ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner, vs. LUCITA G. ONG, respondent.

G.R. No. 153206 • October 23, 2006 • FIRST DIVISION • AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

DOCTRINE: The argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree
of legal separation should not be granted is without merit, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the
Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have
given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was established that
Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment
contemplated by the said provision.

FACTS:

Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were married on
July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin Church in Manila. They have three children: Kingston,
Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of majority.

On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the
Family Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41 alleging that her
life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive
conduct. RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC
Decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of abandonment thus the petition for legal separation should
be denied.

RULING:

The argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation
should not be granted is without merit, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides
that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation.
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for
more than one year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such
does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010 MARIO SIOCHI, Petitioner, vs. ALFREDO GOZON, et al.,
Respondents. G.R. No. 169977 INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., Petitioner, vs. MARIO
SIOCHI, ELVIRA GOZON, et al., Respondents. CARPIO, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Under Article 63 (2) of the Family Code, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall
be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net
profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in
accordance with the provisions of article

Facts:

Elvira Gozon filed with the RTC Cavite a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo
Gozon.

Then, while the pending case of Legal Separation of both parties, Alfredo and Mario entered into
Agreement of Buy and Sell involving their conjugal property for the price of 18 million pesos. Mario
pays the partial payment of the said price and he took the possession of the property.

When the Court granted the legal separation of Elvira and Mario, their property was dissolved and
liquidated. Being the offending spouse, Alfredo is deprived of his share in the net profits and the
same is awarded to their child Winifred R. Gozon whose custody is awarded to Elvira.

On Oct, 26, 1994 Alfredo sold that property into Inter Dimensional Realty Inc. for 18 million pesos
in his favor by Winnifred. And the IDRI paid it in full payment.

Because of that Mario, filed a complaint with RTC Malabon for specific performance and
damages, annulment of donation and sale, with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction
and/or temporary restraining order.

The Court held, the agreement between Alfredo and IDRI is null and void for their attempt of
commission or continuance of their wrongful acts, further alienating or disposing of the subject
property. Also the agreement of Alfredo and Mario is null and void, for the absence of written
consent of Elvira Gozon for her property rights to the undivided one-half share in the conjugal
property of this case.

Issue:
Whether or not the offending spouse, Alfredo Gozon has right to sell their conjugal partnership
without the consent of the other spouse, and share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership.

Held:

No,

The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion
of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse
actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouse’s written consent
to the sale is still required by law for its validity. And the offending spouse in an action for legal
separation is deprived of his share in the net profits of the conjugal properties.

Under Article 63 (2) of the Family Code, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall
be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net
profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in
accordance with the provisions of article

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions. We AFFIRM the 7 July 2005 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74447 with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) We DELETE the portions regarding the forfeiture of Alfredo Gozon's one-half undivided share
in favor of Winifred Gozon and the grant of option to Winifred Gozon whether or not to dispose of
her undivided share in the property; and

(2) We ORDER Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon to pay Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. jointly
and severally the Eighteen Million Pesos (P18,000,000) which was the amount paid by Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc. for the property, with legal interest computed from the finality of this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO v. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, GR No. 139789, 2000-05-12

DOCTRINE:

May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal
bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not
be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas... corpus.

"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce
the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his capture
and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or judge... awarding the writ
shall consider in that behalf."

It is issued when one is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising... legal
custody over another person.
Facts:

The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio[6] is to reverse the decision[7] of the Court of Appeals and its
resolution[8] dismissing the application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband,
lawyer

Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce consortium as the wife.

***

Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.

Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions
of pesos. Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a
period of thirty (30) years.

they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta
Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in

Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other
hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.

Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children

*... upon Potenciano's arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5)
months in Antipolo City.

The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano
an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg

Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a consequence,
Potenciano's health deteriorated.

*... after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to
Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati.

PETITION

Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio.
She alleged that respondents[11] refused petitioner's demands to see and visit her husband and
prohibited

Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.

CA... the Court of Appeals... to allow visitation rights to Potenciano Ilusorio's wife, Erlinda Ilusorio
and all her children, notwithstanding any list limiting visitors thereof, under penalty of contempt in
case of violation of refusal thereof; xxx

"(2) ORDERING that the writ of habeas corpus previously issued be recalled and the herein
petition for habeas corpus be DENIED

Issues:

W/N a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal
bliss

Ruling:

NO. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the
extra-ordinary writ of habeas... corpus. a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention,[13] or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one
entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully... denied of one or more
of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not
merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has
later become arbitrary.[14] It is... devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.

The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.

To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action.[17] The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective,
not merely nominal or moral.

HERE

The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio's liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily... render
him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but
on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.

After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful restraint on his
liberty.

Potenciano Ilusorio did not request the administrator of the Cleveland Condominium not to allow
his wife and other children from seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not object to
seeing them.

Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the
crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices
he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which... exclusively
belong to Potenciano.

With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the
subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to
privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional... right.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we DENY Erlinda's motion for reconsideration. At any rate, the case has
been rendered moot by the death of subject.

SO ORDERED.
NANCY GO AND ALEX GO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 114791 May 29, 1997

DOCTRINE:

Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the Family Code), the wife may exercise any
profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In the instant
case, we are convinced that it was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the contract with
private respondent. Consequently, we rule that she is solely liable to private respondents for the
damages awarded below, pursuant to the principle that contracts produce effect only as between
the parties who execute them.

FACTS: Private respondents, spouses Hermogenes and Jane Ong, were married on June 7,
1981, in Dumaguete City. The video coverage of the wedding was provided by petitioners at a
contract price of P1,650.00. Three times thereafter, the newlyweds tried to claim the video tape
of their wedding, which they planned to show to their relatives in the United States where they
were to spend their honeymoon, and thrice they failed because the tape was apparently not yet
processed. The parties then agreed that the tape would be ready upon private respondents’
return.

When private respondents came home from their honeymoon, however, they found out that the
tape had been erased by petitioners and therefore, could no longer be delivered.

Furious at the loss of the tape which was supposed to be the only record of their wedding, private
respondents filed on September 23, 1981 a complaint for specific performance and damages
against petitioners, which was granted by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nancy and Alex Go should be held liable for the damages sought

RULING: Yes. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, it is contrary to human nature for
any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their wedding; the fact that private
respondents filed a case against petitioners belies such assertion. Clearly, petitioners are guilty
of actionable delay for having failed to process the video tape. Considering that private
respondents were about to leave for the United States, they took care to inform petitioners that
they would just claim the tape upon their return two months later. Thus, the erasure of the tape
after the lapse of thirty days was unjustified.
In this regard, Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that “those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who is any manner contravene the
tenor thereof, are liable for damages.”

In the instant case, petitioners and private respondents entered into a contract whereby, for a fee,
the former undertook to cover the latter’s wedding and deliver to them a video copy of said event.
For whatever reason, petitioners failed to provide private respondents with their tape. Clearly,
petitioners are guilty of contravening their obligation to said private respondents and are thus
liable for damages.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated September 14, 1993 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner Alex Go is absolved from any liability to private respondents and
that petitioner Nancy Go is solely liable to said private respondents for the judgment award. Costs
against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO v. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY

OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

(G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010)

Case Doctrines:

● A married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to use her husband’s surname upon
marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name because when a
woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status.
● Once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not
revert to the use of her maiden name, except in cases of: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3)
annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage.

● The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the

passport applicant’s constitutional right to travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect
and maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport and travel documents proceeding from it
as a Philippine passport remains at all times the property of the Government. The holder is merely
a possessor of the passport as long as it is valid.

