JOINT INTELLIGENCE

THE MEANT OF JOINT OPERATION AND THE ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF

INTELLIGENCE IN A JOINT OPERATION

INTRODUCTION

1. Joint Operation is in essence a form of combined arms warfare on a larger, national scale,
in which complementary forces from a state's army, navy, air, and Special Forces are meant to
work together in joint operations, rather than planning and executing military operations separate
from each other. One of the key factors supporting any successful military campaign. Great battles
have been won or lost based on the quality of plan and supporting from other support element.
Therefore, how a commander utilises the resources under his command to produce answer related
to questions of “Who”, “Where”, “When”, “what” and How and his ability to arrive at a sound
assessment would greatly determine the planning and conduct of his battle. Without combined
arms with other organisation or support element, I don’t think the battle can be successfully such
as Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Overload in Normandy or in other operation carried out in
any corner of the world.

2. The importance of joint operation in the MAF is very glaring indeed. As we embarked
into the next millennium it is clear that the nature of future military conflict confronting the MAF

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will be multidimensional in nature and will require similar form of response. Thus, the move
toward attaining joint operations capability is indeed a wise decision and most probably the only
option available. Joint operations demand composite view of current activity whether on land, sea,
air and space. However, no echelon of command has sufficient assets to collect all the information
and produce all the intelligence to meet their need. Hence, to help commanders build and maintain
this common picture, intelligence organisations and systems must provide mutual support,
operating on a shared information basis. Though the current intelligence system in the MAF is
capable of supporting such need but we have to admit that there are still weaknesses that
rectification. In short, there is a need to enhance the level of joint ness in the overall MAF warfare
system before it could support the conduct of joint operations effectively.

Image 1. IGUANA Context in Joint Operation Image 2. Joint Operation Meeting

Weapon.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modern_warfare
http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/concepts_intelligence_in_war.html
https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/90854/intelligence-in-war-by-john-keegan/9780375700460/
MP 10.2.2 TD

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AIM

2. The aim of this paper is to find out what are the roles and function of Joint Intelligence in a
Joint Warfare scenario.

SCOPE

3. This lecture will cover the following aspects:

a. Warfare requirement for 21st century.

b. The New Joint Operation.

c. Responsibility for Intelligence.

d. Operation Requirements.

e. Role of Intelligence in Joint Operation.

e. Level of Joint Intelligence in Joint Intelligence.

f. Relationship between joint operation and existing intelligence

organisations.

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REQUIREMENT FOR 21ST CENTURY

5. To repeat a crucial point made earlier, the day is long past when military
intelligence staffs could tend only to the operations of their own branch of service on the
battlefield. The need for joint warfare is given added impetus with the emergence of the era
of joint operations and the changes that is taking place in the overall conduct of modern
warfare. In short, the battle in the 21st century will require new approach to the
intelligence problem and it could be summarised as follows:

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a. Moving intelligence capability into a crisis region. The pace of

future military conflict will be swift and decisive. Technological advancement has
made it possible to achieve tactical and strategic advantage in matters of hours
rather than days. Thus, the reaction time available to counter a particular crisis will
be shorter and subsequently commanders will require maximum intelligence
coverage as to achieve and maintain the initiative. To full-fill this requirement,
intelligence organisations must be able to “deploy” intelligence capability to the
trouble area from the wort go and not just tag along behind the combat units. We
have reached the stage where we must be able to move an intelligence capability
into an area as readily as we move other military assets. In the context of MAF,
especially in support of joint operations, this will require the rapid deployment of
joint warfare staffs to man the JTF Warfare cell. Once activated the cell must be
immediately linked to the JIC and the rest of the intelligence system. This
arrangement will ensure that full intelligence support is available to the JTF
commanders no matter where the battle will be fought. As we know, in Malaysian
we do a lot of exercise and operation involved joint operation such as issues in
LAHAD DATU. In that situation, army provided all capability and skill in order to
vanish the enemy and also provide information to navy and air forces to complete
the same mission. The capabilities that provided by the army is include logistic
element, manpower, weaponries and also how the army manoeuvre the enemy
during the crisis.

