LANDMARK JURISPRUDENCE IN CIVIL LAW AS STATED IN THE SYLLABUS

ALBANO BAR REVIEW CENTER

PREPARED BY: ATTY. ED VINCENT ALBANO III

Tan-Andal vs. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021, Leonen, J.

Facts: After four (4) years of marriage, the Spouses Andal separated in fact. Rosanna thereafter
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage. Rosanna alleges that Mario was always
out and about with his friends, seemingly without direction in life and unable to support them
financially; further describing him as emotionally immature, irresponsible, irritable, and
psychologically imbalance. This was further exacerbated by the latter’s drug use. Upon
examination by a clinical psychiatrist, Mario was diagnosed with narcissistic antisocial personality
disorder and substance abuse disorder with psychotic features. The trial court ruled in favor of
Rosanna.

Issues: a. Whether or not the guidelines for deciding cases for declaration of nullity of marriage
due to psychological incapacity, as laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, violate
the right to liberty, personal autonomy, and human dignity of Filipinos;

b. Whether or not, as characterized in Santos v. Court of Appeals, psychological incapacity has

juridical antecedence and its root cause medically or clinically identifiable at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. If it is so identifiable, then:

1. should it be grounded on a particular psychological illness;

2. may it be established without a psychological assessment or clinical diagnosis; 3. may it be
established on the basis of testimonial evidence attesting to the behavioral pattern of the spouse
with the psychological incapacity during the marriage;

c. Whether or not, as characterized in Santos, psychological incapacity is truly incurable. If it is,

must it be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable to warrant a declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code;

d. Whether or not Article 36 of the Family Code 1s violative of the separation of Church and State;

e. Whether or not the expert opinion on a party's psychological incapacity is competent evidence
if it is solely based on collateral information from the other spouse;

f. Whether or not the existence of grounds for legal separation precludes a finding of psychological
incapacity on the part of one or both of the spouses;

g. Whether or not psychological incapacity may be relative to each couple.

Ruling:

a.

Article 36 was first interpreted in Santos v. Court of Appeals, a case where the wife, after three
years of marriage, left for the United States, never to return to her husband and son. Despite the
wife's abandonment of the family, this Court in Santos refused to void the marriage after outlining
the history of the provision and defining the term "psychological incapacity."

This Court initially noted how the Family Code Revision Committee (Code Committee) deliberately
refused to define psychological incapacity "to allow some resiliency" in applying the provision.
Article 36 provides no examples of psychological incapacity so that "the applicability of the
provision [would not be limited] under the principle of ejusdem generis."
After reviewing the Code Committee deliberations, this Court determined that psychological
incapacity should mean "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage." It added that "psychological incapacity" must refer to
"the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."

In reference to the Catholic roots of Article 36, it being derived from the New Canon Law, this
Court cited the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso (Dr. Veloso), a former presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila. Dr. Veloso was of the
opinion that psychological incapacity "must be characterized by (a} gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and ( c) incurability."

Building on these three criteria, this Court promulgated Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina
180 in 1997. Molina involved a wife who, after five years of marriage, filed a case for declaration
of its nullity due to her husband's psychological incapacity. In her petition, she alleged that her
husband preferred to spend his time and money on his friends, failing to support the family. If
the husband had any money, it was because he allegedly depended on his parents for aid. The
husband eventually left her and their child when she had to resign from work.

It was in Molina where this Court laid down the guidelines for interpreting and applying Article
36. In formulating the guidelines, this Court invited two amici curiae: Rev. Oscar V. Cruz, Vicar
Judicial or Presiding Judge of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Philippine Catholic
Church; and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The
Molina guidelines are as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at ''the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise· of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated
in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

The Molina guidelines were applied in subsequent cases. Since Molina's promulgation in 1997
until 2008, only Antonio v. Reyes was found to have satisfied all the requirements of Molina.
Antonio involved a wife whose pathological lying rendered her psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her essential marital obligations.

Because of the restrictive interpretation resulting from the application of the Molina guidelines,
this Court pronounced in the 2009 case of Ngo Te v. Yu-Te that "jurisprudential doctrine has
unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed," a view
that is "totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulated[.]" In Ngo Te, this Court
remarked that the Molina guidelines worked like a "strait-jacket" in which psychological incapacity
cases are forced to fit:

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the
one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was
then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, _and was sensitive
to the [Office of the Solicitor General's] exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce
procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on
people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality
anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our
basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-
jacket, forcing all sizes to fit and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists
and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. (Citations omitted)

This Court's statements in Ngo-Te and Kalaw notwithstanding, the tendency to rigidly
apply the Molina guidelines continued. Apart from Chi Ming Tsai v. Court of Appeals, Antonio v.
Reyes, Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, and Kalaw v. Fernandez, only the parties in Azcueta v. Republic, Halili v.
Santos-Halili, Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, Aurelio v. Aurelio, Tani-De La Fuente v. De La Fuente,
Republic v. Javier, and Republic v. Mola Cruz were granted a decree of nullity by this Court via a
signed decision or resolution since the Family Code was signed into law.

Q. What quantum of proof is required to prove psychological incapacity?

In light of the foregoing, this Court now categorically abandons the second Molina guideline.
Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be
proven through expert opinion. There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects
of a person's personality, called "personality structure," which manifests itself through clear acts
of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse's personality structure must make it
impossible for him or her to understand and, more important, to comply with his or her essential
marital obligations.
Proof of these aspects of personality need not be given by an expert. Ordinary witnesses who
have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on
behaviors that they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. From
there, the judge will decide if these behaviors are indicative of a true and serious incapacity to
assume the essential marital obligations.

In this way, the Code Committee's intent to limit the incapacity to "psychic causes" is fulfilled.
Furthermore, there will be no need to label a person as having a mental disorder just to obtain a
decree of nullity. A psychologically incapacitated person need not be shamed and pathologized
for what could have been a simple mistake in one's choice of intimate partner, a mistake too easy
to make as when one sees through rose-colored glasses. A person's psychological incapacity to
fulfill his or her marital obligations should not be at the expense of one's dignity, because it could
very well be that he or she did not know that the incapacity existed in the first place.

xxx

Difficult to prove as it may be, a party to a nullity case is still required to prove juridical
antecedence because it is an explicit requirement of the law. Article 36 is clear that the
psychological incapacity must be existing "at the time of the celebration" of the marriage, "even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." This distinguishes psychological
incapacity from divorce. Divorce severs a marital tie for causes, psychological or otherwise, that
may have developed after the marriage celebration.

According to Dean Estrada-Claudio, "it is an accepted principle of all major and recognized
theoretical schools within psychology that a person's behavior is determined by the interaction of
certain genetic predispositions and by his or her environment, working in iterative loops of
influence." From this, proof of juridically antecedent psychological incapacity may consist of
testimonies describing the environment where the supposedly incapacitated spouse lived that
may have led to a particular behavior. For instance, violence against one's spouse and children
can be a manifestation of juridically antecedent psychological incapacity when it is shown that
the violent spouse grew up with domestic violence or had a history of abusive romantic
relationships before the marriage.

xxx

It is true that Dr. Garcia gave the expert opinion-which, we reiterate, is no longer required but is
considered here given that it was offered in evidence-without having to interview Mario. Even Dr.
Garcia herself admitted during cross-examination that her psychiatric evaluation would have been
more comprehensive had Mario submitted himself for evaluation.276 However, the Court of
Appeals erred in discounting wholesale Dr. Garcia's expert opinion because her methodology was
allegedly "unscientific and unreliable."

Unlike ordinary witnesses who must have personal knowledge of the matters they testify on,278
expert witnesses do not testify in court because they have personal knowledge of the facts of the
case. The credibility of expert witnesses does not inhere in their person;279 rather, their
testimony is sought because of their special knowledge, skill, experience, or training280 that
ordinary persons and judges do not have. 281 Rule 130, Section 49 of the Rules of Court on the
opinion of expert witness provides:

SECTION 49. Opinion of expert witness. - The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in
evidence.