Facts:

Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine

passport was then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco R.
Rallonza, the following entries appear in her passport: Rallonza as her surname, Maria Virginia
as her given name, and Remo as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her
passport, petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert
to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport.

Petitioner’s request having been denied.

Petitioner’s counsel wrote then Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siason expressing a
similar request.

The DFA, through Assistant Secretary Belen F. Anota, denied the request, stating thus:
 This Office is cognizant of the provision in the law that it is not obligatory for a married
woman to use her husband’s name. Use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only
if the married name has not been used in previous application. The Implementing Rules and
Regulations for Philippine Passport Act of 1996 clearly defines the conditions when a woman
applicant may revert to her maiden name, that is, only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce
and death of the husband. Ms. Remo’s case does not meet any of these conditions.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

Petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President.

The Office of the President dismissed the appeal and ruled that Section 5(d) of Republic
Act No. 8239 (RA 8239) or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996offers no leeway for any other
interpretation than that only in case of divorce, annulment, or declaration [of nullity] of marriage
may a married woman revert to her maiden name for passport purposes.

The Office of the President further held that in case of conflict between a general and special law,
the latter will control the former regardless of the respective dates of passage. Since the Civil
Code is a general law, it should yield to RA 8239.

The Office of the President denied the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the Office of the
President.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution.
 The Court of Appeals found no conflict between Article 370 of the Civil Code[9] and Section
5(d) of RA 8239.[10] The Court of Appeals held that for passport application and issuance
purposes, RA 8239 limits the instances when a married woman applicant may exercise the option
to revert to the use of her maiden name such as in a case of a divorce decree, annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage. Since there was no showing that petitioner's marriage to
Francisco Rallonza has been annulled, declared void or a divorce decree has been granted to
them, petitioner cannot simply revert to her maiden name in the replacement passport after she
had adopted her husband’s surname in her old passport.Hence, according to the Court of
Appeals, respondent was justified in refusing the request of petitioner to revert to her maiden
name in the replacement passport.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport, can
revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her
marriage.

Held:

No. The Court held that the petition lacks merit.The Court cited Title XIII of the Civil Code
governs the use of surnames. In the case of a married woman, Article 370 of the Civil Code
provides:

ART. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND SURNAME AND ADD HER HUSBANDS SURNAME, OR

(2) HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND HER HUSBAND'S SURNAME, OR

(3) HER HUSBANDS FULL NAME, BUT PREFIXING A WORD INDICATING THAT SHE IS HIS
WIFE, SUCH AS MRS.

The Court agreed with the petitioner that the use of the word may in the provision indicates that
the use of the husbands surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. This has been
settled in the case of Yasin v. Honorable Judge Sharia District Court.
In Yasin,petitioner therein filed with the Sharia District Court a Petition to resume the use of
maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to another woman. In
ruling in favor of petitioner therein, the Court explained that:

Clearly, a married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in
any of the ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code.[13] She is therefore allowed to use not
only any of the three names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She
is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a
woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. Further, this
interpretation is in consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, argues
that the highlighted proviso in Section 5(d) of RA 8239 limits the instances when a married woman
may be allowed to revert to the use of her maiden name in her passport. These instances are
death of husband, divorce decree, annulment or nullity of marriage. Significantly, Section 1, Article
12 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8239 provides:

The passport can be amended only in the following cases:

A) AMENDMENT OF WOMANS NAME DUE TO MARRIAGE;

B) AMENDMENT OF WOMANS NAME DUE TO DEATH OF SPOUSE, ANNULMENT OF

MARRIAGE OR DIVORCE INITIATED BY A FOREIGN SPOUSE; OR

C) CHANGE OF SURNAME OF A CHILD WHO IS LEGITIMATED BY VIRTUE OF A

SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE OF HIS PARENTS.

Since petitioners marriage to her husband subsists, placing her case outside of the purview of
Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (as to the instances when a married woman may revert to the use of her
maiden name), she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport.

In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s surname or
continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband’s surname in her new
passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage
certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The
DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.
The Court notes that petitioner would not have encountered any problems in the replacement
passport had she opted to continuously and consistently use her maiden name from the moment
she was married and from the time she first applied for a Philippine passport. However, petitioner
consciously chose to use her husband’s surname before, in her previous passport application,
and now desires to resume her maiden name. If we allow petitioners present request, definitely
nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use of her husband’s
surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport, which is considered
superior to all other official documents, cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and
inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise. Thus, for passport issuance purposes,
a married woman, such as petitioner, whose marriage subsists, may not change her family name
at will.

THE ACQUISITION OF A PHILIPPINE PASSPORT IS A PRIVILEGE.

THE LAW RECOGNIZES THE PASSPORT APPLICANTS CONSTITUTIONAL

WHEREFORE, the Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals.
ALAIN M. DIÑO v. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, GR No. 178044, 2011-01-19

DOCTRINE:

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;

They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and

Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and
45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does... not apply to marriages which
are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

Facts:

Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent)... started living together in 1984
until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together
again. On 14 January 1998, they were... married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.

On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of
the petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons,
respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary period.

Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with
petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also
learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V.

Alcantara.

Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report
establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was
deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that
respondent's... disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent
was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.

trial court ruled that

A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition

and distribution of the parties' properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

Issues:

whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall
only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties' properties under Article
147 of the Family Code.

Ruling:

Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void,... such
as petitioner and respondent in the case before the

Court.

Article 147 of the Family Code provides:

Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the... property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in... the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith
in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or
waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant... share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;

They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and

Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.

We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties' properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because

Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the
Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:

Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein
that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as... implemented under the Rule on
Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and
45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does... not apply to marriages which
are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage
was contracted. Under Article 40, "[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous...
marriage void.
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages
which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for
annulment.

In both instances under Articles 40 and 45,... the marriages are governed either by absolute
community of property... or conjugal partnership of gains... unless the parties agree to a complete
separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage

Since... the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or
conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties
before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of... marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on
co-ownership.

In this case, petitioner's marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36... of the Family
Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in
common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on... co-ownership.

In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period
of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.

The rules on co-ownership apply and the... properties of the spouses should be liquidated in
accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership.

Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties
or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate the... properties of the spouses
in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the
decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision
without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article
147 of the Family Code.

SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST: Pana v. Heirs of Juanite | G.R. No. 164201 | December 10, 2012

DOCTRINE:

According to Article 122 of the Family Code, personal debts contracted by either the husband or
wife before or during the marriage cannot be charged to the conjugal properties partnership,
unless they benefited the family.

FACTS: The petitioner, Efren Pana, along with his wife Melecia and others, were charged with
murder. Efren was acquitted, but Melecia and another individual were found guilty and were
sentenced to death and ordered to pay civil indemnity and damages to the heirs of the victims.

In response to the motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the
issuance of a writ, which led to the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and
Melecia. This was followed by the issuance of a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution.

Efren and Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, arguing that the levied properties
were conjugal assets and not paraphernal assets of Melecia.

ISSUE: The main question at hand is whether the conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia can
be levied and executed for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case.

RULING: According to Article 122 of the Family Code, personal debts contracted by either the
husband or wife before or during the marriage cannot be charged to the conjugal properties
partnership, unless they benefited the family. This also applies to fines and pecuniary indemnities
imposed upon them, unless the spouse who is bound has no exclusive property or if their
exclusive property is insufficient.

Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive property, the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after
the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 77198 dated January 29, 2004 and May 14, 2004. The Regional Trial
Court of Surigao City, Branch 30, shall first ascertain that, in enforcing the writ of execution on the
conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia Pana for the satisfaction of the indemnities
imposed by final judgment on the latter accused in Criminal Cases 4232 and 4233, the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO A. S. VALDES v. RTC, GR No. 122749, 1996-07-31

DOCTRINE:

It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41[15] and 42,[16] of the
Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not
to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand,
between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between
common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the
ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family
Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the
provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter
2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.

Facts:

Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the
marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of
nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code (docketed Civil Case No.

Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After hearing the parties following
the joinder of issues, the trial court,[1] in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition; viz:

Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with
Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no
provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without... marriage."
Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their
desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes, herein petitioner.

In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court
said:

"Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent
as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
"The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article 102
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute community of... property."[4]

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 October 1995.

In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code
should be held controlling

The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family

Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in
previous cases

Issues:

Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition
of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage
declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.

Ruling:

The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family

Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in
previous cases;

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common
property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction
to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to... resolve
incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner
and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as
well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the... property owned in common by
them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation
to Articles 102 and 129,[12] of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern
the liquidation of either the... absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the
property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract
is annulled ),are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law
spouses. The first... paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2 ),(3 ),(4)
and (5) of Article 43,[13] relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally,
to void marriages under Article 40[14] of the Code,... i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent
marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared
void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that
void marriages are inexistent... from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final
judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any
continuing... uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the
provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41[15] and 42,[16] of the Family Code, on the effects
of the termination of a subsequent marriage... contracted during the subsistence of a previous
marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the
law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in
valid and voidable marriages (before... annulment) and, on the other, between common-law
spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on
co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be
stressed, nevertheless, even as... it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the
Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family
Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.

WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court
are AFFIRMED. No costs.
VIRGINIA OCAMPO v. DEOGRACIO OCAMPO, GR No. 198908, 2015-08-03

DOCTRINE:

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not... participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.

Facts:

September 10, 1990, petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of her Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo (Deogracio) before Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 87, on the ground of psychological incapacity

January 22, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision[4] declaring the marriage between Virginia
and Deogracio as null and void

March 31, 1999, the trial court directed the parties to submit a project of partition of their
inventoried properties, and if they failed to do so, a hearing will be held on the factual issues with
regard to said properties. Having failed to agree on a project of partition of... their conjugal
properties, hearing ensued where the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective
stand.

January 13, 2004, the trial court rendered the assailed Order[6] stating that the properties
declared by the parties belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.

Issues:

whether respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of gains by reason
of bad faith and psychological perversity.

Ruling:

While Virginia and Deogracio tied the marital knot on January 16, 1978, it is still the Family Code
provisions on conjugal partnerships, however, which will govern the property relations between
Deogracio and Virginia even if they were married before the effectivity of the
Family Code.

Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal
partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties... are
acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. Hence, the burden of
proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal.

Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties... are acquired during the marriage, the
presumption is that they are conjugal.

The applicable law, however, in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and
liability is concerned, is Article 129[8] of the Family Code in relation to Article 147 of the Family
Code.[9]

The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article 36[10] of the Family
Code, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family

Code.[11] Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void,
as in this case.

Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the... property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage.

Thus, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held that the parties will share on equal
shares considering that Virginia failed to prove that the properties were acquired solely on her
own efforts

All properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the
properties are registered, are presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise.
Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption remains even if the property is "registered in
the name of one or both of the spouses."

Thus, the failure of Virginia to rebut this presumption, said properties were obtained by the
spouses' joint efforts

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 11, 2010 and the Resolution
dated October 5, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82318 are AFFIRMED. The
case is REMANDED to the trial court for proper disposition.
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner,
vs.
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by
their mother RITA QUIAO, Respondents.

G.R. No 176556 July 4, 2012

REYES, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the
Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be
returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate
property which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.

Facts:

Petitioner Brigido Quiao was married to respondent Rita Quiao in 1977 and got four children. They
had no separate properties prior to their marriage.

In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting with another
woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the legal separation of the
parties pursuant to Article 55, thereby awarding the custody of their three minor children in favor
of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.

The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject to the
respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigido’s share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par. 9 of Article
129 of the Family Code.

A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the trial court. By
2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.

After more than nine months, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to define “Nets
Profits Earned.” In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes “the remainder of the properties
of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.”
Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that net profit
earned shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code. However,
it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.

Issue:

Whether or not the offending spouse acquired vested rights over ½ of the properties in the
conjugal partnership.

Held:

In the case at bar, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no
separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them.

The listed properties are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what
remains in the listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their
respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from
the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to
Article 63(2) of the Family Code.

So, as not to be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the
guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may
be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of
Butuan City is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the Regional
Trial Court, the Order dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby CLARIFIED in
accordance with the above discussions.

SO ORDERED.
DOLORES ALEJO v. SPS. ERNESTO CORTEZ AND PRISCILLA SAN PEDRO, GR No. 206114,
2017-06-19

DOCTRINE:

Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong
to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties,
the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void.

Facts:

parcel of land

Pulilan, Bulacan

The property belonged to the conjugal property/absolute community of property[7] of the

respondent Spouses Jorge and Jacinta Leonardo (Spouses Leonardo) and upon which their
residential house was built.

sometime in March 1996, Jorge's father, Ricardo, approached his sister, herein petitioner Dolores
Alejo... negotiate the sale of the subject property.

Jacinta executed a Kasunduan with Dolores for the sale of the property for a purchase price of
PhP500,000. Under the Kasunduan, Dolores was to pay PhP70,000 as down payment, while
PhP230,000 is to be paid on April 30, 1996 and the remaining balance of PhP200,000 was to be
paid before the end of the year 1996.[9] The Kasunduan was signed by Jacinta and Ricardo as
witness. Jorge, however, did not sign the agreement.

down payment of PhP70,000 and the PhP230,000 were paid by Dolores... thereafter, Dolores
was allowed to possess the property and introduce improvements thereon.
However, on July 3, 1996, Jorge wrote a letter to Dolores denying knowledge and consent to the
Kasunduan. Jorge further informed Dolores that Jacinta was retracting her consent to the
Kasunduan due to Dolores' failure to comply with her obligations.

another letter... demanding that the latter pay the balance of PhP200,000 on or before October 5,
1996, otherwise the purchase price shall be increased to PhP700,000.

As a result, Jorge went to her house, destroyed its water pump and disconnected the electricity.
Before the officials of the Barangay, Dolores tendered the balance of PhP200,000 but Jorge
refused to accept the same. Instead, Jorge filed cases for ejectment[13] and annulment of sale,
reconveyance and recovery of possession[14] against her.[15] These cases were later on
dismissed by the trial court on technical grounds.

during the pendency of said cases, the subject property was sold by Jorge and Jacinta to
respondents Spouses Ernesto Cortez and Priscilla San Pedro (Spouses Cortez) under a Deed of
Absolute Sale... new transfer certificate of title was issued in the latter's names.

At the time of said sale, Dolores was in possession of the subject property.[16]

Dolores filed the case a quo for annulment of deed of sale and damages against the Spouses
Cortez and the Spouses Leonardo.

the RTC noted

Jorge... acts reveal that he later on acquiesced and accepted the same.

Jorge did not seasonably and expressly repudiate the Kasunduan but instead demanded from
Dolores compliance therewith and that he allowed Dolores to take possession of the property...
the case for annulment of sale, reconveyance and recovery of possession filed by Jorge...
dismissed... res judicata set in preventing Jorge from further assailing the Kasunduan.