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b. Ability to Integrate Information From Many Sources Across Many

Disciplines. Of the many challenges ahead for intelligence organisation to
support the conduct of joint operations, one of the most critical will be the
development of the capabilities to deliver full intelligence support to commanders
who are engage in complex security issues across a wide operational and strategic
agenda. Advice to the commanders coming from a variety of sources must not be
allowed to become merely the intelligence equivalent of newspaper writing. To be
helpful, intelligence staffs at JTF HQ must fuse an especially wide range of
information into their assessments. This could only be achieved through joint
training and availability of a sound joint warfare doctrine. Intelligence staffs
assigned to the JTF must be well exposed to various levels of intelligence duties. In
addition, the JIC must be ready to provide the basic data to form the basic for
further exploitation by the JTF intelligence staffs. By the information gain, it can
use for any joint operation that involved with MAF in our nation. Better example
that we can see that is the issues happen in LAHAD DATU, army cannot do the
operation if the intelligent do not arrived at army commander, navy and air forces
also cannot do the same task if army cannot deliver the intelligent that needed by
navy and air forces, so meant that the army ability to seek and provide the
intelligence to navy and air force is very important in order to make sure the
mission is success.

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c. Ability to Support Joint Operations. Joint warfare came of

age in the 1990’s and will be predominant in 21 st Century. Consequently, this new
approach must include a “joint warfare” a log to the joint warfare concept.
Therefore intelligence organisations need a common understanding and a common
approach to the many issues they confronted or they will not be effective in the new
environment. This can only be achieved through an effective and efficient
intelligence co- ordination centre. Under the present arrangement this would mean
the full utilisation of the JIC. Malaysian Army has big capabilities to do multiple
tasks given by the higher commanders. For examples crisis happen in our country
that issues of LAHAD DATU, army are deployed to settle down the issues in order
to secure the peace of our country from any threat. So that, the capabilities of
Malaysian Army are very strong because army can move alone without any support
from others services. But the strength of the capabilities will be increase when the
joint operation or warfare is conducted between Malaysian Army, Royal Malaysian
Navy and the Royal Malaysian Air Forces.

d. Strategy and Tactic. Distinctions between the strategic and the

tactical levels of war are no longer clear. Nowhere is this lack of clarity more
pronounced than in designating weapon systems. Long-range bombers destroy
ground forces along the forward line of troops as short-range fighters attack and
destroy oil refineries. Army helicopters hit strategic air defense control centers as
Navy cruise missiles designed for fighting nuclear wars disable electrical grids with
specialized payloads. Those who remain prone to “old think” fail to recognize how
technology now enables all combat systems and elements to become strategic or
tactical depending on their intended objective. The distinction between strategic
and tactical targets is also undergoing change. Influenced by waning doctrine
associated with the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and Cold War,
military planners have lost track of the fact that the distinction relates to a target’s
impact on the CINC’s objective rather than to the nature of the target itself. Thus

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communication nets, fielded forces, oil refineries, and vehicles have a strategic or
tactical implication depending on the desired outcome.

THE NEW JOINT WARFARE

6. There have been other occasions in military history when one puzzle was
supplanted by another, particularly as the result of technological developments. The
introduction of the machine gun, tank, airplane, submarine, atomic bomb, and ICBM all
caused the Armed Forces to readjust their doctrine to meet fresh challenges. More recent
innovations brought about stealth, precision, lethality, and surveillance systems that
portend other revolutionary changes in military capabilities. The Malaysian Armed Forces
decided to actively pursue particular strategies and tactical over the last twenty-five years
to provide the Armed Forces with distinct military advantages. Even though the services
worked to bring about this dramatic shift in the puzzle, many appear surprised by the
outcome. This situation highlights the need to develop new doctrines and strategies that
fully recognize and support the spectacular changes that have occurred. The services must
dedicate themselves to solving the puzzle. We must also determine if the puzzle is still a
cube or whether it has taken on another form better suited to the new environment.

(a) Future Operations Will Be Joint. Military history is replete with

accounts of campaigns and battles involving participation by only one service. In
the new paradigm it is difficult to envision any point on the conflict spectrum
where a single service would be committed alone. In the new joint warfare it is very
likely such as joint operation conduct in Malaysian Armed Forces:
 Naval armadas will do battle on the high seas together with
long-range missille and their weapons.