Standards for admitting expert opinion were discussed in Tortona v. Gregorio.282 In Tortona, a
parcel of land was extrajudicially partitioned based on a deed of absolute sale bearing the
thumbmark of the purported seller. The seller's heirs contested the deed for being a forgery
because the seller, allegedly illiterate, could not have executed it without the knowledge and
assistance of her children. As evidence, they presented the expert opinion of fingerprint examiner
Eriberto B. Gomez, Jr. (Gomez) of the National Bureau of Investigation, who testified that the
thumbmark on the deed of absolute sale, indeed, did not belong to the purported seller.

Q. If this is the rule on the requirement of expert witnesses, discuss the requirements
for annulment of marriage.

Standards for admitting expert opinion were discussed in Tortona v. Gregorio. In Tortona, a parcel
of land was extrajudicially partitioned based on a deed of absolute sale bearing the thumbmark
of the purported seller. The seller's heirs contested the deed for being a forgery because the
seller, allegedly illiterate, could not have executed it without the knowledge and assistance of her
children. As evidence, they presented the expert opinion of fingerprint examiner Eriberto B.
Gomez, Jr. (Gomez) of the National Bureau of Investigation, who testified that the thumbmark
on the deed of absolute sale, indeed, did not belong to the purported seller.

In their attempt to discredit Gomez and his competence, the buyer's heirs contended that the
examiner was "just an ordinary employee" in the National Bureau of Investigation who collected
fingerprints from applicants for clearance and took the fingerprints of those involved in crimes.

In other words, Gomez allegedly lacked the necessary skill, experience, or training to be an expert
on fingerprints. The trial court nevertheless relied on the expert testimony of Gomez, declaring
the deed of absolute sale a forgery. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, finding
that the seller's heirs failed to overcome the presumption of regularity accorded to the deed. It
highlighted that the deed was a notarized document and, therefore, should be presumed genuine,
and its execution due and voluntary.

In reinstating the trial court's decision, this Court gave credence to Gomez and his expert opinion.
We first discussed opinions in general. According to this Court, opinions are products of personal
interpretation and belief and, therefore, inherently subjective and generally inadmissible in
evidence. Thus, to qualify as an expert and the opinion admitted as expert opinion, the witness
must be shown to possess a special knowledge, skill, or training relevant to the matter they are
testifying on, and that the opinion was rendered on the basis of any of these special criteria. This
is apart from the requirement that the testimony, in itself, must be credible; that is, it must be
based on "common experience and observation . . . as probable under the circumstances."

This Court in Tortona went on to discuss the standards for evaluating expert opinion in the United
States. In Frye v. United States, James Alfonso Frye (Frye) was charged with second-degree
murder. During trial, he offered as evidence expert testimony on the results of a systolic blood
pressure deception test, or the polygraph test, to which he was subjected before trial. The
prosecution objected to the offer, and it was sustained by the trial court. On appeal, Frye
maintained that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the expert testimony offered in evidence.
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia affirmed the trial court's judgment, ruling that
the systolic blood pressure test was not "sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs":

Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and
demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of
the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony
deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.

xxx

After discussing the standards for admitting expert opinion, this Court in Tortona ultimately held
that Gomez qualified as an expert and his testimony, necessarily, as expert opinion. According to
this Court, his work as a fingerprint examiner at the National Bureau of Investigation qualified
him as an expert on fingerprints. Further, his conclusion-that the seller's fingerprint in the deed
of absolute sale and that appearing on the specimen documents were different-was arrived at
using a three-part examination done for determining whether a thumbmark was impressed by
the same person. The methodology he used was not shown to be unscientific and unreliable;
thus, this Court relied on his expert opinion that the thumbmark on the deed did not belong to
the purported seller.

Applying Tortona here, we find that Dr. Garcia was sufficiently qualified as an expert in psychiatry.
She possesses the special knowledge to practice her profession, holding degrees in medicine and
special education. She has been practicing her profession as a physicianpsychiatrist since 1990,
including working at the Philippine Mental Health Association_as a psychiatrist for 11 years.

On the principles and methodology Dr. Garcia applied in evaluating Rosanna and Mario, she
conducted a psychiatric clinical interview and mental status examination of Rosanna. She likewise
interviewed Ma. Samantha and Jocelyn Genevieve, Rosanna's sister. The psychiatric clinical
interview and mental status examination remain to be the principal techniques in diagnosing
psychiatric disorders. While ideally, the person to be. diagnosed should be personally interviewed,
it is accepted practice in psychiatry to base a person's psychiatric history on collateral information,
or information from sources aside from the person evaluated. This is usually done if the patient
is not available, incapable, or otherwise refuses to cooperate, as in this case.

In any case, it cannot be said that the psychiatric evaluation of Mario was exclusively based on
collateral information. Dr. Garcia likewise based her diagnosis on a personal history handwritten
by Mario himself while staying at Seagulls, an "independent evidence."

xxx

At any rate, this Court said in Marcos that personal examination of the allegedly psychologically
incapacitated spouse is "not [required] for a declaration of [ nullity of marriage due to]
psychological incapacity." So long as the totality of evidence, as in this case, sufficiently proves
the psychological incapacity of one or both of the spouses, a decree of nullity of marriage may
be issued.

Q. Is the incurability of the illness required to last even after the psychological
incapacity?

Reading together the deliberations of the Code Committee and our rulings in Santos and Molina,
we hold that the psychological incapacity contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code is
incurable, not in the medical, but in the legal sense; hence, the third Molina guideline is amended
accordingly. This means that the incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific
partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple's respective personality structures are so
incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and
irreparable breakdown of the marriage. "[A]n undeniable pattern of such persisting failure [to be
a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse] must be established so as to
demonstrate that there is indeed a psychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative to
the other."

With respect to gravity, the requirement is retained, not in the sense that the psychological
incapacity must be shown to be a serious or dangerous illness, but that "mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" are excluded. The psychological
incapacity cannot be mere "refusal, neglect[,] or difficulty, much less ill will." In other words, it
must be shown that the incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause.

Q. What is the basis for the declaration that one of the spouses has not complied with
the marital obligations?

Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (Justice Perlas-Bernabe) makes an enlightening point in her

opinion that the essential marital obligations are limited to those between the spouses, as these
are the only provisions "relevant to the finding of a spouse's psychological incapacity [ with
respect to] to his or her specific partner." She cites the legal definition of marriage, which is
primarily a contract between a man and a woman. Therefore, according to her, if a marriage is
to be declared void "due to psychological incapacity, it must be so primarily due to the failure to
assume the essential marital obligations as a spouse, and only incidentally, as a father or mother."

It is true that marriage is a contract primarily between the spouses; but its cause remains to be
the establishment of not just conjugal but also family life. The Constitution treats marriage as the
foundation of the family. 246 Furthermore, Article 70 of the Family Code provides that the spouses
are jointly responsible for the support of the family. As such, once the parties decide and do have
children, their obligations to their children become part of their obligations to each other as
spouses.

This interpretation is more consistent with the canonical concept of marriage and psychological
incapacity from which Article 36 of the Family Code was drawn. For Article 36 to be a true
accommodation, as Justice Perlas-Bernabe submits, the State, through this Court, might as well
consider "the theoretical and operational system which ... is inextricably and inherently ... part of
[the concept of psychological incapacity] - the Canon Law on Marriage."

Q: Is proof of medical illness required for psychological incapacity?

A: To summarize, psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality that show a

lack of understanding and concomitant compliance with one's essential marital obligations due to
psychic causes. It is not a medical illness that has to be medically or clinically identified; hence,
expert opinion is not required.

As an explicit requirement of the law, the psychological incapacity must be shown to have been
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and is caused by a durable aspect of one's
personality structure, one that was formed before the parties married. Furthermore, it must be
shown caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause. To prove psychological incapacity, a party
must present clear and convincing evidence of its existence.

Q: Was the husband psychologically incapacitated?

A: Here, the totality of evidence presented by Rosanna clearly and convincingly proved that
Mario's drug abuse was of sufficient durability that antedates the marriage. Admittedly, part of
marriage is accepting a person for who they are, including their addictions. However, in Mario's
case, his persistent failure to have himself rehabilitated, even bringing his child into a room where
he did drugs, indicates a level of dysfunctionality that shows utter disregard of his obligations not
only to his wife, but to his child.