Kasunduan as a perfected contract and Dolores as the rightful owner of the property.

The CA granted the appeal.

Jorge, by imposing a new period within which Dolores was to pay the remaining balance and by
increasing the purchase price, only qualifiedly accepted the Kasunduan.

the same partakes of a counter-offer and is a rejection of the original offer.

Kasunduan as void absent Jorge's consent and acceptance.

Dolores to be a possessor in good faith who is entitled to reimbursement for the useful
improvements introduced on the land or to the increase in the value thereof, at the option of the
Spouses Leonardo

Issues:

Dolores maintains that the Kasunduan is a perfected and binding contract as it was accepted by
Jorge through his overt acts.

the dismissal of Jorge's complaint for annulment of sale constitutes res judicata thus preventing
Jorge from further questioning the validity of the Kasunduan.

she contends that the Spouses Cortez were not buyers in good faith as they knew that the
property was being occupied by other persons.

The CA Correctly Ruled that Dolores is a Possessor in Good Faith

Ruling:

Sale by one Spouse of Conjugal Real Property is Void Without the Written Consent of the other
Spouse. The disposition of conjugal property of one spouse sans the written consent of the other
is void. Here, it is an established fact that the Kasunduan was entered into solely by Jacinta and
signed by her alone. By plain terms of the law therefore, the Kasunduan is void.

We agree... that the void Kasunduan constitutes a continuing offer from Jacinta and Dolores and
that Jorge had the option of either accepting or rejecting the offer before it was withdrawn by
either, or both, Jacinta and Dolores.

after the execution of the Kasunduan, Jorge sent two letters to Dolores: one, informing her that
he did not consent to the sale; and the other, demanding that Dolores pay the balance of the
purchase price on or before October 5, 1996 and failing which, the purchase price shall be
increased to PhP700,000.

Jorge's first letter was an outright and express repudiation of the Kasunduan. The second letter,
while ostensibly a demand for compliance with Dolores' obligation under the Kasunduan, varied
its terms on material points, i.e., the date of payment of the balance and the purchase price.
Consequently, such counter-offer cannot be construed as evidencing Jorge's consent to or
acceptance of the Kasunduan for it is settled that where the other spouse's putative consent to
the sale of the conjugal property appears in a separate document which does not contain the
same terms and conditions as in the first document signed by the other spouse, a valid transaction
could not have arisen.

Neither can Jorge's subsequent letters to Dolores be treated as a ratification of the Kasunduan
for the basic reason that a void contract is not susceptible to ratification. Nor can Jorge's alleged
participation in the negotiation for the sale of the property or his acquiescence to Dolores' transfer
to and possession of the subject property be treated as converting such continuing offer into a
binding contract as the law distinctly requires nothing less than a written consent to the sale for
its validity. Suffice to say that participation in or awareness of the negotiations is not consent.

Dolores acted in good faith in entering the subject property and building improvements on it.
Ricardo represented that Jacinta and Jorge wanted to sell the subject property. Dolores had no
reason to believe that Ricardo and Jacinta were lying. Indeed, upon her own brother's prodding,
Dolores willingly parted with her money and paid the down payment on the selling price and later,
a portion of the remaining balance. The signatures of Jacinta and of Ricardo (as witness) as well
as her successful entry to the property appear to have comforted Dolores that everything was in
order. Article 526 of the Civil Code provides that she is deemed a possessor in good faith, who is
not aware that there exists in her title or mode of acquisition any flaw that invalidates it.

Dolores, as possessor in good faith, is under no obligation to pay for her stay on the property prior
to its legal interruption by a final judgment. She is further entitled under Article 448 to indemnity
for the improvements introduced on the property with a right of retention until reimbursement is
made. The Spouses Leonardo have the option under Article 546 of the Civil Code of indemnifying
Dolores for the cost of the improvements or paying the increase in value which the property may
have acquired by reason of such improvements.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 3, 2012 and Resolution
dated February 26, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 95432 which (1) declared
void the Kasunduan dated 29 March 1996; (2) declared valid the title issued in the names of
Spouses Cortez and San Pedro; (3) ordered the reimbursement of PhP300,000 with legal interest
to Dolores Alejo; (3) ordered the Spouses

Leonardo, at their option, to indemnify Dolores Alejo of her expenses on the useful improvements
or pay the increase in value on the subject property, with retention rights until indemnity is made;
and (4) remanded the case to the RTC for purposes of receiving evidence and determining the
amount of said indemnity are AFFIRMED in toto.SO ORDERED.
UY v. ESTATE OF FERNANDEZ G.R. No. 200612, April 05, 2017 Barangay Conciliation, Unlawful
Detainer

DOCTRINE:

Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

FACTS:

A contract of lease was executed between Vipa Fernandez and Rafael Uy over a parcel of land
for the amount of P3,000.00 per month, with a provision for a 10% increase every year thereafter.

Vipa died and Grace Joy, Vipa’s daughter, became the de facto administrator of the estate of Vipa.

In June 1998, Rafael Uy stopped paying the monthly rents.

A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against Rafael. The Estate of Vipa claimed that despite
repeated demands, Rafael refused to pay the rents due.

Judgment was rendered by the MTCC in favor of the Estate of Vipa and against Rafael.

On appeal, the RTC, in its Decision, reversed the MTCC’s Decision and, thus, dismissed the
complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the Estate of Vipa.

The RTC opined that Grace Joy was actually the plaintiff in the case and not the Estate of Vipa.
It then pointed out that Grace Joy failed to bring the dispute to the barangay for conciliation prior
to filing the complaint for unlawful detainer.

The Estate of Vipa then filed a Petition for Review with the CA.

The CA granted the petition and Reversed the RTC decision. The subsequent MR was denied.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether there was lack of barangay conciliation prior to filing of the complaint for unlawful detainer
with the MTCC.
RULING:

Unlawful detainer cases are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. Section 5 of the 1991
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure provides that affirmative and negative defenses not
pleaded in the answer shall be deemed waived, except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

There was no need to refer the dispute between the parties herein to the barangay for conciliation
pursuant to the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. It bears stressing that only individuals may be
parties to barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents. Complaints
by or against corporations, partnerships or other juridical entities may not be filed with, received
or acted upon by the barangay for conciliation. The Estate of Vipa, which is the complainant below,
is a juridical entity that has a personality, which is separate and distinct from that of Grace Joy.
Thus, there is no necessity to bring the dispute to the barangay for conciliation prior to filing of the
complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTCC.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition for review

on certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated November 26, 2010 and Resolution
dated January 24, 2012 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04481 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rafael C. Uy is hereby directed to pay the Estate
of Vipa Fernandez the following:

1. The amount of P271,150.00, representing the unpaid rentals, with interest at the rates of
twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of the last demand on May 3, 2003 until
June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid;

2. Reasonable rent for the use and occupancy of the subject property from May 2003 until
December 28, 2005 at the rate of P3,000.00 per month with interest at the rates of twelve
percent (12%) per annum from the date of the last demand, i.e., the filing of the complaint
for unlawful detainer on June 12, 2003, until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per
annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid; and

3. The amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees.

ESTRELLA ABID-BABANO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 201176, 28 August 2019.

