was lower for tion screen selected, the computer program also
those in the experienced group than for those recorded the response latency for each selection.
pilots in either the intermediate or inexperienced Across participants, the mean response latency for
groups. As Figure 2 reveals, the proportions de- the forced choice between returning to the point of
creased as a function of cross-country category for take-off or continuing en route to the destination
all three transition matrices. was 18.9 s (SD = 17.97). The raw data were
transformed logarithmically prior to statistical
Decision Making analysis to reduce any disparity between the covari-
ance matrices of groups. These data were sub-
Following the information acquisition phase of jected to a 3 x 2 x 3 mixed factorial ANOVA to
each scenario, participants were asked to select determine whether differences existed between
from pairs of alternative strategies, those which cross-country experience (three levels), familiarity
they would most prefer to undertake given the (two levels), and trials (three levels), for the
particular circumstances. One of these pairs in- response latency recorded for the forced choice
volved a forced choice between either returning to between continuing toward the destination or
the departure point or continuing en route to the returning to the take-off point.
destination. Overall, participants chose to return The results disclosed a significant main effect for
to their point of departure in 43% of cases, cross-country flying experience, F(2, 37) = 3.29,
whereas 57% of selections involved continuing the p < .01. An inspection of the data for the three
flight en route to the destination. Chi-square tests cross-country groups indicated that the mean re-
did not reveal any statistically significant differ- sponse latency for the intermediate group ex-
0.2
• First-Order TM
c 0.15 nSecond-Order TM
o
L.
OThird-Order TM
a
CL
a 0.1
03
0)
0.05
absolute confidence in the decision. A 3 x 2 x 3 Note. One pilot from the experienced group was excluded
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
55. The audiotapes were transcribed and entered percentage of each group's total verbalizations
into the SHAPA system (Sanderson et al., 1989). that were encoded into each category.
The verbalizations were divided into segments It can be seen that the expert pilots made fewer
containing one predicate. The predicates were explicit goal or detection references than other
derived from Rasmussen's (1982) analysis of hu- pilots, but rather more diagnostic statements. Nov-
man error that had previously been applied to the ice pilots were mostly concerned with detecting
coding of aircraft accident reports (O'Hare, Wig- appropriate information and with explicitly articu-
gins, Batt, & Morrison, 1994). The six predicates lating their goals. The very small number of partici-
were detection (identifying information); diagno- pants in each group means that conventional
sis (discerning the meaning of the information); statistical tests lack sufficient power to detect true
goal (selecting a goal); strategy (identifying a differences. Despite this, a test of the absolute
means to achieve the goal); procedure (specifying number of goal statements produced by the three
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
tasks needed to carry out the strategy); and action groups approached statistical significance, F(2,6) =
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
(implementation). Two independent raters coded 4.13, p < .07, as did the absolute number of
samples of two transcripts. The cross-coder reliabil- detection statements, F(2, 6) = 3.38,p < .10. The
ity was assessed by calculating values of Cohen's difference in absolute number of diagnosis state-
kappa. These were 0.73 and 0.79 for the two ments between the three groups was nonsignifi-
samples. These indicate excellent levels of agree- cant, F(2, 6) = 0.33, p > .7. However, the ratio of
ment (Fleiss, 1981). diagnostic to detection statements was less than
A simple frequency analysis of the six predicates one for all participants except for 2 of the 3 expert
showed that although the first three (detection, pilots. Again, this difference approached signifi-
diagnosis, and goal) were used frequently, in- cance,^, 6) = 3.23,p < .11.
stances of strategy, procedure, and action were As noted previously, SHAPA provides a number
rarely recorded. Therefore, for the present analy- of techniques for exploring the sequential depen-
sis, these last three categories were collapsed into dencies in data in greater depth. The first-order
one group referred to as tactics. The novice group transition matrices show that the most common
produced more verbalizations (n = 1,155) than transition for experts was from one diagnostic
either the intermediate (« = 700) or expert groups statement to another (148 examples—more than
(n = 732), although these differences were not 60% greater than the next most common transi-
statistically significant. tion), whereas this pattern was less frequent for
The distribution of the predicates across the novices (64 examples). The most common pattern
three groups (expert, intermediate, and novice) is for novices was from a goal statement to a detec-
shown in Figure 3. The numbers represent the tion statement (224 examples), which was much
50
* • Experts
tn ^Intermediates
£ 40
a; DNovices j
to 30
20
C
o
•H
10
o
Q.
O
less frequent for experts (86 examples). This differ- lem. Collectively, the results provide considerable
ence approached statistical significance, F(2, 6) = empirical support for the theoretical distinctions
3.78,p < .08. These differences are consistent with proposed between the information acquisition strat-
the working backward and working forward strate- egies of experienced and inexperienced pilots.
gies adopted by novices and experts respectively in These results occurred independently of either
solving physics problems (Larkin et al., 1980). the particular characteristics of the scenarios (trial)
The second-order transition matrices showed or the extent to which pilots were familiar with the
that experts were most likely to transition to a third particular area. Thus it can be concluded that the
diagnosis statement, whereas novices were most differences evident between experienced and inex-
likely to transition to a detection statement. Inspec- perienced pilots, both qualitatively and quantita-
tion of the frequency of predicate cycles supplied tively, were relatively consistent and not the prod-
by SHAPA confirms these observations. Further uct of idiosyncracies associated with any particular
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
obtained in the present study can be found in Because we were unable to differentiate signifi-
O'Hare, Wiggins, and Jones (1995). cantly between the performance of intermediate
and inexperienced pilots in the experimental sce-
narios, we believe this suggests that either the
Discussion transition between stages was continuous instead
Strategies of Information Acquisition of stepwise or that the classification procedure
used did not distinguish effectively between pilots
During the acquisition of aeronautical informa- at the two stages. This is a matter for further
tion, experienced pilots accessed significantly fewer research.