We agree with the trial court that Mario failed to render mutual help and support to his wife,
failing to find gainful employment and even driving to bankruptcy the construction firm founded
by Rosanna by siphoning its funds for his drug use. He failed to exercise his rights and duties as
a parent to Ma. Samantha. In the words of the trial court:

... [Mario] is incapable of performing his marital obligations, particularly to observe love and
respect for his wife and to render mutual help and support. [Mario] had shown utter disregard
for his wife. Throughout their life together, it was [Rosanna] who mostly provided for the needs
of the family. [Mario J hardly contributed to their expenses because he never bothered to look
for a job. [Mario] was also using prohibited drugs. A responsible husband would not commit acts
which will bring danger, dishonor or injury to [his spouse or to his family}. (Art. 72, Family Code
of the Philippines). The safety and security of the family at all times is a primordial duty of the
spouse.

Even assuming that Mario has since lived a drug-free life, he only did so after separating from
Rosanna. This confirms Dr. Garcia's finding that his psychological incapacity was enduring relative
to his long-estranged wife and can manifest again if she is forced to stay with her.

DR. NIXON L. TREYES VS. ANTONIO L. LARLAR et al.

G.R. No. 232579, September 08, 2020
 CAGUIOA, J:

Facts: Rosie, the wife of petitioner Treyes, passed away. Rosie, who did not bear any children
with petitioner Treyes, died without any will. Rosie also left behind seven siblings, i.e., the private
respondents Antonio, Emilio, Heddy, Rene, Celeste, Judy, and Yvonne.

At the time of her death, Rosie left behind 14 real estate properties, situated in various locations
in the Philippines, which she owned together with petitioner Treyes as their conjugal properties
(subject properties).

Subsequently, Treyes executed two Affidavits of Self-Adjudication which transferred the estate of
Rosie unto himself. Thereafter, private respondents wrote Treyes requesting a conference to
discuss the settlement of the estate which the latter did not accede to.

The private respondents then alleged that sometime during the latter part of 2012, they
discovered that the TCTs previously registered in the name of their sister and petitioner Treyes
had already been cancelled, except TCT No. M-43623 situated in Tanay, Rizal and TCT No. T-
627723 situated in Cabuyao, Laguna.

Issue: The central question to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the CA was correct in
ruling that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied petitioner Treyes' second Motion to Dismiss.

Ruling:

In the instant case, petitioner Treyes maintains that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying its second Motion to Dismiss, arguing, in
the main, that the RTC should have dismissed the private respondents' Complaint on the basis of
three grounds: a) improper venue, b) prescription, and c) lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter and, corrolarily, lack of real parties in interest. The Court discusses these grounds ad
seriatim.

Q: What was the proper venue for the Complaint?

A: The Court finds and holds that the Complaint cannot be dismissed on the ground of improper
venue on the basis of Rule 73 because such Rule refers exclusively to the special proceeding of
settlement of estates and NOT to ordinary civil actions. Invoking Rule 73 to allege improper venue
is entirely inconsistent with petitioner Treyes' assertion in the instant Petition that the Complaint
is not a special proceeding but an ordinary civil action.

Moreover, the Court finds that improper venue as a ground for the dismissal of the Complaint
was already deemed waived in accordance with the Omnibus Motion Rule.

According to Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except with respect to the grounds of (1)
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia (3) res judicata; and (4)
prescription of the action. In turn, Rule 15, Section 8 states that a motion attacking a pleading,
order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not
so included shall be deemed waived.

Hence, under the Omnibus Motion Rule, when the grounds for the dismissal of a Complaint under
Rule 16, Section 14 are not raised in a motion to dismiss, such grounds, except the grounds of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription, are
deemed waived.

Q: Has the action already prescribed?

A: The Court stresses that Rule 74 pertains exclusively to the settlement of estates, which is a
special proceeding and NOT an ordinary civil action.

As well, this argument of petitioner Treyes invoking prescription on the basis of Rule 74 is
again wholly inconsistent with his main theory that the instant Complaint is not a special
proceeding but an ordinary civil action for annulment of the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication,
cancellation of TCTs, reconveyance of ownership and possession, and damages.

Moreover, as clarified by the Court in Sampilo, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., the provisions of
Rule 74, Section 4 barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after
the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition is applicable only: (1) to persons who
have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and (2) when the
provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or
heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by
themselves or through guardians.

Both requirements are absent here as it is evident that not all the legal heirs of Rosie participated
in the extrajudicial settlement of her estate as indeed, it was only petitioner Treyes who executed
the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication.

In this regard, it is well to note that it is the prescriptive period pertaining to constructive trusts
which finds application in the instant case.

xxx

In cases wherein fraud was alleged to have been attendant in the trustee's registration of the
subject property in his/her own name, the prescriptive period is 10 years reckoned from the date
of the issuance of the original certificate of title or TCT since such issuance operates as a
constructive notice to the whole world, the discovery of the fraud being deemed to have taken
place at that time.

Accordingly, it is clear here that prescription has not set in as the private respondents still have
until 2021 to file an action for reconveyance, given that the certificates of title were issued in the
name of petitioner Treyes only in 2011.

Therefore, considering the foregoing discussion, the ground of prescription raised by petitioner
Treyes is unmeritorious.

Q: Is there a need for a prior determination of heirship in a separate special

proceeding?

A: The Court now proceeds to discuss the centerpiece of petitioner Treyes' Petition – that the
RTC has no jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the subject matter of the private respondents'
Complaint because the determination of the status of the legal heirs in a separate special
proceeding is a prerequisite to an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of
property instituted by the legal heirs.

xxx

The Case of Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon v. Ricaforte, et al. and Preceding Cases

Petitioner Treyes cited Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon v. Ricaforte, et al. (Ypon), as well as the cases
that preceded it, i.e., Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario (Yaptinchay), Portugal
v. Portugal-Beltran (Portugal), and Reyes v. Enriquez (Reyes) to buttress his main argument that
since the private respondents have yet to establish in a special proceeding their status as legal
heirs of Rosie, then the ordinary civil action they instituted must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
In Ypon, the Court made the following ruling:

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased
must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the
action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that
the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that
such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status,
a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can
be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must
be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was
reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x[.]

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling
that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate
court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing
the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed
to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as
in this case, was for the recovery of property.

Nevertheless, the Court likewise added in Ypon that there are circumstances wherein a
determination of heirship in a special proceeding is not a precondition for the institution of an
ordinary civil action for the sake of practicality, i.e., (1) when the parties in the civil case had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding
the issue of heirship, and (2) when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally
terminated and cannot be re-opened:

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of
heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case
had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence
regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or
when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and
hence, cannot be re-opened.

Ordinary Civil Actions vis-à-vis Special Proceedings

In the main, Ypon, citing certain earlier jurisprudence, held that the determination of a decedent's
lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding, precluding the RTC in an
ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance from making the same.

According to Rule 1, Section 3(c) of the Rules, the purpose of a special proceeding is to establish
a status, right, or particular fact. As held early on in Hagans v. Wislizenus, a "special proceeding"
may be defined as "an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact." In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or
motion.

In Pacific Banking Corp. Employees Organization v. Court of Appeals, the Court made the crucial
distinction between an ordinary action and a special proceeding:

Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection
of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding is the act by which
one seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence, action is
distinguished from special proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right by one
against another, while the latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact. Where
a party-litigant seeks to recover property from another, his remedy is to file an action. Where his
purpose is to seek the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding
to establish the fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship.

Hence, the main point of differentiation between a civil action and a special proceeding is that in
the former, a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right which the party
claims he/she is entitled to, such as when a party-litigant seeks to recover property from
another, while in the latter, a party merely seeks to have a right established in his/her favor.

Applying the foregoing to ordinary civil actions for the cancellation of a deed or instrument and
reconveyance of property on the basis of relationship with the decedent, i.e., compulsory or
intestate succession, the plaintiff does not really seek to establish his/her right as an heir. In
truth, the plaintiff seeks the enforcement of his/her right brought about by his/her being an
heir by operation of law.

Restated, the party does not seek to establish his/her right as an heir because the law itself
already establishes that status. What he/she aims to do is to merely call for the nullification of a
deed, instrument, or conveyance as an enforcement or protection of that right which he/she
already possesses by virtue of law.