DOCTRINE:

“The requirement under Republic Act No. 6713 and similar laws that the sworn statement of
assets, liabilities, and net worth (SALN) to be filed by every government official must include
assets, liabilities, and net worth of the spouse of the filer is construed not to include the assets,
liabilities, and net worth of spouses whose property regime during the marriage is by law or by
agreement prior to the marriage one of complete separation of property.”

FACTS:

The requirement under Republic Act No. 6713[1] and similar laws that the sworn statement of
assets, liabilities, and net worth (SALN) to be filed by every government official must include
assets, liabilities, and net worth of the spouse of the filer is construed not to include the assets,
liabilities, and net worth of spouses whose property regime during the marriage is by law or by
agreement prior to the marriage one of complete separation of property

Petitioner appeals the adverse decision promulgated on October 21, 2011,[2] whereby the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the Office of the President (OP) finding her guilty of
simple neglect of duty for her failure to disclose in her SALN certain motor vehicles belonging to
her husband, himself a public servant required to file his own SALN

Issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE NON-INCLUSION BY PETITIONER IN HER SALN OF THE VEHICLES

OWNED BY AND REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF HER HUSBAND IS CORRECT OR A
NEGLECT OF DUTY OR A MISTAKE IN GOOD FAITH.

Ruling:

The appeal is meritorious

We cannot subscribe to the simplistic view adopted by CA and the OP that the legal implications
of such marriage property regimes should be disregarded because Republic Act No. 3019 and
Republic Act No. 6713 are silent on the effect of marriage property regimes on the SALN
disclosure requirement. The view completely ignores the spirit animating the enactment of the
statutory requirement. That is impermissible under any just and democratic society. Indeed, in the
application of the letter of the law, which is usually hard or harsh, the spirit must not be ignored,
for that is the law of the statute.

WHEREFORE, the Court (a) GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; (b) REVERSES and
SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on October 21, 2011 and the resolution promulgated on
February 24, 2012 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02163; and (c) DISMISSES the
administrative charge against petitioner, without pronouncement on costs of suit.
JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO AND HUSBAND DR. GERARD C. SALGADO, Petitioners,
vs.
LUIS G. ANSON, Respondent.

G.R. No. 204494

July 27, 2016

DOCTRINE:

Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in
conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no longer
be necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made
shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony.

FACTS:

Luis Anson filed a Complaint against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado and Gerard Salgado (Spouses
Salgado) seeking the annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale and the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis.

Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina de Asis-Anson.
They were married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of their
marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965 while Jo-Ann
is Severina’s daughter from a previous relationship.

During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties, because there was
no marriage settlement between him and Severina, the above-listed properties pertain to their
conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three separate
Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring the properties in favor of Jo-Ann, who secured new
certificates of title over the said properties.10 When Severina died Maria Luisa executed a Deed
of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis adjudicating herself as
Severina’s sole heir. She secured new TCTs over the properties.

Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the
conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina. The Spouses in
defense raised the nullity of the marriage which took effect prior the effectively of the family code
for lack of marriage license.
RTC and CA rendered its Decision in favor of Luis.

ISSUE:

Is the marriage celebrated prior the effectivity of the FC valid in the absence of marriage license?

HELD:

No. A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no marriage
license number was indicated therein. It also appears therein that no marriage license was
exhibited to the solemnizing officer with Article 77 of Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code) being cited
as the reason therefor.

The reference to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract is not dismissible. Being a
public document, the marriage contract is not only a prima facie proof of marriage, but is also a
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

Consequently, the entries made in Luis and Severina’s marriage contract are prima facie proof
that at the time of their marriage, no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer for
the reason that their marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code.

The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifying
a marriage which was solemnized civilly. In the eyes of the law, the marriage already exists; the
subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to conform to religious practices. Thus, the parties
are exempted from complying with the required issuance of marriage license insofar as the
subsequent religious ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua
non that: (1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in
accordance with law (civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.

Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and Severina were not married to each
other prior to the civil ceremony officiated on December 28, 1966 – the only date of marriage
appearing on the records.

Being that the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only marriage ceremony between
the parties and this was not solemnized pursuant to any ratifying religious rite, practice or
regulation but a civil one officiated by the mayor, this marriage does not fall under the purview of
Article 77 of the Civil Code. It is evident that the twin requirements of the provision, which are:
prior civil marriage between the parties and a ratifying religious ceremony, were not complied with.
There is no prior ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage is not of an exceptional character and a
marriage license is required for Luis and Severina’s marriage to be valid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 6, 2012 and the Resolution
dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 69611
is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
ANTIPOLO INING v. LEONARDO R. VEGA, GR No. 174727, 2013-08-12

DOCTRINE:

One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot
become a co-owner of the decedent's property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of
the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the... decedent's heirs.

Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the
other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may
prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the... co-owner has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2)
such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the
evidence thereof is clear and convincing.

Facts:

Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a... parcel of land
(subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (24071) RO-630[5]
(OCT RO-630).

Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining
(Gregoria), who are now both deceased.

Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein respondent
Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife
Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard
Vega, the... substituted respondents.

Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children: petitioners Natividad Ining-Ibea
(Natividad), Dolores Ining-Rimon (Dolores), Antipolo, and Pedro; Jose; and Amando. Natividad is
survived by Edilberto Ibea, Josefa Ibea, Martha Ibea, Carmen Ibea, Amparo

Ibea-Fernandez, Henry Ruiz and Pastor Ruiz. Dolores is survived by Jesus Rimon, Cesaria
Rimon Gonzales and Remedios Rimon Cordero. Antipolo is survived by Manuel Villanueva,
daughter Teodora Villanueva-Francisco (Teodora), Camilo Francisco (Camilo), Adolfo Francisco
(Adolfo),... Lucimo Francisco, Jr. (Lucimo Jr.), Milagros Francisco, Celedonio Francisco, and
Herminigildo Francisco (Herminigildo). Pedro is survived by his wife, Elisa Tan Ining and Pedro
Ining, Jr. Amando died without issue. As for Jose, it is not clear from the records if he was made...
party to the proceedings, or if he is alive at all.

In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera
(Tajonera), are Gregoria's grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregoria's heirs).

acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romana's surviving heir,
Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan... recovery of ownership and
possession, with... damages, against Gregoria's heirs.

Leonardo alleged that on several occasions, he demanded the partition of the property but
Gregoria's heirs refused to heed his demands... that portions of the property were sold to
Tresvalles and Tajonera, which portions must be collated and included as part of the... portion to
be awarded to Gregoria's heirs

Leonardo thus prayed that he be declared the owner of half of the subject property;... that the
same be partitioned after collation and determination of the portion to which he is entitled; that
Gregoria's heirs be ordered to execute the necessary documents or agreements

Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo claimed that Leonardo had no cause of
action against them; that they have become the sole owners of the subject property through
Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in... good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in
turn acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact; that they were in
continuous, actual, adverse, notorious and exclusive possession of the property with a just title;
that they have been paying the... taxes on the property; that Leonardo's claim is barred by
estoppel and laches

As agreed during pre-trial, the trial court commissioned Geodetic Engineer Rafael M. Escabarte
to identify the metes and bounds of the property.

the trial court rendered a Decision

Dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs' right of action has long prescribed under
Article 1141 of the New Civil Code;

Declaring Lot 1786... to be the common property of the heirs of Gregoria Roldan Ining and by
virtue whereof, OCT No. RO-630 (24071) is ordered cancelled and the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Aklan is directed to issue a transfer certificate... of title to the heirs of Natividad Ining,
one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Dolores Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Antipolo Ining, one-
fourth (1/4) share; and Heirs of Pedro Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share.

trial court found... deeds of sale to be spurious. It concluded that Leon never sold the property to
Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property
remained part of Leon's estate at the... time of his death in 1962. Leon's siblings, Romana and
Gregoria, thus inherited the subject property in equal shares. Leonardo and the respondents are
entitled to Romana's share as the latter's successors.

the trial court held that Leonardo had only 30 years from Leon's death in 1962 or up to 1992 within
which to file the partition case. Since Leonardo instituted the partition suit only in 1997, the same
was already barred by prescription

In addition, the trial court held that for his long inaction, Leonardo was... guilty of laches as well.
Consequently, the property should go to Gregoria's heirs exclusively.