information screens, made fewer information recur-
sions, and spent relatively less time examining the
information screens than inexperienced pilots. Verbal Protocol Analysis
These results are consistent with Hypotheses 2a, e,
and b, respectively, and suggest that experienced Combined with differences in information acqui-
pilots required relatively less task-related informa- sition strategies, the distinction between automatic
tion with which to formulate a decision that they and controlled processing also predicts differences
considered appropriate under the circumstances. between experienced and inexperienced pilots in
This is consistent with research in other domains, terms of the extent to which information is verbal-
such as financial analysis (Bouman, 1980) and ized (Shanteau, 1988). Thus, in Hypothesis la, we
auditing (Bedard, 1989), and suggests that experi- predicted that experts would be less able to verbal-
enced decision makers use information search ize procedural knowledge than the novices who
patterns that are more structured and efficient interpret declarative information directly. Al-
than those of their inexperienced counterparts. though the novice pilots produced more verbaliza-
Further support for this assertion can be derived tions than both the intermediate and expert groups,
from the results arising from the analysis of transi- these differences were not statistically significant.
tion matrices. Of the total number of sequences of However, the hypotheses that experts would be
information screens accessed by pilots, a signifi- less likely to articulate their goals (Hypothesis 2d)
cantly greater proportion was accessed from the and would be more concerned with implications or
same submenu by inexperienced pilots than by diagnosis (Hypothesis 2c) were confirmed.
experienced pilots. Therefore, those pilots who Although they are based on a small sample,
were experienced in formulating weather-related these findings are strikingly consistent with those
decisions were less likely to access information of Larkin et al. (1980) who noted that when
according to the experimenter-defined categories, attempting to solve elementary physics problems
supporting Hypothesis 2f. This is consistent with novices "seem to require goals and sub-goals to
research in other domains that suggests that ex- direct their search" (p. 1338). Larkin et al. hypoth-
perts operate on a different representation of the esized that the management of these goals takes
problem than novices, who are more likely to up a substantial proportion of working memory
operate with the surface representation of a prob- capacity, thus accounting in part for the relatively
EXPERTISE IN AERONAUTICAL DECISION MAKING 317
slow and effortful problem-solving performance of Problem-Solving Skills and Pilot Performance
novices.
As an individual develops experience in a particu-
lar domain, Klein (1989) and Klein and Klinger
(1991) suggested that task-specific experiences are
Aeronautical Decisions acquired. These experiences through further prac-
tice can be applied successfully to a variety of
Because of the nature of the terrain, coupled problems and circumstances. This makes redun-
with the daylight and fuel limitations, the decision dant any reliance on general procedures for prob-
to return to the point of departure would, in most lem resolution. Consequently, the performance of
of scenarios used, be ill-advised. A chi-square
individuals at later stages of skill acquisition would
analysis of the decisions indicated that pilots in the
be expected to occur independent of any profi-
intermediate and experienced groups were signifi-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
experience classification. Combined, these results dures that can be generalized and applied subse-
provide empirical support for Hypothesis Ib: Dif- quently to a variety of situations.
ferences between experts and novices will be less Quantitative differences were also observed be-
apparent when a global measure of experience, tween the information search strategies of inexpe-
such as total flying hours, rather than a proximal rienced and experienced pilots, with the former
measure, such as cross-country flying experience, is accessing a greater number of information screens;
used. making a greater number of information recur-
The distinction between the cross-country and sions; and spending more time examining the
total experience classifications also provides sup- information screens than the latter. Inexperienced
port for the assumption that the acquisition of a pilots also exhibited a greater response latency in
cognitive skill is dependent on the participation of selecting from a forced choice: whether to con-
tinue to the destination or return to the point of
an individual repeatedly in the performance of
take-off.
that skill (Ericsson & Charness, 1994). Thus, the
The main aim of cross-sectional analysis is to
development of weather-related decision-making determine whether differences exist between cer-
skills is unlikely to occur if the pilot has not directly tain groups defined a priori. The main disadva-
experienced situations in which the application of tange associated with this discriminatory approach
such skills are necessary. Moreover, it is not is that transitory phases are often overlooked.
possible to instill such skills solely through text- From a training perspective, this information is
books or even through demonstrations. The evi- extremely important if effective training programs
dence suggests that these resources need to be are to be developed. Trainers and educators must
combined with practical tasks in order to facilitate not only be able to identify the quantity and quality
the transition from the initial, declarative stage to of the information required to effect the transition,
the advanced, procedural stages of skill acquisition but they must also be able to identify the character-
(Anderson, 1987). istics associated with the transition. Thus future
In an interesting study of U.S. Air Force Class A research should undertake either a longitudinal
fighter mishaps, McKinney (1993) found that the approach or a cluster analysis across participants
decisions made by highly experienced flight leads in order to determine at which point or points
in response to an unexpected mechanical malfunc- along the continuum the significant transition from
tion were generally worse than those made by novice to expert occur.
less experienced flight leads. Experience was di-
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883-887). Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors Society. Accepted June 28,1995
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