Moreover, it is likewise noted that ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity of a document,
nullity of title, recovery of ownership of real property, or reconveyance are actions in
personam. And thus, they only bind particular individuals although they concern rights to tangible
things. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. Hence, any
decision in the private respondents' ordinary civil action would not prejudice non-parties.

To emphasize, any holding by the trial court in the ordinary civil action initiated by the private
respondents shall only be in relation to the cause of action, i.e., the annulment of the Affidavits
of Self-Adjudication executed by petitioner Treyes and reconveyance of the subject properties,
and shall only be binding among the parties therein.

At this juncture, the Court now deems it proper and opportune to revisit existing jurisprudence
on the requisite of establishing one's heirship in a prior special proceeding before invoking such
heirship in an ordinary civil action.

The Transmission of the Rights of Heirs at

the Precise Moment of Death of the
Decedent under the Civil Code

The operation of Article 777 occurs at the very moment of the decedent's death – the transmission
by succession occurs at the precise moment of death and, therefore, the heir is legally deemed
to have acquired ownership of his/her share in the inheritance at that very moment, "and not at
the time of declaration of heirs, or partition, or distribution."

Hence, the Court has held that the "[t]itle or rights to a deceased person's property are
immediately passed to his or her heirs upon death. The heirs' rights become vested without need
for them to be declared 'heirs.'"

In Bonilla, et al. v. Barcena, et al., the Court held that:

"[F]rom the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his
property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, x x x [t]he right of the heirs to
the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in
the testate or intestate proceedings."

In fact, in partition cases, even before the property is judicially partitioned, the heirs are already
deemed co-owners of the property. Thus, in partition cases, the heirs are deemed real parties in
interest without a prior separate judicial determination of their heirship. Similarly, in the summary
settlement of estates, the heirs may undertake the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
decedent amongst themselves through the execution of a public instrument even without a prior
declaration in a separate judicial proceeding that they are the heirs of the decedent. If there is
only one legal heir, the document usually executed is an affidavit of self-adjudication even without
a prior judicial declaration of heirship.

xxx

As correctly explained by Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (Justice Bernabe) in

her Separate Opinion, "a prior declaration of heirship in a special proceeding should not be
required before an heir may assert successional rights in an ordinary civil action aimed only to
protect his or her interests in the estate. Indeed, the legal heirs of a decedent should not be
rendered helpless to rightfully protect their interests in the estate while there is yet no special
proceeding."

To stress once more, the successional rights of the legal heirs of Rosie are not merely contingent
or expectant — they vest upon the death of the decedent. By being legal heirs, they are entitled
to institute an action to protect their ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession and are
thus real parties in interest in the instant case. To delay the enforcement of such rights until
heirship is determined with finality in a separate special proceeding would run counter to Article
777 of the Civil Code which recognizes the vesting of such rights immediately — without a
moment's interruption — upon the death of the decedent.

Jurisprudential Support on the Institution of

an Ordinary Civil Action by Legal Heirs
arising out of a Right based on Succession
without the Necessity of a Previous Judicial
Declaration of Heirship

To be sure, even prior to the promulgation of Litam which, as already explained, does not actually
support the doctrine that a determination of heirship in a prior special proceeding is a prerequisite
for the resolution of an ordinary civil action, the Court had already pronounced that the legal heirs
may commence an ordinary civil action arising out of a right based on succession without the
necessity of a previous and separate judicial declaration of their status as such.

xxx

To reiterate, once again, the Court's holdings in Cabuyao and Marabilles that an heir may assert
his/her right to the property of the decedent without the necessity of a previous judicial
declaration of heirship are decisions of the Court En Banc that cannot be reversed by a ruling of
a Division of the Court. Ypon, Yaptinchay, Portugal, and Reyes, which are all decisions of the
Court's Divisions, in so far as they hold that a prior special proceeding for declaration of heirship
is a prerequisite for the assertion by an heir of his/her ownership rights acquired by virtue of
succession in an ordinary civil action, did not, as they could not, overturn the Court En Banc's
holdings in De Vera, Cabuyao, Atun, and Marabilles that heirs should be able to assert their
successional rights without the necessity of a previous judicial declaration of heirship.

Similarly, in Morales, et al. v. Yañez, which involved an ordinary civil action for the recovery of
certain parcels of land, the Court held that the enforcement or protection of rights of heirs from
encroachments made or attempted may be undertaken even before their judicial declaration as
heirs is made in a special proceeding:

Appellants contend, however, that for Defendant to acquire a vested right to Eugeniano's
property, he must first commence proceedings to settle Eugeniano's estate — which he had not
done, There is no merit to the contention. This Court has repeatedly held that the right of heirs
to the property of the deceased is vested from the moment of death. Of course, the formal
declaration or recognition or enforcement of such right needs judicial confirmation in proper
proceedings. But we have often enforced or protected such rights from encroachments made or
attempted before the judicial declaration. Which can only mean that the heir acquired hereditary
rights even before judicial declaration in testate or intestate proceedings.

In Gayon v. Gayon, in denying the argument posed by the defendants therein that they cannot
be made defendants in a suit filed against the decedent because "heirs cannot represent the dead
defendant, unless there is a declaration of heirship," the Court held that the heirs may be sued
even without a prior declaration of heirship made in a special proceeding:

Inasmuch, however, as succession takes place, by operation of law, "from the moment of the
death of the decedent" and "(t)he inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of
a person which are not extinguished by his death," it follows that if his heirs were included as
defendants in this case, they would be sued, not as "representatives" of the decedent, but
as owners of an aliquot interest in the property in question, even if the precise extent of their
interest may still be undetermined and they have derived it from the decent. Hence, they may be
sued without a previous declaration of heirship x x x.

In Bonilla, et al. v. Barcena, et al., an ordinary civil action was instituted by a surviving spouse to
quiet title over certain parcels of land. When the surviving spouse passed away during the
pendency of the action, the lower court immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a
dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue. The Court
reversed the lower court's ruling, holding that the right of the heirs to the property of the
deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of heirship in a special proceeding. Thus,
the lower court should have allowed the substitution by the heirs of the deceased even without
any prior judicial determination of their status as heirs:

xxx

As heirs, the petitioners have legal standing to challenge the deeds of sale purportedly signed by
Paulina Baranda for otherwise property claimed to belong to her estate will be excluded therefrom
to their prejudice. Their claims are not merely contingent or expectant, as argued by the private
respondents, but are deemed to have vested in them upon Paulina Baranda's death in 1982, as,
under Article 777 of the Civil Code, "the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent." While they are not compulsory heirs, they are nonetheless
legitimate heirs and so, since they "stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or suit," are
entitled to protect their share of successional rights.

This Court has repeatedly held that "the legal heirs of a decedent are the parties in interest to
commence ordinary actions arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased, without separate
judicial declaration as to their being heirs of said decedent, provided that there is no pending
special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate."

In Marquez v. Court of Appeals, the therein petitioners filed a complaint for reconveyance and
partition with damages, alleging that both the Affidavit of Adjudication and Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos executed by the therein private respondents were invalid as the other heirs of the decedent
were excluded in the execution of the said instruments. While the issue on real party in interest
was not made an issue in the said case, the ruling of the lower court was upheld by the Court,
declaring that both the Affidavit of Adjudication and the Donation Inter Vivos did not produce any
legal effect and did not confer any right whatsoever despite the lack of any determination in a
special proceeding as to the heirship of the therein petitioners.

In the 2013 case of Pacaña-Contreras and Pacaña v. Rovila Water Supply, Inc., et al., which was
decided around five months after Ypon, the therein petitioner heirs filed an action for accounting
and damages against the therein respondents. The latter filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that
the therein petitioners are not real parties in interest to institute and prosecute the case, just as
what is alleged in the instant case. While the lower court denied the motion to dismiss, the
appellate court, citing Litam and Yaptinchay, reversed the lower court and dismissed the case
because "the (therein) petitioners should first be declared as heirs before they can be considered
as the real parties in interest. This cannot be done in the present ordinary civil case but in a
special proceeding for that purpose." Arguing that their declaration as heirs in a special
proceeding is not necessary pursuant to the Court's ruling in Marabilles, the therein petitioners'
petition was granted by the Court which reversed and set aside the appellate court's ruling.