Only respondents interposed an appeal with the CA... the appeal questioned the propriety of the
trial court's dismissal of Civil Case No. 5275, its application of Article 1141, and the award of the
property to Gregoria's heirs exclusively.

this appeal is GRANTED

CA held that the trial court's declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943
deeds of sale in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., respectively, became final and was settled by
petitioners' failure to appeal the same. Proceeding from the premise that no... valid prior
disposition of the property was made by its owner Leon and that the property which remained part
of his estate at the time of his death passed on by succession to his two siblings, Romana and
Gregoria, which thus makes the parties herein who are Romana's and

Gregoria's heirs co-owners of the property in equal shares, the appellate court held that only the
issues of prescription and laches were needed to be resolved.

CA declared that prescription began to run not from Leon's death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.'s
execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979,... which amounted to a repudiation of his
co-ownership of the property with Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil
Code, which provides that "[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his
co-owners or co-heirs so long as he... expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership," the
CA held that it was only when Lucimo Sr. executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979 and
obtained a new tax declaration over the property (TD 16414) solely in his name that a repudiation
of his co-ownership with

Leonardo was made, which repudiation effectively commenced the running of the 30-year
prescriptive period under Article 1141.

The CA did not consider Lucimo Sr.'s sole possession of the property for more than 30 years to
the exclusion of Leonardo and the respondents as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership either,
stating that his exclusive possession of the property and appropriation of its fruits... even his
continuous payment of the taxes thereon while adverse as against strangers, may not be deemed
so as against Leonardo in the absence of clear and conclusive evidence to the effect that the
latter was ousted or deprived of his rights as co-owner with the intention of... assuming exclusive
ownership over the property, and absent a showing that this was effectively made known to
Leonardo.

CA granted respondents' prayer for partition, directing that the manner of partitioning the property
shall be governed by the Commissioner's Report and Sketch and the Supplementary
Commissioner's Report which the parties did not... contest.

Issues:

THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE

DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND THAT LUCIMO FRANCISCO
REPUDIATED THE CO-OWNERSHIP ONLY ON FEBRUARY 9, 1979.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES

Ruling:

The Court denies the Petition.

The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled and had become
final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part of Leon's estate.

The trial court, examining the two deeds of sale executed in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr.,
found them to be spurious. It then concluded that no such sale from

Leon to Lucimo Sr. ever took place. Despite this finding, petitioners did not appeal. Consequently,
any doubts regarding this matter should be considered settled. Thus, petitioners' insistence on
Lucimo Sr.'s 1943 purchase of the property to reinforce their claim over the... property must be
ignored. Since no transfer from Leon to Lucimo Sr. took place, the subject property clearly
remained part of Leon's estate upon his passing in 1962.

Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.

Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and Gregoria, who thus inherited
the property in equal shares.

Gregoria's and Romana's heirs are co-owners of the subject property.

Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana, petitioners and
respondents became co-owners thereof. As co-owners, they may use the property owned in
common, provided they do so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such
a way as... not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using
it according to their rights.

For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner.

Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the
other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may
prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the... co-owner has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2)
such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the
evidence thereof is clear and convincing.

it is clear that the trial court erred in reckoning the prescriptive period within which Leonardo may
seek partition from the death of Leon in 1962. Article 1141 and Article 494 (fifth paragraph) provide
that prescription shall begin to run in... favor of a co-owner and against the other co-owners only
from the time he positively renounces the co-ownership and makes known his repudiation to the
other co-owners.

What escaped the trial and appellate courts' notice, however, is that while it may be argued that
Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be characterized as a repudiation of the co-ownership, the
fact is, he is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria;... he is merely
Antipolo's son-in-law, being married to Antipolo's daughter Teodora.

In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property; Teodora is. Consequently,
he cannot validly effect a repudiation of the co-ownership, which he was never part of. For this
reason, prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to seek... a partition of
the property has not been lost.

Leon remained the rightful owner of the land, and Lucimo Sr. knew this... very well, being married
to Teodora, daughter of Antipolo, a nephew of Leon. More significantly, the property, which is
registered under the Torrens system and covered by OCT RO-630, is in Leon's name. Leon's
ownership ceased only in 1962, upon his death when the property passed... on to his heirs by
operation of law.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

CONSOLACION D. ROMERO v. ENGRACIA D. SINGSON, GR No. 200969, 2015-08-03

DOCTRINE:

Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned, the registration of the
property in said person's name would not be sufficient to vest in him or her the title to the property.
A certificate of title merely confirms or records title already existing and vested. The indefeasibility
of the Torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner
of real property. Good faith must concur with registration because, otherwise, registration would
be an exercise in futility. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud, notwithstanding the
long-standing rule that registration is a constructive notice of title binding upon the whole
world. The legal principle is that if the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose
name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee.

Facts:

petitioners Consolacion Domingo Romero and Rosario S.D. Domingo and respondent Engracia
Domingo Singson - are siblings. Their parents, Macario and Felicidad Domingo, own a 223-
square meter piece of property (the subject property) located at 127 F. Sevilla

Street, San Juan City, Metro Manila... which was issued in 1953

It appears that petitioners and other siblings, Rafael and Ramon Domingo, are the actual
occupants of the subject... property, having stayed there with their parents since birth. On the
other hand, respondent took up residence in Mandaluyong City after getting married.

On February 22, 1981, Macario passed away, while Felicidad died on September 14, 1997.

On June 7, 2006,... a new certificate of title... was issued in respondent's name, by virtue of a
notarized "Absolute Deed of

Sale"... ostensibly executed on June 6, 2006 by and between Macario and Felicidad - as sellers,
and respondent - as buyer. And this despite the fact that Macario and Felicidad were then already
deceased.

Soon thereafter, respondent sent letters to her siblings demanding that they vacate the subject
property, under pain of litigation.
Petitioners and their other siblings just as soon filed a Complaint... against respondent and the
Register of Deeds of San Juan City for annulment and cancellation of TCT 12575 and the June
6, 2006 deed of sale, reconveyance, and damages, on the claim that... the deed of sale is a
forgery and that as heirs of Macario and Felicidad, the true owners of the subject property, they
were entitled to a reconveyance of the same.

petitioners prayed for dismissal, claiming that the June 6, 2006 deed of sale was a forgery, and
no certificate of title in her name could be issued; that they thus remained co-owners of the subject
property, and respondent had no right... to evict them; and that the pendency of Civil Case No.
70898-SJ bars the ejectment suit against them.

Issues:

petitioners essentially argue that since the parties to the case are siblings and... no attempt at
compromise was made by the respondent prior to the filing of Civil Case No. 9534, then it... should
be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure...
in relation to Article 151 of the Family

Code... and Article 222 of the Civil Code;... that they could not be evicted from the subject property
since they are co-owners of the same, having inherited it from their deceased parents; that
respondent's title was derived from a... forged deed of sale, which does not make her the sole
owner of the subject property; that as co-owners and since respondent's title is void, they have a
right of possession over the subject property and they may not be evicted therefrom; that their
defense that respondent... obtained her title through a forged deed of sale does not constitute a
collateral attack on such title, but is allowed in order to prove their legal right of possession and
ownership over the subject property.