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 Operations against enemy land forces will involve sea-

launched or air-launched, stand-off specialized anti-armor
munitions as well as more conventional artillery.
 Air battles will involve theater ballistic missile defense
systems launched by land forces or from off the decks of
specialized naval vessels as well as the commitment of
aircraft.
 Even relatively small, covert special operations will involve
space-based communications and be supported by sea or air
insertion and recovery of mission personnel.
 Army will provided concentration in ground battle space
with is penetrate the enemy or threat on all avenue of
approach that considered by higher commanders.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE

6. Like in most single – service operations, in joint force operation, it is the

responsibility of the Joint Force commander (JFC) to produce the intelligence required for
the planning and execution of the joint operations. The only difference perhaps is that, to
assist the JFC in his responsibility, the joint Force Headquarters ( JFHQ ) or Markas
Angkatan Bersama (MAB) as we term it locally here has in addition to other staff, an
intelligence staff organisation know as Joint Intelligence staff (JIS ), whose functions are to
collect, evaluate and disseminate intelligence.

7. Intelligence Collection Agencies. The collection stage of the intelligence cycle

is considered one of the most important as it would later determine the type of operation to
be executed. In this context, the agencies responsible to provide information/ intelligence
to the JFC through the JIS are the lower echelon, in the form of assigned Forces or
intelligence units operating in the field and the higher echelon.

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8. The Higher Echelon.

a. Strategic. It is intelligence that is required for the formulation of

strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at national level. It is collected
and analyzed on the basis of each country based on the components of Strategic
Intelligence. Joint operations are normally initiated at the national level arising
from the assessment of the threat by the National Security Council (NSC). Within
the national security framework, intelligence is the responsibility of the National
Intelligence Committee (NIC). The committee is responsible for the coordination,
the determination on the arrears of need and to lay priorities for collection of
intelligence by other related agencies within the country.

b. Operational. It is intelligence required for planning and conducting

campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres
of operation. This level gets into more detail as it deals with smaller areas. It is
often further divided by activity; land, naval and air operations, etc. Service
commanders and GOCs are users of operational intelligence. One of these agencies
is BSPP at Kementerian Pertahanan (KEMENTAH) representative for army whose
function is to provide military intelligence. It is also responsible for the
coordination of intelligence activities of other intelligence organisations within he
three services. For examples crisis in LAHAD DATU, BSPP became the first party
that receive the information from many sources before they BSPP is serviced by
operatives from the following organisations:

(1) BSPP:

(a) Military Intelligence Special Branch (MISB)

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(b) Special Combat Intelligence Regiment.

(c) Electronic Warfare Regiment.

(d) Counter Intelligence Field Units.

(2) It is supported by:

(a) Army Intelligence.

(b) Naval Intelligence.

(c) Air Force Intelligence.

c. Tactical. This is battlefield intelligence or sometimes referred as

combat intelligence. The more detail, the better and applied as quickly as possible.
This type of intelligence is required by unit and formation commanders for
planning and conducting tactical operations and deals would the tactical aspects of
enemy, weather and terrain In addition, BSPP has working link with other
intelligence agencies which are provided at:

(1) Ministry of Home Affairs (Special Branch of Royal

Malaysian Police).

(2) Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(3) Secretariat of NIC.

(4) Secretariat of NSC.

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9. The JFC in this respect shall be responsible for acquiring the necessary intelligence
from BSPP, Army, Navy and Air Intelligence Organisations. To augment his requirement,
BSPP will assist the JFC in liaising with the agencies listed above. Be that as it may,
intelligence operations follow the chain of command and intelligence staff shall be directly
responsible to the JFC. They may, however, liaise directly with BSPP and services
intelligence organisations from time to time.

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

10. The success of military operations have been, too a large extent, dependent on
accurate and timely intelligence. This is achieved through the intelligence staff ‘awareness’
of the intelligence requirements. In joint Force operations, emphasis should be given to the
coordination of all agencies particularly in the collection effort in order to achieve better
intelligence support. It is therefore important for the JIS to fully understand the various
intelligence requirements in order to advise the JFC.

11. The term “intelligence” in joint Force operation embraces basic Strategic, Tactical,
Counter Intelligence, EW intelligence, Technical intelligence, aerial surveillance and
reconnaissance, as well as psyops. The requirement to have intelligence input on these
subjects are essential because besides providing unbiased and accurate information on
external powers (i.e. strategic intelligence ) for the formulation of defense policies and
military plans, intelligence collection efforts should help a commander to determine the
best use of combat power while seeking to reduce the combat efficiency of enemy Force.
Besides that, intelligence requirements are also necessary in order to facilitate the
following:

a. To provide a clear, accurate and timely analysis of the enemy situation and
capabilities to assist the JFC in decision making and the preparation of joint plans.

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b. To recommend Joint Intelligence policy, including signal intelligence

(SIGHT) policy.

c. To provide assistance on intelligence to other Joint Staffs in the preparation

of joint plans and operation orders.

d. To prepare and disseminate intelligence reports and assessments.