In 2014, the Court, through Senior Associate Justice Marvic M. V. F. Leonen (Justice Leonen),
promulgated its Decision in Heirs of Gregorio Lopez v. Development Bank of the
Philippines, wherein the therein petitioners discovered that one of the heirs executed an affidavit
of self-adjudication declaring himself to be the decedent's only surviving heir. The therein
petitioners instituted an ordinary civil action for the nullification of the affidavit of self-
adjudication. In upholding the nullification of the affidavit of self-adjudication, the Court held that
the rights to a deceased person's property are immediately passed to his or her heirs upon death.
The heirs' rights become vested without need for them to be declared "heirs":

Title or rights to a deceased person's property are immediately passed to his or her heirs upon
death. The heirs' rights become vested without need for them to be declared "heirs". Before the
property is partitioned, the heirs are co-owners of the property.

In this case, the rights to Gregoria Lopez's property were automatically passed to her sons —
Teodoro, Francisco, and Carlos — when she died in 1922. Since only Teodoro was survived by
children, the rights to the property ultimately passed to them when Gregoria Lopez's sons died.
The children entitled to the property were Gregorio, Simplicio, Severino, and Enrique.

Gregorio, Simplicio, Severino, and Enrique became co-owners of the property, with each of them
entitled to an undivided portion of only a quarter of the property. Upon their deaths, their children
became the co-owners of the property, who were entitled to their respective shares, such that
the heirs of Gregorio became entitled to Gregorio's one-fourth share, and Simplicio's and
Severino's respective heirs became entitled to their corresponding one-fourth shares in the
property. The heirs cannot alienate the shares that do not belong to them.

In 2017, the Court promulgated Capablanca v. Heirs of Pedro Bas, et al. In the said case, the
decedent Norberto Bas (Norberto) purchased a piece of land and took possession. Similar to the
instant case, Norberto died without a will and was succeeded by a collateral relative, i.e., his
niece and only heir, Lolita Bas Capablanca (Lolita). Subsequently, Lolita learned that a TCT had
been issued in the names of the therein respondents on the basis of a reconstituted Deed of
Conveyance. Hence, just as in the instant case, a collateral relative, i.e., Lolita, filed a complaint
before the RTC of Cebu City for the cancellation of the titles covering the property once owned
by the decedent. While the RTC ruled in favor of Lolita, the appellate court reversed the RTC's
ruling. The appellate court, citing the case of Yaptinchay, held that there is a need for a separate
proceeding for a declaration of heirship in order to resolve petitioner's action for cancellation of
titles of the property.

In reversing the ruling of the appellate court, the Court, again through Justice Leonen,
emphatically held that no judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an heir may
assert his or her right to the property of the deceased:

The dispute in this case is not about the heirship of petitioner to Norberto but the validity of the
sale of the property in 1939 from Pedro to Faustina, from which followed a series of transfer
transactions that culminated in the sale of the property to Norberto. For with Pedro's sale of the
property in 1939, it follows that there would be no more ownership or right to property that would
have been transmitted to his heirs.

x x x What petitioner is pursuing is Norberto's right of ownership over the property which was
passed to her upon the latter's death.

This Court has stated that no judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an heir
may assert his or her right to the property of the deceased. In Marabilles v. Quito:

The right to assert a cause of action as an heir, although he has not been judicially declared to
be so, if duly proven, is well settled in this jurisdiction. This is upon the theory that the property
of a deceased person, both real and personal, becomes the property of the heir by the mere fact
of death of his predecessor in interest, and as such he can deal with it in precisely the same way
in which the deceased could have dealt, subject only to the limitations which by law or by contract
may be imposed upon the deceased himself. Thus, it has been held that "[t]here is no legal
precept or established rule which imposes the necessity of a previous legal declaration regarding
their status as heirs to an intestate on those who, being of age and with legal capacity, consider
themselves the legal heirs of a person, in order that they may maintain an action arising out of a
right which belonged to their ancestor" [x x x] A recent case wherein this principle was maintained
is Cabuyao vs. [C]aagbay. (Emphasis supplied)

Similar to the above-stated case, the private respondents in the instant case did not file their
Complaint to establish their filiation with Rosie or apply for the determination of their right as
intestate heirs, considering that the law already vested in them, as siblings of the decedent, their
status as intestate heirs of Rosie. Rather, the private respondents sought to enforce their already
established right over the property which had been allegedly violated by the fraudulent acts of
petitioner Treyes.

In the instant Petition, petitioner Treyes argues that the cases of Marquez v. Court of Appeals,
Baranda, et al. v. Baranda, et al., and Heirs of Gregorio Lopez v. Development Bank of the
Philippines find no application in the instant case because the parties in the aforesaid cases were
able to present evidence as to their status as heirs and that the determination of their status as
heirs was not contested.

This argument is not well taken.

In the instant case, the Court notes that in substantiating the fact that the private respondents
are siblings of Rosie, and thus intestate heirs of the latter by operation of law, they attached their
respective birth certificates proving that they are indeed siblings of Rosie.

Rule 132, Section 23 of the Rules states that documents consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated.

The Court has held that a birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima facie evidence
of filiation and a high degree of proof is needed to overthrow the presumption of truth contained
in such public document. This is pursuant to the rule that entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

To be sure, upon meticulous perusal of the petitioner Treyes' pleadings, it is clear that the status
of the private respondents as siblings of Rosie was not even seriously refuted by him. He also
does not make any allegation that the birth certificates of the private respondents are fake,
spurious, or manufactured. All he says is that there must first be a declaration of the private
respondents' heirship in a special proceeding. Clearly, therefore, it cannot be said in the instant
case that the private respondents were not able to present evidence as to their status as heirs
and that the determination of their status as heirs was seriously contested by petitioner Treyes.

In relation to the foregoing, considering that the private respondents' action is founded on their
birth certificates, the genuineness and due execution of the birth certificates shall be deemed
admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he
claims to be the facts. In the instant case, the records show that there was no specific denial
under oath on the part of petitioner Treyes contesting the birth certificates. Therefore, the
genuineness and due execution of the subject birth certificates are deemed admitted.

Hence, despite the promulgation of Ypon, Yaptinchay, Portugal, Reyes, and other cases upholding
the rule that a prior determination of heirship in a special proceeding is a prerequisite to an
ordinary civil action involving heirs, such rule has not been consistently upheld and is far from
being considered a doctrine. To the contrary, a plurality of decisions promulgated by both the
Court En Banc and its Divisions firmly hold that the legal heirs of a decedent are the parties in
interest to commence ordinary civil actions arising out of their rights of succession, without the
need for a separate prior judicial declaration of their heirship, provided only that there is no
pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate.

As similarly viewed by Justice Bernabe, the "more recent strand of jurisprudence correctly
recognize the legal effects of Article 777 of the Civil Code, and thus, adequately provide for
remedies for the heirs to protect their successional rights over the estate of the decedent even
prior to the institution of a special proceeding for its settlement"

By this Decision now, the Court so holds, and firmly clarifies, that the latter formulation is the
doctrine which is more in line with substantive law, i.e., Article 777 of the Civil Code is clear and
unmistakable in stating that the rights of the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent even prior to any judicial determination of heirship. As a substantive law,
its breadth and coverage cannot be restricted or diminished by a simple rule in the Rules.

To be sure, the Court stresses anew that rules of procedure must always yield to substantive
law. The Rules are not meant to subvert or override substantive law. On the contrary, procedural
rules are meant to operationalize and effectuate substantive law.

Hence, even assuming arguendo that the Rules strictly provide that a separate judicial
determination of heirship in a special proceeding is a precondition in an ordinary civil action
wherein heirship is already established by compulsory succession or intestacy and is only sought
to be enforced, which, as already discussed at length, is not the case, the Rules must still yield
to the specific provisions of the Civil Code that certain relatives of the decedent attain their status
as either compulsory or intestate heirs and that their successional rights are transmitted and
enforceable at the very moment of death without the need of such separate judicial
determination.