Ruling:

The Court grants the Petition.

The procedural issue of lack of attempts at compromise should be resolved in respondent's favor.
True, no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been... made.
However, the failure of a party to comply with this condition precedent is not a jurisdictional defect.
If the opposing party fails to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed
waived... the fact that respondent has in her favor a certificate of title is of no moment; her title
cannot be used to validate the forgery or cure the void sale.
Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned, the registration of the
property in said person's name would not be sufficient to vest in him or her the title to the property.
A certificate of title merely confirms or records title already... existing and vested. The
indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the
rightful owner of real property.

Since respondent acquired no right over the subject property, the same remained in the name of
the original registered owners, Macario and Felicidad. Being heirs of the owners, petitioners and
respondent thus became, and remain co-owners - by succession - of the subject... property. As
such, petitioners may exercise all attributes of ownership over the same, including possession -
whether de facto or dejure; respondent thus has no right to exclude them from this right through
an action for ejectment.

This Court has always recognized the general rule that in appellate proceedings, the reversal of
the judgment on appeal is binding only on the parties in the appealed case and does not affect or
inure to the benefit of those who did not join or were not made... parties to the appeal. An
exception to the rule exists, however, where a judgment cannot be reversed as to the party
appealing without affecting the rights of his co-debtor, or where the rights and liabilities of the
parties are so interwoven and dependent on each other as to be... inseparable, in which case a
reversal as to one operates as a reversal as to all. This exception, which is based on a
communality of interest of said parties, is recognized in this jurisdiction. x x x

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The February 29, 2012 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 114363 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 11, 2009
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160 in SCA No. 3144 is REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
JOSE Z. MORENO v. RENE M. KAHN, GR No. 217744, 2018-07-30

DOCTRINE:

Article 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear
from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made,
but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must
be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise
under the Civil Code.

Facts:

Jose alleged that since May 1998 and in their capacity as lessees, he and his family have been
occupying two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 181516 and
181517[6] (subject lands) co-owned by his full-blooded sister, respondent Consuelo Moreno
KahnHaire (Consuelo) and his nephews and nieces (Consuelo's children), respondents Rene M.
Kahn (Rene), Rene Luis Pierre Kahn (Luis), Philippe Kahn (Philippe), and Ma. Claudine Kahn-
McMahon (Claudine; collectively, respondents).[7] Around April or May 2003, through numerous
electronic mails (emails) and letters, respondents offered to sell to Jose the subject lands for the
amount of US$200,000.00 (US$120,000.00 to be received by Consuelo and US$20,000.00 each
to be received by her children),[8] which Jose accepted. Notably, the agreement was made
verbally and was not immediately reduced into writing, but the parties had the intention to
eventually memorialize the same via a written document. Over the next few years, Jose made
partial payments to respondents by paying off the shares of Rene, Luis, Philippe and Claudine,
leaving a remaining balance of US$120,000.00 payable to Consuelo.[9] However, in July 2010,
Consuelo decided to "cancel" their agreement, and thereafter, informed Jose of her intent to
convert the earlier partial payments as rental payments instead. In response, Jose expressed his
disapproval to Consuelo's plan and demanded that respondents proceed with the sale, which the
latter ignored.[10] He then claimed that on July 26, 2011, without his consent, Consuelo, Luis,
Philippe, and Claudine sold[11] their shares over the subject lands to Rene, thereby consolidating
full ownership of the subject lands to him. Consequently, TCT Nos. 181516 and 181517 were
cancelled and new TCTs, i.e., TCT Nos. 148026 and 148027,[12] were issued in Rene's name.
Upon learning of such sale, Jose sent a demand letter[13] to Rene, and later on to Consuelo,
Luis, Philippe, and Claudine,[14] asserting his right to the subject lands under the previous sale
agreed upon. As his demands went unheeded, Jose brought the matter to the barangay lupon for
conciliation proceedings between him and Rene only, since Consuelo, Luis, Philippe, and
Claudine are all living abroad. As no settlement was agreed upon,[15] Jose was constrained to
file the subject complaint[16]for specific performance and cancellation of titles with damages and
application for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil
Case No. 12-004.[17]

Issues:

whether or not: (a) the CA correctly affirmed the RTC's motu proprio dismissal of Jose's complaint;
and (b) Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable to this case.

Ruling:

The petition is meritorious. Article 151 of the Family Code reads: Article 151. No suit between
members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or
petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed.
If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. This rule shall
not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.

The base issue is whether or not the appellate court may dismiss the order of dismissal of the
complaint for failure to allege therein that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made.

The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint. The appellate courts
decision hinged on Article 151 of the Family Code x x... he appellate court correlated this provision
with Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

The appellate court's reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16 treats of the grounds for a
motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished f... rom the grounds provided under
Section l, Rule 9 which specifically deals with dismissal of the claim by the court motu proprio.
Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Thus was it made clear that a failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a
complaint among members of the same family, is not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in
the statement of a cause of action. Versoza was cited in a later case as an instance analogous to
one where the conciliation process at the barangay level was not priorly resorted to. Both were
described as a "condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court." In such instances, the
consequence is precisely what is stated in the present Rule. Thus: The defect may however be
waived by failing to make seasonable objection, in a motion to dismiss or answer, the defect being
a mere procedural imperfection which does not affect the jurisdiction of the court.
no motion to dismiss the complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition precedent was
filed in the trial court; neither was such failure assigned as error in the appeal that respondent
brought before the Court of Appeals. Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-
jurisdictional defense or objection is wholly applicable to respondent. If the respondents as
parties-defendants could not, and did not, after filing their answer to petitioner's complaint, invoke
the objection of absence of the required allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise, the
appellate court unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to motu propio order the
dismissal of petitioner’s complaint.

In this light, case law states that Article 151 of the Family Code must be construed strictly, it being
an exception to the general rule. Hence, any person having a collateral familial relation with the
plaintiff other than what is enumerated in Article 150 of the Family Code is considered a stranger
who, if included in a suit between and among family members, would render unnecessary the
earnest efforts requi... irement under Article 151.[37] Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The
express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others.[38] In this
instance, it is undisputed that: (a) Jose and Consuelo are full-blooded siblings; and (b) Consuelo
is the mother of Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine, which make them nephews and niece of their
uncle, Jose. It then follows that Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine are considered "strangers'' to
Jose insofar as Article 151 of the Family Code is concerned. In this relation, it is apt to clarify that
whi1e it was the disagreement between Jose and Consuelo that directly resulted in the filing of
the suit, the fact remains that Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine were rightfully impleaded as co-
defendants Jose’s complaint as they are co-owners of the subject lands in dispute. In view of the
inclusion “strangers" to the suit between Jose and Consuelo who are full-blooded siblings, the
Court concludes that the suit is beyond the ambit of Article 151 of the Family Code. Perforce, the
courts a quo gravely erred in dismissing Jose's complaint due to non-compliance with the earnest
effort requirement therein.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 24, 2014 and the
Resolution dated March 17, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129232 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 12-004 is REINSTATED and
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 205 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
FELICITAS L. SALAZAR v. REMEDIOS FELIAS, GR No. 213972, 2018-02-05

DOCTRINE:

the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment,
constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated. It confers upon a particular
family the right to enjoy such properties.34 It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special
cases.