ROLES OF JIS

13. The JIS is responsible obtain and fulfill all the intelligence requirements as required
by the JFC for him to plan the operation within his theatre of responsibility. Hence, the
roles of the JIS within the JFHQ are as follows:

a. Provision of joint intelligence to the JFC in order to facilitate planning and

execution of operation.

b. Planning, collecting, processing and dissemination of joint intelligence.

c. Plan the conduct of joint intelligence operation of the purpose of procuring
intelligence.

d. Plan the conduct of counter intelligence.

e. Plan the conduct of EW operation and counter measures.

f. Plan and coordinate surveillance and air reconnaissance.

g. Plan and coordinate pysop.

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FUNCTIONS OF JIS

14. Functions of SOJI. The SOJI in responsible to the JFC through the KS of the
JFHQ for the operation of the JIS. His duties include:

a. Keep the JFC and joint staff officers informed of the enemy situation,
capabilities and probable courses of action.

b. Request intelligence effort to meet the JFC and other joint staff intelligence
requirements.

c. Recommend intelligence policy for the JFC’s approval including the joint
SIGINT plan, joint counter intelligence policy, joint intelligence collection policy,
joint electronic warfare plan, and joint psyops plan.

d. Coordinate preparation and presentation of joint intelligence briefings as

required.

e. Ensure integration of operational intelligence functions of JOC and JIC.

f. Ensure dissemination of intelligence materials.

g. Provide the intelligence for preparation of joint operational orders and

plans.

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h. Carry out any other duties as specified by the JFC or the Ketua Staff.

15. Functions of Cells and Staff

a. Intelligence Cells. The functions of the respective service cells and the
staff are as follows:

(1) Army

(a) To plan, collate, process and disseminate intelligence

requirements for the JF.

(b) To establish liaison with other operational intelligence

agencies responsible for the particular area of operation.

(c) To initiate requests and issue directive on intelligence

matters for the land forces.

(2) Navy

(a) To review intelligence requirements for naval force, landing

force and other forces and to consolidate the same for the JF as a
whole.

(b) To coordinate naval intelligence received and disseminate to

naval/ maritime forces and to major elements of the JF in
accordance with special requirements of each.

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(c) Establish liaison with other operational intelligence agencies

responsible for the particular area of operation.

(d) To initiate requests and directives on intelligence matters for

naval forces.

(e) Coordinate tactical intelligence collection efforts by the

naval units in the area of operation.
(f) Produce and disseminate naval intelligence appreciations and
assist in the planning of the joint intelligence appreciations when
required.

(3) Air Force

(a) Coordination of all in – theatre tactical air reconnaissance

(recce) forces and conduct of air recce operations.

(b) Coordination of air surveillance operations.

(c) Coordination of sea surveillance and maritime collection in

conjunction with the Navy.

(d) Interpretation of aerial photographs and air targeting

materials programmed.

LEVEL OF INTELLIGENCE IN JOINT INTELLIGENCE.

16. General.

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(a) The levels of war, from a doctrinal perspective. Clarify the links between
strategic objectives and tactical actions. Although there are no finite limits or
boundaries between them, the three levels are strategic, operational, and tactical.
They apply to both war and MOOTW.

(b) Levels of command, size of units, types of equipment, or types and

location office or components are not associated with a particular level.
National assets such as intelligence and communications satellites, previously
considered principally in a strategic context, are an important adjunct to tactical
operations. Actions can be defined as strategic, operational, or tactical based on
their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives,
but many times the accuracy of these labels can only be determined during
historical studies. Advances in technology, information age media reporting, and
the compression of time-space relationships contribute to the growing
interrelationships between the levels of war. The levels of war help commanders
visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the
appropriate command. However, commanders at every level must be aware that in
a world of constant, immediate communications, any single event may cut across
the three levels.

17. The Strategic Level.

(a) The strategic level is that level of war at which a nation. Often as a
member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or
coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance and develops and uses national
resources to accomplish these objectives. Strategy is the art and science of
developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in
a synchronized and integrated fashion to secure national or multinational

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objectives. The NCA translate policy into national strategic military objectives.
These military objectives facilitate theater strategic planning. Combatant
commanders usually participate in discussions with the NCA through the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with allies and coalition members. The combatant
command strategy is thus an element that relates to both US national strategy and
operational activities within the theater. Military strategy, derived from policy,
provides a framework for conducting operations.