Indeed, the Rules shall always be construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

Hence, it would be highly inimical to the very purpose of the Rules to dispose of matters without
the unnecessary and circuitous procedures created by a misreading of the requirements of said
Rules, i.e, they still require a separate and lengthy special proceeding for the solitary purpose of
establishing the private respondents' status as legal heirs of Rosie, when their heirship has already
been deemed established by virtue of civil law, with petitioner Treyes not seriously and
substantially refuting that the private respondents are siblings of the decedent. If the Court will
subscribe to petitioner Treyes' arguments and grant the instant Petition, it would sanction
superfluity and redundancy in procedure. To accept petitioner Treyes' stance will necessarily
mean that, moving forward, heirs will not even be able to extra-judicially and summarily settle
the estate of a decedent without a prior judicial declaration of heirship in a special proceeding.
Ironically, even petitioner Treyes' Affidavits of Self-Adjudication would be legally baseless as he
himself has not previously established in a prior special proceeding his status as the husband and
heir of Rosie.

Recapitulation

Given the clear dictates of the Civil Code that the rights of the heirs to the inheritance vest
immediately at the precise moment of the decedent's death even without judicial declaration of
heirship, and the various Court En Banc and Division decisions holding that no prior judicial
declaration of heirship is necessary before an heir can file an ordinary civil action to enforce
ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession through the nullification of deeds divesting
property or properties forming part of the estate and reconveyance thereof to the estate or for
the common benefit of the heirs of the decedent, the Court hereby resolves to clarify the
prevailing doctrine.

Accordingly, the rule laid down in Ypon, Yaptinchay, Portugal, Reyes, Heirs of Gabatan v. Court
of Appeals, and other similar cases, which requires a prior determination of heirship in a separate
special proceeding as a prerequisite before one can file an ordinary civil action to enforce
ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession, is abandoned.
Henceforth, the rule is: unless there is a pending special proceeding for the settlement of the
decedent's estate or for the determination of heirship, the compulsory or intestate heirs may
commence an ordinary civil action to declare the nullity of a deed or instrument, and for recovery
of property, or any other action in the enforcement of their ownership rights acquired by virtue
of succession, without the necessity of a prior and separate judicial declaration of their status as
such. The ruling of the trial court shall only be in relation to the cause of action of the ordinary
civil action, i.e., the nullification of a deed or instrument, and recovery or reconveyance of
property, which ruling is binding only between and among the parties.

Therefore, the Court is in total agreement with the CA that the RTC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner Treyes' second
Motion to Dismiss.

AQUINO vs. AQUINO, G.R. No. 208912, December 7, 2021

Leonen, J.

Facts: Rodolfo filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and alleged that his
father Miguel died intestate with personal and real properties. He is survived by his second wife
and 2 children with 3 grandchildren inheriting by representation. Miguel’s first wife (Amadea) and
son Arturo had already predeceased him and had children (Abdulah and Rodolfo).

Later, Angela moved that she be included in the distribution of Miguel’s estate; alleging that she
is the daughter of Arturo. This was opposed by Rodolfo; on the allegation that her filiation was
not recognized by Miguel.

The RTC granted Abdulah with the letters of administration after Rodolfo yielded in her favor. It
also ruled that Angela’s filiation has already been established.

Just the same, Rodolfo filed a petition before the CA alleging that Angela’s filiation nevertheless
prevents her from claiming under the Iron Curtain Principle. The CA denied the Petition. Hence,
a suit for Certiorari was filed before the SC on the same grounds.

Issue: Can Angela inherit from Miguel even if she is a child of Arturo who is not married to
Angela’s mother?

Held:

The statutory prohibition against reciprocal intestate succession between nonmarital children and
the marital children and relatives of their parents is rooted in Article 943 of the Spanish Civil
Code, made effective in the Philippines on December 7, 1889:

ARTICLE 943. A natural or a legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor
shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.

This is in line with what this Court had considered as the regime under the Spanish Civil Code:
The "legitimate" relationship is the general rule, and exceptions made for nonmarital ascendants
or descendants, which would allow properties of the marital family to pass to nonmarital relatives,
must be expressly stated.

xxx

When Republic Act No. 386, ordaining and instituting the Civil Code of the Philippines, took effect
in 1950, nonmarital children, or "illegitimate children," was classified as the following: "natural
children," or those whose parents were unmarried at the time of conception, and not disqualified
to marry each other; "natural children by legal fiction," or those conceived or born of marriages
void from the beginning; and "illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with Article
269 and other than natural children by legal fiction[.]" Later, the Family Code would eliminate the
distinctions among the various categories of nonmarital children:

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated
in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -legitimate ( and those
who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All
children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself
gives them legitimate status.

Article 54 of the Code provides these exceptions: "Children conceived or born before the judgment
of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory
shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under
Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate."

Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under
one category, without any distinction between natural and spurious. The concept of
"natural child" is important only for purposes of legitimation. Without the subsequent
marriage, a natural child remains an illegitimate child.

Because the Civil Code changed the classification of nonmarital children, so did the wording of
the prohibition, reflected now in Article 992:

ARTICLE 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate child.

The Civil Code now allows all nonmarital children as defined in the Civil Code to inherit in intestate
succession. But because of Article 992, all nonmarital children are barred from reciprocal intestate
succession:

Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it
is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of
the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the
language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Baranda
v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable
intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When
the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who
may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. RFC,
110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general
rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language
fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather
than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not
curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A. 145 SCRA 654
[1986]).

Clearly, the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.

xxx

The prohibition affects the nonmarital child's right of representation under Articles 970 to 977 of
the Civil Code.

The prohibition in Article 992 is so restrictive that this Court has characterized it as an "iron
curtain" separating marital and nonmarital relatives. In Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, this
Court after conducting oral arguments on the matter even rejected an interpretation of the word
"relatives" that would bar reciprocal intestate succession only between collateral relatives.
Yet, while Article 992 prevents nonmarital children from inheriting from their marital parents'
relatives, there is no such prohibition for the nonmarital child whose parent is a nonmarital child
as well. Articles 989 and 990 of the Civil Code provide:

Article 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive descendants of
another illegitimate child who is dead, the former shall succeed in their own right and the
latter by right of representation. (940a)

Article 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding articles to illegitimate
children shall be transmitted upon their death to their descendants, who shall inherit by
right of representation from their deceased grandparent. (941a)

Because of this, the reciprocity in intestate succession of nonmarital children now depends on
their parents' marital status. The parity granted to nonmarital children is more illusory than real.
This disparity of treatment was not left unnoticed.

Article 992 carves out an exception to the general rule that persons, by operation of law, inherit
intestate from their blood relatives up to a certain degree. It does so through a classification of
persons based on their birth status. The classification created in Article 992 is made upon persons
at their conception and birth-hen they are children. Children bear the burden of this classification,
despite having no hand in it and its creation dependent on matters beyond their control, and
without any power to change it or even mitigate some of its most pernicious effects.

xxx

It is our State policy to protect the best interests of children, referring to the "totality of the
circumstances and conditions which are most congenial to the survival, protection and feelings of
security of the child and most encouraging to the child's physical, psychological and emotional
development."

xxx

Clearly, our Constitution, our laws, and our voluntary commitment to our treaty obligations, when
taken together, extend special protection to children, in equal measure and without any
qualifications. When we affirm our international commitments that are in harmony with our
constitutional provisions and have already been codified in our domestic legislation, we do nothing
more than to recognize and effect what has already formed part of our / legal system.

In this instance, should children’s successional rights be at stake, then the best interest of the
child should be of paramount consideration.

Intestate succession is based on the decedent's presumed will. Article 992 then assumes that the
decedent's disposition of their property would not have included any nonmarital children, due to
a supposed hostility between the marital family and the nonmarital child because the latter was
the outcome of an extramarital affair.

However, a nonmarital child is not defined that way. Nonmarital children, or "illegitimate children"
as used under Article 165 of the Family Code, are "[c]hildren conceived and born outside a valid
marriage[ .]" The phrase "outside a valid marriage" does not necessarily mean an extramarital
affair. Parents may choose not to get married despite having no legal impediment to marry. The
2016 report of the Philippine Statistics Authority on Marriage in the Philippines206 showed a
declining trend in the number of marriages-from 490,054 registered marriages in 2007 to 419,628
in 2016. In 10 years, the number decreased by 14.4%.