Facts:

private respondent Remedios Felias, representing the heirs of Catalino Nivera (Heirs of Nivera)
filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages against the Spouses
Romualdo Lastimosa (Romualdo) and Felisa Lastimosa (Fe1isa). The former sought to recover
from the latter four parcels of land located in Baruan, Agno, Pangasinan (subject property).

On March 16, 2004, the RTC Branch 55 rendered a Decision,[5] declaring the Heirs of Nivera as
the absolute owners of the parcels of land in question, and thereby ordering the Heirs of Lastimosa
to vacate the lands and to surrender possession thereof.

Issues:

Felicitas claims that the execution cannot proceed, as the subject property is her family home and
is therefore exempt from execution.

Ruling:

The movant's claim that his/her property is exempt from execution for being the family home is
not a magic wand that will freeze the court's hand and forestall the execution of a final and
executory ruling. It is imperative that the claim for exemption must be set up and proven.

Indeed, the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment,
constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated. It confers upon a particular
family the right to enjoy such properties.[34] It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain
special cases

However, the claim that the property is exempt from execution for being the movant's family home
is not a magic wand that will freeze the court's hand and forestall the execution of a final and
executory ruling. It must be noted that it is not sufficient for the claimant to merely allege that such
property is a family home. Whether the claim is premised under the Old Civil Code or the Family
Code, the claim for exemption must be set up and proved.

In addition, residence in the family home must be actual. The law explicitly mandates that the
occupancy of the family home, either by the owner thereof, or by any of its beneficiaries must be
actual. This occupancy must be real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely
possible, or that which is merely presumptive or constructive.

it becomes all too apparent that Felicitas cannot conveniently claim that the subject property is
her family home, sans sufficient evidence proving her allegation. It bears emphasis that it is
imperative that her claim must be backed with evidence showing that the home was indeed (i)
duly constituted as a family home, (ii) constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an
unmarried head of a family, (iii) resided in by the family (or any of the family home's beneficiaries),
(iv) forms part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the
exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent, or property of the unmarried head
of the family, and (v) has an actual value of Php 300,000.00 in urban areas, and Php 200,000.00
in rural areas.

Felicitas adduced no proof to substantiate her claim that the property sought to be executed is
indeed her family home.

Interestingly, Felicitas admitted in her Motion for Reconsideration dated December 23, 2013, and
her Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated June 22, 2006, that she is, and has always been a
resident of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija.[41] Similarly, the address indicated in Felicitas' petition for review
on certiorari is Muñoz, Nueva Ecija... the Court takes judicial notice of the final ruling of the RTC
Branch 55 in the case for recovery of ownership, that the subject property has belonged to the
Heirs of Nivera since the 1950s.

This automatically negates Felicitas' claim that the property is her family home.

Felicitas' argument that the property subject of the writ of execution is a family home, is an
unsubstantiated allegation that cannot defeat the binding nature of a final and executory
judgment. Thus, the Writ of Execution and Demolition issued by the RTC Branch 55 must perforce
be given effect.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the Decision dated December 6, 2013 and Resolution dated August 7, 2014,
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97309 are AFFIRMED in toto.
FLORANTE VITUG v. EVANGELINE A. ABUDA, GR No. 201264, 2016-01-11

DOCTRINE:

that void acts declared in Article 4 of the Old Civil Code[63]... refer to those made in violation of
the law. Not all those acts are void from the beginning. Void acts may... be "those that are ipso
facto void and those which are merely voidable."

Facts:

Abuda loaned P250,000.00 to Vitug and his wife, Narcisa Vitug.[1] As security for the loan, Vitug
mortgaged to Abuda his property in Tondo

The property was then subject of a conditional Contract to Sell between the National Housing
Authority and Vitug.

the parties executed a "restructured"[4] mortgage contract on the property to secure the amount
of P600,000.00 representing the original P250,000.00 loan, additional loans,[5] and subsequent
credit... accommodations[6] given by Abuda to Vitug

Spouses Vitug failed to pay their loans despite Abuda's demands.

Abuda filed a Complaint for Foreclosure of Property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

RTC... the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision in favor of Abuda.

CA... the Court of Appeals

AFFIRMED

Issues:

YES... all the requisites of a valid mortgage are present.

Ruling:

All the elements of a valid mortgage contract were present. For a mortgage contract to be valid,
the absolute owner of a property must have free disposal of the property.[51] That property must
be used to secure the fulfillment of an obligation.[52] Article 2085 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2085. The following requisites are essential to contracts of pledge and mortgage:

(1) That they be constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation;

(2) That the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged;

(3) That the persons constituting the pledge or mortgage have the free disposal of their
property, and in the absence thereof, that they be legally authorized for the purpose.

Petitioner's undisputed title to and ownership of the property is sufficient to give him free disposal
of it. As owner of the property, he has the right to enjoy all attributes of ownership including jus
disponendi or the right to encumber, alienate, or... dispose his property "without other
limitations than those established by law."

Petitioner's claim that he lacks free disposal of the property stems from the existence of the
restrictions imposed on his title by the National Housing Authority.

These restrictions do not divest petitioner of his ownership rights. They are mere burdens or
limitations on petitioner's jus disponendi. Thus, petitioner may dispose or encumber his property.
However, the disposition or encumbrance of his property is subject to the... limitations and to the
rights that may accrue to the National Housing Authority. When annotated to the title, these
restrictions serve as notice to the whole world that the National Housing Authority has claims over
the property, which it may enforce against others.

Contracts entered into in violation of restrictions on a property owner's rights do not always have
the effect of making them void ab initio.

void acts... refer to those made in violation of the law. Not all those acts are void from the
beginning. Void acts may... be "those that are ipso facto void and those which are merely
voidable."... contracts that contain provisions in favor of one party may be void ab initio or
voidable.[70] Contracts that lack consideration,[71] those that are against public order or public
policy,[72] and those that... are attended by illegality[73] or immorality[74] are void ab initio.

Contracts that only subject a property owner's property rights to conditions or limitations but
otherwise contain all the elements of a valid contract are merely voidable by the person in whose
favor the conditions or limitations are made.

The mortgage contract entered into by petitioner and respondent contains all the elements of a
valid contract of mortgage. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found no irregularity in its
execution. There was no showing that it was attended by fraud, illegality, immorality,... force or
intimidation, and lack of consideration.
At most, therefore, the restrictions made the contract entered into by the parties voidable[76] by
the person in whose favor they were made—in this case, by the National Housing Authority.[77]
Petitioner has no actionable right or... cause of action based on those restrictions.

Having the right to assail the validity of the mortgage contract based on violation of the restrictions,
the National Housing Authority may seek the annulment of the mortgage contract.[79] Without
any action from the National Housing Authority, rights and... obligations, including the right to
foreclose the property in case of non-payment of the secured loan, are still enforceable between
the parties that executed the mortgage contract.

The voidable nature of contracts entered into in violation of restrictions or conditions necessarily
implies that the person in whose favor the restrictions were made has two (2) options. It may
either: (1) waive[80] its rights... accruing from such restrictions, in which case, the duly executed
subsequent contract remains valid; or (2) assail the subsequent contract based on the breach of
restrictions imposed in its favor.

In any case, there was at least substantial compliance with the consent requirement given the
National Housing Authority's issuance of a Permit to Mortgage.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated October 26, 2011
and its Resolution dated March 8, 2012 are AFFIRMED. The interest rate for the loan of
P600,000.00 is further reduced to 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.