18. The Operation Level.

(a) The Operational Level Links the Tactical Employment of Forces to

Strategic Objectives. The use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through
the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major
operations, and battles. Operational art determines when, where, and for what
purpose major forces will be employed and should influence the adversary
disposition before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their
commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major
operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

(b) Operatinal Arts Helps Commanders use Resources Efficiently and

Effectively. Fundamentals of Joint Operations achieve strategic objectives. It
provides a framework to assist commanders in ordering their thoughts when
designing campaigns and major operations. Operational art helps commanders
understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle, thus avoiding
unnecessary battles. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected
engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure.
Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and effective joint,
interagency, and multinational cooperation. Operational art is practiced not only by
JFCs but also by their staff officers and subordinate commanders. Joint operational

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art looks not only at the employment of military forces and the threat but also at the
arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. Joint operational art, in
particular, focuses on the fundamental methods and issues associated with the
synchronization and integration of air, land, sea, space, and special operations
forces.

19. The Tactical Level.

(a) Tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered

arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the adversary
in order to use their full potential. An engagement is normally short in duration and
fought between small forces, such as individual aircraft in air-to-air combat.
Engagements include a wide variety of actions between opposing forces in the air,
in space, on and under the sea, or on land. A battle consists of a set of related
engagements. Battles typically last longer; involve larger forces such as fleets,
armies, and air forces; and could affect the course of a campaign.

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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JOINT INTELLIGENCE IN JOINT FORCE

OPERATION AND EXISTING INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION

16. The personnel who form the JIS are normally drawn from the existing relevant
intelligence organisations within the MAF. It is imperative that the JIS in staffed by
personnel drawn from the existing intelligence organisations of all the services because the
link between them is important. The JIS needs a constant support from the existing
intelligence organisation like BSPP and Intelligence directorates of the Army, Navy, and
Air Force, while the latter need the feedback from the JIS. For example, the JIS may not be
able to provide reconnaissance force for a specific task and to fulfill this requirement it has
to request the support of an existing organisation. Similarly, the JIS may find that the threat
has extended beyond the scope of the joint force operation. In this case it may recommend
a separate operation to the relevant intelligence establishment. In other word the JIS does
not exist and operate in isolation from the existing intelligence organisations.

17. Coordination. Previously, should the need arise for such a link between the
JIS and the existing intelligence organisation it has to be through separate lines to all the
services. There is no proper coordinating body which can decide for all the three services
intelligence organisations. To rectify this weakness BSPP had proposed the establishment
of a joint intelligence effort in the three services. The JDIC comprises the following
member:

a. Chairman - CDIS.

b. Members - Dy CDIS.

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Head, DI 2

Director, Army Int

Director, Naval Int

Director, Air Int

c. In Attendance - Head MISB.

Other relevant intelligence officer as
required.

d. Secretariat - Policy and Plans, BSPP.

18. Functions. The functions of the committee are:

a. Determine priorities in defence intelligence requirements.

b. Coordinate all defence intelligence activities.

c. Effect intelligence exchanges among the services intelligence agencies as

well as with other agencies at national and international levels.

d. Formulate policies concerning manpower, equipment, logistic support,

training and electronic warfare requirement for intelligence operations.

e. Prepare defense intelligence and threat papers from time to time.

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CONCLUSION

19. The organisation and role of JIS in Joint Warfare calls for a closely coordinated
effort among the three services. The capability of BSPP alone to provide intelligence
support to all the three services, particularly in a Joint Force Operation, has been found to
be inadequate. This has been apparent through the various Joint Exercises held so far. In
addition, it is assessed that the current threat requires a more integrated in handling
intelligence activities. The existing intelligence organisation is the MAF here been
developed to meet this requirement.

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Bibliography:

1. The New Joint Warfare by Frederick R. Strain.

2. Handel, M. (ed), (1990) Intelligence in Military Operations, Oxon (Frank Cass).

3. Stone, J. (2011), Military Strategy – The Politics and Technique of War, London/New
York (Continuum)

4. Https://www.iwp.edu/programs/course/military-intelligence-and-modern-warfare.

5. Https://www.military1.com/military-career/article/1637250014-how-important-is-timely-
accurate-intelligence-to-modern-warfare/

6. Https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_intelligence.

7. Https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modern_warfare.

8. Http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/concepts_intelligence_in_war.html.

9. Https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/90854/intelligence-in-war-by-john-
keegan/9780375700460/.

10. Https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/int006.html.

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