If there is a legal impediment, it does not necessarily follow that the impediment is that either
or both parents are married to another person. It is entirely possible that one or both of them
are below marriageable age.209 The Philippine Statistics Authority also reported that in 2017,
196,478 children were born to adolescent-19 years old and under-mothers and 52,342 children
were sired by adolescent fathers.
Children born from these circumstances are also considered "illegitimate." Yet, there may be no
"antagonism or incompatibility," "hate," or "disgraceful looks" to speak of. If Article 992 merely
recognizes existing conditions, then it should be construed to account for other circumstances of
birth and family dynamics. Peace within families cannot be encouraged by callously depriving
some of its members of their inheritance. Such deprivation may even be the cause of antagonism
and alienation that could have been otherwise avoided.

This Court has recognized that the alleged resentment and hostility presumed by Article 992 can
be proven by evidence to be non-existent. Particular facts of a case may show that the decedent's
will does not distinguish between marital and nonmarital relatives, precluding a rigid application
of Article 992.

This Court abandons the presumption in In re Grey, Corpus, Diaz, and In re Suntay, among
others, that nonmarital children are products of illicit relationships or that they are automatically
placed in a hostile environment perpetrated by the marital family. We are not duty bound to
uncritically parrot archaic prejudices and cruelties, to mirror and amplify oppressive and
regressive ideas about the status of children and family life. The best interest of the child should
prevail.

We adopt a construction of Article 992 that makes children, regardless of the circumstances of
their births, qualified to inherit from their direct ascendants-such as their grandparent-by their
right of representation. Both marital and nonmarital children, whether born from a marital or
nonmarital child, are blood relatives of their parents and other ascendants. Nonmarital children
are removed from their parents and ascendants in the same degree as marital children.
Nonmarital children of marital children are also removed from their parents and ascendants in
the same degree as nonmarital children of nonmarital children.

This interpretation likewise makes Article 992 more consistent with the changes introduced by
the Family Code on obligations of support among and between the direct line of blood relatives.

Accordingly, when a nonmarital child seeks to represent their deceased parent to succeed in their
grandparent's estate, Article 982 of the Civil Code shall apply. Article 982 provides:

Article 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion
pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions. (933)

The language of Article 982 does not make any distinctions or qualifications as to the birth status
of the "grandchildren and other descendants" granted the right of representation. Moreover, as
pointed out by Senior Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe, to allow grandchildren and other
descendants, regardless of their birth status, to inherit by right of representation will protect the
legitime of the compulsory heir they represent; otherwise, the legitime will be impaired, contrary
to protections granted to this legitime in other areas of our law on succession.

To emphasize, this ruling will only apply when the nonmarital child has a right of representation
to their parent's share in her grandparent's legitime. It is silent on collateral relatives where the
nonmarital child may inherit by themself. We are not now ruling on the extent of the right of a
nonmarital child to inherit in their own right. Those will be the subject of a proper case and, if so
minded, may also be the subject of more enlightened and informed future legislation.

CASE DIGEST
REPUBLIC VS. PASIG RIZAL CO., INC.
G.R. NO. 213207, FEBRUARY 15, 2022
CAGUIOA, J.

FACTS: Sometime in 1958, a parcel of unregistered land was caused to be surveyed by Manuel.
Thereafter, a tax declaration was issued in his name. Upon his death, the beneficial ownership of
the subject land was transferred to PRCI Corporation. Later, a petition for registration was filed
by Esperanza for original registration of the land. The RTC granted the said petition. The OSG
appealed to the CA and the latter denied the appeal. In particular, the CA found that the Regional
Director of NCR was duly authorized to issue a certification on the status of the land as alienable
and disposable and furthermore, private in nature. Thus, allowing the land to be susceptible of
acquisition via prescription; and that the requisite period of possession had been duly complied
with. Hence, an appeal by certiorari was lodged before the SC.

Issue: Was the property proven to be alienable and disposable land?

Held: The case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. However, it was ruled by the
Court that:

Distinctions between property of public dominion and lands of the public domain:

As the quoted exchange shows, it was initially suggested that the term “lands of the public
domain” under then Section 6, Article XII be qualified with the term “agricultural” in order to
clarify that only private agricultural lands of the public domain may be acquired and/or held by
individuals,corporations, or associations.

This initial suggestion, albeit not pursued, clearly shows that the concept of public domain
under the Constitution is indeed broader than the concept of public dominion under the Civil
Code.

Hence, while lands of the public domain under the Constitution pertain to all lands owned or
held by the State both in its public and private capacity,lands forming part of the public
dominion under the Civil Code pertain only to those which are intended for public use, public
service, or the development of national wealth, and excludes patrimonial property. Therefore,
property of public dominion and patrimonial property, as defined by the Civil Code,
both fall within the scope of public domain contemplated under the 1987
Constitution. Excepted from the scope of public domain are lands subject of a claim of
ownership based on native title as explicitly recognized in Cariño Insular Government.

Classification of land as alienable and disposable equivalent to classification as

patrimonial land:

As stated, the Civil Code classifies property into two (2) categories: (i) property of public
dominion (that held by the State in its public capacity for public use, public service or the
development of national wealth for the common and public welfare), or (ii) patrimonial
property (that held by the State in its private capacity to attain economic ends).

Being private in nature, patrimonial property is subject to alienation and disposition in the same way
as properties owned by private individuals, and may thus be subject to prescription and be the
object of ordinary contracts or agreements. Examples of patrimonial property of the State include
those acquired by the government in execution sales and tax sales, friar lands, mangrove lands
and mangrove swamps.

Article 420 suggests that at any given point in time, all property of the State may either be
classified as property of public dominion or patrimonial property. The Republic recognizes
this dichotomy inasmuch as it asserts that “[t]he classifications of land pertaining to the State
under the Civil Code are mutually exclusive.

In turn, patrimonial property of the State may be further classified into two sub-categories:
(i) those which are not property of public dominion or imbued with public purpose based on
the State’s current or intended use, and may thus be classified as patrimonial property “by
nature” pursuant to Article 421; and (ii) those which previously assumed the nature of property
of public dominion by virtue of the State’s use, but which are no longer being used or intended
for said purpose, and may thus be classified as “converted” patrimonial property pursuant
to Article 422.
Thus, the proper interpretation of Article 422 in relation to Articles 420 and 421 is that “converted”
patrimonial property can only come from property of public dominion under Article 420. Hence,
“converted” patrimonial property should not be understood as a subset of patrimonial
property “by nature” under Article 421.

There is no doubt that forest lands, timber lands, mineral lands, and national
parks which are lands of the public domain under the Constitution fall under
property of public dominion under Artlcle 420(2) of the Civil Code, as do agricultural
lands. It is also clear that land classified as agricultural and subject to the State’s
current or intended use remains property of public dominion. However, these
agricultural lands, once declared as alienable and disposable, become
“converted” patrimonial property of the State.

In effect, the classification of agricultural land as alienable and disposable serves as

unequivocal proof of the withdrawal by the State of the said land from the public dominion,
and its “conversion” to patrimonial property. The clear intention of such conversion is to open
the land to private acquisition or ownership. Again, as keenly observed by Justice Gaerlan,
such converted patrimonial property remains within the broader constitutional concept of
public domain precisely as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

To recall, property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man. Consequently, it can
neither be appropriated nor be the subject of contracts; hence, they cannot be alienated or
encumbered. Property falling under Article 420 is outside the commerce of man precisely
because it is property of public dominion. Conversely, those falling under Articles 421 and
422 arenecessarily within the commerce of man, as they are not property of public dominion.

Clearly, any specific property of the State may either be outside or within the commerce of man;
it cannot be both. Prior to the classification of such property to alienable and disposable,
agricultural lands (being property of public dominion) are beyond the commerce of man. It is
the classification of agricultural lands as alienable and disposable which places them within
the commerce of man, and renders them capable of being the subject matter of contracts
(such as a patent, the latter being a contract between the State and the grantee). In turn,
the power to classify (and re-classify) land is vested solely in the Executive Department.
Once a parcel of land forming part of public dominion is classified as alienable and
disposable, they become subject to private acquisition but only through the prescribed modes of
acquisition of ownership.

Effect of R.A. 11573 on prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership under R.A. No.
11573

In Malabanan, the Court laid down the requirements for original registration under what was then
Section 14(2). Reconciling Section 14(2) with the Civil Code provisions governing prescription,
the Court held:

x x x Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription under existing laws.
Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil
Code, in our interpretation of Section 14(2) x x x

The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: “[p]roperty of the State or
any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.” The
identification [of] what consists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which
we quote in full:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding
article, is patrimonial property.

It is clear that property of public dominion x x x cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed,
be subject of the commerce of man. Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and
disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that “[p]roperty of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of
the State.” It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into
patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420(2) makes clear
that those property “which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth” are public dominion property.
For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or
disposable, it remains property of the public dominion x x x when it is “intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.”

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property
is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the properly,
even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable
and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription
can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.

It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already declared
alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title
to the lands, Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant
assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain
as such and ought to be used only by the Government." (Emphasis omitted)

Based on the foregoing discussion in Malabanan, the requirements for original registration
under then Section 14(2) were: (i) a declaration that the land subject of the application is
alienable and disposable; (ii) an express government manifestation that said land constitutes
patrimonial property, or is “no longer retained” by the State for public use, public service, or
the development of national wealth; and (iii) proof of possession for the period and in the
manner prescribed by the Civil Code for acquisitive prescription, reckoned from the moment
the property subject of the application becomes patrimonial property of the State.

The second Malabanan requirement, that is, the express government manifestation that the
land constitutes patrimonial property, was anchored onthe premise that “all lands owned by
the State, although declared alienable ordisposable, remain as [property of public dominion]
and ought to be used only by the Government.” However, this premise was not meant to be
adopted inabsolute terms.

Once property of public dominion is classified by the State as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, it immediately becomes open to private acquisition, since “[a]lienable lands of the public
domain x x x [form]part of the patrimonial [property] of the State.” The operative act which
converts property of public dominion to patrimonial property is its classification as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, as this classification precisely
serves as the manifestation of the State’s lack of intent to retain the same for some
public use or purpose.
To emphasize, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
generally presumed to be part of the public domain pursuant to the Regalian doctrine.

Consequently, those who seek registration on the basis of title over land forming part of the
public domain must overcome the presumption of State ownership. To do so, the applicant
must establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable and
thus susceptible of acquisition and subsequent registration. However, once the
presumption of State ownership is discharged by the applicant, the burden to refile the
applicant’s claim that the land in question is patrimonial in nature necessarily falls on the State.
For while the burden to prove that the land subject of the application is alienable and
disposable is placed on the applicant, the burden to prove that such land is retained for public
service or for the development of the national wealth, notwithstanding its previous
classification as alienable and disposable, rests, as it should, with the State.

Where the property subject of the application had not been utilized by the State, and the latter had
not manifested any intention to utilize the same, proof of conversion into patrimonial property
requires the establishment of a negative fact — the lack of intent on the part of the State to
retain the property and utilize the same for some public purpose. In such situations, what
precludes the conversion of property of public dominion to patrimonial property is an existing
intention to use the same for public purpose, and not one that is merely forthcoming. This is
clear from the language of Article 420of the Civil Code:

ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

In other words, placing on the applicant the burden to prove the State’s lack of intent to retain
the property would be unreasonable, and totally beyond the text and purpose of PD 1529.
Further, this renders illusory the legal provisions in the Civil Code for the acquisition of
property. After all, it is theState which has the capacity to prove its own intent to use such
property for some public purpose in the absence of any overt manifestation thereof through prior
use, occupation, or express declaration.

Jurisprudence instructs that when the plaintiffs case depends upon the establishment of a
negative fact, and the means of proving the fact are equally within the control of each party,
the burden of proof is placed upon the party averring the negative fact. Conversely, if the
means to prove the negativefact rests easily, if not only, upon the defendant, the
plaintiff should not be made to bear the burden of proving it.

In cases where land held by the State has not been previously utilized for some public
purpose, the State has no prior use to abandon or withdraw the land from. It would therefore
be unreasonable to require the applicant to present a law or executive proclamation
expressing such abandonment for there never will be one. The imposition of this additional
requirement in cases where the land so possessed had never been utilized by the State has
dire consequences for those who have occupied and cultivated the land in the concept of
owners for periods beyond what is required by law.

However, and to be clear, where the property subject of the applicationhad been previously
utilized by the State for some public purpose, proof of conversion requires the establishment
of a positive fact — the abandonment by the State of its use and the consequent withdrawal of
the property from the public dominion. To establish this positive fact, it becomes incumbent
upon the applicant to present an express government manifestation that the land subject of
his application already constitutes patrimonial property, or is no longer retained for some
public purpose. It is within this context that the second requirement espoused in
Malabanan was crafted. This second requirement covered “converted” patrimonial
property of the State, or those falling within the scope of Article 422 of the Civil Code.
The early case of Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles (Cebu Oxygen) already
established this interpretation of Article 422 of the Civil Code. In Cebu Oxygen, the applicant
therein sought the registration of aparcel of land previously used by the local government as
a public road. The Court held that the registration of the property should be permitted since
the petitioner therein had been able to prove that the parcel of land had been explicitly
withdrawn from public use by virtue of a city resolution authorizing its sale in a public bidding.

The fact that explicit withdrawal from public use finds relevance only with respect to
“converted” patrimonial property under Article 422 (i.e., property subject to prior state-use)
was further emphasized in Laurel v. Garcia (Laurel), which involved consolidated petitions
for prohibition to enjoin government officials from selling a 3,179-square meter property in
Roponggi, Tokyo which had been acquired by the State through the Reparations Agreement
executed between the Philippines and Japan in 1956. The Roponggi property initially served
as the site of the Philippine embassy before it was relocated to Nampeidai, Tokyo when the
embassy building hadto undergo major repairs.

In Laurel, the Court held that the Roponggi property assumes the nature of property of public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code (i.e., intended for some public service or the
development of national wealth). Noting that the Roponggi property had been subject of
prior state-use, the Court held that its conversion from property of public dominion under
Article420(2) to patrimonial property under Article 422 must be explicit. The Court ruled:

The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as
property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.

Has the intention of the government regarding the use of the property been changed because
the lot has been idle for some years? Has it become patrimonial?

The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service
does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion
happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be
part of the public [dominion], not available for private appropriation or ownership “until there is
a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such[”] x x x.

The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by concerned public officials insinuating a

changes of intention. We emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the intention to use the
Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the
Civil Code must be definite. Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone
specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government’s own deliberate and indubitable
will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property x x
Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises. (Emphasis
supplied; italics in the original)

From these referenced cases, it becomes clear that the need for an express government
manifestation confirming that the property in question is“no longer retained” by the State for
public use, public service, or the development of national wealth, stems from the principle
that abandonment of property of public dominion under Article 420 cannot be inferred solely
from non-use. In turn, the determination of whether property has in fact been abandoned by
the State is necessary only in cases where there has been prior state-use. To repeat, there
is no abandonment to speak of in the absence of prior state-use.

The application of the second Malabanan requirement in cases where there has been no prior
state-use, in addition to the requirement of proof that the property in question had been
declared alienable and disposable, is thus improper.

Requirements of T.A.N. Properties now amended by R.A. No. 11573

Hence, at present, the presentation of the approved survey plan bearing a certification signed
by a duly designated DENR geodetic engineer stating that the land subject of the application
for registration forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public
domain shall be sufficient proof of its classification as such, provided that the certification
bears references to:

(i) the relevant issuance {e.g., Forestry Administrative Order, DENR

Administrative Order, Executive Order, or Proclamation); and
(ii) the LC Map number covering the subject land.

In the absence of a copy of the relevant issuance classifying the subject land as alienable and
disposable, the certification of the DENR geodetic engineer must state: (i) the LC Map number;
(ii) the Project Number; and (iii)the date of release indicated in the LC Map; and (iv) the fact
that the LC Mapforms part of the records of the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority (NAMRIA) and is therefore being used by DENR as such.

In addition, the DENR geodetic engineer must be presented as witness for proper
authentication of the certification so presented.